Interview With Matthew Swibel of Forbes MagazineSecretary Condoleezza Rice
Jerusalem
October 15, 2007Complete Interview Series with Forbes Magazine:
8.07.2008 - 3.11.2008 - 12.03.2007 - 10.15.2007 - 09.30.2007
QUESTION: I hear that during the 2+2 meeting you and Secretary Gates called a few audibles. Can you share what were they, what triggered them?
SECRETARY RICE: Yeah. Actually we called the audibles before we got there.
QUESTION: Oh, okay.
SECRETARY RICE: Bob and Steve Hadley and the Vice President and I met without our aides, which makes everybody very nervous. (Laughter)
ADVISOR: It's like when somebody gives you a computer.
SECRETARY RICE: Yeah, exactly.
And we, Bob and I were -- I think it was Bob that first said, "We're going to get nowhere unless we find some way to break this impasse.
QUESTION: On what issue because there are lot of issues?
SECRETARY RICE: On missile defense in particular, but also CMB.
QUESTION: Okay.
SECRETARY RICE: And find a way to, in a sense, test whether the Russians really want cooperation or confrontation. Because they had lined up many, many different reasons that they couldn't cooperate. And so what we decided to do was to basically go at those reasons and to put on the table proposals that addressed those concerns.
And then we sent Steve Hadley off to make sure the President was comfortable with where we were going to go. So totally unstaffed, we went and did this kind of dangerous probably for the country, (laughter) but -- but we -- so we went to the 2+2 with some new ideas.
It's not fair to say we were un-staffed because then we called in, you know, Dan Fried and Eric Edelman and others and told them what we wanted to work on (inaudible) and missile defense chief.
So that's, that's really when we called the audible was before. At the table --
QUESTION: The audible was to bring the new ideas.
SECRETARY RICE: It was to bring the new --
QUESTION: To remove the impediments which in our last conversation you said is sort of a hallmark of your approach.
SECRETARY RICE: Exactly. Correct.
QUESTION: Okay.
SECRETARY RICE: Exactly.
QUESTION: Can you give me a sense of the delivery and what, you know, when you were in the meeting at what point did you think, "Okay. This seems to be working."
SECRETARY RICE: Well, at the very first when Putin, President Putin was before the cameras, he said something about some constructive ideas. And I could hear that. But then there was a bit of theater, you know, and maximalist Russian positions and so forth. And I just thought to myself, "Okay. We'll get through that."
But then when the cameras were off, he started out by saying, "You know, you brought some new proposals, some new ideas and this is kind of a good basis. This maybe shows that you actually do want to try to do something and we'll study them and we'll look at them." And the atmosphere was just very good from that time on.
And so -- and I've been around President Putin enough and I can hear in his language.
QUESTION: So it's actually his word choices, not his tone?
SECRETARY RICE: Right. This is, this is an advantage of speaking the language because I can sense, you know, that it's softer, that the language is soft (inaudible) never is, but softer.
So anyway it was a really quite good meeting.
QUESTION: One of the challenges you have is to take the long view amidst, you know, a new cycle that is almost non-stop.
SECRETARY RICE: Mm-hmm.
QUESTION: So that night I tried to tally a list of what your stated goals were.
SECRETARY RICE: Right.
QUESTION: So you were able to not to -- not freeze your plans.
SECRETARY RICE: Right.
QUESTION: And not illicit a specific consequence.
SECRETARY RICE: Right.
QUESTION: You were able to get a positive response of the new ideas even though there is nothing concrete.
SECRETARY RICE: Right. Right.
QUESTION: So it seems like you were able to keep moving along the two paths. It seems like it's an advantageous position.
SECRETARY RICE: Yeah.
QUESTION: How do you keep -- how do you immunize yourself, or inoculate yourself, from the pressures of the media or maybe the staff?
SECRETARY RICE: You mean the headlines?
QUESTION: Which could influence how you -- the tempo, you know.
SECRETARY RICE: Yeah. Yeah. You have to be true to the tempo of what's going to try to get things done.
QUESTION: Do you make an extra call to the other side to say, "Listen, we don't think this is reading."
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I – no, no. In fact, what I tried to do in that circumstance, and Bob and I did, we could have tried to background the press in a way that said, "Oh, they loved our new ideas. And so you're reading this wrong." But that would have blown up the diplomacy, because, in fact, it's not -- they haven't yet -- they are studying the ideas.
QUESTION: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.
SECRETARY RICE: So if you put words in their mouths and say, "No. Really, really believe us. These were -- they believed these are great ideas and they're just posturing for the camera." Now what does that do to the diplomacy?
