BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON, DC 20401 STUART M. FOSS Administrative Law Judge Appeal of R.C. SWANSON PRINTING AND TYPESETTING COMPANY Docket No. GPO BCA 31-90 Jacket No. 262-267 Purchase Order 82905 Program C460-S February 6, 1992 DECISION AND ORDER This appeal, timely filed by R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Company, 5205 York Road, Baltimore, Maryland 21212 (hereinafter Appellant), is from the final decision, dated August 23, 1990, of Contracting Officer, Mr. Julian Lowery (hereinafter Contracting Officer), of the U.S. Government Printing Office, North Capitol and H Streets, NW., Washington, DC 20401 (hereinafter Respondent or GPO), partially terminating the Appellant's contract identified as Purchase Order 82905, Program C460-S, Jacket No. 262-267, for default because of its "continuing failure to comply with the delivery requirements" (R4 File, Tab S). 1/ For the following reasons, the decision of the Contracting Officer is hereby AFFIRMED. 2/ BACKGROUND The relevant facts in this appeal are not in dispute and are set forth here only to the extent necessary for the Board's decision. The roots of this appeal lie in a Printing and Binding Requisition (SF-1), dated October 1, 1989, from the U.S. Department of Labor (Labor) for the procurement of Area Wage Surveys under Program 460-S (R4 File, Tab A). On March 28, 1990, the Respondent issued an Invitation for Bids (IFB) for Program 460-S, soliciting bids from potential contractors for the production of Area Wage Survey Summaries/Bulletins and Industry Wage Survey Summaries/Bulletins for the Department of Labor (hereinafter referred to as AWSSs, AWSBs, IWSSs, and IWSBs) (R4 File, Tab B, p. 1). The successful bidder was to receive a "Single Award" term contract, for the period beginning May 1, 1990, and ending April 30, 1990 (R4 File, Tab B, p. 1). Furthermore, like all such contracts, Program C460-S was to be governed by applicable articles of GPO Contract Terms, GPO Publication 310-2, effective December 1, 1987 (Rev. 9-88) (1988 Contract Terms), and GPO's Quality Assurance Through Attributes Program, GPO Publication 310.1, Revised September 1986 (QATAP) (R4 File), Tab B, p. 2). 3/ The work covered by Program C460-S was ". . . the production of self and separate cover publications requiring such operations as film making, printing, binding, packing, and distribution" (R4 File, Tab B, p. 5). The following IFB provisions are particularly pertinent to this appeal: ORDERING: Items to be furnished under the contract shall be ordered by the issuance of print orders by the Government. Orders may be issued under the contract from May 1, 1990 through April 30, 1991. All print orders issued hereunder are subject to the terms and conditions of the contract. The contract shall control in the event of conflict with any print order. When mailed, a print order shall be "issued" for the purposes of the contract at the time the Government deposits the order in the mail (R4 File, Tab B, p. 3). * * * * * * * * * * REQUIREMENTS: This is a requirements contract for the items and for the period specified herein. Shipment / delivery of items or performance of work shall be made only as authorized by orders Ð issued in accordance with the clause entitled "Ordering." The quantities of items specified herein are estimates only, and are not purchased hereby. Except as may be otherwise provided in this contract, if the Government's requirements for the items set forth herein do not result in orders in the amounts or quantities described as "estimated", it shall not constitute the basis for an equitable price adjustment under this contract (R4 File, Tab B, p. 4). [Emphasis added.] Except as otherwise provided in this contract, the Government shall order from the contractor all the items set forth which are required to be purchased by the Government activity identified on page 1 (R4 File, Tab B, p. 4). * * * * * * * * * * If shipment/delivery of any quantity of an item covered by the contract is required by reason of urgency prior to the earliest date that shipment/ delivery may be specified under this contract, and if the contractor will not accept an order providing for the accelerated shipment/delivery, the Government may procure this requirement from another source (R4 File, Tab B, p. 4). The Government may issue orders which provide for shipment/delivery to or performance at multiple destinations (R4 File, Tab B, p. 4). Subject to any limitations elsewhere in this contract, the contractor shall furnish to the Government all items set forth herein which are called for by print orders issued in accordance with the "Ordering" clause of this contract (R4 File, Tab B, p. 4). * * * * * * * * * * FREQUENCY OF ORDERS: It is impossible at this time to predetermine the frequency or number of orders that will be placed on this contract. However, based upon past history, it is anticipated that approximately 104-265 orders will be placed during the contract term as indicated below: Ð Approximate Approximate Approximate Number of Number of Number of Publication Orders Per Copies Per Pages Per à Title Ä Year Ä Order Ä Area Wage Survey Bulletins 20 to 50 250 to 2,500 20 to 56* Area Wage Survey Summaries 50 to 125 300 to 1,200 2 to 12 Industry Wage Survey Summaries 30 to 80 300 to 1,500 8 or 12 Industry Wage Survey Bulletins 4 to 10 800 to 2,000 40 to 256 * One or two annual issues may be ordered for up to approximately 192 pages. No more than 30 print orders will be placed in any one month (R4 File, Tab B, p. 5). [Emphasis added.] * * * * * * * * * * SCHEDULE: Adherence to this schedule must be maintained. Contractor must not start production of any job prior to receipt of the individual print order. * * * * * * * * * * The following schedule begins the workday after notification of the availability of print order and furnished material. Complete production, distribution and mailing must be made within five workdays. Multiple orders may be placed in a single day. Schedule for orders placed in excess of the stated limitations (30 per month) shall be arranged by mutual agreement with the contractor. The ship/delivery dates indicated on the print order is the date that products delivering f.o.b. destination must be received at the destination(s) specified and the date that products distributed f.o.b. contractor's city must be mailed/shipped (R4 File, Tab B, p. 9). [Emphasis added.] Ð The record discloses that the IFB was sent to 39 contractors, 11 of whom returned responsive bids (R4 File, Tabs D and F). One of the responding bidders was the Appellant, who submitted an offer, dated April 17, 1990, to do the work at an estimated cost of $53,695.90 (R4 File, Tab C). The record also shows that the Appellant's bid was over 30 percent lower than the next lowest bidder. When the Appellant was asked to review its price quotations, however, it confirmed them (R4 File, Tab F). Accordingly, on April 30, 1990, the Appellant was awarded the contract for Program C460-S by the issuance of Purchase Order 82905 (R4 File, Tab G). The first Print Order under Program C460-S was issued to the Appellant by Labor on May 15, 1990 (R4 File, Tab AA). 4/ Between May 15, 1990 and August 23, 1990, when the contract was terminated, 69 Print Orders were issued to the Appellant, as follows: à Print OrderÄ Date IssuedÄ Scheduled Delivery Date Ä 20001 May 15, 1990 May 22, 1990 20002 May 15, 1990 May 22, 1990 20003 May 16, 1990 May 23, 1990 20004 May 16, 1990 May 23, 1990 20005 May 16, 1990 May 23, 1990 20006 May 17, 1990 May 24, 1990 20007 May 17, 1990 May 24, 1990 20008 May 30, 1990 June 6, 1990 20009 May 30, 1990 June 6, 1990 20010 May 30, 1990 June 6, 1990 20011 May 30, 1990 June 6, 1990 20012 June 1, 1990 June 11, 1990 20013 June 1, 1990 June 11, 1990 20014 June 1, 1990 June 11, 1990 20015 June 1, 1990 June 11, 1990 20016 June 1, 1990 June 11, 1990 20017 June 1, 1990 June 11, 1990 20018 June 5, 1990 June 13, 1990 20019 June 5, 1990 June 13, 1990 20020 June 5, 1990 June 13, 1990 20021 June 5, 1990 June 13, 1990 20022 June 5, 1990 June 13, 1990 20023 June 5, 1990 June 13, 1990 20024 June 8, 1990 June 18, 1990 20025 June 8, 1990 June 18, 1990 20026 June 8, 1990 June 18, 1990 20027 June 8, 1990 June 18, 1990 20028 June 8, 1990 June 18, 1990 20029 June 12, 1990 June 20, 1990 20030 June 12, 1990 June 20, 1990 20031 June 12, 1990 June 20, 1990 20032 June 12, 1990 June 20, 1990 20033 June 12, 1990 June 20, 1990 20034 June 12, 1990 June 20, 1990 20035 June 12, 1990 June 20, 1990 20036 June 19, 1990 June 27, 1990 20037 June 19, 1990 June 27, 1990 20038 June 22, 1990 July 2, 1990 20039 June 22, 1990 July 2, 1990 20040 June 22, 1990 July 2, 1990 20041 June 22, 1990 July 2, 1990 20042 July 2, 1990 July 11, 1990 20043 July 2, 1990 July 11, 1990 20044 July 2, 1990 July 11, 1990 Print OrderÄ Date IssuedÄ Scheduled Delivery Date Ä 20045 July 3, 1990 July 12, 1990 20046 July 3, 1990 July 12, 1990 20047 July 12, 1990 July 20, 1990 20048 July 18, 1990 July 26, 1990 20049 July 18, 1990 July 26, 1990 20050 July 18, 1990 July 26, 1990 20051 July 31, 1990 August 7, 1990 20052 July 31, 1990 August 7, 1990 20053 July 31, 1990 August 7, 1990 20054 July 31, 1990 August 7, 1990 20055 July 31, 1990 August 7, 1990 20056 August 6, 1990 August 14, 1990 20057 August 6, 1990 August 14, 1990 20058 August 6, 1990 August 14, 1990 20059 August 6, 1990 August 14, 1990 20060 August 6, 1990 August 14, 1990 20061 August 6, 1990 August 14, 1990 20062 August 10, 1990 August 20, 1990 20063 August 10, 1990 August 20, 1990 20064 August 15, 1990 August 23, 1990 20065 August 15, 1990 August 23, 1990 20066 August 15, 1990 August 23, 1990 20067 August 20, 1990 August 28, 1990 20068 August 20, 1990 August 28, 1990 20069 August 8, 1990 August 15, 1990 (R4 File, Tab AA). The record shows that on June 26, 1990, John Fennell, Labor's Chief, Production Services, sent a memorandum to the Respondent's Customer Service Division (CSD) reporting that publications covered by seven of the Print Orders issued to the AppellantÀ" numbers 20008, 20015, 20024, 20025, 20026, 20027, and 20029À" had not been delivered on time and were "now long overdue" (R4 File, Tab J). 5/ According to Fennell, these delinquencies were in addition to two other complaints raised by Labor earlier with regard to the Appellant's performance (R4 File, Tab J). 6/ Consequently, Fennell believed that "at this point" the Appellant's performance was "unacceptable," and unless there was immediate improvement, Labor ". . . would like to see action taken to get a new vendor" (R4 File, Tab J). On June 27, 1990, after being informed of Fennell's complaint, Jack Scott, who was the Contracting Officer at the time, telephoned the Appellant's plant and spoke to Larry Ford (R4 File, Tab J). Ford told Scott that the missing Print Orders would be shipped between June 28, 1990 and July 2, 1990 (the original scheduled delivery dates for these Print Orders were between June 6, 1990 and June 20, 1990) (R4 File, Tab J). Furthermore, Ford advised Scott that the reason for the delay was "machine problems" (R4 File, Tab J). On July 2, 1990, Scott mailed a "Cure Notice" to the Appellant notifying it that the Respondent considered the failure to meet the delivery schedule for the above seven Print Orders ". . . a condition that is endangering performance of the balance of the contract in accordance with its terms" (R4 File, Tab J). 1988 Contract Terms, À 20.(a)(1)(ii). Accordingly, the Appellant was offered an opportunity to inform the Respondent, in writing, within 10 days of the measures that it had taken or would take to cure such condition (R4 File, Tab J). 1988 Contract Terms, À 20.(a)(2). See also, GPO Printing Procurement Regulation (GPOPPR), GPO Publication 305.3, Chap. XIV, Sec. 1, À 3.c.(2). Furthermore, the Appellant was warned that unless the unsatisfactory condition had been cured, the Respondent might terminate the balance of the contract for default pursuant to the "Default" Clause of the GPO contract terms (R4 File, Tab J). 1988 Contract Terms, À 20.(a)(1)(i),(ii). The record shows that on July 3, 1990, the Respondent's CSD received another complaint from Fennell about the poor quality of service the Appellant was providing under contract (R4 File, Tab J). In this instance, Fennell told the Respondent that now 20 Print OrdersÀ" numbers 20006, 20008, 20009, 20016, 20017, 20018, 20019, 20020, 20021, 20022, 20023, 20025, 20026, 20027, 20029, 20030, 20031, 20032, 20033 and 20036À" were "due or past due" (R4 File, Tab J). These 20 Print Orders represented nearly half of all the orders issued by Labor in May and June 1990 with delivery due dates prior to July 3, 1990 (41 Print Orders). According to Fennell, the Appellant's late deliveries were causing problems for the Superintendent of Documents' operation because the AWSBs and IWSBs were sent out in numerical order (R4 File, Tab J). In light of this, Fennell reiterated his belief that if the Appellant could not provide the service an immediate change should be made because "[a]t this rate another two weeks and we will never catch up" (R4 File, Tab J). On receiving Fennell's second complaint, Scott made two telephone calls to FordÀ" one on July 5, 1990 and the other on July 6, 1990À" in order to find out when the missing Print Orders would be shipped (R4 File, Tab J). Also on July 6, 1990, Scott prepared and mailed a second "Cure Notice" to the Appellant, identical to the first, except that this time the failure to meet the delivery schedule for the aforementioned 20 Printing Orders was the condition ". . . endangering performance of the balance of the contract in accordance with its terms" (R4 File, Tab J). 7/ 1988 Contract Terms, À 20.(a)(1)(ii). Again, the Appellant was offered an opportunity to inform the Respondent, in writing, within 10 days of the measures that it had taken or would take to cure such condition, and it was also informed that if it failed to rectify the problem the balance of its contract could be terminated for default (R4 File, Tab J). 