Detailed Information on the
Space-based Communications Programs Assessment

Continue monitoring milestones for schedule compliance to ensure programmatic adjustments can be made to address potential problems in a timely and efficient manner (e.g., missed milestones, operational availability gaps).

Continue monitoring earned value management system data and program manager estimates as reported in selected acquisition reports to address cost or schedule issues in a timely and efficient manner (e.g., schedule delays, cost overruns).

Evaluate and reallocate MILSATCOM portfolio resources to delivery the SATCOM capabilities necessary to satisfy validated warfighting requirements in response to the redirection received during development of the FY09 President's Budget Request.

Within the Wideband MILSATCOM Mission Area, complete WGS Block I replenishment of the currently operational DSCS constellation, providing enhanced capabilities to the warfighter.

Within the Protected MILSATCOM Mission Area, update the operational availability gap analyses identifying probability and timing of potential future coverage gaps.

Within the Narrowband MILSATCOM Mission Area, begin MUOS replenishment of the currently operational UFO constellation, sustaining global coverage and providing enhanced capabilities to the warfighter.

Measure: Protected MILSATCOM Mission Area (Space Segment) Operational Availability

Explanation:Statistical estimate of the date when a potential gap in operational availability could occur in the Protected MILSATCOM Mission Area. Target value is "no gap." Potential gap date is based upon the estimated remaining life of the currently deployed MILSATCOM space segment systems and the planned dates for operational availability of the successor systems still in procurement.

Measure: Narrowband MILSATCOM Mission Area (Space Segment) Operational Availability

Explanation:Statistical estimate of the date when a potential gap in operational availability could occur in the Narrowband MILSATCOM Mission Area. Target value is "no gap." Potential gap date is based upon the estimated remaining life of the currently deployed MILSATCOM space segment systems and the planned dates for operational availability of the successor systems still in procurement.

Measure: Mobile Users Objective System (MUOS) Cost Performance Index (CPI) / Earned Value Management System (EVMS) Data

Explanation:Cost Performance Measure. The prime contractor reports this information to the MILSATCOM Joint Program Office and applicable government Program Manager on a monthly basis. This data is used in trend analysis. That is, for this period, how is the cost efficiency of the system procurement doing against the integrated baseline and also as compared to other periods. It also flags potential cost overruns that may be emerging on a particular part of the system procurement.

Measure: Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Cost Performance Index (CPI) / Earned Value Management System (EVMS) Data

Explanation:Cost Performance Measure. The prime contractor reports this information to the MILSATCOM Joint Program Office and applicable government Program Manager on a monthly basis. This data is used in trend analysis. That is, for this period, how is the cost efficiency of the system procurement doing against the integrated baseline and also as compared to other periods. It also flags potential cost overruns that may be emerging on a particular part of the system procurement.

Measure: Mobile Users Objective System (MUOS) Schedule Performance Index (SPI) / Earned Value Management System (EVMS) Data

Explanation:Schedule Performance Measure. The prime contractor reports this information to the MILSATCOM Joint Program Office and applicable government Program Manager on a monthly basis. This data is used in trend analysis. That is, for this period, how is the schedule adherence of the system procurement doing against the integrated baseline and also as compared to other periods. It also flags potential schedule delays that may be emerging on a particular part of the system procurement.

Measure: Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Schedule Performance Index (SPI) / Earned Value Management System (EVMS) Data

Explanation:Schedule Performance Measure. The prime contractor reports this information to the MILSATCOM Joint Program Office and applicable government Program Manager on a monthly basis. This data is used in trend analysis. That is, for this period, how is the schedule adherence of the system procurement doing against the integrated baseline and also as compared to other periods. It also flags potential schedule delays that may be emerging on a particular part of the system procurement.

Measure: Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Projected system procurement effort cost (year end Selected Acquisition Report) against baselined cost (Acquisition Program Baseline).

Explanation:Annually, the Department reports to Congress the latest projected cost at completion for systems in procurement (the Selected Acquisition Report). The latest projections, compared against the Acquisition Program Baseline, provides information over time about how well resources are being spent. [Total Acquisition Cost, Base Year 2002 Dollars.]

Measure: Mobile Users Objective System (MUOS) Projected system procurement effort cost (year end Selected Acquisition Report) against baselined cost (Acquisition Program Baseline).

Explanation:Annually, the Department reports to Congress the latest projected cost at completion for systems in procurement (the Selected Acquisition Report). The latest projections, compared against the Acquisition Program Baseline, provides information over time about how well resources are being spent. [Total Acquisition Cost, Base Year 2004 Dollars.]

Measure: Successfully deployment of the Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT).

Explanation:For every engineering effort there are a series of milestone "gates" that must be passed through to result in a successful final product. The TSAT system procurement effort must accomplish this series of milestone events prior to successful deployment of the new SATCOM capabilities. Goals and targets for this measure are measured in fiscal year performance periods. [TSAT Acquisition Milestones: System Design Review (SDR), Preliminary Design Review (PDR), Critical Design Review (CDR), Initial Launch Capability (ILC), Initial Operational Capability (IOC).]

Measure: Successfully deployment of the Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminal (FAB-T).

Explanation:For every engineering effort there are a series of milestone "gates" that must be passed through to result in a successful final product. The FAB-T system procurement effort must accomplish this series of milestone events prior to successful deployment of the new SATCOM terminal capabilities. Goals and targets for this measure are measured in fiscal year performance periods. [FAB-T Increment 1 Acquisition Milestones: System Design Review (SDR), Preliminary Design Review (PDR), Critical Design Review (CDR), Low Rate Initial Production Decision, Full Rate Production Decision.]

Measure: Protected MILSATCOM Mission Area Bandwidth Availability (Space Segment)

Explanation:Within each MILSATCOM mission area, the radio frequency spectrum available for satellite communications is fixed. Over time, the successor systems and constellations of satellites to those currently deployed are intended to provide more bandwidth through more efficiently using the allocated and assigned spectrum. [Measurement taken at end of Calendar Year]

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: The Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) program purpose is clear. MILSATCOM's mission is to provide global, space-based communications capabilities supporting Department of Defense (DoD) and other government agency missions. One of the DoD's most crucial goals is to create an interoperable "system of systems" aimed toward enhanced command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I). The two most critical elements for achieving this goal are global connectivity and interoperable systems. MILSATCOM systems are built to satisfy requirements provided by warfighters and user communities. These requirements are documented in Operational Requirements Documents (ORDs) or Capability Development Documents (CDDs) that are vetted and validated through the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff serves as the user advocate, advising the Secretary of Defense by identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military capability needs. The MILSATCOM portfolio consists of the following mission areas and systems. First is the narrowband SATCOM mission area that includes the UHF Follow-On (UFO) system and Mobile User Objective System (MUOS). Narrowband SATCOM provides reliable service to mobile users. The wideband mission area includes the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), Wideband Gapfiller System (WGS), and Global Broadcast Service (GBS). Wideband SATCOM provides broadcast service, similar to DIRECTV, and high capacity data pipes. The protected mission area is supported by Milstar, Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF), and Polar MILSATCOM. Protected SATCOM provides highly secure and survivable communications. The Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) is a next generation MILSATCOM system, following WGS and AEHF. It will support both the protected and wideband mission areas. In addition to the satellite systems, MILSATCOM includes a terminals segment. The different SATCOM terminals communicate with one or more of the satellite systems. Examples include the Milstar Command Post Terminal, Secure Mobile Anti-Jam Reliable Tactical Terminal (SMART-T), Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T), DSCS and GBS Terminals, Ground Multi-band Terminal (GMT), Airborne Integrated Terminal (AIT), Navy Multi-band Terminal (NMT), Warfighter Information Network - Tactical (WIN-T), High Capacity Communications Capability (HC3), and Multi-Band Multi-Mode Radio (MBMMR).

Evidence: The WGS ORD (May 2000) states the need to provide a flexible, capable, and secure communications capability that can rapidly support the command and control (C2) requirements of highly mobile joint U.S. forces around the world. The Global Broadcast Service Joint ORD (Jan 2005) states the need to provide a continuous, high-speed, one-way flow of high volume information to deployed, on the move, or garrisoned forces?? supporting routine operations, training and military exercises, special activities, crisis, situational awareness, weapons targeting, intelligence, and the transition to and conduct of opposed operations short of nuclear war. The MUOS ORD (Jul 2001) notes that mobile user beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) MILSATCOM is critical to ensuring the dissemination of information to friendly forces. The AEHF ORD (Oct 2000) states the need to provide essential, survivable, enduring, anti-jam, communications to?? command and control strategic and tactical forces in all levels of conflict through nuclear war. The TSAT CDD (Jan 2004) states the need to provide the survivable and endurable communications to support national and senior leaders through the spectrum of conflict, including nuclear C2 and homeland defense; protected wideband satellite communications (SATCOM) connectivity required to support the C2 and information needs of strategic and joint tactical forces deployed worldwide; and SATCOM connectivity needed to support the day-to-day operations of the DoD and other authorized users. The Advanced Wideband Terminals ORD (Mar 2004) recognizes the diverse missions performed by platforms in the DoD inventory require communication systems that support voice, data, and video, as well as properly protecting information at various classification levels. These systems must communicate at various data rates, operate in line-of-sight and/or BLOS environments while stationary, and also when moving, and meet conventional and nuclear requirements.

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: Military forces are dependent on space-based communications systems to access essential information in the execution of land, sea, air, and space operations. Satellite communications (SATCOM) systems are used primarily for establishing or augmenting telecommunications in areas lacking terrestrial infrastructure, for users requiring beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) connectivity, and for users requiring a communications-on-the-move (COTM) capability. SATCOM systems provide command and control (C2) for warfighters and other authorized users and survivable communications for Presidential support, strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces, and coalition/allied operations. Execution of these missions requires a flexible, capable, and secure communications capability that can rapidly support the C2 requirements of highly mobile joint U.S. forces around the world. Space-based C2 and communications give deployed U.S. forces a decisive military advantage. Further, they often offer the only communications means to support on-going operations. Rapid access to information gives our forces in the field greater situational awareness - a decisive advantage that results in more effective mission operations with fewer friendly losses. The current DoD SATCOM systems were designed and built to support the military requirements and weapon systems envisioned ten to twenty years ago. The vision for how to conduct warfighting and other military activities has changed dramatically over time. The "Information Age" represented by the Internet, the availability of and access to data from multiple sources, and the near real-time combination of this data into an understandable snapshot of the situation is bringing about a revolution in military affairs (RMA). This RMA includes new information-intensive, highly mobile warfighting concepts that require vast increases in the amount of throughput available to move information around in a timely manner. The current systems and envisioned commercial systems will not be able to fully provide the coverage, capacity, protection, access and control, interoperability, flexibility, and quality of service needed to support tomorrow's dynamic operations. MILSATCOM systems under development - the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), Wideband Gapfiller System (WGS), Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF), Enhanced Polar System, Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT), Secure Mobile Anti-Jam Reliable Tactical Terminal (SMART-T), and Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) - are being built to address this need.

Evidence: The Mission Need Statement (MNS) for Military Satellite (23 Apr 1996) identifies the DoD need for military satellite communications (MILSATCOM); it also provides the foundation for the DoD's future advanced SATCOM capability. CJCSI 6250.01, Satellite Communications, provides high-level operational policy, guidance, and procedures for planning, management, employment, and use of SATCOM resources for the DoD. The DoD SATCOM Database (SDB) tracks all SATCOM requirements from various operational users/platforms (both current and planned). All MILSATCOM systems are acquired to meet user needs identified in ORDs or CDDs.

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: The requirements for the military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) mission areas and associated systems has been carefully assessed through the DoD's Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) review process to evaluate existing systems or solutions that meet warfighter needs before building new capabilities. The different MILSATCOM mission areas (narrowband, protected, wideband SATCOM) have few overlaps; the systems comprising each mission area support different users. Within a given mission area, there is sometimes overlap among MILSATCOM, commercial satellite communications, and other U.S. Government SATCOM systems; however, these overlaps are acceptable. Typically, only the MILSATCOM systems are built to be available in the most stressing environments, when the DoD most needs SATCOM capabilities. These stressing environments could include situations requiring communications with low probability of detection, interception, or exploitation; natural or human caused jamming environments; or assured communications availability after a nuclear blast. MILSATCOM's missions have been tailored and optimized to minimize redundancies, focusing upon 1. supporting national security user requirements for essential, survivable, enduring, anti-jam, communications to strategic and tactical forces at all levels of conflict through nuclear war (protected SATCOM); 2. providing large bandwidth SATCOM connectivity required to support the command and control and information needs of strategic and joint tactical forces deployed worldwide (wideband SATCOM); and 3. supporting disadvantaged mobile user requirements for essential, accessible, jam resistant, communications to strategic, tactical, and support organizations at all levels of conflict, including joint and coalition forces worldwide (narrowband SATCOM). Attempting to further reduce duplication, in 2003, the Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA) was released, identifying gaps, overlaps, redundancies, and other issues among MILSATCOM, other Government SATCOM systems, and commercial services. This document is approved by the warfighter, via the JROC, and used to help guide future MILSATCOM development efforts. The TCA is reviewed and revised bi-annually. It not only tracks changes, but also provides direction on how the MILSATCOM systems, in conjunction with the commercial and other Government SATCOM systems, should be integrated together to achieve an interoperable, multi-segment satellite communications architecture. At a local level, the MILSATCOM Joint Program Office (MJPO) has implemented several initiatives to eliminate redundant or duplicative efforts such as the stand-up of the MJPO Chief Engineer and the System of Systems Engineering, Architecture and Integration group; the MJPO Configuration Board; weekly senior-level functional reviews and discussions; and the MILSATCOM Integrated Master Schedule. The MJPO also conducts Financial, Technical and Contracting Brown Bag Reviews every four to six weeks where status of all MILSATCOM Program Control issues, technical issues and contract actions are presented to MJPO managers. The purpose is to assess real-time financial status, earned value metrics, and technical issues, as well as contract actions in progress, to assess timelines and progress by members of various functions. This allows various program managers and cross-cutting directorate chiefs access to MJPO-wide information for decision-making.

