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**Analyses of the effects of global change on human health and  
welfare and human systems**

**THIRD REVIEW DRAFT  
FOR CCSP and CENR CLEARANCE—APRIL 2008**

Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.6  
Report by the U.S. Climate Change Science Program  
And the Subcommittee on Global Change Research

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1 **Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.6**

2

3 **Analyses of the Effects of Global Change on Human Health**  
4 **and Welfare and Human Systems**

5

6 **Executive Summary**

7

8

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## Abstract

Climate change, interacting with changes in land use and demographics, will affect important human dimensions in the United States, especially those related to human health, settlements and welfare. The challenges presented by population growth, an aging population, migration patterns, and urban and coastal development will be compounded by changes in temperature, precipitation, and extreme climate-related events. Climate change will affect where people choose to live, work, and play. Among the most likely climate changes are changes in the intensity and frequency of precipitation, more frequent heat waves, more persistent and extreme drought conditions and associated water shortages, changes in minimum and maximum temperatures, potential increases in the intensity and frequency of extreme tropical storms, measurable sea-level rise and increases in the occurrence of coastal and riverine flooding. In response to these anticipated changes, the United States may develop and deploy strategies for mitigating greenhouse gases and for adapting to unavoidable individual and collective impacts of climate change.

This report – the Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.6 (SAP 4.6) – focuses on impacts of global climate change, especially impacts on three broad dimensions of the human condition: human health, human settlements, and human welfare. The SAP 4.6 has been prepared by a team of experts from academia, government, and the private sector in response to the mandate of the U.S. Climate Change Science Program’s Strategic Plan (2003). The assessment examines potential impacts of climate change on human society, opportunities for adaptation, and associated recommendations for addressing data gaps and near- and long-term research goals.

### ES.1 Survey of Findings

Climate variability and change challenge even the world’s most advanced societies. At a very basic level, climate affects the costs of providing comfort in our homes and work places. A favorable climate can provide inputs for a good life: adequate fresh water supplies; products from the ranch, the farm, the forests, the rivers and the coasts; pleasure derived from tourist destinations and from nature, biodiversity, and outdoor recreation. Climate not only supports the provision of many goods and services, but also affects the spread of some diseases and the prevalence of other health problems. It is also associated with threats from extreme events and natural disasters such as tropical storms, riverine and coastal flooding, wildfires, droughts, wind, hail, ice, heat, and cold.

Table ES.1 summarizes important climate change endpoints that are identified in the chapters for human health, human settlements, and human welfare, including anticipated impacts and adaptation strategies. The impacts should not be taken to be a comprehensive list of potential effects, but rather those that the available evidence suggests are likely to occur as a consequence of climatic changes. Not all effects have been equally well-studied. The effects identified for



1 welfare, in particular, should be taken as examples of effects about which we have some  
2 knowledge, rather than a complete listing of all welfare effects.

3  
4 Climate variability and change interact with existing and evolving settlement patterns. In the  
5 United States, we have seen shifts of population from frost-belt to sun-belt, the movement of  
6 households from urban centers to increasingly more distant suburbs, an overall loss of population  
7 in some urban centers in the Midwest and Northeast, and rapid growth in the metropolitan areas  
8 of the South and West. Additionally, the proliferation of information technologies and the  
9 convenience of air travel have made remote locations more accessible for work or recreation or  
10 retirement. These trends alter anticipated impacts from climate because they fundamentally  
11 shape the nature and scope of human vulnerability. Understanding the impacts of climate change  
12 and variability on the quality of life in the U.S. implies knowledge of how these dynamics vary  
13 by location, time, and socioeconomic group. The following summary examines a range of  
14 climate-related impacts on critical human systems, including: human health, human settlements,  
15 and human welfare (Table ES.2 summarizes regional vulnerabilities to a range of climate  
16 impacts).

## 17 **ES.2 Summary of Effects of Climate Change on Human Health.**

18 The United States is a highly developed country with a temperate climate. While there may be  
19 fewer cases of illness and death associated with climate change in the U.S. than in the developing  
20 world, we nevertheless anticipate substantial human health impacts. Greater wealth and a more  
21 developed public health infrastructure enhance our capacity to respond to climate change.  
22 Similarly, governments' capacities for disaster planning and emergency response are key assets  
23 that should allow the U.S. to adapt to many of the health effects associated with climate change.  
24

25 **It is very likely that the burden of heat-related morbidity and mortality will increase over**  
26 **coming decades.** According to the U.S. Census, the U.S. population is aging; the percent of the  
27 population over age 65 is projected to be 13% by 2010 and 20% by 2030 (over 50 million  
28 people). Older adults are vulnerable to temperature extremes. This suggests that temperature-  
29 related morbidity and mortality are likely to increase. Similarly, heat-related mortality affects  
30 poor and minority populations disproportionately, in part due to lack of air conditioning. The  
31 concentration of poverty in inner city neighborhoods leads to disproportionate adverse effects  
32 associated with urban heat islands.

33 **The impacts of higher temperatures in urban areas and associated increases in**  
34 **tropospheric ozone concentrations are likely to cause or exacerbate cardiovascular and**  
35 **pulmonary illness.** In addition, stagnant air masses related to climate change are likely to  
36 increase air pollution in some densely populated areas. Physical features of communities,  
37 including housing quality and green space, social programs that affect access to health care,  
38 aspects of population composition (level of education, racial/ethnic composition), and social and  
39 cultural factors are all likely to affect vulnerability to temperature extremes.

40 **Hurricanes, extreme precipitation resulting in floods, and wildfires also have the potential**  
41 **to affect public health through direct and indirect health risks.** Health risks associated with  
42 extreme events are likely to increase with the size of the population and the degree to which it is

1 physically, mentally, or financially constrained in its ability to prepare for and respond to  
 2 extreme weather events. For example, coastal evacuations prompted by imminent hurricane  
 3 landfall are only moderately successful. Many of those who are advised to flee to higher ground  
 4 stay behind in inadequate shelter. Surveys find that the public is either not aware of the  
 5 appropriate preventive actions or incorrectly assesses the extent of their personal risk.

6 **Several food and water-borne pathogens are likely to be transmitted among susceptible**  
 7 **populations depending on the pathogens' survival, persistence, habitat range and**  
 8 **transmission under changing climate and environmental conditions.** The primary climate-  
 9 related factors that may affect these pathogens include temperature, precipitation, extreme  
 10 weather events, and ecological shifts. Nonetheless, the impact of climate on food and water-  
 11 borne pathogens will seldom be the only factor determining the burden of injuries, illness, and  
 12 death.

13 **Health burdens related to climate change will vary by region.** The northern latitudes of the  
 14 United States are likely to experience the largest increases in average temperatures; they will also  
 15 bear the brunt of increases in ground-level ozone and other airborne pollutants. Populations in  
 16 Midwestern and Northeastern cities are likely to be disproportionately affected by heat related  
 17 illnesses as heat waves increase in frequency, severity, and duration. The distributions of disease  
 18 vectors are likely to widen. The range of many vectors is likely to extend northward and to  
 19 higher elevations. For some vectors, such as rodents associated with Hantavirus, ranges are  
 20 likely to expand, based on decreased, rather than increased, precipitation. Forest fires with their  
 21 associated decrements to air quality and pulmonary effects are likely to increase in frequency,  
 22 severity, distribution, and duration in the Southeast, the Intermountain West and the West.

23 **Finally, climate change is very likely to accentuate the disparities already evident in the**  
 24 **American health care system.** Many of the expected health effects are likely to fall  
 25 disproportionately on the poor, the elderly, the disabled, and the uninsured. The most important  
 26 adaptation to ameliorate health effects from climate change is to support and maintain the United  
 27 States' public health infrastructure.

### 28 **ES.3 Summary of the Effects of Climate Change on Human Settlements**

29 **Effects of climate change on human settlements are likely to vary considerably according to**  
 30 **location-specific vulnerabilities, with the most vulnerable areas likely to include: Alaska**  
 31 **with increased permafrost melt, flood-risk coastal zones and river basins, arid areas with**  
 32 **associated water scarcity and areas where the economic base is climate sensitive.** Except for  
 33 Alaska, the main climate impacts have to do with changes in the intensity, frequency and  
 34 location of extreme weather events and, in some cases, water availability rather than temperature  
 35 change.

36 **Changes in precipitation patterns will affect water supplies nationwide. Likely reductions**  
 37 **in snowmelt, river flows, and groundwater levels, along with increases in saline intrusion**  
 38 **into coastal rivers and groundwater will shrink fresh water supplies even as population**  
 39 **growth taxes demand.** Moreover, storms, floods, and other severe weather events are likely to  
 40 affect infrastructure such as sanitation, transportation, supply lines for food and energy, and  
 41 communication. Some of the nation's most expensive infrastructure, such as exposed structures

1 like bridges and utility networks, are especially vulnerable. In many cases, water supply  
 2 networks and stressed reservoir capacity interact with growing populations (especially in coastal  
 3 cities and in the Mountain and Pacific West). The complex interactions of land use, population  
 4 growth and dynamics of settlement patterns further challenge supplies of water for municipal,  
 5 industrial, and agricultural uses. In the Pacific Northwest the electricity base dominated by  
 6 hydropower is directly dependent upon the water flows from snowmelt. Reduced hydropower  
 7 would mean the need for supplemental electricity sources, resulting in a wide variety of negative  
 8 ripple effects to the economy and to human welfare. Similarly, along the West Coast,  
 9 communities are likely to experience greater demands on water supplies even as regional  
 10 precipitation declines and average snow packs decrease.

11 **Communities in risk-prone regions have reason to be particularly concerned about**  
 12 **potential increases in severe weather events.** The combined effects of severe storms and sea-  
 13 level rise in coastal areas or increased risks of fire in more arid areas are examples of how  
 14 climate change may increase the magnitude of challenges already facing risk-prone regions.  
 15 Vulnerabilities may be especially pronounced for rapidly-growing and/or larger metropolitan  
 16 areas, where the potential magnitude of both impacts and coping requirements are likely to be  
 17 very large. On the other hand, such regions have greater opportunity to adapt infrastructure and  
 18 to make decisions that limit vulnerability.

19 **Warming is virtually certain to increase overall energy demand in U.S. cities** (see SAP 4.5  
 20 Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States). Even though  
 21 some regions will have less demand related to winter heating, increased demand for cooling  
 22 during unusually warm periods will most likely be larger. This increased demand is also more  
 23 likely to jeopardize energy service reliability in areas where failures of the electric grid occurs  
 24 more frequently in over-taxed urban systems. The increasing climate control needs in homes,  
 25 schools, hospitals and commercial buildings will inflate business and household energy costs.  
 26 Substantial equity effects will be entrained as energy needs increase, prices rise, and low income  
 27 households are increasingly stressed and least able to adapt.

28 **Climate change has the potential not only to affect communities directly but also through**  
 29 **undermining their economic bases.** Some regional economies are dependent on sectors that  
 30 are highly sensitive to changes in climate, such as agriculture, forestry, water resources, or  
 31 recreation and tourism. Climate change can add to stress on social and political structures by  
 32 increasing management and budget requirements for public services such as public health care,  
 33 disaster risk reduction, and even public safety. As sources of stress grow and combine, the  
 34 resilience of social and political structures are expected to be challenged, especially in locales  
 35 with relatively limited social and political capital.

36 **Finally, growth and development is generally moving toward those areas that are more**  
 37 **likely to be vulnerable to the effects of climate change.** Approximately half of the U.S.  
 38 population, 160 million people, will live in one of 673 coastal counties by 2008. Coastal areas –  
 39 particularly those on gently-sloping coasts and zones with gradual land subsidence – will be at  
 40 risk for sea level rise, especially related to severe storms and storm surges.

41

## 1 **ES.4 Summary of the Effects of Climate Change on Human Welfare**

2 **The terms human welfare, quality of life, and well-being are often used interchangeably,**  
 3 **and by a number of disciplines as diverse as psychology, economics, health science,**  
 4 **geography, urban planning, and sociology.** There is a shared understanding that all three terms  
 5 refer to aspects of individual and group life that improve living conditions and reduce chances of  
 6 injury, stress, and loss.

7  
 8 **Human well-being is typically defined and measured as a multi-dimensional concept.**

9 Taxonomies of place-specific well-being or quality of life typically converge on six dimensions:

10 1) economic conditions, 2) natural resources and amenities, 3) human health, 4) public and  
 11 private infrastructure, 5) government and public safety and 6) social and cultural resources.

12 Climate change will likely have impacts across all of these dimensions – both positive and  
 13 negative. In addition, the positive and negative effects of climate change will affect broader  
 14 communities, as networks of households, businesses, physical structures, and institutions are  
 15 located together across space and time.

16

17 **Quantifying impacts of climate change on human well-being requires linking effects in the**  
 18 **quality of life dimensions to the projected physical effects of climate change and the**  
 19 **consequent effects on human and natural systems. Economics provides one means of**  
 20 **quantifying and, in some cases, placing dollar values on welfare effects.** But most

21 assessments of climate impacts have not focused on quantifying linkages from climate change to  
 22 specific aspects of individual or collective welfare. Even in cases where welfare effects have  
 23 been quantified, it is difficult to compare and aggregate disparate effects across different sectors,  
 24 because of the different metrics used by each sector (e.g., human illness and morbidity vs.  
 25 reductions in numbers of species).

26

27 **This report examines four types of effects on economic welfare: those on ecosystems,**  
 28 **human health, recreation, and amenities associated with climate.** Some of the less tangible  
 29 effects of climate change can be difficult to quantify and value, because they represent effects on  
 30 goods and services that are not traded in markets. For example, ecosystems provide a variety of  
 31 services, including food and fiber, regulating air and water quality, support services such as  
 32 photosynthesis, and cultural services such as recreation and aesthetic or spiritual values.

33 Ecologists have already detected or predict within this century a number of ecological impacts of  
 34 climate change, including the shifting, break up, and loss of ecological communities; plant and  
 35 animal extinctions and a loss in biodiversity; shifting ranges of plant and animal populations; and  
 36 changes in ecosystem processes, such as nutrient cycling and decomposition.

37

38 **Little research has been done linking these ecological changes to changes in services, and**  
 39 **still less has been done to quantify, or place dollar values on, these changes.** Ecosystem  
 40 impacts also extend beyond the obvious direct effects within the natural environment to indirect  
 41 effects on human systems. For instance, nearly 90% of Americans take part in outdoor  
 42 recreation. The length of the season of some of these activities may be favorably affected by  
 43 slightly increased temperature, however ambient conditions may eventually have adverse effects  
 44 on outdoor activities like walking or beach recreation that is affected by sea level rise. Snow and  
 45 ice sports are the most obvious loss among vulnerable recreation activities with the reduction in  
 46 visitor use associated with a shorter season. But, decrements associated with snow-based

1 recreation may be more than outweighed by increases in other outdoor activities, including  
2 boating, fishing, golf, and beach and stream recreation.

3

4 **An agenda for understanding the impacts of climate change on human welfare may require**  
5 **taking steps both to develop a framework for addressing welfare, and to address the data**  
6 **and methodological gaps inherent in the estimation and quantification of effects.** To that  
7 end, the study of climate change on human welfare is still developing, and, to our knowledge, no  
8 study has made a systematic survey of the full range of welfare impacts associated with climate  
9 change, much less attempted to quantify them.

1 **ES.5 Tables**

2 **Table ES.1 Impacts of Climate Variability and Change on Human Health, Settlements, and Welfare in**  
 3 **the United States (see likelihood discussion in Chapter 1)**










Focus Area	Climate factor	Impact	Assessment *	Adaptation Strategies
<b>HUMAN HEALTH</b>				
	Extreme temperatures	Heat stress/stroke or hyperthermia	Very likely in Midwest and northeast urban centers	Early watch and warning systems and installation of cooling systems in residential and commercial buildings
	Changes in precipitation	Contaminated water and food supplies with associated gastrointestinal illnesses, including salmonella and giardia	Likely in areas with out-dated or over-subscribed water treatment plants	Improve infrastructure to guard against combined sewer overflow; public health response to include "boil water" advisories
	Hurricane and storm surge	Injuries from flying debris and drowning / exposure to contaminated flood waters and to mold and mildew / exposure to carbon monoxide poisoning from portable generators	Likely in coastal zones of the southeast Atlantic and the Gulf Coast	Public health advisories in immediate aftermath of storm; coordinate storm relief efforts to insure that people receive necessary information for safeguarding their health
	Devastating storm events	Post-traumatic stress disorder and related anxiety and depression	Likely in instances of extreme storm events, such as was seen in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina	Public health response should include identification of persons in need of mental health care; response should coordinate local service providers and emergency providers
	Air pollution aggravated by temperature-related increases in ozone and aeroallergens	Cardiovascular and pulmonary illnesses, including exacerbation of asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder (COPD)	Very likely in urban centers in the west, the southwest, the mid-Atlantic and the northeast	Public warning via air quality action days; encourage public transit, electric / hybrid vehicles, walking and bicycling to decrease emissions
	Air pollution degraded by wildfire	Asthma and COPD aggravated	Likely in California, the Intermountain	Public health air quality advisories

Focus Area	Climate factor	Impact	Assessment *	Adaptation Strategies
			West, the southwest and the southeast	
<b>HUMAN SETTLEMENTS</b>				
	Extreme temperatures	Increased net energy demand and expand capacity for peak cooling	Very likely	Expand capacity for heating and cooling through public utilities; invest in alternative energy sources
	Drought	Strain on municipal and agricultural water supplies	Very likely in intermountain west, desert southwest, and southeast	Reallocate water among current users; develop water markets to encourage more efficient allocation; identify new sources through expansion of reservoirs; encourage conservation of water for personal and public use; develop drought resistant crops, resort to water pricing at replacement cost, work with states to develop property rights for water trading
	Hurricane and storm surge	Disruption of infrastructure, including levee systems, river channels, bridges, and highway systems; disruption of residential neighborhoods	Very likely in southeast Atlantic Coast and Gulf Coast	Harden coastal zones or retreat or relocate; insure against catastrophic loss due to flooding and high winds
	Wildfires	Disruption of communities and property destruction	Very likely in intermountain west, desert southwest, and southeast	Clear vegetation away from buildings; issue emergency evacuation orders, prescribed burns, thinning of combustible matter
	Late snow fall and early snow melt	Disruption of water supplies for municipal and agricultural use	Very likely in intermountain west	Build reservoirs; conserve water supplies; divert supply from agricultural to municipal use;

Focus Area	Climate factor	Impact	Assessment *	Adaptation Strategies
				modify operation of existing infrastructure to account for changes in hydrology; develop drought resistant crops, water prices at replacement cost, enable trading by working with states to develop property rights
HUMAN WELFARE				
	Extreme temperatures	Discomfort; limit some outdoor activities / recreation	Very likely in more northern latitudes of the United States	Public health watch/warning advisories
	Late snow fall and early snow melt	Limit some snow-related recreational opportunities; substantial economic disruption to recreation industry	Very likely in intermountain west, Northern New England and the Upper Great Lakes	Engage in alternative recreation activities
	Extreme precipitation events	Local flooding and contamination of water supplies	Very likely nationwide	Issue flood advisories / warnings
	Hurricane and coastal storms	At-risk properties experience flood and wind damage; individuals experience disruption to daily life	Very likely in coastal zone of the Gulf Coast and the southern Atlantic	Relocate dwellings and business, and reinforce structures and infrastructure to reduce disruptions



1 **Table ES.2** The regional texture of climate endpoints associated with U.S. population growth to 2030, by census region. The expected population  
 2 growth is concentrated in the relatively more vulnerable areas of the South Atlantic, the Gulf Coast (West South Central) and the West.

United States Census Regions	Projected Percent Population Change 2000 to 2030	Record of Climate-Related Impacts by Census Region								
										
		Early Snowmelt	Degrade d Air Quality	Urban Heat Island	Wildfires	Heat Wave	Drought	Tropical Storms	Extreme Rainfall with Flooding	Sea Level Rise
<b>New England</b> ME VT NH MA RI CT	12.2	X	X	X		X	X		X	X
<b>Middle Atlantic</b> NY PA NJ	6.0	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
<b>East North Central</b> WI MI IL IN OH	7.7	X	X	X		X	X		X	
<b>West North Central</b> ND MN SD IA NE KS MO	13.6	X		X		X	X		X	
<b>South Atlantic</b> WV VA MD MC SC GA FL DC	50.8		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
<b>East South Central</b> KY TN MS AL	16.9					X	X	X		X
<b>West South Central</b> TX OK AR LA	44.0		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
<b>Mountain</b> MT ID WY NV UT CO AZ NM	64.6	X	X	X	X	X	X			
<b>Pacific</b> AK CA WA OR HI	38.2	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
<b>Source:</b> US Census Bureau. State Interim Population Projections by Age and Sex: 2004 – 2030. <a href="http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/projectionsagesex.html">www.census.gov/population/www/projections/projectionsagesex.html</a> .										

3

1 **Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.6**

2

3 **Analyses and Effects of Global Change on Human Health**  
4 **and Welfare and Human Systems**

5

6 **Chapter 1: Introduction**

7

8

9

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## 1 1.1 Scope and Approach of the SAP 4.6

2 The Global Change Research Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-606) calls for the periodic  
 3 assessment of the impacts of global environmental change for the United States. In 2001, a  
 4 series of sector and regional assessments were conducted by the U.S. Global Change Research  
 5 Program as part of the First National Assessment of the Potential Consequences of Climate  
 6 Variability and Change on the United States. Subsequently, the U.S. Climate Change Science  
 7 Program developed a *Strategic Plan* (CCSP 2003) calling for the preparation of 21 synthesis and  
 8 assessment products (SAPs) to inform policy making and adaptive management across a range of  
 9 climate-sensitive issues. Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.6 examines the effects of global  
 10 change on human systems. This product addresses Goal 4 of the five strategic goals set forth in  
 11 the CCSP *Strategic Plan* to “understand the sensitivity and adaptability of different natural and  
 12 managed ecosystems and human systems to climate and related global changes” (CCSP 2003).  
 13 The “global changes” assessed in this report include: climate variability and change, evolving  
 14 patterns of land use within the United States, and changes in the nation’s population.

15  
 16 While the mandate for the preparation of this report calls for evaluating the impacts of global  
 17 change, the emphasis is on those impacts associated with climate change. Collectively, global  
 18 changes are human problems, not simply problems for the natural or the physical world. Hence,  
 19 this SAP examines the vulnerability of human health and socioeconomic systems to climate  
 20 change across three foci, including: human health, human settlements and human welfare. The  
 21 three topics are fundamentally linked but unique dimensions of global change.

22  
 23 Human health is one of the most basic and direct measures of human welfare. Following past  
 24 assessments of climate change impacts on human health, SAP 4.6 focuses on human morbidity  
 25 and mortality associated with extreme weather, vector-, water- and foodborne diseases, and  
 26 changes in air quality. Adaptation is a key component to evaluating human health vulnerabilities,  
 27 including consideration of public health interventions (including prevention, response, and  
 28 treatment strategies) that could be revised, supplemented, or implemented to protect human  
 29 health and how much adaptation could be achieved.

30  
 31 Settlements are where people live. Humans live in a wide variety of settlements in the U.S.,  
 32 ranging from small villages and towns with a handful of people to metropolitan regions with  
 33 millions of inhabitants. In particular, SAP 4.6 focuses on urban and highly-developed population  
 34 centers in the U.S. Because of their high population density, urban areas multiply human health  
 35 risks, and this is compounded by their relatively high proportions of the very old, the very young,  
 36 and the poor. In addition, the components of infrastructure that support settlements, such as  
 37 energy, water supply, transportation, and waste disposal, have varying degrees of vulnerability to  
 38 climate change.

39  
 40 Welfare is an economic term used to describe the state of well-being of humans on an individual  
 41 or collective basis. Human welfare is an elusive concept, and there is no single, commonly  
 42 accepted definition or approach to thinking about welfare. There is, however, a shared  
 43 understanding that increases in human welfare are associated with improvements in individual  
 44 and communal conditions in areas such as political power, individual freedoms, economic

1 power, social contacts, health and opportunities for leisure and recreation, along with reductions  
 2 in injury, stress, and loss. The physical environment, with climate as one aspect, is among many  
 3 factors that can affect human welfare via economic, physical, psychological, and social pathways  
 4 that influence individual perceptions of quality of life. Some core aspects of quality of life are  
 5 expressed directly in markets (e.g., income, consumption, personal wealth, etc.). The focus in  
 6 SAP 4.6 is on non-market effects, although, these aspects of human welfare are often difficult to  
 7 measure and value (Mendelsohn *et al.*, 1999; EPA, 2000).

8  
 9 The other Synthesis and Assessment Products related to CCSP's Goal 4 include reports on  
 10 climate impacts on sea level rise (SAP 4.1), ecosystem changes (SAP 4.2), agricultural  
 11 production (SAP 4.3), adaptive options for climate sensitive ecosystems (SAP 4.4), energy use  
 12 (SAP 4.5) and transportation system impacts along the Gulf Coast (SAP 4.7). Collectively, these  
 13 reports provide an overview of climate change impacts and adaptations related to a range of  
 14 human conditions in the United States.

15 The audience for this report includes research scientists, public health practitioners, resource  
 16 managers, urban planners, transportation planners, elected officials and other policy makers, and  
 17 concerned citizens. A recent National Research Council analysis of global change assessments  
 18 argues that the best assessments have an audience asking for them, and a broad range of  
 19 stakeholders (U.S. National Research Council, 2007). This report clearly identifies the pertinent  
 20 audience and what decisions it will inform.

21 Chapters 2-4 describe the impacts of climate change on human systems and outline opportunities  
 22 for adaptation. SAP 4.6 addresses the questions of how and where climate change may impact  
 23 U.S. socio-economic systems. The challenge for this project is to derive an assessment of risks  
 24 associated with health, welfare, and settlements and to develop timely adaptive strategies to  
 25 address a range of vulnerabilities. Risk assessments evaluate impacts of climate change across an  
 26 array of characteristics, including: the magnitude of risk (both baseline and incremental risks),  
 27 the distribution of risks across populations (including minimally-impacted individuals as  
 28 compared to maximally-exposed individuals), and the availability, difficulty, irreversibility, and  
 29 cost of adaptation strategies. While the state of science limits the ability to conduct formal,  
 30 quantitative risk assessments, it is possible to develop information that is useful for formulating  
 31 adaptation strategies. Primary goals for adaptation to climate variability and change include:

- 32 (i) To avoid maladaptive responses;
- 33 (ii) To establish protocols to detect and measure risks and to manage risks proactively  
 34 when possible;
- 35 (iii) To leverage technical and institutional capacity;
- 36 (iv) To reduce current vulnerabilities to climate change;
- 37 (v) To develop adaptive capacity to address new climate risks that exceed conventional  
 38 adaptive responses, and
- 39 (vi) To recognize and respond to impacts which play out across time. (Scheraga and  
 40 Grambsch, 1998; WHO, 2003; IPCC, 2007b)

41  
 42 The issue of co-benefits is central in the consideration of adaptation to climate change. Many  
 43 potential adaptive strategies have co-benefits. Along with helping human populations cope with  
 44 climate change, adaptive strategies produce additional benefits. For example,

- 1   ▪ Creating and implementing early warning systems and emergency response plans for heat  
2   waves can also improve those services for other emergency responses while improving all-  
3   hazards preparedness; (Glantz, 2004)
- 4   ▪ Improving the infrastructure and capacity of combined sewer systems to avoid overflows due  
5   to changes in precipitation patterns also has the added benefit of decreasing contaminant  
6   flows that cause beach closings and impact the local ecology; (Rose *et al.*, 2001)
- 7   ▪ A key adaptation technique for settlements in coastal zones is to promote maintenance or  
8   reconstruction of coastal wetlands ecosystems, which has the added benefit of creation or  
9   protection of coastal habitats (Rose *et al.*, 2001); and,
- 10  ▪ Promotion of green building practices has added health and welfare benefits as improving  
11  natural light in office space and schools has been shown to increase productivity and mental  
12  health (Edwards and Torcellini, 2002).

13

14 Chapter 2 assesses the potential impacts of climate change on human health in the United States.  
15 Timely knowledge of human health impacts may support our public health infrastructure in  
16 devising and implementing strategies to prevent, compensate, or respond to these effects. For  
17 each of the health endpoints, the assessment addresses a number of topics, including:

- 18   ▪ Reviewing evidence of the current burden associated with the identified health outcome;
- 19   ▪ Characterizing the human health impacts of current climate variability and projected  
20   climate change (to the extent that the current literature allows);
- 21   ▪ Discussing adaptation opportunities and support for effective decision making; and
- 22   ▪ Outlining key knowledge gaps.

23 Each topic chapter includes research published from 2001 through early 2007 in the U.S., or in  
24 Canada, Europe, and Australia, where results may provide insights for U.S. populations. As  
25 such, the health chapter serves as an update to the Health Sector Assessment conducted as part of  
26 the First National Assessment in 2001.

27

28 Chapter 3 focuses on the climate change impacts and adaptations associated with human  
29 settlements in the United States. The IPCC Third and Fourth Assessment Reports (IPCC, 2001;  
30 IPCC, 2007c) conclude that settlements are among the human systems that are the most sensitive  
31 to climate change. For example, if there are changes in climate extremes there could be serious  
32 consequences for human settlements that are vulnerable to droughts and wildfires, coastal and  
33 river floods, sea level rise and storm surge, heat waves, land slides, and windstorms. However,  
34 specific changes in these conditions in specific places cannot yet be projected with great  
35 confidence. Chapter 3 focuses on the interactions between settlement characteristics, climate and  
36 other global stressors, with a particular focus on urban areas and other densely-developed  
37 population centers in the U.S.

38

39 The scale and complexity of these built environments, transportation networks, energy and  
40 resource demands, and the interdependence of these systems and their populaces, suggests that  
41 urban areas are especially vulnerable to multiplying impacts in response to externally imposed  
42 environmental stresses. The collective vulnerability of American urban centers may also be  
43 determined by the disproportionate share of urban growth in areas like the Inter-Mountain West  
44 or the Gulf Coast. The focus of Chapter 3 is on high density or rapidly-growing settlements and  
45 the potential for changes over time in the vulnerabilities associated with place-based

1 characteristics (such as their climate regime, elevation, and proximity to coasts and rivers) and  
2 spatial characteristics (such as whether development patterns are sprawling or compact).

3 Chapter 4 focuses on the impacts of climate change on human welfare. To examine the impacts  
4 of climate change on human welfare, this chapter reports on two relevant bodies of literature:  
5 approaches to welfare that rely on both qualitative assessment and quantitative measures, and  
6 economic approaches that monetize, or place money values, on quantitative impacts.

7 Finally, Chapter 5 revisits the research recommendations and data gaps of previous assessment  
8 activities and describes the progress to date and the opportunities going forward. In addition,  
9 Chapter 5 reviews the overarching themes derived from Chapters 2-4.

10 The remainder of this chapter is designed to provide the reader with an overview of the current  
11 state of knowledge regarding:

- 12 (1) changes in climate in the United States;
- 13 (2) population trends, migration patterns, and the distribution of people across settlements;
- 14 (3) non-climate stressors and their interactions with climate change to realize complex impacts,  
15 and;
- 16 (4) a discussion of the handling of uncertainty in reporting scientific results.

## 17 **1.2 Climate Change in the United States: Context for an Assessment of** 18 **Impacts on Human Systems**

19 In the following chapters, the authors examine the impacts on human society of global change,  
20 especially those associated with climate change. The impact assessments in Chapters 2-4 do not  
21 rely on specific emissions or climate change scenarios but, instead, rely on the state of the  
22 science with respect to our understanding of climate change and its impacts on social systems  
23 and human health and well-being in the United States. This report does not make quantitative  
24 projections of specific impacts in specific locations based on specific projections of climate  
25 drivers of these impacts. Instead the report adopts a vulnerability perspective that merges our  
26 current understanding of climate change that has already occurred with changes that may occur.  
27 What is more, this assessment is not just related to changes that are projected to occur, but also  
28 projected changes in factors that are likely to affect sensitivity and vulnerability to climate. The  
29 report reviews historical trends along with current extreme events to point to vulnerabilities and  
30 then, where possible, determines the likely direction and range of potential climate-related  
31 impacts.

32  
33 In the United States, we are observing the evidence of long-term changes in temperature and  
34 precipitation consistent with global warming. Changes in average conditions are being realized  
35 through rising temperatures, changes in annual and seasonal precipitation, and rising sea levels.  
36 Observations also indicate there are changes in extreme conditions, such as an increased  
37 frequency of heavy rainfall (with some increase in flooding), more heat waves, fewer very cold  
38 days, and an increase in areas affected by drought. Frequencies of tropical storms and hurricanes  
39 vary considerably from year to year and there are limitations in the quality of the data which

1 make it difficult to discern trends, but evidence suggests some increases in their intensity and  
2 duration since the 1970s (Christensen *et al.*, 2007)

3 The brief overview that follows summarizes observed changes in the global climate as reported  
4 in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC 2007a).  
5 This introduction is intended for readers who would benefit from a short discussion of climate  
6 change as a context for the following chapters on impacts and adaptation. Note that the impacts  
7 described in the *Summary for Policy Makers* are based on global climate changes and may not  
8 pertain to all regions of the United States.

- 9     ▪ “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of  
10        increases in global average air and ocean temperature, widespread melting of snow and  
11        ice, and rising global average sea level.”
- 12     ▪ “Eleven of the last twelve years rank among the 12 warmest years in the instrumental  
13        record of global surface temperatures (since 1850).”
- 14     ▪ “Average temperature of the global ocean has increased to depths of at least 3000 m and  
15        that the ocean has been absorbing more than 80% of the heat added to the climate system.  
16        Such warming causes sea water to expand, contributing to sea level rise.”
- 17     ▪ “Mountain glaciers and snow cover have declined on average in both hemispheres.”
- 18     ▪ “The frequency of heavy precipitation events has increased over most land areas,  
19        consistent with warming and observed increases of atmospheric water vapor.”
- 20     ▪ “Widespread changes in extreme temperatures have been observed over the last 50  
21        years... Hot days, hot nights, and heat waves have become more frequent.”
- 22     ▪ “There is observational evidence for an increase of intense tropical cyclone activity in the  
23        North Atlantic since about 1970.” (IPCC, 2007a)

24 In addition to the changes described in the IPCC *Summary for Policy Makers*, the following  
25 discussion examines U.S. climate trends and historical records related to temperature,  
26 precipitation, sea level rise, and changes in hurricanes and other catastrophic events. Information  
27 is also drawn from the North American Chapter of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report and the  
28 Climate Change Science Programs Synthesis and Assessment Product 3.3: Weather and Climate  
29 Extremes in a Changing Climate. Taken together, this discussion provides a context from which  
30 to assess likely impacts of climate change on human health, human welfare, and human  
31 settlements.

### 32 **1.2.1 Rising temperatures.**

33 Climate change is already affecting the United States. According to long-term station-based  
34 observational records such as the Historical Climatology Network (Karl *et al.*, 1990; Easterling  
35 *et al.*, 1999; Williams *et al.*, 2007), temperatures across the continental U.S. have been rising at a  
36 rate of 0.1°F per decade since the early 1900s. Increases in average annual temperatures over the  
37 last century now exceed 1°F (Figure 1.1a). The degree of warming has varied by region across  
38 the United States, with the West and Alaska experiencing the greatest degree of warming (U.S.  
39 Environmental Protection Agency, 2007). These changes in temperature have led to an increase  
40 in the number of frost-free days, with the greatest increases occurring in the West and Southwest  
41 (Tebaldi *et al.*, 2006). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in its most recent  
42 assessment report concluded that “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal...” (IPCC,  
43 2007a).



1  
2 **Figure 1.1** Observed trends in annual average (a) temperature ( $^{\circ}\text{F}$ ) and (b) precipitation (inches)  
3 across the continental United States from 1896 to 2006 (Source: NCDC, 2007)  
4

5 The current generation of global climate models, run with IPCC SRES scenarios of future  
6 greenhouse gas emissions, simulate future changes in the earth's climate system that are greater  
7 in magnitude and scope than those already observed. By the end of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, annual  
8 surface temperature increases are projected to range from 2-3 $^{\circ}\text{C}$  near the coasts in the  
9 conterminous United States to more than 5 $^{\circ}\text{C}$  in northern Alaska. Nationally, annual warming in  
10 the United States is projected to exceed 2 $^{\circ}\text{C}$ , with projected increases in summertime  
11 temperatures ranging between 3 and 5 $^{\circ}\text{C}$  (greatest in the Southwest). The largest warming is  
12 projected to reach 10 $^{\circ}\text{C}$  for winter temperatures in the northernmost parts of Alaska. (Christensen  
13 *et al.*, 2007).

#### 14 **1.2.2 Trends in precipitation.**

15 Shifting precipitation patterns have also been observed. Over the last century, annual  
16 precipitation across the continental U.S. has been increasing by an average of 0.18 inches per  
17 decade (Figure 1.1b). Broken down by season, winter precipitation around the coastal areas,  
18 including the West, Gulf, and Atlantic coasts, has been increasing by up to 30% while  
19 precipitation in the central part of the country (the Midwest and the Great Plains) has been  
20 decreasing by up to 20%. Large-scale spatial patterns in summer precipitation trends are more  
21 difficult to identify, as much of summer rainfall comes in the form of small-scale convective  
22 precipitation. However, it appears that there have been increases of 20-80% in summer rainfall  
23 over California and the Pacific Northwest, and decreases on the order of 20-40% across much of  
24 the south. The IPCC reports that rainfall is arriving in more intense events. (IPCC, 2007a).  
25

26 El Niño events (a periodic warming of the tropical Pacific Ocean between South America and  
27 the International Date Line) are associated with increased precipitation and severe storms in  
28 some regions, such as the southeast U.S. and the Great Basin region of the western U.S. El Niño  
29 events have also been characterized by warmer temperatures and decreased precipitation in other  
30 areas, such as western Canada, the Pacific Northwest and parts of Alaska. Historically, El Niño  
31 events occur about every 3 to 7 years and alternate with the opposite phases of below-average  
32 temperatures in the eastern tropical Pacific (La Niña). Since 1976-1977, there has been a  
33 tendency toward more prolonged and stronger El Niños (IPCC, 2007a). However, recent  
34 analyses of climate simulations indicate no consistent trends in future El Niño amplitude or  
35 frequency (Meehl *et al.*, 2007)  
36

37 Global model simulations summarized in the North American Chapter of the IPCC AR4, show  
38 moderate increases in precipitation (10% or less) over much of the United States over the next  
39 100 years, except for the southwest. However, projected increases in these simulations are  
40 partially offset by increases in evaporation, resulting in greater drying in the central part of the  
41 United States. Projections for the central, eastern and western regions of the United States show  
42 similar seasonal characteristics (i.e., winter increases, summer decreases), although there is  
43 greater consensus for winter increases in the north and summer decreases in the south. However,  
44 uncertainty around the projected changes is large (Christensen *et al.*, 2007).

### 1 1.2.2.1 Changes in snow melt and glacial retreat.

2 Warmer temperatures are melting mountain glaciers and more winter precipitation in northern  
 3 states is falling as rain instead of snow. (Huntington *et al.*, 2004). Snow pack is also melting  
 4 faster, affecting stream flow in rivers. Over the last fifty years, changes in the timing of snow  
 5 melt has shifted the schedule of snow-fed stream flow in the western part of the country by 1-4  
 6 weeks earlier in the year (Stewart *et al.*, 2005). The seasonal “center of stream flow volume”  
 7 (i.e., the date at which half of the expected winter-spring stream flow has occurred) also appears  
 8 to be advancing by on average one day per decade for streams in the Northeast (Huntington *et*  
 9 *al.*, 2003).

10

11 This trend is projected to continue, with more precipitation falling as rain rather than snow, and  
 12 snow season length and snow depth are generally projected to decrease in most of the country.  
 13 Such changes tend to favor increased risk of winter flooding and lower summer soil moisture and  
 14 streamflows (Christensen *et al.*, 2007).

### 15 **1.2.3 Rising sea levels and erosion of coastal zones**

16 Sea levels are rising at an increasing rate. The main cause for observed sea level rise over the  
 17 past century is the fact that the oceans are absorbing about 80% of the additional heat being  
 18 trapped in the earth-atmosphere system by greenhouse gases. This trapped heat is causing the  
 19 ocean waters to expand, raising sea levels around the world. Over the first part of the century,  
 20 sea level was rising at a rate of just 0.7 inches per decade (1.7 mm/yr). Over the last few decades,  
 21 however, sea level has been rising nearly twice as fast, at 1.2 inches per decade (3.1 mm/yr;  
 22 IPCC, 2007a). Some of this recent increase may be due to the observed acceleration in the rate of  
 23 Greenland ice melting over the past decade (Rignot, 2006). In the past century, global sea level  
 24 rose 5-8 inches.

25

26 Rising global temperatures are projected to accelerate the rate of sea-level rise by further  
 27 expanding ocean water, melting mountain glaciers, and increasing the rate at which  
 28 Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets melt or discharge ice into the oceans. Estimates of sea-level  
 29 rise for a global temperature increase between 1.1 and 6.4°C (the IPCC estimate of likely  
 30 temperature increases by 2100) are about 7 to 23 inches (0.18m to 0.59m), excluding the  
 31 contribution from accelerated ice discharges from the Greenland and Antarctica ice sheets.  
 32 Extrapolating the recent acceleration of ice discharges from the polar ice sheets would imply an  
 33 additional contribution up to 8 inches (20cm). If melting of these ice caps increases, larger values  
 34 of sea-level rise cannot be excluded (IPCC, 2007a).

35

36 For additional details about sea level rise and its effects on US coasts please see Synthesis and  
 37 Assessment Product 4.1 *Coastal elevations and sensitivity to sea level rise*

### 38 **1.2.4 Changes in Extreme Conditions**

39 The climatic changes described above are often referred to as changes in “average” conditions.  
 40 Most observations of temperature will tend to be close to the average: days with very hot  
 41 temperatures happen infrequently. Similarly, only rarely will there be days with extremely heavy  
 42 precipitation. Climate change could result in a shift of the entire distribution of a meteorological  
 43 variable so that a relatively small shift in the mean could be accompanied by a relatively large  
 44 change in the number of relatively rare (according to today’s perspective) events. For example,

1 with an increase in average temperatures, it would be expected there would be an increase in the  
 2 number of very hot days and a decrease in the number of very cold days. Other, relatively rare,  
 3 extreme events of concern for human health, welfare and settlements include hurricanes, floods  
 4 and droughts.

5  
 6 In general, it is difficult to attribute any individual extreme event to a changing climate. Because  
 7 extreme events occur infrequently, there is typically limited information to characterize these  
 8 events and their trends. In addition, extreme events usually require several conditions to exist for  
 9 the event to occur, so that linking a particular extreme event to a single, specific cause is  
 10 problematic. For some extreme events, such as extremely hot/cold days or rainfall extremes,  
 11 there is more of an observational basis for analyzing trends, increasing our understanding and  
 12 ability to project future changes.

13  
 14 Finally, there are many different aspects to extremes. Frequency is perhaps the most often  
 15 discussed but changes in other aspects of extremes such as intensity (e.g., warmer hot days), time  
 16 of occurrence (e.g., earlier snowmelt), duration (e.g., longer droughts), spatial extent and location  
 17 are also important when determining impacts on human systems.

18  
 19 Synthesis and Assessment Product 3.3 *Weather and Climate Extremes in a Changing Climate*  
 20 (CCSP, 2008) has a much more detailed discussion of climate extremes that are only very briefly  
 21 described here. The interested reader is referred to that report for additional details.

#### 22 1.2.4.1 Heat and cold waves

23 Extreme temperatures (e.g., temperatures in the upper 90<sup>th</sup> or 95<sup>th</sup> percentile of the distribution)  
 24 often change in parallel with average temperatures. Since 1950, there are more 3-day warm  
 25 spells (exceeding the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile) when averaged over all of North America (Peterson *et al.*,  
 26 2008). While the number of heat waves has increased, the heat waves of the 1930s remain the  
 27 most severe in the U.S. historical record. Mirroring this shift toward more hot days is a decrease  
 28 in unusually cold days during the last few decades. There has been a corresponding decrease in  
 29 frost days and a lengthening of the frost-free season over the past century. The number of frost  
 30 days decreased by four days per year in the United States during the 1948-1999 period, with the  
 31 largest decreases, as many as 13 days per year, occurring in the western United States  
 32 (Easterling, 2002). For the United States, the average length of the frost-free season over the 20<sup>th</sup>  
 33 century increased by almost two weeks (Kunkel *et al.*, 2004).

34  
 35 Recent studies have found that there is an increased likelihood of more intense, longer-lasting  
 36 and more frequent heat waves (Meehl and Tebaldi, 2004, Schar *et al.*, 2004, Clark *et al.*, 2006).  
 37 As the climate warms, the number of frost days is expected to decrease (Cubasch *et al.*, 2001)  
 38 particularly along the northwest coast of North America (Meehl *et al.*, 2004). SAP 4.6, using a  
 39 range of greenhouse gas emission scenarios and model simulations, found that hot days, hot  
 40 nights and heat waves are very likely to become more frequent, that cold days and cold nights are  
 41 very likely to become much less frequent, and that the number of days with frost is very likely to  
 42 decrease (CCSP, 2008). Growing season length is related to frost days, which is projected to  
 43 increase in a warmer climate in most areas (Tebaldi *et al.*, 2006).

#### 1 1.2.4.2 Heavy Precipitation Events.

2 Over the 20<sup>th</sup> century, periods of heavy downpours became more frequent and more intense and  
 3 accounted for a larger percentage of total precipitation (Karl and Knight, 1997; Groisman *et al.*,  
 4 1999, 2001, 2004, 2005; Kunkel *et al.*, 1999; Easterling *et al.*, 2000; Kunkel, 2003). These  
 5 heavy rainfall events have increased in frequency by as much as 100% across much of the  
 6 Midwest and Northeast over the last century (Kunkel *et al.*, 1999). These findings are consistent  
 7 with observed warming and associated increases in atmospheric water vapor.

8  
 9 The intensity of precipitation events is projected to increase, particularly in high latitude areas  
 10 that experience increases in mean precipitation (Meehl *et al.*, 2007). In areas where mean  
 11 precipitation decreases (most subtropical and mid-latitude regions), precipitation intensity is  
 12 projected to increase but there would be longer periods between rainfall events. Precipitation  
 13 extremes increase more than does the mean in most tropical and mid- and high-latitude areas.  
 14 Some studies project widespread increases in extreme precipitation (Christensen *et al.*, 2007),  
 15 with greater risks of not only flooding from intense precipitation, but also droughts from greater  
 16 temporal variability in precipitation. SAP 3.3 concluded that, over most regions, future  
 17 precipitation is likely to be less frequent but more intense, and precipitation extremes are very  
 18 likely to increase (CCSP 2008).

#### 19 1.2.4.3 Changes in Flooding.

20 Heavy rainfall clearly can lead to flooding, but assessing whether observed changes in  
 21 precipitation have lead to similar trends in flooding is difficult for a number of reasons. In  
 22 particular, there are many human influences on streamflow (e.g., dams, land-use changes, etc.)  
 23 that confound climatic influences. In some cases, researchers using the same data came to  
 24 opposite assessments about trends in high streamflows (Lins and Slack, 1999, 2005; Groisman *et al.*,  
 25 2001, 2004). Short duration extreme precipitation events can lead to localized flash flooding,  
 26 but for large river basins, significant flooding will not occur from these types of episodes alone;  
 27 excessive precipitation must be sustained for weeks to months for flooding to occur.

#### 28 1.2.4.4 Changes in droughts

29 An extended period with little precipitation is the main cause of drought, but the intensity of a  
 30 drought can be exacerbated by high temperatures and winds, a lack of cloudiness/low humidity  
 31 which result in high evaporation rates. Droughts occur on a range of geographic scales and can  
 32 vary in their duration, in some cases lasting years. The 1930s and the 1950s experienced the most  
 33 widespread and severe drought conditions (Andreadis *et al.*, 2005), although the early 2000s also  
 34 saw severe droughts in some areas, especially in the western United States (Piechota *et al.*,  
 35 2004).

36  
 37 Based on observations averaged over the United States, there is no clear overall national trend in  
 38 droughts (CCSP, 2008). Over the past century, the area affected by severe and extreme drought  
 39 in the United States each year averaged about 14%: by comparison, in 1934 the area affected by  
 40 drought was as high as 65% (CCSP, 2008). In recent years, the drought-affected area ranged  
 41 between 35 and 40% (CCSP, 2008). These trends at the national level however mask important  
 42 differences in drought conditions at regional scales: one area may be very dry while another is  
 43 wet. For example, in the Southwest and parts of the interior of the West increased temperatures  
 44 have led to rising drought trends (Groisman *et al.*, 2004; Andreadis and Lettenmaier, 2006). In

1 the Southwest, the 1950s were the driest period, though droughts in the past 10 years are  
 2 approaching the 1950s drought (CCSP, 2008). There are also recent regional tendencies toward  
 3 more severe droughts in parts of Alaska (CCSP, 2008).

4  
 5 Several generations of global climate models, including the most recent find an increase in  
 6 summer drying in the mid latitudes in a future, warmer climate (Meehl *et al.*, 2007). This  
 7 tendency for drying of the mid-continental areas during summer indicates a greater risk of  
 8 droughts in those regions (CCSP, 2008). Analyses using several coupled global circulation  
 9 models project an increased frequency of droughts lasting a month or longer in the Northeast  
 10 (Hayhoe *et al.*, 2007) and greatly reduced annual water availability over the Southwest (Milly *et al.*,  
 11 2005). SAP 3.3 concluded that droughts are likely to become more frequent and severe in  
 12 some regions of the country as higher air temperatures increase the potential for evaporation.

#### 13 1.2.4.5 Changes in hurricanes

14 Assessing changes in hurricanes is difficult: There have been large fluctuations in the number of  
 15 hurricanes from year to year and from decade to decade. Furthermore, it is only since the 1960s  
 16 that reliable data can be assembled for assessing trends. In general, there is increasing  
 17 uncertainty in the data record the further back in time one goes. For example, prior to satellites,  
 18 hurricanes that remained out at sea or that struck sparsely inhabited areas could be missed  
 19 entirely: it has been estimated that about three tropical cyclones per year are missing in the pre-  
 20 satellite data (Landsea and Knabb, 2007). Even taking these factors into account, SAP 3.3  
 21 concluded that it is likely that the annual numbers of tropical storms, hurricanes, and major  
 22 hurricanes in the North Atlantic have increased over the past 100 years. However, the existing  
 23 data and an adjusted record of tropical storms indicate no significant linear trends beginning  
 24 from the mid- to late 1800s to 2005 (CCSP, 2008). Moreover, SAP 3.3 concluded that there is  
 25 no evidence for a long-term increase in North American mainland land-falling hurricanes.

26  
 27 Evidence suggests that the intensity of Atlantic hurricanes and tropical storms has increased over  
 28 the past few decades. According to the IPCC, increased intensity is “as likely as not” due at least  
 29 in part to warming sea surface temperatures (Emanuel, 2005; Webster *et al.*, 2005; CCSP,  
 30 2007a). An increase in extreme wave heights in the Atlantic since the 1970s has been observed:  
 31 consistent with more frequent and intense hurricanes (CCSP, 2008).

32  
 33 For North Atlantic hurricanes, it is likely that wind speeds and core rainfall rates will increase  
 34 (Henderson-Sellers *et al.*, 1998; Knutson and Tuleya, 2004, 2008; Emanuel, 2005). However,  
 35 the CCSP concluded that “frequency changes are currently too uncertain for confident  
 36 projection” (CCSP, 2008). The CCSP also found that the spatial distribution of hurricanes will  
 37 likely change (CCSP, 2008). Storm surge is likely to increase due to projected sea level rise  
 38 (CCSP, 2008).

### 39 **1.3 Population Trends and Migration Patterns: A Context for Assessing** 40 **Climate-related Impacts**

41 Assessments of climate-related risk must account for the size of the population, including  
 42 especially sensitive sub-populations, and their geographic distribution across the landscape. The  
 43 following discussion provides a basis for assessing the interactions of global change within the

1 larger context of demographic trends. In particular, the social characteristics of a populace may  
 2 interact with its spatial distribution to produce a non-linear risk. In such instances, risk  
 3 assessments are shaped by questions such as:

- 4     ▪ *Which counties, states, and regions will grow most rapidly?*
- 5     ▪ *How many people will live in at-risk areas, such as coastal zones, flood plains, and arid*  
 6       *areas?*
- 7     ▪ *What share of retirees will migrate and where will they move?*

### 8 **1.3.1 Trends in total U.S. Population**

9 The US population numbered some 280 million individuals in 2000.<sup>1</sup> In 1900, the US  
 10 population numbered about 76 million people; fifty years later the population had roughly  
 11 doubled to 151 million people.

12  
 13 Population projections are estimates of the population at future dates. They are based on  
 14 assumptions about future births, deaths, international migration, and domestic migration and  
 15 represent plausible scenarios of future population.

16  
 17 In 2000 the IPCC published a set of emission scenarios for use in the Third Assessment Report  
 18 (Nakicenovic *et al.*, 2000). The SRES scenarios were constructed to explore future developments  
 19 in the global environment with special reference to the production of greenhouse gases and  
 20 aerosol precursor emissions. The SRES team defined four narrative storylines labeled A1, A2,  
 21 B1 and B2, describing the relationships between the forces driving greenhouse gas and aerosol  
 22 emissions and their evolution during the 21st century for large world regions and globally. Each  
 23 storyline represents different demographic, social, economic, technological, and environmental  
 24 developments that diverge in increasingly irreversible ways. (Nakicenovic *et al.*, 2000)

25  
 26 The US Census Bureau periodically releases projections for the resident population of the United  
 27 States based on Census data. The cohort-component methodology<sup>2</sup> is used in these projections.  
 28 Alternative assumptions of fertility, life expectancy, and net immigration yield low, middle and  
 29 high projections.

30  
 31 Figure 1.2 displays the SRES and Census population projections<sup>3</sup> for the US. The Census  
 32 projections span a greater range than the SRES scenarios: by 2100 the low series projection of  
 33 282 million is below the current population while the high projection is about 1.2 billion, or  
 34 about four times the current population. The Census middle series projection is relatively close  
 35 to the SRES A2 scenario (570 million vs. 628 million in 2100), while the SRES A1/B1 and B2  
 36 scenarios fall below the Census middle projection.

---

<sup>1</sup> Information on historical US population data and current population estimates and projections can be found at <http://www.census.gov/>.

<sup>2</sup> See Census web-site for additional details on the projection methodology.

<sup>3</sup> The Census projections are based on the 1990 Census. Preliminary projections based on the 2000 Census for 2000-2050 are available.

1           **Figure 1.2** US Population Projections 2000-2100.

2    1.3.1.1 Aging of the population

3    The US population has not simply increased by 300% over the past century, it has also shifted in  
4    its demographic structure. For example, in 1900 less than 4% of the US population was 65 years  
5    or older; currently about 12% of Americans are 65 or older (He *et al.*, 2005). By 2050, the US  
6    population aged 65 and older is projected to be about 86 million, or about 21% of the total  
7    population. Nearly 5% of the projected population in 2050, over 20 million people, will be 85  
8    years or older (He *et al.*, 2005). Figure 1.3 displays the projected age distribution for the total  
9    resident population of the United States by sex for the middle projection series.

10  
11           **Figure 1.3** Population Pyramids of the US 2000 and 2050 (Interim Projections based on 2000  
12           Census)

13  
14    The projected increase in the elderly population is an important variable in projections of the  
15    effects of climate change. The elderly are identified in many health assessments as more  
16    vulnerable than younger age groups to a range of health outcomes associated with climate  
17    change, including injury resulting from weather extremes such as heatwaves, storms and floods  
18    (WHO, 2003; IPCC 2007b; NAST, 2001). Aging also can be expected to be accompanied by  
19    multiple, chronic illnesses that may result in increased vulnerability to infectious disease (NAST,  
20    2001). Chapter two in this report also identifies the elderly as a vulnerable subpopulation.

21    **1.3.2 Migration patterns**

22    Although numbers produced by population projections are important, the striking relationship  
23    between potential future settlement patterns and the areas that may experience significant  
24    impacts of climate change is the critical insight. In particular, nearly all trends point to more  
25    Americans living in areas that may be especially vulnerable to the effects of climate change (see  
26    Figure 1.4). For example, many rapidly growing places in the Mountain West may also  
27    experience decreased snow pack during winter and earlier spring melting, leading to lower  
28    stream flows, particularly during the high-demand period of summer.

29  
30    The continued growth of arid states in the West is therefore a critical crossroads for human  
31    settlements and climate change. These states are expected to account for one-third of all U.S.  
32    population growth over the next 25 years (US Census Bureau, 2005). The combined effects of  
33    growing demand for water due to a growing population and changes in water supplies associated  
34    with climatic change pose important challenges for these states. For example, a study  
35    commissioned by the California Energy Commission estimated that the Sierra Mountain snow  
36    pack could be reduced by 12% to 47% by 2050 (Cayan *et al.*, 2006). At the same time, state  
37    projections anticipate an additional 20 million Californians by that date (California Department  
38    of Finance, 2007).

39  
40           **Figure 1.4:** U.S. Population and Growth Trends with evidence of more pronounced growth  
41           projected along the coasts, in urban centers, and in cities in the South and West (NAST, 2001).

1 Growth in coastal population has kept pace with population growth in other parts of the country,  
 2 but given the small land area of the coasts, the density of coastal communities has been  
 3 increasing (Crossett *et al.*, 2004). Over 50% of the US population now lives in the coastal zone,  
 4 and coastal areas are projected to continue to increase in population, with associated increases in  
 5 population density, over the next several decades. The overlay of this migration pattern with  
 6 climate change projections has several implications. Perhaps the most obvious is the increased  
 7 exposure of people and property to the effects of sea level rise and hurricanes (Kunkel *et al.*,  
 8 1999). With rapidly growing communities near coastlines, property damages would be expected  
 9 to increase even without any changes in storm frequency or intensity (Changnon *et al.*, 2003).  
 10 1.3.2.1 How Climate Impacts Migration Patterns

11 It is often said that Americans are a nation of movers and data collected for both the 1990 and  
 12 2000 Census support this notion. While roughly half of the U.S. population had lived in the  
 13 same house for the previous five years, nearly 10 percent had recently moved from out of state.<sup>4</sup>  
 14 In other words, during the five year period preceding each Census, over 20 million Americans  
 15 had moved across state lines and half of those moved to different regions.