1988 Contract Terms, À 20.(a)(1)(i), (ii),(2). On July 9, 1990, Ford telephoned Scott and gave him new shipping dates for the 20 delinquent Print Orders (R4 File, Tab J). In that regard, Ford told Scott that the Appellant would now ship those Print Orders on the following schedule: à Print OrderÄ Ã Promised Shipping DateÄ 20006 May 29, 1990 20008 July 16, 1990 20009 July 13, 1990 20016 June 11, 1990 20017 June 11, 1990 20018 June 27, 1990 20019 June 26, 1990 20020 June 26, 1990 20021 July 12, 1990 20022 July 12, 1990 20023 July 12, 1990 20025 June 29, 1990 20026 June 29, 1990 20027 June 29, 1990 20029 July 10, 1990 20030 June 27, 1990 20031 June 27, 1990 20032 June 27, 1990 20033 June 27, 1990 20036 July 16, 1990 (R4 File, Tab J). The record also shows that between July 11, 1990, and July 12, 1990, the Respondent made two requests to the Appellant for the signed shipping receipts for the Print Orders which Labor claimed had not been delivered (R4 File, Tab J). The Appellant gave the Respondent those receipts on July 13, 1990 (R4 File, Tab K). In the meantime, on July 11, 1990, the Appellant wrote to Scott in response to his "letter dated July 2, 1990," and basically admitted that there was a problem with delinquent deliveries but that corrective measures had been taken to rectify the situation (R4 File, Tab J). As for the specific reasons which caused the delays, the Appellant stated: Ð First, we had ordered a new press from Heidelberg that was scheduled for delivery on April 14, 1990. Due to some damaged parts that had to be obtained from Germany, the press was not delivered until late June. This press was what we had planned to run the [Program C460-S] contract on. The press is now in place and running and we are almost completely caught up on the contract. Second, we have one other press that is an older model 2 color that we were using to perform on this contract until our new press came in. In late May/early June the press threw several bushings and seized up. The press required major work to un- seize it and this is where our lateness developed. Of course, the break-down was unforeseen, but since that time the press has been repaired and has been used to help catch up on the [Program C460-S] contract. Finally, on top of our two problems, the agency issued more work than the maximum allowed under the contract. In June the agency issued 34 Print Orders, almost 15% more than the maximum and almost 2 1/2 times the minimum expected quantity. Furthermore, they had an extremely large number of larger jobs (Bulletins) and many of these had run lengths longer than the contract called for and all of them Ð were at the maximum end of the scale which ran from 250 to 2500 copies. Unfortunately, Murphy's Law prevailed, [and] we had several problems reducing our productive capability, and the agency at the same time required extraordinary productive capability. . . . Ð (R4 File, Tab J). Despite these difficulties, however, the Appellant assured the Respondent that "[a]ll is on track and we expect to be completely current on the contract before July 23" (R4 File, Tab J). Although the Appellant promised to have the delivery situation under control before the end of July, the record discloses that it was unable to meet the delivery schedule on nine of the 14 Print Orders issued that monthÀ" numbers 20042, 20043, 20044, 20045, 20046, 20048, 20049, 20050 and 20051 À" or approximately 64 percent of them (R4 File, Tab W). 8/ Similarly, of the 14 Print Orders received by the Appellant in August 1990, publications covered by of themÀ" numbers 20057, 20058, 20059, 20060, 2006À" were sent to Labor after the contract due date (nearly 36 percent) (R4 File, Tab W). Overall, the record shows that of the 69 Print Orders issued to the Appellant under Program C460-S, it was unable to deliver 43 of them on time (approximately 62 percent) (R4 File, Tab W). 9/ On August 10, 1990, after Labor had notified the Respondent that the Appellant was late on eight Print Orders which were due in July 1990À" numbers 20042, 20043, 20044, 20045, 20046, 20048, 20049, and 20050À" the Contracting Officer (Lowery) sent a third a "Cure Notice" to the Appellant (R4 File, Tab O). This "Cure Notice" was identical in all respects to the previous two, except that the Appellant was only given five days to inform the Respondent, in writing, of the measures that it had taken or would take to cure its continuing failure to meet the contract delivery schedule (R4 File, Tab O). The record shows that the Appellant never replied to this "Cure Notice." Consequently, on August 22, 1991, the Contracting Officer wrote to the Respondent's CRB seeking its concurrence in terminating the Appellant's Program C460-S contract for default (R4 File, Tab Q). See, GPOPPR, Chap. I, Sec. 10, À 4.b.(i). As he explained to the CRB, the Contracting Officer believed the proposed action was justified for the following reasons: To date, [the Appellant] has received 61 print orders with 31 of them being delivered late and 17 of them have not been given a promised ship date, even though the action ship date has already passed. On July 2, 1990 and July 6, 1990 a cure notice was sent to [the Appellant]. On July 11, 1990 a reply was received from Richard Swanson. He claimed that their delivery problems were due to the late arrival of a new press (it had been due in April and not received until June) and mechanical problems on their old press. Mr. Swanson expected Program C460-S to be on schedule by July 23, 1990. As of August 10, 1990 [the Appellant] was still not on schedule on Program C460-S. Another cure notice, dated August 10, 1990, was sent to [the Appellant]. No reply has been received. * * * * * * * * * * Based on [the Appellant's] continuing failure to comply with the delivery requirements of Program C460-S, concurrence is sought to terminate for default, the balance of the contract and to procure the requirements with any excess reprocurement costs to [the Appellant]. Ð (R4 File, Tab Q). The CRB gave its approval to the action recommended by the Contracting Officer that same day (R4 File, Tab Q). 10/ On August 23, 1990, the Contracting Officer, sent the Appellant a letter, entitled "Notice of Termination/Complete," informing the contractor that its contract ". . . identified as Purchase Order 82905, Program C460-S, Print Order 20070 and the balance of the contract, Jacket No. 262-267, is hereby terminated for default because of your continuing failure to comply with the delivery requirements" (R4 File, Tab S). The notice also told the Appellant that the termination action was effective immediately, and that it was liable for any excess costs in the event that the Government decided to reprocure the work covered by the canceled contract (R4 File, Tab S). The Appellant responded with this appeal to the Board. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES Neither party has filed a brief with the Board in this appeal. See, Order Closing the Record and Filing of Briefs, dated August 22, 1991, pp. 2-3. Therefore, the Board's understanding of their respective positions is based on the documents in the record, other material they have submitted, and their statements during the prehearing telephone conference held on December 12, 1990. The Appellant admits that it had problems making timely deliveries of Program C460-S work for the first three months of its contract. On the other hand, it is uncontroverted in the record that the last eight Print Orders À" numbers 20062, 20063, 20064, 20065, 20066, 20067, 20068 and 20069 À" were received by Labor on the scheduled delivery dates in August 1990 (R4 File, Tab V). However, as the Board understands the Appellant's position it essentially places the blame for its failure to timely deliver so many of the early Print Orders on the Government. In the Appellant's view, if Labor had not issued an excessive number of Print Orders À" that is, more than the number of jobs allowed in a given period by the contract itself À" the default would not have occurred. The Appellant supports its position with several arguments, most of them predicated on averaging Labor's requirements under the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause over the life of the contract (R4 File, Tab V). Indeed, during the prehearing telephone conference the Appellant stated that it had relied on such averages to develop its cost estimates for bidding purposes. PHR, p. 13. First, the Appellant argues that the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause told potential bidders that the range of total orders over the contract term (12 months) for AWSBs, AWSSs, IWSBs and IWSSs, would be between 104 and 265 Print Orders (R4 File, Tab B, p. 5). To the Appellant, this meant that it could expect to receive between 8.6 and 22 orders a month, or 15.3 jobs per month, on average (R4 File, Tab V). See also, PHR, p. 13. When this figure is subdivided into work days (the average month has 23 work days), the Appellant expected an average of .66 jobs a day. According to the Appellant, however, Labor issued 69 Print Orders between May 15, 1990 and August 20, 1990 (a period containing 65 work days), 19 requiring the Appellant to work on an average of 1.06 jobs per day, or at 160.61 percent of the "average expected volume" (R4 File, Tab V). Second, the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause states that "[n]o more than 30 print orders will be placed in any one month" (R4 File, Tab B, p. 5). In contrast to the Respondent, whose position is that the underscored phrase means a "calendar month," the Appellant interprets those words to mean "any 30-day period." PHR, pp. 13, 16. The Appellant argues that the meaning it imputes to these words is the only fair and equitable interpretation because under the Government's view 60 Print Orders could be issued in a two day periodÀ" 30 on the last day of one month and 30 on the first day of the next. PHR, p. 16. Furthermore, the Appellant believes that the meaning it ascribes to the phrase is in accord with good business practices because a reasonable agency would spread the work over the 30-day period. Id. In this case, however, the Appellant notes that during the first 30 days of its contract (May 15, 1990 to June 15, 1990), Labor issued 35 Print Orders. When those orders are considered in light of the 19 work days available to the Appellant, this meant that it had to accomplish 1.84 jobs per day, or work at 278.79 percent of the average expected volume (R4 File, Tab V). A similar amount of work was received by the Appellant over the 30 days between June 4, 1990 and July 5, 1990 (R4 File, Tab V). Although Labor issued less Print Orders between July 5, 1990 and August 7, 1990 (20), and July 19, 1990 and August 20, 1990 (19), the Appellant nonetheless was compelled to work on an average of .87 jobs a day (131.83 percent above the average expected volume) and 1.19 jobs daily (180.30 percent over expected volume), respectively (R4 File, Tab V). Consequently, the Appellant contends that the number of Print Orders issued by Labor not only exceeded the allowable maximums under the contract for the first 30-day period, but generally was above the expected volume of work the entire time that it had the contract (R4 File, Tab V). See also, PHR, p. 15. Third, the Appellant argues that while the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause forecast between 20 and 50 Print Orders for AWSBs (the "larger jobs"), Labor issued orders for them at a much faster rate (R4 File, Tab V). In that regard, the Appellant claims that even though it had the Program C460-S contract for only 21.57 percent of its term, Labor issued 13 Print Orders for AWSBs during that period, which represented 65 percent of the minimum number of orders and 26 percent of the maximum number (R4 File, Tab V). Assuming, as the Appellant does, that an average of 35 AWSBs would be required a year, then it accomplished 37.14 percent of the annual work load, which meant that Labor was issuing AWSB Print Orders at 172.18 percent of the expected volume, or at an accelerated rate above the maximum number of such orders (R4 File, Tab V). Finally, the Appellant points to the "DETERMINATION OF AWARD" provision of the contract, and states that it requires the printing of four million impressions and 2,416 pages over the contract term (R4 File, Tab B, p. 11). See also, PHR, p. 17. The Appellant argues that since it held the contract for about one-quarter of the contract term, it expected to accomplish one-fourth of that work, i.e., one million impressions and 604 pages (R4 File, Tab V). However, according to the Appellant, it received and completed Print Orders for two million impressions and 1,052 pages (R4 File, Tab V). In the Appellant's view, these figures also demonstrated that Labor was sending it work at twice the rate estimated in the contract (R4 File, Tab V). 