Evidence: The role for MILSATCOM is outlined in the Mission Needs Statement (MNS) for Military Satellite (23 Apr 1996), the Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA), version 1.0 (17 Dec 2003), and MILSATCOM systems' Operational Requirements Documents and Capability Development Documents.

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: The operational Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) programs have no major performance limiting design flaws. The next generation systems are being developed to meet criteria provided by the user community. However, there are issues concerning on-orbit deficiencies and limitations that are being resolved to maintain optimal mission performance, and to reduce the risk of coverage gaps between today and when the next generation systems are launched and available. The failure of Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Follow-On (UFO) satellite F3 in June 2005 resulted in a predicted UHF SATCOM availability gap of four months (as of June 2006), from December 2009 until the first Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) satellite is launched and available for operations in March 2010. Additionally, there are inherent trade-offs between the current and future systems, which drive changes to the larger MILSATCOM program. Following the failure of Milstar flight 3, AEHF was accelerated to complete worldwide protected SATCOM coverage. This decision forced significant adjustments to AEHF flight 1, including a transition to an operations plan that is less than optimal. These changes resulted in an addition of an AEHF requirement to be backwards compatible with Milstar. An external issue with significant impacts to the MILSATCOM program is the decision-making process associated with emerging warfighting approaches and systems having significant communications requirements. For any MILSATCOM system procurement effort, requirements for that system must be established several years prior to completion and delivery of the system to successfully incorporate the technology and techniques needed to satisfy the requirements. As an example, today, there are emerging requirements in the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) arena that will require significant communications capability to successfully prosecute the missions; however, the decision about what systems are expected to satisfy those requirements remains unknown. Timely, strategic level decisions about how communications requirements are being allocated to MILSATCOM, other government, and commercial communications systems is essential to ensure the communications capability will be there when it is needed. The MILSATCOM program office is actively participating in the Airborne ISR Analysis of Alternatives that will determine the approaches by which AISR communications requirements might be best satisfied, helping to move forward the decision-making process. There is also an ongoing challenge to synchronize the availability of the communications satellites and the user terminals that are required to access the communication services provided by the satellites. In addition to staying in sync with the satellites, the terminals must stay in sync with the user platforms on which they will be deployed (for example, Army tanks, Navy ships, Air Force bombers). This issue is often beyond the control of the MILSATCOM program, with changes to terminals deployment schedules or configurations resulting from changes in the platform delivery schedules, changing warfighter needs and priorities, or Congressional or DoD funding reductions. This issue is recognized by the DoD. The Joint Terminal Engineering Office (JTEO) monitors satellite/terminal synchronization issues and, semi-annually, reports out preexisting and new conflicts so they can be addressed.

Evidence: The MILSATCOM program office, spacecraft and sensor contractors, and user community have gauged operational performance of the deployed MILSATCOM systems. Performance limiting deficiencies have been identified and steps are being taken by all stakeholders to resolve known deficiencies. Acquisition Program Baselines (APBs) establish technical, schedule, and cost thresholds the MILSATCOM systems must achieve. Operational Requirements Documents (ORDs), Capability Development Documents (CDDs), Test and Evaluation Master Plans (TEMPs), Single Acquisition Management Plans (SAMPs), and other documents provide the organizational structure for the deployment of the next generation MILSATCOM systems. Various ongoing independent cost reviews take place on a monthly, quarterly, and yearly basis to ensure resources are in place to achieve program objectives. The JTEO produces the semi-annual National Security SATCOM System Synchronization Roadmap (NS4R), reporting satellite/terminal synchronization issues. The Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA) is reviewed and revised bi-annually. It not only tracks changes, but also provides direction on how the MILSATCOM systems, in conjunction with the commercial and other U.S. Government SATCOM systems, should be integrated together to achieve an interoperable, multi-segment satellite communications architecture. Emerging user requirements, including the desire for Internet-like capabilities and ISR data relay are formally recorded in the Satellite Data Base and refined through mechanisms including Integrated Product Teams, Analysis of Alternative studies and Cost As an Independent Variable working groups. Functional Availability Reports (FARs), generated for each MILSATCOM mission area project the combined availability of currently operational and future systems to help determine when capability gaps might occur and the timing for satellite replenishment. Also see National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01, dated 27 Dec 2004 and DoDI 5000.1, the Defense Acquisition System, dated 12 May 2003.

Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?

Explanation: Warfighters, including joint and coalition forces, and other national security users are Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) program's intended beneficiaries. End users will interface with only a small portion of the MILSATCOM enterprise, using a MILSATCOM Terminal to access and use a satellite based communications signal. Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) are used as a tool between the end users, requirements developers, and system builders to achieve common understanding on what capability the user needs and how they plan to use it. Types of CONOPS include those associated with the MILSATCOM program enterprise (for example, the Transformational Communications Architecture CONOPS), approaches to communications of which MILSATCOM is only a piece (Joint CONOPS for Global Information Grid Network Operations (NetOps); Command and Control Constellation Operational Concept), and specific MILSATCOM systems (Wideband Gapfiller System CONOPS, Advanced Extremely High Frequency CONOPS). During development, MILSATCOM systems use forums with representation from the acquisition and operational communities (for example, the TSAT Users Forum), to ensure the needs of the system's beneficiaries are supported. These venues vet issues and propose end-user agreements to courses of action that typically are raised to senior level decision bodies such as the satellite communications (SATCOM) Senior Warfighters' Forum (SWarF). The SATCOM SWarF, composed of senior operational leaders from the Combatant Commands and the Services, as well as representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other Agencies, ensure that program resources are effectively allocated to meet end-user needs. Where necessary, recommendations of the SATCOM SWarF feed into the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process, which supports the Chairman and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in advising the Secretary of Defense in identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military capability needs. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process enables the DoD to allocate resources to the highest priority programs. MILSATCOM utilizes Microsoft Project to lay out MILSATCOM program office-wide Business Rhythms. These rhythms document each event required in the program management, contracting, logistic and financial management community in order to achieve an integrated inchstone look at the individual and MILSATCOM program office-wide program requirements to optimize scarce resources. The MILSATCOM program office-wide Business Rhythms lay the groundwork necessary to achieve program schedule, obligation and expenditure objectives. Another tool that MILSATCOM utilizes is the Comprehensive Cost and Requirement System (CCAR) which is an AF-standard. CCAR documents all program office requirements in a database that provides life-cycle information on each requirement with archiving capability for historical purposes. The CCAR database is used to track all MILSATCOM program office requirements including duration, cost, period of performance, funding type, funding amount and financial execution status.

Evidence: Representative CONOPS include the Joint Concept of Operations for Global Information Grid NetOps, Command and Control (C2) Constellation Operational Concept, Transformational Communications Architecture Concept of Operations, Wideband Gapfiller System Concept of Operations, and Concept of Operations for Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellite Operations. User Forums, SATCOM SWarFs, etc. have documented meeting minutes and copies of applicable briefings. JROC Memoranda (JROCMs) document the deliberations and decisions of the JROC. DoD budget material, program budgets, and Combatant Command Integrated Priority Lists are products of the PPBE process. The CCAR database houses the current and out year budgets, funding received, as well as the associated budget execution documents.

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: An underlying assumption by end users of MILSATCOM is that the services currently provided will always be there, that there will not be any coverage gaps. End users are also asking for new or better MILSATCOM services such as streaming video from Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Internet-like connectivity. The MILSATCOM Program is attempting to satisfy both these needs. MILSATCOM mission area operational availability measures are used to address the MILSATCOM service continuity outcome. One tool used is Functional Availability Reports (FARs) that capture information about the health of the currently operational systems and also about the current development status of the next generation systems. The FARs, updated annually, project the combined availability of currently operational and future systems to help determine when capability gaps might occur and the timing for satellite replenishment to mitigate any potential gap. For example, the 2005 Protected MILSATCOM Mission Area FAR projected a coverage gap beginning in early 2018. A year later, the gap has moved to March 2018. Decision-makers can use this information to plan the deployment of the next generation systems (AEHF, TSAT) to continue indefinitely coverage. The 2006 Narrowband MILSATCOM Mission Area FAR projects a coverage gap beginning in January 2010 and lasting until the first MUOS system is available for service. There are several ways to determine the status of system procurement efforts that are being built to ensure continuity of current MILSATCOM services and deliver the new services requested by users. For each system under development, cost, schedule, and performance thresholds and objectives are used to measure execution status of the procurement effort. These metrics are formalized in acquisition program baselines (APBs) developed for each system. One important type of measure are the different types of costs associated with the system procurement effort. The costs are baselined in the APB and an update provided to Congress annually. Excessive cost growth is an indication that there are problems that need to be addressed. If the eventual costs are below those projected, cost avoidance is the result. For AEHF and MUOS, the latest projected total acquisition costs are lower than those baselined in the APB. For every engineering effort there are a series of milestone gates that must be passed through to result in a successful final product. MILSATCOM system procurement efforts must accomplish these milestone events prior to successful deployment of the new SATCOM capabilities. The timing of these events is established by the APB and other documentation. An update is provided to decision makers and Congress annually. Excessive schedule slips to any event indicates problems needing addressed. TSAT has experienced a schedule slip of about one year for its milestone events from 2005 to 2006. The FAB-T schedule remained constant during that period. Only upon Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for TSAT, and Full Rate Production (FRP) for FAB-T, will these systems achieve operational status. The Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA) and the National Security SATCOM System Synchronization Roadmap (NS4R) provide strategic level policy direction for MILSATCOM. The TCA identifies gaps and redundancies among MILSATCOM, other Government SATCOM systems, and commercial services. The NS4R addresses MILSATCOM space segment and terminal segment synchronization issues, recognizing that the satellites, terminals, and platforms on which the terminals are installed all must be available for the MILSATCOM mission to be performed. The TCA and NS4R guide how to meet existing and emerging user requirements; the timing of replenishment or enhancement of SATCOM systems supporting the different mission areas; and determining how best to allocate resources during the annual budget cycle to address satellite/terminal/platform synchronization.

Evidence: Cost and schedule information is found in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation and Procurement budget exhibits, OSD/OMB and Congressional staffer briefs, Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs), and APBs. Operational availability information is available in deployed MILSATCOM systems' operational status reports and operational availability reports; MILSATCOM FARs; APBs that identify performance, schedule, and cost parameters to be met; and regular program management reviews, Defense Acquisition Executive Summary meetings, and the annual DoD and Office of Management & Budget (OMB) budget processes. Strategic level policy direction includes the TCA version 1.0 and draft version 2.0, and also the semi-annual NS4R reports on Terminal synchronization. Transformational Communications Senior Leadership Team meeting minutes and action items illustrate decision-making based upon the TCA and NS4R.

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: An underlying assumption by end users of MILSATCOM is that the services currently provided will always be there, that there will not be any coverage gaps. End users are also asking for new or better MILSATCOM services such as streaming video from Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Internet-like connectivity. The MILSATCOM Program is attempting to satisfy these emerging requirements. MILSATCOM mission area operational availability measures are used to address the MILSATCOM service continuity outcome. The operational availability target within each MILSATCOM mission area is that the services provided today are satisfied or exceeded indefinitely. In other words, there will never be any coverage gaps. To achieve this, due diligence must be used in the operations of currently available system and the procurement of next generation systems to ensure that the planned replenishment timeframes do not include a gap. In a fiscally constrained environment, such as the one in which MILSATCOM system procurement efforts exist, cost efficiency is a very important consideration. Using information from past procurement efforts and independent reviews, at the beginning of the effort, cost, schedule, and performance thresholds and objectives are baselined in an acquisition program baseline (APB). As with any large scale engineering effort, there are unforeseeable problems that will occur during system development, driving costs increases and schedule slips. Further, five to seven years will pass between this time and delivery of the operational capability. A careful balance between the various risks and excessive cost and schedule margins must be established and then maintained. Currently, approximately two-thirds of the way through the system procurement effort for both AEHF and MUOS, the latest projected total acquisition costs are lower than those baselined in the APB. The TSAT and FAB-T schedules have recently been reevaluated to better incorporate lessons learned from programs such as AEHF and MUOS and also the findings of independent assessments by retired program managers and the Government Accountability Office. Adjustments have been made to the timing of TSAT milestone events to better ensure system procurement success, resulting in a slip of about one year for its important milestone events. Today's operational MILSATCOM systems were designed and built to support the military requirements and weapon systems as they were envisioned ten to twenty years ago. Emerging user requirements include the desire for Internet-like capabilities and increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data relay. These current systems are not able to fully meet these needs. Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) systems under development are being built to provide the dramatic increases in capability required. An example is illustrative. Within the protected SATCOM mission area, the AEHF successor to the currently deployed Milstar will have five times the data rate and 25 times the throughput of Milstar; TSAT, the successor to AEHF, has 29 times the data rate and 243 times the throughput of Milstar. In operational terms, the time it takes to transmit an 8-inch by 10-inch high resolution imagery photo drops from 2.1 minutes (Milstar) to 24 seconds (AEHF) to 4.3 seconds (TSAT). WGS will take over the wideband mission from DCSC, with each WGS satellite having greater capacity than the entire DSCS constellation operating today. WGS and TSAT will enable high data rate ISR data relay desired by users; for example, relaying Global Hawk radar imagery in less than 10 seconds. TSAT will also provide brand new capabilities - laser-based communications and Internet-like communications - both key enablers for the military services' visions regarding future operations.