16 Although many forces shape domestic migration, climate is a key element of perceived quality of  
 17 life. In turn, quality of life can be an important factor driving the relocation decisions of  
 18 households and businesses. The popularity of the Places Rated Almanac and other publications  
 19 ranking cities' livability illustrates the concept's importance. Additionally, many of the  
 20 indicators in these reports are based directly on climatic conditions (average winter and summer  
 21 temperature, precipitation, days of sunshine, humidity, etc.).

22 A range of studies have attempted to quantify how natural amenities, including a favorable  
 23 climate, affect migration. While the methods vary<sup>5</sup> the conclusions are similar. In general:

- 24 ■ People move for a variety of reasons other than climate, such as: proximity to family and  
 25 friends, employment opportunities, lower cost of living, and aesthetics,
- 26 ■ Areas with natural amenities that are close to urban centers have attracted the largest  
 27 numbers of in-migrants (Serow 2001),
- 28 ■ Climate's impact on migration varies by income with lower income groups also moving to  
 29 colder areas in which their wages are likely to compare more favorably to the cost of living  
 30 (Rebhun and Raveh, 2006),
- 31 ■ For retirees, weather is a far more important rationale cited for moving out of an area than  
 32 moving to an area (AARP 2006),
- 33 ■ Population growth in rural counties is strongly related to a more favorable climate and  
 34 other key natural amenities (McGranahan 1999). In addition, new information  
 35 technologies may make it possible for some urban dwellers to move to and work from rural  
 36 regions.

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2002/sumfile3.html>

<sup>5</sup> Study methodologies include: aggregate studies of population changes alongside regional characteristics, explanatory models developed from individual migration data and individual surveys.



## 1 1.4. Complex Linkages: The Role of Non-climate Factors

2 Climate is only one of a number of global changes that affect human well-being. These non-  
 3 climate processes and stresses interact with climate change, determining the overall severity of  
 4 climate impacts. Moreover, climate change impacts can spread from directly impacted areas and  
 5 sectors to other areas and sectors through extensive and complex linkages (IPCC, 2007b).  
 6 Evaluating future climate change impacts therefore require assumptions, explicit and implicit,  
 7 about how future socioeconomic conditions will develop. The IPCC (1994) recommends the use  
 8 of socioeconomic scenarios in impacts assessments to capture in a consistent way these factors.  
 9

10 Socioeconomic scenarios have tended to focus on variables such as population and measures of  
 11 economic activity (e.g., Gross Domestic Product) that can be quantified using well-established  
 12 models or methods (for examples of economic models which have been used for long run  
 13 projections, see Nakicenovic *et al.*, 2000; NAST 2001; Yohe *et al.*, 2007). While useful as a  
 14 starting point, some key socioeconomic factors may not allow this type of quantification: they  
 15 could however be incorporated through a qualitative, “storyline” approach and thus yield a more  
 16 fully developed socioeconomic scenario. The UNEP country study program guidance (Tol,  
 17 1998) notes the role of formal modeling in filling in (but not defining) socioeconomic scenarios  
 18 but also emphasizes the role of expert judgment in blending disparate elements into coherent and  
 19 plausible scenarios. Generally socioeconomic scenarios have been developed in situations where  
 20 it is not possible to assign levels of probability to any particular future state of the world and  
 21 therefore it usually is not appropriate to make confidence statements with respect to a specific  
 22 socioeconomic scenario (Moss and Schneider, 2000).  
 23

24 Socioeconomic scenarios include non-environmental factors that influence exposures,  
 25 vulnerability and impacts. Factors that may be incorporated into a scenario include:

- 26 ■ population (e.g., demographics, migration patterns),
- 27 ■ economic status (income, prices)
- 28 ■ technology (e.g., pesticides, vaccines, transportation modes, wireless communications)
- 29 ■ infrastructure (e.g., water treatment plants, sewers, and drinking water systems; public  
 30 health systems; roads, rails and bridges; flood control structures)
- 31 ■ human capital and social context and behaviors (e.g., skills and knowledge, social  
 32 networks, lifestyles, diet), and
- 33 ■ institutions (legislative, social, managerial).  
 34

35 These factors are important both for characterizing potential effects of a changing climate on  
 36 human health, settlements and welfare and for evaluating the ability of the US to adapt to climate  
 37 change.

### 38 1.4.1 Economic status

39 The US is a developed economy with GDP approaching \$14 trillion and per capita income of  
 40 \$38,611 in 2007 (US BEA, 2008). The US economy has large private and public sectors, with  
 41 strong emphasis on market mechanisms and private ownership (Christensen *et al.*, 2007). A  
 42 nation’s economic status clearly is important for determining vulnerability to climate change:  
 43 wealthy nations have the economic resources to invest in adaptive measures and bear the costs of  
 44 impacts and adaptation thereby reducing their vulnerability (WHO, 2003, IPCC, 2001). With the  
 45 aging of the population (described in Section 1.3.1.1) however, the costs of health care are likely

1 to rise over the coming decades (Christensen *et al.*, 2007). Moreover, if the trend toward  
 2 globalization continues through the 21<sup>st</sup> century, markets, primary factors of production,  
 3 ownership of assets, and policies and governance will become more international in outlook  
 4 (Stiglitz, 2002). Unfortunately, there has been little research to understand how these economic  
 5 trends interact with climate change to affect vulnerability (i.e., whether they facilitate or hinder  
 6 adaptation to climate change in the US).

### 7 **1.4.2 Technology**

8 The past half-century has seen stunning levels of technological advancement in the U.S. which  
 9 has done much to improve American standards of living. The availability and access to  
 10 technology at varying levels, in key sectors such as energy, agriculture, water, transportation and  
 11 health is a key component to understanding vulnerability to climate change. Many technological  
 12 changes, both large and small, have reduced American's vulnerability to climate change (NAST,  
 13 2001). Improved roads and automobiles, better weather and climate forecasting systems,  
 14 computers and wireless communication, new drugs and vaccines, better building materials, more  
 15 efficient energy production – the list is very long indeed– have contributed to America's material  
 16 well being while reducing vulnerability to climate. Many of the adaptive strategies that are  
 17 currently deployed that protect human beings from climate involve technology (e.g., warning  
 18 systems, air conditioning and heating, pollution controls, building design, storm shelters, vector  
 19 control, water treatment and sanitation) (WHO, 2003). Continued advances in technology in the  
 20 21<sup>st</sup> century can increase substantially our ability to cope with climate change (IPCC, 2007a;  
 21 USGCRP, 2001).

22  
 23 However, it will be important to assess risks from proposed technological adaptations to avoid or  
 24 mitigate adverse effects (i.e., maladaptation) (Patz, 1996; Klein and Tol, 1997). For example, if  
 25 new pesticides are used to control disease vectors their effects on human populations, insect  
 26 predators, and insect resistance to pesticides need to be considered (Scheraga and Grambsch,  
 27 1998; Gubler *et al.*, 2001).

28  
 29 In addition, technological change can interact in complex ways with other socioeconomic factors  
 30 (e.g., migration patterns) and affect vulnerability to climate change. For example, advances in  
 31 transportation technology – electric streetcars, freight trucks, personal automobiles, and the  
 32 interstate highway system – have fueled the decentralization of urban regions (Hanson and  
 33 Giuliano 2004, Garreau 1991, Lang 2003). More recently, the rapid development of new  
 34 information technologies, such as the internet, have made previously remote locations more  
 35 accessible for work, recreation, or retirement. Whether these developments increase or decrease  
 36 vulnerability is unknown, but they do indicate the need for socioeconomic scenarios to better  
 37 characterize the complex linkages between climate and non-climate factors in order evaluate  
 38 vulnerability.

### 39 **1.4.3 Infrastructure**

40 Communities have reduced, and can further reduce, their vulnerability to adverse climate effects  
 41 through investments in infrastructure. For example, water resources in the US have been  
 42 modified and intensively managed over the years, partly in response to climate variability  
 43 (Cohan and Miller, 2001). These investments range from small, privately constructed  
 44 impoundments, water diversions and levees to major projects constructed by federal and state

1 governments. Public health infrastructures, such as sanitation facilities, waste water treatment,  
 2 and laboratory buildings reduce climate change health risks (Grambsch and Menne, 2003).  
 3 Coastal communities have developed an array of systems to manage erosion and protect against  
 4 flooding (see SAP 4.1 for an extensive discussion). More generally infrastructure such as roads,  
 5 rails and bridges, water supply systems and drainage, mass transit and buildings can reduce  
 6 vulnerability (Grambsch and Menne, 2003).

7  
 8 However, infrastructure can increase vulnerability if its presence encourages people to locate in  
 9 more vulnerable areas. For example, increasing the density of people in coastal metropolitan  
 10 areas, dependent on extensive fixed infrastructure, can increase vulnerability to extreme events  
 11 such as floods, storm surges and heat waves (NAST, 2001). In assessments of severe storms,  
 12 measures of property damage are consistently higher and loss of life lower in the US when  
 13 compared with less-developed countries (Cohan and Miller, 2001), reflecting both the high level  
 14 of development in coastal zones and the effectiveness of warnings and emergency preparedness  
 15 (Pielke and Pielke, 1997).

16  
 17 Fixed infrastructure itself has the potential to be adversely impacted by climate change, which  
 18 can increase vulnerability to climate change. For example, flooding can overwhelm sanitation  
 19 infrastructure and lead to water-related illnesses (Grambsch and Menne, 2003). Much of the  
 20 transportation infrastructure in the Gulf Coast has been constructed on land at elevations below  
 21 16.4 ft: storm surge, therefore poses risks of immediate flooding of infrastructure and damage  
 22 caused by the force of floodwaters (see SAP 4.7 for additional information on the vulnerability  
 23 of Gulf Coast transportation infrastructure to climate change). Damage to transportation  
 24 infrastructure can make it more difficult to assist affected populations (Grambsch and Menne,  
 25 2003).

#### 26 **1.4.4 Human and Social Capital and Behaviors**

27 While these factors are extremely difficult to quantify, much less project into the future, they are  
 28 widely perceived to be important in determining vulnerability in a number of different ways. In  
 29 general, countries with higher levels of “human capital” or knowledge are considered to be less  
 30 vulnerable to climate change. Effective adaptation will require individuals skilled at  
 31 recognizing, reporting and responding to climate change effects. Moreover, a number of the  
 32 adaptive measures described in the literature require knowledgeable, trained and skilled  
 33 personnel to implement them. For example, skilled public health managers, who understand  
 34 surveillance and diagnostic information, will be needed to mobilize appropriate responses.  
 35 People trained in the operation, quality control and maintenance of laboratories, communications  
 36 equipment, and sanitation, wastewater, and water supply systems are also key (Grambsch and  
 37 Menne, 2003). Researchers and scientists spanning a broad range of disciplines will be needed  
 38 to provide a sound basis for adaptive responses.

39  
 40 In addition to a countries’ human capital (i.e., the knowledge, experience and expertise of its  
 41 citizens) the relationships, exchange of resources and knowledge, and the levels of trust and  
 42 conflicts between individuals (i.e., “social capital”) are also important for understanding future  
 43 vulnerability to climate change (Adger 2003; Lehtonen 2004; Pelling and High 2005). Social  
 44 networks can play an important role in coping and recovery from extreme weather events  
 45 (Adger, 2003). For example, individuals who were socially isolated were found to be a greater

1 risk of dying from extreme heat (Semenza *et al.*, 1996), as well as people living in  
2 neighborhoods without public gathering places and active street life (Klinenberg 2002).

3  
4 Individual behaviors and responses to changing conditions also determine vulnerability. For  
5 example, fitness, body composition, and level of activity are among the factors that determine  
6 the impact extremely hot weather will have on the human body (see Chapter 2 for additional  
7 information). Over the past three decades, there has been a dramatic increase in obesity and  
8 associated health conditions such as diabetes<sup>6</sup> (Flegal *et al.*, 1998.). Whether this trend  
9 continues or not could have important implications for determining vulnerability to climate  
10 change. Individual responses and actions to reduce their exposures to extreme heat can also  
11 substantially ameliorate adverse health impacts (McGeehin and Mirabelli, 2001). Successfully  
12 motivating individuals to respond appropriately can therefore decrease vulnerability and reduce  
13 health impacts -- a key goal of public health efforts (McGeehin and Mirabelli, 2001).

#### 14 **1.4.5 Institutions**

15 The ability to respond to climate change and reduce vulnerability is influenced by social  
16 institutions as well as the social factors noted above. Institutions are viewed broadly in the  
17 climate change context and include a wide diversity of things such as regulations, rules and  
18 norms that guide behavior. Examples include past development and land use patterns, existing  
19 environmental and coastal laws; building codes, and legal rights. Institutions also can determine  
20 a decision-maker's access to information and the ways in which the information can be used  
21 (Moser *et al.*, 2007).

22  
23 Well-functioning institutions are essential to a modern society and provide a mechanism for  
24 stability in otherwise volatile environments (Moser *et al.*, 2007). Future options for responding  
25 to future climate impacts are thus shaped by our past and present institutions and how they  
26 evolve over time. In addition, the complex interaction of issues expected with climate change  
27 may require new arrangements and collaborations between institutions to address risks  
28 effectively, thereby enhancing adaptive capacity (Grambsch and Menne, 2003). A number of  
29 institutional changes have been identified that improve adaptive capacity and reduce  
30 vulnerability (see Chapter 3 for additional details). While the importance of institutions is clear,  
31 there are few scenarios which incorporate an explicit representation of them.

#### 32 **1.4.6 Interacting effects**

33 The same social and economic systems that bear the stress of climate change also bear the stress  
34 of non-climate factors, including: air and water pollution, the influx of immigrants, and an aging  
35 and over-burdened infrastructure in rapidly-growing metropolitan centers and coastal zones.  
36 While non-climate stressors are currently more pronounced than climate impacts, one cannot  
37 assume that this trend will persist. Understanding the impacts of climate change and variability  
38 on health and quality of life assumes knowledge of how these dynamics might vary by location  
39 and across time and socioeconomic group. The effects of climate change often spread from  
40 directly affected areas and sectors to other areas and sectors through complex linkages. The  
41 relative importance of climate change depends on the directness of each climate impact and on  
42 demographic, social, economic, institutional, and political factors, including, the degree of  
43 emergency preparedness.

---

<sup>6</sup> See <http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/> for additional data and information.

1 Consider the wide swath of damage left by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. Damage was  
 2 measured not only in terms of lives and property lost, but also in terms of the devastating impacts  
 3 on infrastructure, neighborhoods, businesses, schools, and hospitals as well as in the disruption  
 4 to families and friends in established communities, with lost lives and lost livelihoods,  
 5 challenges to psychological well-being, and exacerbation of chronic illnesses. While the  
 6 aftermath of a single hurricane is not the measure of climate change, such an event demonstrates  
 7 the disruptive power of climate impacts and the resulting tangle of climate and non-climate  
 8 stressors that complicate efforts to respond and to adapt. Certainly, the impacts following these  
 9 hurricanes reveal that socioeconomic factors and failures in human systems may be as damaging  
 10 as the storms themselves.

11  
 12 Another trend of significance for climate change is the suburbanization of poverty. A recent  
 13 study noted that by 2005 the number of low income households living in suburban communities  
 14 had for the first time surpassed the number living in central cities (Berube and Kneebone 2006).  
 15 Although the poverty rate in cities was still double the suburban rate, there were 1 million more  
 16 people living in poverty in America's suburbs. Many of these people live in older inner-ring  
 17 suburbs developed in the 1950's and 60's. The climate adaptation challenge for these places is  
 18 captured succinctly by a recent study: "Neither fully urban nor completely suburban, America's  
 19 older, inner-ring, "first" suburbs have a unique set of challenges—such as concentrations of  
 20 elderly and immigrant populations as well as outmoded housing and commercial buildings—  
 21 very different from those of the center city and fast growing newer places. Yet first suburbs exist  
 22 in a policy blind spot with little in the way of state or federal tools to help them adapt to their  
 23 new realities" (Puentes and Warren 2006).  
 24

## 25 **1.5 Reporting Uncertainty in SAP 4.6**

26 Uncertainty can be traced to a variety of sources: (1) a misspecification of the cause(s), such as  
 27 the omission of a causal factor resulting in spurious correlations; (2) mischaracterization of the  
 28 effect(s), such as a model that predicts cooling rather than warming; (3) absence of or imprecise  
 29 measurement or calibration (such as devices that fail to detect minute causal agents); (4)  
 30 fundamental stochastic (chance) processes; (5) ambiguity over the temporal ordering of cause  
 31 and effect; (6) time delays in cause and effect; and, (7) complexity where cause and effect  
 32 between certain factors are camouflaged by a context with multiple causes and effects, feedback  
 33 loops, and considerable noise.

34  
 35 A new perspective on the treatment of uncertainty has emerged from the IPCC Third and Fourth  
 36 Assessment processes. This new perspective suggests that uncertainties about projections of  
 37 climate changes, impacts, and responses include two fundamentally different dimensions. One  
 38 dimension recognizes that most processes and systems being observed are characterized by  
 39 inherent variability in outcomes, the more variable the process or system, the greater the  
 40 uncertainty associated with any attempt to project an outcome. A second dimension recognizes  
 41 limitations in our knowledge about processes and systems. These two dimensions are different in  
 42 what they imply about the value of research for improving the treatment of uncertainty.  
 43 Research can certainly reduce uncertainties associated with knowledge limitations, which can  
 44 sharpen a focus on more likely outcomes.

1 This report is a summary of the state of the science on the impacts of climate change on human  
2 health, human settlements and human welfare. With this focus, the assessment of uncertainty in  
3 this report is based on a comprehensive reading of the literature and the author's expert  
4 judgment, in which authors assign a confidence level to the major statements on the basis of an  
5 assessment of current knowledge. The considerations in determining confidence should include  
6 the degree of belief in the scientific community that available understanding, models, and  
7 analyses are accurate, expressed by the degree of consensus in the available evidence and its  
8 interpretation. This can be thought of using two different dimensions related to consensus, as  
9 shown in Figure 1.5.

10 **Figure 1.5 Considerations in determining confidence.**

11 In this report, each chapter author team comprehensively read the literature and assigned  
12 likelihood judgments that reflect their assessment, based on the current consensus in the science,  
13 the quality and amount of evidence as well as their expert judgment, that the given climate  
14 impact statement is likely to be true. The likelihood terminology and their corresponding values  
15 that are used in this report are shown in Table 1.2. As the focus of this report is on impacts, it is  
16 important to note that these likelihood statements refer to the statement of the impact, not  
17 statements related to underlying climatic changes.

18 The application of this approach to likelihood estimates demonstrates some variability across  
19 each of the three core chapters (Chapters 2-4). This variability in reporting uncertainty is based  
20 on the richness of their respective knowledge bases. A relatively more extensive and specific  
21 application of likelihood and state of the knowledge estimates is possible for health impacts, only  
22 a more general approach is warranted for conclusions about human settlements, and uncertainty  
23 statements about human welfare conclusions are necessarily the least explicit.

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## 1 1.7 Boxes

**Box 1.1** Potential impacts of heat and droughts: wildfires and reservoir levels

Two of the projected changes in climate -- increased temperatures and droughts -- can increase the risks of wildfires and water shortages. Fire frequency is correlated with temperature, fuel loads and fuel moisture. Periods of drought followed by weeks of extreme heat and low humidity provide ideal conditions for fire. Westerling *et al.* (2006) compiled a database of large wildfires in western United States forests since 1970 and compared them with hydroclimatic and land-surface data. They find that large wildfire activity increased suddenly and markedly in the mid-1980's with higher large-wildfire frequency and longer fire duration and season (Westerling, *et.al.*, 2006). The greatest increases in wildfires have occurred in mid-elevation forests in the Northern Rockies, and are strongly associated with increased spring and summer temperatures and earlier spring snowmelt (CCSP, 2008).

Droughts continue to be exacerbated by earlier spring snowmelt run-off in the mountainous West, which results in less water available in late summer. In addition, widespread declines in springtime snow water equivalent in the West have occurred over the period 1925–2000, especially since mid-century. Because high-elevation snow pack contributes approximately 70% of the annual runoff in the Colorado River Basin, these changes pose significant risks of water shortages. Water levels have fallen in recent years in reservoirs across the West. For example, Lake Mead, the largest man-made lake in the United States, has historically provided a steady water supply for the Colorado River Basin. However, drought conditions and decreased runoff have threatened the lake's supplies. The duration of drought conditions in the Colorado River system is similar in extent to a drought experienced in the late 1950s. As of October 2006, the lake was at 51% of capacity, with a surface area is 100,000 acres which is significantly less than the lake's maximum surface area of 162,700 acres. It is estimated that as a result of the 1999-2004 drought and increased water resources extraction, Lake Mead and Lake Powell will take 13 to 15 years of average flow conditions to refill.

Lake Mead Elevation at Hoover Dam



Source: Ken Dewey, High Plains Regional Climate Center and National Drought Mitigation Center. October 31, 2006. (<http://www.hprcc.unl.edu/nebraska/Lake-Mead-2006.html>)

1 **1.8 Tables**


2 **Table 1.2** Description of likelihood: probabilistic assessment of outcome having occurred or occurring  
 3 in the future based on quantitative analysis or elicitation of expert views.

Likelihood Terminology	Likelihood of the occurrence / outcome
Virtually certain	> 99% probability
Very likely	> 90% probability
Likely	> 66% probability
About as likely as not	33 - 66% probability
Unlikely	< 33% probability
Very unlikely	< 10% probability
Exceptionally unlikely	< 1% probability

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
1 **1.9 Figures**

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**Figure 1.1** Observed trends in annual average (a) temperature ( $^{\circ}$ F) and (b) precipitation (inches) across the continental United States from 1896 to 2006 (Source: NCDC, 2007)


1 **Figure 1.2** US Population Projections 2000-2100.



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
Data sources: Census Population Projections <http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/natsum-T1.html>  
 SRES Population Projections: <http://sres.ciesin.columbia.edu/tgci/>

1 **Figure 1.3** Population Pyramids of the US 2000 and 2050 (Interim Projections based on 2000 Census)  
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 4 Data source: Census Population Projections <http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj/>  
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
1 **Figure 1.4:** U.S. Population and Growth Trends with evidence of more pronounced growth projected  
 2 along the coasts, in urban centers, and in cities in the South and West (NAST, 2001).



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1 **Figure 2.5 Considerations in determining confidence.**



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1 **Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.6**

2

3 **Chapter 2: Effects of Global Change on Human Health**

4

5

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## 1 2.1 Introduction

2 Climate change can affect health directly and indirectly. Directly, extreme weather  
 3 events (floods, droughts, windstorms, fires, and heatwaves) can affect the health of  
 4 Americans and cause significant economic impacts. Indirectly, climate change can alter  
 5 or disrupt natural systems, making it possible for vector, water-, and foodborne diseases  
 6 to spread or emerge in areas where they had been limited or not existed, or for such  
 7 diseases to disappear by making areas less hospitable to the vector or pathogen (NRC,  
 8 2001). Climate also can affect the incidence of diseases associated with air pollutants  
 9 and aeroallergens<sup>1</sup>. (Bernard *et al.*, 2001) The cause-and-effect chain from climate  
 10 change to changing patterns of health outcomes is often complex and includes factors  
 11 such as initial health status, financial resources, effectiveness of public health programs,  
 12 and access to medical care. Therefore, the severity of future impacts will be determined  
 13 by changes in climate as well as by concurrent changes in nonclimatic factors and by  
 14 adaptations implemented to reduce negative impacts.

15 A comprehensive assessment of the potential impacts of climate variability and change  
 16 on human health in the United States was published in 2000 as part of the First National  
 17 Assessment of the Potential Impacts of Climate Variability and Change undertaken by the  
 18 U.S. Global Change Research Program. This Health Sector Assessment examined  
 19 potential impacts and identified research and data gaps to be addressed in future research;  
 20 results appeared in a special issue of *Environmental Health Perspectives* (May 2001).  
 21 The Health Sector Assessment's conclusions on the potential health impacts of climate  
 22 change in the United States included:

- 23 • Populations in Northeastern and Midwestern U.S. cities are likely to experience the  
 24 greatest number of illnesses and deaths in response to changes in summer  
 25 temperatures (McGeehin and Mirabelli, 2001).
- 26 • The health impacts of extreme weather events hinge on the vulnerabilities and  
 27 recovery capabilities of the natural environment and the local population (Greenough  
 28 *et al.*, 2001).
- 29 • If the climate becomes warmer and more variable, air quality is likely to be affected  
 30 (Bernard *et al.*, 2001). However, uncertainties in climate models make the direction  
 31 and degree of change speculative (Bernard and Ebi, 2001).
- 32 • Federal and State laws and regulatory programs protect much of the U.S. population  
 33 from waterborne disease. However, if climate variability increases, current and  
 34 future deficiencies in areas such as watershed protection, infrastructure, and storm  
 35 drainage systems will probably increase the risk of contamination events (Rose *et al.*,  
 36 2000).
- 37 • It is unlikely that vector- and rodent-borne diseases will cause major epidemics in the  
 38 U.S. if the public health infrastructure is maintained and improved (Gubler *et al.*,  
 39 2001).
- 40 • Multiple uncertainties preclude any definitive statement on the direction of potential  
 41 future change for each of the health outcomes assessed (Patz *et al.*, 2000).

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<sup>1</sup> Any of various airborne substances, such as pollen or spores, that can cause an allergic response.

1 The assessment further concluded that much of the U.S. population is protected against  
 2 adverse health outcomes associated with weather and/or climate by existing public health  
 3 and medical care systems, although certain populations are at increased risk.

4 This chapter of Synthesis Assessment Product 4.6 updates the Health Sector Assessment.  
 5 It also examines adaptation strategies that have been or are expected to be developed by  
 6 the public health community in response to the challenges and opportunities posed by  
 7 climate change. The first section of this chapter focuses on climate-related impacts on  
 8 human morbidity and mortality from extreme weather, vector-, water- and foodborne  
 9 diseases, and changes in air quality. For each health endpoint, the assessment addresses  
 10 the potential impacts, populations that are particularly vulnerable, and research and data  
 11 gaps that, if bridged, would allow significant advances in future assessments of the health  
 12 impacts of global change. The assessment includes research published from 2001  
 13 through early 2007 in the U.S. or in Canada, Europe, and Australia, where results may  
 14 provide insights for U.S. populations.

15 This chapter summarizes the current burden of climate-sensitive health determinants and  
 16 outcomes for the U.S., before assessing the potential health impacts of climate change.  
 17 Two types of studies are assessed. Studies that increase our understanding of the  
 18 associations between weather variables and health outcomes raise possible concerns  
 19 about the impacts of a changing climate. A few studies project the burden of health  
 20 outcomes using scenarios of socioeconomic and climate change.

21 It is important to note that the assessment focuses on how climate change could affect the  
 22 future health of Americans. However, the net impact of any changes will depend on  
 23 many other factors, including demographics; population and regional vulnerabilities; the  
 24 future social, economic, and cultural context; availability of resources and technological  
 25 options; built and natural environments; public health infrastructure; and the availability  
 26 and quality of health and social services.

27 The chapter then turns to adaptation to the potential health impacts of environmental  
 28 change in the United States. It also considers public health interventions (including  
 29 prevention, response, and treatment strategies) that could be revised, supplemented, or  
 30 implemented to protect human health in response to the challenges and opportunities  
 31 posed by global change; and how much adaptation could achieve.

## 32 **2.2 Observed Climate-Sensitive Health Outcomes in the U.S.**

### 33 **2.2.1 Thermal Extremes: Heat Waves**

34 Excess deaths occur during heatwaves, on days with higher-than-average temperatures,  
 35 and in places where summer temperatures vary more or where extreme heat is rare (Braga  
 36 *et al.* 2001). Figure 2.1 illustrates that the relation between temperature and mortality is  
 37 nonlinear, typically J- or U-shaped, and that increases in mortality occur even below  
 38 temperatures considered to be extremely hot. This figure was created using log-linear  
 39 regression to analyze 22 years of data on daily mortality and outdoor temperature in  
 40 eleven U.S. cities (Curriero *et al.* 2002). Exposure to excessive natural heat caused a

1 reported 4,780 deaths during the period 1979 to 2002, and an additional 1,203 deaths had  
 2 hyperthermia reported as a contributing factor (CDC 2005). These numbers are  
 3 underestimates of the total mortality associated with heatwaves because the person filling  
 4 out the death certificate may not always list heat as a cause. Furthermore, heat can  
 5 exacerbate chronic health conditions, and several analyses have reported associations  
 6 with cause-specific mortality, including cardiovascular, renal, and respiratory diseases;  
 7 diabetes; nervous system disorders; and other causes not specifically described as heat-  
 8 related (Conti *et al.* 2007; Fouillet *et al.* 2006; Medina-Ramon *et al.* 2006). Among the  
 9 most well-documented heatwaves in the U.S. are those that occurred in 1980 (St. Louis  
 10 and Kansas City, Missouri), 1995 (Chicago, Illinois), and 1999 (Cincinnati, Ohio;  
 11 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Chicago, Illinois). The highest death rates in these  
 12 heatwaves occurred in people over 65 years of age.

13 Less information exists on temperature-related morbidity, and those studies that have  
 14 examined hospital admissions and temperature have not seen consistent effects, either by  
 15 cause or by demonstrated coherence with mortality effects where both deaths and  
 16 hospitalizations were examined simultaneously (Kovats *et al.* 2004; Michelozzi *et al.*  
 17 2006; Schwartz *et al.* 2004; Semenza *et al.* 1999).

18 Age, fitness, body composition, and level of activity are important determinants of how  
 19 the human body responds to exposure to thermal extremes (DeGroot *et al.* 2006;  
 20 Havenith *et al.* 1995; Havenith *et al.* 1998; Havenith 2001). Groups particularly  
 21 vulnerable to heat-related mortality include the elderly, very young, city-dwellers, those  
 22 with less education, people on medications such as diuretics, the socially isolated, the  
 23 mentally ill, those lacking access to air conditioning, and outdoor laborers (Diaz *et al.*  
 24 2002; Klinenberg 2002; McGeehin and Mirabelli 2001; Semenza *et al.* 1996; Whitman *et al.*  
 25 1997; Basu *et al.* 2005; Gouveia *et al.* 2003; Greenberg *et al.* 1983; O'Neill *et al.*  
 26 2003; Schwartz 2005; Jones *et al.* 1982; Kovats *et al.* 2004; Schwartz *et al.* 2004;  
 27 Semenza *et al.* 1999; Watkins *et al.* 2001). A sociological analysis of the 1995 Chicago  
 28 heatwave found that people living in neighborhoods without public gathering places and  
 29 active street life were at higher risk, highlighting the important role that community and  
 30 societal characteristics can play in determining vulnerability (Klinenberg 2002).

31 **Figure 2.1** Temperature-mortality relative risk functions for 11 U.S. cities, 1973–1994.  
 32 Northern cities: Boston, Massachusetts; Chicago, Illinois; New York, New York;  
 33 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Baltimore, Maryland; and Washington, DC. Southern cities:  
 34 Charlotte, North Carolina; Atlanta, Georgia; Jacksonville, Florida; Tampa, Florida; and  
 35 Miami, Florida. Relative risk is defined as the risk of an event such as mortality relative  
 36 to exposure, such that the relative risk is a ratio of the probability of the event occurring  
 37 in the exposed group versus the probability of occurrence in the control (non-exposed)  
 38 group.

39 Urban heat islands may increase heat-related health impacts by raising air temperatures in  
 40 cities 2–10°F over the surrounding suburban and rural areas due to absorption of heat by  
 41 dark paved surfaces and buildings, lack of vegetation and trees, heat emitted from  
 42 buildings, vehicles, and air conditioners, and reduced air flow around buildings (EPA  
 43 2005; Pinho and Orgaz 2000; Vose *et al.* 2004; Xu and Chen 2004). However, in some

1 regions, urban areas may not experience greater heat-related mortality than in rural areas  
2 (Sheridan and Dolney 2003); few comparisons of this nature have been published.

3 The health impacts of high temperatures and high air pollution can interact, with the  
4 extent of interaction varying by location (Bates 2005; Goodman *et al.* 2004; Goodman *et al.*  
5 *et al.* 2004; Keatinge and Donaldson 2001; O'Neill *et al.* 2005; Ren *et al.* 2006).

### 6 **2.2.2 Thermal Extremes: Cold Waves**

7 From 1979 to 2002, an average of 689 reported deaths per year (range 417-1,021),  
8 totaling 16,555 over the period, were attributed to exposure to excessive cold  
9 temperatures (Fallico *et al.* 2005). Cold also contributes to deaths caused by respiratory  
10 and cardiovascular diseases, so the overall mortality burden is likely underestimated.  
11 Factors associated with increased vulnerability to cold include black race (Fallico *et al.*  
12 2005); living in Alaska, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Montana, or living in milder  
13 states that experience rapid temperature changes (North and South Carolina) and western  
14 states with greater ranges in nighttime temperatures (e.g., Arizona) (Fallico *et al.* 2005);  
15 having less education (O'Neill *et al.* 2003); being female or having pre-existing  
16 respiratory illness (Wilkinson *et al.* 2004); lack of protective clothing (Donaldson *et al.*  
17 2001); income inequality, fuel poverty, and low residential thermal standards (Healy  
18 2003); and living in nursing homes (Hajat *et al.* 2007).

19 Because climate change is projected to reduce the severity and length of the winter  
20 season (Alley *et al.*, 2007), there is widespread speculation that cold-related mortality  
21 will decrease. However, many factors contribute to winter mortality, making highly  
22 uncertain how climate change could affect mortality. No projections have been published  
23 for the U.S. that incorporate critical factors, such as the influence of influenza outbreaks.

### 24 **2.2.3 Extreme Events: Hurricanes, Floods, and Wildfires**

25 The United States experiences a wide range of extreme weather events, including  
26 hurricanes, floods, tornadoes, blizzards, windstorms, and drought. Other extreme events,  
27 such as wildfires, are strongly influenced by meteorological conditions. Direct morbidity  
28 and mortality due to an event increase with the intensity and duration of the event, and  
29 can decrease with advance warning and preparation. Health also can be affected  
30 indirectly. Examples include carbon monoxide poisonings from portable electric  
31 generator use following hurricanes (CDC, 2006c) and an increase in gastroenteritis cases  
32 among hurricane evacuees (CDC, 2005a). The mental health impacts (e.g. post traumatic  
33 stress disorder, depression) of these events are likely to be especially important, but are  
34 difficult to assess (Middleton *et al.*, 2002; Russoniello *et al.*, 2002; Verger *et al.*, 2003;  
35 North *et al.*, 2004; Fried *et al.*, 2005; Weisler *et al.*, 2006). However, failure to fully  
36 account for direct and indirect health impacts may result in inadequate preparation for  
37 and response to future extreme weather events.

38 Figure 2.2 shows the annual number of deaths attributable to hurricanes in the U.S. from  
39 the 1900 Galveston storm, (NOAA, 2006), records for the years 1940-2004 (NOAA,  
40 2005a), and a summary of a subset of the 2005 hurricanes (NOAA, 2007). The data

1 shown are dominated by the 1900 Galveston storm and a subset of 2005 hurricanes,  
 2 particularly Katrina and Rita, which together accounted for 1,833 of the 2,002 lives lost  
 3 to hurricanes in 2005 (NOAA, 2007b). From 1940 through 2005 roughly 4,300 lives  
 4 were lost in the U.S. to hurricanes. The impact of the 2005 hurricane season is especially  
 5 notable as it doubled the estimate of the average number of lives lost to hurricanes in the  
 6 U.S. over the previous 65 years.

7 **Figure 2.2** Annual Deaths Attributed to Hurricanes in the United States, 1900 and 1940-  
 8 2005

9 Figure 2.3 shows the annual number of deaths attributed to flooding in the United States  
 10 from 1940-2005 (NOAA, 2007a). Over this period roughly 7,000 lives were lost.

11 **Figure 2.3** Annual Deaths Attributed to Flooding in the United States, 1940-2005

12 A wildfire's health risk is largely a function of the population in the affected area and the  
 13 speed and intensity with which the wildfire moves through those areas. Wildfires can  
 14 increase eye and respiratory illnesses due to fire-related air pollution. Climate conditions  
 15 affect wildfire incidence and severity in the West (Westerling *et al.*, 2003; Gedalof *et al.*,  
 16 2005; Sibold and Veblen, 2006). Between 1987-2003 and 1970-1986, there was a nearly  
 17 fourfold increase in the incidence of large Western wildfires (i.e., fires that burned at  
 18 least 400 hectares) (Westerling *et al.*, 2006). The key driver of this increase was an  
 19 average increase in springtime temperature of 0.87°C that affected spring snowmelt,  
 20 subsequent potential for evapotranspiration, loss of soil moisture, and drying of fuels  
 21 (Running, 2006; Westerling *et al.*, 2006). Data providing a time-series summary of  
 22 deaths similar to the data in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 was not identified.

23 There is a rich body of literature detailing the mental health impacts of extreme weather  
 24 events. Anxiety and depression, the most common mental health disorders, can be  
 25 directly attributable to the experience of the event (i.e. being flooded) or indirectly during  
 26 the recovery process (e.g. Gerrity and Flynn, 1997). These psychological effects tend to  
 27 be much longer lasting and can be worse than the physical effects experienced during an  
 28 event and its immediate aftermath.

29 Extreme events are often multi-strike stressors, with stress associated with the event  
 30 itself; the disruption and problems of the recovery period; and the worry or anxiety about  
 31 the risk of recurrence of the event (Tapsell *et al.*, 2002). During the recovery period,  
 32 mental health problems can arise from the problems associated with geographic  
 33 displacement, damage to the home or loss of familiar possessions, and stress involved  
 34 with the process of repairing. The full impact often is not appreciated until after people's  
 35 homes have been put back in order. For instance, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina  
 36 in 2005, mental health services in New Orleans were challenged by an increased  
 37 incidence of serious mental illness, including anxiety, major depression, and post-  
 38 traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Shortly after Katrina, a Centers for Disease Control  
 39 and Prevention poll found that nearly half of all survey respondents indicated a need for  
 40 mental health care, yet less than 2% were receiving professional attention (Weisler *et al.*  
 41 2006).

## 1 2.2.4 Indirect Health Impacts of Climate Change

2 The observation that most vector-, water- or foodborne and/or animal-associated diseases  
 3 exhibit a distinct seasonal pattern suggests *a priori* that weather and/or climate influence  
 4 their distribution and incidence. The following sections differentiate between zoonotic  
 5 and water- and foodborne diseases, although many water- and foodborne diseases are  
 6 zoonotic.

### 7 2.2.4.1 Vectorborne and Zoonotic (VBZ) Diseases

8 Transmission of infectious agents by blood-feeding arthropods (particular insect or tick  
 9 species) and/or by non-human vertebrates (certain rodents, canids, and other mammals)  
 10 has changed significantly in the U.S. during the past century. Diseases such as rabies and  
 11 cholera have become less widespread and diseases such as typhus, malaria, yellow fever,  
 12 and dengue fever have largely disappeared, primarily because of environmental  
 13 modification and/or socioeconomic development (Philip and Bozeboom, 1973; Beneson,  
 14 1995; Reiter, 1996). While increasing average temperatures may allow the permissive  
 15 range for *Aedes aegypti*, the mosquito vector of dengue virus, to move further north in the  
 16 US, it is unlikely that more cases of dengue fever will be observed because most people  
 17 are protected while living indoors due to quality housing. Indeed, a recent epidemic of  
 18 dengue in southern Texas and northern Mexico produced many cases among the  
 19 relatively poor Mexicans, and very few cases among Texans (Reiter *et al.* 1999). At the  
 20 same time, other diseases reported their distribution either because of suitable  
 21 environmental conditions (including climate) or enhanced detection (examples include  
 22 Lyme disease, ehrlichioses, and Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome) or were introduced and  
 23 are expanding their range due to appropriate climatic and ecosystem conditions (West  
 24 Nile Virus; e.g. Reisen *et al.* 2006). Still others are associated with non-human  
 25 vertebrates that have complex associations with climate variability and human disease  
 26 (e.g. plague, influenza). The burden of VBZ diseases in the U.S. is not negligible and  
 27 may grow in the future because the forces underlying VBZ disease risk simultaneously  
 28 involve weather/climate, ecosystem change, social and behavioral factors, and larger  
 29 political-economic forces that are part of globalization. In addition, introduction of  
 30 pathogens from other regions of the world is a very real threat.

31 Few original research articles on climate and VBZ diseases have been published in the  
 32 U.S. and in other developed temperate countries since the First National Assessment.  
 33 Overall, these studies provide evidence that climate affects the abundance and  
 34 distributions of vectors that may carry West Nile virus, Western Equine encephalitis,  
 35 Eastern Equine encephalitis, Bluetongue virus, and Lyme disease. Climate also may  
 36 affect disease risk, but sometimes in counter-intuitive ways that do not necessarily  
 37 translate to increased disease incidence (Wegbreit and Reisen, 2000; Subak, 2003;  
 38 McCabe and Bunnell, 2004; DeGaetano, 2005; Purse *et al.*, 2005; Kunkel *et al.*, 2006;  
 39 Ostfeld *et al.*, 2006; Shone *et al.*, 2006). Changes in other factors such as hosts, habitats,  
 40 and human behavior are also important.

### 41 2.2.4.2 Waterborne and Foodborne Diseases



1 Water and foodborne diseases continue to cause significant morbidity in the U.S. In  
 2 2002, there were 1,330 food-related disease outbreaks (Lynch *et al.*, 2006), 34 outbreaks  
 3 from recreational water (2004), and 30 outbreaks from drinking water (2004) (Dziuban *et*  
 4 *al.*, 2006; Liang *et al.*, 2006). For outbreaks of foodborne disease with known etiology,  
 5 bacteria (*Salmonella*) accounted for 55% and viruses accounted for 33% (Lynch *et al.*,  
 6 2006). Viral associated outbreaks rose from 16% in 1998 to 42% in 2002, primarily due  
 7 to increases in norovirus (Lynch *et al.*, 2006). In recreational water, bacteria accounted  
 8 for 32% of outbreaks, parasites (primarily *Cryptosporidium*) for 24%, and viruses 10%  
 9 (Dziuban *et al.*, 2006). Similarly in drinking water outbreaks of known etiology, bacteria  
 10 were the most commonly identified agent (29%, primarily *Campylobacter*), followed by  
 11 parasites and viruses (each identified 5% of the time) (2003 – 2004; Liang *et al.*, 2006).  
 12 Gastroenteritis continues to be the primary disease associated with food and water  
 13 exposure. In 2003 and 2004, gastroenteritis was noted in 48% and 68% of reported  
 14 recreational and drinking water outbreaks, respectively (Dziuban *et al.*, 2006; Liang *et*  
 15 *al.*, 2006).

16 Water- and foodborne disease remain highly underreported (e.g., Mead *et al.*, 1999).  
 17 Few people seek medical attention and of those that do, few cases are diagnosed (many  
 18 pathogens are difficult to detect and identify in stool samples) or reported. Using a  
 19 combination of underreporting estimates, passive and active surveillance data, and  
 20 hospital discharge data, Mead *et al.* (1999) estimated that over 210 million cases of  
 21 gastroenteritis occur annually in the U.S., including over 900,000 hospitalizations and  
 22 over 6,000 deaths. More recently, Herikstad *et al.* (2002) estimated as many as 375  
 23 million episodes of diarrhea occur annually in the U.S., based on a self-reporting study.  
 24 These numbers far exceed previous estimates. Of the total estimated annual cases, just  
 25 over 39 million can be attributed to a specific pathogen and approximately 14 million are  
 26 transmitted by food (Mead *et al.*, 1999). While bacteria continue to cause the majority of  
 27 documented foodborne and waterborne outbreaks (Lynch *et al.* 2006; Liang *et al.* 2006),  
 28 the majority of sporadic (non outbreak) cases of disease are caused by viruses (67%;  
 29 primarily noroviruses), followed by bacteria (30%, primarily *Campylobacter* and  
 30 *Salmonella*) and parasites (3%, primarily *Giardia* and *Cryptosporidium*). While the  
 31 outcome of many gastrointestinal diseases is mild and self limiting, they can be fatal or  
 32 significantly decrease fitness in vulnerable populations, including young children, the  
 33 immunocompromised, and the elderly. Children ages 1-4 and older adults (>80 years)  
 34 each make up more than 25% of hospitalizations involving gastroenteritis, but older  
 35 adults contributed to 85% of the associated deaths (Gangarosa *et al.*, 1992). As the U.S.  
 36 population ages, the economic and public health burden of diarrheal disease will increase  
 37 proportionally without appropriate interventions.

38 Most pathogens of concern for food- and waterborne exposure are enteric and transmitted  
 39 by the fecal-oral route. Climate may affect the pathogen directly by influencing its  
 40 growth, survival, persistence, transmission, or virulence. In addition, there may be  
 41 important interactions between land-use practices and climate variability. For example,  
 42 incidence of foodborne disease associated with fresh produce is growing (FDA 2001;  
 43 Powell and Chapman 2007). Storm events and flooding may result in the contamination  
 44 of food crops (especially produce such as leafy greens and tomatoes) with feces from

1 nearby livestock or feral animals. Therefore, changing climate or environments may alter  
2 the transmission of pathogens or affect the ecology and/or habitat of zoonotic reservoirs  
3 (NAS, 2001)

4 Studies in North America (U.S. and Canada) (Fleury *et al.*, 2006; Naumova *et al.*, 2006),  
5 Australia (D'Souza *et al.*, 2004), and several countries across Europe (Kovats *et al.*,  
6 2004a) report striking similarities in correlations between peak ambient temperatures  
7 (controlled for season) and peak in clinical cases of salmonellosis. Over this broad  
8 geographic range, yearly peaks in salmonellosis cases occur within 1 to 6 weeks of the  
9 highest reported ambient temperatures. Mechanisms suggested include replication in  
10 food products at various stages of processing (D'Souza *et al.*, 2004; Naumova *et al.*,  
11 2006) and changes in eating habits during warm summer months (i.e., outdoor eating)  
12 (Fleury *et al.*, 2006). Additionally, because *Salmonella* are well adapted to both host  
13 conditions and the environment, they can grow readily even under low nutrient  
14 conditions at warm temperatures (e.g., in water and associated with fruits and vegetables)  
15 (Zhuang *et al.*, 1995; Mouslim *et al.*, 2002). Evidence supports the notion that increasing  
16 global temperatures will likely increase rates of salmonellosis; however, additional  
17 research is needed to determine the critical drivers behind this trend (i.e., intrinsic  
18 properties of the pathogen or extrinsic factors related to human behavior).

19 The possible effects of increasing temperatures on *Campylobacter* infection rates and  
20 patterns cannot be reliably projected. The apparent seasonality of campylobacteriosis  
21 incidence is more variable than salmonellosis and temperature models are less consistent  
22 in their ability to account for the observed infection patterns. In the northeastern U.S.,  
23 Canada, and the U.K., *Campylobacter* infection peaks coincide with high annual daily or  
24 weekly temperatures (Louis *et al.*, 2005; Fleury *et al.*, 2006; Naumova *et al.*, 2006).  
25 However, in several other European countries, campylobacteriosis rates peak earlier,  
26 before high annual temperatures, and in those cases temperature accounts for only 4% of  
27 the interannual variability (Kovats *et al.*, 2005b). Pathogenic species of *Campylobacter*  
28 cannot replicate in the environment and will not persist long under non-microaerophilic  
29 conditions, suggesting that high ambient temperatures would not contribute to increased  
30 replication in water or in food products.

31 Leptospirosis is a re-emerging disease in the U.S. and, given its wide case distribution,  
32 high number of pathogenic strains and wide array of hosts, it is often cited as one of the  
33 most widespread zoonotic disease in the world (Meites *et al.*, 2004; WHO 1999). While  
34 it has not been a reportable disease nationally since 1995, several states continue to  
35 collect passive surveillance data and cases continue to be reported (Katz *et al.*, 2002;  
36 Meites *et al.*, 2004). Because increased disease rates are linked to warm temperatures,  
37 epidemiological evidence suggest that climate change may increase the number of cases.

38 Pathogenic species of *Vibrio* (primarily *V. vulnificus*) account for 20% of sporadic  
39 shellfish-related illnesses and over 95% of deaths (Lipp and Rose 1997; Morris 2003).  
40 While the overall incidence of illness from *Vibrio* infections remains low, the rate of  
41 infection increased 41% since 1996 (Vugia *et al.*, 2006). *Vibrio* species are more  
42 frequently associated with warm climates (e.g. Janda *et al.*, 1988; Lipp *et al.*, 2002).  
43 Coincident with proliferation in the environment, human cases also occur during warm

1 temperatures. In the US, the highest case rates occur in the summer months (Dziuban *et*  
2 *al.*, 2006). Given the close association between temperature, the pathogen, and disease,  
3 increasing temperatures may increase the geographic range and disease burdens of *Vibrio*  
4 pathogens (e.g., Lipp *et al.*, 2002). For example, increasing prevalence and diversity of  
5 *Vibrio* species has been noted in northern Atlantic waters of the U.S. coincident with  
6 warm water (Thompson *et al.*, 2004). Additionally, although most cases of *V. vulnificus*  
7 infection are attributed to Gulf Coast states, this species recently has been isolated from  
8 northern waters in the U.S. (Pfeffer *et al.*, 2003; Randa *et al.*, 2004).

9 The most striking example of an increased range in pathogen distribution and incidence  
10 was documented in 2004, when an outbreak of shellfish-associated *V. parahaemolyticus*  
11 was reported from Prince William Sound in Alaska (McLaughlin *et al.*, 2005). *V.*  
12 *parahaemolyticus* had never been isolated from Alaskan shellfish before and it was  
13 thought that Alaskan waters were too cold to support the species (McLaughlin *et al.*,  
14 2005). In the period preceding the July 2004 outbreak, water temperatures in the  
15 harvesting area consistently exceeded 15°C and the mean daily water temperatures were  
16 significantly higher than in the prior six years (McLaughlin *et al.*, 2005). This outbreak  
17 extended the northern range of oysters known to contain *V. parahaemolyticus* and cause  
18 illness by 1,000 km. Given the well-documented association between increasing sea  
19 surface temperatures and proliferation of many *Vibrio* species, evidence suggests that  
20 increasing global temperatures will lead to an increased burden of disease associated with  
21 certain *Vibrio* species in the U.S., especially *V. vulnificus* and *V. parahaemolyticus*.

22 Protozoan parasites, particularly *Cryptosporidium* and *Giardia*, contribute significantly to  
23 waterborne and to a lesser extent foodborne disease burdens in the U.S. Both parasites  
24 are zoonotic and form environmentally resistant infective stages, with only 10-12 oocysts  
25 or cysts required to cause disease. In 1998, 1.2 cases of cryptosporidiosis per 100,000  
26 people were reported in the U.S. (Dietz and Roberts, 2000); the immunocompromised are  
27 at particularly high risk (Casman *et al.*, 2001; King and Monis, 2006). Between 2003 and  
28 2004, of the 30 reported outbreaks of gastroenteritis from recreational water, 78.6% were  
29 due to *Cryptosporidium* and 14.3% were due to *Giardia* (Dziuban *et al.*, 2006). *Giardia*  
30 has historically been the most commonly diagnosed parasite in the U.S.; between 1992  
31 and 1997 there were 9.5 cases per 100,000 people (Furness *et al.*, 2000). Both  
32 *Cryptosporidium* and *Giardia* case reports peak in late summer and early fall, particularly  
33 among younger age groups (Dietz and Roberts, 2000; Furness *et al.*, 2000). For both  
34 parasites, peak rates of reported infection in Massachusetts occurred approximately one  
35 month after the annual temperature peak (Naumova *et al.*, 2006). The lagged association  
36 between peak annual temperatures and peaks in reported cases in late summer has been  
37 attributed to increased exposure during the summer bathing season, especially in the  
38 younger age groups, and to a slight lag in reporting (Dietz and Roberts 2000; Furness *et*  
39 *al.*, 2000; Casman *et al.*, 2001). With increasing global temperatures, an increase in  
40 recreational use of water can be reasonably expected and could lead to increased  
41 exposure among certain groups, especially children.

42 *Naegleria fowleri* is a free-living amoeboflagellate found in lakes and ponds at warm  
43 temperatures, either naturally or in thermally polluted bodies of water. While relatively  
44 rare, infections are almost always fatal (Lee *et al.*, 2002). *N. fowleri* can be detected in

1 environmental waters at rates up to 50% (Wellings *et al.*, 1977) at water temperatures  
 2 above 25°C (Cabanes *et al.*, 2001). Cases are consistently reported in the U.S.; between  
 3 1999 and 2000, four cases (all fatal) were reported. While *N. fowleri* continues to be a  
 4 rare disease, it remains more common in the U.S. than elsewhere in the world (Marciano-  
 5 Cabral *et al.*, 2003). Given its association with warm water, elevated temperatures could  
 6 increase this pathogen's range.

7 Epidemiologically significant viruses for food and water exposure include enteroviruses,  
 8 rotaviruses, hepatitis A virus, and norovirus. Viruses account for 67% of foodborne  
 9 disease, and the vast majority of these are due to norovirus (Mead *et al.*, 1999).  
 10 Rotavirus accounts for a much smaller fraction of viral foodborne disease (Mead *et al.*,  
 11 1999), but is a significant cause of diarrheal disease among infants and young children  
 12 (Charles *et al.*, 2006). Enteroviruses are not reportable and therefore incidence rates are  
 13 poorly reflected in surveillance summaries (Khetsuriani *et al.*, 2006). With the exception  
 14 of hepatitis A (Naumova *et al.*, 2006), enteric viral infection patterns follow consistent  
 15 year to year trends. Enteroviruses are characterized by peaks in cases in the early to late  
 16 summer (Khetsuriani *et al.*, 2006), while rotavirus and norovirus infections typically peak  
 17 in the winter (Cook *et al.*, 1990; Lynch *et al.*, 2006). No studies have been able to  
 18 identify a clear role for temperature in viral infection patterns.

19 An analysis of waterborne outbreaks associated with drinking water in the United States  
 20 between 1948 and 1994 found that 51% of outbreaks occurred following a daily  
 21 precipitation event in the 90th percentile and 68% occurred when precipitation levels  
 22 reached the 80th percentile (Curriero *et al.*, 2001) (Figure 2.4). Similarly, Thomas *et al.*  
 23 (2006) found that the risk of waterborne disease doubled when rainfall amounts surpassed  
 24 the 93rd percentile. Rose *et al.* (2000) found that the relationship between rainfall and  
 25 disease was stronger for surface water outbreaks, but the association was significant for  
 26 both surface and groundwater sources. In 2000, groundwater used for drinking water in  
 27 Walkerton, Ontario was contaminated with *E. coli* O157:H7 and *Campylobacter* during  
 28 rains that surpassed the 60-year event mark for the region and the 100-year event mark in  
 29 local areas (Auld *et al.*, 2004). In combination with preceding record high temperatures,  
 30 2,300 people in a community of 4,800 residents became ill (Hrudey *et al.*, 2003; Auld *et al.*,  
 31 2004).

32 **Figure 2.4** Drinking Waterborne Disease Outbreaks and 90%-ile Precipitation Events (a  
 33 two month lag precedes outbreaks); 1948 – 1994.

34 Floodwaters may increase the likelihood of contaminated drinking water and lead to  
 35 incidental exposure to standing floodwaters. In 1999, Hurricane Floyd hit North Carolina  
 36 and resulted in severe flooding of much of the eastern portion of the state, including  
 37 extensive hog farming operations. Residents in the affected areas experienced over twice  
 38 the rate of gastrointestinal illness following the flood (Setzer and Domino, 2004).  
 39 Following the severe floods of 2001 in the Midwest, contact with floodwater was shown  
 40 to increase the rate and risk of gastrointestinal illness, especially among children (Wade  
 41 *et al.*, 2004); however, consumption of tap water was not a risk factor as drinking water  
 42 continued to meet all regulatory standards (Wade *et al.*, 2004).

### 1 2.2.4.3 Influenza

2 Influenza may be considered a zoonosis in that pigs, ducks, etc. serve as non-human hosts  
 3 to the influenza viruses (e.g. H3N2, H1N1) that normally infect humans (not H5N1). A  
 4 number of recent studies evaluated the influence of weather and climate variability on the  
 5 timing and intensity of the annual influenza season in the U.S. and Europe. Results  
 6 indicated that cold winters alone do not predict pneumonia and influenza (P&I)-related  
 7 winter deaths, even though cold spells may serve as a short-term trigger (Dushoff *et al.*,  
 8 2005), and that regional differences in P&I mortality burden may be attributed to climate  
 9 patterns and to the dominant circulating virus subtype (Greene *et al.*, 2006). Studies in  
 10 France and the U.S. demonstrated that the magnitude of seasonal transmission (whether  
 11 measured as mortality or morbidity) during winter seasons is significantly higher during  
 12 years with cold El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) conditions than during warm  
 13 ENSO years (Flahault *et al.*, 2004; Viboud *et al.*, 2004), whereas a study in California  
 14 concluded that higher temperatures and El Niño years increased hospital admissions for  
 15 viral pneumonia (Ebi *et al.*, 2001). In an attempt to better understand the spatio-temporal  
 16 patterns of ENSO and influenza, Choi *et al.* (2006) used stochastic models (mathematical  
 17 models that take into account the presence of randomness) to analyze California county-  
 18 specific influenza mortality, and produced maps that showed different risks during the  
 19 warm and cool phases. In general, these studies of influenza further support the  
 20 importance of climate drivers at a global and regional scale, but have not advanced our  
 21 understanding of underlying mechanisms.

### 22 2.2.4.4 Valley Fever

23 Valley fever (Coccidioidomycosis) is an infectious disease caused by inhalation of the  
 24 spores of a soil-inhabiting fungus that thrives during wet periods following droughts.  
 25 The disease is of public health importance in the desert southwest. In the early 1990s,  
 26 California experienced an epidemic of Valley Fever following five years of drought  
 27 (Kolivras and Comrie, 2003). Its incidence varies seasonally and annually, which may be  
 28 partly due to climatic variations (Kolivras and Comrie, 2003; Zender and Talamantes,  
 29 2006). If so, then climate change could affect its incidence and geographic range.

### 30 2.2.4.5 Morbidity and Mortality Due to Changes in Air Quality

31 Millions of Americans continue to live in areas that do not meet the health-based  
 32 National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ozone and fine particulate matter  
 33 (PM<sub>2.5</sub>). Both ozone and PM<sub>2.5</sub> have well-documented health effects, and levels of  
 34 these two pollutants have the potential to be influenced by climate change in a variety of  
 35 ways.