11/ PHR, p. 17. The Appellant says that it informed the Contracting Officer that it was having problems meeting the delivery schedule because Labor was issuing Print Orders at a rate above the contractual limits, and also because the installation of its new press was delayed, but the Respondent was not sympathetic to this explanation and terminated the contract for default (R4 File, Tab V). The Appellant believes that the contract clearly underestimated Labor's needs, and the Contracting Officer should have shown some understanding of the situation. In the Appellant's view, the termination for default in this case was clearly unjustified. Therefore, since the Appellant had caught up with the Program C460-S work and was making timely deliveries after August 8, 1990, it believes that it has demonstrated its ability to meet the greater demand and, therefore it asks the Board to reinstate its contract (R4 File, Tab V). The Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Appellant's contract for Program C460-S was properly terminated for default because of its inability to meet the contractual delivery dates (R4 File, Tab S). See also, PHR, p. pp. 12-13. The Respondent observes that as a "requirements" contract, Program C460-S obligated the Government to procure all the needed work from the Appellant. PHR, p. 13. However, the "REQUIREMENTS" clause of the contract clearly stated that "[t]he quantity of items specified herein are estimates only, and are not purchased hereby," and did not guarantee a specific amount of work to be procured. Id. Furthermore, the estimated frequency and number of orders shown in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause were just the Respondent's "best guess" based on projections from the previous year, and were merely intended to inform bidders that orders could be expected in a wide range of quantities. Id. Consequently, the Respondent rejects the Appellant's contention that the failure to meet the scheduled shipment dates was due to an excess volume of work because the contract does not fix a specific figure (only ranges are given) against which to measure the frequency or number of Print Orders issued by Labor. The Respondent also disagrees with the Appellant's interpretation of the phrase "any one month" in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause. It argues that the disputed phrase is commonly understood to mean a "calendar month," not "any 30-day period," as contended by the Appellant. PHR, p. 15. The Respondent contends that the "calendar month" meaning is consistent with the way it keeps its business records. PHR, p. 17. Furthermore, even if one were to accept the Appellant's interpretation of the disputed phrase, the Respondent does not believe it would help or advance the contractor's position, because "any 30- day period" could also be manipulated to produce results different from those asserted by the Appellant. Id. Finally, the Respondent states that if the Appellant had any doubts about the meaning of the term "any one month," it was obligated to ask the Contracting Officer for a clarification before submitting its bid and accepting the contract. Id. Contrary to the Appellant, the Respondent claims that Labor never issued more than 30 Print Orders in any one calendar month (R4 File, Tab AA). PHR, p. 15. Furthermore, the Respondent points to the "SCHEDULE" clause of the contract which provides that "[s]chedule for orders placed in excess of the stated limitations (30 per month) shall be arranged by mutual agreement with the contractor," and states that under this provision the Appellant could have sought an extension of the delivery schedule in the event that more than 30 Print Orders were issued in a month (R4 File, Tab B, p. 9). PHR, p. 13. An extension of delivery time would have been particularly appropriate in such a case because the "SCHEDULE" clause also holds the contractor to making a "quick turn around" of work; i.e., "complete production, distribution and mailing must be made within five work days" (R4 File, Tab B, p. 9). PHR, pp. 13-14. Finally, the Respondent contends that the Appellant's poor performance in making timely deliveries under the contract is amply supported in the record, and fully justified the Contracting Officer's termination action in this case (R4 File, Tab W). PHR, p. 15. Accordingly, for all of these reasons, the Respondent asks the Board to affirm the Contracting Officer's partial termination of the Appellant's contract for default (R4 File, Tab S). DECISION 12/ The sole issue before the Board is whether or not the Contracting Officer was in error in terminating the remainder of the Appellant's contract for Program C460-S for default. Because a default termination is a drastic action, it may only be taken for good cause and on the basis of solid evidence. 13/ See, e.g., Stephenson, Inc., GPO BCA 02-88 (December 19, 1991), Sl. op. at 20 (citing, Mary Rogers Manley d/b/a Mary Rogers Real Estate, HUDBCA No. 76-27, 78-2 BCA À 13,519; Decatur Realty Sales, HUDBCA No. 75-26, 77-2 BCA À 12,567.) If the Contracting Officer erroneously exercised his default authority, then the termination is converted into one of convenience and the Appellant would be allowed to recover for the work performed. 14/ See, e.g., Stephenson, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 17; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 9; Bonnar-Vawter, GPOCAB [No Docket Number], at 5 (1975) (citing, Racon Electric Company, ASBCA No. 8020, 1962 BCA À 3,528. 15/ See also, 1988 Contract Terms, À 20.(g). In the judgment of the Board, the Appellant has admitted to facts, amply supported in the record, concerning its inability to meet the delivery schedules on numerous Print Orders, which justified the termination of its Program C460-S contract. Under the standard "Default" clause in GPO contracts, a Contracting Officer may, by written notice of default to the contractor, terminate a contract, in whole or in part, if the contractor fails to: (1) deliver the supplies or perform the required services within the time specified or any extension which may have been granted; (2) make progress on the work, so as to endanger performance of the contract; or (3) perform any of the other provisions of the contract. 1988 Contract Terms, À 20.(a)(1)(i), (ii),(iii). Furthermore , where a contract is terminated for default and the work must be reprocured, the contractor will be held responsible for excess procurement costs and possible liquidated damages. Id., À 20.(b), 22.(d). However, the contractor must continue the work not terminated. Id., À 20.(b). Moreover, 1988 Contract Terms provides that where the default termination is based on the failure to ship/delivery or perform the work within the time specified, the contractor will not be liable for any excess costs if such a delinquency arises from causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor. Id., À 20(c) ("Default" clause), 22(e) ("Liquidated Damages" clause), 23 ("Delay in Deliveries" clause). Such causes include, but are not limited to, acts of God or of the public enemy, acts of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual capacity, fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine restrictions, strikes, freight embargoes, and unusually severe weatherÀ" but in each case, the failure to perform must be beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor. Id., À 20.(c). 16/ The Government's initial burden in default cases is to show that the contractor has failed, in some respect, to perform on the contract. See, e.g., Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 11 ; Vogard Printing Corporation, GPOCAB 7-84 (January 7, 1986), Sl. op. at 5 (citing, Caskel Forge, Inc., ASBCA No. 6205, 61-1 BCA À 2,891; National Aviation Electronics, Inc., ASBCA No. 18256, 74-2 BCA À 10,677). Because the findings and determinations of contracting officers are, as a rule, considered prima facie correct, once the default has been established, the contractor must then demonstrate that the default was excusable. See, Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 11; Remco Business Systems, Inc., GPOCAB [No Docket Number] (October 5, 1977), Sl. op. at 2-3 (citing, Norm Evans Construction Company, AGBCA No. 341, 75-1 BCA À 11,229); Mill River Press Lithographers, Printers, GPOCAB [No Docket Number] (August 12, 1977), Sl. op. at 4 (citing, Beco, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 9702, 9734, 1964 BCA À 4,493; Highway Products, Inc., ASBCA No. 14212, 69-2 BCA À 8,064); Vogard Printing Corporation, supra (citing. B. M. Harrison Electrosonics, Inc., ASBCA No. 7684, 1963 BCA À 3,736; Hy-Cal Engineering Corporation, NASA BCA Nos. 871-18 and 772-7, 75-2 BCA À 11,399). If the default termination is based on untimely performance, the contractor's burden is four-fold: (1) to prove affirmatively that the delay was caused by or arose out of a situation which was beyond the contractor's control and it was not at fault or negligent; (2) to show that performance would have been timely but for the occurrence of the event which is claimed to excuse the delay; (3) to show that it took every reasonable precaution to avoid foreseeable causes for delay and to minimize their effect; and (4) to establish a precise period of time that performance was delayed by the causes alleged. See, Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 12; Loose Leaf Devices Company, GPOCAB [No Docket Number] (1977), Sl. op. at 4-5 (citing, Ace Electronics Associates, Inc., ASBCA No. 13899, 69-2 BCA À 7,922); Allegheny Plastics, Inc., GPOCAB [No Docket Number] (1975), Sl. op. at 5; Scanforms, Incorporated, GPOCAB [No Docket Number] (September 24, 1975), Sl. op, at 3; American Printing and Publishing, Inc., GPOCAB [No Docket Number] (September 19, 1975), Sl. op. at 3-4 (citing, Lee K. Geiger Construction Company, GSBCA Nos. 2152, 2164, 67-1 BCA À 6,189; American Construction Company, Inc., GSBCA No. 1097, 65-2 BCA À 4,964). This burden must be carried by substantial evidence À" unsupported reasons by way of explanation are not enoughÀ" and the contractor must also show that the delay in contract performance was due to unforeseeable causes beyond its control and without any contributory negligence on its part. See, Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 12-13; Kaufman DeDell Printing, Inc., GPOCAB [No Docket Number] (November 6, 1979), Sl. op. at 5 (citing, Empire State Tree Service, VACAB No. 949, 71-1 BCA À 8,716); Bonnar-Vawter, Incorporated, supra, Sl. op. at 5-6 (citing, H. C. Thode, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 18177, 18294, 74-1 BCA À 10,418); Loose Leaf Devices Company, supra, Sl. op. at 7 (citing, Aargus Poly Bag, GSBCA Nos. 4314, 4315, 76-2 BCA À 11,927). The Appellant in this case acknowledges that it failed to meet the contract delivery dates for a substantial number of Print Orders under the Program C460-S contract; i.e., the Appellant admits that it was in default on those orders. See, e.g., Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 13. As a general rule, the Government is entitled to strict compliance with its specifications. 17/ See, e.g, Rose Printing Company, GPO BCA 2-87 (June 9, 1989), Sl. op. at 6 (and cases cited therein); Fry Communications, Inc., GPO BCA 1-87 (June 1, 1989), Sl. op. at 5; Mid-America Business Forms Corporation, GPO BCA 8-87 (December 30, 1988), Sl. op. at 18-19. See also, Astro Dynamics, Inc., ASBCA No. 28320, 83-2 BCA À 16,900; Arnold Diamond, Inc., ASBCA No. 12335, 68-1 BCA À 8,672. Therefore, on June 26, 1990, when Labor first notified the Respondent that seven of the Print Orders issued to the AppellantÀ" numbers 20008, 20015, 20024, 20025, 20026, 20027, and 20029À" had not been delivered on time and were "now long overdue," it would have been within its rights to terminate the contract immediately. See, e.g., Stephenson, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 21 (citing, Nuclear Research Associates, Inc., ASBCA No. 13563, 70-1 BCA À 8,237 (where the contractor's delivery was late by one day, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals upheld the default termination, stating that "once an appellant has failed to deliver on time, the Government, absent excusable cause of delay, has an indefensible right to terminate the contract, unless its own conduct deprives it of that right."). See also, e.g., Northeastern Manufacturing and Sales, ASBCA No. 35493, 89-3 BCA À 22,093; Appli Tronics, ASBCA No. 31540, 89-1 BCA À 21,555; Riggs Engineering Co., ASBCA No. 26509, 82-2 BCA À 15,955; R & O Industries, Inc., GSBCA No. 4804, 80-1 BCA À 14,196. As a practical matter, however, the Government rarely terminates contracts for slight delays, muchless immediately. 18/ See, e.g., Stephenson, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 21-22; ACL-FILCO Corporation, ASBCA No. 26196, 83-1 BCA À 16,151 ("It has often been noted, . . . , that neither the Government nor the contractor is well served by a precipitously taken decision to terminate a contract for default . . .".). Consequently, it is well-settled that the Government does not waive its right to terminate a defaulted contract because it fails to do so immediately when the right to terminate accrues. 19/ See, Frank A. Pelliccia v. United States, 208 Ct. Cl. 278, 525 F.2d 1035 (1975). The decision to terminate a defaulted contract is a matter largely within a contracting officer's discretion. See, e.g., Stephenson, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 23. As indicated above, however, where the default action is based on the failure to meet the delivery schedules specified, certain provisions in the contract itself will excuse the delay if it arose from causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor. 20/ See, 1988 Contract Terms, À 20(c), 22(e), 23. Although the "Default" clause lists some types of events which will excuse delays by contractorsÀ" acts of God or of the public enemy, acts of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual capacity, fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine restrictions, strikes, freight embargoes, and unusually severe weatherÀ" these are examples only and the clause is not intended to be all inclusive. 1988 Contract Terms, À 20.(c) In this case, the Appellant essentially tenders two reasons for its failure to meet the Program C460-S delivery schedules: (1) the Appellant experienced major machinery problems at the beginning of its contract because its new Heidelberg press was not delivered until late June, and its older model 2 color press (which was being used for Program C460-S work in the interim) broke down in late May/early June and it took time to fix it; and (2) Labor issued more Print Orders in terms of frequency and number than the maximum allowed by the contract itself. The Board believes that neither of these reasons falls within the range of acceptable occurrences or events which would excuse the Appellant's failure to perform. 