Evidence: Joint Vision 2020, the Military Services' future warfighting visions, different types of concepts of operations, and enterprise level efforts such as the Transformational Communication Architecture describe the dynamic operations MILSATCOM will need to support in the future. ORDs and CDDs state the requirements MILSATCOM systems must achieve towards satisfying the needs described in the Service Visions in terms of capability and longevity. The requirements are transferred to APBs, where cost and schedule objectives are added, becoming the procurement baseline. Cost and schedule information is found in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation and Procurement budget exhibits, OSD/OMB and Congressional staffer briefs, Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs), and APBs. Operational availability information is available in deployed MILSATCOM systems' operational status reports and operational availability reports; MILSATCOM FARs; APBs that identify performance, schedule, and cost parameters to be met; and regular program management reviews, Defense Acquisition Executive Summary meetings, and the annual DoD and Office of Management & Budget (OMB) budget processes. The ambitious schedule and financial targets are documented in MILSATCOM program office-wide Business Rhythms. They are ambitious but not unrealistic. Each series of events are tied to a specific funding line or Comprehensive Cost and Requirements (CCAR) record. The long-term measures are "graded" in various service and Air Force MILSATCOM-reviews including the Spring Program Review, Investment Budget Review and Program Executive Officer (PEO) Management Reviews (PMR). The CCAR is utilized for many of these reviews. The President's Budget information is generated from events documented in MILSATCOM program office-wide Business Rhythms and the records from CCAR. Tom Young led a team of experienced, retired program managers during the 2003, Defense Science Board / Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs. He led a follow up on the changes instituted one year later. Many of these observations and recommendations were incorporated into National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01, which provides the framework within which MILSATCOM procurements should be conducted and how they advance from one step to the next. Mr. Young also specifically reviewed how TSAT specifically was incorporating his findings and recommendations in fall 2005.

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: The MILSATCOM program has three fundamental long-term goals: no coverage gaps, cost and schedule efficient delivery of new capabilities to meet emerging warfighter needs, and better synchronization of MILSATCOM systems, including between the satellites and terminals and also among the different satellite systems. MILSATCOM mission area operational availability measures are used to address the MILSATCOM service continuity outcome. Annually, the products associated with these measures, including the Functional Availability Reports (FARs), are revised based upon the latest information associated with the health of the currently operational systems and also about the current development status of the next generation systems. These updated products are used by decision-makers to make the necessary adjustments to mitigate future coverage gaps. Each MILSATCOM system has an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) that describes a select number of the user communities most desired requirements, objective dates for various procurement events, and expected costs. Annually, the latest program manager's assessment about the current status of the total program cost, schedule, and performance as compared against the baseline (for example, AEHF, MUOS), is reported to Congress in the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR). The SAR allows detection of changes over time; for example, the annual update to the projected Total Acquisition Cost is a good measure of system procurement effort health. Excessive growth in the cost indicates problems. Another useful performance measure is the use of Earned Value Management System (EVMS) data for trend analysis. EVMS reporting compares what really happens during different periods over the course of the procurement against the APB cost and schedule measures. Poor program execution relative to goals can indicate schedule slips, slow billings, or excess funds. EVMS provides measures on the status of each system's development, cost efficiency, timeliness of data and product delivery, and progress towards major milestones. Specific metrics include cost performance index (CPI) and schedule performance index (SPI) as measured on the MUOS and AEHF procurement efforts (for both measures, 1.00 equals that planned for in the contract integrated baseline; greater than 1.0 means effort is performing above expectations). To reach the long-term milestone gates, progress must occur in terms of technology readiness levels (TRLs), technical performance measures (TPMs), program documentation completion (updated requirements documents, test and evaluation plans, acquisition strategies, integrated program summaries), and completion of technical and programmatic reviews (system design review, critical design review, Key Decision Point B (KDP-B) - preliminary design phase entry decision, KDP-C - complete design decision). DoD decision-makers, OSD/OMB analysts, and congressional staffers receive regular briefings about the status of these activities. The strategic level Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA) and the National Security SATCOM System Synchronization Roadmap (NS4R) are living documents, having regular updating processes (every 2 years for the TCA; 6 months for the NS4R). The Transformational Communications Senior Leadership Team (TC-SLT) comprised of executive level personnel from the MILSATCOM program, other Government SATCOM programs, Office of the Secretary of Defense organizations, MILSATCOM user representatives, and other stakeholders, meets quarterly to debate and resolve crosscutting issues identified in products such as the TCA and NS4R.

Evidence: MILSATCOM system's Acquisition Program Baselines establish the baselines. Selected Acquisition Reports and Congressional Staffer Briefs report the status against the baseline and against expected advancement during the last time period. Cost and schedule information is found in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation and Procurement budget exhibits, OSD/OMB and Congressional staffer briefs, Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs), and APBs. Operational availability information is available in operational MILSATCOM systems' operational status reports and operational availability reports; MILSATCOM FARs; APBs that identify performance, schedule, and cost parameters to be met; and regular program management reviews, Defense Acquisition Executive Summary meetings, and the annual DoD and Office of Management & Budget (OMB) budget processes. TRLs, TPMs, updated ORDs/CDDs, Test and Evaluation Master Plans, Integrated Program Summaries, and Defense Space Acquisition Board related matters illustrate progress through the acquisition life cycle. EVMS, MARs, and DAES provide DoD decision makers at all levels with information necessary to understand how things are going and where changes might be made to improve the procurement. Strategic level policy direction includes the TCA version 1.0 and draft version 2.0, and also the semi-annual NS4R reports on Terminal synchronization. Transformational Communications Senior Leadership Team meeting minutes and action items illustrate decision-making based upon the TCA and NS4R. DoD Directive 5000.1, National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01, DOD Instruction 5000.2, and the Defense Acquisition Guidebook provide the framework within which procurements should be conducted and how they advance from one step to the next.

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: Strong stewardship of the operational MILSATCOM systems and adequate advancement on the next generation procurement efforts must be achieved annually to help maintain or extend the period of time until a operational availability gap is projected to occur. The DoD does an excellent job of operating MILSATCOM systems beyond their planned lifetimes. The more critical factor is forward progress on the next generation system procurement efforts. Completing the sequence of milestone events each system procurements must pass through leads to a long term outcome. Individually, the work tasks making up each milestone gate, and passing through each, is a shorter term output. Targets are set in several ways. Within the program office, when entering into the procurement process, MILSATCOM systems establish a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) that outlines all the work that must be accomplished to complete the effort. The Integrated Master Plan (IMP) and Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) are established out of the WBS. They outline how and when work will be accomplished. Senior DoD leadership, with involvement from the program office, agrees upon the acquisition program baseline (APB), the acquisition strategy, and the budget and schedule profiles for the system procurement using information from the WBS, the acquisition framework model, and lessons learned from previous efforts. Cost, schedule, and performance thresholds and objectives are baselined in an APB. From this information, other planning and scheduling documents are created outlining the work and events that must occur to accomplish the due-outs outlined in the APB. As with any large scale engineering effort, there are unforeseeable problems that will occur during system development, driving costs increases and schedule slips. Further, five to seven years will pass between this time and delivery of the operational capability. Adequately accounting for the unknown unknowns and quickly making adjustments is essential to successful prosecution of the procurement effort. The milestone events are established using lessons learned from past efforts and independent assessments, tending to be optimistic in the amount of schedule and budget allocated to accomplishing each. From this, the integrated baseline is established and then tracked using tools like the Cost and Schedule Performance Indices. The goal is a CPI and SPI both equal to 1.0 (for both measures, 1.00 equals that planned for in the contract integrated baseline; greater than 1.0 means effort is performing above expectations). A drop much below 1.0 results in much greater scrutiny for that part of the effort. Monthly, quarterly, or annually, actual cost, schedule, and technical performance within the period are measured against the APB and reported to program management, senior DoD decision makers, or to OMB and Congress Each budget year, MILSATCOM programs go through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process, which rigorously examines the previous and current years cost, performance, and schedule, adjusting program baselines to ensure the efficient and effective use of resources. The MILSATCOM Joint Program Office employs OSD obligation goals to obligate funds in a timely manner and as intended. Data are measured against monthly goals and program forecasts to indicate program execution health and offer an indication of program progress. Each MILSATCOM system in the design phase has a fully integrated baseline. These baselines provide the schedule and performance measures. Many target dates for milestones are tracked and discussed on a weekly basis. Recurring program reviews are held where performance measures are reported and discussed. This process identifies technology maturation, integration, manufacturing, schedule, and funding issues that are later actively addressed by the program office, primary contractor(s), sub-contractors, and other major stakeholders.

Evidence: MILSATCOM system's Acquisition Program Baselines establish the baselines. WBS' break out the work scope; IMPs and IMSs provide the how and when for accomplishing that work. PPBE results are found in annual budget documents (R-Docs and P-Docs), Spring Program Reviews, Investment Budget Reviews, Defense Executive Summary review, and Selected Acquisition Reports. Lessons learned on past acquisition efforts have been incorporated into National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01, dated 27 Dec 2004 and the Defense Acquisition Guidebook. Status against OSD obligation goals is reported to OSD, OMB, and Congress in annual OSD and Congressional Staff briefings. Budget documents and Selected Acquisition Reports are shared with Congress annually. Developmental systems' have regular program management reviews, either monthly or quarterly. The Program Executive Officer (PEO) and the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) both have reoccurring MILSATCOM program level reviews (i.e., Integrated Baseline Review and Defense Acquisition Executive Summary, respectively). The ambitious schedule and financial targets are documented in MILSATCOM-Business Rhythms. They are ambitious but not unrealistic. Each series of events are tied to a specific funding line or Comprehensive Cost and Requirements (CCAR) record. The same systems that document long-term targets are utilized for annual measures. The annual measures are "graded" in various service and Air Force MILSATCOM-reviews including the Spring Program Review, Investment Budget Review and PEO Management Reviews (PMR). The CCAR is utilized for many of these reviews. The President's Budget information is generated from events documented in MILSATCOM program office-wide Business Rhythms and the records from CCAR.

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) partners include 1. warfighter and other user communities who establish requirements; 2. Office of the Secretary of Defense organizations, the National Security Space Office, and others who create and maintain architectures and other larger system of systems products of which MILSATCOM is only a piece (for example, the Global Information Grid (GIG)); 3. contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers who build the MILSATCOM systems; 4. all other MILSATCOM systems within the MILSATCOM portfolio; and 5. the test and evaluation (T&E) community who independently verifies the procured MILSATCOM systems meet user requirements. The requirements community identifies capability shortfalls and documents them in vetted and validated requirements documents. The acquisition community, including the MILSATCOM program offices, participates in the process, helping to ensure the capabilities being sought match up to what is technically feasible, and reasonable to provide, in the timelines desired. The MILSATCOM program supports the GIG effort where interface standards must be created and enforced so that the various pieces, each built separately and by different organizations, successfully work together when they are assembled into this system of systems. The GIG Net-Centric Implementation Documents (NCID) effort involves stakeholders from all organizations who will interface with the GIG. Working groups and relationships have been established from the lowest technical levels to the highest decision-maker levels to better enable success. Numerous efforts have been made in recent years to manage MILSATCOM as an enterprise and ensure all stakeholders concerns are being addressed. The MILSATCOM Program Executive Officer has established reoccurring executive level reviews of the MILSATCOM mission areas, looking at the space and terminal segments from a mission perspective as opposed to a system perspective to get better visibility on MILSATCOM enterprise wide, crosscutting issues. The Transformation Communications Architecture identifies gaps, overlaps, redundancies, and other issues among MILSATCOM, other Government SATCOM systems, and commercial services and provides direction on how the SATCOM systems should be integrated together. The Joint Terminal Engineering Office produces the semi-annual National Security SATCOM System Synchronization Roadmap (NS4R) identifying and reporting issues in the area of satellite/terminal synchronization and terminal/host platform synchronization. Contractor partners are committed to, and work towards, MILSATCOM program goals through the contracts they sign up to with the MJPO. The operational MILSATCOM systems contracts incentive payments are structured to support achievement of the required operational availability targets. Systems in procurement have contracts structured so that the fee awarded to the Contractor balances short-term and long-term goals. This ensures the Contractor achieves success in terms of earned fee, and the Government achieves success in execution of the system procurement effort. Cost control incentive fee is earned at the target fee rate as work is performed, subject to adjustment upon final delivery. Milestone award fees provide periodic lump sum payments for contractor performance and schedule adherence assessed at key events during the design and initial construction of the system. Mission success award fees provide lump sum payments upon delivery of each satellite based on tested system performance and schedule adherence. Satellite performance guarantees provide for payback of earned fee for premature failures of delivered satellites, ensuring that workmanship is not sacrificed to maximize earned fees. The prime contractor is evaluated periodically on cost, schedule, and technical performance during that period, compared to past periods, and against the planned program schedule, to determine award fees.