36 Ground-level ozone is formed mainly by reactions that occur in polluted air in the  
 37 presence of sunlight. Nitrogen oxides (emitted mainly by burning of fuels) and volatile  
 38 organic compounds (emitted both by burning of fuels and by evaporation from vegetation  
 39 and stored fuels, solvents, and other chemicals) are the key precursor pollutants for ozone  
 40 formation. Ozone formation increases with greater sunlight and higher temperatures; it  
 41 reaches peak concentrations during the warm half of the year, and then mostly in the late

1 afternoon and early evening. Cloud cover and mixing height are two additional  
 2 meteorological factors that influence ozone concentrations. It has been firmly established  
 3 that breathing ozone results in short-term, reversible decreases in lung function  
 4 (Folinsbee *et al.* 1988) as well as inflammation deep in the lungs (Devlin *et al.*, 1991). In  
 5 addition, epidemiology studies of people living in polluted areas have suggested that  
 6 ozone may increase the risk of asthma-related hospital visits (Schwartz, 1995), premature  
 7 mortality (Kinney and Ozkaynak, 1991; Bell *et al.*, 2004), and possibly the development  
 8 of asthma (McConnell *et al.*, 2002). Vulnerability to ozone health effects is greater for  
 9 persons who spend time outdoors during episode periods, especially with physical  
 10 exertion, because this results in a higher cumulative dose to the lung. Thus, children,  
 11 outdoor laborers, and athletes may be at greater risk than people who spend more time  
 12 indoors and who are less active. At a given lung dose, little has been firmly established  
 13 about vulnerability as a function of age, race, and/or existing health status. However,  
 14 because their lungs are inflamed, asthmatics are potentially more vulnerable than non-  
 15 asthmatics.

16 PM<sub>2.5</sub> is a far more complex pollutant than ozone, consisting of all airborne solid or  
 17 liquid particles that share the property of being less than 2.5 micrometers in aerodynamic  
 18 diameter.<sup>2</sup> All such particles are included, regardless of their size, composition, and  
 19 biological reactivity. PM<sub>2.5</sub> has complex origins, including primary particles directly  
 20 emitted from sources and secondary particles that form via atmospheric reactions of  
 21 precursor gases. Most of the particles captured as PM<sub>2.5</sub> arise from burning of fuels,  
 22 including primary particles such as diesel soot and secondary particles such as sulfates  
 23 and nitrates. Epidemiologic studies have demonstrated associations between both short-  
 24 term and long-term average ambient concentrations and a variety of adverse health  
 25 outcomes including respiratory symptoms such as coughing and difficulty breathing,  
 26 decreased lung function, aggravated asthma, development of chronic bronchitis, heart  
 27 attack, and arrhythmias (Dockery *et al.*, 1993; Samet *et al.*, 2000; Pope *et al.*, 1995, 2002,  
 28 2004; Pope and Dockery 2006; Dominici *et al.*, 2006; Laden *et al.*, 2006). Associations  
 29 have also been reported for increased school absences, hospital admissions, emergency  
 30 room visits, and premature mortality. Susceptible individuals include people with  
 31 existing heart and lung disease, and diabetics, children, and older adults. Because the  
 32 mortality risks of PM<sub>2.5</sub> appear to be mediated through narrowing of arteries and  
 33 resultant heart impacts (Künzli *et al.*, 2005), persons or populations with high blood  
 34 pressure and/or pre-existing heart conditions may be at increased risk. In a study of  
 35 mortality in relation to long-term PM<sub>2.5</sub> concentrations in 50 U.S. cities, individuals  
 36 without a high school education demonstrated higher concentration/response functions  
 37 that those with more education (Pope *et al.*, 2002). This result suggests that low  
 38 education was a proxy for increased likelihood of engaging in outdoor labor with an  
 39 associated increase in exposure to ambient air.

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<sup>2</sup> Aerodynamic diameter is defined in a complex way to adjust for variations in shape and density of various particles, and is based on the physical diameter of a water droplet that would settle to the ground at the same rate as the particle in question. For a spherical water particle, the aerodynamic and physical diameters are identical.

1 Using a coupled climate-air pollution three-dimensional model, Jacobson (2008)  
 2 compared the health effects of pre-industrial vs. present day atmospheric concentrations  
 3 of CO<sub>2</sub>. The results suggest that increasing concentrations of CO<sub>2</sub> increased tropospheric  
 4 ozone and PM<sub>2.5</sub>, which increased mortality by about 1.1% per degree temperature  
 5 increase over the baseline rate; Jacobson estimated that about 40% of the increase was  
 6 due to ozone and the rest to particulate matter. The estimated mortality increase was  
 7 higher in locations with poorer air quality.

#### 8 2.2.4.6 Aeroallergens and Allergenic Diseases

9 Climate change has caused an earlier onset of the spring pollen season for several species  
 10 in North America (Casassa *et al.*, 2007). Although data are limited, it is reasonable to  
 11 infer that allergenic diseases caused by pollen, such as allergic rhinitis, also have  
 12 experienced concomitant changes in seasonality (Emberlin *et al.*, 2002; Burr *et al.*, 2003).  
 13 Several laboratory studies suggest that increasing CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations and temperatures  
 14 could increase ragweed pollen production and prolong the ragweed pollen season (Wan *et al.*,  
 15 2002; Wayne *et al.*, 2002; Singer *et al.*, 2005; Ziska *et al.*, 2005; Rogers *et al.*, 2006)  
 16 and increase some plant metabolites that can affect human health (Ziska *et al.*, 2005;  
 17 Mohan *et al.*, 2006). Although there are suggestions that the abundance of a few species  
 18 of airborne pollens has increased due to climate change, it is unclear whether the  
 19 allergenic content of these pollen types has changed (Huynen and Menne, 2003; Beggs  
 20 and Bambrick, 2005). The introduction of new invasive species associated with climatic  
 21 and other changes, such as ragweed and poison ivy, may increase current health risks.  
 22 There are no projections of the possible impacts of climate change on allergenic diseases.

## 23 **2.3 Projected Health Impacts of Climate Change in the U.S.**

### 24 **2.3.1 Heat-Related Mortality**

25 Determinants of how climate change could alter heat-related mortality include actual  
 26 changes in the mean and variance of future temperatures; factors affecting temperature  
 27 variability at the local scale; demographic and health characteristics of the population;  
 28 and policies that affect the social and economic structure of communities, including  
 29 urban design, energy policy, water use, and transportation planning. Barring an  
 30 unexpected and catastrophic economic decline, residential and industrial development  
 31 will increase over the coming decades, which could increase urban heat islands in the  
 32 absence of urban design and new technologies to reduce heat loads.

33 The U.S. population is aging; the percent of the population over age 65 is projected to be  
 34 13% by 2010 and 20% by 2030 (over 50 million people) (Day 1996). Older adults are  
 35 physiologically and socially vulnerable (Khosla and Guntupalli 1999; Klinenberg 2002)  
 36 to hot weather and heatwaves, suggesting that heat-related mortality could increase.  
 37 Evidence that diabetics are at greater risk of heat-related mortality (Schwartz 2005),  
 38 along with the increasing prevalence of obesity and diabetes (Seidell 2000; Visscher and  
 39 Seidell 2001), suggests that reduced fitness and higher-fat body composition may  
 40 contribute to increased mortality.

1 Table 2.1 summarizes projections of temperature-related mortality either in the U.S. or in  
2 temperate countries whose experience is relevant to the U.S. (Dessai 2003)<sup>3</sup> (Woodruff *et*  
3 *al.* 2005) (Knowlton *et al.* 2007) (CLIMB 2004; Hayhoe *et al.* 2004). Similar studies are  
4 underway in Europe (Kosatsky *et al.* 2006; Lachowsky and Kovats 2006). All studies  
5 used downscaled projections of future temperature distributions in the geographic region  
6 of interest. The studies used different approaches to incorporate likely future adaptation,  
7 addressing such issues as increased availability of air conditioning, heatwave early  
8 warning systems, demographic changes, and enhanced services such as cooling shelters  
9 and physiological adaptation.

10 Time-series studies also can shed light on potential future mortality during temperature  
11 extremes. Heat-related mortality has declined over the past decades (Davis *et al.* 2002;  
12 Davis *et al.* 2003a; Davis *et al.* 2003b). A similar trend, for cold and heat-related  
13 mortality, was observed in London over the last century (Carson *et al.* 2006). The  
14 authors speculate that these declines are due to increasing prevalence of air-conditioning  
15 (in the U.S.), improved health care, and other factors. These results do not necessarily  
16 mean that future increases in heat-related mortality may not occur in the U.S., as some  
17 have claimed (Davis *et al.* 2004), because the percentage of the population with access to  
18 air conditioning is high in most regions (thus with limited possibilities for increasing  
19 access) and improvements in health care have stalled in recent years. Further, population  
20 level declines may obscure persistent mortality impacts in vulnerable groups.

21 In summary, given the projections of increases in the frequency, intensity, and duration of  
22 heatwaves and projected demographic changes, the at-risk population will increase  
23 (highly likely). The extent to which mortality increases will depend on the effective  
24 implementation of a range of adaptation options, including heatwave early warning  
25 systems, urban design to reduce heat loads, and enhanced services during heatwaves.

### 26 **2.3.2 Hurricanes, Floods, Wildfires and Health Impacts**

27 No studies have projected the future health burdens of extreme weather events. There is  
28 concern that climate change could increase the frequency and/or severity of extreme  
29 events, including hurricanes, floods, and wildfires.

30 Theoretically, climate change could increase the frequency and severity of hurricanes by  
31 warming tropical seas where hurricanes first emerge and gain most of their energy  
32 (Pielke *et al.*, 2005; Trenberth, 2005; Halverson, 2006). Controversy over whether  
33 hurricane intensity increased over recent decades stem less from the conceptual  
34 arguments than from the limitations of available hurricane incidence data (Halverson,  
35 2006; Landsea, 2005; Pielke *et al.*, 2005; Trenberth, 2005). Even if climate change  
36 increases the frequency and severity of hurricanes, it will be difficult to definitively  
37 identify this trend for some time because of the relatively short and highly variable  
38 historical data available as a baseline for comparison. Adding to the uncertainty, some  
39 research has projected that climate change could produce future conditions that might

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1 hinder the development of Atlantic hurricanes despite the warming of tropical seas  
2 (NOAA, 2007c).

3 Theoretical arguments for increases in extreme precipitation and flooding are based on  
4 the principles of the hydrological cycle where increasing average temperature will  
5 intensify evaporation and subsequently increase precipitation (Bronstert, 2003; Kunkel,  
6 2003, Senior *et al.*, 2002). Looking at the available data for evidence of a climate change  
7 signal, evidence suggests that the number of extreme precipitation events in the United  
8 States has increased (Balling Jr. and Cervený, 2003; Groisman *et al.*, 2004; Kunkel,  
9 2003). However, these results are not as consistent when evaluated by season or region  
10 (Groisman *et al.*, 2004).

11 Projections of changes in the future incidence of extreme-precipitation and flooding rely  
12 on the results from general circulation models (GCMs). These models project increases  
13 in mean precipitation with a disproportionate increase in the frequency of extreme  
14 precipitation events (Senior *et al.*, 2002). Kim (2003) used a regional climate model to  
15 project that a doubling in CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations in roughly 70 years could increase the  
16 number of days with at least 0.5 mm of precipitation by roughly 33% across the study's  
17 defined elevation gradients in the western U.S. Furthermore, the IPCC concluded that it  
18 is very likely (>90% certainty) that trends in extreme precipitation will continue in the  
19 21st century (IPCC, 2007a).

20 Studies modeling future wildfire incidence in the Western U.S. using GCM outputs  
21 project increasingly severe wildfires, measured both in terms of energy released and the  
22 number of fires that avoid initial containment in areas that GCMs project will be  
23 increasingly dry (Brown *et al.*, 2004; Fried *et al.*, 2004). In general, these results suggest  
24 much of the western U.S. could face an increasing wildfire risk from climate change.  
25 The apparent exception could be the Pacific Northwest, including northern California,  
26 where GCMs generally project a wetter future.

27 Factors independent of the impacts of and responses to climate change will affect  
28 vulnerability to extreme events, including population growth, continued urban sprawl,  
29 population shifts to coastal areas, and differences in the degree of community preparation  
30 for extreme events (U.S. Census Bureau, 2004).

31 All else equal, the anticipated demographic changes will increase the size of the U.S.  
32 population at risk for future extreme weather events (very likely). This raises the  
33 potential for increasing total numbers of adverse health impacts from these events, even if  
34 the rate these impacts are experienced decreases (where the rate reflects the number of  
35 impacts per some standard population size among those actually experiencing the events).

### 36 **2.3.3 Vectorborne and Zoonotic Diseases**

37 Modeling the possible impacts of climate change on VBZ diseases is complex, and few  
38 studies have made projections for diseases of concern in the U.S. Studies suggest that  
39 temperature influences the distributions of *Ixodes* spp. ticks that transmit pathogens  
40 causing Lyme disease in the U.S. (Brownstein *et al.*, 2003) and Canada (Ogden *et al.*,

1 2006), and tick-borne encephalitis in Sweden (Lindgren *et al.*, 2000). Higher minimum  
 2 temperatures were generally favorable to the potential of expanding tick distributions and  
 3 greater local abundance of these vectors. However, changing patterns of tick-borne  
 4 encephalitis (TBE) in Europe are not consistently related to changing climate (Randolph,  
 5 2004a). Climate change is projected to decrease the geographic range of TBE in areas of  
 6 lower latitude and elevation as transmission expands northward (Randolph and Rogers,  
 7 2000).

#### 8 **2.3.4 Water- and Foodborne Diseases**

9 Several important pathogens that are commonly transmitted by food or water may be  
 10 susceptible to changes in replication, survival, persistence, habitat range, and  
 11 transmission under changing climatic and environmental conditions (Table 2.2). Many of  
 12 these agents show seasonal infection patterns (indicating potential underlying  
 13 environmental or weather control), are capable of survival or growth in the environment,  
 14 or are capable of waterborne transport. Factors that may affect these pathogens include  
 15 changes in temperature, precipitation, extreme weather events (i.e., storms), and  
 16 ecological shifts.

#### 17 **2.3.5 Air Quality Morbidity and Mortality**

18 The sources and conditions that give rise to elevated ozone and PM<sub>2.5</sub> in outdoor air in  
 19 the U.S. have been and will continue to be affected by global environmental changes  
 20 related to land use, economic development, and climate change. Conversions of  
 21 farmland and forests into housing developments and the infrastructure of schools and  
 22 businesses that support them change the spatial patterns and absolute amounts of  
 23 emissions from fuel combustion related to transportation, space heating, energy  
 24 production, and other activities. Resulting vegetation patterns affect biogenic volatile  
 25 organic compound (VOC) emissions that influence ozone production. Conversion of  
 26 land from natural to man-made also changes the degree to which surfaces absorb solar  
 27 energy (mostly in the form of light) and later re-radiate that energy as heat, which  
 28 contributes to urban heat islands. In addition to their potential for increasing heat-related  
 29 health effects, heat islands also can influence local production and dispersion of air  
 30 pollutants like ozone and PM<sub>2.5</sub>.

31 It is important to recognize that U.S. Environmental Protection Agency administers a  
 32 well-developed and successful national regulatory program for ozone, PM<sub>2.5</sub>, and other  
 33 criteria pollutants. Although many areas of the US remain out of compliance with the  
 34 ozone and PM<sub>2.5</sub> standards, there is evidence for gradual improvements in recent years,  
 35 and this progress can be expected to continue with more stringent emissions controls  
 36 going forward in time. Thus, the influence of climate change on air quality will play out  
 37 against a backdrop of ongoing regulatory control of both ozone and PM<sub>2.5</sub> that will shift  
 38 the baseline concentrations of these two important air pollutants. On the other hand, most  
 39 of the studies that have examined potential future climate impacts on air quality reviewed  
 40 below have tried to isolate the climate effect by holding precursor emissions constant  
 41 over future decades. Thus, the focus has been on examining the sensitivity of ozone

1 concentrations to alternative future climates rather than on attempting to predict actual  
2 future ozone concentrations.

3 The influence of meteorology on air quality is substantial and well-established (EPRI,  
4 2005), raising the possibility that changes in climate could alter patterns of air pollution  
5 concentrations. Temperature and cloud cover affect the chemical reactions that lead to  
6 ozone and secondary particle formation. Winds, vertical mixing, and rainfall patterns  
7 influence the movement and dispersion of anthropogenic pollutant emissions in the  
8 atmosphere, with generally improved air quality at higher winds, mixing heights, and  
9 rainfall. The most severe U.S. air pollution episodes occur with atmospheric conditions  
10 that limit both vertical and horizontal dispersion over multi-day periods. Methods used to  
11 study the influence of climatic factors on air quality range from statistical analyses of  
12 empirical relationships to integrated modeling of future air quality resulting from climate  
13 change. To date, most studies have been limited to climatic effects on ozone. Additional  
14 research is needed on the impacts of climate change on anthropogenic particulate matter  
15 concentrations.

16 Leung and Gustafson (2005) used regional climate simulations for temperature, solar  
17 radiation, precipitation, and stagnation/ventilation, and projected worse air quality in  
18 Texas and better air quality in the Midwest in 2045-2055 compared with 1995-2005. Aw  
19 and Kleeman (2003) simulated an episode of high air pollution in southern California in  
20 1996 with observed meteorology and then with higher temperatures. Ozone  
21 concentrations increased up to 16% with higher temperatures, while the PM<sub>2.5</sub> response  
22 was more variable due to opposing forces of increased secondary particle formation and  
23 more evaporative losses from nitrate particles. Bell and Ellis (2004) showed greater  
24 sensitivity of ozone concentrations in the Mid-Atlantic to changes in biogenic than to  
25 changes in anthropogenic emissions. Ozone's sensitivity to changing temperatures,  
26 absolute humidity, biogenic VOC emissions, and pollution boundary conditions on a  
27 fine-scale (4 km grid resolution) varied in different regions of California (Steiner *et al.*,  
28 2006).

29 Several studies explored the impacts of climate change alone on future ozone projections.  
30 In a coarse-scale analysis of pollution over the continental U.S., Mickley *et al.* (2004)  
31 used the GISS (NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies) 4x5° model to project that,  
32 due to climate change alone (A1b emission scenario), air pollution could increase in the  
33 upper Midwest due to decreases between 2000 and 2052 in the frequency of Canadian  
34 frontal passages that clear away stagnating air pollution episodes. The 2.8x2.8° Mozart  
35 global chemistry/climate model was used to explore global background and urban ozone  
36 changes over the 21st century in response to climate change, with ozone precursor  
37 emissions kept constant at 1990s levels (Murazaki and Hess, 2006). While global  
38 background decreased slightly, the urban concentrations due to U.S. emissions increased.

39 As part of the New York Climate and Health Study, Hogrefe and colleagues conducted  
40 local-scale analyses of air pollution impacts of future climate changes using integrated  
41 modeling (Hogrefe *et al.*, 2004a,b,c; 2005a,b) to examine the impacts of climate and land  
42 use changes on heat- and ozone-related health impacts in the NYC metropolitan area  
43 (Knowlton *et al.*, 2004; Kinney *et al.*, 2006; Bell *et al.*, 2007; Civerolo *et al.*, 2006). The

1 GISS 4x5° was used to simulate hourly meteorologic data from the 1990s through the  
 2 2080s based on the A2 and B2 SRES scenarios. The A2 scenario assumes roughly  
 3 double the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of B2. The global climate outputs were downscaled to a 36  
 4 km grid over the eastern U.S. using the MM5 regional climate model. The MM5 results  
 5 were used in turn as inputs to the CMAQ regional-scale air quality model. Five summers  
 6 (June, July, and August) in each of four decades (1990s, 2020s, 2050s, and 2080s) were  
 7 simulated at the 36 km scale. Pollution precursor emissions over the eastern U.S. were  
 8 based on U.S. EPA estimates at the county level for 1996. Compared with observations  
 9 from ozone monitoring stations, initial projections were consistent with ozone spatial and  
 10 temporal patterns over the eastern U.S. in the 1990s (Hogrefe *et al.*, 2004a). Average  
 11 daily maximum 8-hour concentrations were projected to increase by 2.7, 4.2, and 5.0 ppb  
 12 in the 2020s, 2050s, and 2080s, respectively due to climate change (Figure 2.5) (Hogrefe  
 13 *et al.*, 2004b). The influence of climate on mean ozone values was similar in magnitude  
 14 to the influence of rising global background by the 2050s, but climate had a much greater  
 15 impact on extreme values than did the global background. When biogenic VOC  
 16 emissions were allowed to increase in response to warming, an additional increase in  
 17 ozone concentrations was projected that was similar in magnitude to that of climate alone  
 18 (Hogrefe *et al.*, 2004b). Climate change shifted the distribution of ozone concentrations  
 19 towards higher values, with larger relative increases in future decades (Figure 6).

20 **Figure 2.5** (a) Summertime Average Daily Maximum 8-hour Ozone Concentrations  
 21 (ppb) for the 1990s and Changes for the (b) 2020s relative to the 1990s, (c) 2050s relative  
 22 to the 1990s, and (d) 2080s relative to the 1990s. All are based on the A2 Scenario  
 23 relative to the 1990s. Five consecutive summer seasons were simulated in each decade.

24 **Figure 2.6** Frequency Distributions of Summertime Daily Maximum 8-hr Ozone  
 25 Concentrations over the Eastern U.S. in the 1990s, 2020s, and 2050s based on the A2  
 26 Scenario.

27 Projections in Germany also found larger climate impacts on extreme ozone values (Forkel  
 28 and Knoche, 2006). Using the IS92a business-as-usual scenario, the ECHAM4 GCM  
 29 projected changes for the 2030s compared with the 1990s; the output was downscaled to  
 30 a 20 km grid using a modification of the MM5 regional model, which was in-turn linked  
 31 to the RADM2 ozone chemistry model. Both biogenic VOC emissions and soil NO  
 32 emissions were projected to increase as temperatures rose. Daily maximum ozone  
 33 concentrations increased by between 2 and 6 ppb (6-10%) across the study region. The  
 34 number of cases where daily maximum ozone exceeded 90 ppb increased by nearly four-  
 35 fold, from 99 to 384.

36 Using the NYCHP integrated model, PM<sub>2.5</sub> concentrations are projected to increase with  
 37 climate change, with the effects differing by component species, with sulfates and  
 38 primary PM increasing markedly and with organic and nitrated components decreasing,  
 39 mainly due to movement of these volatile species from the particulate to the gaseous  
 40 phase (Hogrefe *et al.*, 2005b; 2006).

41 Hogrefe *et al.*, 2005b noted that “the simulated changes in pollutant concentrations  
 42 stemming from climate change are the result of a complex interaction between changes in

1 transport, mixing, and chemistry that cannot be parameterized by spatially uniform linear  
 2 regression relationships.” Additional uncertainties include how population vulnerability,  
 3 mix of pollutants, housing characteristics, and activity patterns may differ in the future.  
 4 For example, in a warmer world, more people may stay indoors with air conditioners in  
 5 the summer when ozone levels are highest, decreasing personal exposures (albeit with  
 6 potential increases in pollution emissions from power plants). Baseline mortality rates  
 7 may change due to medical advances, changes in other risk factors such as smoking and  
 8 diet, and aging of the population.

9 The New York Climate and Health Project examined the marginal sensitivity of health to  
 10 changes in climate to project the potential health impacts of ozone in the eastern U.S.  
 11 (Knowlton *et al.*, 2004; Bell *et al.*, 2007). Knowlton and colleagues computed absolute  
 12 and percentage increases in ozone-related daily summer-season deaths in the NYC  
 13 metropolitan region in the 2050s as compared with the 1990s using a downscaled  
 14 GCM/RCM/air quality model (Knowlton *et al.*, 2004; Kinney *et al.*, 2006). The  
 15 availability of county-scale ozone projections made it possible to compare impacts in the  
 16 urban core with those in outlying areas. Increases in ozone-related mortality due to  
 17 climate change ranged from 0.4 to 7.0% across 31 counties. Bell and colleagues  
 18 expanded the analysis to 50 eastern cities and examined both mortality and hospital  
 19 admissions (Bell *et al.*, 2007). Average ozone concentrations were projected to increase  
 20 by 4.4 ppb (7.4%) in the 2050s; the range was 0.8% to 13.7%. In addition, ozone red  
 21 alert days could increase by 68%. Changes in health impacts were of corresponding  
 22 magnitude.

23 Based on the new research findings published since the previous assessment, the  
 24 following summary statements can be made:

- 25 • There is an established but incomplete level of knowledge suggesting that both  
 26 ozone and fine particle concentrations may be affected by climate change.
- 27 • A substantial body of new evidence on ozone supports the interpretation that ozone  
 28 concentrations would be more likely to increase than decrease in the U.S. as a result  
 29 of climate change, holding precursor emissions constant.
- 30 • Too few data yet exist for PM to draw firm conclusions about the direction or  
 31 magnitude of climate impacts

## 32 **2.4 Vulnerable Regions and Subpopulations**

33 In adapting the IPCC's definitions<sup>4</sup> to public health, "vulnerability" can be defined as the  
 34 summation of all risk and protective factors that ultimately determine whether an  
 35 individual or subpopulation experiences adverse health outcomes, and "sensitivity" can  
 36 be defined as an individual's or subpopulation's increased responsiveness, primarily for  
 37 biological reasons, to a given exposure. Thus, specific subpopulations may experience

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<sup>4</sup> IPCC Second Assessment. Climate Change 1995. Available at [http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/sa\(E\).pdf](http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/sa(E).pdf). Accessed 11-12-07.

1 heightened vulnerability for climate-related health effects for a wide variety of reasons.  
 2 Biological sensitivity may be related to the developmental stage, presence of pre-existing  
 3 chronic medical conditions (such as the sensitivity of people with chronic heart  
 4 conditions to heat-related illness), acquired factors (such as immunity), and genetic  
 5 factors (such as metabolic enzyme subtypes that play a role in sensitivity to air pollution  
 6 effects). Socioeconomic factors also play a critical role in altering vulnerability and  
 7 sensitivity to environmentally-mediated factors. They may alter the likelihood of  
 8 exposure to harmful agents, interact with biological factors that mediate risk (such as  
 9 nutritional status), and/or lead to differences in the ability to adapt or respond to  
 10 exposures or early phases of illness and injury. For public health planning, it is critical to  
 11 recognize populations that may experience synergistic effects of multiple risk factors for  
 12 health problems related to climate change and to other temporal trends.

### 13 **2.4.1 Vulnerable Regions**

14 Populations living in certain regions of the United States may experience altered risks for  
 15 specific climate-sensitive health outcomes due to their regions' baseline climate,  
 16 abundance of natural resources such as fertile soil and fresh water supplies, elevation,  
 17 dependence on private wells for drinking water, or vulnerability to coastal surges or  
 18 riverine flooding. Some regions' populations may in fact experience multiple climate-  
 19 sensitive health problems simultaneously. One approach to identifying such areas is to  
 20 map regions currently experiencing increased rates of climate-sensitive health outcomes  
 21 or other indicators of increased climate risk, as illustrated in Figure 2.7a-2.7d.

22 Residents of low-lying coastal regions, which are common locations for hurricane  
 23 landfalls and flooding, are particularly vulnerable to the health impacts of climate change.  
 24 Those who live in the Gulf Coast region, for example, are likely to experience increased  
 25 human health burdens due to the constellation of more intense storms, greater sea level  
 26 rise, coastal erosion, and damage to freshwater resources and infrastructure. Other  
 27 coastal areas may also experience the combination of sea level rise chronically  
 28 threatening water supplies and periodic infrastructure damage from more intense storms.  
 29 Populations in the Southwest and Great Lakes regions may experience increased strain on  
 30 water resources and availability due to climate change. More intense heat waves and  
 31 heat-related illnesses may take place in regions where extreme heat events already occur,  
 32 such as interior continental zones of the U.S. High-density urban populations will  
 33 experience heightened health risks, in part due to the heat-island effect. In addition,  
 34 increased demand for electricity during summers may lead to greater air pollution levels  
 35 (IPCC, 2007b).

36 **Figure 2.7 a-d** U.S. maps indicating counties with existing vulnerability to climate  
 37 sensitive health outcomes: (a) location of hurricane landfalls; (b) extreme heat  
 38 events, defined by CDC as temperatures 10 or more degrees above the average  
 39 high temperature for the region and lasting for several weeks; (c) percentage of  
 40 population over age 65; (d) West Nile Virus cases reported in 2004. Historical  
 41 disease activity, especially in the case of WNV, is not necessarily predictive of  
 42 future vulnerability.

### 43 **2.4.2 Specific Subpopulations at Risk**

1 Vulnerable subpopulations may be categorized according to specific health endpoints.  
2 (Table 2.3). While this is typically the way the scientific literature reports risk factors for  
3 adverse health effects, this section discusses vulnerability for a variety of climate-  
4 sensitive health endpoints one subpopulation at a time.

#### 5 2.4.2.1 Children

6 Children's small body mass to surface area ratio and other factors make them more  
7 vulnerable to heat-related morbidity and mortality (AAP, 2000), while their increased  
8 breathing rates relative to body size, time spent outdoors, and developing respiratory  
9 tracts heighten their sensitivity to harm from ozone air pollution (AAP, 2004). In  
10 addition, children's relatively naïve immune systems increase the risk of serious  
11 consequences from water and foodborne diseases; specific developmental factors make  
12 them more vulnerable to complications from specific severe infections like *E Coli*  
13 O157:H7.

14 Children's lack of immunity also plays a role in higher risk of mortality from malaria  
15 (CDC, 2004b). Conversely, maternal antibodies to dengue in infants convey increased  
16 risk of developing dengue hemorrhagic syndromes. A second peak of greater risk of  
17 complications from dengue appears in children between the ages of 3 and 5 (Guzman and  
18 Khouri, 2002).

19 Children may also be more vulnerable to psychological complications of extreme weather  
20 events related to climate change. Following two floods in Europe in the 1990s, children  
21 demonstrated moderate to severe stress symptoms (Becht *et al.*, 1998; cited in Hajat *et*  
22 *al.*, 2003) and long-term PTSD, depression, and dissatisfaction with ongoing life  
23 (Bokszanin, 2000; cited in Hajat *et al.*, 2003).

#### 24 2.4.2.2 Older Adults

25 Health effects associated with climate change pose significant risks for the elderly, who  
26 often have frail health and limited mobility. Older adults are more sensitive to  
27 temperature extremes, particularly heat (Semenza *et al.*, 1996; Medina-Ramon *et al.*,  
28 2006); individuals 65 years of age and older comprised 72% of the heat-related deaths in  
29 the 1995 Chicago heatwave (Whitman *et al.*, 1997). The elderly are also more likely to  
30 have preexisting medical conditions, including cardiovascular and respiratory illnesses,  
31 which may put them at greater risk of exacerbated illness by climate-related events or  
32 conditions. For example, a 2004 rapid needs assessment of older adults in Florida found  
33 that Hurricane Charley exacerbated preexisting, physician-diagnosed medical conditions  
34 in 24-32% of elderly households (CDC, 2004a). Also, effects of ambient particulate  
35 matter on daily mortality tend to be greatest in older age groups (Schwartz, 1995).

#### 36 2.4.2.3 Impoverished Populations

37 Even in the U.S., the greatest health burdens related to climate change are likely to fall on  
38 those with the lowest socioeconomic status (O'Neill *et al.*, 2003a). Most affected are  
39 individuals with inadequate shelter or resources to find alternative shelter in the event

1 their community is disrupted. While quantitative methods to assess the increase in risk  
2 related to these social and economic factors are not well-developed, qualitative insights  
3 can be gained by examining risk factors for mortality and morbidity from recent weather-  
4 related extreme events such as the 1995 heatwave in Chicago and Hurricane Katrina in  
5 2005 (Box 2.1).

6 Studies of heatwaves identify poor housing conditions, including lack of access to air  
7 conditioning and living spaces with fewer rooms, as significant risk factors for heat-  
8 related mortality (Kalkstein, 1993; Semeza *et al.*, 1996). Higher heat-related mortality  
9 has been associated with socioeconomic indicators, such as lacking a high school  
10 education and living in poverty (Curriero *et al.*, 2002). Financial stress plays a role, as  
11 one study of the 1995 Chicago heatwave found that concern about the affordability of  
12 utility bills influenced individuals to limit air conditioning use (Klinenberg, 2002). The  
13 risk for exposure and sensitivity to air pollution is also elevated among groups in a lower  
14 socioeconomic position (O'Neill *et al.*, 2003a).

15 Air conditioning is an important short-term method for protecting health, but is not a  
16 sustainable long-term adaptation technology because the electricity use is often  
17 associated with greenhouse gas emissions and during heatwaves can overload the grid  
18 and contribute to outages (O'Neill, 2003c). Furthermore, the elderly with limited budgets  
19 and racial minorities are less likely to have access to air conditioning or to use it during  
20 hot weather (O'Neill *et al.* 2005b, Sheridan, 2006). Incentives for and availability of  
21 high-efficiency, low energy-demand residential cooling systems, especially among  
22 disadvantaged populations, can advance health equity and minimize some of the negative  
23 aspects of air conditioning.

24 Another area of concern for impoverished populations is the impact that climate change  
25 may have on food systems and food supply. In the U.S., food insecurity is a prevalent  
26 health risk among the poor, particularly poor children (Cook *et al.*, 2007). On a global  
27 scale, studies suggest that climate change is likely to contribute to food insecurity by  
28 reducing crop yield, most significantly at lower latitudes, due to shortened growing  
29 periods and decreases in water availability (Parry *et al.*, 2005). In the U.S., changes in  
30 the price of food would likely contribute to food insecurity to a greater degree than  
31 overall scarcity.

32 The tragic loss of life that occurred after Hurricane Katrina underscores the increased  
33 vulnerability of special populations and demonstrates that, in the wake of extreme  
34 weather events, particularly those that disrupt medical infrastructure and require large-  
35 scale evacuation, treating individuals with chronic diseases is of critical concern (Ford *et*  
36 *al.*, 2006).

#### 37 2.4.2.4 People with chronic conditions and mobility and cognitive constraints

38 People with chronic medical conditions have an especially heightened vulnerability for  
39 the health impacts of climate change. Extreme heat poses a great risk for individuals with  
40 diabetes (Schwartz, 2005), and extreme cold has an increased effect on individuals with  
41 chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (Schwartz, 2005). People with mobility and



1 cognitive constraints may be at particular risk during heatwaves and other extreme  
2 weather events (EPA, 2006). As noted above, those with chronic medical conditions are  
3 also at risk of worsened status as the result of climate-related stressors and limited access  
4 to medical care during extreme events.

#### 5 2.4.2.5 Occupational groups

6 Certain occupational groups, primarily by virtue of spending their working hours  
7 outdoors, are at greater risk of climate-related health outcomes. Outdoor workers in rural  
8 or suburban areas, such as electricity and pipeline utility workers, are at increased risk of  
9 infection with Lyme Disease, although evidence is lacking for greater risk of clinical  
10 illness (Schwartz and Goldstein, 1990; Piacentino and Schwartz, 2002). They and other  
11 outdoor workers have increased exposures to ozone air pollution and heat stress,  
12 especially if work tasks involve heavy exertion.

#### 13 2.4.2.6 Recent migrants and immigrants

14 Residential mobility, migration, and immigration may increase vulnerability. For  
15 example, new residents in an area may not be acclimated to the weather patterns, have  
16 lower awareness of risks posed by local vectorborne diseases, and have fewer social  
17 networks to provide support during an extreme weather event. U.S. immigrants returning  
18 to their countries of origin to visit friends and relatives have also been shown to suffer  
19 increased risks of severe travel-associated diseases (Bacaner *et al.*, 2004, Angell and  
20 Cetron, 2005). This vulnerability may become more significant if such diseases, which  
21 include malaria, viral hepatitis, and typhoid fever, become more prevalent in immigrants'  
22 countries of origin because of climate change.

## 23 **2.5 Adaptation**

24 Realistically assessing the potential health effects of climate change must include  
25 consideration of the capacity to manage new and changing climatic conditions.  
26 Individuals, communities, governments, and other organizations currently engage in a  
27 wide range of actions to identify and prevent adverse health outcomes associated with  
28 weather and climate. Although these actions have been largely successful, recent  
29 extreme events and outbreaks of vectorborne diseases highlight areas for improvement  
30 (Confalonieri *et al.*, 2007). Climate change is likely to further challenge the ability of  
31 current programs and activities to control climate-sensitive health determinants and  
32 outcomes. Preventing additional morbidity and mortality requires consideration of all  
33 upstream drivers of adverse health outcomes, including developing and deploying  
34 adaptation policies and measures that consider the full range of health risks that are likely  
35 to arise with climate change.

36 In public health, prevention is the term analogous to adaptation, acknowledging that  
37 adaptation implies a set of continuous or evolving practices and not just upfront  
38 investments. Public health prevention is classified as primary, secondary, or tertiary.  
39 Primary prevention aims to prevent the onset of disease in an otherwise unaffected  
40 population (such as regulations to reduce harmful exposures to ozone). Secondary

1 prevention entails preventive action in response to early evidence of health effects  
2 (including strengthening disease surveillance programs to provide early intelligence on  
3 the emergence or re-emergence of health risks at specific locations, and responding  
4 effectively to disease outbreaks, such as West Nile virus). Tertiary prevention consists of  
5 measures (often treatment) to reduce long-term impairment and disability and to  
6 minimize suffering caused by existing disease. In general, primary prevention is more  
7 effective and less expensive than secondary and tertiary prevention. For every health  
8 outcome, there are multiple possible primary, secondary, and tertiary preventions.

9 The degree to which programs and measures will need to be modified to address the  
10 additional pressures due to climate change will depend on factors such as the current  
11 burden of climate-sensitive health outcomes, the effectiveness of current interventions,  
12 projections of where, when, and how quickly the health burdens could change with  
13 changes in climate and climate variability (which depends on the rate and magnitude of  
14 climate change), the feasibility of implementing additional cost-effective interventions,  
15 other stressors that could increase or decrease resilience to impacts, and the social,  
16 economic, and political context within which interventions are implemented (Ebi *et al.*,  
17 2006a). Failure to invest in adaptation may leave communities poorly prepared and  
18 increase the probability of severe adverse consequences (Haines *et al.*, 2006a,b).

19 Adaptation to climate change is basically a risk management issue. Adaptation and  
20 mitigation are the primary responses to manage current and projected risks. Mitigation  
21 and adaptation are not mutually exclusive; co-benefits to human health can result  
22 concurrently with implementation of mitigation and adaptation actions. A dialogue is  
23 needed on prioritizing the costs of mitigation actions designed to limit future climate  
24 change and the potential costs of continually trying to adapt to its impacts. This dialogue  
25 should explicitly recognize that there is no guarantee that future changes in climate will  
26 not present a threshold that poses technological or physical limits to which adaptation is  
27 not possible.

28 Adaptation policies and measures should address both projected risks and the regions and  
29 populations that currently are not well adapted to climate-related health risks. Because  
30 the degree and rate of climate change is projected to increase over time, adaptation will  
31 be a continual process of designing and implementing policies and programs to prevent  
32 adverse impacts from changing exposures and vulnerabilities (Ebi *et al.*, 2006). Clearly,  
33 the extent to which effective proactive adaptations are developed and deployed will be a  
34 key determinant of future morbidity and mortality attributable to climate change.

35 Regional vulnerabilities to the health impacts of climate change are influenced by  
36 physical, social, demographic, economic, and other factors. Adaptation activities take  
37 place within the context of slowly changing factors that are specific to a region or  
38 population, including specific population and regional vulnerabilities, social and cultural  
39 factors, the built and natural environment, the status of the public health infrastructure,  
40 and health and social services. Because these factors vary across geographic and  
41 temporal scales, adaptation policies and measures generally are more successful when  
42 focused on a specific population and location. Additional important factors include the

1 degree of risk perceived, the human and financial resources available for adaptation, the  
2 available technological options, and the political will to undertake adaptation.

### 3 **2.5.1 Actors and Their Roles and Responsibilities for Adaptation**

4 Responsibility for the prevention of climate-sensitive health risks rests with individuals,  
5 community and state governments, national agencies, and others. The roles and  
6 responsibilities vary by health outcome. For example, individuals are responsible for  
7 taking appropriate action on days with declared poor air quality, with health care  
8 providers and others responsible for providing the relevant information, and government  
9 agencies providing the regulatory framework. Community governments play a central  
10 role in preparedness and response for extreme events because of their jurisdiction over  
11 police, fire, and emergency medical services. Early warning systems for extreme events  
12 such as heat waves (Box 2.2) and outbreaks of infectious diseases may be developed at  
13 the community or state level. The federal government funds research and development to  
14 increase the range of decision support planning and response tools. Medical and nursing  
15 schools are responsible for ensuring that health professionals are trained in the  
16 identification and treatment of climate-sensitive diseases. The Red Cross and other  
17 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often play critical roles in disaster response.

18 Additional research and development are needed to ensure that surveillance systems  
19 account for and anticipate the potential effects of climate change. Surveillance systems  
20 will be needed in locations where changes in weather and climate may foster the spread  
21 of climate-sensitive pathogens and vectors into new regions (NAS, 2001). Understanding  
22 associations between disease patterns and environmental variables can be used to develop  
23 early warning systems that warn of outbreaks before most cases have occurred. Increased  
24 understanding is needed of how to design these systems where there is limited knowledge  
25 of the interactions of climate, ecosystems, and infectious diseases (NAS, 2001).

26 There are no inventories in the U.S. of the various actors taking action to cope with  
27 climate change-related health impacts. However, the growing numbers of city and state  
28 actions on climate change show increasing awareness of the potential risks. As of 1  
29 November 2007, more than 700 cities have signed the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection  
30 Agreement (<http://www.seattle.gov/mayor/climate/cpaText.htm>); although this agreement  
31 focuses on mitigation through increased energy efficiency, one strategy, planting trees,  
32 can both sequester CO<sub>2</sub> and reduce urban heat islands. The New England Governors and  
33 Eastern Canadian Premiers developed a Climate Change Action Plan because of concerns  
34 about ‘degradation in air quality and an increase in urban smog (with its associated  
35 human health impacts); public health risks; insect reproduction and the population of  
36 disease-bearing pests such as mosquitoes; the magnitude and frequency of extreme  
37 climatic phenomena’ and availability of water (NEC/ECP, 2001). One action item  
38 focuses on the reduction and/or adaptation of negative social, economic, and  
39 environmental impacts. Activities being undertaken include a long-term phenology  
40 study, and studies on temperature increases and related potential impacts.

41 Strategies, policies, and measures implemented by community and state governments,  
42 federal agencies, NGOs, and other actors can change the context for adaptation by

1 conducting research to assess vulnerability and to identify technological options available  
 2 for adaptation, implementing programs and activities to reduce vulnerability, and shifting  
 3 human and financial resources to address the health impacts of climate change. State and  
 4 federal governments also can provide guidance for vulnerability assessments that  
 5 consider a range of plausible future scenarios. The results of these assessments can be  
 6 used to identify priority health risks (over time), particularly vulnerable populations and  
 7 regions, effectiveness of current adaptation activities, and modifications to current  
 8 activities or new activities to implement to address current and future climate change-  
 9 related risks.

10 Table 2.4 summarizes the other roles and responsibilities of various actors for adapting to  
 11 climate change. Note that viewing adaptation from a public health perspective results in  
 12 similar activities being classified as primary rather than secondary prevention under  
 13 different health outcomes. It is not possible to prevent the occurrence of a heatwave, so  
 14 primary prevention focuses on actions such as developing and enforcing appropriate  
 15 infrastructure standards, while secondary prevention focuses on implementing early  
 16 warning systems and other activities. For vectorborne diseases, primary prevention refers  
 17 to preventing exposure to infected vectors; in this case, early warning systems can be  
 18 considered primary prevention. For most vectorborne diseases, there are few options for  
 19 preventing disease onset once an individual has been bitten.

20 A key activity not included in this framework is research on the associations between  
 21 weather / climate and various health outcomes, taking into consideration other drivers of  
 22 those outcomes (e.g. taking a systems-based approach), and projecting how those risks  
 23 may change with changing weather patterns. Increased understanding of the human  
 24 health risks posed by climate change is needed for the design of effective, efficient, and  
 25 timely adaptation options.

## 26 **2.5.2 Adaptation Measures to Manage Climate Change-Related Health Risks**

27 Determining where populations are not effectively coping with current climate variability  
 28 and extremes facilitates identification of the additional interventions that are needed now.  
 29 However, given uncertainties in climate change projections, identifying current  
 30 adaptation deficits is not sufficient to protect against projected health risks. Adaptation  
 31 measures can be categorized into legislative policies, decision support tools, technology  
 32 development, surveillance and monitoring of health data, infrastructure development, and  
 33 other. Table 2.5 lists some adaptation measures for health impacts from heatwaves,  
 34 extreme weather events, vectorborne diseases, waterborne diseases, and air quality.  
 35 These measures are generic because the local context, including vulnerabilities and  
 36 adaptive capacity, need to be considered in the design of programs and activities to be  
 37 implemented.

38 An additional category of measures includes public education and outreach to provide  
 39 information to the general public and specific vulnerable groups on climate risks to which  
 40 they may be exposed and appropriate actions to take. Messages need to be specific to the  
 41 region and group; for example, warnings to senior citizens of an impending heatwave  
 42 should focus on keeping cool and drinking lots of water. Box 2.3 provides tips for

1 dealing with extreme heatwaves developed by U.S. EPA with assistance from Federal,  
2 state, local, and academic partners (U.S. EPA, 2006).

### 3 **2.6 Conclusions**

4 The conclusions from this assessment are consistent with those of the First National  
5 Assessment: climate change poses a risk for U.S. populations, with uncertainties limiting  
6 quantitative projections of the number of increased injuries, illnesses, and deaths  
7 attributable to climate change. However, the strength and consistency of projections for  
8 climatic changes for some exposures of concern to human health suggest that  
9 implementation of adaptation actions should commence now (Confalonieri *et al.*, 2007).  
10 Further, trends in factors that affect vulnerability, such as a larger and older U.S.  
11 population, will increase overall vulnerability to health risks. At the same time, the  
12 capacity of the U.S to implement effective and timely adaptation measures is assumed to  
13 remain high throughout this century, thus reducing the likelihood of severe health  
14 impacts if appropriate programs and activities are implemented. However, the nature of  
15 the risks posed by climate change means that some adverse health outcomes may not be  
16 avoidable, even with attempts at adaptation. Severe health impacts will not be evenly  
17 distributed across populations and regions, but will be concentrated in the most  
18 vulnerable groups.

19 Proactive policies and measures should be identified that improve the context for  
20 adaptation, reduce exposures related to climate variability and change, prevent the onset  
21 of climate-sensitive health outcomes, and increase treatment options. Future community,  
22 state, and national assessments of the health impacts of climate variability and change  
23 should identify gaps in adaptive capacity, including where barriers and constraints to  
24 implementation, such as governance mechanisms, need to be addressed.

25 Because of regional variability in the types of health stressors attributable to climate  
26 change and their associated responses, it is difficult to summarize adaptation at the  
27 national level. Planning for adaptation is hindered by the fact that downscaled climate  
28 projections, as well as other climate information and tools, are generally not available to  
29 local governments. Such data and tools are essential for sectors potentially affected by  
30 climate change to assess their vulnerability and possible adaptation options, catalogue,  
31 evaluate, and disseminate adaptation measures. Explicit consideration of climate change  
32 is needed in the many programs and research activities within federal, state, and local  
33 agencies that are relevant to adaptation to ensure that they have maximum effectiveness  
34 and timeliness in reducing future vulnerability. In addition, collaboration and  
35 coordination are needed across agencies and sectors to ensure protection of the American  
36 population to the current and projected impacts of climate change.

### 37 **2.7 Expanding the Knowledge Base**

38 Few research and data gaps have been filled since the First National Assessment. An  
39 important shift in perspective that occurred since the First National Assessment is a  
40 greater appreciation of the complex pathways and relationships through which weather

1 and climate affect health, and the understanding that many social and behavioral factors  
2 will influence disease risks and patterns (NRC, 2001). Several research gaps identified in  
3 the First National Assessment have been partially filled by studies that address the  
4 differential effects of temperature extremes by community, demographic, and biological  
5 characteristics; that improve our understanding of exposure-response relationships for  
6 extreme heat; and that project the public health burden posed by climate-related changes  
7 in heatwaves and air quality. Despite these advances, the body of literature remains  
8 small, limiting quantitative projections of future impacts.

9 Improving our understanding of the linkages between climate change and health in the  
10 U.S., may require a wide range of activities along the following lines:

- 11 • Improve characterization of exposure-response relationships, particularly at regional  
12 and local levels, including identifying thresholds and particularly vulnerable groups.
- 13 • Collect data on the early effects of changing weather patterns on climate-sensitive  
14 health outcomes.
- 15 • Collect and enhance long-term surveillance data on health issues of potential  
16 concern, including vectorborne and zoonotic diseases, air quality, pollen and mold  
17 counts, reporting of food- and waterborne diseases, morbidity due to temperature  
18 extremes, and mental health impacts from extreme weather events.
- 19 • Develop quantitative models of possible health impacts of climate change that can be  
20 used to explore the consequences of a range of socioeconomic and climate scenarios.
- 21 • Increase understanding of the processes of adaptation, including social and  
22 behavioral dimensions, as well as the costs and benefits of interventions.
- 23 • Evaluate the implementation of adaptation measures. For example, evaluation of  
24 heatwave warning systems, especially as they become implemented on a wider scale  
25 (NOAA, 2005), is needed to understand how to motivate appropriate behavior.
- 26 • Understand local and regional scale vulnerability and adaptive capacity to  
27 characterize the potential risks and the time horizon over which climate risks might  
28 arise; these assessments should include stakeholders to ensure their needs are  
29 identified and addressed in subsequent research and adaptation activities.
- 30 • Improve comprehensive estimates of the co-benefits of adaptation and mitigation  
31 policies in order to clarify trade-offs and synergies.
- 32 • Improve collaboration across the multiple agencies and organizations with  
33 responsibility and research related to climate change-related health impacts, such as  
34 weather forecasting, air and water quality regulations, vector control programs, and  
35 disaster preparation and response.
- 36 • Anticipate infrastructure requirements that will be needed to protect against extreme  
37 events such as heatwaves, and food- and waterborne diseases, or to alter urban

1 design to decrease heat islands, and to maintain drinking and wastewater treatment  
2 standards and source water and watershed protection.

3 Develop downscaled climate projections at the local and regional scale in order to  
4 conduct the types of vulnerability and adaptation assessments that will enable adequate  
5 response to climate change and to determine the potential for interactions between  
6 climate and other risk factors, including societal, environmental, and economic. The  
7 growing concern over impacts from extreme events demonstrates the importance of  
8 climate models that allow for stochastic generation of possible future events, to assess not  
9 only how disease and pathogen population dynamics might respond, but also to assess  
10 whether levels of preparedness are likely to be adequate.

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32

1 **2.9 Boxes**2 **BOX 2.1 Vulnerable Populations and Hurricane Katrina**

3 In 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused more than 1,500 deaths along the Gulf Coast, and  
4 many of these victims were members of vulnerable subpopulations, such as hospital and  
5 nursing-home patients, older adults who required care within their homes, and individuals  
6 with disabilities (U.S. CHSGA, 2006). According to the Louisiana Department of Health  
7 and Hospitals, more than 45% of the state's identified victims were 75 years of age or  
8 older; 69% were above age 60 (LDHH, 2006). In Mississippi, 67% of the victims whose  
9 deaths were directly, indirectly, or possibly related to Katrina were 55 years of age or  
10 older (MSDH, 2005).

11 At hurricane evacuation centers in Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Texas, chronic  
12 illness was the most commonly reported health problem, accounting for 33% or 4,786 of  
13 14,531 visits (CDC, 2006b). Six of the fifteen deaths indirectly related to the hurricane  
14 and its immediate aftermath in Alabama were associated with preexisting cardiovascular  
15 disease (CDC, 2006d), and the storm disrupted an estimated 100,000 diabetic evacuees  
16 across the region from obtaining appropriate care and medication (Cefalu *et al.*, 2006).  
17 One study suggested that the hurricane had a negative effect on reproductive outcomes  
18 among pregnant women and infants, who experienced exposure to environmental toxins,  
19 limited access to safe food and water, psychological stress, and disrupted health care  
20 (Callaghan *et al.*, 2007). Other vulnerable individuals included those without personal  
21 means of transportation and poor residents in Louisiana and Mississippi who were unable  
22 to evacuate in time (U.S. CHSGA, 2006).

23



**BOX 2.2 Heatwave Early Warning Systems**

1  
2 Projections for increases in the frequency, intensity and duration of heatwaves suggests  
3 more cities need heatwave early warning systems, including forecasts coupled with  
4 effective response options, to warn the public about the risks during such events (Meehl  
5 and Tebaldi 2004). Prevention programs designed to reduce the toll of hot weather on the  
6 public have been instituted in several cities, and guidance has been developed to further  
7 aid communities seeking to plan such interventions, including buddy systems, cooling  
8 centers, and community preparedness (EPA 2006b). Although these systems appear to  
9 reduce the toll of hot weather (Ebi *et al.* 2004; Ebi and Schmier 2005; Weisskopf *et al.*  
10 2002), and enhanced preparedness following events such as the 1995 heatwaves in  
11 Chicago and elsewhere, a survey of individuals 65 or older in four North American cities  
12 (Dayton, OH; Philadelphia, PA; Phoenix, AZ; and Toronto, Ontario, Canada) found that  
13 the public was unaware of appropriate preventive actions to take during heatwaves  
14 (Sheridan 2006). Although respondents were aware of the heat warnings, the majority  
15 did not consider they were vulnerable to the heat, or did not consider hot weather to pose  
16 a significant danger to their health. Only 46% modified their behavior on the heat  
17 advisory days. Although many individuals surveyed had access to home air-  
18 conditioning, their use of it was influenced by concerns about energy costs.  
19 Precautionary steps recommended during hot weather, such as increasing intake of  
20 liquids, were taken by very few respondents (Sheridan 2006). Some respondents reported  
21 using a fan indoors with windows closed and no air-conditioning, a situation that can  
22 increase heat exposure and be potentially deadly. Further, simultaneous heat warnings  
23 and ozone alerts were a source of confusion, because recommendations not to drive  
24 conflicted with the suggestion to seek cooler locations if the residence was too warm.  
25 Critical evaluation is needed of heatwave early warning systems, including which  
26 components are effective and why (Kovats and Ebi 2006; NOAA 2005).

1 **Box 2.3: Quick Tips for Responding to Excessive Heat waves**

2 ***For the Public***

3 **Do**

- 4 • Use air conditioners or spend time in air-conditioned locations such as malls and  
5 libraries
- 6 • Use portable electric fans to exhaust hot air from rooms or draw in cooler air
- 7 • Take a cool bath or shower
- 8 • Minimize direct exposure to the sun
- 9 • Stay hydrated – regularly drink water or other nonalcoholic fluids
- 10 • Eat light, cool, easy-to-digest foods such as fruit or salads
- 11 • Wear loose fitting, light-colored clothes
- 12 • Check on older, sick, or frail people who may need help responding to the heat
- 13 • Know the symptoms of excessive heat exposure and the appropriate responses.

14 **Don't**

- 15 • Direct the flow of portable electric fans toward yourself when room temperature  
16 is hotter than 90°F
- 17 • Leave children and pets alone in cars for any amount of time
- 18 • Drink alcohol to try to stay cool
- 19 • Eat heavy, hot, or hard-to-digest foods
- 20 • Wear heavy, dark clothing.

21

22 **Useful Community Interventions**

23 ***For Public Officials***

24 **Send a clear public message**

- 25 • Communicate that EHEs [extreme heat event] are dangerous and conditions can  
26 be life-threatening. In the event of conflicting environmental safety  
27 recommendations, emphasize that health protection should be the first priority.

28 **Inform the public of anticipated EHE conditions**

- 29 • When will EHE conditions be dangerous?
- 30 • How long will EHE conditions last?
- 31 • How hot will it feel at specific times during the day (e.g., 8 a.m., 12 p.m., 4 p.m.,  
32 8 p.m.)?

33 **Assist those at greatest risk**

- 34 • Assess locations with vulnerable populations, such as nursing homes and public  
35 housing
- 36 • Staff additional emergency medical personnel to address the anticipated increase  
37 in demand
- 38 • Shift/expand homeless intervention services to cover daytime hours
- 39 • Open cooling centers to offer relief for people without air conditioning and urge  
40 the public to use them.

41 **Provide access to additional sources of information**

- 42 • Provide toll-free numbers and Web site addresses for heat exposure symptoms  
43 and responses
- 44 • Open hotlines to report concerns about individuals who may be at risk

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- Coordinate broadcasts of EHE response information in newspapers and on television and radio.

Source: U.S. EPA, 2006

1 **2.10 Tables**2 **Table 4.1 Projections of Impacts of Climate Change on Heat-Related Mortality**

<b>Location</b>	<b>Period</b>	<b>Adaptation considered</b>	<b>Projected Impact on Heat-Related Deaths</b>
<b>Lisbon, Portugal<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>2020s, 2050s compared to 1990-1999</b>	<b>yes</b>	<b>Increase of 57%-113% in 2020s, 67-265% in 2050s, depending on adaptation</b>
<b>8 Australian cities<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>2100 compared to 1990s</b>	<b>no</b>	<b>Increase of 1700 to 3200 deaths, depending on policy approach followed and age structure of population</b>
<b>New York, NY<sup>3</sup></b>	<b>2080s compared to 1990s</b>	<b>yes</b>	<b>Increase 47% to 65%; reduced by 25% with adaptation</b>
<b>California<sup>4</sup></b>	<b>2080s compared to 1990s</b>	<b>yes</b>	<b>Depending on emissions, mortality increases 2-7 fold from 1990 levels, reduced 20-25% with adaptation</b>
<b>Boston, MA<sup>5</sup></b>	<b>projections to 2100 compared to 1970-92</b>	<b>yes</b>	<b>Decrease after 2010 due to adaptation</b>

**1 Dessai, 2003**  
**2 Woodruff, 2005**  
**3 Knowlton, in press**  
**4 Hughes, 2004**  
**5 CLMIS, 2004**

3

4 The impacts projected for Lisbon were more sensitive to the choice of regional climate model  
 5 than the method used to calculate excess deaths, and the author described the challenge of  
 6 extrapolating health effects at the high end of the temperature distribution, for which data are  
 7 sparse or nonexistent (Dessai 2003).