Then they have to come out and say, "No. Actually -- because they've got a lot of work to do. One thing that became very clear in our meeting with Lavrov is that one of their problems is their generals. They have a problem with their military. And if, you know, we kind of prematurely --
QUESTION: You mean support them?
SECRETARY RICE: Yeah. Support, the support for these missile defense. General Baluyevsky, who is the Chief of the General Staff, hates the idea of missile defense.
And so -- and, you know, he said it publicly. He said it in the meeting. He was extremely, you know, harsh about what we were trying to do. And so we've got to step back and give them a little time to work the inner agency. And if we go out, you know, if I tell Sean, "Okay, you can go tell the press that it looks like they really like these ideas, and then they have to say, no, we really don't because they haven't worked them internally, or because we haven't given them enough -- which is really true -- enough specificity so they would really know what they would be signing onto, that would harm the diplomacy. So in that sense I have to ignore what the press is saying.
QUESTION: Last question on Russia.
SECRETARY RICE: And I think Sean will tell you I do. I will say to him, “you know, you just can't go.”
ADVISOR: Absolutely.
QUESTION: I think you said you're a Russianist the other day.
SECRETARY RICE: Yes. I used to call myself a "Sovietologist." That kind of doesn't exist anymore.
QUESTION: It seems like in this meeting from what we've been told so far and your characterization a little bit is that you were, you were trying to create a constructive dialogue, but also make sure you get across to them that you're listening.
How do you make sure that that's not interpreted as some consent of a new Russian dominance or -- do you see what I'm saying?
SECRETARY RICE: Yes, I do.
First of all, they know me. It's been a long time. I've been working with them a long time. I have not been shy about criticizing them publicly. I think I was the one who said that their concerns about missile defense were ludicrous. So they know what I think. And they know I'm prepared to say that.
But once you kind of establish that ground, then you can say, okay, I may think your concerns don't make sense, but I can see in the relationship that the military you've got-- with the military on this issue that there's a problem here so let's try to address the problem.
QUESTION: Oh, mm-hmm.
SECRETARY RICE: It goes back a little bit to what I said to you when we were in New York. You have to establish that you are prepared to use both tough language and sticks and more conciliatory language and carrots in order to get anything done.
QUESTION: Okay.
SECRETARY RICE: Is this fine?
STAFF: Yes.
QUESTION: Ten minutes more?
It seems to me that your time here is a perfect opportunity to talk about how you choose your agenda for each different party. I understand you take great pains to consider what specific points you're going to address.
SECRETARY RICE: Right. Right.
QUESTION: You are speaking to far more people here than in the past. Can you lay it out for me?
SECRETARY RICE: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.
QUESTION: You know, your objective with this person is to do what?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, some of it's by role. Defense Minister Barak is the one since the idea has responsibility for things like movement and access, has responsibility for lifting check points, has responsibility for what I'll call -- what we are calling movement on the ground, that kind of day-to-day life of the Palestinians.
I spend most of my time with him on those kinds of issues, as well as the Phase 1 roadmap obligations, like removing outposts and settlement freeze because those are within his responsibility.
But with each of these leaders, they also, because you know, they're all political -- they're not like Gates and me, you know, kind of appointed bureaucrats. They are, in their own right, people who lead political parties and so are political leaders. And so I also spend some time talking about the process going forward on statehood and, you know, how the United States -- this is, in part, some reassurance or assurance to Israel and Israelis that the foundation for moving forward has also, at its core, a strong US-Israeli friendship and a strong US-Israeli alliance. Because they are, they are about to take, if they are willing to do it, decisions that are really hard, that will overturn a lot of totems, will overturn a lot of long-held positions. And I think they have to be confident that the United States is a good friend in all of this. So we talk about that as well.
With the two, with Shas, the leader of Shas and with the (inaudible) I just talked principally so they can hear first-hand, and Prime Minister Olmert thought this was a good idea, by the way, first-hand what we are trying to achieve, assuring them that we are not going to go after a two-state solution at any cost. That there has to be a -- that the Palestinians have to have a realistic prospect of a state, but the Israelis have to have a realistic prospect that that state is not going to undermine Israeli security by being unable to fight terror or the like.
QUESTION: Were there any suggestions you got from Olmert, specific phrases or a specific message?
SECRETARY RICE: No. No. We just -- I said, you know, there are some people I would like to meet with. I've met several times, I'll meet later with Avigdor Lieberman, for instance.
And so it's not a matter of being involved in Israeli domestic politics. It's really more a matter of saying, being able to say directly to each person and for them to hear it from me and for them to ask questions if they want.
With the Palestinians today I will -- I'll spend a lot of time with Abu Masen one-on-one trying to hear from him where he thinks this whole thing is going.