Evidence: DOD Directive 5000.1, National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01, CJCSI 3170.01, DOD Instruction 5000.2, and the Defense Acquisition Guidebook detail government stakeholder responsibilities. CJCSI 6250.01, Satellite Communications, provides high-level operational policy, guidance, and procedures for planning, management, employment, and use of SATCOM resources for the DoD. Also see the Transformational Communications Architecture, the GIG NCID standards in the DoD Information Technology Standards, TC-SLT minutes and action items, and the National Security SATCOM System Synchronization Roadmap. The MILSATCOM Joint Program Office (MJPO) has taken several steps to ensure the commitment of all partners to the annual and/or long-term goals of its programs. The AEHF EHF System Acquisition Council (ESAC) brings together the communities of the space segment, the ground planning and control segment, the terminal segment, the National Security Agency (NSA), the launch community, the testing community, and the user community to ensure the integration of all the technical, programmatic, and operational aspects of providing the AEHF capability. The TSAT program works closely with representatives of the joint community and the services at the periodic Users Forum to address necessary changes to the TSAT Capabilities Development Document. It also conducts a Quarterly Program Management Review (QPMR) to keep stakeholders informed of program issues and progress. To ensure the MJPO achieves the long-term goals of providing operationally sustainable systems, the MJPO has enhanced the logistics organization to lead the Operations Sustainment functions. This group has implemented a Program Office-Operator team approach to planning, programming and budgeting , it has improved integration between MJPO assets in Colorado Springs, Boston and Los Angeles through telecons with acquisition program offices, sustainment offices and customers (users/operators). This group will form the necessary System Activation Task Forces (SATAFs) to smoothly transition the WGS and AEHF systems from development and testing to operations. An example contract, tying in the contractor partners, is MUOS Contract N00039-04-C-2009. It contains award fee provisions for key milestones, mission success for system performance, cost control for system design and deployment, and satellite performance guarantee covering the mission duration of each satellite. Other examples can be found in the TSAT Mission Operations Segment contract (FA8808-06-C-003) was awarded January 2006. The Wideband Gapfiller System satellites 4 and 5 contract for advanced procurement and non-recurring engineering (FA8808-06-C-0001 L/C) was awarded in February 2006.

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: The military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) program uses the following tools to conduct periodic analyses and support program improvements: Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment (CRRA), Life Cycle Cost Estimates, and Office of the Secretary of Defense Budget Analyses. Independent Program Assessments (IPAs) and Independent Cost Assessments (ICAs) are conducted, and their findings regarding the state of technical, cost, and schedule performance are presented to executive management before any system procurement effort enters into a future acquisition phase. An IPA and ICA was conducted on the Transformation Satellite Communications System (TSAT) as part of its Key Decision Point B (KDP-B) milestone in Jan 2004. At Milestone A, KDP-B, and KDP-C, the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) program received IPAs and ICAs to evaluate the state of the program technical, cost, and schedule performance and present findings to executive management before entering the next acquisition phase. At KDP-C, MUOS also received an Independent Technology Assessment. ICAs are led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Analysis Improvement Group (OSD CAIG). In addition, Congressional Armed Services and Appropriations Committee Staffers review and assess MILSATCOM systems' content, progress, and relevance on an annual basis, prior to authorizing and appropriating funds. The GAO also conducts annual budget and program assessments. Other independent reviews occur semi-regularly, specific to each MILSATCOM system, and also look across the entire MILSATCOM program. In 2003, and again in 2005-2006 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviewed the TSAT system, evaluating its maturity as a development program, highlighting both successes and remaining concerns. The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reviewed three of the developmental MILSATCOM systems (Wideband Gapfiller System (WGS), Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF), and TSAT), attempting to determine the best way ahead to meeting emerging warfighter needs. The QDR team examined these options against potential MILSATCOM coverage and capacity gaps and the risk to the warfighter resulting from delaying delivery of net-centric capabilities. Cost, schedule, system performance, and risk associated with all three were considered for each alternative. Following an in-depth analysis, the QDR recommended continuing pursuit of TSAT in a restructured program versus acquiring more or improved WGS and AEHF satellites. In 2003 and 2005, the National Security Space Office (NSSO) reviewed the Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA), considering not only the MILSATCOM systems, but also the role of other Government SATCOM systems and also commercial services available to identify overlaps, redundancies, and gaps. NSSO also conducts an annual congressionally directed National Security Space Program Assessment (NSSPA) that includes an evaluation of the health and status of MILSATCOM systems, with identification of any specific issues, and recommends actions to resolve those issues.

Evidence: Capabilities Review & Risk Assessments. 10 U.S.C. 2434 requires that an independent life cycle cost be prepared and provided to the milestone decision authority before the approval of a major defense acquisition program to proceed with either system development and demonstration, or production and deployment. In DoD Directive 5000.4, Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG), the specific responsibility for fulfilling this requirement is assigned to the OSD CAIG. ICAs were conducted as part of the IPAs on TSAT at Key Decision Point B (Jan 04) and again at Interim Program Review (IPR) 1 (Dec 04); the same are scheduled for TSAT at IPR-2 scheduled for 2007. IPAs and ICAs were conducted on MUOS prior to Milestone A in August 2002, prior to KDP-B in September 2004, and prior to KDP-C in July 2006. Results of these independent reviews are documented in IPA and ICA briefings and Defense Space Acquisition Board (DSAB) briefings. Additionally, In-Process Reviews (IPRs) were held from May-August 2003 on MUOS and for TSAT in October 2004. GAO annually reviews and reports the status of the developmental MILSATCOM systems in DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS, Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs. GAO-04-71R reported on the GAO evaluation of TSAT in Dec 2003; GAO-06-537 reported on GAO's follow-up evaluation in May 2006. The 2005 QDR Integrated Product Team-2 reviewed the SATCOM transport element of the DoD, deciding on pursuing TSAT versus more, or improved, WGS and AEHF satellites. The NSSO is currently finalizing TCA version 2.0 that updates the TCA 1.0 released 3 Nov 2003. The NSSO produced the first NSSPA in 2003, revising it annually ever since.

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: Deployed military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) systems' budgets are structured to ensure sustainment of global communications coverage without gaps in capability in accordance with Operational Requirements Documents in support of user operations. Using data gathered from past performance/problems and future requirements, Operations and Maintenance "brochures" identify current and future budget year requests. Any modifications or enhancements to these programs are explicitly presented to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Congress in the annual budget review process. For MILSATCOM system procurement efforts, cost, schedule, and performance thresholds and objectives are formalized in acquisition program baselines (APBs). Earned value management system (EVMS) data are performance measures used to compare what really happens during the course of the procurement against the APB cost and schedule measures. Monthly, quarterly, or annually, actual cost, schedule, and technical performance within the period are measured against the APB and reported to program managers, senior DoD decision makers, or to OMB and Congress. Each budget year MILSATCOM programs go through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process, which rigorously examines the previous and current years cost, performance, and schedule, adjusting program baselines to ensure the efficient and effective use of resources. The annual budget submission is tied directly to performance during the system procurement; adjustments to the budget and schedule profiles reflect successes and problems that have occurred against what was projected to happen. With respect to annual Air Force budget submissions to OSD, the final product of the annual Air Force budget programming process, known as the Program Objectives Memorandum, shows the resource allocation decisions of the Air Force made in response to and in accordance with Strategic Planning Guidance. Funding changes are identified in the annual budget review process and also in Selected Acquisition Reports.

Evidence: MILSATCOM system's Acquisition Program Baselines establish the baselines. Selected Acquisition Reports and Congressional Staffer Briefs report the status against the baseline and against expected advancement during the last time period. Cost and schedule information is found in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation and Procurement budget exhibits, OSD/OMB and Congressional staffer briefs, Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs), and APBs. Operational availability information is available in deployed MILSATCOM systems' operational status reports and operational availability reports; MILSATCOM FARs; APBs that identify performance, schedule, and cost parameters to be met; and regular program management reviews, Defense Acquisition Executive Summary meetings, and the annual DoD and Office of Management & Budget (OMB) budget processes.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: Historically, the military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) systems were handled in a piecemeal fashion - each system focused upon only what it needed to be individually successful, not considering how it might contribute to the broader MILSATCOM program. Today, the MILSATCOM program is being handled as an enterprise where each system is assessed not only on its own merits, but also on how it contributes to the various MILSATCOM mission areas (protected, wideband, narrowband SATCOM) and how it can contribute to meeting some or all of the needs of a particular user community (for example supporting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data relay). In 2002, the National Security SATCOM System Synchronization Roadmap (NS4R) was established to evaluate, monitor, and address MILSATCOM space segment and terminal segment synchronization issues. This is a very broad look, recognizing that the satellites, the terminals, and the platforms on which the terminals are installed all must be available for the MILSATCOM mission to be performed. The NS4R is updated semi-annually. In 2003, the Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA) version 1.0 was released, identifying gaps, overlaps, redundancies, and other issues among MILSATCOM, other Government SATCOM systems, and commercial services, while providing a roadmap to the future. This document is approved by the warfighter and used to help guide future MILSATCOM development efforts. TCA 1.0 highlighted policy, programmatic, budgetary, and technical issues. TCA version 2.0 is currently in its final stages, updating the architecture to reflect changes over the past two years. MILSATCOM mission area operational availability measures are used to address the MILSATCOM service continuity outcome. In 2004, the Department initiated the functional availability report (FAR) that projects the future health and replenishment requirements for the wideband and protected MILSATCOM missions. The FARs are updated regularly, incorporating what really happened since the last update into future models and estimates. In 2005, the MILSATCOM Program Executive Officer established reoccurring executive level reviews of the MILSATCOM mission areas, looking at the space and terminal segments from a mission perspective as opposed to a system perspective to get better visibility on enterprise-wide, crosscutting issues. Related to the TCA efforts, the National Security Space Office (NSSO) hosts the Transformational Communications Senior Leadership Team (TC-SLT) quarterly, comprised of executive level personnel from the MILSATCOM program, other Government SATCOM programs, Office of the Secretary of Defense organizations, MILSATCOM user representatives, and other stakeholders, to debate and resolve crosscutting issues.

Evidence: The MJPO has taken several measures to reduce program risks and increase the probability of success in delivering MILSATCOM capabilities. These efforts have focused primarily on the integration impacts in four areas: across the breath of individual programs, transition to operations, the impacts between programs, and external influences to programs. As a result of interconnections between various MILSATCOM systems, the MJPO has also recognized the interdependencies between programs. The MJPO has started several initiatives to reduce the risks of a program adversely impacting others. These initiatives include the stand-up of the MILSATCOM Chief Engineer and the System of Systems Engineering, Architecture and Integration (SSEA&I) group; the MJPO Configuration Board (MCB); weekly senior-level functional reviews and discussions; and the MILSATCOM Integration Master Schedule (IMS). To track and manage the integration of interfaces, specifications and standards, and program efforts, the MJPO has also created the MILSATCOM JPO Configuration Board (MCB). This Executive-level board, composed of MJPO Program Managers, is responsible for advising the MCB Chair (MJPO Director or Deputy) on proposed contract change actions, manages all MJPO configuration baselines throughout sustainment and any changes causing a cost impact. MILSATCOM functional disciplines have taken a more integrated approach towards budgeting and contracting to achieve efficiencies and, pinpoint and eliminate weaknesses. This has been accomplished through development and maintenance of MS Project products to lay out MILSATCOM program office-wide Business Rhythms. These rhythms document each event required in the program management, contracting, logistic and financial management community in order to achieve an integrated inchstone look at the individual and MJPO program wide requirements to optimize scarce resources. The MC-wide Business Rhythms lay the groundwork necessary to achieve program schedule, obligation and expenditure objectives. Another tool that MILSATCOM utilizes is the Comprehensive Cost and Requirement System (CCAR) which is an AF-standard. CCAR documents all program office requirements in a database that provides life-cycle information on each requirement with archiving capability for historical purposes. The CCAR database is used to track all MJPO requirements including duration, cost, period of performance, funding type, funding amount and financial execution status. Common support (i.e., training, SETA support, FFRDC support) have been centralized. In addition, the MUOS system program office has accepted sound advice from the space acquisition experts who served on the KDP-B and KDP-C Independent Program Assessment teams to address potential problems in software development at the start of the Preliminary Design Phase. The Program Office has established an MUOS Acquisition Council (MAC) to address program synchronization and requirements issues with the terminal programs, National Security Agency (NSA), National Security Space Office (NSSO), Assistant Secretary of Defense Networks & Information Integration, and other DoD stakeholders. The Program Office has also worked with the MUOS contractor to implement minor revisions to the system performance requirements and contract incentive structure to better synchronize award fees with program success measures. The MUOS program has also instituted an Executive Committee, comprised of the Government and Contractor senior leaders to identify and discuss MUOS issues whose resolution needs senior level help. References include wideband and protected MILSATCOM FARs, TCA version 1.0, and NS4R report on Terminal synchronization. TC-SLT meeting minutes and action items are also well documented. MUOS strategic planning improvement information is found in: (1) MAC meeting minutes; (2) MUOS Integrated Program Summary and IPA briefings; and (3) the MUOS contract.

Has the agency/program conducted a recent, meaningful, credible analysis of alternatives that includes trade-offs between cost, schedule, risk, and performance goals, and used the results to guide the resulting activity?