8

1 **Table 2.2. Possible Influence of Climate Change on Climate Susceptible Pathogens and/or Disease, Based on Observational Models or**  
 2 **Empirical Evidence**

Pathogen	Climate Related Driver	Possible Influence of Climate Change	Likelihood of Change <sup>a</sup>	Basis for Assessment	References
<b>Bacteria</b> <i>Salmonella</i>	Rising Temperature	Increasing temperature associated with increasing clinical cases	Likely	Likelihood of climate event is high and published research supports disease trend	D'Souza <i>et al.</i> , 2004; Kovats <i>et al.</i> , 2004a; Fleury <i>et al.</i> , 2006; Naumova <i>et al.</i> , 2006
	Changes in Precipitation	Precipitation and run-off associated with increased likelihood of contamination of surface waters used for recreation, drinking or irrigation.	Likely	Likelihood of climate event is probable but more research is needed to confirm disease trend	Haley 2006; Holley <i>et al.</i> , 2006
	Shifts in Reservoir Host Ranges	Shifts in habitat and range of reservoir hosts may influence exposure routes and/or rate of contact with humans	More likely than not	Likelihood of climate event is probable but there is insufficient research on this relationship	Srikantiah <i>et al.</i> , 2003
<i>Campylobacter</i>	Rising Temperature	Increasing temperatures may expand typical peak season of clinical infection, or result in earlier peak (commonly spring and summer)	More likely than not	Likelihood of climate event is high and published research supports disease trend, but mechanisms are not understood	Skelly & Weinstein, 2003; Louis <i>et al.</i> , 2005; Kovats <i>et al.</i> , 2005
		Increasing temperatures may result in shorter developmental times for flies, contributing to increased transmission by this proposed vector	About as likely as not	Likelihood of climate event and fly development trend is high but additional research is needed to confirm disease association	Nichols, 2005

	Changes in Precipitation	Increasing precipitation and run-off associated with increased likelihood of contamination of surface waters used for recreation or drinking	More likely than not	Likelihood of climate event is probable but more research is needed to confirm disease trend	Auld <i>et al.</i> , 2004; Vereen <i>et al.</i> , 2007
	Shifts in Reservoir Host Ranges or Behavior	Shifts in habitat and range of reservoir hosts (geographically or temporally) may influence exposure routes and/or rate of contact with humans	More likely than not	Likelihood of climate event is probable but there is insufficient research on this relationship	Stanley <i>et al.</i> , 1998; Lacey, 1993; Southern <i>et al.</i> , 1990
<i>Vibrio</i> species	Rising Temperature	Increasing ambient temperatures associated with growth in pre-harvest and post-harvest shellfish (in absence of appropriate post-harvest controls) and increasing disease	Very likely	Likelihood of climate event is high and evidence supports growth trend in ambient waters; adaptive (control) measures (refrigeration) would reduce this effect for post-harvest oysters	Cook, 1994
		Increasing temperature associated with higher environmental prevalence and disease	Extremely likely	Likelihood of climate event is high and evidence is supports environmental growth trend	Janda <i>et al.</i> , 1988; Lipp <i>et al.</i> , 2002; McLaughlin <i>et al.</i> , 2005; Dziuban <i>et al.</i> , 2006
		Increasing temperature associated with range expansion	Very likely	Likelihood of climate event is high and evidence collected to date supports trend; more data needed to confirm	McLaughlin <i>et al.</i> , 2005
	Changes in Precipitation	Increasing precipitation and fresh water run off leads to depressed estuarine salinities and increase in some <i>Vibrio</i> species	About as likely as not	Likelihood of climate event is probable but additional research is needed to confirm pathogen distribution patterns	Lipp <i>et al.</i> , 2001b; Louis <i>et al.</i> , 2003
	Sea Level Changes	Rising sea level and or storm surge increase range and human exposure	Likely	Likelihood of climate event is probable but confirmatory	Lobitz <i>et al.</i> , 2000

<i>Leptospira</i>	Rising Temperature	Increasing temperatures may increase range of pathogen (temporally and geographically)	Likely	research is needed on disease patterns Likelihood of climate event is high but additional research is needed to confirm pathogen distribution patterns	Bharti <i>et al.</i> , 2003; Howell and Cole, 2006
	Changes in Precipitation	Increasing precipitation and run off precedes outbreaks	Likely	Likelihood of climate event in probable and research supports this pattern	Meites <i>et al.</i> , 2004
<b>Viruses</b>					
Enteroviruses	Rising Temperature	Increasing temperature associated with increased or expanded peak clinical season (summer)	Unlikely	Likelihood of climate event is high but no mechanistic studies are available to explain the underlying cause of this seasonality.	Khetsuriani <i>et al.</i> , 2006
		Increasing temperature associated with increased decay and inactivation of viruses in the environment	About as likely as not	Likelihood of climate event is high and research demonstrates decreased persistence under increasing temperatures but little data are available to relate this with disease	Gantzer <i>et al.</i> , 1998; Wetz <i>et al.</i> , 2004
	Changes in Precipitation	Increasing precipitation associated with increased loading of viruses to water and increased exposure or disease	Likely	Likelihood of climate is probable and research supports this pattern	Lipp <i>et al.</i> , 2001a; Frost <i>et al.</i> , 2002; Fong <i>et al.</i> , 2005
Norovirus	Rising Temperature	Increasing temperature leads to decreased retention of virus in shellfish	Unlikely	Likelihood of climate event is high and research indicates seasonally high shellfish loading in winter but there is no evidence for direct control of temperature on seasonality of infection	Burkhardt and Calci, 2000
		Increasing temperature associated with shorter peak clinical season (winter)	Unlikely	Likelihood of climate event is high and research indicates seasonal disease peak in winter but there is	Mounts <i>et al.</i> , 2000

		Increasing temperature associated with increased decay and inactivation of viruses in the environment	About as likely as not	no evidence for direct control of temperature on seasonality of infection Likelihood of climate event is high and research demonstrates decreased persistence under increasing temperatures but little data are available to relate this with disease	Griffin <i>et al.</i> , 2003
	Changes in Precipitation	Increasing precipitation associated with increased loading of viruses to crops and fresh produce	More likely than not	Likelihood of climate event is probable but there is insufficient research on this relationship	Miossec <i>et al.</i> , 2000
		Increasing precipitation associated with increased loading of viruses to water and increased exposure or disease	Likely	Likelihood of climate is probable and research supports this pattern	Goodman <i>et al.</i> , 1982
Rotavirus	Rising Temperature	Increasing temperature associated with increased decay and inactivation of viruses in the environment	About as likely as not	Likelihood of climate event is high and research demonstrates decreased persistence under increasing temperatures but little data are available to relate this with disease	Rzesutka and Cook, 2004
		Dampening of winter seasonal peak in temperate latitudes	About as likely as not	Likelihood of climate event is high and research indicates seasonal disease peak in winter but there is no evidence for direct control of temperature on seasonality of infection; although tropical countries do not exhibit a seasonal peak	Cook <i>et al.</i> , 1990
<b>Parasites</b>					
<i>Naegleria fowleri</i>	Rising Temperature	Increasing temperature associated with expanded range and conversion to flagellated	More likely than not	Likelihood of climate event is high but more research is	Cabanes <i>et al.</i> , 2001



		form (infective)		needed to confirm disease trend	
<i>Cryptosporidium</i>	Rising Temperature	Expanding recreational (swimming) season may increase likelihood of exposure and disease	About as likely as not	Likelihood of climate event is high but there is insufficient research on this relationship	Naumova <i>et al.</i> , 2006
	Changes in Precipitation	Increasing precipitation associated with increased loading of parasite to water and increased exposure and disease	Very likely	Likelihood of climate event is probable and research supports this pattern but adaptive measures (water treatment and infrastructure) would reduce this effect	Curriero <i>et al.</i> , 2001; Davies <i>et al.</i> , 2004
<i>Giardia</i>	Rising Temperature	Expanding recreational (swimming) season may increase likelihood of exposure and disease	About as likely as not	Likelihood of climate event is high but there is insufficient research on this relationship	Naumova <i>et al.</i> , 2006
	Changes in Precipitation	Increasing precipitation associated with increased loading of parasite to water and increased disease	Very likely	Likelihood of climate event is probable and research supports this pattern but adaptive measures (water treatment and infrastructure) would reduce this effect	Kistemann <i>et al.</i> , 2002
	Shifts in Reservoir Host Ranges or Behavior	Increasing temperature associated with shifting range in reservoir species (carriers) and expanded disease range	About as likely as not	Likelihood of climate event is probable but there is insufficient research on this relationship	Parkinson and Butler, 2005

1 <sup>a</sup> Likelihood was based on expert judgment of the strength of the research and the likelihood of the event. See Chapter 1 for a  
2 discussion of likelihood (section 1.5).

3

1

**Table 2.3. Climate-Sensitive Health Outcomes and Particularly Vulnerable Groups**

<b><u>Climate-Sensitive Health Outcome</u></b>	<b><u>Particularly Vulnerable Groups</u></b>
<b>Heat-Related Illnesses and Deaths</b>	Elderly, chronic medical conditions, infants and children, pregnant women, urban and rural poor, outdoor workers
<b>Diseases and Deaths Related to Air Quality</b>	Children, pre-existing heart or lung disease, diabetes, athletes, outdoor workers
<b>Illnesses and Deaths Due to Extreme Weather Events</b>	Poor, pregnant women, chronic medical conditions, mobility and cognitive constraints
<b>Water- and Foodborne Illness</b>	Immunocompromised, elderly, infants; specific risks for specific consequences (e.g., <i>Campylobacter</i> and Guillain-Barre syndrome, <i>E. coli</i> O157:H7)
<b>Vectorborne Illnesses</b>	
A. Lyme Disease	Children, outdoor workers
B. Hantavirus	Rural poor, occupational groups
C. Dengue	Infants, elderly
D. Malaria	Children, immunocompromised, pregnant women, genetic (e.g., G6PD status)

2

1 **Table 2.4: Actors and Their Roles and Responsibilities for Adaptation to Climate Change Health Risks**  
2

<b>Actor</b>	<b>Reduce Exposures</b>	<b>Prevent Onset of Adverse Health Outcomes</b>	<b>Reduce Morbidity and Mortality</b>
<i>Extreme Temperature and Weather Events</i>			
Individuals	Stay informed about impending weather events Follow guidance for emergency preparedness	Follow guidance for conduct during and following an extreme weather event (such as seeking cooling centers during a heatwave or evacuation during a hurricane)	Seek treatment when needed
Community, State, and National Agencies	Provide scientific and technical guidance for building and infrastructure standards Enforce building and infrastructure standards, including identification of restricted building zones where necessary	Develop scientific and technical guidance and decisions support tools for development of early warning systems and emergency response plans, including appropriate individual behavior Implement early warning systems and emergency response plans Conduct tests of early warning systems and response plans before events Conduct education and outreach on emergency preparedness	Ensure that emergency preparedness plans include medical services Improve programs to monitor the air, water, and soil for hazardous exposures Improve surveillance programs to collect, analyze, and disseminate data on the health consequences of extreme events and heatwaves Monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of systems
NGOs and Other Actors		NGOs and other actors play critical roles in emergency preparedness and disaster relief	Education and training of health professionals on risks from extreme weather events
<i>Vectorborne and Zoonotic Diseases</i>			
Individuals	Take appropriate actions to reduce exposure to infected vectors, including eliminating vector breeding sites around residence	Vaccinate for diseases to which one would likely be exposed	Seek treatment when needed

Community, State, and National Agencies	<p>Provide scientific and technical guidance and decision support tools for development of early warning systems</p> <p>Conduct effective vector (and pathogen) surveillance and control programs (including consideration of land use policies that affect vector distribution and habitats)</p> <p>Develop early warning systems for disease outbreaks, such as West Nile virus</p> <p>Develop and disseminate information on appropriate individual behavior to avoid exposure to vectors</p>	<p>Conduct research on vaccines and other preventive measures</p> <p>Conduct research and development on rapid diagnostic tools</p> <p>Provide vaccinations to those likely to be exposed</p>	<p>Conduct research on treatment options</p> <p>Develop and disseminate information on signs and symptoms of disease to guide individuals on when to seek treatment</p>
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***Waterborne and Foodborne Diseases***

Individuals	<p>Follow proper food-handling guidelines</p> <p>Follow guidelines on drinking water from outdoor sources</p>		Seek treatment when needed
Community, State, and National Agencies	<p>Improve surveillance and control programs for early detection of disease outbreaks</p> <p>Develop methods to ensure watershed protection and safe water and food handling (e.g., Clean Water Act)</p>	<p>Sponsor research and development on rapid diagnostic tools for food- and waterborne pathogens</p>	<p>Sponsor research and development on treatment options</p> <p>Develop and disseminate information on signs and symptoms of disease to guide individuals on when to seek treatment</p>

***Diseases Related to Air Quality***

Individuals	<p>Follow advice on appropriate behavior on high ozone days</p>	<p>For individuals with certain respiratory diseases, follow medical advice during periods of high air pollution</p>	Seek treatment when needed
-------------	---	--	----------------------------

Community,  
State, and  
National  
Agencies

Develop and enforce regulations of air  
pollutants (e.g., Clean Air Act)

Develop decision support tools for early  
warning systems  
Conduct education and outreach on the risks  
of exposure to air pollutants

Conduct research on treatment  
options

1

1 **Table 2.5: Adaptation Measures to Reduce Climate Change-Related Health Risks**  
 2

	<b>Heatwaves</b>	<b>Extreme Weather Events</b>	<b>Vectorborne Diseases</b>	<b>Waterborne Diseases</b>	<b>Air Quality</b>
<b>Decision Support Tools</b>	Enhance early warning systems	Enhance early warning systems and emergency response plans	Enhance early warning systems based on climate and environmental data for selected diseases	Develop early warning systems based on climate and environmental data for conditions that may increase selected diseases	Enhance alert systems for high air pollution days
<b>Technology Development</b>	Improve building design to reduce heat loads during summer months		Develop vaccines for West Nile virus and other vectorborne diseases Develop more rapid diagnostic tests	Develop more rapid diagnostic tests	
<b>Surveillance and Monitoring</b>	Alter health data collection systems to monitor for increased morbidity and mortality during a heatwave	Alter health data collection systems to monitor for disease outbreaks during and after an extreme event	Enhance vector surveillance and control programs Monitor disease occurrence	Enhance surveillance and monitoring programs for waterborne diseases	Enhance health data collection systems to monitor for health outcomes due to air pollution
<b>Infrastructure Development</b>	Improve urban design to reduce urban heat islands by planting trees, increasing green spaces, etc.	Design infrastructure to withstand projected extreme events	Consider possible impacts of infrastructure development, such as water storage tanks, on vectorborne diseases	Consider possible impacts of placement of sources of water- and foodborne pathogens (e.g., cattle near drinking water sources)	Improve public transit systems to reduce traffic emissions
<b>Other</b>	Conduct research on effective approaches to encourage appropriate behavior	Conduct research on effective approaches to encourage appropriate behavior during an			


during a heatwave      extreme event

1

## 1 2.11 Figures

2 **Figure 2.1.** Temperature-mortality relative risk functions for 11 U.S. cities, 1973–1994.  
 3 Northern cities: Boston, Massachusetts; Chicago, Illinois; New York, New York; Philadelphia,  
 4 Pennsylvania; Baltimore, Maryland; and Washington, DC. Southern cities: Charlotte, North  
 5 Carolina; Atlanta, Georgia; Jacksonville, Florida; Tampa, Florida; and Miami, Florida. Relative  
 6 risk is defined as the risk of an event such as mortality relative to exposure, such that the relative  
 7 risk is a ratio of the probability of the event occurring in the exposed group versus the probability  
 8 of occurrence in the control (non-exposed) group.

9 (Curriero *et al.* 2002)




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
1 **Figure 2.2.** Annual Deaths Attributed to Hurricanes in the United States, 1900 and 1940-2005



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Source: NOAA, 2007


1 **Figure 2.3.** Annual Deaths Attributed to Flooding in the United States, 1940-2005



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
Source: NOAA, 2007a

1 **Figure 2.4.** Drinking Waterborne Disease Outbreaks and 90%-ile Precipitation Events (a two  
2 month lag precedes outbreaks); 1948 – 1994.



Source: Curriero *et al.*, 2001


1 **Figure 2.5:** (a) Summertime Average Daily Maximum 8-hour Ozone Concentrations (ppb) for  
 2 the 1990s and Changes for the (b) 2020s relative to the 1990s, (c) 2050s relative to the 1990s, and  
 3 (d) 2080s relative to the 1990s. All are based on the A2 Scenario relative to the 1990s. Five  
 4 consecutive summer seasons were simulated in each decade.



Source: Hogrefe *et al.*, 2004a.

5  
 6  
 7

1 **Figure 2.6.** Frequency Distributions of Summertime Daily Maximum 8-hr Ozone Concentrations  
 2 over the Eastern U.S. in the 1990s, 2020s, and 2050s based on the A2 Scenario.




3  
 4 Source: From Hogrefe *et al.*, 2005a

1 **Figure 2.7.a-d.** U.S. maps indicating counties with existing vulnerability to climate  
2 sensitive health outcomes: (a) location of hurricane landfalls; (b) extreme heat events,  
3 defined by CDC as temperatures 10 or more degrees above the average high temperature  
4 for the region and lasting for several weeks; (c) percentage of population over age 65;  
5 West Nile Virus cases reported in 2004. Historical disease activity, especially in the case  
6 of WNV, is not necessarily predictive of future vulnerability.

### Geographic Vulnerability of US Residents to Selected Climate Related Health Impacts



Location of Hurricane Landfalls,  
1995-2000



Percentage of US Population 65  
or older, 2000



Locations of Extreme Heat Events,  
1995-2000



West Nile Virus Cases, 2004

7  
8

## Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.6

### Chapter 3

## Effects of Global Change on Human Settlements

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## 3.1 Introduction

### 3.1.1 Purpose

Human settlements are where people live and work, including all population centers ranging from small rural communities to densely developed metropolitan areas. This chapter addresses climate change impacts, both positive and negative, on human settlements in the United States. First, the chapter summarizes current knowledge about the vulnerability of human settlements to climate change, in a context of concurrent changes in other non-climate factors. Next, the chapter summarizes opportunities within settlements for adaptation to climate change. Finally, the chapter provides an overview of recommendations for expanding the current knowledge base with respect to climate change and human settlements..

### 3.1.2 Background

Events such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and electric power outages during the hot summer of 2006 have demonstrated how climate-related events can dramatically impact U.S. settlements. Climate affects the costs of assuring comfort at home and work. Climate affects inputs for a good life: water, products and services from agriculture and forestry, pleasures and tourist potentials from nature, biodiversity, and outdoor recreation. Climate also affects the presence and spread of diseases and other health problems, and it is associated with threats from natural disasters, including floods, fires, droughts, wind, hail, ice, and heat and cold waves.

Some U.S. settlements may find opportunities in climate change. Warmer winters are not necessarily undesirable. Periods of change tend to reward forward-looking, effectively-governed communities. Considering climate change effects may help to focus attention on other important issues for the long-term sustainable development of settlements and communities. Furthermore, planning for the future is an essential part of public policy decision-making in urban areas.

Since infrastructure investments in urban areas are often both large and difficult to reverse, climate considerations are increasingly perceived as one of a number of relevant issues to consider when planning for the future (Ruth, 2006a). If U.S. settlements, especially larger cities, respond effectively to climate change concerns, their actions could have far-reaching implications for human well-being, because these areas are where most of the U.S. population lives, large financial decisions are made, political influence is often centered, and technological and social innovations take place.

Meanwhile, the pattern of human settlements in the U.S. is changing. In addition to shifts of population from frost-belt to sun-belt settlements, patterns are changing in other ways as well. For instance, what once appeared to be an inexorable spread of households from urban centers to peripheries is showing renewal in many city centers as metropolitan areas continue to expand across multiple jurisdictions (Solecki and Leichenko, 2006).

Modern information technologies are enabling people to perform what were historically urban functions from relatively remote locations (Riebsame, 1997).

### 3.1.3 Current State of Knowledge

The current knowledge base provides limited grounds for developing conclusions and recommendations related to climate impacts on human settlements. In many cases, the best that can be done is to sketch out the issue “landscape” that should be considered by both policy-makers and the research community as a basis for further discussion, offering illustrations from the relatively small research literature that is now available.

The fact is that little research has been done to date specifically on the effects of climate change in U.S. cities and towns. Reasons appear to include (i) limitations in capacities to project climate change impacts at the geographic scale of a metropolitan area (or smaller) and (ii) the fact that none of the federal agencies currently active in climate science research has a clear responsibility for settlement impact issues. Improvements in our understanding of the impacts of and adaptation to climate change across different sectors and geographic regions, differential vulnerabilities, and in designing interventions to build resilience are all needed (NRC, 2007).

To some degree, gaps can be filled by referring to several comprehensive analyses that do exist, to literature on effects of climate *variation* on settlements and their responses, to research on climate change impacts on cities in other parts of the world, and to historical analogs of responses of urban areas to significant environmental changes. A text box entitled *Historical Perspective of the U.S. Urban Responses to Environmental Change* is included as Box 3.1. This perspective examines how American cities have been affected by environmental change over the past two centuries. But this is little more than a place to start.

At the current state of knowledge, vulnerabilities to possible impacts are easier to project than actual impacts because they *estimate risks or opportunities* associated with possible consequences rather than *estimating the consequences* themselves, which requires far more detailed information about future conditions. Vulnerabilities are shaped not only by existing exposures, sensitivities, and adaptive capacities but also by the ability of settlements to develop responses to risks.

## 3.2 Climate Change Impacts and the Vulnerabilities of Human Settlements

This section examines possible impacts of climate change on settlements in the U.S. including the determinants of vulnerability to such impacts and how those impacts could affect settlement patterns and various systems related to those patterns.

### 3.2.1 Determinants of vulnerability

It has been difficult to project impacts of climate change on human settlements in the U.S., in part because climate change forecasts are not specific enough for the scale of decision-making (as for other relatively local-scale impact questions) but moreover

because climate change is not the only change being confronted by settlements. More often, attention is paid to vulnerabilities to climate change, if those changes should occur.

Vulnerabilities to or opportunities from climate change are related to three factors, both in absolute terms and in comparison to other elements (Clark et al., 2000):

- (1) *Exposure to climate change.* To what climate changes are settlements likely to be exposed: Changes in temperature or precipitation? Changes in storm exposures and/or intensities? Changes in sea level?
- (2) *Sensitivity to climate change.* If primary climate changes occur, how sensitive are the activities and populations of a settlement to those changes? For instance, a city dependent substantially on a regional agricultural or forestry economy, or to the availability of abundant water resources, might be considered more sensitive than a city whose economy is based mainly on an industrial sector less sensitive to climate variation.
- (3) *Adaptive capacity.* Finally, if effects are experienced due to a combination of exposure and sensitivity, how able is a settlement to handle those impacts without disabling damages, perhaps even while realizing new opportunities?

### 3.2.2 Impacts of Climate Change on Human Settlements

Impacts of climate change on human settlements vary regionally (see Table 3.2 and Vignettes below), and generally relate to some of the following issues:

- 1 *Effects on health.* It is well-established that higher temperatures in urban areas are related to higher levels of ozone which cause respiratory and cardiovascular problems. There is also some evidence that combined effects of heat stress and air pollution may be greater than simple additive effects (Patz and Balbus, 2001). Moreover, historical data show relationships between mortality and temperature extremes (Rozenzweig and Solecki, 2001a). Other health concerns include changes in exposure to water and food-borne diseases, vector-borne diseases, concentrations of plant species associated with allergies, and exposures to extreme weather events such as storms, floods, and fires (see Chapter 2).
- 2 *Effects on water and other urban infrastructures.* Changes in precipitation patterns may lead to reductions in meltwater, river flows, groundwater levels, and in coastal areas lead to saline intrusion in rivers and groundwater, affecting water supply; and warming may increase water demands (Gleick et al., 2000; Kirshen, 2002; Ruth *et al.*, 2007). Moreover, storms, floods, and other severe weather events may affect other infrastructure, including sanitation systems, transportation, supply lines for food and energy, and communication. Exposed structures such as bridges and electricity transmission networks are especially vulnerable. In many cases, infrastructures are interconnected; an impact on one can also affect others (Kirshen, *et al.*, 2007). An example is an interruption in energy supply, which increases heat stress for vulnerable populations (Ruth *et al.*,

2006a). Many of the infrastructures in older cities are aging and are already under stress from increasing demands.

- 3 *Effects on energy requirements.* Warming is virtually certain to increase energy demand in U.S. cities for cooling in buildings while it reduces demands for heating in buildings (see SAP 4.5). Demands for cooling during warm periods could jeopardize the reliability of service in some regions by exceeding the supply capacity, especially during periods of unusually high temperatures (see Vignettes in Boxes 3.2 and 3.3). Higher temperatures also affect costs of living and business operation by increasing costs of climate control in buildings (Amato *et al.*, 2005; Ruth and Lin, 2006c; Kirshen *et al.*, 2007).
- 4 *Effects on the urban metabolism.* An urban area is a living complex mega-organism, associated with a host of inputs, transformations, and outputs: heat, energy, materials, and others (Decker *et al.*, 2000). An example is the Urban Heat Index (UHI), which measures the degree to which built/paved areas are associated with higher temperatures than surrounding rural areas (see Box 3.4: Climate Change Impacts on the Urban Heat Island Effect (UHI)). Imbalances in the urban metabolism can aggravate climate change impacts, such as roles of UHI in the formation of smog in cities. The maps in this box demonstrate how the built environment creates and retains heat in metropolitan settings.
- 5 *Effects on economic competitiveness, opportunities, and risks.* Climate change has the potential not only to affect settlements directly but also to affect them through impacts on other areas linked to their economies at regional, national, and international scales (Rosenzweig and Solecki, 2006). In addition, it can affect a settlement's economic base if it is sensitive to climate, as in areas where settlements are based on agriculture, forestry, water resources, or tourism (IPCC, 2001b).
- 6 *Effects on social and political structures.* Climate change can add to stress on social and political structures by increasing management and budget requirements for public services such as public health care, disaster risk reduction, and even public security. As sources of stress grow and combine, the resilience of social and political structures that are already somewhat unstable is likely to suffer, especially in areas with relatively limited resources (Sherbinin *et al.*, 2006).
- 7 *Effects on vulnerable populations* (see Chapter 1). Where climate change stresses settlements, it is likely to be especially problematic for vulnerable parts of the population: the poor, the elderly, those already in poor health, the disabled, those living alone, those with limited rights and power (e.g., recent in-migrants with limited English skills), and/or indigenous populations dependent on one or a few resources. As one example, warmer temperatures in urban summers have a more direct impact on populations who live and work without air-conditioning. Implications for environmental justice are clear; see, for instance, Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, 2004.

- 8 *Effects on vulnerable regions.* Approximately half of the U.S. population, 160 million people, will live in one of 673 coastal counties by 2008 (NOAA, 2005). Obviously, settlements in coastal areas – particularly on gently-sloping coasts – should be concerned about sea level rise in the longer term, especially if they are subject to severe storms and storm surges and/or if their regions are showing gradual land subsidence (Neumann *et al.*, 2000; Kirshen *et al.*, 2004). Settlements in risk-prone regions have reason to be concerned about severe weather events, ranging from severe storms combined with sea-level rise in coastal areas to increased risks of fire in drier arid areas. Vulnerabilities may be especially great for rapidly-growing and/or larger metropolitan areas, where the potential magnitude of both impacts and coping requirements could be very large (IPCC, 2001b; IPCC, 2007).

Different combinations of circumstances are likely to cause particular concerns for cities and towns in the United States as they consider possible implications of climate change.

### **3.2.3. The Interaction of Climate Impacts with Non-Climate Factors.**

In general, climate change effects on human settlements in the U.S. are imbedded in a variety of complexities that make projections of quantitative impacts over long periods of time very difficult. For instance, looking out over a period of many decades, it seems likely that other kinds of change – such as technological, economic, and institutional – will have more impact on the sustainability of most settlements rather than climate change per se (IPCC, 2007). Climate change will interact with other processes, driving forces, and stresses; and its significance, positive or negative, will largely be determined by these interactions. It is therefore difficult to assess effects of climate change without a reasonably clear picture of future scenarios for these other processes.

In many cases, these interactions involve not only direct impacts such as warming or more or less precipitation but, sometimes more important, second, third, or higher-order impacts, as direct impacts cascade through urban systems and other settlement-determined processes (e.g., warming which affects urban air pollution which affects health which affects public service requirements which affect social harmony: Kirshen *et al.*, 2007). Some of these higher-order impacts, in turn, may feed back to create ripple effects of their own. For example, a heat wave may trigger increased energy demands for cooling, which may cause more air conditioners and power generators to be operated, which could lead to higher urban heat island effects, inducing even higher cooling needs.

Besides this “multi-stress” perspective, it is highly likely that effects of climate change on settlements are shaped by certain “thresholds,” below which effects are incidental but beyond where effects quickly become major when a limiting or inflection point is reached. An example might be a city’s capacity to cope with sustained heat stress combined with a natural disaster. In general, these climate-related thresholds for human settlements in the U.S. are not well-understood. For multi-stress assessments of thresholds, changes in climate extremes are very often of more concern than changes in climate averages. Besides extreme weather events, such as hurricanes or tornadoes, ice storms, winds, heat waves, drought, or fire, settlements may be affected by changes in

daily or seasonal high or low levels of temperature or precipitation, which have not always been projected by climate change models (see Figure 3.2).

Finally, human settlements may be affected by climate change mitigation initiatives as well as by climate change itself. Examples include effects on policies related to energy sources and uses, environmental emissions, and land use. The most direct and short-term effects would likely be on settlements in regions whose economies are closely related to the production and consumption of large quantities of fossil fuels. Indirect and longer term effects are less predictable.

As climate change affects settlements in the U.S., impacts are realized at the intersection of climate change with underlying forces. Most of the possible effects are linked with changes in regional comparative advantage, with consequent migration of population and economic activities (Ruth and Coelho, in press). Examples of these complex interactions and issues include:

- 1 *Regional risks and availability of insurance.* It is possible that regions exposed to risks from climate change will see movement of population and economic activity to other locations. One reason is public perceptions of risk, but a more powerful driving force may be the availability of insurance. The insurance sector is one of the most adaptable of all economic sectors, and its exposure to costs from severe storms and other extreme weather events is likely to lead it to withdraw (or to make much more expensive) private insurance coverage from areas vulnerable to climate change impacts (IPCC, 2007), which would encourage both businesses and individual citizens to consider other locations over a period of several decades.
- 2 *Areas whose economies are linked with climate-sensitive resources or assets.* Settlements whose economic bases are related to such sectors as agriculture, forestry, tourism, water availability, or other climate-related activities could be affected either positively or negatively by climate change, depending partly on the adaptability of those sectors (i.e., their ability to adapt to changes without shifting to different locations).(citation)
- 3 *Shifts in comparative living costs, risks, and amenities.* Related to a range of possible climate change effects – higher costs for space cooling in warmer areas, higher costs of water availability in drier areas, more or less exposure to storm impacts in some areas, and sea level rise – regions of the U.S. and their associated settlements are likely to see gradual changes over the long term in their relative attractiveness for a variety of human activities. One example, although its likelihood is highly uncertain, would be a gradual migration of the “Sun Belt” northward, as retirees and businesses attracted by environmental amenities find that regions less exposed to very high temperatures and seasonal major storms are more attractive as places to locate.

- 4 *Changes in regional comparative advantage related to shifts in energy resource use.* If climate mitigation policies result in shifts from coal and other fossil resources toward non-fossil energy sources, or if climate changes affect the prospects of renewable energy sources (especially hydropower), regional economies related to the production and/or use of energy from these sources could be affected, along with regional economies more closely linked with alternatives. (citation: SAP 4.5)
- 5 *Urban “footprints” on other areas.* Resource requirements for urban areas involve larger areas than their own bounded territories alone. Ecologists have sought to estimate the land area required to supply the consumption of resources and compensate for emissions and other wastes from urban areas (e.g., Folke *et al.*, 1997). By possibly affecting settlements, along with their resource capacities for their inputs and destinations of their outputs, climate change could affect the nature, size, and geographic distribution of these footprints.

Human settlements are foci for many economic, social, and governmental processes, and historical experience has shown that catastrophes in cities can have significant economic, financial, and political effects much more broadly. The case which has received the most attention to date is insurance and finance (IPCC, 2007).

### 3.2.4 Realizing Opportunities from Climate Change in the U.S.

Climate change can have positive as well as negative implications for settlements.

Examples of potential positive effects include:

- 1) *Reduced winter weather costs and stresses.* Warmer temperatures in periods of the year that are normally cold are not necessarily undesirable. They reduce cold-related stresses and costs (e.g., costs of warming buildings and costs of clearing ice and snow from roads and streets), particularly for cold-vulnerable populations. They expand opportunities for warmer-weather recreational opportunities over larger parts of the year, and they expand growing seasons for crops, parks, and gardens.
- 2) *Increased attention to long-term sustainability.* One of the most positive aspects of climate change can be that its capacity to stimulate a broader discussion of what sustainability means for settlements (Wilbanks, 2003; Ruth, 2006). Even if climate change itself may not be the most serious threat to sustainability, considering climate change impacts in a multi-change, multi-stage context can encourage and facilitate processes that lead to progress in dealing with other sources of stress as well.
- 3) *Improved competitiveness compared with settlements subject to more serious adverse impacts.* While some settlements may turn out to be “losers” due to climate change impacts, others may be “winners,” as changes in temperature or precipitation result in added economic opportunities (see the following section), at least if climate change is not severe. In addition for many settlements climate

change can be an opportunity not only to compare their net impacts with others, seeking advantages as a result, but to present a progressive image by taking climate change (and related sustainability issues) seriously.

### 3.2.5 Examples of Impacts on Metropolitan Areas in the U.S.

Possible impacts of climate change on settlements in the U.S. are usually assessed by projecting climate changes at a regional scale: temperature, precipitation, severe weather events, and sea level rise (see Table 3.2 and Boxes 3.2 and 3.3). Ideally, these regional projections are at a relatively detailed scale, and ideally they consider seasonal as well as annual changes and changes in extremes as well as in averages; but these conditions cannot always be met.

The most comprehensive assessments of possible climate change impacts on settlements in the U.S. have been two studies of major metropolitan areas:

- (1) New York: This assessment concluded that impacts of climate change on this metropolitan area are likely to be primarily negative over the long term, with potentially significant costs increasing as the magnitude of climate change increases, although there are substantial uncertainties. (Rosenzweig and Solecki, 2001a; also see Rosenzweig and Solecki, 2001b, and Solecki and Rosenzweig, 2006).
- (2) Boston: This assessment concluded that long-term impacts of climate change are likely to depend at least as much on behavioral and policy changes over this period as on temperature and other climate changes (Kirshen *et al.*, 2004; also see Kirshen *et al.*, 2006 and 2007)

Other U.S. studies include Seattle (Hoo and Sumitani, 2005) and Los Angeles (Koteen *et al.*, 2001) (Table 3.1). Internationally, studies have included several major metropolitan areas, such as London (London Climate Change Partnership, 2004) and Mexico City (Molina *et al.*, 2005) as well as possible impacts on smaller settlements (e.g., AIACC: see [www.aiaccproject.org](http://www.aiaccproject.org)). A relevant historical study of effects of an urban heat wave in the U.S. is reported by Klinenberg (2003).

## 3.3 Opportunities for Adaptation of Human Settlements to Climate Change

Settlements are important in considering prospects for adaptation to climate change, both because they represent concentrations of people and because buildings and other infrastructures offer ways to manage risk and monitor/control threats associated with climate extremes and other non-climate stressors.

Where climate change presents risks of adverse impacts for U.S. settlements and their populations, there are two basic options to respond to such concerns (a third is combining the two). One response is to contribute to climate change **mitigation** strategies, i.e., by taking actions to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and by showing leadership in



encouraging others to support such actions (see Box 3.5: Roles of Settlements in Climate Change Mitigation). The second response is to consider strategies for **adaptation**, i.e., finding ways either to reduce sensitivity to projected changes or to increase the settlement's coping capacities. Adaptation can rely mainly on anticipatory actions to avoid damages and costs, such as "hardening" coastal structures to sea-level rise; or adaptation can rely mainly on response potentials, such as emergency preparedness; or it can include a mix of the two approaches. Research to date suggests that anticipatory adaptation may be more cost-effective than reactive adaptation (Kirshen *et al.*, 2004).

Adaptation strategies will be important to the well-being of U.S. settlements as climate change evolves over the next century. As just one example, the New York climate impact assessment (Rosenzweig and Solecki, 2001a) projects significant increases in heat-related deaths based on historical relationships between heat stress and mortality, unchanged by adaptation. The Boston CLIMB assessment (Kirshen *et al.*, 2004) projects that, despite similar projections of warming, heat-related deaths will decline over the coming century because of adaptation. Whether or not adaptation to climate change occurs in U.S. cities is therefore a potentially serious issue. The CLIMB assessment includes analyses showing that in many cases adaptation actions taken now are better than adaptation actions delayed until a later time (Kirshen *et al.*, 2006).

### 3.3.1. Perspectives on Adaptation by Settlements

For decision-makers in U.S. settlements climate change is yet one more source of possible risks that need to be addressed. Climate change is different as an issue because it is relatively long-term in its implications, future impacts are uncertain, and public awareness is growing from a relatively low level to a higher level of concern. Because climate change is different in these ways, it is seldom attractive to consider allocating massive amounts of funding or management attention to current climate change actions. What generally makes more sense is to consider ways that actions which reduce vulnerabilities to climate change impacts (or increase prospects for realizing benefits from climate change impacts) are also desirable for other reasons as well: often referred to as "co-benefits." Examples include actions that reduce vulnerabilities to current climate variability regardless of long-term climate change, actions that add resilience to water supply and other urban infrastructures that are already stressed, and actions that make metropolitan areas more attractive for their citizens in terms of their overall quality of life.

Cities and towns have used both "hard" approaches such as developing infrastructure and "soft" approaches such as regulations to address impacts of climate variability. Examples include water supply and waste water systems, drainage networks, buildings, transportation systems, land use and zoning controls, water quality standards and emission caps, and tax incentives. All of these are designed in part with climate and environmental conditions in mind. The setting of regulations has always been a context of benefit-cost analysis and political realities; and infrastructure is also designed in a benefit-cost framework, subject to local design codes. The fact that both regulations and infrastructures vary considerably across the U.S. reflects cultural, economic, and

environmental factors; and this suggests that mechanisms exist to respond to concerns about climate change. Urban designers and managers deal routinely with uncertainties, because they must consider uncertain demographic and other socioeconomic changes; thus, if climate change is properly institutionalized into the urban planning process, it can be handled as yet another uncertainty.

### 3.3.2 Major Categories of Adaptation Strategies

Adaptation strategies for human settlements, large and small, include a wide range of possibilities such as:

- 1 *Changing the location of people or activities (within or between settlements)* – especially addressing the costs of sustaining built environments in vulnerable areas: e.g., siting and land use policies and practices to shift from more vulnerable areas to less, adding resilience to new construction in vulnerable areas, increased awareness of changing hazards and associated risks, and assistance for the less-advantaged (including actions by the private insurance sector as a likely driving force).
- 2 *Changing the spatial form of a settlement* – managing growth and change over decades without excluding critical functions (e.g., architectural innovations improving the sustainability of structures, reducing transportation emissions by reducing the length of journeys to work, seeking efficiencies in resource use through integration of functions, and moving from brown spaces to green spaces). Among the alternatives receiving the most attention are encouraging “green buildings” (e.g., green roofs: Parris, 2007; see Rosenzweig *et al.*, 2006a; Rosenzweig *et al.*, 2006b) and increasing “green spaces” within urban areas (e.g., Bonsignore, 2003).
- 3 *Technological change to reduce sensitivity of physical and linkage infrastructures* – e.g., more efficient and affordable interior climate control, surface materials that reduce heat island effects (Quattrochi *et al.*, 2000), waste reduction and advanced waste treatment, and better warning systems and controls. Physical design changes for long-lived infrastructure may also be appropriate, such as building water-treatment or storm-water runoff outflow structures based on projected sea level rather than the historical level.
- 4 *Institutional change to improve adaptive capacity*, including assuring effective governance, providing financial mechanisms for increasing resiliency, improving structures for coordinating among multiple jurisdictions, targeting assistance programs for especially impacted segments of the population, adopting sustainable community development practices, and monitoring changes in physical infrastructures at an early stage (Wilbanks *et al.*, 2007). Policy instruments include zoning, building and design codes, terms for financing, and early warning systems (Kirshen, Ruth, and Anderson, 2005).

- 5 “No regrets” or low net cost policy initiatives that add resilience to the settlement and its physical capital – e.g., in coastal areas changing building codes for new construction to require coping with projected amounts of sea-level rise over the expected lifetimes of the structures.

The choice of strategies from among the options is likely to depend on co-benefits in terms of other social, economic, and ecological driving forces; the availability of fiscal and human resources; and political aspects of “who wins” and “who loses.”

### 3.3.3 Examples of Current Adaptation Strategies

In most cases in the U.S., settlements have been more active in climate change mitigation than climate change adaptation (see Box 3.5), but there are some indications that adaptation is growing as a subject of interest (Solecki and Rosenzweig, 2005; Ruth, 2006). Bottom-up grassroots activities currently under way in the U.S. are considerable, and that number appears to be growing. For example, Boston has built a new wastewater treatment plant at least one-half meter higher than currently necessary to cope with sea level rise, and in a coastal flood protection plan for a site north of Boston the U.S. Corps of Engineers incorporated sea-level rise into their analysis (Easterling, Hurd, and Smith, 2004). California is considering climate change adaptation strategies as a part of its more comprehensive attention to climate change policies (Franco, 2005). And, Alaska is already pursuing ways to adapt to permafrost melting and other climate change effects.

Meanwhile, in some cases, settlements are taking actions for other reasons that add resilience to climate change effects. An example is the promotion of water conservation, which is reducing per capita water consumption in cities that could be subject to increased water scarcity (City of New York, 2005).

It seems very likely that local governments will play an important role in climate change responses in the U.S. Many adaptation options must be evaluated at a relatively local scale in terms of their relative costs and benefits and their relationships with other urban sustainability issues, and local governments are important as guardians of public services, able to mobilize a wide range of stakeholders to contribute to broad community-based initiatives (as in the case of the London Climate Change Partnership, 2004). Because climate change impact concerns and adaptation potentials tend to cross jurisdictional boundaries in highly fragmented metropolitan areas, local actions might encourage cross-boundary interactions that would have value for other reasons as well.

While no U.S. communities have developed comprehensive programs to ameliorate the effects of heat islands, some localities are recognizing the need to address these effects. In Chicago, for example, several municipal buildings have been designed to accommodate “green” rooftops. Atlanta has had a Cool Communities “grass roots” effort to educate local and state officials and developers on strategies that can be used to mitigate the UHI. This Cool Communities effort was instrumental in getting the State of Georgia to adopt the first commercial building code in the country emphasizing the benefits of cool roofing technology (Young, 2002; Estes, Jr. *et al.*, 2003). The “Excessive Heat Events Guidebook” developed by the Environmental Protection Agency

in collaboration with NOAA, CDC, and DHS provides information for municipal officials in the event of an excessive heat event:

<http://www.epa.gov/hiri/about/heatguidebook.html>.

### 3.3.4: Strategies to Enhance Adaptive Capacity

In most cases, the likelihood of effective adaptation is related to the capacity to adapt, which in turn is related to such variables as knowledge and awareness, access to fiscal and human resources, and good governance (IPCC, 2001b). Strategies for enhancing such capacities in U.S. settlements are likely to include the development and use of local expertise on climate change issues (AAG, 2003), attention to the emerging experience with climate change effects and response strategies globally and in other U.S. settlements, information sharing about adaptation potentials and constraints among settlements and their components (likely aided by modern information technology), and an emphasis on participatory decision-making, where local industries, institutions, and community groups are drawn into discussions of possible responses.

## 3.4. Conclusions

Even from a current knowledge base that is very limited, it is possible to conclude several things about effects of climate change on human settlements in the United States:

- 1 Climate change takes place in the context of a variety of factors driving an area's development: it is likely to be a secondary factor in most places, with its importance determined mainly by its interactions with other factors, except in the case of major abrupt climate change (very likely).
- 2 Effects of climate change will vary considerably according to location-specific vulnerabilities, and the most vulnerable areas are likely to be Alaska, coastal and river basins susceptible to flooding, arid areas where water scarcity is a pressing issue, and areas whose economic bases are climate-sensitive (very likely).
- 3 The main impact concerns, in areas other than Alaska, have to do with changes in the intensity, frequency, and/or location of extreme weather events and, in some cases, water availability rather than changes in temperature (very likely).
- 4 Over the time period covered by current climate change projections, the potential for adaptation through technological and institutional development as well as behavioral changes are considerable, especially where such developments meet other sustainable development needs as well, especially considering the initiatives already being shown at the local level across the U.S. (extremely likely).
- 5 While uncertainties are very large about specific impacts in specific time periods, it is possible to talk with a higher level of confidence about vulnerabilities to impacts for most settlements in most parts of the U.S. (virtually certain).

## 3.5 Expanding the Knowledge Base

A number of sources, including NACC, 1998; Parson *et al.*, 2003; Ruth, 2006; and Ruth, Donaghy, and Kirshen, 2004, have considered research pathways for improving the understanding of effects of climate change on human settlements in the United States. The following list suggests a number of research topics that would help expand the knowledge base about the linkages between climate change and human settlements.

- Advance understanding of settlement vulnerabilities, impacts, and adaptive responses in a variety of different local contexts around the country through case studies. In addition to identifying vulnerable settlements, these studies should also identify vulnerable populations (such as the urban poor and native populations on rural and/or tribal lands) that have limited capacities for response to climate change, within those settlements. Better understanding of climate change at the community scale would provide a basis for adaptation research that addresses social justice and environmental equity concerns.
- Develop better projections of climate change at the scale of U.S. metropolitan areas or smaller, including scenarios projecting extremes and scenarios involving abrupt changes.
- Improve abilities to associate projections of climate change in U.S. settlements with changes in other driving forces related to impacts, such as changes in metropolitan/urban patterns and technological change.
- Design practically implementable, socially acceptable strategies for shifting human populations and activities away from vulnerable locations.
- Improve the understanding of vulnerabilities of urban inflows and outflows to climate change impacts, as well as second and third-order impacts of climate change in urban environments, including interaction effects among different aspects of the urban system.
- Improve the understanding of the relationships between settlement patterns (both regional and intra-urban) and resilience/adaptive capacity.
- Improve understanding of how urban decision-making is changing as populations become more heterogeneous and decisions become more decentralized, especially as this affects adaptive responses.
- Review current regulations, guidelines, and practices related to climate change responses to help inform community decision-makers and other stakeholders about potentials for relatively small changes to make a large difference.
- Evaluate and document experiences with urban/settlement climate change responses while involving decision-making, research and stakeholder communities more actively in discussions of climate change impacts and response

issues. Focus attention on the costs, benefits, and possible limits and potentials of adaptation to climate change vulnerabilities in U.S. cities and smaller settlements.

- Improve tools and approaches for infrastructure planning and design to reduce exposure and sensitivity to climate change effects while increasing adaptive capacity.
- Enhance coordination within federal government agencies to improve understanding about impacts, vulnerabilities and responses to climate change for the nation's cities and smaller settlements. Connections with U.S. urban decision-makers can enable integration of climate change considerations into what they do with building codes, zoning, lending practices, etc. as mainstreamed urban decision processes.

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### 3.7 Boxes

#### **BOX 3.1: U.S. URBAN RESPONSES TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

Over time, American cities have been affected by environmental change. City founders often showed an important disregard with respect to siting of settlements, focusing on aspects of location such as commercial or recreational opportunities rather than on risks such as flood potential, limited water, food or fuel supplies, or the presence of health threats. Oftentimes settlers severely exploited their environments, polluting ground water and adjacent water bodies, building in unsafe and fragile locations, changing landforms, and filling in wetlands. Construction of the urban built environment involved vast alterations in the landscape, as forests and vegetation and wildlife species were eliminated and replaced by highways, suburbs, and commercial buildings. The building of wastewater and water supply systems had the effect of altering regional hydrology and creating large vulnerabilities. In other cases settlers concluded that the weather was changing for the good, that technology would solve problems, or that new resources could be discovered.

Technological fixes were pursued to seek ways to modify or control environmental change. Cities exposed to flooding built levees and seawalls and channelized rivers. When urbanites depleted and polluted local water supplies cities went outside their boundaries to seek new supplies: building reservoirs, aqueducts, and creating protected watersheds. When urban consumption exhausted local fuel sources, cities adapted to new fuels, embraced new technologies, or searched far beyond city boundaries for new supplies. Many of these actions resulted in the extension of the urban ecological footprint, so that urban growth and development affected not only the urban site but also increasingly the urban hinterland and beyond.

There are few examples of environmental disasters or climate change actually resulting in the abandonment of an urban site. One case appears to be that of the Hohokam Indians of the Southwest, who built extensive irrigation systems, farmed land, and built large and dense settlements over a period of approximately 1,500 years (Krech, 1999: 45-72). Yet, they abandoned their settlements and disappeared into history. The most prominent explanation for their disappearance is an ecological one -- that the Hohokam irrigation systems suffered from salinization and water logging, eventually making them unusable. Other factors besides ecological ones may have also entered into the demise of their civilization and abandonment of their cities, but the ecological explanation appears to have the most supporters.

In the case of America in the 19th and 20th centuries, however, no city has been abandoned because of environmental or climatic factors. Galveston, Texas suffered from a catastrophic tidal wave but still exists as a human settlement, now protected by an extensive sea wall. Johnstown, Pennsylvania has undergone major and destructive flooding since the late 19th century, but continues to survive as a small city. Los Angeles and San Francisco are extremely vulnerable to earthquakes, but still continue to increase in population. And, in coming years New Orleans almost certainly will experience a hurricane as or more severe than Katrina, and yet rebuilding goes on, encouraged by the belief that technology will protect it in the future. Whether or not ecological disaster or extreme risk will eventually convince Americans to abandon some of their settlements, as the Hohokam did, has yet to be determined (Colten, 2005; Steinberg, 2006; Vale and Campanella, 2005).

### **BOX 3.2: VIGNETTES OF VULNERABILITY - I**

#### **Alaskan Settlements**

No other region in the U.S. is likely to be as profoundly changed by climate change as Alaska, our nation's part of the polar region of Earth (ACIA, 2004). Because warming is more pronounced closer to the poles, and because settlement and economic activities in Alaska have been shaped and often constrained by Arctic conditions, in this region warming is especially likely to reshape patterns of human settlement.

Human settlements in Alaska are already being exposed to impacts from global warming (ACIA, 2004), and these impacts are expected to increase. Many coastal communities see increasing exposure to storms, with significant coastal erosion, and in some cases facilities are being forced either to relocate or to face increasing risks and costs. Thawing ground is beginning to destabilize transportation, buildings, and other facilities, posing needs for rebuilding, with ongoing warming adding to construction and maintenance costs. And indigenous communities are facing major economic and cultural impacts. One recent estimate of the value of Alaska's public infrastructure at risk from climate change set the value at tens of billions of today's dollars by 2080, with the replacement of buildings, bridges, and other structures with long lifetimes having the largest public costs (Larsen *et al.*, 2007).

Besides impacts on built infrastructures designed for permafrost foundations and effects on indigenous societies, many observers expect warming in Alaska to stimulate more active oil and gas development (and perhaps other natural resource exploitation), and if thawing of Arctic ice permits the opening of a year-round Northwest sea passage it is virtually certain that Alaska's coast will see a boom in settlements and port facilities (ACIA, 2004).

#### **Coastal Southeast Settlements**

While there is currently no evidence for a long-term increase in North American mainland land-falling hurricanes, concerns remain that certain aspects of hurricanes, such as wind speed and rainfall rates may increase (CCSP, 2008). In addition, sea level rise is expected to increase storm surge levels (CCSP, 2008). Recent hurricanes striking the coast of the U.S. Southeast cannot be attributed clearly to climate change, but they suggest a range of possible impacts. As an extreme case, consider the example of Hurricane Katrina. In 2005, the city of New Orleans had a population of about half a million, located on the delta of the Mississippi River along the U.S. Gulf Coast. Urban development throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> Century has significantly increased land use and settlement in areas vulnerable to flooding, and a number of studies had indicated growing vulnerabilities to storms and flooding. In late August 2005, Hurricane Katrina moved onto the Louisiana and Mississippi coast with a storm surge, supplemented by waves, reaching up to 8.5 m above sea level. In New Orleans, the surge reached around 5m, overtopping and breaching sections of the city's 4.5m defenses, flooding 70 to 80 % of New Orleans, with 55 % of the city's properties inundated by more than 1.2 m and maximum flood depths up to 6 m. 1101 people died in Louisiana, nearly all related to flooding, concentrated among the poor and elderly. Across the whole region, there were 1.75 million private insurance claims, costing in excess of \$40 billion (Hartwig, 2006), while total economic costs are projected to be significantly in excess of \$100 billion. Katrina also exhausted the federally backed National Flood Insurance Program (Hunter, 2006), which had to borrow \$20.8 billion from the Government to fund the Katrina residential flood claims. In New Orleans alone, while flooding of residential structures caused \$8-\$10 billion in losses, \$3-6 billion was uninsured. 34,000-35,000 of the flooded homes carried no flood insurance, including many that were not in a designated flood risk zone (Hartwig, 2006). Six months after Katrina, it was estimated that the population of New Orleans was 155,000, with the number projected to rise to 272,000 by September 2008 – 56% of its pre-Katrina level (McCarthy *et al.*, 2006).

### BOX 3.3: VIGNETTES OF VULNERABILITY – II

#### Arid Western Settlements

Human settlements in the arid West are affected by climate in a variety of ways, but perhaps most of all by water scarcity and risks of fire. Clearly, access to water for urban populations is sensitive to climate, although the region has developed a vast system of engineered water storage and transport facilities, associated with a very complex set of water rights laws (NACC, 2001). It is very likely that climate change will reduce winter snowfall in the West, reducing total runoff – increasing spring runoff while decreasing summer water flows. Meanwhile, water demands for urban populations, agriculture, and power supply are expected to increase, and conflicts over water rights are likely to increase. If total precipitation decreases or becomes more variable, extending the kinds of drought that have affected much of the interior West in recent years, water scarcity will be exacerbated, and increased water withdrawals from wells could affect aquifer levels and pumping costs. Moreover, drying increases risks of fire, which have threatened urban areas in California and other Western areas in recent years. The five-year average of acres burned in the West is more than 5 million, and urban expansion is increasing the length of the urban-wild lands interface (Morehouse *et al.*, 2006). Drying would lengthen the fire season, and pest outbreaks such as the pine beetle could affect the scale of fires.


#### Summer 2006 Heat Wave

In July and August 2006, a severe heat wave spread across the United States, with most parts of the country recording temperatures well above the average for that time of the year. For example, temperatures in California were extraordinarily high, setting records as high as 130 degrees. As many as 225 deaths were reported by press sources, many of them in major cities such as New York and Chicago. Electric power transformers failed in several areas, such as St. Louis and Queens, New York, causing interruptions of electric power supply, and some cities reported heat-related damages to water lines and roads. In many cities, citizens without home air-conditioning sought shelter in public and office buildings, and city/county health departments expressed particular concern for the elderly, the young, pregnant women, and individuals in poor health. Although this heat wave cannot be attributed directly to climate change, it suggests a number of issues for human settlements in the U.S. as they contemplate a prospect of temperature extremes in the future that are higher and/or longer-lasting than historical experience.



### BOX 3.4: CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE URBAN HEAT ISLAND EFFECT (UHI)

Climate change impacts on the Urban Heat Island (UHI) effect will primarily depend upon the geographic location of a specific city, its urban morphology (i.e. landscape and built-up characteristics), and areal extent (i.e., overall spatial “footprint”). These factors will mitigate or exacerbate how the UHI phenomenon (Figure 3.1) is affected by climate change, but overall, climate change is likely to impact the UHI effect in the following ways:



**Figure 3.1.** Example of urban surface temperatures and albedo for the Atlanta, Georgia Central Business District (CBD) area derived from high spatial resolution (10m) aircraft thermal remote sensing data. The image on the left illustrates daytime surface heating for urban surfaces across the CBD. White and red colors indicate very warm surfaces (~40-50°C). Green relates to surfaces of moderately warm temperatures (~25-30°C). Blue indicates cool surfaces (e.g., vegetation, shadows) (~15-20°C). Surface temperatures are reflected in the albedo image on the right where warm surfaces are dark (i.e., low reflectivity) and cooler surfaces are in red and green (i.e., higher reflectivity). The images exemplify how urban surface characteristics influence temperature and albedo as drivers of the urban heat island effect (Quattrochi et al., 2000).

- Exacerbation of the intensity and areal extent of the UHI as a result of warmer surface and air temperatures along with the overall growth of urban areas around the world. Additionally, as urban areas grow and expand, there is a propensity for lower albedos which forces a more intense UHI effect. (There is also some indication that sustained or prolonged higher nighttime air temperatures over cities that may result from warmer global temperatures will have a more significant impact on humans than higher daytime temperatures.)
- As the UHI intensifies and increases, there could be a subsequent impact on deterioration of air quality, particularly on ground level ozone caused by higher overall air temperatures and an increased background effect produced by the UHI as an additive air temperature factor that helps to elevate

ground level ozone production. Additionally, particulate matter (PM<sub>2.5</sub>) could increase due to a number of human induced and natural factors (e.g., more energy production to support higher usage of air conditioning).

- The UHI has an impact on local meteorological conditions by forcing rainfall production either over, or downwind, of cities. As the UHI effect intensifies, there will be a higher probability for urban-induced rainfall production (dependent upon geographic location) with a subsequent increase in urban runoff and flash flooding.
- Exacerbation and intensification of the UHI would have impacts on human health:
  - increased incidence of heat stress
  - impact on respiratory illnesses such as asthma due to increases in particulate matter caused by deterioration in air quality as well as increased pollination production because of earlier pollen production from vegetation in response to warmer overall temperatures

(Lo and Quattrochi, 2003; Brazel and Quattrochi, 2006; Ridd, 2006; Stone, 2006)

**BOX 3.5: ROLES OF SETTLEMENTS IN CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION**

Although U.S. government commitments to climate change mitigation policies at the national level have emerged only recently, an increasing number of state and local authorities are involved in strategies to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions (Selin and Vandever, 2005; Rabe, 2006; Selin, 2006). U.S. states and cities are joining such initiatives as ICLEI (ICLEI, 2006), the U.S. Mayor Climate Protection Agreement, the Climate Change Action Plan, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) (Selin, 2006), and the Large Cities Climate Leadership Group.<sup>1</sup> These initiatives focus on emissions inventories; on such actions aimed at reducing GHG emissions as switching to more energy efficient vehicles, using more efficient furnaces and conditioning systems, and introducing renewable portfolio standards (RPS). These strategies, which mandate an increase in the amount of electricity generated from renewable resources also adapt to negative social, economic and environmental impacts; and on actions to promote public awareness (see references in footnote 1).