1. Machinery Problems It is accepted that a contractor has an obligation to reasonably assure itself of the availability of necessary supplies and machinery prior to making a contract commitment with the Government. See, Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 13-14; Scanforms, Incorporated, supra, Sl. op. at 4 (citing, Woodhull Construction Company, ASBCA No. 3628, 57-1 BCA À 1,260; First Dominion Corporation (1967), GSBCA No. 2659, 69-1 BCA À 7,488); American Printing and Publishing, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 4; Allegheny Plastics, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 5-7 (citing, Vereinigte Osterreichische Eisen and Stahlwerke Aktiengesellschaft, IBCA No. 327, 1962 BCA À 3,503). Indeed, as a general rule the unexplained breakdown of machinery is not excusable per se; in fact, the difficulty attending the performance of a contract is not an excusable cause of delay. See, Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 14; Allegheny Plastics, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 7 (citing, Carnegie Steel Company v. United States, 240 U.S. 156 (1916)). The reason for these rules is simpleÀ" implicit in a contractor's promise to perform is its assurance that it has the ability to perform; i.e., that there is available machinery and replacement parts so that performance will not be delayed due to machinery breakdown. See, Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 14; Allegheny Plastics, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 7. See also, Jomar Enterprises, Inc., GPO BCA 13-86 (May 25, 1989), Sl. op. at 3. As explained by one of GPO's ad hoc boards: Ð Every contractor impliedly represents, when he makes his bid, that he can accomplish what he sets out to do, within the time upon which there was an agreement; and by such implied representation, he is not, in the eyes of the law, entitled to maintain a mental reservation, to the effect, that he can perform within the time required provided the material suppliers lives [sic] up to their commitment and he can obtain the paper stock in time to maintain the required schedule. [Citation omitted.] The failure of the paper supplier to make timely delivery of the necessary stock does not excuse the contractor from resulting delays in contract completion. [Citation omitted.] Ð Scanforms, Incorporated, supra, at 4. In short, it is the contractor's responsibility to have labor, plant, equipment, finances and material adequate for contract performance. See, Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 14-15; Allegheny Plastics Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 7 (citing, Fulton Shipyard, IBCA No. 735-10-68, 71-1 BCA À 8,616). Therefore, the unexplained mechanical failure of the Appellant's older model 2 color press in this case is not an acceptable excuse which, under the law, would allow the Appellant to escape the consequences of its failure to perform the tasks required of it under the contract. Similarly, although the Appellant asserts that the reason its new press was unavailable when it commenced performance under the contract was because of some damaged parts that had to be obtained from Germany, it has offered no evidence which would demonstrate that the failure of HeidelbergÀ" its press supplierÀ" to deliver the new machine on time was due to Heidelberg's negligence or reasons beyond its control. Cf., Loose Leaf Devices Company, supra, Sl. op. at 7 (citing, Williamsburg Drapery Co. v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 776, 799, 369 F.2d 729 (1966)). In the Board's judgment, the Appellant's reliance on the delay of its vendor of machinery to excuse its own failure to meet the delivery schedules under the Program C460-S contract, affords it no protection under the law. The Appellant had an obligation under the contract to plan for its performance, including, prior to submitting its bid and binding itself to the delivery terms of the contract, assuring that essential materials and machinery would be available. In the absence of any evidence from the Appellant that the Heidelberg press was delivered late because of the negligence on the part of its press supplier, the Board must conclude that the untimely shipment under Program C460-S was attributable to the Appellant's own failure to properly plan for its performance. The burden of proof was on the Appellant to demonstrate that its failure to perform was due to causes beyond its control and without its fault or negligence. However, in the Board's opinion, the reasons offered by the Appellant to excuse its delay were not unforeseeable and beyond its control and without its fault or negligence. Accordingly, as to this aspect of its defense, the Appellant has not met its burden of proof with respect to excusing its failure to make timely shipments under Program C460-S. 2. Excessive Print Orders Issued by Labor The Appellant's principal excuse for its failure to meet the Program C460-S delivery schedules is its claim that Labor overtaxed its production capacity by issuing more Print Orders than the maximum allowed under the contract. The Appellant's position, detailed above, is based on its view of Labor's "average" requirements over the life of the contract. Interpreting the contract in that light, the Appellant contends that: (1) the 69 Print Orders issued by Labor between May 15, 1990 and August 20, 1990 represented 160.61 percent of the average expected volume; (2) Labor ignored the contractual restriction against generating more than the 30 Print Orders in "any one month," compelling the Appellant to work at 278.79 percent of the average expected volume between May 15, 1990 and July 5, 1990, and never less than 131.83 percent above the average expected volume at any time during its performance of the contract; (3) Labor issued Print Orders for the larger AWSB Print Orders at 172.18 percent of the expected volume and required the Appellant to complete 37.14 percent of the annual work load between May 15, 1990 and August 23, 1990; and (4) the Print Orders received from Labor required the Appellant to produce two million impressions and 1,052 pages, or nearly one-half the amount expected over the contract term. In summary, the gravamen of the Appellant's challenge to the default termination action, and indeed the main reason it claims that it was unable to meet the scheduled shipment dates, was that Labor was ordering work at a rate nearly 200 percent, or double, the quantities estimated in the contract specifications. PHR, p. 17. In the Board's view, the Appellant's assertion blaming its failure to meet the required delivery schedules under the contract because Labor sent it excessive work is without foundation in the record. At the outset, the Board is mindful that Program C460-S was a "direct-deal term contract," which allowed Labor to place Print Orders directly with the Appellant rather than routing them through the Respondent. GPO Handbook, Section IV, À 1, at 8. As indicated previously, agency direct-deal authority ". . . extends only the placement of print orders and to the transmission of copy and proofs". GPO Handbook, Section IV, À 2, at 9. See, Castillo Printing Co., supra, Sl. op. at 3-4. The authority of a customer agency's Printing Officer is strictly circumscribed by the GPO Handbook, 1988 Contract Terms, and the contract itself. Id., Sl. op. at 47. Generally, it is limited to such tasks as issuing Print Orders, issuing bills of lading, giving specific instructions regarding production, and determining the production schedule for each Print Order. Id. The Board sees nothing in this record to indicate that Fennell, Labor's Printing Officer, deviated from these guidelines or misunderstood his authority. Id., Sl. op. at 4, 47-48. The key concept in the Appellant's position is that there was an "average expected volume" of work arising from the estimates contained in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause. As the Board understands it, the concept is based on certain assumptions about the language in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" (and the "DETERMINATION OF AWARD" clause to some degree), namely: (1) the language regulates the frequency at which such orders could be issued over the life of the contract (a maximum of 30 orders per month); and (2) the clause guarantees the contractor a range of work over the contract term with respect to number of orders, types of publications, size of jobs and overall number of impressions and pages. The concept also assumes that Labor would issue orders at a reasonably uniform rate over the contract term. Accordingly, taking these assumptions into account, the Appellant made certain business calculations which apportioned the annual estimates of work contained in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause on a monthly and work day basis, to arrive at its bid for Program C460-S. The Appellant's conclusion that Labor was ordering work at an accelerated rate nearly double the quantities estimated in the contract specifications is rooted in this "per month" and "per work day" interpretation of the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause. While the Board appreciates the business reasons which may have led the Appellant to try to forecast a steady rate of work and income, we believe that it has misconstrued the contract. The first assumption made by the Appellant involves its interpretation of so much of the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause which provides: "No more than 30 print orders will be placed in any one month" (R4 File, Tab B, p. 5). The Appellant sees the key phrase "any one month," as meaning "any 30-day period." PHR, pp. 13, 16. Under this view, the Appellant is correct when it says that during the first 30 days of its Program C460-S contract (May 15, 1990 to June 15, 1990), Labor issued Print Orders (35) in excess of the number of allowable number (30) (R4 File, Tab AA). However, the Appellant's contention that Labor issued the same number of Print Orders in the 30 days between June 4, 1990 and July 5, 1990, is not borne out by the record; i.e., only 29 Print OrdersÀ" numbers 20018 to 20046À" were issued in that period (R4 File, Tab AA). 21/ Nonetheless, if one accepts the Appellant's further refinement of its concept and considers only the work days available for contract performance, then its conclusion that Labor issued Print Orders at a rate exceeding "average expected volume" throughout the contract is probably true; e.g., 278.79 percent of the average expected volume in the first 30 days under the contract, never less than 131.83 percent above the average expected volume at any time during the Appellant's performance, and 160.61 percent overall for the period May 15, 1990 to August 20, 1990 (R4 File, Tab V). See also, PHR, p. 15. Furthermore, applying the Appellant's formula to the "DETERMINATION OF AWARD" clause in the contract, there is some justification, at least mathematically, for its statement that Labor was ordering work at a rate nearly 200 percent, or double, the quantities estimated in the contract specifications. PHR, p. 17. Against the Appellant's "30 Print Orders in 30 days" view of the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause, the Respondent's interposes a much simpler interpretationÀ" the disputed phrase "any one month," in common parlance, means a "calendar month." PHR, p. 15. According to the Respondent, this is particularly true because it keeps its business records on a calendar month basis. PHR, p. 17. Certainly, the record supports the Respondent's contention that Labor never issued more than 30 Print Orders in any one calendar month; i.e., the documentary evidence confirms that Labor issued 69 Print Orders to the Appellant in the following sequenceÀ" 11 in May 1990, 30 during June 1990, 14 in July 1990 and 14 during August 1990 (up to August 20) (R4 File, Tabs W and AA). (PHR, p. 15. However, by asserting during the prehearing telephone conference that if the Appellant was unsure of the intent of the phrase "any one month" in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" provision it was obligated to ask the Contracting Officer for a clarification before submitting its bid, the Respondent has raised, by implication, the possibility that the phrase may be ambiguous. 22/ PHR, p. 17. In fact, the word "month" can have the meaning ascribed to it by both parties in this case; i.e., standard reference sources define the word as either (1) a "calendar month," or (2) the time from any date of one month to the corresponding date of the next. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 880 (3d Coll. ed. 1988); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1159 (4th ed. 1968). Consequently, on the surface at least, there might appear to be an inherent ambiguity in the IFB's "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause. However, the Board has observed in the past that the rules concerning ambiguous provisions come into play only if the meaning of the disputed terms are not susceptible to interpretation through the usual rules of contract construction. Castillo Printing Co., supra, Sl. op. at 27. The most basic principle of contract construction is that the document should be interpreted as a whole. 