Explanation: As part of DoD policy, the Department conducts an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) prior to beginning any developmental program. This process first explores whether current systems, procedures, and efforts could be modified before starting a new material solution. More recently, the Department tasked the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review Integrated Product Team (IPT) #2 to examine the options to providing satellite communications (SATCOM) based net-centric transport capabilities. IPT-2 considered the alternatives of remaining with the TSAT system as previously planned; procuring additional Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) or Wideband Gapfiller System (WGS) satellites and delaying the delivery of Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT), and evolving AEHF/WGS instead of procuring TSAT. IPT-2 examined these options against potential military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) coverage and capacity gaps and the risk to the warfighter resulting from delaying delivery of the net-centric capabilities. Cost, schedule, system performance, and risk associated with all three were considered for each alternative. Following an in-depth analysis, IPT-2 recommended continuing pursuit of TSAT in a restructured program versus acquiring more or improved WGS and AEHF satellites. Also, as part of the QDR, the Senior Warfighters Forum (SWarF) was asked to examine various TSAT configurations and assessed those as well for cost, performance, and schedule towards meeting warfighting requirements. An effort currently underway is the Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (AISR) AoA that will determine the approaches by which AISR communications requirements might be best satisfied. This information will feed into the decision-making process associated with this emerging warfighting need, enabling decisions to be made on the allocation of the AISR communication requirements to MILSATCOM, other government, and commercial communications systems. This effort will help ensure that the communications capability will be there when it is needed.

Evidence: CJCSI 3170.01, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, establishes criteria for AoAs. Report to the Defense Committees of the Congress of the United States on the Status of the Transformational Satellite Communications System Program (Mar 2006). AISR AoA Terms of Reference.

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: The operational Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) system program offices (SPOs) receive weekly system operational status updates during periods of nominal system operations and more frequent performance feedback during periods of irregular system performance. The programs' systems engineering staff, operations crews, users, and management use this performance feedback to make any required changes to maintain or improve system performance. For the next generation MILSATCOM programs currently in development, the contractor partners collect Earned Value Management System (EVMS) data on a recurring basis. This EVMS data is part of the contract deliverables and is provided to the government officials managing the procurement effort. EVMS reporting serves as a performance measure, comparing what really happens during the course of the procurement against the Acquisition Program Baseline cost and schedule measures. EVMS provides measures on the status of each system's development, cost efficiency, timeliness of data and product delivery, and progress towards major milestones. Specific metrics include cost performance index (CPI), schedule performance index (SPI), and estimate at completion based upon progress to date. Using EVMS reporting among other information sources, the system program director, program managers, program executive offices, and Department acquisition executives conduct regular reviews of cost, schedule, and technical performance. The program office conducts weekly meetings with team leads and primary contractors to assess progress, review schedules, and discuss issues with program development. Monthly or quarterly program management reviews (PMRs) are conducted where concerns, risks, and mitigation plans are presented. The PMRs also have splinter sessions on selected issues to discuss and analyze alternatives in more depth. All of this information feeds into the biennial DoD Space Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) review that is used to advise the DoD Space Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) of potential program deviations against the acquisition program baseline, key performance parameters, etc. In addition, for each program, the program office conducts routine technical performance reviews with contractors, has insight into contractor cost data under the terms of the applicable contracts, and receives financial data from prime contractors on a regular basis.

Evidence: Weekly operations status reports, Program Management Review (PMR) meeting minutes and action items. Prime contractors building the next generation MILSATCOM systems provide to the government monthly Contract Performance Reports (CPR), quarterly Contract Funds Status Reports (CFSR), and annual Contractor Cost Data Reports (CCDR) as part of the contract deliverables. The Services (Air Force, Navy) submit Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs), Unit Cost Reports (UCRs), integrated product team documents, Earned Value Management Reports, and Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) reports via internal processes to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Staff. National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01 provides the framework for system acquisitions, including deliverables and meetings with the MDA. The Defense Acquisition Guidebook contains the guidance for DAES, SAR, and UCR procedures. National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01, dated 27 Dec 04; DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, dated 12 May 03; and the Defense Acquisition Guidebook contain the latest guidance on how to successfully execute DoD space efforts. The Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) is an illustrative example. The MUOS program receives monthly CPR, quarterly CFSR, and annual CCDR Contract Data Requirements Lists (CDRLs) from the Prime Contractor, as well as the two major subcontractors. The Statement of Work requires the contractor and major subcontractors to hold Quarterly Program Reviews providing status of program cost, schedule, and performance, and insight into program technical progress and issues. The contractor also presents progress of the Risk Management Program and Technical Performance Measures. In addition to the Quarterly Program Reviews, the contractor also conducts weekly Program Status Reviews, and monthly Program Management Reviews. The program office and the contractor also maintain open communication through working group meetings, telephone conferences, and email. Another example is the TSAT Program which operates under a weekly, month, quarterly and annual battle rhythm updated periodically by the program director and his staff. Meetings conducted under this battle rhythm ensure the horizontal and vertical flow of key information as well as timely decision-making at appropriate levels.

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: Federal managers and program partners are fully aware of the standards they are expected to meet. Quantifiable measures in Acquisition Program Baselines (APB) detail deliverables expected from managers and partners, in terms of cost, schedule, and performance. The Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), System Program Director (SPD), and Program Managers (PM) make decisions, lead the execution of the programs, and are accountable for results. The Program Executive Officer (PEO) or Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) and the DoD Space MDA provide the SPD/PM with the resources and guidance necessary to accomplish these goals. Contractor partners are held accountable to the contract they sign, with evaluations every 6-months on cost, schedule, and technical performance during that period, compared to past periods, and against the planned program schedule, to determine award fees. The contract incentive structure is multidimensional, including an incentive fee for cost control, award fees for contractor performance and schedule adherence, and mission success award fees for the tested performance of the delivered system and delivery on schedule. Earned value analysis provides regular reporting on details about cost and schedule performance, permitting evaluation against the APB and contract terms. Being critical to national security, some leniency exists for limited cost or schedule overruns. However, consequences do exist for failing to perform acceptably. For the contractor partner, it ranges from losing some, or all, of the potential contract award fee, to removal of the program management team, to restructure or termination of the effort. For the government management team, it ranges from loss of budget authority, to removal of the program management team, to a Nunn-McCurdy review and certification by the Secretary of Defense that the effort is still necessary. The Nunn-McCurdy law requires the Department to notify Congress whenever the cost of a procurement effort increases 15% over that established in the current APB (a 15% unit cost breach), as well as whenever a 30% breach of the unit cost occurs as measured against the original APB. The law also requires a certification of the procurement effort whenever there is a 25%/50% breach. In a certification situation, the DoD must certify to Congress that: 1) the program is critical to national security, 2) no alternatives exist that provide equal capability at less cost, 3) the cost estimates are reasonable, and 4) the management structures are in place to control further cost increases. All four criteria must be met to certify a program; if the DoD cannot do so, the program is terminated. Several examples illustrate the consequences of non-performance. The Wideband Gapfiller System prime contractor did not receive compensation for its erroneous business plans when it experienced large cost growth due to the non-materialization of the commercial SATCOM market. The Ground Multi-band Terminal follow-on production contract was not awarded to the development contractor because the contractor was unable to satisfy government requirements. In the Family of Advance Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminal procurement effort, the contractor partner did not receive Award Fees for two periods in Fiscal Year 2006 (FY06) and received only half of his fee in FY05 due to poor performance on the development contract. The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) system procurement effort has had to provide a Nunn-McCurdy notification to Congress due to late delivery of government-furnished information assurance products and replacement of critical electronic parts, causing a cost breach greater than 15%. AEHF had to replan the procurement effort, delaying delivery of the first satellite by at least one year, and is now subject to increased scrutiny within the Department and to Congress.

Evidence: The system program offices keep all managers and partners aware of the cost, schedule, and performance of the program through the implemented Earned Value Management Data collection required by the contract. Contractor performance is also captured annually in Contractor Performance Assessment Reports (CPARs) that are used by Defense agencies for determining the risk of hiring the contractors for future support. Congressional Justification Books capture decision-making associated with nonperformaning partners. The DoD acquisition stakeholders, financial communities, and operational users maintain continuous and effective communications with each other by using Integrated Product Teams. Teaming among warfighters, users, developers, acquirers, technologists, testers, budgeters, and sustainers begins during capability needs definition, and continues throughout the acquisition, and into the operational deployment and sustainment of each system. The acquisition execution chain is ultimately accountable for programs' success or failure. The SPD/PM, as the leader of the Government-Contractor team for each program, is accountable and has the authority to accomplish the program's objectives and meet user needs. See National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01, 27 Dec 04; DoD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, 12 May 03. DoD responsibilities and Congressional reporting requirements associated with the Nunn McCurdy process are found in United States Code Title 10 Chapter 144, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sup_01_10_10_A_20_IV_30_144.html> and Public Law 109-163 Sec 802 & 804. Congress was formally notified of the AEHF Nunn-McCurdy breach on 2 Dec 2004 and on the subsequent AEHF Replan during the calendar year 2005 congressional staffer briefs.

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner, spent for the intended purpose and accurately reported?

Explanation: The financial management system ensures that obligations and expenditures do not exceed the amount appropriated, apportioned, reapportioned, allocated, and allotted (Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 United States Code). Each planned transaction is always examined to ensure appropriateness of funding based on time, purpose, and amount. Expenditure of appropriations must be for a specified purpose, necessary and incident to the proper execution of the general purpose of the appropriation. In terms of "time", appropriations are available for limited periods of time. Appropriations are available only for the authentic need of an appropriation's period of availability. Finally, obligations and expenditures in excess of the funding available in an appropriation creates a violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act. Obligations are recorded immediately and expenditures are recorded as the bills arrive from the contractors. The Military Communications Satellite (MILSATCOM) Joint Program Office employs OSD obligation goals to obligate funds in a timely manner and as intended. OSD obligation and expenditure goals for Fiscal Year 2006 are being met or exceeded by all MILSATCOM systems. These goals are tracked on an end-of-month basis as percentages of the total budget authority available for the program to spend. This regular reporting allows for quick identification of and action taken upon these problems. Contract performance is evaluated using Earned Value Management System (EVMS) data contractual required from the contractor partners on a recurring basis. EVMS provides measures on the status of each system's development, cost efficiency, and timeliness of data and product delivery, and progress towards major milestones. Specific metrics include cost variance (cost performance index), schedule efficiency (schedule performance index), and estimate at completion based upon progress to date. Data are measured against monthly goals and program forecasts to indicate program execution health and offer an indication of program progress. Poor program execution relative to goals can indicate schedule slips, slow billings, or excess funds.

Evidence: RDT&E and Procurement budget exhibits and monthly funds execution updates (Monthly Acquisition Reports). Contractually required submissions of EVMS reports. Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) reviews. Annual briefs to Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congressional Staff Members include published program budgets and schedules and also status against obligation and expenditure goals. The fund control procedures prevent untimely liquidation of obligations, unmatched expenditures, and undistributed disbursements, including fiscal year end "Section 1311 Statement of Certification" by a senior accounting official to ensure the validity of all obligations and unobligated balances. Administrative funds control ensures that funds are used economically, efficiently, and only for properly authorized purposes (see DoD Financial Management Regulation, Volume 1, Chapter 3, Key Accounting Requirement #7). In addition, there are specific Air Force MILSATCOM reviews such as the Spring Program Review (SPR) and the Investment Budget Review (SPR), each held annually resulting in a thorough scrub of funding in hand against current requirements along with a view towards outyear requirements, schedule, and overall portfolio health. The Monthly Acquisition Report (MAR) for specific programs and end-of-month funds reviews ensures validity of all active year funding.

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: Operational Requirements Documents and Capability Development Documents reflect the needs and requirement of the various user communities to meet their varied mission goals. These needs and requirements are transposed into requirements that must be met by contractors in building and delivering the system. Contractors are expected to deliver cost-effective solutions and are motivated through the use of award fees and mission success fees. The Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) contract also contains a System Integration and Collaboration or "Shared Destiny" award fee that can be earned based upon the extent and manner to which the space segment, ground network, and systems integration prime contractors satisfactorily work together. Contracts are competed and awarded based upon competitive sourcing. Recent examples include the TSAT Mission Operations Segment (TMOS) contract with three teams bidding for this contract, and the Wideband Gapfiller System (WGS) satellites 4 and 5 contract where a request for bidders was issued seeking a competitive sourcing and only the current contractor on WGS 1-3 expressed interest in bidding. Programs also employ measures such as evaluating Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV). For example, TSAT conducts trades throughout the life of the program in the CAIV Integrated Product Team in a cooperative effort with the user community. Results are captured in requirements documentation and cost estimates. For each system procurement effort, the projected costs are baselined in the acquisition program baseline (APB). Annually, the latest program manager's assessment about the current status of the total program cost (for example, AEHF, MUOS) is reported to Congress in the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR). The SAR update to the projected Total Acquisition Cost is a good measure of system procurement effort health. Excessive cost growth is an indication that there are problems that need to be addressed. If the eventual costs are below those projected, cost avoidance is the result. For AEHF and MUOS, the latest projected total acquisition costs are lower than those baselined in the APB. Another useful performance measure is the use of Earned Value Management System (EVMS) data for trend analysis. EVMS reporting compares what really happens during different periods over the course of the procurement against the APB cost and schedule measures. EVMS provides measures on the status of each system's development, cost efficiency, timeliness of data and product delivery, and progress towards major milestones. Specific metrics include cost performance index (CPI) and schedule performance index (SPI) as measured on the MUOS and AEHF procurement efforts (for both measures, 1.00 equals that planned for in the contract integrated baseline; greater than 1.0 means effort is performing above expectations). Poor program execution relative to goals (that is, CPI < 1.0) can indicate schedule slips, slow billings, or excess funds. The MILSATCOM program is trying to achieve radio frequency spectrum use efficiency. Within each MILSATCOM mission area, the spectrum available for satellite communications is fixed. Over time, the successor MILSATCOM systems and constellations of satellites to those currently deployed are intended to provide more bandwidth through more efficiently using the allocated and assigned spectrum. An example is illustrative. In the Protected Mission Area, the current system, Milstar, can provide a total bandwidth capability of 31 Mbps. When AEHF becomes available beginning in 2009, the amount of bandwidth will begin increasing significantly, reaching 781 Mbps by 2012.