Different drivers lie behind these mitigation efforts. Public and private entities have begun to “perceive” such possible impacts of climate change as rising sea level, extreme shifts in weather, and losses of key resources. They have realized that a reduction of GHG emissions opens opportunities for longer economic development (e.g. investment in renewable energy: Rabe, 2006). In addition, climate change can become a political priority if it is reframed in terms of local issues (i.e. air quality, energy conservation) already on the policy agenda (Betsill, 2001; Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003; Romero Lankao, 2007)

The promoters of these initiatives face challenges related partly to inertia (e.g. the time it takes to replace energy facilities and equipment with a relatively long life of 5 to 50 years: Haites *et al.*, 2007). They can also face opposition from organizations who do not favor actions to reduce GHG emissions, some of whom are prepared to bring legal challenges against state and local initiatives (Rabe, 2006:17). But the number of bottom-up grassroots activities currently under way in the U.S. is considerable, and that number appears to be growing.

<sup>1</sup> ICLEI is the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives. Local governments participating in ICLEI’s Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) Campaign commit to a) conduct an energy- and emissions-inventory and forecast, b) establish an emissions target, c) develop and obtain approval for the Local Action Plan, d) Implement policies and measures, and e) monitor and verify results (ICLEI, 2006: April 20 2006 [www.iclei.org](http://www.iclei.org)). The Large Cities Climate Leadership Group is a group of cities committed to the reduction of urban carbon emissions and adapting to climate change. It was founded following the World Cities Leadership Climate Change Summit organized by the Mayor of London in October 2005. For more information on the US Mayor Climate Protection Agreement see <http://www.seattle.gov/mayor/climate/>

### 3.8 Tables

**Table 3.1.** Overview of Integrated Assessments of Climate Impacts and Adaptation in U.S. Cities. “x” indicates that the reference addresses a category of interest.

	<b>Bloomfield <i>et al.</i>, 1999</b>	<b>Kooten <i>et al.</i>, 2001</b>	<b>Rosenzweig <i>et al.</i>, 2000</b>	<b>Kirshen <i>et al.</i>, 2004</b>	<b>Hoo and Sumitani, 2005</b>
<b>Location:</b>	Greater Los Angeles	New York	Metropolitan New York	Metropolitan Boston	Metropolitan Seattle
<b>Coverage:</b>					
Water supply	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Water Quality				✓	
Water Demand				✓	
Sea-level Rise	✓		✓	✓	✓
Transportation				✓	✓
Communication					
Energy			✓	✓	
Public Health					
Vector-borne Diseases		✓			
Food-borne Diseases					
Temperature-related Mortality				✓	
Temperature-related Morbidity	✓	✓			
Air-quality Related Mortality					
Air-quality Related Morbidity			✓		
Other Health Issues	✓	✓	✓		
Ecosystems					
Wetlands					
Other Ecol.(Wildfires)	✓		✓		
Urban Forests (Trees and Vegetation)		✓			
Air Quality		✓			✓
<b>Extent of:</b>					
Quantitative Analysis	Low	Medium	Medium	High	Low
Computer-based Modeling	None	Low	Low	High	None
Scenario Analysis	None	None	Medium	High	Medium
Explicit Risk Analysis	None	None	None	Medium	None
<b>Involvement of:</b>					
Local Planning Agencies	None	None	High	High	High
Local Government Agencies	None	None	High	High	High
Private Industry	None	None	None	Low	None
Non-profits	None	None	Low	High	None
Citizens	None	None	None	Medium	None
<b>Identification of:</b>					
Adaptation Options	X	X	X	X	X
Adaptation Cost			X	X	
Extent of Integration Across Systems	None	None	Low	Medium	Low
Attention to Differential	None	None	Low	Low	Low

Impacts (e.g., on individual types of businesses, populations)					
--	--	--	--	--	--

**Table 3.2.** Regional vulnerabilities of settlements to impacts of climate change in the United States

<b>REGIONAL VULNERABILITIES OF SETTLEMENTS TO IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE</b>		
<b>Region</b>	<b>Vulnerabilities</b>	<b>Major Uncertainties</b>
Metro NE	Flooding, infrastructures, health, water supply, sea-level rise	Storm behavior, precipitation
Larger NE	Changes in local landscapes, tourism, water, energy needs	Ecosystem impacts
Mid-Atlantic	Multiple stresses; e.g., interactions between climate change and aging infrastructures	Ecosystem impacts
Coastal SE	More intense storms, sea-level rise, flooding, heat stress	Storm behavior, coastal land use, sea-level rise
Inland SE	Water shortages, heat stress, UHI, economic impacts	Precipitation change, development paths
Upper Midwest	Lake and river levels, extreme weather events, health	Precipitation change, storm behavior
Inner Midwest	Extreme weather events, health	Storm behavior
Appalachians	Ecological change, reduced demand for coal	Ecosystem impacts, energy policy impacts
Great Plains	Water supply, extreme events, stresses on communities	Precipitation changes, weather extremes
Mountain West	Reduced snow, water shortages, fire, tourism	Precipitation changes, effects on winter snowpack
Arid Southwest	Water shortages, fire	Development paths, precipitation changes
California	Water shortages, heat stress; sea level rise	Temperature and precipitation changes, infrastructure impacts
Northwest	Water shortages, ecosystem stresses, coastal effects	Precipitation changes, sea-level rise
Alaska	Effects of warming, vulnerable populations	Warming, sea-level rise
Hawaii	Storms and other weather extremes, freshwater supplies, health, sea-level rise	Storm behavior, precipitation change

# Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.6

## Chapter 4

### Effects of Global Change on Human Welfare

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## 4.1 Introduction

Human welfare is an elusive concept, and there is no single, commonly accepted definition or approach to thinking about welfare. Yet there is a shared understanding that human welfare, well-being, and quality of life (terms that are often used interchangeably) refer to aspects of individual and group life that improve living conditions and reduce chances of injury, stress, and loss. The physical environment is one factor, among many, that may improve or reduce human well-being. Climate is one aspect of the physical environment, and can affect human well-being via economic, physical, psychological, and social pathways that influence individual perceptions of quality of life.

Climate change may result in lifestyle changes and adaptive behavior with both positive and negative implications for well-being. For example, warmer temperatures may change the amount of time that individuals are comfortable spending outdoors in work, recreation, or other activities, and temperature combined with other climatic changes may alter (or induce) changes in intra- and inter-country human migration patterns. More generally, studies of climate change and the United States identify an assortment of impacts on human health, the productivity of human and natural systems, and human settlements. Many of these impacts—ranging from changes in livelihoods to changes in water quality and supply—are linked to some aspect of human well-being.

Communities are also an integral determinant of human well-being. Climate change that affects public goods—for example, damages infrastructure or causes interruptions in public services—or that disrupts patterns of production and commerce, will affect community performance in terms of overall health, poverty levels, employment, and other measures. These changes may affect individual well-being directly, for example, due to a lost job or a more difficult commute. In other cases, individual well-being may be indirectly affected, for example, due to concern for the well-being of other individuals, or for a lack of cohesion in the community. The sustainability or resilience of a community (i.e., its ability to cope with climate change and other stressors over the long term) may be reduced by climate change weakening the physical and social environment. In the extreme, such changes may undermine the individual's sense of security or faith in government officials and government policies to accommodate change.

Completely cataloging the effects of global change on human well-being or welfare would be an immense undertaking. Despite its importance, no well-accepted structure for doing so has been developed and applied. Moreover, little (if any) research focuses explicitly on the impact of global change on human well-being, *per se*. The chapter seeks to make a review of this topic manageable by focusing on several discrete issues:

- Alternative approaches to defining and studying human well-being
- Identifying human well-being and quality of life measures and indicators (qualitative and quantitative)
- Describing economic welfare and monetary methods of assigning value to climate change's potential impacts

- Providing examples of climate change impacts on selected categories of well-being and reporting indicators of economic welfare for these categories

Section 4.2, focuses on valuation and non-monetary metrics and draws on the literature to provide insights into a possible foundation for future research into the effects of climate change on human well-being. This section first discusses the literature defining human well-being. Next, it presents an illustrative place-based-indicators approach (the typical approach of planners and policy makers to evaluating quality of life in communities, cities, and countries). Approaches of this type represent a commonly accepted way of thinking about well-being that is linked to objective (and sometimes subjective) measures. While a place-based indicators approach has not been applied to climate change, it has the potential to provide a framework for identifying categories of human well-being that might be affected by climate change, and for making the identification of measures or metrics of well-being a more concrete enterprise in the future. To illustrate that potential, the section draws links between community welfare and some of the negative impacts of climate change.

Economics has been at the forefront of efforts to quantify the welfare impacts of climate change. Economists employ, however, a very specific definition of well-being—*economic* welfare—for valuing goods and services or, in this case, climate impacts. This approach is commonly used to support environmental policy decision making in many areas. Section 4.3 very briefly describes the basis of this approach, and the techniques that economists use (focusing on those that have been applied to estimate impacts of climate change). This section next summarizes the existing economic estimates of the *non-market* impacts of climate change.<sup>1</sup> An accompanying appendix provides more information on the economic approach to valuing changes in welfare, and highlights some of the challenges in applying valuation techniques to climate impacts.

The fourth section of the chapter summarizes some of the key points of the chapter and the chapter concludes with a brief discussion of research gaps.

## 4.2 Human Welfare, Well-being, and Quality of Life

No single, widely accepted definition exists for the term human welfare, or for related terms such as well-being and quality of life, and they are all often used interchangeably (Veenhoven, 1988, 1996, 2000; Ng, 2003; Rahman 2007). Academic economists, epidemiologists, health scientists, psychologists, sociologists, geographers, political scientists, and urban planners have all rendered their own definitions and statistical indicators of life quality at both individual and community levels.<sup>2</sup> For purposes of clarity in this chapter, from this point forward we adopt the convention of the Millenium Assessment (MA 2005) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007b), which use “well-being” as an umbrella term—referring broadly to the extent to

<sup>1</sup> Because more concrete aspects of welfare, such as impacts on prices or income, may be covered by other synthesis and assessment products (see, for example, discussions of dollar values in SAP 4.3, *The Effects of Climate Change on Agriculture, Land Resources, Water Resources, and Biodiversity*, which is in draft form at the time this is being written), this report focuses exclusively on the types of intangible amenities that directly impact quality of life, but are not traded in markets, including health, recreation, ecosystems, and climate amenities.

<sup>2</sup> For example, In sociological literature, the terms well-being and welfare are used interchangeably to refer to objectively measurable life chances and experiences, and the term quality of life is used to describe subjective assessments and experiences of individuals.

1 which human conditions satisfy the range of constituents of well-being, including health, social  
 2 relations, material needs, security, and freedom of choice. “Quality of life” is here used  
 3 synonymously with well-being, to reflect usage in a wide range of disciplines, including medical,  
 4 sociological, psychological, and urban planning literatures. The term “welfare” is generally used  
 5 herein to refer narrowly to economic measures of individual well-being, although it is also used  
 6 in the context of communities in a broader sense.

7  
 8 Despite differences in definitions, human well-being—in its broadest sense—is typically a multi-  
 9 dimensional concept, addressing the availability, distribution, and possession of economic assets,  
 10 and non-economic goods such as life expectancy, morbidity and mortality, literacy and  
 11 educational attainment, natural resources and ecosystem services, and participatory democracy.  
 12 These conceptualizations often also include social and community resources (sometimes referred  
 13 to as social capital in social scientific literature), such as the presence of voluntary associations,  
 14 arts, entertainment, and shared recreational amenities (see Putnam, 1993, 2000). The quantity of  
 15 community resources shared by a population is often called social capital.<sup>3</sup> These components of  
 16 life quality are interrelated and correlate with subjective valuations of life satisfaction, happiness,  
 17 pleasure, and the operation of successful democratic political systems (Putnam, 2000).

18  
 19 The concepts of well-being, economic welfare, and quality of life play important roles not only  
 20 in academic research, but also in practical analysis and policy making. Quality of life measures  
 21 may be used, for example, to gauge progress in meeting policy or normative goals in particular  
 22 cities by planners; municipalities in New Zealand, England, Canada, and United States have  
 23 constructed their own metrics of quality of life to estimate the overall well-being and life chances  
 24 available to citizens. Similarly, health-related quality of life measures can indicate progress in  
 25 meeting goals. For example, the U.S. Medicare program uses metrics to track quality of life for  
 26 beneficiaries and to monitor and improve health care quality (HCFR, 2004). Moreover,  
 27 international agencies from the United Nations Human Development Programme (UNDP) to the  
 28 Millenium Ecosystem Assessment on Ecosystems and Human Well-Being and highly regarded  
 29 periodicals like *The Economist*, have built composite measures of human and societal well-being  
 30 to compare and rank nations of the world.<sup>4</sup>

31  
 32 Life quality and human well-being are increasingly important objects of theoretical and empirical  
 33 research in diverse disciplines. Two analytic approaches characterize the research literature:  
 34 (1) studies that emphasize well-being as an individual attribute or possession; and (2) studies that  
 35 treat well-being as a social or economic phenomenon associated with a geographic place.

#### 36 **4.2.1 Individual Measures of Well-being**

37 Approaches focusing on individuals are generally found in medical, health, cognitive, and  
 38 economic sciences, and it is to these we turn first, and then next to place-focused indicators.

---

<sup>3</sup> The concept of social capital has been defined, in different ways, by Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000) and by Coleman (1988, 1990, 1993). For Coleman, social capital is a store of community value that is embodied in social structures and the relations between social actors, from which individuals can draw in the pursuit of private interest. Putnam’s definition is similar, but places a stronger emphasis on altruism and community resources.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, the discussion of the sources of Table 1 subsequently in this chapter, which include a number of country-level quality of life assessments. The UNDP Human Development Index, a country by country ranking of quality of life indicators, can be accessed at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>.

#### 1 4.2.1.1 Health Focused Approaches

2 In medical science, quality of life is used as an outcome variable to evaluate the effectiveness of  
3 medical, therapeutic, and/or policy interventions to promote population health. Quality of life is  
4 an individual's physiological state constituted by body structure, function, and capability that  
5 enable pursuit of stated and revealed preferences. In medical science, the concept of life quality  
6 is synonymous with good health – a life free of disease, illness, physical, and/or cognitive  
7 impairment (Raphael *et al.*, 1996, 1999, 2001).

8  
9 In addition to objective measures of physical and occupational function, disease absence, or  
10 somatic sensation, life quality scientists measure an individual's perception of life satisfaction.  
11 The scientific basis of such research is that pain and/or discomfort associated with a  
12 physiological impairment are registered and experienced variably. Based on patient reports or  
13 subjective valuations, psychologists and occupational therapists have developed valid and  
14 reliable instruments to assess how mental, developmental, and physical disabilities interfere with  
15 the performance and enjoyment of life activities (Bowling, 1997; Guyatt *et al.*, 1993).

#### 16 4.2.1.2 Economic and Psychological Approaches

17 Individual valuations of life quality also anchor economic and psychological investigations of  
18 happiness and utility. In the new science of happiness, scholars use the tools of neuroscience,  
19 experimental research, and modern statistics to discover and quantify the underlying  
20 psychological and physiological sources of happiness (for reviews see Kahneman *et al.*, 1999;  
21 Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006). Empirical studies show, for example,  
22 that life satisfaction and happiness correlate predictably with marital status (married persons are  
23 generally happier than single people), religiosity (persons that practice religion report lower  
24 levels of stress and higher levels of life satisfaction), and individual willingness to donate time,  
25 money and effort to charitable causes. Similarly, the scholarly literature notes interesting  
26 statistical associations between features of climate (such as variations in sunlight, temperature,  
27 and extreme weather events) and self-reported levels of happiness, utility, or life satisfaction.

28  
29 Individual valuations of health, psychological, and emotional well-being are sometimes summed  
30 across representative samples of a population or country to estimate correspondences between  
31 life satisfaction and “hard” indicators of living standards such as income, life expectancy,  
32 educational attainment, and environmental quality. Cross-national analyses generally find that  
33 population happiness or life satisfaction increases with income levels and material standards of  
34 living (Ng, 2003) and greater personal autonomy (Diener *et al.*, 1995; Diener and Diener,  
35 1995).<sup>5</sup> In such studies, subjective valuations of life satisfaction are embedded in broader  
36 conceptions of quality of life associated with the conditions of a geographic place, community,  
37 region or country—the social indicators approach.

### 38 4.2.2 The Social Indicators Approach

39 In this second strand of research, what some refer to as the social indicators approach, scholars  
40 assemble location-specific measures of social, economic, and environmental conditions, such as  
41 employment rates, consumption flows, the availability of affordable housing, rates of crime

---

<sup>5</sup>Some studies suggest that individual utility or happiness is not positively determined by some absolute quantity of income, wealth, or items consumed, but rather how an individual perceives his or her lot in relation to others or to conditions in their past. See, for example, Frank 1985.

1 victimization and public safety, public monies invested in education and transportation  
 2 infrastructure, and local access to environmental, cultural, and recreational amenities. These  
 3 place-specific variables are seen as exogenous sources of individual life quality. Scholars reason  
 4 that life quality is a bundle of conditions, amenities, and lifestyle options that shape stated and  
 5 revealed preferences. In technical terms, the social indicators approach treats quality of life as a  
 6 latent variable, jointly determined by several causal variables that can be measured with  
 7 reasonable accuracy.

8  
 9 The indicators approach has several advantages in the context of understanding the impacts of  
 10 climate change on human well-being. First, social indicators have considerable intuitive appeal,  
 11 and their widespread use has not only made it familiar to both researchers and the general public,  
 12 but has subjected them to considerable debate and discussion. Second, they offer considerable  
 13 breadth and flexibility in terms of categories of human well-being that can be included. Third,  
 14 for many of the indicators or dimensions of well-being, objective metrics exist for measurement.

15  
 16 In addition, while its strength is in providing indicators of progress on individual dimensions of  
 17 quality of life, the indicators approach has also been used to support aggregate or composite  
 18 measures, at least for purposes of ranking or measuring progress. Various techniques are also  
 19 available, or being developed, that aggregate or combine measures of well-being. These range  
 20 from pure data reduction procedures to stakeholder input models where variables are evaluated  
 21 on their level of social and economic importance. For example, Richard Florida (2002a) has  
 22 constructed a statistical index of technology, talent, and social tolerance variables to estimate the  
 23 human capital of cities in the United States. Given the analytical strengths of the social indicators  
 24 approach, it may be a good starting point for understanding the relationships between human  
 25 well-being and climate change.

#### 26 4.2.2.1 A Taxonomy of Categories of Wellbeing

27 Taxonomies of place-specific well-being or quality of life typically converge on six categories or  
 28 dimensions: (1) economic conditions; (2) natural resources, environment, and amenities; (3)  
 29 human health; (4) public and private infrastructure; (5) government and public safety; and (6)  
 30 social and cultural resources. These categories represent broad aspects of personal and family  
 31 circumstances, social structures, government, environment, and the economy that influence well-  
 32 being. Table 4.1 illustrates these categories, which are listed in Column 1. The third column,  
 33 “components/indicators of welfare” provides examples of the way in which these categories are  
 34 often interpreted. These components represent what, in an ideal world, researchers would wish to  
 35 measure in order to determine how a specific society fares from the perspective of well-being.  
 36 The fourth column provides illustrative metrics, i.e., objective or quantifiable measures that are  
 37 often used by researchers as indicators of well-being for each category.<sup>6</sup> Finally, the last column  
 38 provides some examples of climate impacts that may be linked to that category. This column  
 39 should not be viewed as an attempt to create a comprehensive list of impacts, or even to list  
 40 impacts with equal weights, in terms of importance or likelihood of occurrence. Further, while

<sup>6</sup> Sources that contributed to the development of Table 1 include: MA (2005); Sufian, 1993; Rahman, 2007, and Lambiri, *et al.*, 2007. Insights were also derived from quality of life studies of individual cities and countries, including: <http://www.bigcities.govt.nz/indicators.htm> *Quality of Life in New Zealand's Large Urban Areas*; <http://www.asu.edu/copp/morrison/public/qofl99.htm> *What Matters in Greater Phoenix 1999 Edition: Indicators of Our Quality of Life*; and <http://www.jcci.org/statistics/qualityoflife.aspx> *Tracking the Quality of Life in Jacksonville*.

1 Table 4.1 focuses on negative impacts (as potentially more troubling for quality of life), there are  
 2 also opportunities or potential positive impacts that will result in some categories.

3  
 4 These categories of well-being or life quality are interrelated. For example, as economic or social  
 5 conditions in a society improve (e.g., as measured by GDP per capita and rates of adult literacy),  
 6 improvements occur in human health outcomes such as infant mortality, rates of morbidity, and  
 7 female life expectancy at birth. Thus, while the categories and corresponding metrics of well-  
 8 being presented in Table 4.1 are analytically separable, in reality they are highly interconnected.<sup>7</sup>  
 9

10 *Economics* as a source of quality of life refers to a mix of production, consumption, and  
 11 exchange activities that constitute the material well-being of a geographic place, community,  
 12 region or country. Standard components of economic well-being include income, wealth,  
 13 poverty, employment opportunities, and costs of living. Localities characterized by efficient and  
 14 equitable allocation of economic rewards and opportunities enable material security and  
 15 subjective happiness of residents (Florida, 2002a).  
 16

17 *Natural resources, environment, and amenities* as a source of well-being refers to natural  
 18 features, such as ecosystem services, species diversity, air and water quality, natural hazards and  
 19 risks, parks and recreational amenities, and resource supplies and reserves. Natural resources and  
 20 amenities directly and indirectly affect economic productivity, aesthetic and spiritual values, and  
 21 human health (Blomquist *et al.*, 1988; Glaeser *et al.*, 2001; Cheshire and Magrini, 2006).  
 22

23 *Human health* as a source of well-being includes features of a community, locality, region or  
 24 country that influence risks of mortality, morbidity, and the availability of health care services.  
 25 Good health is desirable in itself as a driver of life expectancy (and the quality of life during  
 26 those years), and is also critical to economic well-being by enabling labor force participation  
 27 (Raphael *et al.*, 1996, 1999, 2001).  
 28

29 *Public and private infrastructure* sources of well-being include transportation, energy and  
 30 communication technologies that enable commerce, mobility, and social connectivity. These  
 31 technologies provide basic conditions for individual pursuits of well-being (Lambiri, *et al.*,  
 32 2007).  
 33

34 *Government and public safety* as a source of well-being are activities by elected representatives  
 35 and bureaucratic officials that secure and maximize the public services, rights, liberties, and  
 36 safety of citizens. Individuals derive happiness and utility from the employment, educational,  
 37 civil rights, public service, and security efforts of their governments (Suffian, 1993).  
 38

39 Finally, *social and cultural resources* as a source of well-being are conditions of life that  
 40 promote social harmony, family and friendship, and the availability of arts, entertainment, and  
 41 leisure activities that facilitate human happiness. The terms social and creative capital have

---

<sup>7</sup> More recently, scholars (Costanza *et al.* 2007) and government agencies (like NOAA's Coastal Service Center) have moved toward the global concept of *capital* to integrate indicators and assess community quality of life. The term capital is divided into four types: economic; physical; ecological or natural; and socio-cultural. Various metrics constitute these types of capital, and are understood to foster community resilience and human needs of subsistence, reproduction, security, affection, understanding, participation, leisure, spirituality, creativity, identity, and freedom. See also Rothman, Amelung, and Poleme (2003).

1 become associated with these factors. Communities with greater levels of social and creative  
 2 capital are expected to have greater individual and community quality of life (Putnam, 2000;  
 3 Florida, 2002b).

4  
 5 In thinking about these indicators, it is important to keep two important contextual realities about  
 6 climate change and well-being at the forefront. First, while discussions of climate change  
 7 usually have a global resonance to them, the fact is that the effects of any specific changes in  
 8 temperature, rainfall, storm frequency/intensity and sea level rise will be felt at the local and  
 9 regional level by citizens and communities living and working in those vulnerable areas.  
 10 Therefore, not all populations will be placed under equal amounts of climate change-generated  
 11 stress. Some will experience greater impacts, will suffer greater damage, and will need more  
 12 remediation and better plans and resource allocations for adaptation and recovery efforts to  
 13 protect and restore quality of life (see, for example, Zahran *et al.*, 2008; Liu, Vedlitz and Alston,  
 14 2008; Vedlitz *et al.*, 2007).

15  
 16 Second, not all citizens in areas more vulnerable to climate change effects are equally at risk.  
 17 Some population groupings, within the same community, will be more vulnerable and at risk  
 18 than others. Those who are poorer, minorities, aged or infirmed, and children are at greater risk  
 19 than others to the stresses of climate change events (Lindell and Perry, 2004; Peacock, 2003).  
 20 Recognizing that not all citizens of a particular vulnerable area share the same level of risk is  
 21 something that planners and decision makers must take into account in projecting the likely  
 22 impacts of climate change events on their populations, and in dealing with recovery of those  
 23 populations (Murphy and Gardoni, 2008).

24  
 25 Finally, the situation is further complicated as climate stressors negatively affect disease  
 26 conditions in other nations with particularly vulnerable and mobile populations. Increased  
 27 communicable disease incidence in developing nations have the potential, through legal and  
 28 illegal tourism and immigration, to affect community welfare and individual well-being in the  
 29 United States.

#### 30 4.2.2.2 Climate Change and Quality of Life Indicators

31 Social indicators are generally used to evaluate progress towards a goal: How is society doing?  
 32 Who is being affected? Tracking performance for these indicators——using the types of metrics  
 33 or measures indicated in Table 4.1——could provide information to the public on how  
 34 communities and other entities are reacting to, and successfully adapting to (or failing to adapt  
 35 to), climate change. The indicators and metrics included in Table 4.1 are intended to be  
 36 illustrative of the types of indicators that might be used, rather than a comprehensive or  
 37 recommended set. In any category, multiple indicators could be used; and any one of the  
 38 indicators could have several measures. For example, exposure to natural hazards and risks  
 39 could be measured by the percentage of a locality's tax base located in a high hazard zone, the  
 40 number of people exposed to a natural hazard, the funding devoted to hazard mitigation, or the  
 41 costs of hazard insurance, among others. Similarly, some indicators are more amenable to  
 42 objective measurement; others are more difficult to measure, such as measures of social  
 43 cohesion. The point to be taken from Table 4.1 is that social indicators provide a diverse and  
 44 potentially rich perspective on human well-being.

1 The taxonomy presented in Table 4.1—or a similar taxonomy—might also provide a basis for  
 2 analyses of the impacts of climate change on human well-being, providing a list of important  
 3 categories for research (the components or indicators of life quality), as well as appropriate  
 4 metrics (e.g., employment, mortality or morbidity, etc.). The social indicators approach, and the  
 5 specific taxonomy presented here, are only one of many that could be developed.<sup>8</sup> At the least,  
 6 different conditions and stakeholder mixes may demand different emphases. All taxonomies,  
 7 however, face a common problem: how to interpret and use the diverse indicators, in order to  
 8 compare and contrast alternative adaptive or mitigating responses to climate change. For some  
 9 purposes, metrics have been developed that that aggregate across individuals or individual  
 10 categories of well-being and present a composite measure of well-being; or otherwise  
 11 operationalize related concepts, such as vulnerability (see, for example the discussion of Figure  
 12 4.1).

13  
 14 **Figure 4.1** Geography of Climate Change Vulnerability at the County Scale

### 15 **4.2.3 A Closer Look at Communities**

16 Looking beyond well-being of individuals to the welfare (broadly speaking) of *communities*—  
 17 networks of households, businesses, physical structures, and institutions—provides a broader  
 18 perspective on the impacts of climate change. The categories and metrics in Table 4.1 are  
 19 appealing from an analytical perspective in part because they represent dimensions of well-being  
 20 that are clearly important to individuals, but that also have counterparts and can generally be  
 21 measured objectively at the community level. Thus, for example, the counterparts of individual  
 22 income or health status are, at the social level, per capita income or mortality/illness rates. The  
 23 concept of community welfare is linked to human communities, but is not confined to  
 24 communities in urban areas, or even in industrialized cultures. Human communities in remote  
 25 areas, or subsistence economies, face the same range of quality of life issues—from health to  
 26 spiritual values—although they may place different weights on different values; thus, the weights  
 27 placed on different components of welfare are not determined *a priori*, but depend on  
 28 community values and decision making.

29  
 30 Viewing social indicators and metrics through the lens of the community can be instructive in  
 31 several ways. First, communities are dynamic entities, with multiple pathways of interactions  
 32 among people, places, institutions, policies, structures, and enterprises. Thus, while the social  
 33 indicators described in Table 4.1 have metrics that can be measured independently of each other,  
 34 they are not determined independently within the complex reality of interdependent human  
 35 systems. Second, in part because of this interdependence, the aggregate welfare of a community  
 36 is more than a composite of its quality of life metrics; sustainability provides one means of  
 37 approaching a concept of aggregate welfare. Third, vulnerability and adaptation are typically  
 38 analyzed at the sectoral level: “what should agriculture, or the public health system, do to plan  
 39 for or adapt to climate change.” The issue can also, however, be addressed at the level of the  
 40 community. Each of these issues is touched on below.

---

<sup>8</sup> In addition to variants on the social indicators approach, other types of taxonomies are possible—for example a taxonomy based on broad systems (atmospheric, aquatic, geologic, biological, and built environment), or on forms of capital that make up the productive base of society (natural, manufactured, human, and social). Well-being can also be viewed in terms of its endpoints: necessary material for a good life, health and bodily well-being, good social relations, security, freedom and choice, and peace of mind and spiritual existence (Rothman, Amelung, and Poleme., 2003).



#### 1 4.2.3.1 Community Welfare and Individual Well-being

2 Rapid onset extreme weather events, such as hurricanes or tornadoes, can do serious damage to  
 3 community infrastructure, public facilities and services, tax base, and overall community  
 4 reputation and quality of life, from which recovery may take years and never be complete (see  
 5 additional discussion in Chapter 3). More gradual changes in temperature and precipitation will  
 6 have both negative and positive effects. For example, as discussed elsewhere in this chapter,  
 7 warmer average temperatures increase risks from heat-related mortality in the summer, but  
 8 decrease risks from cold-related mortality in the winter, for susceptible populations. Effects such  
 9 as these will not, however, be confined to a few individual sectors, nor are the effects across all  
 10 sectors independent.

11  
 12 To illustrate the interdependence of impacts and, by extension, the analogous social indicators  
 13 and metrics, consider a natural resource that faces additional stresses from climate change: fish  
 14 populations in estuaries, such as the Chesapeake Bay, that are already stressed by air and water  
 15 pollution from industry, agriculture, and cities. In this case, while the direct effects of climate  
 16 will occur to the resource itself, indirect effects can alter welfare as measured by economic,  
 17 social, and human health indicators. Table 4.2 presents some of the possible pathways by which  
 18 resource changes could affect diverse categories of quality of life; the purpose of Table 4.2 is not  
 19 to assert that all these effects will occur or that they will be significant if they do occur as a result  
 20 of climate change, but rather to illustrate the linkages. These linkages underscore the importance  
 21 of understanding interdependencies within the community or, from another perspective, across  
 22 welfare indicators. Table 4.2 illustrates the general principle of complex linkages in which a  
 23 general equilibrium approach can be used to model climate change impacts.

#### 24 4.2.3.2 Sustainability of Communities

25 Understanding how climate change and extreme events affect community welfare requires a  
 26 different conceptual framework than that for understanding individual level impacts, such as  
 27 quality of life.<sup>9</sup> Communities are more than the sum of their parts; they have unique aggregate  
 28 identities shaped by dynamic social, economic, and environmental components. They also have  
 29 life cycles, waxing and waning in response to societal and environmental changes (Diamond,  
 30 2005; Fagan, 2001; Ponting, 1991; Tainter, 1988). Sustainability is a paramount community  
 31 goal, typically expressed in terms of sustainable development in order to express the ongoing  
 32 process of adaptation into the long-term future. “Climate change involves complex interactions  
 33 between climatic, environment, economic, political, institutional, social, and technological  
 34 processes. It cannot be addressed or comprehended in isolation from broader societal goals (such  
 35 as sustainable development)...” (Banuri and Weyant, 2001). Even for a country as developed as  
 36 the US, continuing growth and development creates both pressures on the natural and built  
 37 environments and opportunities for moving in sustainable directions.

38  
 39 While the term sustainability does not have a single, widely-accepted definition, a central  
 40 guideline is to *balance* economic, environmental, and social needs and values (Campbell, 1996;

---

<sup>9</sup> Measures of quality of life provide a database of relevant individual characteristics at various points in time, including economic conditions, natural resources and amenities, human health, public and private infrastructure, government and public safety, and social and cultural resources. Sustainable development measures are similar, but reflect more emphasis on long-term and reciprocal effects, as well as a concern for community-wide and equitable outcomes.

1 Berke *et al.*, 2006), sometimes portrayed as a three-legged stool. It is distinguished from quality  
 2 of life by its *dynamic linking* of economic, environmental, and social components, and by its  
 3 *future orientation* (Campbell, 1996; Porter, 2000). Sustainability is seen as living on nature's  
 4 "interest," while protecting natural capital. Sustainability is a comprehensive social goal that  
 5 transcends individual sector or impact measurements, although it can include narrower  
 6 community welfare concepts such as the *healthy city*. Thinking about the impacts of climate  
 7 change on communities through the lens of sustainable development allows us to envision cross-  
 8 sector economic, environmental, and social dynamics.

#### 10 **4.2.4 Vulnerable Populations, Communities, and Adaptation**

11 Responding to climate change at the community level requires understanding both vulnerability  
 12 and adaptive responses that the community can take. Vulnerability of a community depends on  
 13 its exposure to climate risk, how sensitive systems within that community are to climate  
 14 variability and change, and the adaptive capacity of the community (i.e., how it is able to respond  
 15 and protect its citizens from climate change). Different groups within the community will be  
 16 differentially vulnerable to climate changes, such as extreme events.

##### 17 4.2.4.1 Vulnerable populations.

18 Categories of persons susceptible to environmental risks and hazards include racial and ethnic  
 19 groups (Bolin 1986; Fothergill *et al.* 1999; Lindell and Perry 2004; Cutter 2006), and groups  
 20 defined by economic variables of wealth, income, and poverty (Peacock 2003; Dash *et al.* 1997;  
 21 Fothergill and Peek 2004). Overall, research indicates that minorities and the poor are  
 22 differentially harmed by disaster events. Economic disadvantage, lower human capital, limited  
 23 access to social and political resources, and residential choices are social and economic reasons  
 24 that contribute to observed differences in disaster vulnerability by race/ethnicity and economic  
 25 status. While the literature on climate change and vulnerable populations is relatively  
 26 underdeveloped, Chapter 2 on Human Health and Chapter 3 on Human Settlements each address  
 27 population vulnerabilities.

28  
 29 Economic, social and health effects are not neatly bounded by geographic or political regions,  
 30 and so the damage and stresses that occur in a specific locality are not limited in their effects to  
 31 only that community. As Hurricane Katrina made clear, impacts felt in one community ripple  
 32 throughout the region and nation. Persons made homeless in New Orleans resettled in Baton  
 33 Rouge, Lafayette and Houston, creating stresses on those communities. Vulnerable groups  
 34 migrate from stricken areas to more hospitable ones, taking their health, economic and  
 35 educational needs and problems with them across both national and state lines

##### 36 4.2.4.2 Vulnerable communities.

37 While most analyses of vulnerability tend to be conducted at the regional scale, Zahran *et al.*  
 38 (2008) have brought the analysis closer to the community level by mapping the geography of  
 39 climate change vulnerability at the county scale. The study uses measures of both *physical*  
 40 *vulnerability* (expected temperature change, extreme weather events, and coastal proximity) and  
 41 *adaptive capacity* (as represented by economic, demographic, and civic participation variables  
 42 that constitute a locality's socioeconomic capacity to commit to costly climate change policy  
 43 initiatives). Their map identifies the concentrations of highly vulnerable counties as lying along

1 the east and west coasts and Great Lakes, with medium vulnerability counties mostly inland in  
 2 the southeast, southwest, and northeast. (See Figure 4.1, in which darker areas represent higher  
 3 vulnerability).

4  
 5 Many possible dimensions can be used to identify and measure vulnerabilities to climate change  
 6 impacts and stressors. The one presented in Figure 4.1 illustrates that the concept of  
 7 vulnerability is a viable one and can be measured and applied to communities in a GIS context.  
 8 It is not the purpose of this chapter to focus in great detail on vulnerability measurement issues  
 9 (for those interested in other formulations of the vulnerability concept, see Dietz *et al.*, In Press).

#### 10 4.2.4.3 Adaptation.

11 From the perspective of the community, the goal of successful adaptation to climate impacts—  
 12 particularly potentially adverse impacts—is to maintain the long-term sustainability and survival  
 13 of the community. Thus, a resilient community is capable of absorbing climate changes and the  
 14 shocks of extreme events without breakdowns in its economy, natural resource base, or social  
 15 systems (Godschalk, 2003). Given their control over shared resources, communities have the  
 16 capacity to adapt to climate change in larger and more coordinated ways than individuals, by  
 17 creating plans and strategies to increase resilience in the face of future shocks, while at the same  
 18 time ensuring that the negative impacts of climate change do not fall disproportionately on their  
 19 most vulnerable populations and demographic groups (Smit and Pilifosova, 2001).

20  
 21 Public policies and programs are in place in the U.S. to enhance the capacity of communities to  
 22 mitigate<sup>10</sup> damage and loss from natural hazards and extreme events (Burby, 1998; Mileti, 1999;  
 23 Godschalk, 2007). A considerable body of research looks at responses to natural hazards, and  
 24 recent research has shown that the benefits of natural hazard mitigation at the national level  
 25 outweigh its costs by a factor of four to one on average (Multihazard Mitigation Council, 2005;  
 26 Rose *et al.*, 2007). Research also has been done on the social vulnerability of communities to  
 27 natural hazards (Cutter *et al.*, 2003) and the economic resilience of businesses to natural hazards  
 28 (Tierney, 1997; Rose, 2004). However, there is scant research on U.S. policies dealing with  
 29 community adaptation to the broader impacts of climate change.

### 30 **4.3 An Economic Approach to Human Welfare**

31 Welfare, well-being, and quality of life are often viewed as multi-faceted concepts. In subjective  
 32 assessments of happiness or quality of life (see the discussion in Section 4.2), the individual  
 33 makes a net evaluation of his or her current state, taking into account (at least implicitly) and  
 34 balancing all the relevant facets or dimensions of that state of being. Constructing an overall  
 35 statement regarding welfare from a set of objective measures, however, requires a means of  
 36 weighting or ranking, or otherwise aggregating, these measures. The economic approach supplies  
 37 one—although not the only possible—approach to aggregation.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> In the natural hazards and disasters field, a single term—mitigation—refers both to adaptation to hazards and mitigation of their stresses. (See the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Public Law 106-390.)

<sup>11</sup> In part because of the difficulty in compiling the information needed for aggregation of economic measures, Jacoby (2004) proposes a portfolio approach to benefits estimation, focusing on a limited set of indicators of global climate change, of regional impact, and one global monetary measure. The set of measures would not be the only information generated and made available, but it would represent a set of variables continuously maintained and used to describe policy choices.

1  
2 Quantitative measures of welfare that use a common metric have two potential advantages. First,  
3 the ability to compare welfare impacts across different welfare categories makes it possible to  
4 identify and rank categories with regard to the magnitude or importance of effects. Welfare  
5 impacts can then provide a signal about the relative importance of different impacts, and so help  
6 to set priorities with regard to adaptation or research. Second, if the concept of welfare is  
7 (ideally) a net measure, then it should be possible to aggregate the effects of climate across  
8 disparate indicators. Quantitative measures that use the same metric can, potentially, be summed  
9 to generate net measures of welfare, and gauge progress over time, or under different policy or  
10 adaptation scenarios.

11  
12 Given the value of welfare both as a multi-dimensional concept, and as one that facilitates  
13 comparisons, the economic approach to welfare analysis—which monetizes or puts dollar values  
14 on impacts—is one means of comparing disparate impacts. Further—and this is the second  
15 advantage of the economic approach—dollar values of impacts can be aggregated, and so  
16 provide net measures of changes in impacts that can be useful to policy makers. This section of  
17 the chapter discusses the foundation of economic valuation, the distinction between market and  
18 non-market effects (only the latter are covered in this paper), and describes some of the valuation  
19 tools that economists use for non-market effects. An appendix covers these issues in additional  
20 detail, and also describes the challenges that economic valuation faces when used as a tool for  
21 policy analysis in the long term context of climate change.

22  
23 Fundamental to the economic approach is a notion that a key element of support for decision-  
24 making is an understanding of the magnitude of costs and benefits, so that the tradeoffs implicit  
25 in any decision can be balanced and compared. However, the economic approach, when  
26 interpreted as requiring a strict cost-benefit test, is not appropriate in all circumstances, and is  
27 viewed by some as controversial in the context of climate change.<sup>12</sup> Benefit cost analysis is one  
28 tool available to decision makers; in the context of climate change; other decision rules and tools,  
29 or other definitions of welfare, may be equally, or more relevant. For example, the recent  
30 Synthesis Report of the IPCC Fourth Assessment (IPCC 2007a) presents an average social cost  
31 (i.e., damages) of carbon in 2005 of \$12 per ton of CO<sub>2</sub>, but also notes that the range of the  
32 roughly 100 peer-reviewed estimates of this value is -\$3 to \$95/tCO<sub>2</sub>.<sup>13</sup> IPCC attributes this very  
33 broad range to differences in assumptions on climate sensitivity, response lags, the treatment of  
34 risk and equity, economic and non-economic impacts, the inclusion of potentially catastrophic  
35 losses, and discount rates. IPCC therefore suggests consideration of an "iterative risk  
36 management process" to support decision-making.<sup>14</sup> Estimated benefits and costs therefore can  
37 provide information relevant to decision makers, but some of the methodologies and data

---

<sup>12</sup> See Arrow *et al.*, 1996 - at page 7, "There may be factors other than economic benefits and costs that agencies will want to weigh in decisions, such as equity within and across generations. In addition, a decision maker may want to place greater weight on particular characteristics of a decision, such as potential irreversible consequences."

<sup>13</sup> See IPCC 2007a, page 23.

<sup>14</sup> IPCC further notes that existing analyses suggest costs and benefits of mitigation are roughly comparable in magnitude, "but do not as yet permit an unambiguous determination of an emissions pathway or stabilization level where benefits exceed costs." (IPCC 2007a page 23).

1 necessary to provide a relatively complete assessment may be unavailable, as discussed  
2 subsequently in this section.<sup>15</sup>

### 3 **4.3.1 Economic Valuation**

4 The framework that economists employ reflects a specific view of human welfare and how to  
5 measure it. Economists define the value of something—be it a good, service, or state of the  
6 world—by focusing on the well-being, utility, or level of satisfaction that the individual derives.  
7 The basic economic paradigm assumes that individuals allocate their available income and time  
8 to achieve the greatest level of satisfaction. The value of a good—in terms of the utility or  
9 satisfaction it provides—is revealed by the tradeoffs that individuals make between that good  
10 and other goods, or between that good and income.<sup>16</sup> The term “willingness to pay” (WTP) is  
11 used by economists to represent the value of something, i.e., the individual’s willingness to trade  
12 money for that particular good, service, or state of the world.

13  
14 Economists distinguish between market and non-market goods. Market goods are those that can  
15 be bought and sold in the market, and for which a price generally exists. Market behavior and, in  
16 particular, the prices that are paid for these goods, is a source of information on the economic  
17 value or benefit of these goods. The economic benefit—the amount that members of society  
18 would in aggregate be willing to pay for these goods—is related to, but frequently greater than,  
19 market prices.

20  
21 Non-market goods are those that are not bought and sold in markets. Consequently, climate  
22 change impacts that involve non-market effects—such as health effects, loss of endangered  
23 species, and other effects—are difficult to value in monetary terms. Economists have developed  
24 techniques for measuring non-market values, by inferring economic value from behavior  
25 (including other market behavior), or by asking individuals directly.

26  
27 A number of studies have attempted to value the range of effects of climate change. For the US,  
28 some of the most comprehensive studies are the Report to Congress completed by U.S. EPA in  
29 1989 (USEPA 1989), Cline (1992), Nordhaus (1994), Fankhauser (1995), Mendelsohn and  
30 Neumann (1999), Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), and a body of work by Richard Tol (e.g., Tol,  
31 2002 and Tol, 2005). In all of these studies, the focus is largely on market impacts, particularly  
32 the effects of climate change on agriculture, forestry, water resource availability, energy demand  
33 (mostly for air conditioning), coastal property, and in some cases, health.

34  
35 Non-market effects, however, are less well characterized in these studies (Smith *et al.*, 2003);  
36 where comprehensive attempts are made, they usually involve either expert judgment or very  
37 rudimentary calculations, such as multiplying the numbers of coastal wetland acres at risk of  
38 inundation from sea-level rise by an estimate of the average non-market value of a wetland. One  
39 such comprehensive attempt generated a value for 17 ecosystem services from 16 ecosystem  
40 types (Costanza *et al.*, 1997), but also generated controversy and criticism from many

<sup>15</sup> Other factors that might be considered, in addition to economic estimates, include emotions, perceptions, cultural values, and other subjective factors, all of which can play a role in creating preferences and reaching decisions. Those factors are beyond what we can evaluate in this chapter.

<sup>16</sup> Although economists are careful to distinguish between the metrics of utility and money as distinct, valuation metric in dollar units (rather than units of utility) may be generally viewed as the outcomes of individual preference expressions among goods, income, and time.

1 economists (Bockstael *et al.*, 2000; Toman 1998; see National Research Council 2004 for a  
 2 summary). Other analysts have attempted to define measures to reflect non-market ecosystem  
 3 services in terms similar to those used for Gross Domestic Product (Boyd 2006), or indicators of  
 4 ecosystem health that reflect ecological contributions to human welfare (Boyd and Banzhaf  
 5 2006).<sup>17</sup> While there are several well-done valuation analyses for non-market effects of climate  
 6 change (as described later in this chapter), it is fair to characterize this literature as opportunistic  
 7 in its focus; where data and methods exist, there are high quality studies, but the overall coverage  
 8 of non-market effects remains inadequate.

### 9 **4.3.2 Impacts Assessment and Monetary Valuation**

10 The process of estimating the welfare effects of climate change involves four steps: (1) estimate  
 11 climate changes; (2) estimate physical effects of climate change, (3) estimate the impacts on  
 12 human and natural systems that are amenable to valuation and (4) value or monetize effects. The  
 13 first step requires estimating the change in relevant measures of climate, including temperature,  
 14 precipitation, sea-level rise, and the frequency and severity of extreme events. The second step  
 15 involves estimating the physical effects of those changes in climate. Such effects might include  
 16 changes in ecosystem structure and function, human exposures to heat stress, changes in the  
 17 geographic range of disease vectors, or flooding of coastal areas. In the third step, the physical  
 18 effects of climate change are translated into measures that economists can value, for example the  
 19 number and location of properties that are vulnerable to floods, or the number of individuals  
 20 exposed to and sensitive to heat stress. Many analyses that reach this step in the process, but not  
 21 all, also proceed on to the fourth step, valuing the changes in dollar terms. .  
 22

23 The simplest approach to valuation would be to apply a unit valuation approach - for example,  
 24 the cost of treating a nonfatal case of heat stress or malaria attributable to climate change is a  
 25 first approximation of the value of avoiding that case altogether. In many contexts, however, unit  
 26 values can misrepresent the true marginal economic impact of these changes. For example, if  
 27 climate change reduces the length of the ski season, individuals could engage in another  
 28 recreational activity, such as golf. Whether they might prefer skiing to golf at that time and  
 29 location is something economists might try to measure.  
 30

31 This step-by-step linear approach to effects estimation is sometimes called the "damage  
 32 function" approach. A damage function approach might imply that we look at effects of climate  
 33 on human health as separate and independent from effects on ecology and recreation, an  
 34 assumption that ignores the complex economic interrelationships among goods and services and  
 35 individual decisions regarding these. Recent research suggests that the damage function  
 36 approach, under some conditions, may be both overly simplistic (Freeman, 2003) and sometimes  
 37 subject to serious errors (Strzepek and Smith, 1995; Strzepek *et al.*, 1999).  
 38

39 Economists have a number of techniques available for moving from quantified effects to dollar  
 40 values. In some cases, the values estimated in one situation—e.g., one ecosystem or species—  
 41 can be transferred and used to value another. For example, value or benefits transfer is  
 42 commonly used by federal agencies such as the US EPA and US Forest Service to value  
 43 recreation when there is insufficient time or budget to conduct original valuation studies

---

<sup>17</sup> Some political economists also emphasize the role of explicit recognition of non-market environmental values as an important step in improving the well-being of poor populations (Boyce and Shelley, 2003).

1 (Rosenberger and Loomis, 2003). Techniques commonly used by economists to value non-  
2 market goods and services include:

- 3 • *Revealed preference*. Revealed preference, sometimes referred to as the indirect valuation  
4 approach, involves inferring the value of a non-market good using data from market  
5 transactions (U.S. EPA, 2000; Freeman, 2003). For example, the value of a lake for its  
6 ability to provide a good fishing experience can be estimated by the time and money  
7 expended by the angler to fish at that particular site, relative to all other possible fishing  
8 sites. Or, the amenity value of a coastal property that is protected from storm damage (by  
9 a dune, perhaps) can be estimated by comparing the price of that property to other  
10 properties similar in every way but the enhanced storm protection.
- 11 • *Stated preference*. Stated preference methods, sometimes referred to as the direct  
12 valuation, are survey methods that estimate the value individuals place on particular non-  
13 market goods based on choices they make in hypothetical markets. The earliest stated  
14 preference studies involved simply asking individuals what they would be willing to pay  
15 for a particular non-market good. The best studies involve great care in constructing a  
16 credible, though still hypothetical, trade-off between money and the non-market good of  
17 interest (or bundle of goods) to discern individual preferences for that good and hence,  
18 WTP.
- 19 • *Replacement or avoided costs*—Replacement cost studies approach non-market values by  
20 estimating the cost to replace the services provided to individuals by the non-market  
21 good. For example, healthy coastal wetlands may provide a wide range of services to  
22 individuals who live near them (such as filtering pollutants present in water). A  
23 replacement cost approach would estimate the value of these services by estimating  
24 market costs for replacing the services provided by the wetlands. Analogously, the cost  
25 of health effects can be estimated using the cost of treating illness and of the lost  
26 workdays, etc. associated with illness.
- 27 • *Value of inputs*—This approach calculated value based on the contribution of an input  
28 into some productive process. This approach can be used to determine the value of both  
29 market and non-market inputs, for example, fertilizer, water, or soil, in farm output and  
30 profits

31  
32 In the remainder of this section, we briefly discuss the relationship between climate change and  
33 four non-market effects (human health, ecosystems, recreation and tourism, and amenities), and  
34 discuss economic estimates of these effects using these techniques.

### 35 **4.3.3 Human Health**

36 In the US, climate change is likely to measurably affect health outcomes known to be associated  
37 with weather and climate, including heat-related illnesses and deaths, health effects due to  
38 storms, floods, and other extreme weather events, health effects related to poor air quality, water-  
39 and food-borne diseases, and insect-, tick-, and rodent-borne diseases. In addition to changes in  
40 mortality and morbidity, climate change may affect health in more subtle ways. Good health is  
41 more than the absence of illness; it includes mental health, the ability to function physically (to  
42 climb stairs or walk a mile), socially (to move freely in the world), and in a work environment.  
43 Please see Chapter 2 of this report, which provides an overview of health effects that have been  
44 associated with climate change.

1 Despite our understanding of the pathways linking climate and health effects, there is uncertainty  
 2 as to the magnitude and geographic and temporal variation of possible impacts on morbidity and  
 3 mortality in the US, primarily due to a poor understanding of many key risk factors and  
 4 confounding issues, such as behavioral adaptation and variability in population vulnerability  
 5 (Patz *et al.*, 2001). Even where our understanding of underlying climate and health relationships  
 6 is better, few studies have attempted to explicitly link these findings to climate change scenarios  
 7 to quantitatively estimate health impacts. Economists have relatively well established (although  
 8 sometimes controversial) techniques for valuing mortality and some forms of morbidity, which  
 9 could, in theory be applied to quantified impacts assessments.

#### 10 4.3.3.1 Overview of Health Effects of Climate Change

11 The US is a developed country with a temperate climate. It has a well-developed health  
 12 infrastructure and government and non-governmental agencies involved in disaster planning and  
 13 response, both of which can help to mitigate potential health effects from climate change.  
 14 Nevertheless, certain regions of the US will face difficult challenges arising from some of the  
 15 following health effects.

- 16
- 17 • *Illnesses and deaths due to heatwaves*—A likely impact in the US is an increase in the  
 18 severity, duration, and frequency of heatwaves (Kalkstein and Greene 1997; IPCC  
 19 2007c). This, coupled with an aging (and therefore more vulnerable) population, will  
 20 increase the likelihood of higher mortality from exposure to excessive heat (see, for  
 21 example, Semenza *et al.*, 1996, and Knowlton *et al.*, 2007).
- 22 • *Injuries and death from extreme weather events*—Climate change is projected to alter the  
 23 frequency, timing, intensity, and duration of extreme weather events, such as hurricanes  
 24 and floods (Fowler and Hennessey, 1995). The health effects of these extreme weather  
 25 events range from the direct effects, such as loss of life and acute trauma, to indirect  
 26 effects, such as loss of shelter, large-scale population displacement, damage to sanitation  
 27 infrastructure (drinking water and sewage systems), interruption of food production,  
 28 damage to the health care infrastructure, and psychological problems such as post  
 29 traumatic stress disorder (Curriero *et al.*, 2001).
- 30 • *Illnesses and deaths due to poor air quality*—Climate change can affect air quality by  
 31 modifying local weather patterns and pollutant concentrations (such as ground level  
 32 ozone), by affecting natural sources of air pollution, and by changing the distribution of  
 33 airborne allergens (Morris *et al.*, 1989; Sillman and Samson, 1995). Many of these effects  
 34 are localized and, for ozone, compounded by assumptions of trends in precursor  
 35 emissions. Despite these uncertainties, all else being equal, climate change is projected  
 36 to increase ozone-related diseases.
- 37 • *Water- and Foodborne Diseases*—Altered weather patterns, including changes in  
 38 precipitation, temperature, humidity, and water salinity, are likely to affect the  
 39 distribution and prevalence of food- and waterborne diseases resulting from bacteria,  
 40 overloaded drinking water systems, and increases in the frequency and range of harmful  
 41 algal blooms (Weniger *et al.*, 1983; MacKenzie *et al.*, 1994; Lipp and Rose, 1997;  
 42 Curriero *et al.*, 2001).
- 43 • *Insect-, Tick-, and Rodent-borne Diseases*—Vector-borne diseases, such as plague,  
 44 Lyme’s disease, malaria, hanta virus, and dengue fever have distinct seasonal pattern,  
 45 suggesting that they may be sensitive to climate-driven changes in rainfall and



1 temperature (Githeko and Woodward, 2003). Moderating factors, such as housing  
 2 quality, land-use patterns, vector control programs, and a robust public health  
 3 infrastructure, are likely to prevent the large-scale spread of these diseases in the U.S.

#### 4 4.3.3.2 Quantifying the Health Impacts of Climate Change

5 A large epidemiological literature exists on the health effects associated with climate change,  
 6 particularly the mortality effects associated with increases in average monthly or seasonal  
 7 temperature, and with changes in the intensity, frequency, and duration of heatwaves. As  
 8 described in Chapter 2, there is considerable speculation concerning the balance of climate  
 9 change-related decreases in winter mortality compared with increases in summer mortality,  
 10 although researchers suspect that declines in winter mortality associated with climate change are  
 11 unlikely to outweigh increases in summer mortality.

12  
 13 Net changes in mortality are difficult to estimate because, in part, much depends on complexities  
 14 in the relationship between mortality and the changes associated with global change. Using  
 15 average temperatures to estimate cold-related mortality, for example, is complicated by the fact  
 16 that many factors contribute to winter mortality (such as spread of the influenza virus). Similarly,  
 17 increased summer mortality may be affected not only by average temperature, but also by other  
 18 temperature factors, such as variability in temperature, or the duration of heat waves. Moreover,  
 19 quantifying projected temperature-related mortality requires going beyond epidemiology and (for  
 20 example) projecting adaptive behaviors, such as the use of air conditioning, expanded public  
 21 programs (such as heat warning systems), or migratory patterns.

22  
 23 Few studies have attempted to link the epidemiological findings to climate scenarios for the  
 24 United States, and studies that have done so have focused on the effects of changes in average  
 25 temperature, with mixed results.<sup>18</sup> Below, we report the results of these studies in order to give a  
 26 sense of the magnitude of mortality that might be associated with temperature changes associated  
 27 with climate change and, by intimation, the magnitude of potential changes in economic welfare.  
 28 The conclusions should be considered preliminary, however, in part because of the complexities  
 29 in estimating mortality under future climate scenarios. Moreover, none of the studies reported  
 30 below traces through the quantitative implications of various climate scenarios for mortality in  
 31 all regions of the United States using region-specific data, suggesting a clear need for future  
 32 research.

33  
 34 Quantifying the relationship between climate change and cases of injury, illness, or death  
 35 requires an exposure-response function that quantifies the relationship between a health endpoint  
 36 (e.g., premature mortality due to cardiovascular disease (CVD), cases of diarrheal disease) and  
 37 climate variables (e.g., temperature and humidity). The exposure-response function can be used  
 38 to compute the relative risk of illness or death due to a specified change in climate, e.g., a  
 39 temperature increase of 2.5°C. Applying this relative risk to the baseline incidence of the illness

---

<sup>18</sup> To our knowledge, there have been no attempts to quantify the impacts of climate on cardiovascular and respiratory morbidity in the United States. McMichael *et al.* (2004) estimate the impact of climate change on DALYs (Disability-Adjusted Life Years) associated with waterborne and vector-borne illness for WHO regions. (DALYs represent the sum of life-years lost due to premature death and productive life years lost due to chronic illness or injury.) These impacts are estimated to be zero for the United States.

1 or death in a population yields an estimated number of cases associated with the climate  
2 scenario.