23/ See, e.g., Hol-Gar Manufacturing Corporation v. United States, 352 F.2d 972 (1965); Restatement (Second) Contracts, À 202(2) (1981). Hence, it is well-accepted that all provisions of a contract are to be given effect and no provision is to be rendered meaningless. See, e.g., Fortec Constructors v. United States, 760 F.2d 1288, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Jamsar, Inc. v. United States, 442 F.2d 930 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Grace Industries, Inc., ASBCA No. 33553, 87-3 BCA À 20,171. Stated otherwise, a contract should be interpreted in a manner which gives meaning to all its parts and in such a fashion that the provisions do not conflict with each other, if this is reasonably possible. See, e.g., B. D. Click Company v. United States, 614 F.2d 748 (Ct. Cl. 1980). In this particular case the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause does not exist in a vacuum, but rather it must read in conjunction with the "SCHEDULE" clause. When the Board construes the relevant provisions as a whole, the contractual scheme becomes readily apparentÀ" normally no more than 30 Print Orders will be placed in any one month ("FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause) but where the Government issues more than 30 Print Orders, the contractor will be entitled, on request, to an extended delivery schedule for the additional work ("SCHEDULE" clause). Since the "SCHEDULE" clause also envisions a brief performance period on Print Orders À" "[c]omplete production, distribution and mailing must be made within five workdays"À" the Board finds itself in agreement with the Respondent that an opportunity for longer due dates on orders in excess of 30 is a reasonable accommodation to the extra strain on a contractor's productive capacity. Furthermore, it seems highly unlikely to the Board that if a contractor, attempting to satisfy the Government's increased needs, asked for such an extension that the Government would deny it, because such an adverse decision could be construed as a breach of its implied duty to cooperate. 24/ See, e.g., Stephenson, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 38-41. In short, the contract itself foresees the possibility of additional work and provides the appropriate relief. Under this interpretation, whether a "month" is a calendar month or any 30- day period extending from a given date of one month to the corresponding date of the next, is immaterial; i.e., the subject matter and principal concern of the relevant language in the contract is the number of orders, not the number of days. Therefore, because the Board sees no conflict between the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause and the "SCHEDULE" clause, it also finds that there is no ambiguity in the intent of the phrase "any one month" in the former provision. 25/ While the Appellant contends that it was receiving more than 30 Print Orders a month, contrary to the limitation contained in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause, there is nothing in the record to indicate that it sought the relief provided for in the "SCHEDULE" clause of the contract when it found its production capacity inadequate to adhere to the order delivery schedules under those circumstances. Although the Appellant asserts that it had informed the Contracting Officer that Labor was exceeding the volume indicated in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause (R4 File, Tabs J (letter of July 11, 1990) and V; PHR, pp. 16-17), the record is devoid of any evidence prior to the termination date of the contract to show that it either formally asked for an extension of the required delivery schedules or lodged an official protest with the Contracting Officer about Labor's issuing an excessive number of Print Orders. The Appellant's assertion in its complaint that it "notified the Contracting Officer that the Agency was exceeding the volume limits" is an insufficient basis for inferring that it initiated either of these actions at the appropriate time (R4 File, Tab V). Cf., Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture, GPO BCA 9-85 ((Decision on Remand, August 5, 1991), Sl. op. at 33, n. 31 ("As the Claims Court observed [in Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, No. 174-89C (Cl. Ct. February 5, 1991), Sl. op at 25], such allegations and statements are not sufficient to enable an appellant to carry its burden of proof on the reliance issue."). Also cf., Singleton Contracting Corporation, GSBCA No. 8548 (January 18, 1990), 90-2 BCA À 22,748; Tri-State Services of Texas, Inc., ASBCA No. 38019, 89-3 BCA À 22,064 (citing, Gemini Services, Inc., ASBCA No. 30247, 86-1 BCA À 18,736). Accordingly, even if the Board accepted the Appellant's theory that the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause absolutely limited Labor to issuing no more than 30 Print Orders a month, and believed that the customer agency's generation of a larger number of orders amounted to a violation of the contract and was the principal cause for the contractor's failure to meet the delivery schedules, there would be no basis for the Board to reverse the Contracting Officer's termination decision because it is well-settled that no recovery may be had if the contract itself provides a remedy. Cf., Triax-Pacific, A Joint Venture, ASBCA No. 36353, 91-2 BCA À 23,724. Like its first assumption, the Appellant's second supposition À" that the contract guarantees the contractor a range of work over the contract term with respect to number of orders, types of publications, size of jobs and overall number of impressions and pages À" will not withstand scrutiny when measured against the express language of the contract. Thus, the "REQUIREMENTS" clause plainly 47 states that it ". . . is a requirements contract for the items and for the period specified herein. . . ." and that ". . . [t]he quantities of items specified herein are estimates only, and are not purchased hereby" (R4 File, Tab B, p. 4). Furthermore, while providing that ". . . the Government shall order from the contractor all the items set forth which are required to be purchased by the Government . . .", the "REQUIREMENTS" clause also makes clear that ". . . if the Government's requirements for the items set forth herein do not result in orders in the amounts or quantities described as 'estimated', it shall not constitute the basis for an equitable price adjustment under this contract." Id. Moreover, the "REQUIREMENTS" clause states that ". . .[s] ubject to any limitations elsewhere in this contract, the contractor shall furnish to the Government all items called for by the print orders issued in accordance with the 'Ordering' clause of this contract." Id. Similarly, the first sentence in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause clearly states that "[i]t is impossible at this time to predetermine the frequency or number of orders that will be placed on this contract," and the next one observes that ". . . based on past history, it is anticipated that approximately 104-265 orders will be placed during the contract term . . ." (R4 File, Tab B, p. 5). Indeed, the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause also lists the potential number of orders for AWSBs, AWSSs, IWSSs, and IWSBs, in terms of approximations of orders per year, copies per order, and pages per copy. Id. Finally, the pertinent language in the "DETERMINATION OF AWARD" provision states ". . . the following units of production . . . are the estimated requirements to produce one year's production under this contract. These units do not constitute, nor are they to be construed as, a guarantee of the volume of work which may be ordered under this contract . . . " (R4 File, Tab B, p. 11). When these several provisions are considered as a whole, it is clear that while the Government agreed to procure all of its AWSB, AWSS, IWSS, and IWSB requirements between May 1, 1990 and April 30, 1990, from the Appellant, it made no commitment as to a specific quantity of work. There is no other way to read phrases such as "estimates only," "amounts or quantities described as 'estimated'," "impossible at this time to predetermine the frequency or number of orders," "approximately 104-265 orders," "estimated requirements," and "[t]hese units do not constitute, nor are they to be construed as, a guarantee of the volume of work which may be ordered," without distorting the clear meaning of the contract. Cf., Tamms Lithography, Inc., GPO BCA 14-89 (July 13, 1990), Sl. op. at 7. These terms, all conveying the same thought and appearing in several critical provisions, should have alerted a reasonably prudent contractor that the Respondent merely making a good faith guess, based on past experience, as to the wide range of potential work which could be expected under the contract. Accordingly, the Board agrees with the Respondent that absent a specific commitment from the Government with respect to an exact volume of work, the Appellant's "average expected volume" theory falls because there is no standard against which to measure the frequency or number of Print Orders generated by Labor in order to determine if the rate at which it issued them was excessive. This is not to say that the Appellant's "average expected volume" concept has no usefulness whatsoever. Certainly, from a business point of view, calculations based on an average of anticipated work may serve as a convenient device for determining contractor costs for the purpose of bidding and for scheduling work in the plant, but it has nothing to do with the scheduling of work under the contract by the agency which requires it. Furthermore, the idea of an "average expected volume" cannot be used to rewrite the contract. That is, when the Appellant refines its concept into anticipated amounts of work on a monthly and daily basis, it is, in effect, attempting to impose its own view of good business practicesÀ" in which orders are spread evenly over a fixed period of timeÀ" on the express language of the contract. PHR, p. 16. Contrary to the Appellant's calculations, nothing in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause either mentions or can be construed as promising work on an average "per month" or "per working day" basis; instead the provision talks of approximate "orders per year," "copies per order," and "pages per copy." These terms are not synonymous, and it is clear that the Government could order more or less than one order, more or less copies per order or more or less pages per copy of several types of publications and still be within the approximate or annual quantity of work listed. Moreover, the Appellant's "per month" or "per working day" averages disappear when one considers that under the express language of the contract, assuming the maximum estimate of 265 orders were placed at the maximum rate of 30 a month, the Government could have satisfied its contractual obligations in less than nine months; i.e., nothing in the contract required Labor to evenly distribute its Program C460-S Print Orders over the entire contract term of 12 months, all that was necessary was that the agency place most of its orders within that period. Cf., Tamms Lithography, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 7. Because there was no "average expected volume" of work under the contract, and thus no standard against which to measure the frequency or number of Print Orders issued by Labor, the Appellant's claim that the amount of work ordered by the agency exceeded by 200 percent the quantities estimated in the contract specifications has no factual support. As a consequence, the Board finds no merit to the Appellant's assertion that its failure to meet the Print Order delivery schedules under the contract was excusable because it resulted from an excess of work required by Labor. Indeed, based on this record, the Board believes that rather than being the major source of the Appellant's delivery delays, the frequency and number of Print Orders issued by Labor only became a problem when the Appellant's new press failed to arrive on time and its old press broke down. This view is reenforced by the fact that the Appellant not only continued to accept the work which it now contends was "excess," but also 51 informed the Contracting Officer, on July 11, 1990, in response to the first "Cure Notice," that everything was "on track" and that it expected "to be completely current on the contract before July 23," because its new Heidelberg press was "now in place and running and we are almost completely caught up" (R4 File, Tab J). 26/ Accordingly, having examined the contract terms and the facts in the record, the Board concludes that there is no merit to the Appellant's contention that Labor was ordering work at a rate nearly double the estimated quantities shown in the contract specifications, and therefore, its defense to the termination action based on that view must fail. CONCLUSION The Board's analysis of the record leads it to the conclusion that the Contracting Officer was fully justified in terminating the remainder of the Appellant's Program C460-S contract for default for the grounds stated in his "Notice of Termination/Complete," dated August 23, 1990. The "SCHEDULE" clause of the contract clearly states that "[a]dherence to this schedule must be maintained" (R4 File, Tab B, p. 9). That time was of the essence in this contract should have been apparent to the Appellant from the three "Cure Notices" it received and the numerous telephone calls concerning overdue Print Orders and requests for rescheduled shipping dates. 27/ The Appellant only replied to the first "Cure Notice." The Appellant then admitted it was having problems meeting the Print Order delivery schedules but sought to excuse the delays because of (1) the late arrival of a new press; (2) the mechanical breakdown of its old press; and (3) the issuance of an excessive number of orders by Labor. Although the Appellant assured the Contracting Officer that with its new press the backlog of work would be eliminated by July 23, 1990, subsequent complaints from Labor disclosed continued unsatisfactory performance by the Appellant with respect to meeting the Print Order delivery schedules. The Contracting Officer's second and third "Cure Notices" elicited no response from the Appellant. Because of the Appellant's continuing failure to comply with the delivery requirements of Program C460-S, the Contracting Officer terminated the balance of its contract effective August 23, 1990 (R4 File, Tab S). 