Evidence: Competition provides major incentives to industry and Government organizations to innovate, reduce costs, and increase quality. All of the DoD Components acquire systems, subsystems, equipment, supplies, and services in accordance with the statutory requirements for competition. If competition is not available, Program Managers consider alternatives that will yield the benefits of competition (see DoD Directive 5000.1, Para E1.1.3). The TMOS contract (FA8808-06-C-003) was awarded January 2006. The WGS satellites 4 and 5 contract for advanced procurement and non-recurring engineering (FA8808-06-C-0001 L/C) was awarded in February 2006. For the MILSATCOM programs currently in development, the contractor partners collect EVMS data on a recurring basis. This EVMS data is part of the contract deliverables and is provided to the government officials managing the procurement effort. EVMS provides measures on the status of each system's development, cost efficiency, timeliness of data and product delivery, and progress towards major milestones. The Services (Air Force, Navy) submit Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs), Unit Cost Reports (UCRs), integrated product team documents, Earned Value Management Reports, and Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) reports via internal processes to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Staff. Capabilities of MILSTAR and AEHF can be found in annual Congressional staffer briefs and requirements documentation. Projected capability on orbit at any given time is found in the Protected Mission Area Functional Availability Report.

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: Within the Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) Joint Program Office (MJPO), the System Program Director (SPD) oversees all MILSATCOM systems and is responsible for collaboration and coordination among resources, responsibilities, and satisfaction of user requirements. Since the future systems continue the missions of currently operational MILSATCOM systems (for example, Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) will supplant Milstar; later, the Transformational Satellite Communications System supplants AEHF), they must support current users, in addition to future users. In other words, the new systems must be backwards compatible to current systems and their users. This requires technical, programmatic, and organizational interaction between the satellite systems, and among the various stakeholders. Recognizing the need for coordination within, between, and among the constituents of the MILSATCOM portfolio, numerous efforts have been made to manage MILSATCOM as an enterprise and ensure all stakeholders concerns are being addressed. In 2004, the Department instigated the Functional Availability Report (FAR) that projects the future health and replenishment requirements for each MILSATCOM mission area. The FARs are updated regularly, incorporating what really happened since the last update into future models and estimates. In 2005, the MILSATCOM PEO established reoccurring executive level reviews of the MILSATCOM missions, looking at the space and terminal segments from a mission perspective as opposed to a system perspective to get better visibility on MILSATCOM enterprise-wide crosscutting issues. In 2002, the National Security SATCOM System Synchronization Roadmap (NS4R) was established to evaluate, monitor, and address MILSATCOM space segment and terminal segment synchronization issues. The Joint Terminal Engineering Office produces the semi-annual NS4R, reporting issues in the areas of satellite/terminal synchronization and terminal/host platform synchronization. This is a very broad look, recognizing that the satellites, the terminals, and the platforms on which the terminals are installed all must be available for the MILSATCOM mission to be performed. The NS4R is updated semi-annually. In 2003, the Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA) was released, identifying gaps, overlaps, redundancies, and other issues among MILSATCOM, other Government SATCOM systems, and commercial services. This document is approved by the warfighter and used to help guide future MILSATCOM development efforts. The TCA is reviewed and revised bi-annually. It not only tracks changes, but also provides direction on how the MILSATCOM systems, in conjunction with the commercial and other Government SATCOM systems, should be integrated together to achieve an interoperable, multi-segment satellite communications architecture. Related, the National Security Space Office hosts the Transformational Communications Senior Leadership Team (TC-SLT) quarterly, comprised of executive level personnel from the MILSATCOM program, other Government SATCOM programs, Office of the Secretary of Defense organizations, MILSATCOM user representatives, and other stakeholders, to debate and resolve crosscutting issues. Another way the MILSATCOM program and systems collaborate is through Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). Since 2001, development of satellite command and control systems has been coordinated with the spacecraft program office through frequent IPT meetings involving government and contractor teams to resolve technical, cost, and schedule issues. The MJPO-chaired Joint Systems Acquisition Council (JSAC) and its MILSATCOM Collaboration IPT meet on a regular basis to review on-going collaborative acquisitions between MILSATCOM Service program offices (for example between the Air Force MJPO and the Navy MUOS office) and to identify new areas of potential collaboration.

Evidence: MILSATCOM Program Management Reviews; wideband and protected Functional Availability Reports; Transformational Communications Architecture; TC-SLT and JCAS minutes and action items; National Security SATCOM System Synchronization Roadmap. The Mission Need Statement (MNS) for Military Satellite (23 Apr 1996) identifies the DoD need for MILSATCOM. CJCSI 6250.01, Satellite Communications, provides high-level operational policy, guidance, and procedures for planning, management, employment, and use of SATCOM resources for the DoD. The tools that MILSATCOM utilizes in order to effectively coordinate and collaborate resources is MILSATCOM program office-wide Business Rhythms in MS Project. These rhythms document each event required in the program management, contracting, logistic and financial management community in order to achieve an integrated inchstone look at the individual and MILSATCOM-wide program requirements to optimize scarce resources. The MILSATCOM program office-wide Business Rhythms lay the groundwork necessary to achieve program schedule, obligation and expenditure objectives. MILSATCOM also utilizes the Comprehensive Cost and Requirement System (CCAR), an AF-standard. CCAR documents all program office requirements in a database that provides life-cycle information on each requirement with archiving capability for historical purposes. The CCAR database is used to track all MJPO requirements including duration, cost, period of performance, funding type, funding amount, and financial execution status. MILSATCOM coordination with related programs includes TSAT's engagement with the Global Information Grid (GIG) System Engineering Working Groups in the development of the Net-Centric Implementation Documents. Cost and performance trades are addressed with representatives of the joint community and services at the Users Forum conducted several times each year. Under the Chief Systems Engineer, the Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) team works diligently to address necessary interfaces and interdependencies. In addition, AEHF has a framework of working groups, products, and processes to address key technical and programmatic risks and issues that arise among the participant segments. The EHF Systems Acquisition Council (ESAC) is a working forum for directors, program managers and team leads of EHF programs. Its purpose is to meet quarterly to direct, review, and coordinate system integration and program management. The focal points for the ESAC are systems engineering, systems integration, inter-segment testing, transition to operations, information assurance certification and accreditation, and risk management. Membership of the ESAC consists of directors and program managers from: United States Strategic Command; HQ Air Force Space Command; National Security Agency; Defense Information Systems Agency; MILSATCOM Joint Program Office; and Army, Navy, and Air Force Terminal Program Offices.

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: DoD's financial management weaknesses are well documented. While DoD continues to make efforts to improve them, the Department has yet to obtain an unqualified audit opinion. The Air Force does not have audit reports demonstrating that the MILSATCOM program is free from internal weaknesses. Moreover, DoD's plan to obtain a department-wide unqualified audit opinion has continued to slip from its planned milestones, which warrants a "no" for this question.

Evidence: None of the reports or audits specifically cite the MILSATCOM program for material financial weaknesses, however none of the audits specifically looked at that aspect of the program. Numerous audits document DoD's financial management weaknesses. Because of the magnitude of its problems, DoD is unlikely to obtain an unqualified opinion for some time. In the meantime, the MILSATCOM Joint Program Office (MJPO) conducts internal self-inspections semi-annually using checklists for relevant functional areas with results briefed to the Program Director. It also conducts numerous financial reviews such as the Business Baseline Review (BBR), an annual briefing to the MJPO Director and Program Executive Officer (PEO) on next fiscal year's President's Budget. This is a forum for discussion and decision by the MJPO Director on allocation of requirements to budget for MJPO cross-cutting costs and planned contractual events required to meet the overall MJPO schedule and program-specific schedule. It also discusses impacts of deltas between requirements and appropriated amounts. Another example of internal practices includes financial brown bags conducted every four to six weeks where the status of all MILSATCOM Program Control Issues is presented to MJPO managers. The purpose is to assess real-time financial status & earned value metrics allowing the MJPO Director, Program Manager's and cross-cutting directorate chiefs' access to SPO-wide information for decision-making.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: MILSATCOM systems' prime contractors present top concerns and issues to the Program Directors during regular reviews and meetings. Lower level contractors and program office personnel are constantly communicating and discussing current or potential issues and risks. If an issue cannot be resolved at a low level, it is raised to higher program office and contractor management using the formal issue resolution process. Also, at any time, the Milestone Decision Authority, Program Executive Officer (PEO), or MILSATCOM System Program Director can direct an independent review of the program, or particular part of the program, to ensure issues are being adequately resolved. Other management practice improvements include: more aggressive monitoring of program execution; increased focus upon systems engineering processes; improved use of performance metrics; enhanced interaction with all the various stakeholders; and the creation of multiple MILSATCOM enterprise-level processes (TC-SLT, TCA, NS4R, FAR described in 3.5). As an example, AEHF has a framework of working groups, products, and processes to address key technical and programmatic risks and issues arising among the participant segments. The EHF Systems Acquisition Council (ESAC) is a working forum for directors, program managers, and team leads of EHF programs. Its purpose is to meet quarterly to direct, review, and coordinate system integration and program management. The focal points for the ESAC are systems engineering, systems integration, inter-segment testing, transition to operations, information assurance certification and accreditation, and risk management. The Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) procurement offers another example. The System Program Office (SPO) participates in weekly program and risk management meetings with the Prime Contractor and its major subcontractors to address, mitigate, and resolve program issues and risks. The SPO also holds weekly program management meetings with PEO Space Systems and the MUOS resource sponsor to keep leadership apprised of program accomplishments and issues. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy Research, Development & Acquisition (ASN(RDA)) requires a weekly status report to address any significant issues. The SPO has a Washington D.C. Liaison who maintains weekly communication with ASN(RDA) and Under Secretary of the Air Force (USecAF) staffs. The MUOS program also instituted an Executive Committee (EXCOM), comprised of Government and Contractor senior leaders to identify and discuss MUOS issues that need senior level help. The EXCOM was used to ask for senior level help in correcting poor performance by one of the major subcontractors on the MUOS team. Corrective actions were put in place and performance changed from a behind schedule condition to a delivery on schedule condition. External issues and actors can impact the internal ability to address management deficiencies. One is the decision-making process associated with emerging warfighting approaches and systems having significant communications requirements. As an example, today, there are emerging requirements in the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) arena that will require significant communications capability to successfully prosecute the missions; however, the decision about what systems are expected to satisfy those requirements remains unknown. Timely, strategic level decisions about how communications requirements are being allocated to MILSATCOM, other government, and commercial communications systems is essential to ensure the communications capability will be there when it is needed. The MILSATCOM program office is taking proactive steps to remedy this situation, including actively participating in the Airborne ISR Analysis of Alternatives that will determine the approaches by which AISR communications requirements might be best satisfied, helping to move forward the decision-making process.

Evidence: Any management deficiencies that cannot be resolved at the regular program management reviews will be elevated to Air Force Space Command's Space and Missile Systems Center or Navy PEO Space Systems leadership for resolution. The MDA, PEO, or SPD can also direct independent reviews and cost assessments to ensure and verify management issues are being addressed in the most cost efficient and timely manner. See also National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01, dated 27 Dec 04; DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, dated 12 May 03; and the Defense Acquisition Guidebook; all three contain the latest guidance on how to successfully execute DoD space efforts. The AISR AoA Terms of Reference describes the roles and goals of the AoA. The MJPO has created a small team in the Washington D.C. area to facilitate integration with external activities. This will increase the MJPO's insight to the sponsorship and support of MILSATCOM capabilities, and will ensure the MJPO has visibility into the architectural efforts being developed by the National Security Space Office (where the MJPO has two military personnel), the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks & Information Integration), National Security Agency Key Management Infrastructure and others. Management staffing and experience shortfalls are being addressed with the PEO. TSAT is increasing the number of GS-14/15 managers to build continuity and filling technical management shortages with external experts via the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) detailees. The MUOS program summary is provided from the PEO Space Systems to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, ASN(RDA), USecAF, the Joint Staff and senior Navy leadership after each quarterly program review. The program summary reports earned value metrics and key issues that the MUOS program is dealing with.

Is the program managed by maintaining clearly defined deliverables, capability/performance characteristics, and appropriate, credible cost and schedule goals?