3  
4 Two studies have attempted to link exposure-response functions to future climate scenarios and  
5 thereby develop temperature-related mortality estimates.<sup>19</sup> McMichael *et al.* (2004) estimate the  
6 effects of average temperature changes associated with projected climates resulting from  
7 alternative emissions scenarios, by WHO region. For the AMR-A region, which includes the  
8 United States, Canada, and Cuba, they estimate the impact on cardio-vascular mortality relative  
9 to baseline conditions in 1990. Effects are estimated for average temperature projections  
10 associated with three alternative emissions scenarios: (1) no control of GHG emissions,<sup>20</sup>  
11 (2) stabilization at 750 parts-per-million (ppm) of CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent by 2210, and (3) stabilization  
12 at 550 ppm CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent by 2170.<sup>21</sup>

13  
14 McMichael *et al.* (2004) bases the estimates of the effects of average temperature changes on  
15 mortality from cardio-vascular disease (CVD) for AMR-A on Kunst *et al.* (1993). Kunst *et al.*  
16 (1993) find CVD mortality rates to be lowest at 16° C, and to increase by 0.5% for every degree  
17 C below 16° C and increase by 1.1% for each degree above 16° C. In applying these results to  
18 future climate scenarios, McMichael *et al.* (2004) assume that people will adjust to higher  
19 average temperatures; thus, the temperature at which mortality rates reach a minimum is adjusted  
20 by scenario. No adjustment is made for attempts to mitigate the effects of higher temperatures  
21 through (for example) increased use of air-conditioning. The effect of the climate scenarios for  
22 the North American region (AMR-A), reported for 2020 and 2030, is, on net, zero—reductions  
23 in CVD mortality due to warmer winter temperatures cancel out increases in CVD mortality due  
24 to warmer summer temperatures.

25  
26 Hayhoe *et al.* (2004) examine the impacts on climate and health in California of projected  
27 climate change associated with two emissions scenarios. The emissions scenarios are similar to  
28 those used in McMichael *et al.* (2004): (1) stabilization at 970 ppm of CO<sub>2</sub> and (2) stabilization  
29 at 550 ppm of CO<sub>2</sub>.<sup>22</sup> In Los Angeles, by the end of the century, the number of heatwave days  
30 (3 or more days with temperatures above 32 °C) increases fourfold under scenario B1 and six to  
31 eight times under scenario A1fi. From a baseline of 165 excess deaths in the 1990s, heat-related  
32 deaths in Los Angeles are projected to increase two to three times under scenario B1 and five to  
33 seven times under scenario A1fi by 2090.

34  
35 These results can be compared with those of an earlier study that employed a composite climate  
36 variable to examine the impact of extreme temperatures on daily mortality under future climate  
37 scenarios. Kalkstein and Greene (1997) analyzed the effect of temperature extremes (both hot  
38 and cold) on mortality for 44 US cities in the summer and winter. They then applied these results  
39 to climate projections from two GCMs for 2020 and 2050. In 2020, under a no-control scenario,

---

<sup>19</sup> These studies use climate scenarios that are associated with different emissions scenarios from IPCC (2000), the so-called SRES scenarios.

<sup>20</sup> McMichael *et al.* (2004) represent unmitigated emissions using the IS92a emissions scenario presented in IPCC (2000).

<sup>21</sup> Climate scenarios are projected for 2025 and 2050 using the HadCM2 model at a resolution of 3.75° longitude by 2.5° latitude and interpolated to other years.

<sup>22</sup> Hayhoe uses two SRES (IPCC 2000) emissions scenarios: A1fi (corresponding to 970 ppm of CO<sub>2</sub>) and B1 (corresponding to 550 ppm of CO<sub>2</sub>).

1 excess summer deaths in the 44 cities were estimated to increase from 1,840 to 1,981-4,100,  
 2 depending on the GCM used. The corresponding figures for 2050 were 3,190-4,748 excess  
 3 deaths.

#### 4 4.3.3.3 Valuation of Health Effects

5 In benefit-cost analyses of health and safety programs, mortality risks are typically valued using  
 6 the “value of a statistical life” (VSL)—the sum of what people would pay to reduce their risk of  
 7 dying by small amounts that, together, add up to one statistical life. The excess deaths associated  
 8 with a particular climate scenario are indeed the number of statistical lives that would be lost. In  
 9 reality, climate changes will alter the *risk of death* for sensitive individuals in the population,  
 10 rather than killing people with certainty. The challenge is to estimate what people would pay to  
 11 avoid a small increase in their risk of dying.

12  
 13 Willingness to pay for a current reduction in risk of death (e.g., over the coming year) is usually  
 14 estimated from compensating wage differentials in the labor market (a revealed preference  
 15 method), or from contingent valuation surveys (a stated preference method) in which people are  
 16 asked directly what they would pay for a reduction in their risk of dying. The basic idea behind  
 17 compensating wage differentials is that jobs can be characterized by various attributes, including  
 18 risk of accidental death. If workers are well-informed about risks of fatal and non-fatal injuries,  
 19 and if labor markets are competitive, riskier jobs should pay more, holding worker and other job  
 20 attributes constant (Viscusi, 1993). In theory, the impact of a small change in risk of death on the  
 21 wage should equal the amount a worker would have to be compensated to accept this risk. For  
 22 small risk changes, this is also what the worker should pay for a risk reduction.

23  
 24 For the compensating wage approach to yield reliable estimates of the VSL, it is necessary that  
 25 workers be informed about fatal job risks and that there be sufficient competition in labor  
 26 markets for compensating wage differentials to emerge.<sup>23</sup> To measure these differentials  
 27 empirically requires accurate estimates of the risk of death on the job—ideally, broken down by  
 28 industry and occupation. The researcher must also be able to include enough other determinants  
 29 of wages that fatal job risk does not pick up the effects of other worker or job characteristics.  
 30 Empirical estimates of the value of a statistical life based on compensating wage studies  
 31 conducted in the U. S. lie in the range of \$0.6 million to \$13.5 million (1990 dollars) (Viscusi,  
 32 1993; U.S. EPA, 1997), which is the rough equivalent of \$0.7 million to \$16.5 million in year  
 33 2000 dollars.<sup>24</sup>

34  
 35 This challenge is compounded by the long-term nature of climate risks, which suggests that  
 36 much of the premature mortality associated with higher temperatures will occur in the future.  
 37 Indeed, McMichael *et al.* (2004) and Kalkstein and Greene (1997) estimate mortality based on  
 38 climate effects around the years 2020 and 2050; Hayhoe *et al.* (2004) analyze impacts in 2070-  
 39 2099.

---

<sup>23</sup> Estimates of compensating wage differentials are often quite sensitive to the exact specification of the wage equation. Black *et al.* (2003), in a reanalysis of data from U.S. compensating wage studies requested by the USEPA, conclude that the results are too unstable to be used for policy.

<sup>24</sup> Adjusted using the GDP implicit price deflator produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis US Department of Commerce, available at <http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp#Mid>

1  
2 It is also the case that the majority of the health effects of climate change will be felt by persons  
3 65 and over. Recent attempts to examine how the VSL varies with worker age (Viscusi and  
4 Aldy, 2007) suggest that the VSL ranges from \$9.0 million (2000 dollars) for workers aged 35-  
5 44 to \$3.7 million for workers aged 55-62. Contingent valuation studies (Alberini *et al.*, 2004)  
6 also suggest that the VSL may decline with age. Further, economic theory suggests that, under  
7 some assumptions, persons are willing to pay less to reduce a risk they will face in the future  
8 (say, at age 65) than they are willing to pay to reduce a risk they face today (Cropper and  
9 Sussman, 1990). Both these factors may affect the economic value that would be attached to  
10 excess mortality estimates, such as those derived by Kalkstein and Greene (1997).

11  
12 The potential health effects associated with climate change are much broader than the changes in  
13 excess mortality discussed above. The effects of climate on illness have been examined in the  
14 literature, as indicated in the previous section; however, there have been few attempts to examine  
15 the implications of these studies for future climate scenarios. In addition to quantified estimates  
16 of mortality and morbidity, themselves indications of well-being and welfare, a range of  
17 economic techniques that have been developed for use in cost-benefit analyses of health and  
18 safety regulations could be applied to many of the endpoints that may be affected by climate  
19 change, as suggested by Table 4.3. Before these methods could be applied, however, the impacts  
20 of climate change must be translated into physical damages.

21  
22 It is also the case that good health is more than the absence of illness. All of the dimensions of  
23 functioning measured in standard questionnaires (including various health outcomes surveys  
24 (HCFR 2004) may be affected by changes in climate. From a valuation perspective, we would  
25 expect changes in functional limitations (stiffness of joints, difficulty walking) not to be linked  
26 directly to climate or to weather, but rather to be instrumental in people's location decisions and,  
27 thus, reflected in wages and property values. The relationship between climate and wages and  
28 property values are discussed in the subsequent section on Amenity values.

#### 29 **4.3.4 Ecosystems**

30 Human welfare depends on the Earth's ecosystems and the services that they provide, where  
31 ecosystem services may be defined as "the conditions and processes through which natural  
32 ecosystems, and the species that make them up, sustain and fulfill human life" (Daily, 1997).  
33 These services contribute to human well-being and welfare by contributing to basic material  
34 needs, physical and psychological health, security, and economic activity, and in other ways (see  
35 Table 4.4). For example, a variety of ecosystem changes may be linked to changes in human  
36 health, from changes that encourage the expansion of the range of vector-borne diseases  
37 (discussed in Chapter 2) to the frequency and impact of floods and fires on human populations,  
38 due to changes in protection afforded by ecosystems.

39  
40 The ability of the biosphere to continue providing these vital goods and services is being strained  
41 by human activities, such as habitat destruction, releases of pollutants, over-harvesting of plants,  
42 fish and wildlife, and the introduction of invasive species into fragile systems. The recent  
43 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment reported that of 24 vital ecosystem services, 15 were being  
44 degraded by human activity (MA, 2005). Climate change is an additional human stressor that

1 threatens to intensify and extend these adverse impacts to biodiversity, ecosystems, and the  
2 services they provide.

3  
4 Changes in temperature, precipitation, and other effects of climate change will have *direct*  
5 effects on ecosystems. Climate change will also *indirectly* affect ecosystems, via, for example,  
6 effects of sea level rise on coastal ecosystems, decision-makers' responses to climate change (in  
7 terms of coastline protection or land use), or increased demands on water supplies in some  
8 locations for drinking water, electricity generation, and agricultural use. Understanding how  
9 these changes alter economic welfare requires identifying and potentially valuing changes in  
10 ecosystems resulting from climate change. Getting to the point of valuation, however, requires  
11 establishing a number of linkages—from projected changes in climate to ecosystem change, to  
12 changes in services, to changes in the value of those services—as illustrated in Figure 4.2. The  
13 scientific community has not, thus far, focused explicitly on establishing these linkages in the  
14 context of climate change. Consequently, the published literature is somewhat fragmented,  
15 consisting of discussions of climate effects on ecosystems and of valuation of ecosystems and  
16 their services (in only a few cases do the latter focus on climate change).

17  
18 **Figure 4.2** Steps from Climate Change to Economic Valuation of Ecosystem Services

19  
20 Already observed effects (see reviews in Parmesan and Yohe, 2003; Root *et al.*, 2003; Parmesan  
21 and Galbraith, 2004) and modeling results indicate that climate change is very likely to have  
22 major adverse impacts on ecosystems (Peters and Lovejoy, 1992; Bachelet *et al.*, 2001; Lenihan  
23 *et al.*, 2006; Galbraith *et al.* 2006). It is also likely that these changes will adversely affect the  
24 services that humans and human systems derive from ecosystems (MA, 2005). Climate change  
25 may affect ecosystems in the US within this century in the following ways.

26  
27 **Shifting, breakup and loss of ecological communities.** As climate changes, species that are  
28 components of communities will be forced to shift their ranges to follow cooler temperatures  
29 either poleward or upward in elevation. In at least some cases, this is likely to result in the  
30 breakup of communities as organisms respond to temperature change and migrate at different  
31 rates. In general, study projections include: northern extensions of the ranges of southern  
32 broadleaf forest types, with northward contractions of the ranges of northern and boreal conifer  
33 forests; elimination of alpine tundra from much of its current range in the U.S.; and the  
34 replacement of forests by grasslands, shrub-dominated communities, and savannas, particularly  
35 in the south (e.g., VEMAP, 1995; Melillo *et al.*, 2001; Lenihan *et al.*, 2006). Because of different  
36 intrinsic rates of migration, communities may not move intact into new areas (Box 4.1).

37  
38 Another potential community effect of climate change is the facilitation of community  
39 penetration and degradation by invasive weeds that will replace more sensitive native species  
40 (Malcolm and Pitelka, 2000)

41  
42 **Extinctions of plants and animals and reduced biodiversity.** While some species may be able to  
43 adapt to changing climate conditions, others will be adversely affected. It is very likely that one  
44 result of this will be to accelerate current extinction rates, resulting in loss in biodiversity. The  
45 most vulnerable species within the U.S. may be those that are currently confined to small,  
46 fragmented habitats that may be sensitive to climate change. This is the case with Edith's  
47 checkerspot, a western butterfly species that is already undergoing local subpopulation

1 extinctions due to climate change (Parmesan, 1996). Other potentially vulnerable organisms  
 2 include those that are restricted to alpine tundra habitats (Wang *et al.*, 2002), or to coastal  
 3 habitats which may be inundated by sea level rise (Galbraith *et al.*, 2002).

4  
 5 **Range shifts.** Faced with increasing temperatures, populations of plants and animals will attempt  
 6 to track their preferred climatic conditions by shifting their ranges. Range shifts will be limited  
 7 by factors such as geology (in the case of plants that are confined to certain soil types), or the  
 8 presence of cities, agricultural land, or other human activities that block northward migration.  
 9 Some individual species in North America and the US are already undergoing range shifts (Root  
 10 *et al.*, 2003; Parmesan and Galbraith, 2004). The red fox in the Canadian arctic shifted its range  
 11 northward by up to 600 miles during the 20th century, with the greatest expansion occurring  
 12 where temperature increases have been the largest (Hersteinsson and Macdonald, 1992). More  
 13 generally, a number of bird species have shifted their ranges northward in the U.S. over the past  
 14 few decades. While some of these changes may be attributable to non-climatic factors, it is very  
 15 likely that some are due to climate change (Root *et al.*, 2003; Parmesan and Galbraith, 2004).

16  
 17 **Timing changes.** The timing of major ecological events is often triggered or modulated by  
 18 seasonal temperature change. Changes in timing may already be occurring in the breeding  
 19 seasons of birds, hibernation seasons of amphibians, and emergences of butterflies in North  
 20 America and Europe (Bebee, 1995; Crick *et al.*, 1997; Brown *et al.*, 1999; Dunn and Winkler,  
 21 1999; Root *et al.*, 2003; Roy and Sparks, 2000). Disconnects in timing of interdependent  
 22 ecological events may be accompanied by adverse effects on sensitive organisms in the U.S.  
 23 Such effects have already been observed in Europe where forest-breeding birds have been unable  
 24 to advance their breeding seasons sufficiently to keep up with the earlier emergence of the  
 25 arboreal caterpillars with which they feed their young. This has resulted in declining productivity  
 26 and population reductions in at least one species (Both *et al.*, 2006).

27  
 28 **Changes in ecosystem processes.** Ecosystem processes, such as nutrient cycling, decomposition,  
 29 carbon flow, etc., are fundamentally influenced by climate. Climate change is likely to disrupt at  
 30 least some of these processes. While these effects are difficult to quantify, some types of changes  
 31 can—and have been observed. Increasing temperatures over the past few decades on the North  
 32 Slope of Alaska have resulted in a summer breakdown of the permanently frozen soil of the  
 33 Alaskan Tundra and increased activity by soil bacteria that decompose plant material. This has  
 34 accelerated the rate at which CO<sub>2</sub> (a breakdown product of the decomposition of the vegetation  
 35 and also a greenhouse gas) is released to the atmosphere—changing the Tundra from a net sink  
 36 (absorber) to a net emitter of CO<sub>2</sub> (Oechel *et al.*, 1993; Oechel *et al.*, 2000).

37  
 38 **Indirect effects of climate change.** Climate change may also result in “indirect” ecological effects  
 39 as it triggers events (the frequency and intensity of fires, for example) that, in turn, adversely  
 40 affect ecosystems. In U.S. forest habitats, increased temperatures are very likely to result in  
 41 increased frequency and intensity of wildfires, especially in the arid west, leading to the breakup  
 42 of contiguous forests into smaller patches, separated by shrub and grass dominated communities  
 43 that are more resistant to the effects of fire (Lenihan *et al.*, 2006). Other major indirect effects are  
 44 likely to include the loss of coastal habitat through sea level rise (Warren and Niering, 1993;  
 45 Ross *et al.*, 1994; Galbraith *et al.*, 2002), and the loss of coldwater fish communities (and the  
 46 recreational fishing that they support) as water temperatures increase (Meyer *et al.*, 1999).

1  
 2 The linkages between these types of changes and the provision of ecosystem services are  
 3 difficult to define. While ecologists have developed a number of metrics of ecosystem condition  
 4 and functioning (e.g., species diversity, presence/absence of indicator species, primary  
 5 productivity, nutrient cycling rates), these do not generally bear an obvious relation to metrics of  
 6 services. In some cases, such as species diversity and bird population sizes, direct links might be  
 7 drawn to services (in this case, opportunities for bird watching). However, in many, if not most  
 8 cases, the linkages between stressor effects, change in ecosystem metrics, and service flows, are  
 9 more obscure. For example, it is known that freshwater wetlands can remove contaminants from  
 10 surface water (Daily, 1997) and this is an important service. However, the specific ways in which  
 11 wetlands do this—in terms of the ecological processes and linkages within the system—are not  
 12 well understood, probably vary between different types of wetland (e.g., beaver swamps vs.  
 13 cattail stands), and may vary spatially and temporally.

#### 14 4.3.4.1 Economic Valuation of Effects on Ecosystems

15 Ecosystems are generally considered non-market goods: although land itself can be bought and  
 16 sold, there is no market for ecosystem services per se, and so land value is only a partial measure  
 17 of the value of the full range of ecosystem services provided. From the perspective of human  
 18 welfare and climate change, however, we are concerned less with the ecosystems or the land on  
 19 which they are located, than with the diverse services they provide, as illustrated in Table 4.4.

20  
 21 Economic valuation of changes in ecosystem services will be easier in cases where there are  
 22 relationships between market goods and the ecosystem services being valued. For example,  
 23 ecosystem changes may result in changes in the availability of goods and services that are traded  
 24 on markets, as in the case of provisioning services, such as food, fisheries, pharmaceuticals etc.  
 25 In other cases, market counterparts to the services may exist, as in the case of regulating services;  
 26 for example, insights into the value of water purification services can come from looking at the  
 27 (avoided) cost of a water purification plant to substitute for the ecosystem service. Services, such  
 28 as water purification, may also have relationships with market goods and services (e.g., as an  
 29 input into the production process) that make it possible to estimate economic values at least in  
 30 part or approximately.

31  
 32 Many ecosystem services are, however, truly non-market, in that there are no market  
 33 counterparts by which to estimate their value. Recreational uses of ecosystems fall into this  
 34 category, and so economists have developed means of inferring values from behavior (e.g., travel  
 35 cost), as discussed in the next section), and in other ways. Most of the support services and  
 36 cultural values of ecosystems are also in the “true” non-market category. Value can arise even if  
 37 a good or service is not explicitly consumed, or an ecosystem even experienced.<sup>25</sup> Thus, it can  
 38 be difficult to define, much less to measure the value of changes in these non-market services. To  
 39 value these services, economists typically use stated preference (direct valuation) methods, a  
 40 method that can be used not only for non-market services, but also to value services in other

---

<sup>25</sup> Economists have devoted much effort to defining the source of non-market values of ecosystems, coining such terms as “use” and “non-use” value, consumption value, existence value, and invoking, as reasons why people care about ecosystems, the moral philosophies inherent in terms such as stewardship, spiritual values, etc. (see for example, Freeman (2003).

1 categories, such as the value that individuals place on clean drinking water or swimming  
2 facilities.

3  
4 Below we report on the relevant literature in two categories. First, we report on studies that have  
5 looked at the non-market value of specific ecosystems or species. Since only a few of these  
6 studies attempt to value the impacts of climate change on ecosystems, we also highlight some  
7 non-market studies from the more general literature on ecosystem valuation, which can provide  
8 insights into the magnitude of potential values of services that might be vulnerable to climate  
9 change. Next we look at a different approach to valuation of ecosystems—a more “top-down”  
10 approach—which has been adopted both to look at the effects of climate change and more  
11 broadly at the total value of ecosystems. As the discussions indicate, the treatment of climate  
12 change, *per se* has been very sparse. Moreover, the lack of studies reflects, in part, a need to  
13 develop analytical linkages between the physical effects of climate on ecosystems, the services  
14 valued by humans, and appropriate techniques to value changes of the types, and with the  
15 breadth, indicated by studies of the effects of global change on ecosystems.

#### 16 4.3.5.2 Valuation of the Effects of Climate Change on Selected Ecosystem and Species

17 Although climate change appears in a number of studies, it is often as a context for the scenario  
18 presented in the study for valuation, and so the study cannot be interpreted as valuation of  
19 climate change or climate effects *per se*. Only a few studies can be said to value the economic  
20 impacts of climate change on a particular ecosystem.

21  
22 Two studies, Layton and Brown (2000) and Layton and Levine (2003) estimate total values for  
23 preventing Colorado (Rocky Mountain) forest loss due to climate change, based on data from the  
24 same stated choice or preference survey. The survey was conducted with Denver-area residents,  
25 who were expected to be familiar with forested regions in their nearby mountains. Respondents  
26 were given detailed information about climate change impacts on these forests, including  
27 changes in tree line elevation over both 60-year and 150- year time horizons, and asked to make  
28 choices between alternatives, allowing recovery of implied willingness to pay (WTP). Layton  
29 and Brown (2000) found WTP in the range of \$10 to \$100 per month, per respondent, to prevent  
30 forest loss, with the range depending, in part, on the amount of forest lost. Layton and Levine  
31 (2003) reanalyzed the same data set, using a different approach that focuses on understanding  
32 respondents’ least preferred, as well as most preferred, choices. They found that respondents’  
33 value of forest protection depends also on the time horizon—preventing effects that occur further  
34 into the future are valued less than nearer term effects.

35  
36 Kinnell *et al.* (2002) designed and implemented several versions of stated preference studies that  
37 explored the impacts of wild bird (duck) loss due to either adverse agricultural practices, climate  
38 change, or both. The respondents consisted of Pennsylvania duck hunters, although the  
39 hypothetical ecosystem impacts occurred in the Prairie Pothole region, which is in the northern  
40 Midwestern states and parts of Canada. The authors considered a hypothetical loss in duck  
41 populations, with a scenario that presented some respondents with a 30 percent loss, and other  
42 with a 74 percent loss, some with a 40 year time horizon, and others with a 100 year time  
43 horizon. The study cannot be viewed as an estimate of willingness to pay to avoid climate  
44 change; however, it is interesting because it suggests that recreational enthusiasts are willing to  
45 pay for ecosystem impacts that they do not necessarily expect to use. In addition, the study



1 provides evidence that the context of climate change or other cause of ecosystem harm (in this  
2 case agricultural practices)—irrespective of the level of harm—may affect respondents’  
3 valuation of the harm.

4  
5 Although very few studies have valued climate change impacts on ecosystems, economists have  
6 conducted numerous studies (primarily using direct valuation methods) of ecosystem values in  
7 particular geographic locations, often focusing on charismatic species, or specific types of  
8 ecosystems, such as wetlands, in a particular location. In some cases, the estimated values are  
9 linked to specific services that the species or ecosystem provide, but in many the services  
10 provided are somewhat ambiguous, and it is not always clear what aspect of the species, habitat,  
11 or ecosystem is driving the individual respondent’s economic valuation.

12  
13 A number of studies indicate that people value the protection of species or ecosystems. Some of  
14 these studies find potentially significant species values, ranging from a few dollars to hundreds  
15 of dollars per year, per person. For example, MacMillan *et al.* (2001) estimate the value of  
16 restoring woodlands habitat, and separately evaluate the reintroduction of the wolf and the  
17 beaver to Scottish highlands. In the United States, species such as salmon and spotted owls, as  
18 well as their habitat, have been examined in connection to their respective controversies.

19  
20 Studies have also looked at the value of ecosystems or changes in ecosystems. In the former  
21 case, economists use either the value of productive output (harvest) as an indicator of value, or  
22 respondents value protecting the ecosystem. For example, numerous coastal wetland and beach  
23 protection studies have used a variety of non-market valuation approaches. A survey of a number  
24 of these studies reports values ranging from \$198 to approximately \$1500 per acre (Woodward  
25 and Wui, 2001).

26  
27 Some studies have looked explicitly at the services provided by ecosystems. For example,  
28 Loomis *et al.* (2000) consider restoration of several ecosystem services (dilution of wastewater,  
29 purification, erosion control, as fish and wildlife habitat, and recreation) for a 45-mile section of  
30 the Platte River, which runs east from the State of Colorado into western Nebraska. Average  
31 values are about \$21 per month for these additional ecosystem services for the in-person  
32 interviewees. While these studies and their values are generally informative, transferring values  
33 from studies like the ones above to other ecosystems, and using the results to estimate values  
34 associated with climate change impacts, can be problematic.

#### 35 4.3.4.3 Top-down Approaches to Valuing the Effects of Climate Change and Ecosystem 36 Services

37 From the perspective of deriving values for ecosystem changes (or changes in ecosystem  
38 services) associated with climatic changes, one difficulty with the above studies is that the focus  
39 is on discrete changes to particular species or geographic areas. It is therefore difficult to know  
40 how these studies relate to, or shed light on, the types of widespread and far-reaching changes to  
41 ecosystems (and the services they provide) that will result from climate change. Consequently,  
42 some studies have attempted to value ecosystems in a more aggregate or holistic manner. While  
43 these studies do not focus specifically on the US, they are indicative of an alternative approach  
44 that recognizes the interdependence of ecosystems and their components, and therefore deserve  
45 some discussion.

1  
2 Several models include values for non-market damages, worldwide, resulting from projected  
3 climate change. These impact studies have been conducted at a highly aggregated level; most of  
4 the models are calibrated using studies of the U.S. which are then scaled for application to other  
5 regions (Warren *et al.*, 2006).

6  
7 A study of total ecosystem values, but not undertaken in the context of climate change, is the  
8 highly publicized study by Costanza *et al.* (1997), which offers a controversial look at valuing  
9 the “entire biosphere.” Because their reported estimated average value of \$33 trillion per year  
10 exceeds the global gross national product, economists have a difficult time reconciling this  
11 estimate with the concept of economic value (WTP); since WTP cannot equal twice income.  
12 Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1996) and Pimental *et al.* (1997) are studies by natural scientists that have  
13 attempted to value ecosystems or in the case of the latter, biodiversity. These are important  
14 attempts to indicate the value of ecosystems, but the accuracy and reliability of the values are  
15 questionable. To paraphrase a study by several prominent environmental economists that is  
16 slightly critical of all of these studies, economists do not have any fundamental difference of  
17 opinion with these natural scientists about the importance of ecosystems and biodiversity, rather  
18 it is with the correct use of economic value concepts in these applications (see Bockstael *et al.*,  
19 2000).

#### 20 **4.3.5 Recreational Activities and Opportunities**

21 Ecosystems provide humans with a range of services, including outdoor recreational  
22 opportunities. In turn, outdoor recreation contributes to individual wellbeing by providing  
23 physical and psychological health benefits. In addition, tourism is one of the largest economic  
24 sectors in the world, and it is also one of the fastest growing (Hamilton and Tol, 2004); the jobs  
25 created by recreational tourism provide economic benefits not only to individuals but also to  
26 communities.<sup>26</sup> A number of studies have looked at the qualitative effects of climate change on  
27 recreational opportunities (i.e., resources available) and activities in the US, but only a few have  
28 taken this literature the additional step of estimating the implications of climate change for  
29 visitation days or economic welfare. This section describes the results of this research into the  
30 impacts on several forms of recreation and reports the economic benefits and losses associated  
31 with these changes at the national level.

32  
33 Slightly more than 90% of the U.S. population participates in some form of outdoor recreation,  
34 representing nearly 270 million participants (Cordell *et al.*, 1999), and several billion days spent  
35 each year in a wide variety of outdoor recreation activities. According to Cordell *et al.* (1999),  
36 the number of *people* participating in outdoor recreation is highest for walking (67%), visiting a  
37 beach or lakeshore or river (62%), sightseeing (56%), swimming (54%) and picnicking (49%).  
38 Most *days* are spent in activities such as walking, biking, sightseeing, bird-watching, and wildlife  
39 viewing (Cordell *et al.*, 1999), because of the high number of days per bicycle rider and bird  
40 watcher, but the range of outdoor recreation activities in the United States is as diverse as its  
41 people and environment. While camping, hunting, backpacking and horseback riding attract a  
42 fraction of the people who go biking or bird-watching, these other specialized activities provide a  
43 very high value to their devotees. Many of these devotees of specialized outdoor recreation

---

<sup>26</sup> Effects on jobs, income, and similar metrics are considered market impacts, and are not discussed here.

1 activities are people who “work to live,” i.e., specialized weekend recreation is one of their  
2 rewards for the 40+ hour workweek.

3  
4 Climate change resulting from increasing average temperatures as well as changes in  
5 precipitation, weather variability (including more extreme weather events), and sea level rise, has  
6 the potential to affect recreation and tourism along two pathways. Figure 4.3 illustrates these  
7 direct and indirect effects of climate change on recreation. Since much recreation and tourism  
8 occurs out of doors, increased temperature and precipitation have a direct effect on the  
9 enjoyment of these activities, and on the desired number of visitor days and associated level of  
10 visitor spending (as well as tourism employment). Weather conditions are considered one of the  
11 four greatest factors influencing tourism visitation (Pileus Project, 2007). In addition, much  
12 outdoor recreation and tourism depends on the availability and quality of natural resources (Wall,  
13 1998), Consequently, climate change can also indirectly affect the outdoor recreational  
14 experience by affecting the quality and availability of natural resources (and, thus, the  
15 availability and quality of recreational experience) used for recreation such as beaches, forests,  
16 wetlands, snow, and wildlife.

17  
18 **Figure 4.3.** Direct and Indirect Effects of Climate Change on Recreation

19  
20 Effects of climate change can be both positive and negative. The length of season for and  
21 desirability of several of the most popular activities—walking, visiting a beach, lakeshore, or  
22 river, sightseeing, swimming, and picnicking (Cordell *et al.*, 1999)—will likely be enhanced by  
23 small near- term increases in temperature. However, long-term higher increases in temperature  
24 may eventually have adverse effects on activities like walking, and result in sufficient sea level  
25 rise to reduce publicly accessible beach areas, just at the time when demand for beach recreation  
26 to escape the heat is increasing. In contrast, some activities are likely to be unambiguously  
27 harmed by even small increase in global warming, such as snow and ice-dependent activities.

28  
29 In some ways, one can interpret the direct effects of climate change as influencing the demand  
30 for recreation and the indirect effects as influencing the supply of recreation opportunities. For  
31 example, warmer temperatures make whitewater boating more desirable. However, the warmer  
32 temperatures may reduce river flows since there is less snowpack, higher evapotranspiration, and  
33 greater water diversions for irrigated agriculture. Some studies cited below look only at the direct  
34 effects, while others represent the combined effect of the direct and indirect pathways.

35  
36 **Direct effects.** To date, most studies of the direct effects of climate change on recreation and  
37 tourism have been qualitative, although a few have been quantitative. Qualitatively, we would  
38 expect both positive and negative effects of climate change on different recreational activities.  
39 Many of the qualitative studies rely simply on intuition to suggest that increases in air and water  
40 temperatures will have a positive effect on outdoor recreation visitation in two ways: (a) more  
41 enjoyment from the activity; (b) a longer season in which to enjoy the activity (DeFreitas, 2005;  
42 Scott and Jones, 2005; Scott, Jones and Konopek (2007). Hall and Highman (2005) note that  
43 climate change may provide more days of “ideal” temperatures for water- based recreation  
44 activities and some land based recreation activities such as camping, picnicking and golf.

45  
46 The recreational activities most obviously harmed by warmer climate are sports that require  
47 snow or cold temperatures, such as downhill and cross country skiing, snowmobiling, ice fishing,

1 and snowshoeing. Reductions in visitor use (see, for example, the studies reported in Table 4.5)  
 2 occur primarily from shorter season, particularly early in the year at such traditional times as  
 3 Thanksgiving and Spring break. But with warmer temperatures, there is also less precipitation as  
 4 snow and more as rain on snow, which contributes to a much shallower snowpack and harder  
 5 snow. Further, recreating in freezing rain or slushy temperatures is not a pleasant experience,  
 6 reducing benefits from skiing, snowshoeing, and snowmobiling, further reducing use.

7  
 8 Some recreation areas that are already hot during the summer recreation season will see  
 9 decreases in use. For example, the Death Valley National Park, Joshua Tree National Park, and  
 10 Mesa Verde National Park are all projected to be “intolerably hot” reducing visitation (Saunders  
 11 and Easley, 2006).

12  
 13 Most quantitative studies of the effects of climate change on recreation evaluate specific  
 14 projected changes in temperature and/or precipitation, such as a 2.5°C increase in temperature  
 15 over the next fifty years. Two quantitative studies look at effects of temperature change in  
 16 Canadian recreation.<sup>27</sup> Scott and Jones (2005) project that the golf season in Banff, Canada could  
 17 be extended by at least one week and up to eight weeks. The combined effect of warmer  
 18 temperatures lengthening the golfing season, and the increasing the desirability of golfing during  
 19 the existing season, together result in an increase in the rounds of golf played by between 50%  
 20 and 86%. (Similar increases might be expected for golf in northern states of the U.S. such as  
 21 Minnesota, Wisconsin, New York, etc. with longer golf seasons.) Scott, *et al.* (2006) and Scott  
 22 and Jones (2005) suggest that some of the previously projected large (30% to 50%) reductions in  
 23 length of ski seasons at northern ski areas (e.g., in Canada, Michigan, and Vermont) can be  
 24 reduced (to 5% to 25%) through the use of advanced snowmaking. While use of advanced  
 25 snowmaking to minimize reductions in ski season seems plausible for the studied northern ski  
 26 areas, it is doubtful that snowmaking would benefit ski areas in California, New Mexico, Oregon  
 27 and West Virginia where the Thanksgiving and “Spring Break” periods are already too warm for  
 28 successful snowmaking or retention of snow made in some years.

29  
 30 Some studies have used natural variations in temperature to evaluate the effects of climate on  
 31 recreation (including measures on monthly, seasonal and inter-annual variation). Two of these  
 32 have found that while visitation increases with initial increases in temperature, visitation actually  
 33 decreases as temperature increases even further (Hamilton and Tol, 2004; Loomis and  
 34 Richardson, 2006). Two of the quantitative studies, which look not only at visitor days but also  
 35 at monetary measures of economic welfare, are discussed in more detail below, following the  
 36 discussion of indirect effects.

37  
 38 **Indirect effects.** While increased temperature may increase the demand for some outdoor  
 39 recreation activities, in some cases climate change may reduce the supply of natural resources on  
 40 which those recreational activities depend. As noted above, reduced snowpack for winter  
 41 activities has been projected in the Great Lakes (Scott *et al.*, 2005), in northern Arizona (Bark-

---

<sup>27</sup> Scott and Jones (2005) used +1C to +5C in their scenarios and Scott *et al.* (2006) used +1.5C to +3C in their low impact scenario and +2C to +8C in their high impact scenario.

1 Hodgins and Colby, 2006) and at a representative set of ski areas in the U.S. (Loomis and Crespi,  
2 1999).<sup>28</sup>

3  
4 For example, lower in-stream flows and lower reservoir levels have consistently been shown to  
5 reduce recreation use and benefits (Shaw, 2005). Thus, changes associated with climate can  
6 reduce opportunities for summer boating and other water sports. When less precipitation falls as  
7 snow in the winter, and more falls as rain in the spring, early spring season run-off will increase.  
8 Summer river flows will be correspondingly lower, at times when demand for whitewater  
9 boating is higher. Human responses to the physical changes associated with climate change may  
10 exacerbate natural effects reducing recreational opportunities. For example, many current  
11 reservoirs are not designed to handle huge spring inflows, and thus this water may be “spilled,”  
12 which lowers reservoir levels during the summer season. These lower reservoir levels are then  
13 drawn down more rapidly as higher temperatures increase evapotranspiration and increase  
14 irrigation releases. In turn, the resulting lower reservoir may leave boat docks, marinas, and boat  
15 ramps inaccessible.

16  
17 Ecosystems that provide recreational benefits may also be at risk from climate change. Wetlands  
18 are another recreational environment that is at risk from climate change. Wetland based  
19 recreation include wildlife viewing and waterfowl hunting. With sea level rise, many existing  
20 coastal wetlands will be lost, and given existing development inland, these lost wetlands may not  
21 be naturally replaced (Wall, 1998). The higher temperatures and reduced water availability is  
22 also expected to adversely affect freshwater wetlands in the interior of the country. As such  
23 waterfowl hunting and wildlife viewing may be adversely affected.

24  
25 Higher water temperatures and lower stream flows are projected to reduce coldwater trout  
26 fisheries (U.S. E.P.A., 1995; Ahn, *et al.* 2000) as well as native and hatchery stocks of Chinook  
27 salmon in the Pacific Northwest (Anderson, *et al.* 1993). Given trout and Chinook salmon  
28 sensitivity to warm water temperatures, these affects are not surprising. However, Anderson *et*  
29 *al*'s estimated magnitude of 50% to 100% reduction in Chinook spawning returns is quite large.  
30 Reductions of such magnitude will have a substantial adverse effect on recreational salmon catch  
31 rates, and possibly whether recreational fishing would even be allowed to continue in some areas  
32 of the Pacific Northwest. However, from a national viewpoint, fishing participation for trout,  
33 cool water species and warm water species dominates geographically specialized fishing like  
34 Chinook salmon. Warmer water temperatures are projected to eliminate stream trout fishing in 8-  
35 10 states and result in a 50% reduction in coldwater stream habitat in another 11-16 states  
36 depending on the GCM model used (U.S. E.P.A., 1995). This could adversely affect up to 25%  
37 of U.S. fishing days (Vaughan and Russell, 1982). This 25% loss may be an upper limit as some  
38 coldwater stream anglers may substitute to less affected coldwater lakes/reservoirs or switch to  
39 cool/warm-water species such as bass (U.S. E.P.A., 1995). Studies that better account for  
40 substitution effects, such as Ahn *et al.* (2000), indicate a 2-20% drop in benefits of trout fishing  
41 depending on the projected degrees of temperature increase which ranged from 1°C to 5°C.

---

<sup>28</sup> Higher temperatures (while they increase snowmelt reducing the snow skiing season) may have two subtle effects: (a) stimulating demand for snow skiing due to warmer temperatures, for those skiers who prefer “spring skiing” due to the warmer temperatures even if the snow conditions are less than ideal; and (b) reduced snowmelt opens up the high mountains for hiking, backpacking and mountain biking activities somewhat earlier than is the case now, which may lead to increases in those visitor use days.

1  
2 Sea level rise reducing beach area and beach erosion are concerns with climate change that may  
3 make it difficult to accommodate the increased demand for beach recreation (Yohe *et al.*, 1999).  
4 In the near term, recreational forests may also be adversely affected by climate change. Although  
5 forests may slowly migrate northward and into higher elevations, in the short run there may be  
6 dieback of forests at the current forest edges (as these areas become too hot), resulting in a loss  
7 of forests for recreation. In the long term, however, several analyses suggest forest species  
8 composition and migration due as well as net increases in forest area due to carbon dioxide  
9 fertilization (Joyce, *et al.* 2001; Iverson and Matthews, 2007). Thus, eventually there may be a  
10 resurgence in forest recreation.

11  
12 Saunders and Easley (2006) find that natural resources of many western National Parks,  
13 National Recreation Areas, and National Monuments resources will be adversely affected by  
14 climate change. The most common adverse effects are reductions in some wildlife species, loss  
15 of coldwater fishing opportunities and increasing park closures due to wildfire associated with  
16 stressed and dying forest stands. The text box discusses in more detail potential effects of climate  
17 change on one park: Rocky Mountain National Park, which has been the subject of both  
18 ecological and economic analysis.

#### 19 4.3.5.1 Economic Studies of Effects of Climate on Recreation

20 Changes in economic welfare due to the effects of climate change on non-market resources, such  
21 as recreation, can be evaluated in several ways. First, since decisions regarding recreational  
22 activities depend on both direct and indirect effects of climate, changes in human well-being (as  
23 a result of these changes) will be reflected in changes in visitor use. Social scientists believe  
24 changes in visitor use are motivated by people “voting with their feet” to maintain or improve  
25 their well-being. In the face of higher temperatures, people may seek relief, for example, by  
26 visiting the beach or water skiing at reservoirs more frequently to cool down. Similarly, reduced  
27 opportunities for recreation due to indirect effects of climate change will also be reflected in  
28 reduced visitation days. Thus, one metric of effects on human well-being is the change in  
29 visitation days.

30  
31 Second, recreational trips—for example, to reservoirs and beaches—have economic implications  
32 to the visitor and the economy. Visitors allocate more of their scarce time and household budgets  
33 to the recreational activities that are now more preferred in a warmer climate. This reflects their  
34 “willingness to pay” for these recreational activities, which is a monetary measure of the benefits  
35 they receive from the activity. Numerous economic studies provide estimates of the value of  
36 changes in diverse recreational activities, using various economic techniques (such as travel  
37 cost<sup>29</sup> analysis and stated preference methods) (see Section 3 of this chapter and the chapter  
38 Appendix for more information). While these studies typically do not focus directly on climate  
39 change, they can be used to extract values for the types of changes that are projected to be  
40 associated with climate change.

41  

---

<sup>29</sup> The travel cost method traces out a demand curve for recreation using travel cost as proxies for the price of recreation, along with the corresponding number of trips individual visitors take at these travel costs. From the demand curve, the net willingness to pay or consumer surplus is calculated.

1 Third, some people who do not currently visit unique natural environments may value climate  
 2 stabilization policies that preserve these natural environments for future visitation. These people  
 3 have what economists call a value for preserving their option—their ability—to visit the  
 4 environments in the future (Bishop, 1982). This option value is much like purchasing trip  
 5 insurance to guarantee that if one wanted to go in the future, that conditions would be as they are  
 6 today.

7  
 8 As discussed below, economists have available a number of well-studied and techniques to  
 9 evaluate the impacts of climate change on at least some of the recreational service provided by  
 10 ecosystems. However, only a few studies have looked explicitly at the effects of climate change  
 11 on recreation in the US. More research is needed to understand the linkages between weather  
 12 and recreation, and to extrapolate results to the range of recreational activities throughout the US.  
 13

14 **Change in visitation days.** Two studies (Loomis and Crespi, 1999; Mendelsohn and Markowski  
 15 1999) have examined the effects of climate on recreational opportunities comprehensively for the  
 16 entire US. These studies both examined the effects of 2.5°C and 5°C increases in temperature,  
 17 along with a 7% increase in precipitation. The studies used similar methodologies to estimate  
 18 visitor days for a range of recreational opportunities. Each study looked at slightly different  
 19 effects, but between them examined a mix of direct and indirect climate effects, including direct  
 20 effects of higher temperatures on golf and beach recreation visitor days, and indirect effects of  
 21 snow cover on skiing. Both studies estimate changes in visitation days due to climate change,  
 22 and then use the results of a number of economic valuation studies to place monetary values on  
 23 the visitation days. The studies find that, as expected, near-term climate change will increase  
 24 participation in activities such as water-based recreation, and reduce participation in snow sports.  
 25

26 Table 4.5 presents the results of the two studies. The results suggest that relatively high  
 27 participation recreation activities such as beach and stream recreation gain, and low participation  
 28 activities like snow skiing lose. Although the percentage drop in visitor days of snow sports is  
 29 much larger than the percentage increase in visitor days in water-based recreation, the larger  
 30 number of water-based sports participants more than offsets the loss in the low participation  
 31 snow sports. Thus, on net, there is an overall net gain in visitation associated with the assumed  
 32 increases of 2.5°C in temperature and 7% in precipitation.<sup>30</sup>  
 33

34 The methods used to forecast visitation were slightly different between the two studies. To  
 35 estimate visitor days for all recreation activities, Mendelsohn and Markowski regressed state  
 36 level data on visitation by recreation activity as a function of land area, water area, population,  
 37 monthly temperature and monthly precipitation. The Loomis and Crespi study used a similar  
 38 approach to Mendelsohn and Markowski for some activities, such as golf. Other forecasting  
 39 techniques were used for other activities; for example, for beach recreation, they used detailed  
 40 data on to individual beaches in the Northeastern, Southern and Western U.S. to estimate three

---

<sup>30</sup> Geographic regions within the U.S. will experience different gains and losses. Currently hot areas with less access to water resources (e.g., New Mexico) may suffer net overall reductions in recreation use to due higher heat that makes walking, sightseeing, and picnicking less desirable. States with substantial water resources (lakes, seashores) may gain visitor days and tourism. Currently cold areas such as the Dakotas and New York may see increases in some recreation due to longer summer seasons.

1 regional regression equations to project beach use, and the response of reservoir recreation to  
 2 climate change was analyzed using visitation at U.S. Army Corps of Engineers reservoirs.

3  
 4 For some of the recreational activities, the Loomis and Crespi study included indirect, as well as  
 5 direct, effects. For example, the reservoir models incorporated climate-induced reductions in  
 6 reservoir surface area besides temperature and precipitation. Similarly, the estimate of visitor  
 7 days for snowskiing used projected changes in the number of days of minimum snow cover to  
 8 adjust skier days proportionally. In some cases, only indirect (supply) effects were included, as  
 9 in the case of stream recreation, water fowl hunting, bird viewing and forest recreation. Since  
 10 these estimates do not include changes in visitation associated with direct effects of climate we  
 11 have less confidence in the accuracy of these results, than we do for reservoir recreation which  
 12 takes into account both demand and supply effects on recreation use.

13  
 14 **Valuation of gains and losses in visitor days.** Since different activities may have different  
 15 levels of enjoyment provided to the visitor (and, therefore, different economic values), adding up  
 16 changes in visitation days to produce a “net change” is not an accurate representation of the  
 17 overall change in well-being. The two studies discussed above used net willingness to pay as a  
 18 measure of value of each day of recreation (Section 3 of this chapter provides a discussion of the  
 19 concept of willingness to pay as a common economic measure of changes in welfare).

20  
 21 To date there have been few original or primary valuation studies of climate change per se on  
 22 recreation; the case study on Rocky Mountain National Park presented below provides one of the  
 23 few examples. Other studies include Scott and Jones (2005), which focused on Banff National  
 24 Park, Scott *et al.* (2006), which looked at snow skiing, Scott, *et al.* (2007), which focused on  
 25 Waterton National Parks, and Pendleton and Mendelsohn (1998), which estimated values for  
 26 fishing in the northeastern US.<sup>31</sup> There have, however, been hundreds of recreation valuation  
 27 studies; the values from these studies (generally travel cost or stated preference) can be applied  
 28 to other applications using a “benefit transfer” approach, and applying average values of  
 29 recreation from previous studies to value their respective visitor days.

30  
 31 Loomis and Crespi (1999) and Mendelsohn and Markowski (1999) estimate the overall net gain  
 32 in visitor benefits, using the change in visitor days reported in Table 4.5 and estimated values of  
 33 a visitation day reported in the literature. Loomis and Crespi (1999) adopt a disaggregated  
 34 activity approach, and Mendelsohn and Markowski (1999) apply a state level approach.<sup>32</sup> Both  
 35 of these studies find that temperature increases of 5°C and up result in increased benefits.  
 36 However, as noted below, the case study of Rocky Mountain National Park suggests that extreme  
 37 heat is likely (based on the model results) to cause these visitor benefits to decrease at some  
 38 point.

---

<sup>31</sup> The three papers by Scott are discussed elsewhere in this paper. Pendleton and Mendelsohn use a random utility model of recreational fishing in the northeastern U.S. They find that, while catch rates of rainbow trout would decrease, catch rates of other trout and pan fish would increase. On net, recreational fishing benefits (under a climate scenario associated with a doubling of atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations) are reduced in the state of New York, but there are offsetting gains in more northern states like Maine.

<sup>32</sup> As noted above, Mendelsohn and Markowski (1999) used state level regression modeling to estimate effects on all activities. In contrast, Loomis and Crespi (1999), used different regression models and different geographic scales for different recreation activities to take advantage of the more micro-level datasets available for beach and reservoir recreation.



1  
2 Visitors are somewhat adaptable to climate change in the recreation activities they choose and  
3 when they choose them. Thus, recreation represents one situation with opportunities to reduce  
4 the adverse impacts of climate change, or increase its benefits, via adaptation. As noted by  
5 Hamilton and Tol (2004), warmer temperatures may shift visitors northward, and up into the  
6 mountains. Thus currently cool areas (e.g. Maine, Minnesota, Washington) may gain, and warm  
7 areas (e.g., Florida, Arizona) may lose, tourism.

8  
9 Some adaptive responses can be expensive, and may be of limited effectiveness; such as  
10 snowmaking at night, which is often mentioned as an adaptation for downhill skiing (Irland *et*  
11 *al.*, 2001). Other adaptive behavior may include moving some outdoor recreation activities  
12 indoors. For example, bouldering is now taking place in climbing gyms on artificial climbing  
13 walls. Running on a treadmill in an air conditioned gym may be a substitute for running out of  
14 doors for some people, but casual observation suggests that many people prefer to run out doors  
15 when weather permits. Unless preferences adjust to increased temperatures, there may be a loss  
16 in human well-being from substituting the treadmill in the air conditioned gym for the out of  
17 doors. Box 4.2 summarizes a case study of the impacts of climate change on Rocky Mountain  
18 National Park.

### 19 **4.3.6 Amenity Value of Climate**

20 It is well established that preferences for climate affect where people choose to live and work.  
21 The desire to live in a mild, sunny climate may reflect health considerations. For example,  
22 people with chronic obstructive lung disease or angina may wish to avoid cold winters. Warmer  
23 climates may be more pleasant for persons with arthritis. Climate preferences may also reflect  
24 the desire to reduce heating and/or cooling costs. Certain climates may be complementary to  
25 leisure activities. For example, skiers may wish to live in colder climates, sunbathers in warmer  
26 ones. Or a particular climate may simply make life more enjoyable in the course of everyday life.  
27 We would also expect based on the evidence that, in addition to preferring certain temperatures  
28 and more sunshine, people would prefer to reduce the risk of experiencing abrupt climate events  
29 such as hurricanes and floods.

30  
31 While climate itself is not bought and sold in markets, the goods that are integral to location  
32 decisions—such as housing and jobs—are market goods. Consequently, economists look at  
33 behavior with regard to location choice (the prices that are paid for houses and the wages that are  
34 accepted for jobs) in order to determine how large a role climate plays in these decisions and,  
35 therefore, how valuable different climates are to the general public. The remainder of this section  
36 discusses methods that have been used to estimate the amenity values people attach to various  
37 climate attributes, as well as the value they attach to avoiding extreme weather events.

38 Unfortunately, few studies have rigorously estimated climate amenity values (e.g., the value of a  
39 2°C change in mean January temperature) for the U.S. and then used these values to estimate the  
40 dollar value of various climate scenarios.

#### 41 **4.3.6.1 Valuing Climate Amenities**

42 People's preferences for climate attributes should be reflected in their location decisions. Other  
43 things equal, homeowners should be willing to pay more for housing (and so bid up housing  
44 prices) in more desirable climates, and so property values should be higher in those climates.

1 Similarly, workers should be willing to accept lower wages to live in more pleasant climates; if  
 2 climate also affects firms' costs, however, actual wages may rise or fall due to the interaction  
 3 between firms and workers (Roback, 1982).

4  
 5 Early attempts to estimate how much consumers will pay for more desirable climates start from  
 6 the view that a good—such as housing or a job—is a bundle of attributes that are valued by the  
 7 homeowner or worker. The price the consumer pays for the good (such as a house) is actually a  
 8 composite of the prices that are implicitly paid for all the attributes of the good. Using a  
 9 statistical technique (known as a hedonic value function), economists can estimate the price of a  
 10 particular attribute, such as climate. The hedonic property value function, thus, describes how  
 11 housing prices vary across cities as a function of housing characteristics and locational amenities,  
 12 such as climate, crime, air quality, or proximity to the ocean. Similarly, the hedonic wage  
 13 function relates the observed wages to job characteristics (such as occupation and industry),  
 14 worker characteristics (such as education and years of experience), and locational amenities.

15  
 16 The value of locational amenities—i.e., how much individuals are willing to pay for amenities—  
 17 can be inferred from these estimated hedonic wage and property value functions. Extracting this  
 18 value, however, assumes that workers and homeowners are mobile, i.e., that they can choose  
 19 where to live fairly freely within the U.S. Similarly, it assumes that, in general, individuals have  
 20 moved to where they would like to live (at the moment), so that housing and job markets are in  
 21 what is said to be “equilibrium.” It also assumes that workers and homeowners have good  
 22 information about the location to which they are moving, and that sufficient options (in terms of  
 23 jobs and houses and amenities) are available to them. The estimates of the value of a particular  
 24 amenity—such as climate—will be more accurate the more nearly these assumptions are met.

25  
 26 A number of hedonic wage and property value studies have included climate, among other  
 27 variables, in their analyses: by Hoch and Drake (1974); Cropper and Arriaga-Salinas (1980);  
 28 Cropper (1981); Roback (1982); Smith (1983); Blomquist *et al.* (1988); Gyourko and Tracy  
 29 (1991). The first four studies estimate only hedonic wage functions, while the last three estimate  
 30 both wage and property value equations. As Moore (1998) and Gyourko and Tracy (1991) note,  
 31 this literature suggests that climate amenities are reflected to a greater extent in wages than in  
 32 property values.<sup>33</sup> Roback (1982), Smith (1983), and Blomquist *et al.* (1988) all find sunshine to  
 33 be capitalized in wages as an amenity, while heating degree days are capitalized as a disamenity  
 34 (Roback, 1982, 1988; Gyourko and Tracy, 1991).

35  
 36 More recent studies using the hedonic approach include Moore (1998) and Mendelsohn (2001),  
 37 who use their results to estimate the value of mean temperature changes in the U.S. associated  
 38 with future climate scenarios. Moore uses aggregate wage data for Metropolitan Statistical Areas  
 39 (MSAs) to estimate the responsiveness of wages with respect to climate variables for various  
 40 occupations. Climate is captured by annual temperature, precipitation and by the difference  
 41 between average July and average January temperature. Moore estimates that a 4.5° C increase in

---

<sup>33</sup> The effect of weather variables on property values is mixed, with Blomquist *et al.* (1988) finding property values to be negatively correlated with precipitation, humidity and heating and cooling degree days, but Roback (1982) finding property values positively correlated with heating degree days. Gyourko and Tracy (1991) find heating and cooling degree days negatively correlated with housing expenditures, but humidity positively correlated.

1 mean annual temperature would be worth between \$30 and \$100 billion (1987\$) assuming that  
 2 precipitation and seasonal variation in temperature remain unchanged.

3  
 4 Mendelsohn (2001) uses county-level data on wages and rents to estimate hedonic wage and  
 5 property value models. Separate equations are estimated for wages in retail, wholesale, service  
 6 and manufacturing jobs. Climate variables, which include average January, April, June and  
 7 October temperature and precipitation, enter each equation in quadratic form. Warmer  
 8 temperatures are generally associated with lower wages and lower rents, although the former  
 9 effect is larger in magnitude. Mendelsohn uses the results of these models to estimate the impact  
 10 of a uniform increase in temperature of 1° C, 2° C and 3.5° C, paired, alternately with an 8% and a  
 11 15% increase in precipitation. The results suggest that warming produces positive benefits in  
 12 every scenario except the 3.5° C temperature change. Averaging across estimates produced by the  
 13 3 models for each of the 6 scenarios suggests annual net benefits (in 1987\$) of \$25 billion.

14  
 15 Unfortunately, hedonic wage and property value studies have limitations that have caused them  
 16 to be replaced by alternate approaches to analyzing data on location choices. One drawback of  
 17 the hedonic approach is that, as mentioned above, it assumes that national labor and housing  
 18 markets exist and are in equilibrium. As Graves and Mueser (1993) and Greenwood *et al.* (1991)  
 19 point out, if national markets are not in equilibrium, inferring the value of climate amenities from  
 20 hedonic wage and property value studies can lead to badly biased results. A second problem is  
 21 that variables that are correlated with climate (e.g., the availability of recreational facilities) may  
 22 be difficult to measure; hence, climate variables may pick up their effects. In hedonic property  
 23 value studies, for example, the use of heating and cooling degree days to measure climate  
 24 amenities is problematic because their coefficients may capture differences in construction and  
 25 energy costs as well as climate amenities per se. A related problem in hedonic wage equations is  
 26 that more able workers may locate in areas with more desirable climates. If ability is not  
 27 adequately captured in the hedonic wage equation, the coefficients of climate amenities will  
 28 reflect worker ability as well as the value of climate.

29  
 30 Cragg and Kahn (1997) were the first to relax the national land and labor market equilibrium  
 31 assumption by estimating a discrete location choice model. Using Census data, they model the  
 32 location decisions of people in the U.S. who moved between 1975 and 1980. Movers compare  
 33 the utility they would receive from living in different states—which depends on the wage they  
 34 would earn and on the cost of housing, as well as on climate amenities—and are assumed to  
 35 choose the state that yields the highest utility. This allows Cragg and Kahn to estimate the  
 36 parameters of individuals' utility functions and thus infer the rate at which they will trade income  
 37 for climate amenities.

38  
 39 The drawback of this study is that it estimates the preferences of movers, who may differ from  
 40 the general population. An alternate approach (Bayer *et al.*, 2006; Bayer and Timmins, 2005) is  
 41 to acknowledge that moving is costly and to explain the location decisions of all households,  
 42 assuming that all households are in equilibrium, given moving costs. Unfortunately, the discrete  
 43 choice literature has yet to provide reliable estimates of the value of climate amenities in the U.S.

### 1 4.3.6.2 Valuing Hurricanes, Floods, and Extreme Weather Events

2 It is sometimes suggested that the value people place on avoiding extreme weather events can be  
 3 measured by the damages that such events cause, or by the premiums that people pay for flood or  
 4 disaster insurance. *Ex post* losses associated with extreme weather events represent a lower  
 5 bound to the value people place on avoiding these events, as long as people are risk averse. It is  
 6 also the case that people can purchase insurance only against the monetary losses associated with  
 7 floods and hurricanes; hence, insurance premiums will not capture the entire value placed on  
 8 avoiding these events.