QUESTION: Okay. All this sounds logical. You know, you're going to talk to political leaders about the political obligations of the United States. But is there anything more you can say about -- like is there a way you can share with me -- there's a message that you're going to dissect it one way for one person and another way --
SECRETARY RICE: You know what? I've found everybody has to get the same message. The worst thing you can do is – look, you know in the back of your mind this person has these kinds of concerns, this person has this kind of platform. You know that.
QUESTION: Mm-hmm.
SECRETARY RICE: But the best thing the United States can be is absolutely consistent about our message and not trying to tailor it or color it a little bit here, and tailor and color it a little bit there.
QUESTION: Okay. With keeping a pace of what your agenda is here, right beforehand you had dealt with Blackwater a little bit. And I just wonder, there seems to be some momentum from Russia, and we'll see what happens here, but how do you -- how do you judge the risk to that momentum and just the overall feeling of what your agenda is with the accountability factors that stem from Blackwater.
SECRETARY RICE: Well, Blackwater is just something where I'm determined to get to the bottom of it. For me, it's a management issue. And I don't see them as related in the sense of what we're doing here, but it's a problem.
When you run a great big organization, there are always going to be things that have to be dealt with and sometimes they are bigger than at other times. And because of what happened with Blackwater, and we have looked at all kinds of management practices. It helps a lot to have John Negroponte who is home while I'm -- and we talk pretty much every night and just to go over what's happened during the day.
But I was home for basically three or four days between the United Nations General Assembly and starting this trip. And I had a meeting on Blackwater, you know, got the people out to do the work and when I get back I'll start getting reports from them. But that's just in the nature of running a big organization.
QUESTION: What do you view as your accountability on this issue?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, look. I think the State Department and I personally need to make sure that we're doing what we need to do in terms of oversight of contractors.
I'm not going to prejudge what the facts are. I told people that I wanted this to be deep and probing and absolutely, you know, getting to the bottom of everything. But, you know, that's-- my responsibility is to do that.
QUESTION: Okay. It seems like you might be in a Catch-22 in terms of the pace at which you've set these meetings seems like it's productive. You know, you're listening you're not doing a rush job. Yet there is only so much time left in your term.
SECRETARY RICE: Yeah. Yeah.
QUESTION: And how do you, how do you reconcile that? Do you feel like you're in a Catch-22?
SECRETARY RICE: I don't worry about how much time is left. I know what I want to try to get done. And, you know, we'll work until the day we're out of here to try to get those things done.
But, no, this is actually a long time. Fifteen months, whatever it is, is a long time. If you look at the end of the Clinton Administration, they were trying to do a deal with North Korea and the Middle East deal in the last two months.
QUESTION: Okay.
SECRETARY RICE: And, by the way, I don't blame them for doing that because you do it until the last minute. But what I'm saying is, 14, 15 months in international politics is a lifetime.
QUESTION: Okay. When is the last time you spoke to the President about what he's been doing on this?
SECRETARY RICE: Just before I left. And I will -- I'll talk to him somewhere in the next couple of days probably.
QUESTION: Okay. Anything you can say about the meetings you had thus far here about your read? So you've been listening.
SECRETARY RICE: Yeah.
QUESTION: So when you've been listening, is there any moment you could share with me on something that you found interesting, or something that gave you pause, or gave you better motivation?
SECRETARY RICE: Yeah, I do have an impression. What's going on I think is that for the first time in a long time people think something's possible. And it's both encouraging and scary. You know, it's kind of like, "Oh, well, what if this doesn't work."
And here, the memories of when Camp David didn't work, or we ended up (inaudible). And so people wondered, you know, if we take these risks and it doesn't work, are we going to end up in a worse situation?
And then my role is to say, "Well, but if you don't take the risk then the situation isn't going to be very good either." And trying to focus people on the opportunity of a different kind of Palestinian leadership, Arab desire to have something happen of the kind of background of the Iranian threat that has led some people to see their interests as different and saying -- big, big changes. There's always a down side. Always.
QUESTION: Can you practically even articulate what those down sides are?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, people are plenty articulating the down sides. But it's -- I think what you really sense is that when people think that something might happen, they are both hopeful and fearful at the same time.
QUESTION: Any phrase you're using to allay those fears?
SECRETARY RICE: No. No. Just that, you know, we -- everybody's got an obligation to try. I mean the one that I've been using publicly and I really do feel it in my bones is that, you know, when you travel in the West Bank or you talk to Palestinians or you talk to Israelis, you know, the Palestinians have waited too long for statehood. It's going to give them dignity and get them out of the kind of daily humiliations of having to live with occupation.
And the Israelis have lived long enough -- too long -- without the security that a democratic and responsible neighbor would give them. And that's what drives me.
QUESTION: Okay.
2008/673
Released on August 29, 2008
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