Explanation: All Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) systems have a set of key user requirements they must meet, established in requirements documents. For each MILSATCOM system, cost, schedule, and performance thresholds and objectives are formalized in acquisition program baselines (APBs). The APB is the Department's contract with the program manager, describing the key user requirements (for example, data rate, number of simultaneous connections supported, signal strength); objective dates for various procurement events (for example, milestone decision authority reviews, design reviews, initial operational capability); and expected costs. During the system procurement effort, technical performance measures are used to assess progress towards meeting the key requirements; after deployment, system performance is compared against these same requirements and reported as part of the operational availability measures. Earned value management system (EVMS) data are performance measures used to compare what really happens, particularly in the areas of cost and schedule, during the course of the procurement against the APB. Monthly, quarterly, or annually, actual cost, schedule, and technical performance within the period are measured against the APB and reported to program managers, senior DoD decision makers, or to OMB and Congress. Additionally, procurements are conducted within an acquisition framework providing guidance for when certain events should occur and milestones denoting progress forward. Progress is measured in terms of technology readiness levels (TRLs), technical performance measures (TPMs), program documentation completion (updated requirements documents, test and evaluation plans, acquisition strategies, integrated program summaries), completion of technical and programmatic reviews (system design review, critical design review, Key Decision Point B (KDP-B) - preliminary design phase entry decision, KDP-C - complete design decision), and operational events. Statements of work and contracts clearly articulate the required deliverables, performance parameters, periods of performance, and cost estimates. Earned value management system (EVMS) reporting of contractor progress on cost and schedule are tracked on a monthly basis for all large contracts and acquisitions. Annually, the MILSATCOM systems are reviewed, and goals revised, where applicable, in consultation with the DoD oversight structure in place, and based upon developmental progress. Changes are identified in budget documents and are briefed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of Management and Budget, and Congress.

Evidence: All MILSATCOM efforts are in response to capability needs identified by the requirements community. MILSATCOM system's Acquisition Program Baselines establish the criteria for success. EVMS Reports, integrated product team documents, Monthly Acquisition Reports, and Defense Acquisition Executive Summary provide DoD decision makers at all levels with information necessary to understand how things are going and where changes might be made to improve the procurement. Selected Acquisition Reports, Unit Cost Reports, and Congressional Staffer Briefs inform DoD Executives, OMB, and Congress about procurement status against the baseline and against expected advancement during the last time period. DoD Directive 5000.1, National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01, DOD Instruction 5000.2, and the Defense Acquisition Guidebook provide the framework within which procurements should be conducted and how they advance from one step to the next. Operational availability reports provide up-to-date information on how well deployed systems are operating.

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: The MILSATCOM program has three fundamental long-term goals: no coverage gaps, cost and schedule efficient delivery of new capabilities to meet emerging warfighter needs, and better synchronization of MILSATCOM systems, including between the satellites and terminals and also among the different satellite systems. Currently, there is no issue with coverage gaps. The revisions to the operational availability measures project that the potential for a gap is continually moving further into the future for all three MILSATCOM mission areas. The 2005 Protected MILSATCOM Mission Area FAR projected a coverage gap beginning in early 2018. A year later, the gap has moved to March 2018. Decision-makers can use this information to plan the deployment of the next generation systems (AEHF, TSAT) to continue indefinitely coverage. The failure of UFO satellite F3 in June 2005 resulted in a predicted narrowband SATCOM availability gap of four months (as of June 2006), from January 2010 until the first Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) satellite is launched and available for operations in March 2010. This is reflected in the 2006 Narrowband FAR. Each month of successful, continued operations of the currently deployed narrowband satellites pushes this date back. In the fiscally constrained environment where MILSATCOM system procurement efforts occur, cost efficiency is a very important consideration. Approximately two-thirds of the way through the system procurement effort for both AEHF and MUOS, the latest projected total acquisition costs are lower than those baselined in the acquisition program baseline (APB). For every engineering effort there are a series of milestone gates that must be passed through to result in a successful final product. MILSATCOM system procurement efforts must accomplish these milestone events prior to successful deployment of the new SATCOM capabilities. Excessive schedule slips to any event indicates problems needing addressed. The TSAT and FAB-T schedules have recently been reevaluated to better incorporate lessons learned from programs such as AEHF and MUOS and also the findings of independent assessments by retired program managers and the Government Accountability Office. TSAT experienced a schedule slip of about one year for its important milestone events from 2005 to 2006. Responding to concerns expressed by Congress, adjustments were made to the timing of TSAT milestone events to better ensure system procurement success. The FAB-T schedule remained constant during that same period. Only upon Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for TSAT, and Full Rate Production (FRP) for FAB-T, will these systems achieve operational status. Achieving interoperability among mission areas requires organizational cooperation as much as technical compatibility. Question 2.6 describes the new efforts established to address this in the past six years. User forums and the SATCOM Senior Warfighters' Forum (SWarF) ensure the emerging needs of the MILSATCOM programs' beneficiaries are supported. Recommendations of the SWarF feed into the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process, which identifies, assesses, and prioritizes joint military capability needs. The MILSATCOM Program Executive Officer (PEO) mission areas reviews allow better visibility into how the different generations of satellites and terminals are interacting from an enterprise-wide perspective. The quarterly meeting of the Transformational Communications Senior Leadership Team uses products such as the regularly revised Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA) and National Security SATCOM System Synchronization Roadmap (NS4R) to highlight and resolve crosscutting issues. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process enables the DoD to allocate resources to the highest priority programs, ensuring that satellites, terminals, and host platform procurements remain synchronized.

Evidence: Cost and schedule information is found in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation and Procurement budget exhibits, OSD/OMB and Congressional staffer briefs, Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs), and APBs. Operational availability information is available in deployed MILSATCOM systems' operational status reports and operational availability reports; MILSATCOM FARs; APBs identifying performance, schedule, and cost parameters to be met; and regular program management reviews, Defense Acquisition Executive Summary meetings, and the annual DoD and Office of Management & Budget (OMB) budget processes. Strategic level policy direction includes the TCA version 1.0 and draft version 2.0, and also the semi-annual NS4R reports on Terminal synchronization. Transformational Communications Senior Leadership Team meeting minutes and action items illustrate decision-making based upon the TCA and NS4R. User Forums, SATCOM SWarFs, etc. have documented meeting minutes and copies of applicable briefings. Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memoranda (JROCMs) document the deliberations and decisions of the JROC. DoD budget material, program budgets, and Combatant Command Integrated Priority Lists are products of the PPBE process. PPBE results are found in annual budget documents (R-Docs and P-Docs), Spring Program Reviews, Investment Budget Reviews, Defense Executive Summary review, and Selected Acquisition Reports. Developmental systems' have regular program management reviews, either monthly or quarterly. The SATCOM PEOs and the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) both have reoccurring MILSATCOM program level reviews (i.e., Integrated Baseline Review and Defense Acquisition Executive Summary, respectively). Lessons learned on past acquisition efforts, including assuring all stakeholders are involved as part of the procurement process, have been incorporated in to National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01, dated 27 Dec 2004 and the Defense Acquisition Guidebook. The ambitious schedule and financial targets are documented in MILSATCOM program office-wide Business Rhythms. They are ambitious but not unrealistic. Each series of events are tied to a specific funding line or Comprehensive Cost and Requirements (CCAR) record. The long-term measures are "graded" in various service and Air Force MILSATCOM-reviews including the Spring Program Review, Investment Budget Review and Program Executive Officer (PEO) Management Reviews (PMR). The Comprehensive Cost and Requirement System (CCAR) is utilized for many of these reviews. The President's Budget information is generated from events documented in MILSATCOM program office-wide Business Rhythms and the records from CCAR.

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: Annually, the products associated with the MILSATCOM mission area operational availability measures, including the Functional Availability Reports (FARs), are revised using the latest information on the health of the currently operational systems and also about the current development status of the next generation systems. These updated products identify changes, highlighting, potential problems, and are used by decision-makers to make the necessary adjustments to mitigate future coverage gaps. Currently, there are no expected coverage gaps. The revisions to the operational availability measures project that the potential for a gap is continually moving further into the future for all three MILSATCOM mission areas. The 2006 FARs revisions are currently underway with an expected late 2006 release. Earned Value Management System (EVMS) reporting compares what really happens during different periods over the course of the procurement against the acquisition program baseline (APB) cost and schedule measures. EVMS provides measures on the status of each system's development, cost efficiency, timeliness of data and product delivery, and progress towards milestones. Specific metrics include cost performance index (CPI) and schedule performance index (SPI) (for both measures, 1.00 equals that planned for in the contract integrated baseline; greater than 1.0 means effort is performing above expectations). MUOS has successfully completed its first three key milestones on schedule. Monthly EVMS reports show that program execution is consistently very close to what was planned in the contract integrated baseline. Over time, the program CPI and SPI has fluctuated within a very narrow range roughly between 0.99 and 1.02. AEHF has historically had program execution problems. Currently for AEHF both SPI and CPI are above 0.92, but the trends remains downward. Extra attention is being given to the AEHF system development effort to address issues on MILSTAR backward compatibility, operations transition, cost overrun projections, and sustainment. To achieve long-term system procurement success, progress must occur in terms of technology readiness levels (TRLs), technical performance measures (TPMs), program documentation completion, and completion of technical and programmatic reviews. Movement through each milestone gate is associated with completion of different amounts of the above. TSAT is early in the system procurement lifecycle, focusing upon finalizing requirements and maturing the key technologies needed. System Design Review, an important first milestone denoting achievement of both of these, has slipped about one year from 2005 to 2006. This was in response to incorporation of lessons learned from previous programs, the finding of independent assessments, and concerns expressed by Congress. The adjustments to the timing of each milestone event were made to better ensure system procurement success. FAB-T milestone events timing remained constant between 2005 and 2006. It completed Preliminary Design Review in late 2004. Each MILSATCOM system's APB describes a select number of the user communities most desired requirements, objective dates for various procurement events, and expected costs. Annually, the latest program manager's assessment about the current status of the total program cost, schedule, and performance as compared against the baseline (for example, AEHF, MUOS), is reported to Congress in the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR). The SAR allows detection of changes over time; for example, the annual update to the projected Total Acquisition Cost, is a good measure of system procurement health. The 2005 SAR submissions show for both AEHF and MUOS that the latest projected total acquisition costs are staying lower than those baselined in the APB. The programs are approximately two-thirds of the way through their system procurement effort. Another update is due at the end of 2006.

Evidence: Operational performance measures and program tracking are found in: (1) Deployed MILSATCOM systems' operational status reports and operational availability reports; (2) MILSATCOM mission area Functional Availability Reports; and (3) APBs that identify performance, schedule, and cost parameters to be met. MILSATCOM system's APBs establish the baselines. Selected Acquisition Reports and Congressional Staffer Briefs report the current status against the baseline and against expected advancement during the last time period. Budget documents and Selected Acquisition Reports are shared with Congress annually. DoD Directive 5000.1, National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01, DOD Instruction 5000.2, and the Defense Acquisition Guidebook provide the framework within which procurements should be conducts and how they advance from one step to the next, including the timing of program documentation completion and technical and programmatic reviews. TRLs, TPMs, updated Operational Requirements Documents or Capability Development Documents, Test and Evaluation Master Plan, Integrated Program Summaries, and Defense Space Acquisition Board related matters, illustrate progress through the acquisition life cycle. Earned Value Management System reports, Monthly Acquisition Reports, and Defense Acquisition Executive Summaries provide DoD decision makers at all levels with information necessary to understand how things are going and where changes might be made to improve the system procurement effort.

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: For each system procurement effort, the projected costs are baselined in the APB. Annually, the latest program manager's assessment about the current status of the total program cost (for example, AEHF, MUOS) is reported to Congress in the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR). The SAR update to the projected Total Acquisition Cost is a good measure of system procurement effort health. Excessive cost growth is an indication that there are problems that need to be addressed. If the eventual costs are below those projected, cost avoidance is the result. For AEHF and MUOS, the latest projected total acquisition costs are lower than those baselined in the APB. Earned Value Management System (EVMS) reporting compares what really happens during different periods over the course of the procurement against the APB cost and schedule measures. EVMS provides measures on the status of each system's development, cost efficiency, timeliness of data and product delivery, and progress towards major milestones. Poor program execution relative to goals can indicate schedule slips, slow billings, or excess funds. Specific metrics include cost performance index (CPI) and schedule performance index (SPI) For both measures, 1.00 equals that planned for in the contract integrated baseline; greater than 1.0 means effort is performing above expectations. MUOS has successfully completed its first three key milestones on schedule. Monthly EVMS reports show that program execution is consistently very close to what was planned in the contract integrated baseline. Over time, the program CPI and SPI has fluctuated within a very narrow range roughly between 0.99 and 1.02. AEHF has historically had program execution problems. Currently for AEHF both SPI and CPI are above 0.92, but the trends remains downward. Extra attention is being given to the AEHF system development effort to address issues on MILSTAR backward compatibility, operations transition, cost overrun projections, and sustainment. Each budget year, the MILSATCOM program go through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process, which rigorously examines the previous and current years cost, performance, and schedule, adjusting program baselines to ensure the efficient and effective use of resources. The PPBE process enables the DoD to allocate resources to the highest priority programs, ensuring that satellites, terminals, and host platform procurements remain synchronized. The Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense review and assess cost efficiencies at least four times each fiscal year to ensure budget execution maximizes cost efficiencies. However, during the last three budget cycles, the DoD has added funds to the MILSATCOM portfolio to address cost growth due to the failed business plans for Wideband Gapfiller Satellite and technical development problems on Advanced Extremely High Frequency. The MILSATCOM program is trying to achieve radio frequency spectrum use efficiency. Within each MILSATCOM mission area, the spectrum available for satellite communications is fixed. Over time, the successor MILSATCOM systems and constellations of satellites to those currently deployed are intended to provide more bandwidth through more efficiently using the allocated and assigned spectrum. An example is illustrative. In the Protected Mission Area, the current system, Milstar, can provide a total bandwidth capability of 31 Mbps. When AEHF becomes available beginning in 2009, the amount of bandwidth will begin increasing significantly, reaching 781 Mbps by 2012.