9  
 10 The value of avoiding extreme weather events should be reflected in property values, assuming  
 11 that people are informed about risks: houses in an area with high probability of hurricane damage  
 12 should sell for less than comparable houses in an area with a lower chance of hurricane damage,  
 13 holding other amenities constant. To estimate the value of avoiding these events correctly is,  
 14 however, tricky; it can be difficult, for example, to disentangle hurricane risk (a negative effect)  
 15 from proximity to the coast (an amenity).

16  
 17 Recent studies use natural experiments to determine the value of avoiding hurricanes and floods.  
 18 Hallstrom and Smith (2005) use property value data before and after hurricane Andrew in Lee  
 19 County, Florida, a county that did not suffer damage from the hurricane, to determine the impact  
 20 of people's *perceptions* of hurricane risk on property values. They find that property values in  
 21 special flood hazard areas of Lee County declined by 19% after hurricane Andrew. The  
 22 magnitude of this decline is significant, and agrees with Bin and Polasky (2004). Bin and  
 23 Polasky find that housing values in a flood plain in North Carolina declined significantly after  
 24 hurricane Floyd, compared to houses not at risk. For the average house, the decline in price  
 25 exceeded the present value of premiums for flood insurance, suggesting that the latter are,  
 26 indeed, a lower bound to the value of avoiding floods.

## 27 **4.4 Conclusions**

28 The study of the impacts of climate change on human welfare, well-being, and quality of life, is  
 29 still developing. Many studies of impacts on particular sectors—such as health or agriculture—  
 30 discuss, and in some cases quantify, effects that have clear implications for welfare. Studies also  
 31 hint at changes that are perhaps less obvious, but also have welfare implications (such as changes  
 32 in outdoor activity levels and how much time is spent indoors) and point also to effects with far  
 33 more dramatic consequences (such as breakdown in public services and infrastructure associated  
 34 with possible extreme events of the magnitude of Katrina). Adaptation, too, has welfare  
 35 implications that studies do not always point out, such as the costs (financial and psychological)  
 36 to the individual of changing behavior.

37  
 38 To our knowledge, no study has made a systematic survey of the myriad welfare implications of  
 39 climate change, much less attempted to quantify—nor yet to aggregate—them. An almost  
 40 bewildering choice of typologies is available for categorizing effects on quality of life, well-  
 41 being, or human welfare. The social science and planning literatures provide not only a range of  
 42 typologies, but also an array of metrics that could be used to measure life quality.

43

1 This chapter explores one commonly used method: the social indicators approach. This approach  
 2 generally divides life quality effects into broad categories, such as economic conditions or  
 3 human health, and then identifies subcategories of important effects.

4  
 5 Most of the measures of well-being—including the social indicators approach—focus on  
 6 individual measures of well-being, although measured at the society level. There is, however,  
 7 another dimension to well-being—community welfare. Communities represent networks of  
 8 households, businesses, physical structures, and institutions and so reflect the interdependencies  
 9 and complex reality of human systems. Understanding how climate impacts communities, and  
 10 how communities are vulnerable—or can be made more resilient—in the face of climate change,  
 11 is an important component of understanding well-being and quality of life.

12  
 13 Economics offers one alternative to address the diversity of impacts: valuing welfare impacts in  
 14 monetary terms, which can then be summed. Estimating value, however, requires completing a  
 15 series of links—from projected climate change to quantitative measures of effects on  
 16 commodities, services, or conditions that are linked to well-being, and then valuing those effects  
 17 using economic techniques.

18  
 19 Regardless of the framework, estimating impacts on human well-being involves numerous and  
 20 diverse effects. This poses several critical difficulties:

- 21 • The large number of effects makes the task of linking impacts to climate change—  
 22 whether qualitatively or quantitatively—difficult.
- 23 • The interdependence of physical and human systems further complicates the process of  
 24 quantification—both for community effects, and also for ecosystems, raising doubts  
 25 about a piecemeal approach to estimation.
- 26 • The diversity of effects raises questions of how to aggregate effects in order to develop a  
 27 composite measure of well-being or other metrics that can be used for policy purposes.

## 28 **4.5 Expanding the Knowledge Base**

29 Despite the potential for impacts on human well-being, little research focuses directly on  
 30 understanding the relationship between well-being and climate change. Completely cataloging  
 31 the effects of global change on human well-being or welfare would be an immense undertaking,  
 32 and no well-accepted structure for doing so has been developed and applied. Moreover,  
 33 identifying the potentially lengthy list of climate-related changes in lifestyle, as well as in other,  
 34 more tangible, features of well-being (such as income), is itself a daunting task—and may  
 35 include changes that are not easily captured by objective measures of well-being or quality of  
 36 life.

37  
 38 This chapter has looked at the climate impacts and economics literature in four areas of welfare  
 39 effects—human health, ecosystems, recreation, and climate amenities. For each of the non-  
 40 market effects analyzed here, significant data gaps exist at each of the steps necessary to provide  
 41 monetized values of climate impacts. Although the economics literature for only a few areas of  
 42 effects is examined, it is probable that similar information gaps exist for the valuation of other  
 43 impacts of climate change, particularly those that involve non-market effects (see Table 4.1). In  
 44 addition, economic welfare—as with any other aggregative approach—does not adequately

1 address the question of how to deal with effects which may not be amenable to valuation or with  
 2 interdependencies among effects and systems.

3  
 4 Developing an understanding of the impacts of climate change on human welfare may require  
 5 taking the following steps:

- 6 • Develop a framework for addressing individual and community welfare and well-being,  
 7 including defining welfare/well-being for climate analysis and systematically  
 8 categorizing and identifying impacts on welfare/well-being
- 9 • Identify priority categories for data collection and research, in order to establish and  
 10 quantify the linkage from climate to welfare effects
- 11 • Decide which metrics should be used for these categories; more generally, which  
 12 components of welfare/well-being should be measured in natural or physical units, and  
 13 which should be monetized
- 14 • Investigate methods by which diverse metrics can be aggregated into a synthetic indicator  
 15 (e.g., vulnerability to climate change impacts, including drought, sea level rise, etc.), or at  
 16 least weighted and compared in policy decisions where aggregation is impossible
- 17 • Develop an approach for addressing those welfare effects that are difficult to look at in a  
 18 piecemeal way, such as welfare changes on communities or ecosystems.
- 19 • Identify appropriate top-down and bottom-up approaches for estimating impacts and  
 20 value (whether economic or otherwise) of the most critical welfare categories.
- 21 • Identify situations in which evaluation following the above steps is likely to be  
 22 prohibitively difficult, and determining alternative methods for approaching the topic of  
 23 the impact of global change on well-being.

24  
 25 Together, these steps should enable researchers to make progress towards promoting the  
 26 consistency and coordination in analyses of welfare/well-being that will facilitate developing the  
 27 body of research necessary to analyze impacts on human welfare, well-being, and quality of life.

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## 4.7 Appendix 1:

### Chapter 4: Human Welfare

#### Economic Valuation: An Introduction to Techniques and Challenges

Assessments of the benefits and costs, whether explicit or tacit, underlie all discussion and debates over alternative actions regarding climate change. These assessments are frequently used to inform such questions as: What actions are justified to ease adaptation to changing climate? Or how much are we willing to pay to reduce emissions? (Jacoby, 2004). Ideally, such analyses would be undertaken with complete and reliable information on benefits, converted into a common unit, commensurable with costs and with each other (Jacoby, 2004). In reality, however, while many impacts can be valued, some linkages from climate change to welfare effects are difficult to quantify, much less value. This appendix describes the steps in developing a benefits estimate, and the tools that economists have available for monetizing benefits. It also briefly discusses some of the challenges in monetizing benefits, and weaknesses in the approach.

#### Estimating the Effects of Climate Change

The process of estimating the effects of climate change, including effects on human welfare, involves up to four steps, illustrated in Figure 4A.1. Moving down from the top of Figure 4A.1, the gray area occupies a larger portion of each box, indicating (in rough terms) that at each stage it is more and more difficult to develop quantified, rather than qualitative, results. The first step is to estimate the change in relevant measures of climate, including temperature, precipitation, sea-level rise, and the frequency and severity of extreme events. This step is usually accomplished by atmospheric scientists - some form of global circulation model (GCM) is typically deployed. Some analyses stop after this step.


The second step involves estimating the physical effects of those changes in climate in terms of qualitative changes in human and natural systems. These might include changes in ecosystem structure and function, human exposures to heat stress, changes in the geographic range of disease vectors, melting of snow on ski slopes, or flooding of coastal areas. A wide range of disciplines might be involved in carrying out those analyses, deploying an equally wide range of tools. Many analyses are complete once this step is completed - for example, we may be unable to say anything more than that increases in precipitation will change an ecosystem's function.

The third step involves translating the physical effects of changes in climate into metrics indicating quantitative impacts. If the ultimate goal is monetization, ideally these measures should be amenable to valuation. Examples include quantifying the number and location of properties that are vulnerable to floods, estimating the number of individuals exposed to and sensitive to heat stress, or estimating the effect of diminished migratory bird populations on bird-watching participation rates. Many analyses that reach this step in the process, but not all, also proceed on to the fourth step.

The fourth step involves valuing or monetizing the changes. The simplest approach would be to apply a unit valuation approach; for example, the cost of treating a nonfatal case of heat stress or malaria attributable to climate change is a first approximation of the value of avoiding that case

1 altogether. In many contexts, however, unit values can misrepresent the true marginal economic  
 2 impact of these changes. For example, if climate change reduces the length of the ski season,  
 3 individuals could engage in another recreational activity, such as golf. Whether they might  
 4 prefer skiing to golf at that time and location is something economists might try to measure.

5 **Figure 4A.1 Estimating the Effects of Climate Change**  
 6



7  
 8  
 9 This step-by-step linear approach to effects estimation is sometimes called the "damage  
 10 function" approach. One practical advantage of the damage function approach is the separation  
 11 of disciplines—scientists can complete their work in steps 1 and 2, and sometimes in step 3, and  
 12 then economists do their work in step 4. The linear process can work well in cases where  
 13 individuals respond and change their behavior in response to changes in their environment,  
 14 without any "feedback" loop.

15  
 16 The linear approach is not always appropriate, however. A damage function approach might  
 17 imply that we look at effects of climate on human health as separate and independent from



1 effects on ecology and recreation, but at some level they are inter-related, as health care and  
 2 recreation both require resources in the form of income. In addition, responding to heat stress by  
 3 installing air conditioning leads to higher energy demand, which in turn may increase greenhouse  
 4 gas emissions and therefore contribute to further climate change. Recent research suggests that  
 5 the damage function approach, under some conditions, may be both overly simplistic (Freeman,  
 6 2003) and subject to serious errors (Strzepek *et al.*, 1999; Strzepek and Smith, 1995).

### 7 **Monetizing and Valuing Non-Market Goods**

8 Economists have developed a suite of methods to estimate willingness to pay for non-market  
 9 goods (see text for a discussion of the market vs. non-market distinction). These methods can be  
 10 grouped into two broad categories, based largely on the source of the data: revealed preference  
 11 and stated preference approaches (Freeman, 2003; U.S. EPA, 2000). Revealed preference,  
 12 sometimes referred to as the indirect valuation approach, involves inferring the value of a non-  
 13 market good using data from market transactions. For example, a lake may be valued for its  
 14 ability to provide a good fishing experience. This value can be estimated by the time and money  
 15 expended by the angler to fish at that particular site, relative to all other possible fishing sites.  
 16 Or, the amenity value of a coastal property that is protected from storm damage (by a dune,  
 17 perhaps) can be estimated by comparing the price of that property to other properties similar in  
 18 every way but the enhanced storm protection.

### 19 **Stated And Revealed Preference Approaches**

20 Accurate measurement of the non-market amenity of interest, in a manner that is not inconsistent  
 21 with the way market participants perceive the amenity, is critical to a robust estimate of value.

22  
 23 **Revealed preference** approaches include recreational demand models, which estimate the value  
 24 of recreational amenities through time and money expenditures to enjoy recreation; hedonic  
 25 wage and hedonic property value models, which attempt to isolate the value of particular  
 26 amenities of property and jobs not themselves directly traded in the marketplace based on their  
 27 price or wage outcomes; and averting behavior models, which estimate the value of time or  
 28 money expended to avert a particular bad outcome as a measure of its negative effect on welfare.

29  
 30 **Stated preference** approaches, sometimes referred to as **direct valuation** approaches, are survey  
 31 methods that estimate the value individuals place on particular non-market goods based on  
 32 choices they make in hypothetical markets.<sup>34</sup> The earliest stated preference studies involved  
 33 simply asking individuals what they would be willing to pay for a particular non-market good.  
 34 The best studies involve great care in constructing a credible, though still hypothetical, trade-off  
 35 between money and the non-market good of interest to discern individual preferences for that  
 36 good and hence, willingness to pay (WTP). For example, economists might construct a  
 37 hypothetical choice between multiple housing locations, each of which differs along the  
 38 dimensions of price and health risk. Repeated choice experiments of this type ultimately map  
 39 out the individual's tradeoff between money and the non-market good. The major challenges in  
 40 stated preference methods involve study design, particularly the construction of a reasonable and  
 41 credible market for the good, and estimation of a valuation function from the response data.

42

---

<sup>34</sup> The contingent valuation method (CVM), or a modern variants, a stated choice model (SCM), are forms of the stated preference methods.

1 In theory, if individuals understand the full implications of their market choices, in real or  
2 constructed markets, then both revealed and stated preference approaches are capable of  
3 providing robust estimates of the total value of non-market goods. When considering the  
4 complex and multidimensional implications of climate change in the application of revealed and  
5 stated preference approaches, it can be extraordinarily challenging to ensure that individuals are  
6 sufficiently informed that their observed or stated choices truly reflect their preferences for a  
7 particular outcome. As a result, these methods are most often applied to a narrowly defined non-  
8 market good, rather than to a complex bundle of non-market goods that might involve multiple  
9 tradeoffs and synergistic or antagonistic effects that would be difficult to disentangle.

10  
11 In addition to market or non-market goods that reflect some use of the environment, value can  
12 arise even if a good or service is not explicitly consumed, or even experienced. For example,  
13 very few individuals would value a polar bear for its ability to provide sustenance - those who do  
14 might not express that value through a direct market for polar bear meat, but by hunting for the  
15 bear. Whether through a market or in a non-market activity, those individuals have value for a  
16 consumptive use—once enjoyed, that good is no longer available to others to enjoy. In addition  
17 to the consumptive users, a small but somewhat larger number of individuals might travel to the  
18 Arctic to see a polar bear in its natural environment. These individuals might express a value for  
19 polar bears, and their "use" of the bear is non-consumptive, but in some sense it does nonetheless  
20 affect others' ability to view the bear—if too many individuals attempt to view the bears, the  
21 congestion might cause the bears to become frightened or, worse, domesticated, diminishing the  
22 experience of viewing them.

23  
24 A third, perhaps much larger group of individuals will never travel to see a polar bear in the  
25 flesh. But many individuals in this group would experience some diminishment in their overall  
26 quality of life if they knew that polar bears had become extinct. This concept is called "**non-use**  
27 **value**". Although there are several categories of non-use value - some individuals may wish to  
28 preserve the future option to visit the Arctic and see a bear, others to bequeath a world with polar  
29 bears to future generations, and others might value the mere existence of the bears out of a sense  
30 of environmental stewardship. While not all economists agree that non-use values ought to be  
31 relevant to policy decisions (Diamond and Hausman, 1993), there is broad agreement that they  
32 are difficult to measure, because the expression of non-use values does not result in measurable  
33 economic behavior (that is, there is no "use" expressed). Those that recognize non-use values  
34 acknowledge that they are likely to be of greatest consequence where a resource has a  
35 uniqueness or "specialness" and loss or injury is irreversible, for example in the global or local  
36 extinction of a species, or the distribution of a unique ecological resource (Freeman, 2003).

### 37 Other Methods of Monetizing

38 Analysts can employ other non-market valuation methods: avoided cost or replacement cost, and  
39 input value estimates. These methods do not measure willingness to pay as defined in welfare  
40 economic terms, but because the methods are relatively straightforward to apply and the results  
41 often have a known relationship to willingness to pay, they provide insights into non-market  
42 values. This chapter focuses on willingness to pay measures, but recognizes that alternative  
43 methods may provide insights and sometimes be more manageable (or appropriate) to estimate a  
44 particular non-market value, given data constraints and the limitations imposed by available  
45 methods.

1  
2 **Cost of illness** studies estimate the change in health expenditures resulting from the change in  
3 incidence of a given illness. Direct costs of illness include costs for hospitalization, doctors'  
4 fees, and medicine, among others. Indirect costs of illness include effects such as lost work and  
5 leisure time. Complete cost of illness estimates reflect both direct and indirect costs. Even the  
6 most complete cost of illness estimates, however, typically underestimate willingness to pay to  
7 avoid incidence of illness, because they ignore the loss of welfare associated with pain and  
8 suffering and may not reflect costs of averting behaviors the individuals have taken to avoid the  
9 illness. Some studies suggest that the difference between cost of illness and willingness to pay  
10 can be large, but the difference varies greatly across health effects and individuals (U.S. EPA,  
11 2000).

12  
13 **Replacement cost** studies approach non-market values by estimating the cost to replace the  
14 services provided to individuals by the non-market good. For example, healthy coastal wetlands  
15 may provide a wide range of services to individuals who live near them; they may filter  
16 pollutants present in water; absorb water in times of flood; act as a buffer to protect properties  
17 from storm surges; provide nursery habitat for recreational and commercial fish; and provide  
18 amenities in the form of opportunities to view wildlife. A replacement cost approach would  
19 estimate the value of these services by estimating market costs for treating contaminants,  
20 containing floods, providing fish from hatcheries, or perhaps restoring an impaired wetland to  
21 health.

22  
23 The replacement cost approach is limited in three important ways: 1) the cost of replacing a  
24 resource does not necessarily bear any relation to the welfare enhancing effect of the resource; 2)  
25 as resources grow scarce, we would expect their value would be underestimated by an average  
26 replacement cost; 3) Complete replacement of ecological systems and services may be highly  
27 problematic. Replacement cost studies are most informative in those conditions where loss of  
28 the resource would certainly and without exception trigger the incidence of replacement costs -  
29 in reality, those conditions are not as common as they might seem, because in most cases there  
30 are readily available substitutes for those services, even if accessing them involves incurring  
31 some transition costs.

32  
33 Finally, value can also be calculated using the contribution of the resource as an input into a  
34 productive process. This approach can be used for both market and non-market inputs. For  
35 example, it can be used to estimate the value of fertilizer, as well as water or soil, in farm output  
36 and profits. An ecosystem's service input into a productive process could, in theory, be used in  
37 this same way.

### 38 **Issues in Valuation and Aggregation**

39 The topic of issues in valuation is far larger than can be covered here. We focus only on  
40 identifying in a superficial way a few of the most important issues, in the context of climate  
41 change.

42  
43 By virtue of the simple process of aggregation, the economic approach creates some difficulties.  
44 These difficulties are not specific to the economic approach, however; any method of  
45 aggregation would face the same limitations.

- 1 • Aggregation, by balancing out effects to produce a “net” effect, masks the positive and  
2 negative effects that comprise net effects, hides inequities in the distribution of impacts,  
3 or large negative impacts that fall on particular regions or vulnerable populations.
- 4 • Any method of aggregation must make an explicit assumption about how to aggregate  
5 over time, i.e., whether to weight future benefits the same as current benefits (economic  
6 analyses generally discount the future, i.e., weight it less heavily in decision making than  
7 the present, for a number of reasons)
- 8 • The method of putting diverse impacts on the same yardstick ignores differences in how  
9 we may wish to treat these impacts from a policy perspective, and assumes that all  
10 impacts are equally certain or uncertain, despite differences in estimation and valuation  
11 methods. These differences may be particularly apparent, for example, for non-market  
12 and market goods.

13  
14 Several potential criticisms of the economic approach in the context of climate change relate  
15 more directly to how economists approach the task of valuation. One issue is the assumption of  
16 stability of preferences over time. Economic studies conducted today, whether revealed or stated  
17 preference, reflect the actions and preferences of individuals today, expressed in today’s  
18 economic, social, and technological context. For an issue such as climate change, however,  
19 impacts may occur decades or centuries hence. The valuation of impacts that occur in the future  
20 should depend on preferences in the future. For the most part, however, while there are some  
21 rudimentary ways in which economists model changes in technology or income, there is no  
22 satisfactory means of modeling changes in preferences over time.

23  
24 A second issue is the treatment of uncertainty. Economic analysis under conditions of imperfect  
25 information and uncertainty is possible, but is one of the most difficult undertakings in  
26 economics. While some climate change impacts may be relatively straight-forward, valuation of  
27 many climate change impacts requires analysis and use of welfare measures that incorporate  
28 uncertainty. When imperfect information prevails, the valuation measure must factor in errors  
29 that arise because of it, and when risk or uncertainty prevail, the most commonly used valuation  
30 measure is the option price. Two related concepts are option value, and expected consumer’s  
31 surplus. All three concepts are more complicated than the discussion here can do justice to, but  
32 briefly:

- 33  
34 • Expected consumer’s surplus,  $E[CS]$  is just consumer’s surplus (CS), or value in welfare  
35 terms, weighted by the probabilities of outcomes that yield CS. For example, if a hiker  
36 gets \$5 of CS per year in a “dry” forest and \$10 in a wet forest (one that is greener) and  
37 the probability of the forest being dry is 0.40 and of it being wet is 0.60, then the  $E[CS] =$   
38  $0.40 \times \$5 + 0.60 \times \$10$ . Expected consumer’s surplus is really an ex-post concept,  
39 because we must know CS in each state after it occurs.
- 40 • Option price (OP) is the WTP that balances expected utility (utility weighted by the  
41 probabilities of outcomes) with and without some change. It is a measure of WTP the  
42 individual must express before outcomes can be known with certainty, i.e. a true ex ante  
43 welfare measure. For example, the hiker might be willing to pay \$8 per year to balance  
44 her expected utility with conditions being wet, versus conditions being dry. The \$8 might  
45 be a payment to support a reduction in dryness otherwise due to climate change.

- Option value (OV) is the difference between OP and E[CS]. A related concept is called quasi-option value and pertains to the value of waiting to get more information.

A third issue concerns behavioral paradoxes. Most economic analyses, particularly if they involve uncertain or risky outcomes, require rationality in the expression of preferences. Such basic axioms as treating gains and losses equally, reacting to a series of small incremental gains with equal strength to a single large gain of the same aggregate magnitude, and viewing gains and losses from an absolute rather than relative or positional scale are particularly important to studies that rely on expected utility theory - that individuals gain and lose welfare in proportion to the product of the likelihood of the gain or loss and its magnitude. Several social and psychological science studies, however, suggest that under many conditions individuals do not behave in a manner consistent with this definition of rationality. For example, prospect theory, often credited as resulting from the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, suggests that behavior under risk or uncertainty is better explained both by reference to a status quo reference point and acknowledgement of unequal treatment of risk aversion when considering losses and gains, even when it can be shown that a different behavior would certainly make the individual better off.

Finally, the issue of perspective—"whose lens are we looking through"—is critical to welfare analysis, particularly economic welfare. In health policy, for example, thinking about whether it is worthwhile to invest in mosquito netting to control malaria depends on whether you are at CDC, are a provider of health insurance, or are an individual in a place where malaria risk is high. In general, the perspective of valuation focuses on the valuation of individuals who are directly affected, and who are living today. The perspectives of public decision makers may be somewhat different from those of individuals, since they will take into account social and community consequences, as well as individual consequences.

1 **4.8 Boxes****Box 4.1 Effects of Climate Change on Selected US Ecosystems**

At their most extreme, community changes could result in the loss of entire habitats valued by the general public. For example, sea level rise puts much of the freshwater wetland that comprises Florida Everglades National Park at risk (Glick and Clough, 2006). Even relatively modest sea level rise projections could result in the conversion of much of this low-lying area to brackish or intertidal marine and mangrove habitats. Another such extreme example is alpine tundra habitat in mountain ranges in the contiguous states. Since tundra lies at the highest elevations, there is little or no opportunity for the plants and animals that comprise this ecosystem to respond to increasing temperatures by moving upward. Thus, one of the probable effects of climate change will be the further fragmentation and loss of this unique habitat (VEMAP, 1995; Root *et al.*, 2003; Lenihan *et al.*, 2006).

California already reports an example of how climate change might modify major marine ecological communities. Over the final four decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the average annual ocean surface temperature off the California coast warmed by approximately 1.5°C (Holbrook *et al.*, 1997). Sagarin *et al.* (1999) found that the intertidal invertebrate community at Monterey has changed since first it was characterized in the 1930s. Many of the coolwater species have retracted their ranges northward, to be replaced by southern warm water species. The community that exists there now is markedly different in its make-up from that which existed prior to warming of the coastal California Current.

2

**Box 4.2 Case Study of the Effects of Climate Change on Rocky Mountain National Park**

One of the National Parks most closely studied to determine the net effect of direct and indirect effect of climate change on visitation, visitor benefits and tourism employment is Rocky Mountain National Park (RMNP) in Colorado. This alpine national park, is located at elevations ranging from 7,000 to 14,000 feet above sea level. It is known for elk viewing, hiking, tundra flowers, snowcapped peaks, and one of Colorado's most visible and recognizable 14,000 foot peaks, Longs Peak.

Loomis and Richardson (2006) compared two approaches to estimating the effect of climate change on visitation and employment in RMNP. The first approach examined variations in monthly visitation in response to historic variations in temperature. The results of this first approach showed a statistically significant positive effect of temperature on visitation (see Loomis and Richardson (2006) for more details). However, increased visitation slowed as temperatures got hotter and hotter, and visitation even declined during one summer of very high temperatures (60 days over 80°F) by 7.5%.

The second approach used a survey that portrayed the direct effects (e.g., temperature) and indirect effects (e.g., changes in elk and ptarmigan (an alpine bird), or percent of the park in tundra). Visitors were then asked to indicate if they would change their visits to RMNP or length of stay in the park. The surveys used three climate change scenarios, one produced by the Canadian Climate Center (CCC) indicating a 4°F increase in temperature by 2020, a Hadley climate scenario that forecasted a 2°F temperature increase by 2020, and an extreme heat scenario designed to capture very hot future conditions (50 days with temperatures above 80°F, as compared to 3 days currently). All climate change scenarios were used with wildlife models to estimate the increase in elk populations and decrease in ptarmigan populations. The extreme heat survey found similar results to that of the monthly visitation model.

Table 4.6 shows the results of the CCC, Hadley, and Extreme Heat temperature scenarios on visitation, visitor benefits and tourism employment as compared to current conditions. As indicated in the table, applying visitor survey estimates of visitation change yields a 13.6% increase with CCC and 9.9% increase with Hadley. Loomis and Richardson also report that applying the historic visitation patterns to the same scenarios yields an 11.6% increase in visitation with CCC and 6.8% with Hadley. Not only is there fairly good agreement between the two methods, but the warmer CCC climate change scenario produces larger increases in visitation. In the extreme heat scenario, however, visitations declines from current conditions.

1 **4.9 Tables**

2 **Table 4.1** Categorization of Well-Being

Category of Well-being	Description and Rationale	Components / Indicators of Well-being	Illustrative Metrics / Measures of Well-being	Examples of Negative Climate Linkages
<b>Economic conditions</b>	The economy supports a mix of activities: opportunities for employment, a strong consumer market, funding for needed public services, and a high standard of living shared by citizens.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Income and production</li> <li>Economic standard of living, e.g., wealth and income, cost of living, poverty</li> <li>Economic development, e.g., business and enterprise, employment</li> <li>Availability of affordable housing</li> <li>Equity in the distribution of income</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Gross Domestic Product (GDP)</li> <li>Wage rates (e.g., persons at minimum wage)</li> <li>Employment rates</li> <li>Business startups and job creation</li> <li>Housing prices</li> <li>Dependence on public assistance</li> <li>Families/children living in poverty</li> <li>Utility costs, gasoline prices, and other prices</li> </ul>	<p>Reduced job opportunities and wage rates in areas dependent on natural resources, such as agricultural production in a given region that faces increased drought.</p> <p>Higher electricity prices resulting from increased demand for Air Conditioning as average temperatures and frequency of heat waves rise.</p>
<b>Natural resources, environment, and amenities</b>	Resources enhance the quality of life of citizens; pollution and other negative environmental effects are kept below levels harmful to ecosystems, human health, and other quality of life considerations; and natural beauty and aesthetics are enhanced.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Air, water, and land pollution</li> <li>Recreational opportunities</li> <li>Water supply and quality</li> <li>Natural hazards and risks</li> <li>Ecosystem condition and services</li> <li>Biodiversity</li> <li>Direct climate amenity effects</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Air and water quality indices</li> <li>Regulatory compliance</li> <li>Waste recycling rates</li> <li>Acreeage, visitation, funding of recreational and protected/preserved areas</li> <li>Water consumption and levels</li> <li>Deaths, injuries, and property loss due to natural hazards</li> <li>Renewable energy generation</li> <li>Endangered and threatened species</li> </ul>	Sea Level rise could both inundate coastal wetland habitats (with negative effects on marsh and estuarine environments necessary to purify water cycle systems and support marine hatcheries) and erode recreational beaches.
<b>Human health</b>	Health care institutions provide medical and preventive health-care services with excellence, citizens have access to services regardless of financial means, and physical and mental health is generally high.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mortality risks</li> <li>Morbidity and risk of illness</li> <li>Quality and accessibility of health care</li> <li>Health status of vulnerable populations</li> <li>Prenatal and childhood health</li> <li>Psychological and emotional health</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Deaths from various causes (suicide, cancer, accidents, heart disease)</li> <li>Life expectancy at birth</li> <li>Health insurance coverage</li> <li>Hospital services and costs</li> <li>Infant mortality and care of elderly</li> <li>Subjective measure of health status</li> </ul>	Increased frequency of heat waves in a larger geographical area will directly affect health, resulting in higher incidence of heat-related mortality and illness. Climate can also affect human health indirectly via effects on ecosystems and water supplies.
<b>Public and private infrastructure</b>	Transportation and communication infrastructure enable citizens to move around efficiently and communicate reliably.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Affordable, and accessible public transit</li> <li>Adequate road, air, and rail infrastructure</li> <li>Reliable communication systems</li> <li>Waste management and sewerage</li> <li>Maintained and available public and private facilities</li> <li>Power generation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mass transit use and commute times</li> <li>Rail lines, and airport use and capacity</li> <li>Telephones, newspapers, and internet</li> <li>Waste tonnage and sewerage safety</li> <li>Congestion and commute to work</li> <li>Transportation accident rates</li> <li>Noise pollution</li> </ul>	Melting permafrost due to warming in the arctic damages road transport, pipeline, and utility infrastructure, which in turn leads to disrupted product and personal movements, increased repair costs, and shorter time periods for capital replacement.
<b>Government and public safety</b>	Governments are led by competent and responsive officials, who provide public services effectively and equitably, such as order and public safety; citizens are well-informed and participate in civic activities.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Electoral participation</li> <li>Civic engagement</li> <li>Equity and opportunity</li> <li>Municipal budgets and finance</li> <li>Public safety</li> <li>Emergency services</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Voter registration, turnout, approval</li> <li>Civic organizations membership rates</li> <li>Availability of public assistance programs</li> <li>Debt, deficits, taxation, and spending</li> <li>Crime rates and victimization</li> <li>Emergency first-responders per capita</li> </ul>	Dislocations and pressures created by climate change stressors can place significant new burdens on police, fire and emergency services.
<b>Social and cultural resources</b>	Social institutions provide services to those in need, support philanthropy, volunteerism, patronage of arts and leisure activities, and social interactions characterized by equality of opportunity and social harmony.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Volunteerism</li> <li>Culture, arts, entertainment, and leisure activities</li> <li>Education and human capital services</li> <li>Social harmony</li> <li>Family and friendship networks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Donations of time, money, and effort</li> <li>Sports participation, library circulation, and support for the arts</li> <li>Graduation rates and school quality</li> <li>Hate, prejudice, and homelessness</li> <li>Divorce rates, social supports</li> </ul>	Disruptions in economic and political life caused by climate change stressors or extreme weather events associated with climate change could create new conflicts and place greater pressure on social differences within communities.



**Table 4.2** An illustration of Possible Effects of Climate Change on Fishery Resources

<b>Linkages/Pathways</b>	<b>Category of Welfare Effect</b>	<b>Possible Metrics</b>
Fishery resource declines as climate changes	Natural resources, environment, and amenities	Fish populations
Recreational opportunities decline	Natural resources, environment, and amenities	Fish catch, visitation days
Related species and habitats are affected	Natural resources, environment, and amenities	Species number and diversity
Employment and wages in resource-based jobs (including recreation) fall as resources decline	Economic conditions	Number of jobs, unemployment rate, wages
Incomes fall as jobs are lost	Economic conditions	Per capita income
More children live in poverty as jobs are lost and incomes fall	Economic conditions	Families, children below poverty level
Access to health care that is tied to jobs and income falls	Human Health	Households without health insurance increase
Increased mortality and morbidity as a result of reduced health care	Human Health	Disease and death rates increase
Lack of jobs results in out-migration	Economic conditions	Working age population decreases
Fewer new residents attracted, because of reduced jobs and amenities (recreation)	Social and cultural resources	Population growth rate slows
Less incentive/drive to participate in community activities	Social and cultural resources	Drop in volunteerism civic participation, completion of high school

1

1 **Table 4.3** Techniques to Value Health Effects Associated with Climate Change

Health Effect	Economic Valuation Tools
Premature mortality (associated with temperature changes, extreme weather events and air pollution effects)	Use of revealed preference techniques to value changes in risk of death (e.g., compensating wage studies). Use of stated preference studies to value changes in risk of death. Use of foregone earnings as a lower bound estimate to the value of premature mortality.
Exacerbation of cardiovascular and respiratory morbidity; morbidity associated with water-borne or vector-borne disease	Use of stated preference methods to elicit WTP to avoid illness (e.g., asthma attacks) or risk of illness (heart attack risk) or injury. Estimation of medical costs and productivity losses (known as the cost-of-illness (COI)) as a lower bound estimate of the value of avoiding illness.
Injuries associated with extreme weather events	Use of stated preference methods to elicit WTP. Use of compensating wage studies that value risk of injury. Use of COI as a lower bound estimate.
Impacts of climate change on physical functioning; sub-clinical effects	Use of stated preference methods to estimate WTP to avoid functional limitation.

2

1 **Table 4.4** Examples of Ecosystem Services Important to Human Welfare\*

<b>Service Category</b>	<b>Components of Service</b>	<b>Illustration of Service</b>
<b>Provisioning services</b>	Food Fiber Fresh water Genetic Resources Pharmaceuticals	Harvestable fish, wildlife and plants Timber, hemp, cotton Water for drinking, hydroelectricity generation, and irrigation
<b>Regulating services</b>	Air quality regulation Erosion regulation Water purification Pest control Crop pollination Climate and water supply regulation Protection from natural hazards	Local and global amelioration of extremes Removal of contaminants by wetlands Removal of timber pests by birds Pollination of orchards by flying insects
<b>Support services</b>	Primary production Soil formation Photosynthesis Nutrient and water cycling	Conversion of solar energy to plant material Conversion of geological materials to soil by addition of organic material and bacterial activity
<b>Cultural services</b>	Recreation/tourism Aesthetic values Spiritual/religious values Cultural heritage	Natural sites for "green" tourism/recreation/nature viewing Existence value of rainforests and charismatic species, "holy" or "spiritual" natural sites
*Based on a classification system developed for the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA, 2005)		

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**Table 4.5** Comparison of Changes in US Visitor Days

<b>Activity</b>	<b>Loomis and Crespi (1999)</b>	<b>Mendelsohn and Markowski (1999)</b>
<b>Boating</b>	9.2%	36.1%
<b>Camping</b>	-2.0%	-12.7%
<b>Fishing</b>	3.5%	39.0%
<b>Golf</b>	13.6%	4.0%
<b>Hunting</b>	-1.2%	no change
<b>Snow Skiing</b>	-52.0%	-39.0%
<b>Wildlife Viewing</b>	-0.1%	-38.4%
<b>Beach Recreation</b>	14.1%	not estimated
<b>Stream Recreation</b>	3.4%	included in boating
<b>Gain in Visitor Benefits (in Billions)</b>	\$2.74	\$2.80

2


1 **Table 4.6** Change in Visits, Jobs and Visitor Benefits with Three Climate Change Scenarios

Climate Scenario	Annual Visits	% change	Tourism Jobs	Visitor Benefits (Millions)
Current	3,186,323		6,370	\$1,004
CCC	3,618,856	13.6%	7,351	\$1,216
Hadley	3,502,426	9.9%	7,095	\$1,157
Extreme Heat	2,907,520	-8.7%	5,770	\$959

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1 **4.10 Figures**


2 **Figure 4.1** Geography of Climate Change Vulnerability at the County Scale



Three measures of climate change risk are used to create the vulnerability index: expected temperature change, extreme weather event history, and coastal proximity. Risk measures are geo-referenced at the county scale. The expected temperature change variable is measured as the expected unit change in average minimum temperature (in degrees Celsius) for a county from 2004 to 2099. Temperature data are from the Hadley Center. Hadley Center monthly time series data on average minimum temperature for the United States are plotted at the 0.5 x 0.5 degree of spatial resolution. In cases where climate cells intersect county boundaries, temperature data are averaged across intersecting climate cells. To estimate extreme weather event history we summarize the number of reported injuries and fatalities from hydrometeorological hazard events at the county level from Jan 01, 1960 to Jul 31, 2004. Higher values on our natural hazard casualty variable reflect more pronounced histories of injury and death from extreme weather events. Casualty data were collected from the Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United States (SHELDUS). The coastal proximity variable is measured dichotomously. A county receives a score of 1 if it is designated by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) as an "at-risk coastal" county, and a score of 0 if it is not. NOAA defines a county as at-risk coastal if at least 15 percent of its total area is located in a coastal watershed. The vulnerability index was created by standardizing then summing each measure of climate change risk (z-scores). The distribution of vulnerability is divided into equal quintiles, with darker colors reflecting higher vulnerability to climate change.


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1 **Figure 4.2** Steps from Climate Change to Economic Valuation of Ecosystem Services



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**Figure 4.3** Direct and Indirect Effects of Climate Change on Recreation



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1 **Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.6**

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3 **Chapter 5**

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5 **Common Themes and Research Recommendations**

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## 1 **5.1 Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.6: Advances in the Science**

2 The Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.6 assesses the impacts of climate variability and change  
 3 on human systems in the United States. Each of the assessment chapters have drawn on different  
 4 literatures, with generally more available scientific knowledge on impacts and adaptations  
 5 related to human health, somewhat less related to human settlements, and still somewhat less  
 6 related to human welfare.

7 Several themes recur across these chapters and point to advances in the science of climate  
 8 impacts assessment and the development and deployment of adaptation responses.

- 9     ▪ Climate change is connected to other environmental and social changes in a complex and  
 10 dynamic fashion. In some cases climate change compounds other global changes, while  
 11 in other cases the impacts of climate change are determined or moderated by other  
 12 socioeconomic factors (5.1.1).
- 13     ▪ Extreme weather events will play a defining role, particularly in the near term, shaping  
 14 climate-related impacts and adaptive capacity. While impacts associated with changes in  
 15 climate averages may be less important now, these averages are expected to have more  
 16 pronounced long-run effects on sea level rise, permafrost melt, glacial retreat, drought  
 17 patterns and water supplies, etc. (5.1.2).
- 18     ▪ Climate change will have a disproportionate impact on disadvantaged groups in  
 19 communities across the U.S. Some regions and some resources are more vulnerable to  
 20 climate impacts, such as coastal zones, drought-prone regions, and flood-prone river  
 21 basins (5.1.3).
- 22     ▪ Adaptation of infrastructure and services to climate change may be costly, but many  
 23 communities will have adequate resources. However, for places already struggling to  
 24 provide or maintain basic public amenities and services, the additional costs of adaptation  
 25 will impose a potentially-insupportable burden (5.1.4.).
- 26     ▪ With such a complex scientific and policy landscape, an integrated multi-disciplinary  
 27 framework is needed to enable climate change impacts to be measured in meaningful  
 28 ways and for optimal mitigation and adaptation strategies to be identified, developed, and  
 29 deployed (5.1.5).

### 30 **5.1.1 Complex Linkages and a Cascading Chain of Impacts Across Global Changes**

31 Climate is only one of a number of global changes that impact human well-being. The major  
 32 effects of climate will be shaped by interactions with non-climate stressors. As such, climate  
 33 change will seldom be the sole or primary factor determining a population's or a location's well-  
 34 being. The impacts of climate variability and change interact with impacts tied to population  
 35 growth and change and other socioeconomic endpoints (for example, impacts on infrastructure  
 36 capacity, water supplies, habitat preservation, community growth and development, and access  
 37 to health care). While this assessment focuses on how climate change could affect the future  
 38 health, well-being, and settlements in the U.S., the extent of any impacts will depend on an array  
 39 of non-climate factors, including:

- 40     ▪ demographic changes related to the location, size, age and characteristics of  
 41 populations;

- 1           ▪ population and regional vulnerabilities;
- 2           ▪ future social, economic, and cultural contexts;
- 3           ▪ availability of natural resources;
- 4           ▪ human, cultural and social capital;
- 5           ▪ advances in science and technology;
- 6           ▪ characteristics of the built environment;
- 7           ▪ land use change; and
- 8           ▪ public health and public utility infrastructures; and
- 9           ▪ the capacity and availability of health and social services.

10           The effects of climate change very often spread from directly impacted areas and sectors to  
 11 other areas and sectors through extensive and complex linkages. The importance of climate  
 12 change depends on the directness of the climate impact coupled with demographic, social,  
 13 economic, institutional, and political factors, including, the degree of preparedness. Consider  
 14 the wide swath of damage left by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. Damage was  
 15 measured not only in terms of lives lost, but also on the devastating impacts on infrastructure,  
 16 neighborhoods, businesses, schools, and hospitals as well as in the personal disruption of  
 17 family and friends in established communities, with lost lives and lost livelihoods, challenged  
 18 psychological well-being, and exacerbation of chronic illnesses. While the aftermath of a  
 19 single hurricane is not the measure of climate change, such an event demonstrates the  
 20 disruptive capacity of extreme weather events.

### 21 **5.1.2 Changes in Climate Extremes and Climate Averages.**

22 Climate variability and change are important stressors. Their potential impacts on health,  
 23 settlements, and welfare result in two broad categories of effects:

- 24           ▪ changes in extreme weather events (e.g., hurricanes, heat waves and urban heat island  
 25 effects, etc.) and
- 26           ▪ changes in average climate conditions (e.g., reduced snowfalls, earlier snowmelt, hotter  
 27 summer average temperatures, drought conditions, etc.).

28 Some changes in the average climate conditions have strong potential to impact human systems.  
 29 For example, changes in the growing season or the timing and amount of spring runoff. Higher  
 30 minimum temperatures are related to the spread of ticks as well as the increase in deaths  
 31 associated with heat waves. The effects of other climate changes, such as the perceived  
 32 relationship between people and their environment (e.g., aesthetics, recreational opportunities,  
 33 etc.), have not yet been well studied. Key vulnerabilities are often defined by climate  
 34 phenomena that exceed thresholds for adaptation. Their severity is not only related to the rate  
 35 and magnitude of climate change, particularly extreme weather events and/or abrupt climate  
 36 change, but also by limited access to resources for coping across a range of social systems. In  
 37 many parts of the U.S. and across many segments of the population, livelihoods and lifestyles are  
 38 likely to be affected by climate change. Net valuations of benefits vs. costs from climate effects  
 39 will vary, but they are more likely to be strongly negative if climate change is substantial and  
 40 rapid in onset rather than moderate and gradual.

1 Thresholds in human systems, below which effects are relatively minor, but above which the  
 2 joint pressure of all the minor effects overwhelms the capacity to cope, are poorly understood.  
 3 Focused research on thresholds would substantially improve understanding of climate impacts.  
 4 Depending on the degree and speed of climate change and on the effectiveness of adaptation  
 5 strategies, adverse human welfare outcomes may increase even as total burdens of climate-  
 6 sensitive outcomes decrease given infrastructure and technology improvements.

### 7 **5.1.3 Vulnerable Populations and Vulnerable Locations**

8 Impacts of climate variability and change on human systems are location- and population-  
 9 specific. For instance, in densely-developed coastlines, populations are especially vulnerable to  
 10 tropical storms, storm surge and flooding, just as the very old and the very young residing in  
 11 urban areas experience increases in cardiovascular and pulmonary morbidity and mortality  
 12 caused by extreme heat coupled with degraded air quality. Native American peoples in Alaska  
 13 and other low socio-economic communities because of their decreased economic capacity to  
 14 prepare for and respond to the impacts of climate change. Just as there are differences across  
 15 populations, there are important differences in vulnerability across geographic regions, such as  
 16 the exposure to extreme events along the Gulf Coast and water supply issues in the southeast, the  
 17 southwest and the Inter-Mountain West.

18 With respect to health impacts from climate variability and change, specific subpopulations may  
 19 experience heightened vulnerability for climate-related health effects associated with:

- 20 1. **Biological sensitivity** related to age (especially the very young and the very old), the  
 21 presence of pre-existing chronic medical conditions (such as the sensitivity of people  
 22 with chronic heart and pulmonary conditions to heat-related illness), developmental  
 23 characteristics, acquired factors (such as immunity), those taking certain medications  
 24 (e.g. some antihypertensive and psychotropic medications) and genetic factors (such as  
 25 metabolic enzyme subtypes that play a role in vulnerability to air pollution effects).
- 26 2. **Socioeconomic factors** also play a critical role in determining vulnerability to  
 27 environmentally-mediated factors. The distribution of climate-related effects will vary  
 28 among those who live alone; those with limited rights (for instance, some in the  
 29 immigrant communities); by economic strata; by housing type and according to other  
 30 elements that either accentuate or limit vulnerability. Socioeconomic factors may  
 31 increase the likelihood of exposure to harmful agents, interact with biological factors that  
 32 mediate risk (such as nutritional status), and/or lead to differences in the ability to adapt  
 33 or respond to exposures or to early phases of illness and injury.
- 34 3. Given their **location**, the underlying vulnerability of some communities is inherently high  
 35 just as their adaptive capacity is similarly limited. Populations in gently-sloping coastal  
 36 areas are particularly vulnerable to sea level rise and settlements along floodplains of  
 37 large rivers are particularly vulnerable due to projections of increased variability in  
 38 precipitation. Projections of increased frequencies of drought combined put the  
 39 increasing populations of desert southwest cities at risk.

1 It is essential that public health interventions and preventions recognize populations that may  
 2 experience interactive or synergistic effects of multiple risk factors for health problems, both  
 3 related to climate change and to other global changes. Poor communities and households are  
 4 already under stress from climate variability and climate-related extreme events such as heat  
 5 waves, hurricanes, and tropical and riverine flooding. Since they tend to be concentrated in  
 6 relatively high-risk areas, have limited access to services and other resources for coping, they can  
 7 be especially vulnerable to climate change. These differential effects propagate concerns  
 8 regarding social inequity and environmental justice and increased pressure for adaptive  
 9 responses from local, state, and federal governments.

#### 10 **5.1.4. The Cost of and Capacity for Adaptation**

11 U.S. society is capable of considerable adaptation, depending heavily on the competence and  
 12 capacity of individuals, communities, federal, state, and local governments, and available  
 13 financial and other social resources. While adaptation to climate change will come at a cost that  
 14 may reduce available resources to cope with other societal burdens, potentials for adaptation  
 15 through technological and institutional development and behavioral changes are considerable,  
 16 especially where such developments meet other sustainable development needs.

17 With scarce resources, communities should also choose adaptation options with co-benefits that  
 18 help ameliorate other issues or where they can easily add climate concerns to existing response  
 19 plans. The focus on all-hazards response within public health agencies can simply add climate  
 20 impacts to its list of hazards for which to prepare. This will likely improve their response plans  
 21 to events in the near term such as storms that happen in a variable climate, whether or not they  
 22 increase in frequency or intensity with a changing climate. Planting trees and green roofs to  
 23 reduce urban heat islands has the added benefit of creating a more aesthetically pleasing location  
 24 that increasing well-being and by decreasing energy use in these buildings. Thus, some  
 25 adaptation measures can also considered mitigation measures.

26 Resiliency – a central concept in assessing the vulnerability and adaptability of regions,  
 27 communities, and individuals – will depend on both physical and social infrastructure. Social  
 28 infrastructure includes factors such as human capital (e.g. formal education), cultural capital (e.g.  
 29 breadth of linguistic mastery), economic capital, and social capital (e.g. ties within social  
 30 networks). Each of these assets vary from community to community and from individual to  
 31 individual. Collectively, non-economic capital provides both assets and buffers for communities  
 32 and individuals.

#### 33 **5.1.5 An Integrative Framework**

34 The impacts of climate variability and change on human health and human settlements are fairly  
 35 well characterized, though additional research is needed to refine impact assessments and  
 36 provide better decision support (particularly with respect to deploying adaptation measures).  
 37 Human welfare is an emerging concept, similar in purpose to something like “sustainability.” As  
 38 an organizing principal, human welfare integrates multiple impacts across diverse sectors and  
 39 regions into an internally-consistent, coherent framework for assessing costs, benefits, and  
 40 tradeoffs.

1 Sustainable development offers an alternative to traditional urban / suburban settlement patterns.  
 2 The focus on sustainability has evolved as an effort to curb individual consumption and to  
 3 minimize the collective footprint of communities on natural resources, ecosystems, pollution,  
 4 and anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change. The  
 5 emphasis of sustainable development is on creating livable communities and promoting physical  
 6 well-being and desirable lifestyles.

7 Put slightly differently, sustainability is realized as resilience within communities. Resilience is  
 8 measured by a community's capacity for absorbing climate changes and the shocks of extreme  
 9 events without breakdowns in its economy, natural resources, and social systems. Resiliency, a  
 10 central concept in measuring the vulnerability and adaptability of communities and individuals  
 11 depends not only on physical infrastructure, but also on social infrastructure. Social  
 12 infrastructure includes factors such as human capital (e.g. formal education), cultural capital (e.g.  
 13 extent of linguistic mastery), and social capital (e.g. ties to social networks). Each of these assets  
 14 varies from community to community and from individual to individual. These non-economic  
 15 capital goods provide both assets and buffers for communities and individuals.

16 Related to sustainable development is the concept of smart growth which has been described as  
 17 an alternative to sprawl, traffic congestion, disconnected neighborhoods and inner city decay. It  
 18 explicitly considers long-term costs and consequences of growth, not just near-term benefits.  
 19 For instance, a focus on mass transit can improve quality of life and encourage a healthier  
 20 pedestrian-based lifestyle with less pollution. Some communities of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century are moving  
 21 away from suburban sprawl, long commutes, vehicle emissions, and sedentary lifestyles and  
 22 adopting sustainable development practices that will cushion the impacts of climate change on  
 23 these communities and enhance their overall resilience.

24 The potential for utilizing human welfare as an integrating framework is not yet mature, and  
 25 additional research will be needed, including, for example, deriving valuation methodologies. As  
 26 an integrating concept, human welfare can provide insight into the determinants of human  
 27 happiness. Just as health is an indicator of welfare, especially as physical health is closely tied to  
 28 individual measures of happiness, contentment, and well-being, similarly determinants of well-  
 29 being are derived from aspects of human settlements. Collectively, human welfare is a measure  
 30 of what makes people, their families, and their communities satisfied.

## 31 **5.2 Expanding the Knowledge Base**

32 The present state of the science suggests that opportunities remain for addressing critical  
 33 research areas. The SAP 4.6 concludes that climate observations and modeling are becoming  
 34 increasingly important for a wide segment of public and private sector entities, such as water  
 35 resource managers, public health officials, agribusinesses, energy providers, forest managers,  
 36 insurance companies, and urban and transportation planners. In order to more accurately portray  
 37 the consequences of climate change and support better-informed adaptation strategies, research  
 38 efforts should focus on:

- 39     ▪ deriving socioeconomic scenarios that describe how the world may evolve in the  
 40       future, including assumptions about changes in societal characteristics, governments  
 41       and public policy, as well as economic and technological development.

- 1       ▪ connecting those socioeconomic scenarios with downscaled climate models to create
- 2       projections of future changes in climate, including the intensity and severity of
- 3       extreme weather events, at the regional and local scales.
- 4       ▪ characterizing the costs of climate change, both those that relate to impacts and those
- 5       that relate to response strategies (including adaptation and mitigation).
- 6       ▪ estimating the damages avoided by stabilizing or reducing emissions.
- 7       ▪ determining the factors that contribute to synergies between adaptive capacity and
- 8       sustainable development as well as synergies between adaptation and mitigation.
- 9       ▪ pursuing cross-disciplinary efforts that focus on the human dimensions of climate
- 10      change in an integrated fashion.
- 11      ▪ improving capacity to incorporate scientific knowledge about climate, including
- 12      uncertainty, in existing adaptation strategies.
- 13      ▪ conducting research at regional and sectoral levels that promote analyses of the
- 14      response of human and natural systems to multiple stresses. Impacts of climate
- 15      change are most damaging when they occur in a context of multiple climate and non-
- 16      climate stressors.
- 17      ▪ evaluating the adaptation strategies that effectively address challenges presented by
- 18      current non-climate stressors (e.g., land use and population dynamics) as well as
- 19      anticipated climate change impacts and develop comprehensive estimates of these co-
- 20      benefits.
- 21      ▪ implementing adaptation measures to address the near- and long-term responses to
- 22      climate change, using regional and local stakeholders as key stakeholders in the
- 23      development of effective, responsive, and timely adaptation policies.
- 24      ▪ advancing the concept of human welfare as an integrating framework by developing
- 25      methods to achieve comparable and comprehensive valuations across diverse impacts
- 26      and sectors.
- 27      ▪ determining which climate impacts exhibit thresholds. Threshold-based damage
- 28      functions can be fundamentally different in their nature and extent than continuous
- 29      damage functions.
- 30      ▪ supporting research on impacts and the development, implementation and evaluation
- 31      of adaptive responses by collecting high quality time-series measurements and other
- 32      observations of both climate and human systems.
- 33      ▪ identifying early effects of changing weather patterns on climate-sensitive outcomes

34      The SAP 4.6 concludes that assessments should be periodically conducted to re-examine the  
 35      rapidly emerging knowledge base in this area. Gaps should be addressed that characterize  
 36      exposure and sensitivity at the local or regional level. Research should evaluate the adaptive  
 37      capacity of places and institutions to climate-induced risks. Key research and development areas  
 38      should address short-term risk assessment and evaluation of the costs and effectiveness of near-  
 39      term adaptive strategies as well as longer-term impacts and responses.

40      The following sections provide a more detailed discussion of research needs and  
 41      recommendations by topic: human health, human settlements, and human welfare. There is  
 42      significant overlap across topics with opportunities for investigating cross-disciplinary pursuits  
 43      of research opportunities and adaptation responses.



## 1 **5.2.1 Human Health Research Gaps**

2 An important shift in perspective has occurred since the Health Sector Assessment of the First  
3 National Assessment in 2001. There is a greater appreciation of the complex pathways by which  
4 weather and climate affect individual and societal health and well-being. In the research  
5 community, there is a more finely-honed understanding of the interaction of multiple non-  
6 climate, social, and behavioral factors and impacts on risks from injury and disease. While  
7 significant gaps remain, several gaps identified in the First National Assessment have been  
8 addressed, including:

- 9     ▪ a more finely honed understanding of the differential effects of temperature extremes by  
10     community, demographic, and biological characteristics;
- 11     ▪ improved characterization of the exposure-response relationships to extreme heat; and
- 12     ▪ improved understanding of the public health burden posed by climate-related changes  
13     from heat waves and air pollution.

14 Despite these advances, the body of literature has only limited quantitative projections of future  
15 impacts. More research is needed to ensure the U.S. public health and medical care systems and  
16 at-risk populations are adequately prepared to cope with projected changes in climate. The  
17 following specific suggestions for research on climate change and human health:

- 18     ▪ Increase the skill with which we characterize exposure-response relationships, including  
19     identifying thresholds and particularly vulnerable groups, considering relevant factors  
20     that affect the geographic range and incidence of climate-sensitive health outcomes, and  
21     including disease ecology and transmission dynamics.
- 22     ▪ Develop quantitative models of possible health impacts of climate change that can be  
23     used to explore a range of socioeconomic and climate scenarios.
- 24     ▪ Evaluate effectiveness of current adaptation projects, including the costs and benefits of  
25     interventions. For example, heat wave and health early warning systems have not been  
26     effective; further research is needed to understand how public health messages can be  
27     made more helpful.
- 28     ▪ Characterize with local stakeholders the local and regional scale vulnerability and  
29     adaptive capacity related to the potential risks and the time horizon over which climate  
30     risks might arise.
- 31     ▪ Anticipate requirements for infrastructure such as may be needed to provide protection  
32     against extreme events, to alter urban design to decrease heat islands, and to maintain  
33     drinking and wastewater treatment standards and source water and watershed protection.

## 34 **5.2.2 Human Settlements Research Gaps**

35 Chapter 3 examines the vulnerabilities and impacts of climate change and variability on human  
36 settlements. The following list enumerates many research topics that would help expand the  
37 knowledge base of the linkages between climate change and human settlements.

- 38     ▪ Advance the understanding of settlement vulnerabilities, impacts, and adaptive responses  
39     in a variety of different local contexts around the country.
- 40     ▪ Develop plans for out-migration from vulnerable locations via realistic, socially  
41     acceptable strategies for shifting human populations away from vulnerable zones.

- 1       ▪ Improve the understanding of vulnerable populations (such as the urban poor and native  
2       populations on rural, tribal lands) that have limited capacities for response to climate  
3       change in order to provide a basis for adaptation research that addresses social justice and  
4       environmental equity concerns.
- 5       ▪ Improve the understanding of how urban decision-making is changing as populations  
6       become more heterogeneous and decisions become more decentralized especially as this  
7       affects adaptive responses.
- 8       ▪ Improve abilities to associate projections of climate change in U.S. settlements with  
9       changes in other driving forces related to impacts, such as changes in metropolitan/urban  
10      patterns and technological change. With continued growth in vulnerable regions,  
11      research is needed to consider alternative growth futures and to minimize the  
12      vulnerability of new development, to insure that communities adopt measures to manage  
13      significant changes in sea level, temperature, rainfall and extreme weather events.
- 14      ▪ Improve the understanding of relationships between settlement patterns (both regional  
15      and intra-urban) and resilience/adaptation.
- 16      ▪ Improve the understanding of vulnerabilities of urban population inflows and outflows to  
17      climate change impacts.
- 18      ▪ Improve the understanding of second and third-order impacts of climate change in urban  
19      environments, including interactive effects among different aspects of the urban system.
- 20      ▪ Review current regulations, guidelines, and practices related to climate change responses  
21      to help inform community decision-makers and other stakeholders about potentials for  
22      relatively small changes to make a large difference.