28/ Considering the record before it as a whole, the Board is unable to say that the Contracting Officer's decision to partially terminate the contract for Program C460-S for default under the circumstances described herein is clearly erroneous. Therefore, the Board AFFIRMS the Contracting Officer's decision and DENIES the appeal. Á It is so Ordered. _______________ à The Contracting Officer's appeal file, assembled pursuant to Rule 4 of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure, was delivered to the Board on October 19, 1990. GPO Instruction 110.12, Subject: Board of Contract Appeals Rules of Practice and Procedure, dated September 17, 1984 (Board Rules), Rule 4. It will be referred to hereafter as R4 File, with an appropriate Tab letter also indicated. As originally submitted, the R4 File consisted of documents identified as Tab A through Tab XYZ. However, at the prehearing telephone conference held on December 12, 1990, Counsel for GPO requested permission to introduce copies of all 69 Print Orders issued to the Appellant under the contract as Tab AA. See, Prehearing Conference Report, dated May 8, 1991, p. 15 (hereinafter PCR). On December 20, 1990, the Board received the Print Orders in question and made them part of the record. A copy of the documents were also provided to the Appellant. à With the consent of the parties, this case was joined for the purposes of a prehearing telephone conference with another appeal filed by the Appellant, GPO BCA Docket No. GPO BCA 15-90. During the prehearing telephone conference, however, the parties were assured by the Board that even though the appeals had been consolidated for that limited purpose, separate decisions would be rendered in each. See, PCR, p. 1 By Order, dated August 22, 1991, the Board officially severed both cases. See, Order Closing the Record and Filing of Briefs, dated August 22, 1991, p. 1. à The record discloses that the Program C460-S QATAP standards for both Product Quality Levels (Printing Attributes and Finishing Attributes) was Level IV (R4 File, Tab B, p. 2). The Inspection Level standard for Non-Destructive tests was General Inspection Level I, while the measurement for Destructive tests was Special Inspection Level S-2 (R4 File, Tab B, p. 2). There were also two specified standardsÀ" one relating to the Type Quality and Uniformity attribute (Camera Copy/Films) and the other to the Solid and Screen Tint Color Match attribute (Pantone Matching System) (R4 File, Tab B, p. 2). à The contract in question was a "direct-deal term contract." As explained in the GPO Agency Procedural Handbook, GPO Publication 305.1, dated March 1987 (GPO Handbook): "[d]irect-deal term contracts allow the customer agency to place print orders (GPO Form 2511) directly with contractors rather than routing them through the GPO for placement." GPO Handbook, Section IV, À 1, at 8. The purpose of this method of contract administration is " . . . to ensure that agency printing needs are met in the most effective and efficient manner possible." Id. It should be noted, however, that agency direct-deal authority ". . . extends only the placement of print orders and to the transmission of copy and proofs. . . .All other authority rests with GPO's Contracting Officers." GPO Handbook, Section IV, À 2, at 9. See, Castillo Printing Co., GPO BCA 10-90 (May 8, 1991), Sl. op. at 3-4. 5. The record does not clearly identify who served as Labor's Printing Officer for the Program C460-S contract. Both Fennell and a "D. Rucker" issued Print Orders for Labor, although Rucker signed the vast majority of them (53) (R4 File, Tab AA). However, no question has been raised in this case concerning an improper exercise of direct deal authority by Labor's Printing Officer, thus his/her exact identity is immaterial. See, Castillo Printing Co., supra, Sl. op. at 14, 42-51. Therefore, for the purposes of this decision, the Board will assume that Fennell was Labor's Printing Officer because he was clearly the Respondent's principal contact at the customer agency (R4 File, Tabs J and P). à The complaints in question concerned quality shortcomings with respect to Print Orders 20006 and 20007 (R4 File, Tabs H and I). Print Order 20006 had several defects in printing and finishing, including missing pages and the wrong binding, and Labor asked that the order be reprinted (R4 File, Tab H). Similarly, Print Order 20007 was delivered with several printing defects, but Labor was willing to accept the order at a discount (R4 File, Tab I). Apart from the two Print Orders mentioned by Fennell, the record indicates that the Appellant had quality control problems with some other deliveries, particularly with regard to "short shipments;" i.e., Print Order 20001 (90 copies missing), Print Order 20015 (135 copies missing), Print Order 20042 (19 copies missing) and Print Order 20043 (40 copies missing) (R4 File, Tabs M, N, X and Y). In addition, the record shows that Print Orders 20036, 20047, 20048 were shipped in the wrong containers, which resulted in damage to the contents (R4 File, Tabs P, À 2, and U). However, since the Contracting Officer based the termination action on the Appellant's failure to comply with the contract's delivery requirements, and not on any quality problems with the products shipped, the contractor's inability to satisfy any other provision of the contract has not been considered in the context of this decision. à The record indicates that on July 6, 1990, Scott believed that his "Cure Notice" of July 2, 1990, had not been sent to the Appellant (R4 File, Tab J). However, there is other evidence in the record which indicates that Scott was mistaken. First, on July 11, 1990, while not specifically referring to a "Cure Notice," the Appellant wrote to Scott in response to his "letter dated July 2, 1990," and proceeded to explain the reasons for the late deliveries on Program C460-S, and to tell him of "the corrective measures we have taken" to remedy the problem (R4 File, Tab J). Second, on August 22, 1990, when Lowery, who had replaced Scott as Contracting Officer for Program C460-S, wrote to the Respondent's Contract Review Board (CRB) seeking permission to terminate the Appellant's contract for default, he stated that "[o]n July 2, 1990, . . . a cure notice was sent to [the Appellant]" (R4 File, Tab Q). Consequently, the Board concludes that the "Cure Notice" of July 2, 1990, was in fact sent to the Appellant, was received, and was answered on July 11, 1990. à The record contains two exhibits, both computer printouts, which show the adjustments made in the delivery schedules of Print Orders received by the Appellant under Program C460-S (R4 File, Tabs R and W). One document, entitled "Contract Compliance Section Exception Report, As of 8/20/90," was received from the Appellant on August 22, 1990, and is labeled Tab R. The other, identified as Tab W, is entitled "Contractor Performance History on Program 460-SÀ" Prior 5 Months to Present." The Board will refer to the latter computer printout in this decision because it is a more complete listing. à After the prehearing telephone conference in this case, by letter dated February 12, 1991, Counsel for GPO informed the Appellant that the Respondent would recommence setoff procedures to recoup an additional amount of excess reprocurement costs on Program C460-S Print Orders. See, Letter from Drew Spalding, Deputy General Counsel to Mr. Richard Swanson, dated February 12, 1991. Enclosed with his letters was a listing of reprocured orders. According to this listing, 59 Print Orders had to be reprocured. à The Contracting Officer's memorandum is dated August 22, 1990. By that date, however, all 69 Print Orders received by the Appellant under Program C460-S had been issued by Labor, not the 61 indicated in the memorandum to the CRB (R4 File, Tab AA). Apparently, the Contracting Officer, became aware of the remaining eight Print Orders in the Appellant's hands after August 22, 1990, since the termination notice issued the following day reflects this knowledge; i.e., the cancellation is effective beginning with Print Order 20070 (R4 File, Tab S). à At the prehearing telephone conference, the Appellant offered two additional reasons the Government was at fault for its delivery problems, namely (a) Labor erroneously gave Print Orders meant for the Appellant to another company and it took time to retrieve them, and (b) Labor issued some Print Orders with insufficient or wrong information. PHR, p. 16. However, from the context of the conference proceedings, it is clear to the Board that these incidents, if true, are only marginal considerations. The Appellant's main claim, and indeed the one which is the linchpin of its position, is that Labor was ordering work far in excess of the limits in the contract. PHR, p. 17. à The record on which the Board's decision is based consists of: (a) the R4 File, consisting of documents labeled Tab A through Tab XYZ, as originally filed by the Respondent on October 19, 1990; (b) the multi-document exhibit submitted by the Respondent on December 20, 1990, consisting of the 69 Print Orders issued under Program C460-S, and added to the R4 File as Tab AA; (c) the Appellant's letter, dated August 31, 1990, protesting the Contracting Officer's termination action and serving as the Complaint in this case; (d) the Prehearing Conference Report; and (6) the Respondent's letter, dated February 12, 1991, to the Appellant concerning excess reprocurement costs on Program C460- S. The record was officially closed on September 9. 1991, pursuant to the Board's Order, dated August 22, 1991. See, Order Closing the Record and Filing of Briefs, dated August 22, 1991, p. 2. On November 12, 1991, the Board received a Request for Decision (Request), dated November 8, 1991, from the Appellant in which it sought, among other things, to present additional information concerning excess reprocurement costs. Because the Appellant's Request was received after the record was closed, it has not been considered by the Board in the context of this decision. 13. Default terminations À" as a species of forfeiture À" are strictly construed. See, D. Joseph DeVito v. United States, 188 Ct. Cl. 979, 413 F.2d 1147, 1153 (1969). See also, Murphy, et al. v. United States, 164 Ct. Cl. 332 (1964); J. D. Hedin Construction Co. v. United States, 187 Ct.Cl. 45, 408 F.2d 424 (1969). à As indicated above, the remedy requested by the Appellant in its complaint letter of August 31, 1990, was reinstatement of its Program C460-S contract (R4 File, Tab V). The Board has stated on numerous occasions that it derives powers solely from the "Default" clause of the contract. See, e.g. Chavis and Chavis Printing, GPO BCA 20-90 (February 6, 1991), Sl. op. at 10; Ascot Tag and Label Company, Inc., GPO BCA 14-85 (August 7, 1987), Sl. op. at 23; Peak Printers, Inc., GPO BCA 12-85 (November 12, 1986), Sl. op. at 6. This case is before the Board under the "Disputes" clause because the Appellant is protesting the final decision of a GPO Contracting Officer terminating the remainder of its contract for default (R4 File, Tab S). 1988 Contract Terms, À 5.(b). It is well-accepted in Government contract law that even where jurisdiction exists, as here, a Board of Contract Appeals will not grant a terminated contractor's request for reinstatement of the contract because that is a matter within the authority of the agency, as exercised by its contracting officers. See, e.g., Crow Fitting Company, Inc., ASBCA No. 25378, 81-1 BCA À 14,951. The Board follows this general rule. à The Board was created by the Public Printer in 1984. GPO Instruction 110.10C, Subject: Establishment of the Board of Contract Appeals, dated September 17, 1984. Prior to the Board's creation, appeals from decisions of GPO Contracting Officers were considered by ad hoc Contract Appeals Boards (the decisions of these ad hoc boards are hereinafter cited as GPOCAB). While the decisions of these ad hoc boards are not legally binding on the Board, it is the Board's policy to follow them where applicable and appropriate. à Where the failure to deliver or perform is caused by the default of a supplier or subcontractor, the cause of the default must be beyond the control of both the prime contractor and subcontractor, and without the fault or negligence of either, in order for the prime contractor not to be liable for any excess costs for failure to perform, unless the subcontracted supplies or services could have been secured from other sources in sufficient time to meet the required delivery schedule. 1988 Contract Terms, À 20.(d). 17. It is "black letter" Government contract law that time is of the essence in any contract containing fixed dates for performance. See, e.g., Clay Bernard Systems International, Ltd. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 804 (1991); D. Joseph DeVito v. United States, supra, 413 F.2d at 1154. "Time is of the essence" means that asserted facts regarding urgency are legally irrelevant; i.e., there is simply no necessity that there be an urgency to a delivery date requirement for time to be of the essence. See, e.g., Kit Pack Company, Inc., ASBCA No. 33135, 89-3 BCA À 22,151; Control Mechanisms, Inc., ASBCA No. 27180, 84-2 BCA À 17,330. Although a contrary view was expressed in the Trial Judge's opinion adopted by the Claims Court in Franklin E. Penney Co. v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 842, 524 F.2d 668 (1975)À" i.e., whether time is of the essence depends upon the nature of the contract and the particular circumstances of the caseÀ" cases both before and after Penney have reinforced the absolute "time is of the essence" rule. See, e.g., Clay Bernard Systems International, Ltd. v. United States, supra, 22 Cl. Ct. 804 (1991); Simmons Precision Products, Inc. v. United States, 546 F.2d 886 (Ct. Cl. 1976); D. Joseph DeVito v. United States, supra, 413 F.2d 1147 (Ct. Cl. 1969). See also, Stephenson, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 25, n. 29, where the Board expressed its view that the Penney factors are just additional considerations in deciding whether a waiver has occurred and that the general ruleÀ" time is of the essence in any contract containing fixed dates for performanceÀ" still holds. 