Evidence: For the MILSATCOM programs currently in development, the contractor partners collect EVMS data on a recurring basis. This EVMS data is part of the contract deliverables and is provided to the government officials managing the procurement effort. EVMS provides measures on the status of each system's development, cost efficiency, timeliness of data and product delivery, and progress towards major milestones. The Services (Air Force, Navy) submit Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs), Unit Cost Reports (UCRs), integrated product team documents, Earned Value Management Reports, and Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) reports via internal processes to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Staff. Capabilities of Milstar and AEHF can be found in annual Congressional staffer briefs and requirements documentation. Projected capability on orbit at any given time is found in the Protected Mission Area Functional Availability Report. PPBE results are found in annual budget documents (R-Docs and P-Docs), Spring Program Reviews, Investment Budget Reviews, Defense Executive Summary review, Selected Acquisition Reports, and Combatant Command Integrated Priority Lists. Lessons learned on past acquisition efforts have been incorporated in to National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01 (NSS 03-01), dated 27 December 2004 and the Defense Acquisition Guidebook. Recognizing the need for coordination within, between, and among the constituents of the MILSATCOM portfolio, numerous efforts have been made in the past few years to begin managing MILSATCOM as an enterprise and ensuring all stakeholders concerns are being addressed. User forums and the SATCOM Senior Warfighters' Forum (SWarF) ensure the emerging needs of the MILSATCOM programs' beneficiaries are supported. SWarF recommendations feed into the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process, which identifies, assesses, and prioritizes joint military capability needs. The MILSATCOM Program Executive Officer (PEO) mission area reviews allow better visibility into how the different generations of satellites and terminals are interacting from an enterprise wide perspective. The quarterly meeting of the Transformational Communications Senior Leadership Team (TC-SLT) uses products such as the Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA) and National Security SATCOM System Synchronization Roadmap (NS4R) to highlight and resolve crosscutting issues. The PPBE process enables the DoD to allocate resources to the highest priority programs, ensuring that satellites, terminals, and host platform procurements remain synchronized. The enterprise approach is evident in MILSATCOM Program Management Reviews, Functional Availability Reports, MILSATCOM program office-wide Business Rhythms, MILSATCOM Configuration Control Board, the TCA v1.0 and 2.0, TC-SLT minutes and action items, and the semi-annually updated NS4R. User Forums, SATCOM SWarFs, etc. have documented meeting minutes and copies of applicable briefings. Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memoranda (JROCMs) document the deliberations and decisions of the JROC. The SATCOM PEOs and the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) both have reoccurring MILSATCOM program level reviews (i.e., Integrated Baseline Review and Defense Acquisition Executive Summary, respectively).

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: The requirements for the military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) mission areas and associated systems has been carefully assessed through the DoD's Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) review process to evaluate existing systems or solutions that meet warfighter needs before building new capabilities. The different MILSATCOM mission areas (narrowband, protected, wideband SATCOM) have few overlaps; the systems comprising each mission area support different users. Within a given mission area, there is sometimes overlap among MILSATCOM, commercial satellite communications, and other U.S. Government SATCOM systems; however, these overlaps are acceptable. Typically, only the MILSATCOM systems are built to be available in the most stressing environments, when the DoD most needs SATCOM capabilities. An example is the Global Broadcast Service's (GBS) extraordinary support to Hurricane Katrina relief efforts, as well as to Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The deployed military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) systems, Milstar, the Interim Polar System, Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), and GBS regularly achieve operational availabilities and capabilities that exceed the planned design usage. The MILSATCOM wideband and protected mission areas Functional Availability Reports project healthy constellations into the next decade, lasting beyond the launch and deployment of the follow-on systems, Wideband Gapfiller System (WGS) and Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites between 2007 and 2011, and the Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) between 2014 and 2018. The failure of Ultra High Frequency Follow-On (UFO) satellite F3 in June 2005 results in a predicted narrowband SATCOM availability gap of four months beginning in December 2009 (as of June 2006), until the first Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) satellite is launched and available. Next generation MILSATCOM systems currently in procurement are being developed to meet the key user requirements, on the schedules and at the costs outlined in their respective acquisition program baselines. WGS and AEHF programs are very similar to any other large satellite procurement in terms of delivering capability on cost and schedule. The effort associated with fielding significant improvements to the U.S.'s MILSATCOM capabilities has resulted in cost and schedule challenges typical for such endeavors. MUOS and TSAT are being postured to do better, incorporating lessons learned from previous space system procurement efforts, including both Government and commercial space systems.. Additionally, TSAT was recently restructured to a more incremental approach to satisfying user requirements. The first two satellites will be less capable than previously planned. This change in the capability delivery approach translates into less risk in providing the overall capability on time. The capability removed from the first satellites will be made up by increasing the capability on the later satellites making up the TSAT constellation.

Evidence: DSCS and Milstar weekly systems operations reports provide satellite health and performance information. MILSATCOM requirements are documented in operational requirements documents and capability development documents. Functional availability reports updated annually for each MILSATCOM mission area, take into account the latest real world happenings of the currently deployed MILSATCOM systems and any changes to the launch dates of the next generation systems in development. Financial reporting documentation can be compared against other MILSATCOM and space system procurement efforts and includes Selected Acquisition Reports, congressional budget justification briefings, and execution data against Office of the Secretary of Defense obligations and expenditures goals presented in annual OSD and Congressional Staff briefings. Government Accountability Office, Office of Management and Budget, and other independent reviews of the MILSATCOM systems (for example, the Fall 2005 Young Panel review on TSAT) are other sources of information for comparing MILSATCOM programs against similar efforts.

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: Programmatic evaluations initiated by independent agencies, including the Spring Program Review, Investment Budget Review, and OSD Budget Reviews, have shown the MILSATCOM program to be effective in achieving the stated goals for cost, schedule, and performance. Independent Program Assessments (IPAs) and Independent Cost Assessments (ICAs) are conducted to evaluate the state of technical, cost, and schedule performance and present their findings to executive management before any system procurement effort enters into the next acquisition phase (for example, prior to the Transformation Satellite Communications System (TSAT) entering into Phase B in Jan 2004; prior to the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) entering Phase B in September 2004 and before Phase C in July 2006). Prior to Phase C entry, MUOS also received an Independent Technology Assessment to independently confirm the maturity of the key technologies. The Milestone Decision Authority uses these independent checks to determine how to proceed. Based upon their recommendations, the Milestone Decision Authority may decide to permit the program to enter into the next phase, reject the request for entry, or conditionally approve based upon further work by the system program management team (for example, the Transformational Satellite Communications System's approval to enter into Phase B in January 2004 established two additional In-Process Reviews (IPRs) during Phase B of the acquisition effort to monitor program maturity process; In-Process Reviews (IPRs) were similarly held from May-August 2003 on MUOS). In 2003, and again in 2005-2006 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviewed the TSAT system, evaluating its maturity as a development program, highlighting both successes and remaining concerns. In 2003, GAO was very critical of the TSAT program status and approach. Based upon their recommendations Congress and the Department significantly re-vectored and re-scoped the TSAT effort. The 2005 follow-up review was much more favorable, acknowledging the work done to better position the TSAT effort for ultimate success, albeit cost and schedule concerns still remain. Other independent reviews such as those conducted under the leadership of Mr. Tom Young have resulted in changes to the space acquisition approach in general and to the MILSATCOM programs in particular to incorporate lessons learned from previous, troubled efforts. The findings of the "Young Panel" and also lessons learned (successes and failures) on past acquisition efforts have been incorporated into National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01, which provides the framework within which MILSATCOM procurements should be conducted and how they advance from one step to the next. The Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) and Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) are the first two MILSATCOM system procurements to use this acquisition framework from early in their acquisition life cycle.

Evidence: IPAs and ICAs were conducted on TSAT at Key Decision Point B (January 2004) and again at Interim Program Review (IPR) 1 (December 2004); the same are scheduled for TSAT at IPR-2 scheduled for 2007. IPAs and ICAs were conducted on MUOS prior to Milestone A in August 2002, prior to KDP-B in September 2004, and prior to KDP-C in July 2006. Results of these independent reviews are documented in IPA and ICA briefings and Defense Space Acquisition Board (DSAB) briefings. GAO annually reviews and reports the status of the developmental MILSATCOM systems in DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS, Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs. GAO-04-71R reported on the GAO evaluation of TSAT in December 2003; GAO-06-537 reported on GAO's follow-up evaluation in May 2006. The 2005 QDR Integrated Product Team-2 reviewed the SATCOM transport element of the DoD, deciding on pursuing TSAT versus more or improved WGS and AEHF satellites. Spring Program Review, Investment Budget Review, OSD Budget Reviews conduct annual programmatic evaluations and feed into the PPBE process that decides yearly Department priorities and funding allocations. Tom Young led the 2003, Defense Science Board / Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs. He led a follow up on the changes instituted one year later. Mr. Young also reviewed how TSAT specifically was incorporating his findings and recommendations in fall 2005. On-going DoD assessments (for example, User SATCOM availability assessments/modeling and simulation, and Senior Warfighters Forums) continue their assessment of the state of currently operational systems and projections to the future with MILSATCOM systems currently in development. The GAO has assessed MILSATCOM in general, finding issues with MILSATCOM personnel experience/staffing. Efforts are underway to address this shortfall by the MILSATCOM Joint Program Office.

Were program goals achieved within budgeted costs and established schedules?

Explanation: The MILSATCOM program has three fundamental long-term goals: no coverage gaps, cost and schedule efficient delivery of new capabilities to meet emerging warfighter needs, and better synchronization of MILSATCOM systems, including between the satellites and terminals and also among the different satellite systems. Currently, there is no issue with MILSATCOM coverage gaps. The revisions to the operational availability measures project that the potential for a gap is continually moving further into the future for all three MILSATCOM mission areas. Achieving interoperability among mission areas requires organizational cooperation as much as technical compatibility. Question 2.6 describes the new efforts established to address this in the past six years. In the fiscally constrained environment in which MILSATCOM system procurement efforts occur, cost efficiency is a very important consideration. In recent years, the development of the MILSATCOM systems has been plagued with delays and cost growth. AEHF had delays due to the late delivery of government furnished equipment, especially united performing cryptographic functions. This resulted in a 12-month slip of the program and a cost increase of $843M. WGS, with a firm fixed price contract that limits the cost impacts to the government, has had problems with fasteners that delayed the delivery of the satellites by 15 months. Congress has repeatedly questioned the maturity of TSAT key technologies, reducing the FY2006 budget by $400M and delayed the program. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) examined the TSAT program and made a recommendation to restructure the program into a block approach to decrease risk and increase schedule margin. The congressional reduction, plus the restructure into the Block approach, has delayed the TSAT capability and increasing its cost. For the Command and Control System - Consolidated, greater than anticipated satellite complexity plus launch slips have increased the acquisition costs associated with efforts to support both the Wideband Gapfiller Satellite and Advanced Extremely High Frequency systems. MUOS is a good news story. Since entry into Preliminary Design Phase (September 2004), the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) system procurement has been executing on cost and on schedule. MUOS has successfully completed its first three key milestones on schedule. Monthly EVMS reports show that program execution is consistently very close to what was planned in the contract integrated baseline. Over time, the program CPI and SPI has fluctuated within a very narrow range roughly between 0.99 and 1.02. Through April 2006 (19 months into the contract, 27% complete), the MUOS Prime contractor has retained a schedule margin of 27 weeks.

Evidence: Operational performance measures and program tracking are found in: (1) Deployed MILSATCOM systems' operational status reports and operational availability reports; (2) MILSATCOM mission area Functional Availability Reports; and (3) acquisition program baselines (APBs) that identify performance, schedule, and cost parameters to be met. MILSATCOM system's APBs establish the baselines. Selected Acquisition Reports and Congressional Staffer Briefs report the current status against the baseline and against expected advancement during the last time period. Budget documents and Selected Acquisition Reports are shared with Congress annually. DoD Directive 5000.1, National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01, DOD Instruction 5000.2, and the Defense Acquisition Guidebook provide the framework within which procurements should be conducts and how they advance from one step to the next, including the timing of program documentation completion and technical and programmatic reviews. Cost increases and schedule slips have occurred for space programs, in general. For AEHF, issues that caused this were as a result of delays in cryptography (concurrent engineering of the units and the spacecraft causing changes to the interfaces and resulting in late delivery), field programmable gate array (FPGA)/electronics technical problems, extra testing requirements, and recent paint adhesion problems. For WGS, incorrectly sized fasteners that needed to be replaced and recertified have caused delays in that program. TSAT, as a result of QDR and several Congressional/DoD budget cuts, has been rebaselined to a block approach, whereby proven technologies will be implemented during an earlier block, while allowing necessary technology maturation/development for a later block; this again resulted in delays in schedule and increased cost. All of these cost increases and schedule slips are documented in the regular briefings provided to Office of Secretary of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, and Congressional Staff members. They are also reported in the Selected Acquisition Reports and congressional budget justification documentation.