23 Meeting these needs is likely to require well-developed partnerships across local, state, and  
24 federal governments, industry, non-governmental organizations, foundations, stakeholders,  
25 resource managers, urban planners, public utility and public health authorities, and the academic  
26 research community.

### 27 **5.2.3 Human Welfare Research Gaps**

28 Despite the potential for impacts on human well-being, little research focuses directly on  
29 understanding the relationship between well-being and climate change. Completely cataloging  
30 the effects of global change on human well-being or welfare would be an immense undertaking,  
31 and no well-accepted structure for doing so has been developed and applied. Moreover,  
32 identifying the potentially lengthy list of climate-related changes in lifestyle, as well as in other,  
33 more tangible, features of well-being (such as income), is itself a daunting task—and may  
34 include changes that are not easily captured by objective measures of well-being or quality of  
35 life.

36 Developing an understanding of the impacts of climate change on human welfare will require  
37 steps designed to develop a framework for addressing individual and community welfare and  
38 well-being, as well as to fill the data gaps associated with the estimation and quantification of  
39 effects. Some specific steps that will help expand the knowledge base related to climate change  
40 and human welfare are listed below.

- 41       ▪ Determine an appropriate definition of human welfare/well-being for climate  
42       analysis.

- 1           ▪ Design an appropriate method for systematically categorizing and identifying  
2           impacts on welfare/well-being.
- 3           ▪ Identify priority categories for data collection and research in order to establish  
4           and quantify the linkage from climate to effects on welfare/well-being.
- 5           ▪ Decide which metrics should be used for these categories; more generally, which  
6           components of welfare/well-being should be measured in natural or physical  
7           units, and which should be monetized.
- 8           ▪ Investigate methods by which diverse metrics can be aggregated, or at least  
9           weighted and compared in policy decisions where aggregation is impossible.
- 10          ▪ Develop an approach for addressing those human welfare effects that are difficult  
11          to look at in a piecemeal way, such as welfare changes on communities or  
12          ecosystem services.
- 13          ▪ Identify appropriate top-down and bottom-up approaches for estimating impacts  
14          and value (whether economic or otherwise) of the most critical categories of  
15          welfare/well-being.

16 Together, these steps should enable researchers to make progress towards promoting the  
17 consistency and coordination in analyses of welfare/well-being that will facilitate developing the  
18 body of research necessary to analyze impacts on human welfare, well-being, and quality of life.

## Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.6

### Appendix 1. Glossary

Sources: Derived from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Third and Fourth Assessment Reports, Working Group II and other sources as indicated.

*Words in italics indicate that the following term is also contained in this glossary.*

## A

### **Acclimatization**

The physiological *adaptation* to climatic variations.

### **Adaptability**

See *Adaptive capacity*.

### **Adaptation**

Adjustment in natural or *human systems* to a new or changing environment. Adaptation to *climate change* refers to adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic *stimuli* or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities. Various types of adaptation can be distinguished, including anticipatory and reactive adaptation, private and public adaptation, and autonomous and planned adaptation.

### **Adaptation assessment**

The practice of identifying options to adapt to *climate change* and evaluating them in terms of criteria such as availability, benefits, costs, effectiveness, efficiency, and feasibility.

### **Adaptation benefits**

The avoided damage costs or the accrued benefits following the adoption and *implementation of adaptation* measures.

### **Adaptation costs**

Costs of planning, preparing for, facilitating, and implementing *adaptation* measures, including transition costs.

### **Adaptive capacity**

The ability of a system to adjust to *climate change* (including *climate variability* and extremes) to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences.

### **Aeroallergens<sup>1</sup>**

Any of various airborne substances, such as pollen or spores, that can cause an allergic response.

### **Aggregate impacts**

Total impacts summed up across sectors and/or regions. The aggregation of *impacts* requires knowledge of (or assumptions about) the relative importance of impacts in different sectors and regions. Measures of aggregate impacts include, for example, the total number of people affected, change in net primary productivity, number of systems undergoing change, or total economic costs.

### **Albedo**

The fraction of solar radiation reflected by a surface or object, often expressed as a percentage. Snow-covered surfaces have a high albedo; the albedo of soils ranges from high to low; vegetation-covered surfaces and oceans have a low albedo. The Earth's albedo varies mainly through varying cloudiness, snow, ice, leaf area, and land-cover changes.

### **Algal bloom**

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<sup>1</sup> *The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition*. Retrieved November 21, 2007, from Dictionary.com website: <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/aeroallergen>

A reproductive explosion of algae in a lake, river or ocean.

**Ancillary benefits**

The ancillary, or side effects, of policies aimed exclusively at *climate change mitigation*. Such policies have an impact not only on *greenhouse gas emissions*, but also on resource use efficiency, like reduction in emissions of local and regional air pollutants associated with *fossil-fuel* use, and on issues such as transportation, agriculture, *land-use* practices, employment, and fuel security. Sometimes these benefits are referred to as “ancillary impacts” to reflect that in some cases the benefits may be negative. From the perspective of policies directed at abating local air pollution, greenhouse gas mitigation may also be considered an ancillary benefit, but these relationships are not considered in this assessment.

**Anthropogenic**

Resulting from or produced by human beings.

**Anthropogenic emissions**

*Emissions of greenhouse gases*, greenhouse gas *precursors*, and *aerosols* associated with human activities. These include burning of *fossil fuels* for energy, *deforestation*, and *land-use* changes that result in net increase in emissions.

**Aquifer**

A stratum of permeable rock that bears water. An unconfined aquifer is recharged directly by local rainfall, rivers and lakes, and the rate of recharge will be influenced by the permeability of the overlying rocks and soils.

**Arid regions**

*Ecosystems* with less than 250 mm precipitation per year.

**Atmosphere**

The gaseous envelop surrounding the Earth. The dry atmosphere consists almost entirely of nitrogen (78.1% *volume mixing ratio*) and oxygen (20.9% *volume mixing ratio*), together with a number of trace gases, such

as argon (0.93% *volume mixing ratio*), helium, and radiatively active *greenhouse gases* such as *carbon dioxide* (0.035% *volume mixing ratio*) and *ozone*. In addition, the atmosphere contains water vapor, whose amount is highly variable but typically 1% *volume mixing ratio*. The atmosphere also contains clouds and *aerosols*.

**B**

**Baseline**

The baseline (or reference) is any datum against which change is measured. It might be a “current baseline,” in which case it represents observable, present-day conditions. It might also be a “future baseline,” which is a projected future set of conditions excluding the driving factor of interest. Alternative interpretations of the reference conditions can give rise to multiple baselines.

**Biofuel**

A fuel produced from organic matter or bombustible oils produced by plants. Examples of biofuel include alcohol, black liquor from the paper-manufacturing process, wood, and soybean oil.

**Biogenic<sup>2</sup>**

Produced by living organisms or biological processes.

**C**

**Carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>)**

A naturally occurring gas, and also a by-product of burning *fossil fuels* and *biomass*, as well as *land-use changes* and other industrial processes. It is the principal *anthropogenic greenhouse gas* that affects

<sup>2</sup> *The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition*. Retrieved November 21, 2007, from Dictionary.com website: <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/biogenic>

the Earth's *radiative balance*. It is the reference gas against which other greenhouse gases are measured and has a *Global Warming Potential* of 1.

### **Cholera**

An intestinal infection that results in frequent watery stools, cramping abdominal pain, and eventual collapse from dehydration.

### **Chronic obstructed pulmonary disease (COPD)<sup>3</sup>**

Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, or COPD, refers to a group of diseases that cause airflow blockage and breathing-related problems. It includes emphysema, chronic bronchitis, and in some cases asthma.

### **Climate**

Climate in a narrow sense is usually defined as the “average weather” or more rigorously as the statistical description in terms of the mean and variability of relevant quantities over a period of time ranging from months to thousands or millions of years. The classical period is 30 years, as defined by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). These relevant quantities are most often surface variables such as temperature, precipitation, and wind. Climate in a wider sense is the state, including a statistical description, of the *climate system*.

### **Climate change**

Climate change refers to any change in *climate* over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity. This usage differs from that in the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)*, which defines ‘climate change’ as: ‘a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global *atmosphere* and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over

comparable time periods’. See also *climate variability*.

### **Climate change commitment**

Due to the thermal inertia of the ocean and slow processes in the *biosphere*, the *cryosphere* and land surfaces, the climate would continue to change even if the atmospheric composition was held fixed at today's values. Past changes in atmospheric position leads to a ‘committed’ *climatic change* which continues for as long as a radiative imbalance persists and until all components of the *climate system* have adjusted to a new state. The further change in temperature after the composition of the *atmosphere* is held constant is referred to as the committed warming or warming commitment. Climate change commitment includes other future changes, for example in the hydrological cycle, in *extreme weather events*, and in *sea-level rise*.

### **Climate model (hierarchy)**

A numerical representation of the *climate system* based on the physical, chemical, and biological properties of its components, their interactions and *feedback* processes, and accounting for all or some of its known properties. The climate system can be represented by models of varying complexity—that is, for any one component or combination of components a “hierarchy” of models can be identified, differing in such aspects as the number of spatial dimensions, the extent to which physical, chemical or biological processes are explicitly represented, or the level at which empirical *parametrizations* are involved. Coupled atmosphere/ocean/sea-ice *general circulation models* (AOGCMs) provide a comprehensive representation of the climate system. There is an evolution towards more complex models with active chemistry and biology. Climate models are applied, as a research tool, to study and simulate the climate, but also for operational purposes,

<sup>3</sup> Definition taken from <http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/airpollution/copd/copdfaq.htm> visited on November 21, 2007.

including monthly, seasonal, and interannual *climate predictions*.

**Climate prediction**

A climate prediction or climate forecast is the result of an attempt to produce a most likely description or estimate of the actual evolution of the *climate* in the future (e.g., at seasonal, interannual, or long-term *time-scales*). See also *climate projection* and *climate (change) scenario*.

**Climate projection**

A *projection* of the response of the *climate system* to *emission* or concentration *scenarios* of *greenhouse gases* and *aerosols*, or *radiative forcing scenarios*, often based upon simulations by *climate models*.

Climate projections are distinguished from *climate predictions* in order to emphasize that climate projections depend upon the emission/concentration/radiative forcing scenario used, which are based on assumptions, concerning, for example, future socio-economic and technological developments that may or may not be realized, and are therefore subject to substantial *uncertainty*.

**Climate scenario**

A plausible and often simplified representation of the future *climate*, based on an internally consistent set of climatological relationships, that has been constructed for explicit use in investigating the potential consequences of *anthropogenic climate change*, often serving as input to impact models. *Climate projections* often serve as the raw material for constructing climate scenarios, but climate scenarios usually require additional information such as about the observed current climate. A “climate change scenario” is the difference between a climate scenario and the current climate.

**Climate system**

The climate system is the highly complex system consisting of five major components: the *atmosphere*, the *hydrosphere*, the

*cryosphere*, the land surface and the *biosphere*, and the interactions between them. The climate system evolves in time under the influence of its own internal dynamics and because of external forcings such as volcanic eruptions, solar variations, and human-induced forcings such as the changing composition of the atmosphere and *land-use change*.

**Climate variability**

Climate variability refers to variations in the mean state and other statistics (such as standard deviations, the occurrence of extremes, etc.) of the *climate* on all *temporal and spatial scales* beyond that of individual weather events. Variability may be due to natural internal processes within the *climate system* (internal variability), or to variations in natural or *anthropogenic external forcing* (external variability). See also *climate change*.

**Co-benefits**

The benefits of policies that are implemented for various reasons at the same time—including *climate change mitigation*—acknowledging that most policies designed to address *greenhouse gas mitigation* also have other, often at least equally important, rationales (e.g., related to objectives of development, sustainability, and equity). The term co-impact is also used in a more generic sense to cover both the positive and negative sides of the benefits. See also *ancillary benefits*.

**Communicable Disease**

An *infectious disease* caused by transmission of an infective biological agent (virus, bacterium, protozoan, or multicellular macroparasite).

**Confidence**

In this Report, the level of confidence in a statement is expressed using a standard terminology defined in the Introduction. See also *uncertainty*.

**Coping range**

The variation in climatic *stimuli* that a system can absorb without producing significant impacts.

**Cost-effective**

A criterion that specifies that a *technology* or measure delivers a good or service at equal or lower cost than current practice, or the least-cost alternative for the achievement of a given target.

**D**

**DALY (Disability-adjusted life years)<sup>4</sup>**

The sum of years of life lost due to premature death and illness, taking into account the age of death compared with natural life expectancy and the number of years of life lived with a disability. The measure of number of years lived with the disability considers the duration of the disease, weighted by a measure of the severity of the disease.

**Dengue Fever**

An infectious viral disease spread by mosquitoes often called breakbone fever because it is characterized by severe pain in joints and back. Subsequent infections of the virus may lead to dengue hemorrhagic fever (DHF) and dengue shock syndrome (DSS), which may be fatal.

**Desert**

An *ecosystem* with less than 100 mm precipitation per year.

**Desertification**

Land degradation in arid, *semi-arid*, and dry sub-humid areas resulting from various factors, including climatic variations and human activities. Further, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification defines land degradation as a reduction or loss in arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-humid areas of the biological or economic productivity and complexity of

rain-fed cropland, irrigated cropland, or range, pasture, *forest*, and woodlands resulting from *land uses* or from a process or combination of processes, including processes arising from human activities and habitation patterns, such as: (i) soil *erosion* caused by wind and/or water; (ii) deterioration of the physical, chemical, and biological or economic properties of soil; and (iii) long-term loss of natural vegetation.

**Detection and attribution**

*Climate* varies continually on all *time scales*.

Detection of *climate change* is the process of demonstrating that climate has changed in some defined statistical sense, without providing a reason for that change.

Attribution of causes of climate change is the process of establishing the most likely causes for the detected change with some defined level of confidence.

**Disturbance regime**

Frequency, intensity, and types of disturbances, such as fires, insect or pest outbreaks, floods, and *droughts*.

**Diurnal temperature range**

The difference between the maximum and minimum temperature during a day.

**Dose-response function<sup>5</sup>**

A mathematical relationship is established which relates how much a certain amount of exposure impacts on production, capital, ecosystems, human health etc.

**Downscaling**

A method that derives local- to regional-scale (10 to 100 km) information from larger-scale models or data analyses.

**Drought**

The phenomenon that exists when precipitation has been significantly below normal recorded levels, causing serious hydrological imbalances that adversely affect land resource production systems.

<sup>4</sup> Definition from the glossary of the Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005.

<sup>5</sup> Definition modified from <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6404> visited on November 21, 2007.



## E

### **Ecosystem**

A system of interacting living organisms together with their physical environment. The boundaries of what could be called an ecosystem are somewhat arbitrary, depending on the focus of interest or study. Thus, the extent of an ecosystem may range from very small *spatial scales* to, ultimately, the entire Earth.

### **Ecosystem processes**

The processes that underpin the integrity and functioning of ecosystems, such as decomposition, carbon cycling, or soil renewal, etc.

### **Ecosystem services**

Ecological processes or functions that have monetary or non-monetary *value* to individuals or society. There are (i) supporting services such as productivity or *biodiversity* maintenance, (ii) provisioning services such as food, fibre, or fish, (iii) regulating services such as climate regulation or *carbon sequestration*, and (iv) cultural services such as tourism or spiritual and aesthetic appreciation.

### **El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO)**

El Niño, in its original sense, is a warm water current that periodically flows along the coast of Ecuador and Peru, disrupting the local fishery. This oceanic event is associated with a fluctuation of the intertropical surface pressure pattern and circulation in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, called the Southern Oscillation. This coupled atmosphere-ocean phenomenon is collectively known as El Niño Southern Oscillation, or ENSO. During an El Niño event, the prevailing trade winds weaken and the equatorial countercurrent strengthens, causing warm surface waters in the Indonesian area to flow eastward to overlie the cold waters of the Peru current.

This event has great impact on the wind, sea surface temperature, and precipitation patterns in the tropical Pacific. It has climatic effects throughout the Pacific region and in many other parts of the world. The opposite of an El Niño event is called *La Niña*.

### **Emissions**

In the *climate change* context, emissions refer to the release of *greenhouse gases* and/or their *precursors* and *aerosols* into the *atmosphere* over a specified area and period of time.

### **Endemic**

Restricted or peculiar to a locality or region. With regard to human health, endemic can refer to a disease or agent present or usually prevalent in a population or geographical area at all times.

### **Epidemic**

Occurring suddenly in numbers clearly in excess of normal expectancy, said especially of *infectious diseases* but applied also to any disease, injury, or other health-related event occurring in such outbreaks.

### **Eutrophication**

The process by which a body of water (often shallow) becomes (either naturally or by pollution) rich in dissolved nutrients with a seasonal deficiency in dissolved oxygen.

### **Evaporation**

The process by which a liquid becomes a gas.

### **Evapotranspiration**

The combined process of *evaporation* from the Earth's surface and *transpiration* from vegetation.

### **Exotic species**

See *introduced species*.

### **Exposure**

The nature and degree to which a system is exposed to significant climatic variations.

### **Externality**

See *external cost*.

### **External cost**

Used to define the costs arising from any human activity, when the agent responsible for the activity does not take full account of the impacts on others of his or her actions. Equally, when the impacts are positive and not accounted for in the actions of the agent responsible they are referred to as external benefits. *Emissions* of particulate pollution from a power station affect the health of people in the vicinity, but this is not often considered, or is given inadequate weight, in private decision making and there is no market for such impacts. Such a phenomenon is referred to as an “externality,” and the costs it imposes are referred to as the external costs.

**Extinction**

The complete disappearance of an entire species.

**Extirpation**

The disappearance of a species from part of its range; local extinction.

**Extreme weather event**

An extreme weather event is an event that is rare within its statistical reference distribution at a particular place.

Definitions of “rare” vary, but an extreme weather event would normally be as rare as or rarer than the 10th or 90th percentile.

By definition, the characteristics of what is called extreme weather may vary from place to place. An extreme *climate* event is an average of a number of weather events over a certain period of time, an average which is itself extreme (e.g., rainfall over a season).

**F**

**Food security**

A situation that exists when people have secure access to sufficient amounts of safe and nutritious food for normal growth, development and an active and healthy life. Food insecurity may be caused by the unavailability of food, insufficient purchasing power, inappropriate

distribution, or inadequate use of food at the household level.

**Foodborne illness**<sup>6</sup>

An illness caused by consuming foods or beverages contaminated with any of many different disease-causing microbes, or pathogens, or poisonous chemicals, or other harmful substances.

**Footprint (ecological)**<sup>7</sup>

An index of the area of productive land and aquatic ecosystems required to produce the resources used and to assimilate the wastes produced by a defined population at a specified material standard of living, wherever on Earth that land may be located.

**Forecast**

See *climate prediction* and *climate projection*.

**G**

**General circulation**

The large scale motions of the *atmosphere* and the ocean as a consequence of differential heating on a rotating Earth, aiming to restore the *energy balance* of the system through transport of heat and momentum.

**General Circulation Model (GCM)**

See *climate model*.

**GIS (Geographic Information Systems)**<sup>8</sup>

A computerized system organizing data sets through a geographical referencing of all data included in its collections.

**Global surface temperature**

The global surface temperature is the area-weighted global average of (i) the sea surface temperature over the oceans (i.e., the

<sup>6</sup> Definition modified from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention website: [http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/foodborneinfections\\_g.htm](http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/foodborneinfections_g.htm), viewed on November 21, 2007.

<sup>7</sup> From the glossary of the Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005.

<sup>8</sup> From the glossary of the Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005.

sub-surface bulk temperature in the first few meters of the ocean), and (ii) the surface air temperature over land at 1.5 m above the ground.

### **Globalization**

The growing integration and interdependence of countries worldwide through the increasing volume and variety of crossborder transactions in goods and services, free international capital flows, and the more rapid and widespread diffusion of technology, information and culture.

### **Greenhouse effect**

*Greenhouse gases* effectively absorb *infrared radiation*, emitted by the Earth's surface, by the *atmosphere* itself due to the same gases, and by clouds. Atmospheric radiation is emitted to all sides, including downward to the Earth's surface. Thus greenhouse gases trap heat within the surface-troposphere system. This is called the "natural greenhouse effect."

Atmospheric radiation is strongly coupled to the temperature of the level at which it is emitted. In the *troposphere*, the temperature generally decreases with height. Effectively, infrared radiation emitted to space originates from an altitude with a temperature of, on average,  $-19^{\circ}\text{C}$ , in balance with the net incoming *solar radiation*, whereas the Earth's surface is kept at a much higher temperature of, on average,  $+14^{\circ}\text{C}$ . An increase in the concentration of greenhouse gases leads to an increased infrared opacity of the atmosphere, and therefore to an effective radiation into space from a higher altitude at a lower temperature. This causes a *radiative forcing*, an imbalance that can only be compensated for by an increase of the temperature of the surface-troposphere system. This is the "enhanced greenhouse effect."

### **Greenhouse gas**

Greenhouse gases are those gaseous constituents of the *atmosphere*, both natural and *anthropogenic*, that absorb and emit

radiation at specific wavelengths within the spectrum of *infrared radiation* emitted by the Earth's surface, the atmosphere, and clouds. This property causes the *greenhouse effect*. Water vapor ( $\text{H}_2\text{O}$ ), *carbon dioxide* ( $\text{CO}_2$ ), *nitrous oxide* ( $\text{N}_2\text{O}$ ), *methane* ( $\text{CH}_4$ ), and *ozone* ( $\text{O}_3$ ) are the primary greenhouse gases in the Earth's atmosphere. Moreover there are a number of entirely human-made greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, such as the *halocarbons* and other chlorine- and bromine-containing substances, dealt with under the *Montreal Protocol*. Besides  $\text{CO}_2$ ,  $\text{N}_2\text{O}$ , and  $\text{CH}_4$ , the *Kyoto Protocol* deals with the greenhouse gases *sulfur hexafluoride* ( $\text{SF}_6$ ), *hydrofluorocarbons* (HFCs), and *perfluorocarbons* (PFCs).

### **Gross Domestic Product**

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the monetary value of all goods and services produced within a nation.

### **Gross National Product**

Gross National Product (GNP) is the monetary value of all goods and services produced in a nation's economy, including income generated abroad by domestic residents, but without income generated by foreigners.

### **Groundwater Recharge**

The process by which external water is added to the zone of saturation of an *aquifer*, either directly into a formation or indirectly by way of another formation.

## **H**

### **Habitat**

The particular environment or place where an organism or species tend to live; a more locally circumscribed portion of the total environment.

### **Hantavirus**

A virus in the family *Bunyaviridae* that causes a type of haemorrhagic fever. It is thought that humans catch the disease

mainly from infected rodents, either through direct contact with the animals or by inhaling or ingesting dust that contains aerosolized viral particles from their dried urine and other secretions.

### **Healthy Cities Program<sup>9</sup>**

The WHO Healthy Cities programme engages local governments in health development through a process of political commitment, institutional change, capacity building, partnership-based planning and innovative projects. It promotes comprehensive and systematic policy and planning with a special emphasis on health inequalities and urban poverty, the needs of vulnerable groups, participatory governance and the social, economic and environmental determinants of health. It also strives to include health considerations in economic, regeneration and urban development efforts.

### **Heat exhaustion<sup>10</sup>**

Heat exhaustion is a phenomenon caused by fluid loss, which in turn causes decreased blood flow to vital organs. Reduced blood flow from heat exhaustion can result in a form of shock. Victims of heat exhaustion often complain of flu-like symptoms hours after exposure.

### **Heat index<sup>11</sup>**

The heat index (HI), given in degrees F, is a measure of how hot it feels when relative humidity (RH) is combined with the actual air temperature.

### **Heat island**

An area within an urban area characterized by ambient temperatures higher than those

of the surrounding area because of the absorption of solar energy by materials like asphalt.

### **Heat stroke<sup>12</sup>**

Heat stroke occurs when the body's heat regulating mechanisms – including convection, sweating, and respiration – fail. The likelihood of heat stroke increases when air temperatures are higher than skin temperature, and when individuals are low on fluids. Body temperatures can be raised to the point at which brain damage and death can result unless cooling measures are quickly taken.

### **Human settlement**

A place or area occupied by settlers.

### **Human system**

Any system in which human organizations play a major role. Often, but not always, the term is synonymous with “society” or “social system” (e.g., agricultural system, political system, technological system, economic system).

### **Hydrological systems**

The systems involved in movement, distribution, and quality of water throughout the Earth, including both the hydrologic cycle and water resources.

### **Hyperthermia<sup>13</sup>**

Unusually high body temperature.

### **I**

### **Ice sheet**

A mass of land ice that is sufficiently deep to cover most of the underlying bedrock topography, so that its shape is mainly

<sup>9</sup> Definition taken directly from <http://www.euro.who.int/healthy-cities> on November 21, 2007.

<sup>10</sup> Definition from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Heat Island Glossary, <http://www.epa.gov/hiri/resources/glossary.html#h>, visited on November 21, 2007.

<sup>11</sup> Definition modified from NOAA's Heat Index website, [http://www.crh.noaa.gov/jkl/?n=heat\\_index\\_calculator](http://www.crh.noaa.gov/jkl/?n=heat_index_calculator), visited on November 21, 2007.

<sup>12</sup> Definition from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Heat Island Glossary, <http://www.epa.gov/hiri/resources/glossary.html#h>, visited on November 21, 2007.

<sup>13</sup> *The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition*. Retrieved November 21, 2007, from Dictionary.com website: <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/hyperthermia>

determined by its internal dynamics (the flow of the ice as it deforms internally and slides at its base). An ice sheet flows outward from a high central plateau with a small average surface slope. The margins slope steeply, and the ice is discharged through fast-flowing ice streams or outlet *glaciers*, in some cases into the sea or into *ice shelves* floating on the sea. There are only two large ice sheets in the modern world, on Greenland and Antarctica, the Antarctic ice sheet being divided into East and West by the Transantarctic Mountains; during glacial periods there were others.

#### **Ice shelf**

A floating *ice sheet* of considerable thickness attached to a coast (usually of great horizontal extent with a level or gently undulating surface); often a seaward extension of ice sheets.

#### **(Climate) Impact assessment**

The practice of identifying and evaluating the detrimental and beneficial consequences of *climate change* on natural and *human systems*.

#### **(Climate) Impacts**

Consequences of *climate change* on natural and *human systems*. Depending on the consideration of *adaptation*, one can distinguish between potential impacts and residual impacts. Potential impacts: All impacts that may occur given a projected change in *climate*, without considering adaptation. Residual impacts: The impacts of climate change that would occur after adaptation. See also *aggregate impacts*, *market impacts*, and *non-market impacts*.

#### **Indicator<sup>14</sup>**

Information based on measured data used to represent a particular attribute, characteristic, or property of a system.

#### **Indigenous peoples**

People whose ancestors inhabited a place or a country when persons from another culture or ethnic background arrived on the scene and dominated them through conquest, settlement, or other means and who today live more in conformity with their own social, economic, and cultural customs and traditions than those of the country of which they now form a part (also referred to as “native,” “aboriginal,” or “tribal” peoples).

#### **Industrial Revolution**

A period of rapid industrial growth with far-reaching social and economic consequences, beginning in England during the second half of the 18th century and spreading to Europe and later to other countries including the United States. The invention of the steam engine was an important trigger of this development. The Industrial Revolution marks the beginning of a strong increase in the use of *fossil fuels* and emission of, in particular, fossil *carbon dioxide*. In this report, the terms “pre-industrial” and “industrial” refer, somewhat arbitrarily, to the periods before and after the year 1750, respectively.

#### **Inertia**

Delay, slowness, or resistance in the response of the *climate*, biological, or *human systems* to factors that alter their rate of change, including continuation of change in the system after the cause of that change has been removed.

#### **Infectious diseases**

Any disease that can be transmitted from one person to another. This may occur by direct physical contact, by common handling of an object that has picked up infective organisms, through a disease carrier, or by spread of infected droplets coughed or exhaled into the air.

#### **Infrastructure**

The basic equipment, utilities, productive enterprises, installations, institutions, and services essential for the development, operation, and growth of an organization,

<sup>14</sup> Definition taken from the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Current State and Trends Assessment Glossary, 2005

city, or nation. For example, roads; schools; electric, gas, and water utilities; transportation; communication; and legal systems would be all considered as infrastructure.

**Integrated assessment**

A method of analysis that combines results and models from the physical, biological, economic, and social sciences, and the interactions between these components, in a consistent framework, to evaluate the status and the consequences of environmental change and the policy responses to it.

**Introduced species**

A species occurring in an area outside its historically known natural range as a result of accidental dispersal by humans (also referred to as “*exotic species*” or “*alien species*”).

**Invasive species**

An *introduced species* that invades natural *habitats*.

**IPCC<sup>15</sup>**

A panel set up by the United Nations in 1988 to review scientific information on climate change. This panel involves over 2,000 of the world’s climate experts. Many of the climate change facts and future predictions we read about come from information reviewed by the IPCC.

## K

**Kyoto Protocol**

The Kyoto Protocol was adopted at the Third Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the *UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)* in 1997 in Kyoto, Japan. It contains legally binding commitments, in addition to those included in the UNFCCC. Countries

included in Annex B of the Protocol (most member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and those with economies in transition) agreed to reduce their *anthropogenic greenhouse gas* emissions (CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF<sub>6</sub>) by at least 5% below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012. The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005.

## L

**La Niña**

See *El Niño Southern Oscillation*.

**Land use**

The total of arrangements, activities, and inputs undertaken in a certain land cover type (a set of human actions). The social and economic purposes for which land is managed (e.g., grazing, timber extraction, and conservation).

**Land-use change**

A change in the use or management of land by humans, which may lead to a change in land cover. Land cover and land-use change may have an impact on the *albedo*, *evapotranspiration*, *sources*, and *sinks* of *greenhouse gases*, or other properties of the *climate system*, and may thus have an impact on *climate*, locally or globally.

**Landslide**

A mass of material that has slipped downhill by gravity, often assisted by water when the material is saturated; rapid movement of a mass of soil, rock, or debris down a slope.

**Likelihood**

The likelihood of an occurrence, an outcome or a result, where this can be estimated probabilistically, is expressed in this Report using a standard terminology, defined in the Introduction. See also *uncertainty* and *confidence*.

**Lyme disease**

<sup>15</sup> Definition taken from the Climate Change North Glossary at [http://www.climatechangenorth.ca/H1\\_Glossary.html](http://www.climatechangenorth.ca/H1_Glossary.html) on November 21, 2007.

A vector-borne disease caused by the spirochete *Borrelia burgdorferi* and transmitted by *Ixodes* ticks, commonly known as deer ticks. Symptoms include skin lesions, fatigue, fever, and chills, and if left untreated may later manifest itself in cardiac and neurological disorders, joint pain, and arthritis.

## M

### Maladaptation

Any changes in natural or *human systems* that inadvertently increase *vulnerability* to climatic *stimuli*; an *adaptation* that does not succeed in reducing vulnerability but increases it instead.

### Malaria

*Endemic* or *epidemic* parasitic disease caused by species of the genus *Plasmodium* (protozoa) and transmitted by mosquitoes of the genus *Anopheles*; produces high fever attacks and systemic disorders, and kills approximately 2 million people every year.

### Market barriers

In the context of *mitigation* of *climate change*, conditions that prevent or impede the diffusion of *cost-effective* technologies or practices that would mitigate *greenhouse gas emissions*.

### Market-based incentives

Measures intended to use price mechanisms (e.g., taxes and tradable permits) to reduce *greenhouse gas emissions*.

### Market impacts

Impacts that are linked to market transactions and directly affect *Gross Domestic Product* (a country's national accounts)—for example, changes in the supply and price of agricultural goods. See also *non-market impacts*.

### Mitigation

An *anthropogenic* intervention to reduce the *sources* or enhance the *sinks* of *greenhouse gases*.

### Mitigative capacity

The social, political, and economic structures and conditions that are required for effective *mitigation*.

### Morbidity

Rate of occurrence of disease or other health disorder within a population, taking account of the age-specific morbidity rates. Health outcomes include chronic disease incidence/prevalence, rates of hospitalization, primary care consultations, disability-days (i.e., days when absent from work), and prevalence of symptoms.

### Mortality

Rate of occurrence of death within a population within a specified time period; calculation of mortality takes account of age-specific death rates, and can thus yield measures of life expectancy and the extent of premature death.

## N

### Nitrogen oxides<sup>16</sup>

Compounds of nitrogen and oxygen produced by the burning of fossil fuels.

### No-regrets opportunities

See *no-regrets policy*.

### No-regret options

See *no-regrets policy*.

### No-regrets policy

One that would generate net social benefits whether or not there is *climate change*. No-regrets opportunities for *greenhouse gas emissions* reduction are defined as those options whose benefits such as reduced energy costs and reduced emissions of local/regional pollutants equal or exceed their costs to society, excluding the benefits of avoided climate change. No-regrets potential is defined as the gap between the *market potential* and the *socio-economic potential*.

<sup>16</sup> Definition from

[www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/95report/glossary.html](http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/95report/glossary.html) visited on November 21, 2007.



**Non-linearity**

A process is called “non-linear” when there is no simple proportional relation between cause and effect. The *climate system* contains many such non-linear processes, resulting in a system with a potentially very complex behavior. Such complexity may lead to *rapid climate change*.

**Non-market impacts**

Impacts that affect *ecosystems* or human welfare, but that are not directly linked to market transactions—for example, an increased risk of premature death. See also *market impacts*.

**North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO)**

The North Atlantic Oscillation consists of opposing variations of barometric pressure near Iceland and near the Azores. On average, a westerly current, between the Icelandic low pressure area and the Azores high pressure area, carries cyclones with their associated frontal systems towards Europe. However, the pressure difference between Iceland and the Azores fluctuates on *time scales* of days to decades, and can be reversed at times. It is the dominant mode of winter *climate variability* in the North Atlantic region, ranging from central North America to Europe.

**O****Ocean conveyor belt**

The theoretical route by which water circulates around the entire global ocean, driven by wind and the *thermohaline circulation*.

**Opportunity**

An opportunity is a situation or circumstance to decrease the gap between the *market potential* of any *technology* or practice and the *economic potential*, *socio-economic potential*, or *technological potential*.

**Opportunity costs**

The cost of an economic activity forgone by the choice of another activity.

**Ozone (O<sub>3</sub>)**

Ozone, the triatomic form of oxygen (O<sub>3</sub>), is a gaseous atmospheric constituent. In the *troposphere* it is created both naturally and by photochemical reactions involving gases resulting from human activities (photochemical “smog”). In high concentrations, tropospheric ozone can be harmful to a wide-range of living organisms. Tropospheric ozone acts as a *greenhouse gas*. In the *stratosphere*, ozone is created by the interaction between solar ultraviolet radiation and molecular oxygen (O<sub>2</sub>). Stratospheric ozone plays a decisive role in the stratospheric *radiative balance*. Its concentration is highest in the *ozone layer*. Depletion of stratospheric ozone, due to chemical reactions that may be enhanced by *climate change*, results in an increased ground-level flux of *ultraviolet-B radiation*. See also *Montreal Protocol* and *ozone layer*.

**P****Parameterization**

In *climate models*, this term refers to the technique of representing processes, that cannot be explicitly resolved at the spatial or temporal resolution of the model (sub-grid scale processes), by relationships between the area- or time-averaged effect of such sub-grid-scale processes and the larger scale flow.

**Pareto criterion/Pareto optimum**

A requirement or status that an individual’s welfare could not be further improved without making others in the society worse off.

**Particulates**

Very small solid exhaust particles emitted during the combustion of fossil and biomass fuels. Particulates may consist of a wide variety of substances. Of greatest concern for health are particulates of less than or



equal to 10nm and 2.5 nm in diameter, usually designated as PM10 and PM2.5, respectively.

**Pathogen**<sup>17</sup>

An agent that causes disease, especially a living microorganism such as a bacterium or fungus.

**Permafrost**

Perennially frozen ground that occurs wherever the temperature remains below 0°C for several years.

**Photochemical smog**

A mix of photochemical oxidant air pollutants produced by the reaction of sunlight with primary air pollutants, especially hydrocarbons.

**Point-source pollution**

Pollution resulting from any confined, discrete source, such as a pipe, ditch, tunnel, well, container, concentrated animal feeding operation, or floating craft. See also *non-point-source pollution*.

**Present value cost**

The sum of all costs over all time periods, with future costs discounted.

**Projection (generic)**

A projection is a potential future evolution of a quantity or set of quantities, often computed with the aid of a model. Projections are distinguished from “predictions” in order to emphasize that projections involve assumptions concerning, for example, future socio-economic and technological developments that may or may not be realized, and are therefore subject to substantial *uncertainty*. See also *climate projection* and *climate prediction*.

**Proxy**

A proxy *climate* indicator is a local record that is interpreted, using physical and biophysical principles, to represent some

combination of climate-related variations back in time. Climate-related data derived in this way are referred to as proxy data.

Examples of proxies are tree ring records, characteristics of corals, and various data derived from ice cores.

**Q**

**QALY (Quality Adjusted Life Year)**<sup>18</sup>

A measure of the outcome of actions (either individual or treatment interventions) in terms of their health impact. If an action gives a person an extra year of healthy life expectancy, that counts as one QALY. If an action gives a person an extra year of unhealthy life expectancy (partly disabled or in some distress), it has a value of less than one. Death is rated at zero.

**Quality of Life**<sup>19</sup>

A scientific measure of personal well-being. Categories used to define place-specific quality of life include the inter-related categories of economic conditions; natural resources, environment, and amenities; human health; public and private infrastructure; government and public safety; and social and cultural resources.

**R**

**Radiative forcing**

Radiative forcing is the change in the net vertical irradiance (expressed in Wm<sup>-2</sup>) at the *tropopause* due to an internal change or a change in the external forcing of the *climate system*, such as, for example, a change in the concentration of *carbon dioxide* or the output of the Sun. Usually

<sup>17</sup> *The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition*. Retrieved November 21, 2007, from Dictionary.com website: <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/pathogen>

<sup>18</sup> Definition taken from <http://www.aihw.gov.au/publications/health/ah96/ah96-x04.html> visited on November 21, 2007.

<sup>19</sup> Definition modified from text within Chapter 5 of this document.

radiative forcing is computed after allowing for stratospheric temperatures to readjust to radiative equilibrium, but with all tropospheric properties held fixed at their unperturbed values.

**Range shifts**

Climate change-induced changes in the geographical distributions of plants, animals and ecosystems

**Rapid climate change**

The *non-linearity* of the *climate system* may lead to rapid *climate change*, sometimes called abrupt events or even surprises. Some such abrupt events may be imaginable, such as a dramatic reorganization of the *thermohaline circulation*, rapid deglaciation, or massive melting of *permafrost* leading to fast changes in the *carbon cycle*. Others may be truly unexpected, as a consequence of a strong, rapidly changing, forcing of a non-linear system.

**Reference scenario**

See *baseline/reference*.

**Reinsurance**

The transfer of a portion of primary insurance risks to a secondary tier of insurers (reinsurers); essentially “insurance for insurers.”

**Relative sea level**

Sea level measured by a *tide gauge* with respect to the land upon which it is situated. See also *Mean Sea Level*.

**Revealed preference**<sup>20</sup>

The use of the value of expenditure to “reveal” the preference of a consumer or group of consumers for the bundle of goods they purchase compared to other bundles of equal or smaller value.

**Reservoir**

A component of the *climate system*, other than the *atmosphere*, that has the capacity to store, accumulate or release a substance of concern (e.g., carbon or a *greenhouse gas*).

Oceans, soils, and forests are examples of carbon reservoirs. The term also means an artificial or natural storage place for water, such as a lake, pond or *aquifer*, from which the water may be withdrawn for such purposes as irrigation or water supply.

**Resilience**

Amount of change a system can undergo without changing state.

**Response time**

The response time or adjustment time is the time needed for the *climate system* or its components to re-equilibrate to a new state, following a forcing resulting from external and internal processes or *feedbacks*. It is very different for various components of the climate system. The response time of the *troposphere* is relatively short, from days to weeks, whereas the *stratosphere* comes into equilibrium on a *time scale* of typically a few months. Due to their large heat capacity, the oceans have a much longer response time, typically decades, but up to centuries or millennia. The response time of the strongly coupled surface-troposphere system is, therefore, slow compared to that of the stratosphere, and mainly determined by the oceans. The *biosphere* may respond fast (e.g., to *droughts*), but also very slowly to imposed changes. See *lifetime* for a different definition of response time pertinent to the rate of processes affecting the concentration of trace gases.

**Rodent-borne disease**<sup>21</sup>

Disease that is transmitted between hosts by a rodent (e.g. bubonic plague, hantavirus).

**Runoff**

That part of precipitation that does not *evaporate* and is not *transpired*.

## S

**Salinization**

<sup>20</sup> Definition <http://www-personal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/r.html> visited on November 21, 2007.

<sup>21</sup> Definition modified from definition of vector-borne disease.

The accumulation of salts in soils.

**Salmonella**<sup>22</sup>

There are many different kinds of Salmonella bacteria. They pass from the feces of people or animals to other people or other animals and can cause diarrheal illness in humans. Salmonella has been known to cause illness for over 100 years. They were discovered by a American scientist named Salmon, for whom they are named.

**Saltwater intrusion/encroachment**

Displacement of fresh surface water or ground water by the advance of saltwater due to its greater density, usually in coastal and estuarine areas.

**Scenario (generic)**

A plausible and often simplified description of how the future may develop, based on a coherent and internally consistent set of assumptions about key driving forces (e.g., rate of *technology* change, prices) and relationships. Scenarios are neither predictions nor forecasts and sometimes may be based on a “narrative storyline.” Scenarios may be derived from *projections*, but are often based on additional information from other sources. See also *SRES scenarios*, *climate scenario*, and *emission scenarios*.

**Sea-level rise**

An increase in the mean level of the ocean. Eustatic sea-level rise is a change in global average sea level brought about by an alteration to the volume of the world ocean. *Relative sealevel* rise occurs where there is a net increase in the level of the ocean relative to local land movements. Climate modelers largely concentrate on estimating eustatic sea-level change. *Impact* researchers focus on relative sea-level change.

**Seawall**

A human-made wall or embankment along a shore to prevent wave *erosion*.

**Semi-arid regions**

*Ecosystems* that have more than 250 mm precipitation per year but are not highly productive; usually classified as *rangelands*.

**Sensitivity**

Sensitivity is the degree to which a system is affected, either adversely or beneficially, by climate-related *stimuli*. The effect may be direct (e.g., a change in crop yield in response to a change in the mean, range, or variability of temperature) or indirect (e.g., damages caused by an increase in the frequency of coastal flooding due to *sea-level rise*). See also *climate sensitivity*.

**Sequential decision making**

Stepwise decision making aiming to identify short-term strategies in the face of long-term uncertainties, by incorporating additional information over time and making mid-course corrections.

**Sequestration**

The process of increasing the carbon content of a carbon *reservoir* other than the *atmosphere*. Biological approaches to sequestration include direct removal of *carbon dioxide* from the atmosphere through *land-use change*, *afforestation*, *reforestation*, and practices that enhance soil carbon in agriculture. Physical approaches include separation and disposal of carbon dioxide from flue gases or from processing *fossil fuels* to produce hydrogen- and carbon dioxide-rich fractions and longterm storage in underground in depleted oil and gas reservoirs, coal seams, and saline *aquifers*. See also *uptake*.

**Sink**

Any process, activity or mechanism that removes a *greenhouse gas*, an *aerosol*, or a *precursor* of a greenhouse gas or aerosol from the *atmosphere*.

**Smog**<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Definition modified from information on the CDC’s website:

[http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/salmonellosis\\_g.htm#What%20sort%20of%20germ%20is%20Salmonella](http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/salmonellosis_g.htm#What%20sort%20of%20germ%20is%20Salmonella) visited on November 21, 2007.

<sup>23</sup> Definition from The U.S. EPA’s Terms of Environment Glossary at

Air pollution typically associated with oxidants.

**Snowpacks**

A seasonal accumulation of slow-melting snow.

**Social cost**

The social cost of an activity includes the *value* of all the *resources* used in its provision. Some of these are priced and others are not. Non-priced resources are referred to as externalities. It is the sum of the costs of these externalities and the priced resources that makes up the social cost. See also *private cost* and *total cost*.

**Social indicators**<sup>24</sup>

Broad, standardized measures of the quality of life or other socio-economic conditions of geographic areas such as nations, metropolitan areas, or other areas; used to assess health conditions, educational levels, food availability, violence, and other conditions.

**Socio-economic scenarios**

*Scenarios* concerning future conditions in terms of population, *Gross Domestic Product* and other socio-economic factors relevant to understanding the implications of *climate change*. See *SRES scenarios*.

**Source**

Any process, activity, or mechanism that releases a *greenhouse gas*, an *aerosol*, or a *precursor* of a greenhouse gas or aerosol into the *atmosphere*.

**Southern Oscillation**

See *El Niño Southern Oscillation*.

**Spatial and temporal scales**

*Climate* may vary on a large range of spatial and temporal scales. Spatial scales may range from local (less than 100,000 km<sup>2</sup>), through regional (100,000 to 10 million km<sup>2</sup>) to continental (10 to 100 million km<sup>2</sup>). Temporal scales may range from seasonal to

geological (up to hundreds of millions of years).

**SRES scenarios**

SRES scenarios are *emissions scenarios* developed by Nakicenovic *et al.* (2000) and used, among others, as a basis for the *climate projections* in the IPCC WGI contribution to the Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001a). The following terms are relevant for a better understanding of the structure and use of the set of SRES scenarios:

**(Scenario) Family:** Scenarios that have a similar demographic, societal, economic, and technical-change *storyline*. Four scenario families comprise the SRES scenario set: A1, A2, B1, and B2.

**(Scenario) Group:** Scenarios within a family that reflect a consistent variation of the *storyline*. The A1 scenario family includes four groups designated as A1T, A1C, A1G, and A1B that explore alternative structures of future energy systems.

In the Summary for Policymakers of Nakicenovic *et al.* (2000), the A1C and A1G groups have been combined into one “Fossil-Intensive” A1FI scenario group. The other three scenario families consist of one group each. The SRES scenario set reflected in the Summary for Policymakers of Nakicenovic *et al.* (2000) thus consist of six distinct *scenario groups*, all of which are equally sound and together capture the range of uncertainties associated with driving forces and emissions.

**Illustrative Scenario:** A scenario that is illustrative for each of the six *scenario groups* reflected in the Summary for Policymakers of Nakicenovic *et al.* (2000). They include four revised *scenario markers* for the *scenario groups* A1B, A2, B1, B2, and two additional scenarios for the A1FI and A1T groups. All *scenario groups* are equally sound.

**(Scenario) Marker:** A scenario that was originally posted in draft form on the SRES

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<http://www.epa.gov/OCEPAterms/sterms.html>

visited on November 21, 2007.

<sup>24</sup> Definition from <http://srmdc.net/glossary.htm#>

visited on November 21, 2007.

website to represent a given *scenario family*. The choice of markers was based on which of the initial quantifications best reflected the storyline, and the features of specific models. Markers are no more likely than other scenarios, but are considered by the SRES writing team as illustrative of a particular storyline. They are included in revised form in Nakicenovic *et al.* (2000). These scenarios have received the closest scrutiny of the entire writing team and via the SRES open process. Scenarios have also been selected to illustrate the other two *scenario groups*.

**(Scenario) Storyline:** A narrative description of a scenario (or family of scenarios) highlighting the main scenario characteristics, relationships between key driving forces, and the dynamics of their evolution.

#### **Stabilization**

The achievement of stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of one or more *greenhouse gases* (e.g., *carbon dioxide* or a *CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent* basket of greenhouse gases).

#### **Stakeholder**

A person or an organization that has a legitimate interest in a project or entity, or would be affected by a particular action or policy.

#### **Stated preference**<sup>25</sup>

*Stated preference* approaches, sometimes referred to as direct valuation approaches, are survey methods that estimate the value individuals place on particular non-market goods based on choices they make in hypothetical markets

#### **Stimuli (climate-related)**

All the elements of *climate change*, including mean *climate* characteristics, *climate variability*, and the frequency and magnitude of extremes.

#### **Storm surge**

The temporary increase, at a particular locality, in the height of the sea due to extreme meteorological conditions (low atmospheric pressure and/or strong winds). The storm surge is defined as being the excess above the level expected from the tidal variation alone at that time and place.

#### **Storyline**

See *SRES scenarios*.

#### **Streamflow**

Water within a river channel, usually expressed in m<sup>3</sup> sec<sup>-1</sup>.

#### **Stratosphere**

The highly stratified region of the *atmosphere* above the *troposphere* extending from about 10 km (ranging from 9 km in high latitudes to 16 km in the tropics on average) to about 50 km.

#### **Submergence**

A rise in the water level in relation to the land, so that areas of formerly dry land become inundated; it results either from a sinking of the land or from a rise of the water level.

#### **Subsidence**

The sudden sinking or gradual downward settling of the Earth's surface with little or no horizontal motion.

#### **Subsidy**

Direct payment from the government to an entity, or a tax reduction to that entity, for implementing a practice the government wishes to encourage. *Greenhouse gas emissions* can be reduced by lowering existing subsidies that have the effect of raising emissions, such as subsidies to *fossil-fuel* use, or by providing subsidies for practices that reduce emissions or enhance *sinks* (e.g., for insulation of buildings or planting trees).

#### **Sustainable development**

Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.

<sup>25</sup> Definition taken from SAP 4.6.

# T

## Technology

A piece of equipment or a technique for performing a particular activity.

## Thermal erosion

The *erosion* of ice-rich *permafrost* by the combined thermal and mechanical action of moving water.

## Thermal expansion

In connection with sea level, this refers to the increase in volume (and decrease in density) that results from warming water. A warming of the ocean leads to an expansion of the ocean volume and hence an increase in sea level.

## Thermohaline circulation

Large-scale density-driven circulation in the ocean, caused by differences in temperature and salinity. In the North Atlantic, the thermohaline circulation consists of warm surface water flowing northward and cold deepwater flowing southward, resulting in a net poleward transport of heat. The surface water sinks in highly restricted sinking regions located in high latitudes.

## Threshold

The level of magnitude of a system process at which sudden or rapid change occurs. A point or level at which new properties emerge in an ecological, economic or other system, invalidating predictions based on mathematical relationships that apply at lower levels.

## Time-series studies<sup>26</sup>

Studies done using a set of data that expresses a particular variable measured over time.

## Top-down models

The terms “top” and “bottom” are shorthand for aggregate and disaggregated models. The top-down label derives from how modelers

applied macro-economic theory and econometric techniques to historical data on consumption, prices, incomes, and factor costs to model final demand for goods and services, and supply from main sectors, like the energy sector, transportation, agriculture, and industry. Therefore, top-down models evaluate the system from aggregate economic variables, as compared to *bottom-up models* that consider technological options or project specific *climate change mitigation* policies. Some technology data were, however, integrated into top-down analysis and so the distinction is not that clear-cut.

## Total cost

All items of cost added together. The total cost to society is made up of both the *external cost* and the *private cost*, which together are defined as *social cost*.

## Trade effects

Economic impacts of changes in the purchasing power of a bundle of exported goods of a country for bundles of goods imported from its trade partners. Climate policies change the relative production costs and may change terms of trade substantially enough to change the ultimate economic balance.

## Transient climate response

The globally averaged surface air temperature increase, averaged over a 20-year period, centered at the time of CO<sub>2</sub> doubling (i.e., at year 70 in a 1% per year compound CO<sub>2</sub> increase experiment with a global coupled *climate model*).

## Troposphere

The lowest part of the *atmosphere* from the surface to about 10 km in altitude in mid-latitudes (ranging from 9 km in high latitudes to 16 km in the tropics on average) where clouds and “weather” phenomena occur. In the troposphere, temperatures generally decrease with height.

## Tundra

<sup>26</sup> Definition modified from the definition of time-series data from the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005.



A treeless, level, or gently undulating plain characteristic of arctic and subarctic regions.

## U

### Uncertainty

An expression of the degree to which a value (e.g., the future state of the *climate system*) is unknown. Uncertainty can result from lack of information or from disagreement about what is known or even knowable. It may have many types of sources, from quantifiable errors in the data to ambiguously defined concepts or terminology, or uncertain *projections* of human behavior. Uncertainty can therefore be represented by quantitative measures (e.g., a range of values calculated by various models) or by qualitative statements (e.g., reflecting the judgment of a team of experts). See Moss and Schneider (2000). See also *confidence* and *likelihood*.

### Unique and threatened systems

Entities that are confined to a relatively narrow geographical range but can affect other, often larger entities beyond their range; narrow geographical range points to *sensitivity* to environmental variables, including *climate*, and therefore attests to potential *vulnerability* to *climate change*.

### United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

The Convention was adopted on 9 May 1992, in New York, and signed at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro by more than 150 countries and the European Community. Its ultimate objective is the ‘stabilization of *greenhouse gas* concentrations in the *atmosphere* at a level that would prevent dangerous *anthropogenic* interference with the *climate system*’. It contains commitments for all Parties. Under the Convention, Parties included in Annex I aim to return greenhouse gas emissions not controlled by the Montreal Protocol to 1990 levels by the year 2000. The Convention

entered in force in March 1994. See also *Kyoto Protocol*.

### Urban Heat Island Effect<sup>27</sup>

The urban heat island effect is a measurable increase in ambient urban air temperatures resulting primarily from the replacement of vegetation with buildings, roads, and other heat-absorbing infrastructure. The heat island effect can result in significant temperature differences between rural and urban areas.

### Urbanization

The conversion of land from a natural state or managed natural state (such as agriculture) to cities; a process driven by net rural-to-urban migration through which an increasing percentage of the population in any nation or region come to live in settlements that are defined as “urban centers”.

## V

### Valley Fever (Coccidiomycosis)<sup>28</sup>

An infectious respiratory disease of humans and other animals caused by inhaling the fungus *Coccidioides immitis*. It is characterized by fever and various respiratory symptoms. Also called coccidiomycosis.

### Valuation<sup>29</sup>

The process of expressing a value for a particular good or service in a certain context (e.g., of decision-making) usually in terms of something that can be counted, often money, but also through methods and

<sup>27</sup> Definition from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Heat Island Glossary, <http://www.epa.gov/hiri/resources/glossary.html#h>, visited on November 21, 2007.

<sup>28</sup> *The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition*. Retrieved November 21, 2007, from Dictionary.com website:

[http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/valley\\_fever](http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/valley_fever).

<sup>29</sup> Definition taken from the glossary of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005.

measures from other disciplines (sociology, ecology, and so on). See also Values.

**Value added**

The net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs.

**Value of a statistical life (VSL)<sup>30</sup>**

The sum of what people would pay to reduce their risk of dying by small amounts that, together, add up to one statistical life.

**Values**

Worth, desirability, or utility based on individual preferences. The total value of any resource is the sum of the values of the different individuals involved in the use of the resource. The values, which are the foundation of the estimation of costs, are measured in terms of the willingness to pay (WTP) by individuals to receive the resource or by the willingness of individuals to accept payment (WTA) to part with the resource.

**Vector**

An organism, such as an insect, that transmits a pathogen from one host to another. See also *vector-borne diseases*.

**Vector-borne diseases**

Disease that is transmitted between hosts by a *vector* organism such as a mosquito or tick (e.g., *malaria*, *dengue fever*, and *leishmaniasis*).

**Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs)<sup>31</sup>**

Organic compounds that evaporate readily into the air. VOCs include substances such as benzene, toluene, methylene chloride, and methyl chloroform.

**Vulnerability**

The degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of *climate change*, including *climate variability* and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate

variation to which a system is exposed, its *sensitivity*, and its *adaptive capacity*.

## W

**Water consumption**

Amount of extracted water irretrievably lost during its use (by *evaporation* and goods production). Water consumption is equal to water withdrawal minus return flow.

**Water stress**

A country is water-stressed if the available freshwater supply relative to water withdrawals acts as an important constraint on development. Withdrawals exceeding 20% of renewable water supply has been used as an indicator of water stress.

**Water-use efficiency**

Carbon gain in *photosynthesis* per unit water lost in *evapotranspiration*. It can be expressed on a short-term basis as the ratio of photosynthetic carbon gain per unit transpirational water loss, or on a seasonal basis as the ratio of *net primary production* or agricultural yield to the amount of available water.

**Water withdrawal**

Amount of water extracted from water bodies.

**Waterborne diseases<sup>32</sup>**

Diseases contracted through contact with water that is infected with any of numerous pathogens including *Vibrio cholerae*, *Campylobacter*, *Salmonella*, *Shigella*, and the diarrheogenic *Escherichia coli*.

**Watershed<sup>33</sup>**

The land area that drains into a particular watercourse or body of water. Sometimes used to describe the dividing line of high ground between two catchment basins.

<sup>30</sup> Definition taken from SAP4.6.

<sup>31</sup> Definition from ATSDR's Glossary of Terms at <http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/glossary.html#G-T-> visited on November 21, 2007.

<sup>32</sup> Definition modified from information on CDC's website

[http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/waterbornediseases\\_t.htm](http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/waterbornediseases_t.htm) visited on November 21, 2007.

<sup>33</sup> Definition taken from the glossary of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005.



**Welfare**

An economic term used to describe the state of well-being of humans on an individual or collective basis. The constituents of well-being are commonly considered to include materials to satisfy basic needs, freedom and choice, health, good social relations, and security.

**Well-being**<sup>34</sup>

A context- and situation-dependent state, comprising basic material for a good life, freedom and choice, health and bodily well-being, good social relations, security, peace of mind, and spiritual experience.

**West Nile virus**<sup>35</sup>

West Nile virus (WNV) is a single-stranded RNA virus of the family Flaviviridae, genus Flavivirus. The main lifecycle of WNV is between birds and insects. Humans are most often infected by a bite from an infected mosquito. Most people infected with WNV don't show any symptoms, whereas those that do are often diagnosed with West Nile Fever which can last up to two weeks.

**Z****Zoonoses**

Diseases and infections which are naturally transmitted between vertebrate animals and people. See also *zoonotic disease*.

**Zoonotic disease**

A disease that normally exists in other vertebrates but also infects humans, such as dengue fever, avian flu, west Nile virus and bubonic plague.

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<sup>34</sup> Definition modified from the Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, Current State and Trends Assessment Glossary, 2005

<sup>35</sup> Definition modified from information on <http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/index.htm>