18. See, John Cibinic, Jr. & Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Administration of Government Contracts 2d ed., (The George Washington University, 1986), p. 677 (hereinafter Cibinic and Nash). As the Court of Claims observed in DeVito: "[t]he Government is habitually lenient in granting reasonable extensions of time for contract performance, for it is more interested in production than in litigation." D. Joseph DeVito v. United States, supra, 413 F.2d at 1153. à The law gives a contracting officer a reasonable period of time to investigate the facts and to determine what course of action would be in the best interest of the Government as the non- defaulting party. During this forbearance period the Government may terminate the contract at any time, without prior notice. See, e.g., Raytheon Service Co., ASBCA No. 14746, 70-2 BCA À 8,390; Lapp Insulator Co., ASBCA No. 13303, 70-1 BCA À 8,219, mot. for reconsid. denied 70-2 BCA À 8,471. The extent of a reasonable forbearance period depends on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. See, e.g., H. N. Bailey & Associates v. United States, 196 Ct. Cl. 156, 449 F.2d 387 (1971); Methonics, Incorporated v. United States, 210 Ct. Cl. 685 (1976). à The primary function of the excusable delays provision is to protect the contractor from sanctions for late performance. To the extent that his/her delay is excusable, the contractor is protected from default termination, liquidated damages, actual damages, or excess costs of reprocurement or completion. See, Cibinic and Nash, note 18 supra, p. 410. à The Board notes that 18 of these 29 Print Orders À" numbers 20018 to 20035 À" would already be included in the initial 30-day period of May 15, 1990 to June 15, 1990. Consequently, the Appellant seems to be engaging in a blatant case of double counting in order to make a point. à Contractual language is ambiguous if it will sustain different reasonable interpretations. See, e.g., Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture, supra (Decision on Remand), Sl. op. at 9; Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, supra, Sl. op at 11 (citing, Edward R. Marden Corporation v. United States, 803 F.2d 701, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 358, 372 (1968)); Castillo Printing Co., supra, Sl. op. at 26. In cases involving a contest between two contrasting interpretations of contract language, the dispute usually turns on whether the ambiguity is latent or patent. Courts will find a latent ambiguity where the disputed language, without more, admits of two differing reasonable interpretations. See, e.g., Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, supra, Sl. op at 11 (citing, Edward R. Marden Corporation v. United States, supra, 803 F.2d at 705; Castillo Printing Co., supra, Sl. op. at 37-38. In such cases, courts will apply the doctrine of contra proferentem and construe the dispute language against the drafter, see, e.g., Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, supra, Sl. op at 11 (citing, William F. Klingensmith, Inc. v. United States, 205 Ct. Cl. 651, 657 (1974)); Castillo Printing Co., supra, Sl. op. at 38, provided that the non-drafter can show that he/she relied on the alternative reasonable interpretation in submitting his/her bid. See, e.g, Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, supra, Sl. op at 23-24 (citing, Fruin-Colon Corporation v. United States, 912 F.2d 1426, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); Lear Siegler Management Services v. United States, 867 F.2d 600, 603 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Castillo Printing Co., supra, Sl. op. at 38-39. On the other hand, a patent ambiguity would exist if the contract language contained a gross discrepancy, an obvious error in drafting, or a glaring gap, as seen through the eyes of a "reasonable man" on an ad hoc basis. See, e.g, Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, supra, Sl. op. at 22 (citing, Max Drill, Inc. v. United States, 192 Ct. Cl. 608, 626 (1970); WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 1, 6 (1963)). Where such discrepancies, errors, or gaps are present, the contractor has an affirmative obligation to seek a clarification from the contracting officer as to the true meaning of the contract language before submitting its bid. Id., Sl. op. at 11-12 (citing, Newsom v. United States, 230 Ct. Cl. 301, 303 (1982)); Enrico Roman, Inc. v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 104 (1983); S.O.G. of Arkansas v. United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 125, 546 F.2d 367 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Beacon Construction v. United States, 314 F.2d 501 (Ct. Cl. 1963). The patent ambiguity doctrine is aimed at avoiding costly post-award litigation, as well as protecting the integrity of the bidding process by ensuring that all offerors bid on the same specifications. Id., Sl. op. at 12 (citing, S.O.G. of Arkansas v. United States, supra, 212 Ct. Cl. at 125; Newsom v. United States, supra, 230 Ct. Cl. at 303). In this case, by asserting that the Appellant had a duty to ask the Contracting Officer to clarify the phrase "any one month" in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause before submitting its bid, the Respondent implies that the ambiguity, if any, would be patent. à The purpose of any rule of contract interpretation is to carry out the intent of the parties. Hegeman-Harris and Company, 440 F.2d 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1979). The test for ascertaining intent is an objective one; i.e., the question is what would a reasonable contractor have understood, not what did the drafter subjectively intend. Corbetta Construction Company v. United States, 198 Ct. Cl. 712, 461 F.2d 1330 (1972). The provisions of the contract itself should provide the evidence of the objective intent of the parties. à See, Cibinic and Nash, note 18 supra, at pp. 221-22, 223-25. There is also an implied negative obligation on the part of the Government that it will not do that which will interfere with the contractor in the performance of the contract. Id., at pp. 222-23. See, e.g., Nanofast, Inc., ASBCA No. 12545, 69-1 BCA À 7,566 (citing, George A. Fuller Company, A Corporation v. United States, 108 Ct. Cl. 70, 69 F.Supp. 409 (1947); Fern E. Chalender d/b/a Chalender Construction Company of Springfield, Missouri v. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 557; Restatement, Contracts, À 295 and 315). Both implied duties are part of every Government contract. George A. Fuller Company, A Corporation v. United States, supra, 69 F.Supp. 409. In essence, the Government's duty of cooperation means that it has implied affirmative obligation to do whatever is necessary to enable the contractor to perform. See, e.g., Nanofast, Inc., supra, 69-1 BCA À 7,566. (citing, The Kehm Corporation v. United States, 119 Ct. Cl. 454, 93 F.Supp. 620 (1950); United States v. Speed, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 77 (1868)). Under this doctrine, the Government will be held liable for breaching its implied duty to cooperate if it wrongfully fails or refuses to take some action, within its control, which is essential for the contractor to perform. In most cases applying this principle to excuse a contractor's default, there is a clear nexus between the Government's breaching conduct and the performance period itself. See, e.g., Maitland Brothers Company and Maitland Brothers Company and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, ASBCA Nos. 30089, 30764, 31032, 32071, 32605, 34659, 90-1 BCA À 22,367; Singleton Contracting Corporation, GSBCA No. 8552, 90-1 BCA À 22,298; G. W. Galloway Company, ASBCA Nos. 17436, 17723, 17836, 17911, 18324, 77-2 BCA À 12,640. 25. This conclusion was indirectly expressed by the Board when it told the parties that its ". . . review of the record discloses no factual dispute between the parties which would warrant an evidentiary hearing" and that it would ". . . decide the matter on the basis of the record . . .". See, Order Closing the Record and Filing of Briefs, dated August 22, 1991, p. 2. The Board's view was buttressed by the agreement of the parties at the prehearing telephone conference that the case was ripe for decision in its present form, and that there were sufficient facts in the record for the Board to make a decision. PHR, pp. 16-17. Furthermore, the Board thought it significant that the Appellant had not requested a hearing, and had expressed the view that the difference between the parties concerning the meaning of the word "month" in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause was not a "major" one, but rather was only meant to emphasize that Labor was ordering work at a rate 200 percent above the estimated quantities set forth in the contract specifications, which the Appellant contended was the main reason for its inability to meet the scheduled shipment dates. PHR, p. 17. 26. Notwithstanding the Appellant's assurances, it was still late on nine Print Orders after July 23, 1990À" numbers 20048, 20049, 20050, 20051, 20057, 20058, 20059, 20060 and 20061. 27. Overall, the "Cure Notices" covered 35 Print Orders of the 69 issued to the AppellantÀ" numbers 20008, 20015, 20024, 20025, 20026, 20027, and 20029 (the first "Cure Notice"); numbers 20006, 20008, 20009, 20016, 20017, 20018, 20019, 20020, 20021, 20022, 20023, 20025, 20026, 20027, 20029, 20030, 20031, 20032, 20033, and, 20036 (the second "Cure Notice"); and numbers 20042, 20043, 20044, 20045, 20046, 20048, 20049, and 20050 (the third "Cure Notice"). à The termination notice of August 23, 1990, clearly advised the Appellant that it could be liable for any excess costs associated with the Respondent's reprocurement of the work covered by the contract (R4 File, Tab S). The only documentation in the R4 File concerning such reprocurement costs is a memorandum from George Berard, Financial Management Service, to Rose Green, Term Contracts, Section C, identifying the new contractor (R4 File, Tab XYZ). During the prehearing telephone conference held on December 12, 1990, the parties agreed that excess reprocurement costs should not be recovered from the Appellant's invoices unless these costs could first be established. PHR, p. 15. Furthermore, while the Appellant claimed that excess costs in the amount of $6,500 to $7,500 had already been recovered from its account, Counsel for GPO informed the Board that the Respondent's claim for excess costs would be finalized after April 30, 1991. Id. Both parties, however, agreed that any question of excess reprocurement costs could be the subject of a separate appeal; indeed, the Appellant expressly reserved the right to raise the quantum of excess costs in a separate proceeding. PHR, p. 16. By letter dated December 20, 1990, Counsel for GPO notified the Appellant that recoupment of excess costs incurred under the defaulted contract would be suspended until the Respondent could establish that the excess costs actually exceeded the amounts that had been withheld from the Appellant's billings. At the time, $6,004.76 had been withheld from the Appellant's invoices. Thereafter, by letter dated February 12, 1991, Counsel for GPO informed the Appellant that as of January 17, 1991, the excess costs amounted to $7,804.55, and that the Respondent would recommence setoff procedures to recoup the additional $1,799.79. See, Letter from Drew Spalding, Deputy General Counsel to Mr. Richard Swanson, dated February 12, 1991 (and enclosures), note 9 supra. The letter also told the Appellant that it could expect additional charges against its account as excess costs were incurred until the end of the term of the defaulted contract. Id. The Board settled the record on September 9, 1991. See, Order Closing the Record and Filing of Briefs, dated August 22, 1991, pp. 2-3. On November 12, 1991, the Appellant filed its Request with the Board stating, among other things, that on October 17, 1991, it had been informed by the Respondent that an additional $17,183.71 in excess reprocurement costs had been subtracted from the Appellant's account, bringing the total excess reprocurement costs recovered on Program C460-S to $24,988.26. See, Appellant's Request for Decision, note 12 supra, p. 1. In light of the agreement of the parties at the prehearing telephone conference, however, the Board has not considered the issue of excess reprocurement costs as part of this appeal. It is not clear to the Board at this time whether those excess costs have now been finalized. If so, upon receipt of a properly filed claim by the Appellant, the matter of excess reprocurement costs is now ripe for consideration by the Board in a separate proceeding. BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON, DC 20401 STUART M. FOSS Administrative Law Judge Appeal of R.C. SWANSON PRINTING AND TYPESETTING COMPANY Docket No. GPO BCA 31-90 Jacket No. 262-267 Purchase Order 82905 Program C460-S February 6, 1992 DECISION AND ORDER This appeal, timely filed by R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Company, 5205 York Road, Baltimore, Maryland 21212 (hereinafter Appellant), is from the final decision, dated August 23, 1990, of Contracting Officer, Mr. Julian Lowery (hereinafter Contracting Officer), of the U.S. Government Printing Office, North Capitol and H Streets, NW., Washington, DC 20401 (hereinafter Respondent or GPO), partially terminating the Appellant's contract identified as Purchase Order 82905, Program C460-S, Jacket No. 262-267, for default because of its "continuing failure to comply with the delivery requirements" (R4 File, Tab S). 1/ For the following reasons, the decision of the Contracting Officer is hereby AFFIRMED. 2/ BACKGROUND The relevant facts in this appeal are not in dispute and are set forth here only to the extent necessary for the Board's decision. The roots of this appeal lie in a Printing and Binding Requisition (SF-1), dated October 1, 1989, from the U.S. Department of Labor (Labor) for the procurement of Area Wage Surveys under Program 460-S (R4 File, Tab A). On March 28, 1990, the Respondent issued an Invitation for Bids (IFB) for Program 460-S, soliciting bids from potential contractors for the production of Area Wage Survey Summaries/Bulletins and Industry Wage Survey Summaries/Bulletins for the Department of Labor (hereinafter referred to as AWSSs, AWSBs, IWSSs, and IWSBs) (R4 File, Tab B, p. 1). The successful bidder was to receive a "Single Award" term contract, for the period beginning May 1, 1990, and ending April 30, 1990 (R4 File, Tab B, p. 1). Furthermore, like all such contracts, Program C460-S was to be governed by applicable articles of GPO Contract Terms, GPO Publication 310-2, effective December 1, 1987 (Rev. 9-88) (1988 Contract Terms), and GPO's Quality Assurance Through Attributes Program, GPO Publication 310.1, Revised September 1986 (QATAP) (R4 File), Tab B, p. 2). 3/ The work covered by Program C460-S was ". . . the production of self and separate cover publications requiring such operations as film making, printing, binding, packing, and distribution" (R4 File, Tab B, p. 5). The following IFB provisions are particularly pertinent to this appeal: Ð ORDERING: Items to be furnished under the contract shall be ordered by the issuance of print orders by the Government. Orders may be issued under the contract from May 1, 1990 through April 30, 1991. All print orders issued hereunder are subject to the terms and conditions of the contract. The contract shall control in the event of conflict with any print order. When mailed, a print order shall be "issued" for the purposes of the contract at the time the Government deposits the order in the mail (R4 File, Tab B, p. 3). * * * * * * * * * * REQUIREMENTS: This is a requirements contract for the items and for the period specified herein. Shipment / delivery of items or performance of work shall be made only as authorized by orders Ð issued in accordance with the clause entitled "Ordering." The quantities of items specified herein are estimates only, and are not purchased hereby. Except as may be otherwise provided in this contract, if the Government's requirements for the items set forth herein do not result in orders in the amounts or quantities described as "estimated", it shall not constitute the basis for an equitable price adjustment under this contract (R4 File, Tab B, p. 4). [Emphasis added.] Except as otherwise provided in this contract, the Government shall order from the contractor all the items set forth which are required to be purchased by the Government activity identified on page 1 (R4 File, Tab B, p. 4). * * * * * * * * * * If shipment/delivery of any quantity of an item covered by the contract is required by reason of urgency prior to the earliest date that shipment/ delivery may be specified under this contract, and if the contractor will not accept an order providing for the accelerated shipment/delivery, the Government may procure this requirement from another source (R4 File, Tab B, p. 4). The Government may issue orders which provide for shipment/delivery to or performance at multiple destinations (R4 File, Tab B, p. 4). Subject to any limitations elsewhere in this contract, the contractor shall furnish to the Government all items set forth herein which are called for by print orders issued in accordance with the "Ordering" clause of this contract (R4 File, Tab B, p. 4). * * * * * * * * * * FREQUENCY OF ORDERS: It is impossible at this time to predetermine the frequency or number of orders that will be placed on this contract. However, based upon past history, it is anticipated that approximately 104-265 orders will be placed during the contract term as indicated below: Ð Approximate Approximate Approximate Number of Number of Number of Publication Orders Per Copies Per Pages Per à Title Ä Year Ä Order Ä Area Wage Survey Bulletins 20 to 50 250 to 2,500 20 to 56* Area Wage Survey Summaries 50 to 125 300 to 1,200 2 to 12 Industry Wage Survey Summaries 30 to 80 300 to 1,500 8 or 12 Industry Wage Survey Bulletins 4 to 10 800 to 2,000 40 to 256 * One or two annual issues may be ordered for up to approximately 192 pages. No more than 30 print orders will be placed in any one month (R4 File, Tab B, p. 5). [Emphasis added.] * * * * * * * * * * SCHEDULE: Adherence to this schedule must be maintained. Contractor must not start production of any job prior to receipt of the individual print order. * * * * * * * * * * The following schedule begins the workday after notification of the availability of print order and furnished material. Complete production, distribution and mailing must be made within five workdays. Multiple orders may be placed in a single day. Schedule for orders placed in excess of the stated limitations (30 per month) shall be arranged by mutual agreement with the contractor. The ship/delivery dates indicated on the print order is the date that products delivering f.o.b. destination must be received at the destination(s) specified and the date that products distributed f.o.b. contractor's city must be mailed/shipped (R4 File, Tab B, p. 9). [Emphasis added.] Ð The record discloses that the IFB was sent to 39 contractors, 11 of whom returned responsive bids (R4 File, Tabs D and F). One of the responding bidders was the Appellant, who submitted an offer, dated April 17, 1990, to do the work at an estimated cost of $53,695.90 (R4 File, Tab C). The record also shows that the Appellant's bid was over 30 percent lower than the next lowest bidder. When the Appellant was asked to review its price quotations, however, it confirmed them (R4 File, Tab F). Accordingly, on April 30, 1990, the Appellant was awarded the contract for Program C460-S by the issuance of Purchase Order 82905 (R4 File, Tab G). The first Print Order under Program C460-S was issued to the Appellant by Labor on May 15, 1990 (R4 File, Tab AA). 4/ Between May 15, 1990 and August 23, 1990, when the contract was terminated, 69 Print Orders were issued to the Appellant, as follows: à Print OrderÄ Date IssuedÄ Scheduled Delivery Date Ä 20001 May 15, 1990 May 22, 1990 20002 May 15, 1990 May 22, 1990 20003 May 16, 1990 May 23, 1990 20004 May 16, 1990 May 23, 1990 20005 May 16, 1990 May 23, 1990 20006 May 17, 1990 May 24, 1990 20007 May 17, 1990 May 24, 1990 20008 May 30, 1990 June 6, 1990 20009 May 30, 1990 June 6, 1990 20010 May 30, 1990 June 6, 1990 20011 May 30, 1990 June 6, 1990 20012 June 1, 1990 June 11, 1990 20013 June 1, 1990 June 11, 1990 20014 June 1, 1990 June 11, 1990 20015 June 1, 1990 June 11, 1990 20016 June 1, 1990 June 11, 1990 20017 June 1, 1990 June 11, 1990 20018 June 5, 1990 June 13, 1990 20019 June 5, 1990 June 13, 1990 20020 June 5, 1990 June 13, 1990 20021 June 5, 1990 June 13, 1990 20022 June 5, 1990 June 13, 1990 20023 June 5, 1990 June 13, 1990 20024 June 8, 1990 June 18, 1990 20025 June 8, 1990 June 18, 1990 20026 June 8, 1990 June 18, 1990 20027 June 8, 1990 June 18, 1990 20028 June 8, 1990 June 18, 1990 20029 June 12, 1990 June 20, 1990 20030 June 12, 1990 June 20, 1990 20031 June 12, 1990 June 20, 1990 20032 June 12, 1990 June 20, 1990 20033 June 12, 1990 June 20, 1990 20034 June 12, 1990 June 20, 1990 20035 June 12, 1990 June 20, 1990 20036 June 19, 1990 June 27, 1990 20037 June 19, 1990 June 27, 1990 20038 June 22, 1990 July 2, 1990 20039 June 22, 1990 July 2, 1990 20040 June 22, 1990 July 2, 1990 20041 June 22, 1990 July 2, 1990 20042 July 2, 1990 July 11, 1990 20043 July 2, 1990 July 11, 1990 20044 July 2, 1990 July 11, 1990 Print OrderÄ Date IssuedÄ Scheduled Delivery Date Ä 20045 July 3, 1990 July 12, 1990 20046 July 3, 1990 July 12, 1990 20047 July 12, 1990 July 20, 1990 20048 July 18, 1990 July 26, 1990 20049 July 18, 1990 July 26, 1990 20050 July 18, 1990 July 26, 1990 20051 July 31, 1990 August 7, 1990 20052 July 31, 1990 August 7, 1990 20053 July 31, 1990 August 7, 1990 20054 July 31, 1990 August 7, 1990 20055 July 31, 1990 August 7, 1990 20056 August 6, 1990 August 14, 1990 20057 August 6, 1990 August 14, 1990 20058 August 6, 1990 August 14, 1990 20059 August 6, 1990 August 14, 1990 20060 August 6, 1990 August 14, 1990 20061 August 6, 1990 August 14, 1990 20062 August 10, 1990 August 20, 1990 20063 August 10, 1990 August 20, 1990 20064 August 15, 1990 August 23, 1990 20065 August 15, 1990 August 23, 1990 20066 August 15, 1990 August 23, 1990 20067 August 20, 1990 August 28, 1990 20068 August 20, 1990 August 28, 1990 20069 August 8, 1990 August 15, 1990 (R4 File, Tab AA). The record shows that on June 26, 1990, John Fennell, Labor's Chief, Production Services, sent a memorandum to the Respondent's Customer Service Division (CSD) reporting that publications covered by seven of the Print Orders issued to the AppellantÀ" numbers 20008, 20015, 20024, 20025, 20026, 20027, and 20029À" had not been delivered on time and were "now long overdue" (R4 File, Tab J). 5/ According to Fennell, these delinquencies were in addition to two other complaints raised by Labor earlier with regard to the Appellant's performance (R4 File, Tab J). 6/ Consequently, Fennell believed that "at this point" the Appellant's performance was "unacceptable," and unless there was immediate improvement, Labor ". . . would like to see action taken to get a new vendor" (R4 File, Tab J). On June 27, 1990, after being informed of Fennell's complaint, Jack Scott, who was the Contracting Officer at the time, telephoned the Appellant's plant and spoke to Larry Ford (R4 File, Tab J). Ford told Scott that the missing Print Orders would be shipped between June 28, 1990 and July 2, 1990 (the original scheduled delivery dates for these Print Orders were between June 6, 1990 and June 20, 1990) (R4 File, Tab J). Furthermore, Ford advised Scott that the reason for the delay was "machine problems" (R4 File, Tab J). On July 2, 1990, Scott mailed a "Cure Notice" to the Appellant notifying it that the Respondent considered the failure to meet the delivery schedule for the above seven Print Orders ". . . a condition that is endangering performance of the balance of the contract in accordance with its terms" (R4 File, Tab J). 1988 Contract Terms, À 20.(a)(1)(ii). Accordingly, the Appellant was offered an opportunity to inform the Respondent, in writing, within 10 days of the measures that it had taken or would take to cure such condition (R4 File, Tab J). 1988 Contract Terms, À 20.(a)(2). See also, GPO Printing Procurement Regulation (GPOPPR), GPO Publication 305.3, Chap. XIV, Sec. 1, À 3.c.(2). Furthermore, the Appellant was warned that unless the unsatisfactory condition had been cured, the Respondent might terminate the balance of the contract for default pursuant to the "Default" Clause of the GPO contract terms (R4 File, Tab J). 1988 Contract Terms, À 20.(a)(1)(i),(ii). The record shows that on July 3, 1990, the Respondent's CSD received another complaint from Fennell about the poor quality of service the Appellant was providing under contract (R4 File, Tab J). In this instance, Fennell told the Respondent that now 20 Print OrdersÀ" numbers 20006, 20008, 20009, 20016, 20017, 20018, 20019, 20020, 20021, 20022, 20023, 20025, 20026, 20027, 20029, 20030, 20031, 20032, 20033 and 20036À" were "due or past due" (R4 File, Tab J). These 20 Print Orders represented nearly half of all the orders issued by Labor in May and June 1990 with delivery due dates prior to July 3, 1990 (41 Print Orders). According to Fennell, the Appellant's late deliveries were causing problems for the Superintendent of Documents' operation because the AWSBs and IWSBs were sent out in numerical order (R4 File, Tab J). In light of this, Fennell reiterated his belief that if the Appellant could not provide the service an immediate change should be made because "[a]t this rate another two weeks and we will never catch up" (R4 File, Tab J). On receiving Fennell's second complaint, Scott made two telephone calls to FordÀ" one on July 5, 1990 and the other on July 6, 1990À" in order to find out when the missing Print Orders would be shipped (R4 File, Tab J). Also on July 6, 1990, Scott prepared and mailed a second "Cure Notice" to the Appellant, identical to the first, except that this time the failure to meet the delivery schedule for the aforementioned 20 Printing Orders was the condition ". . . endangering performance of the balance of the contract in accordance with its terms" (R4 File, Tab J). 7/ 1988 Contract Terms, À 20.(a)(1)(ii). Again, the Appellant was offered an opportunity to inform the Respondent, in writing, within 10 days of the measures that it had taken or would take to cure such condition, and it was also informed that if it failed to rectify the problem the balance of its contract could be terminated for default (R4 File, Tab J). 1988 Contract Terms, À 20.(a)(1)(i), (ii),(2). On July 9, 1990, Ford telephoned Scott and gave him new shipping dates for the 20 delinquent Print Orders (R4 File, Tab J). In that regard, Ford told Scott that the Appellant would now ship those Print Orders on the following schedule: à Print OrderÄ Ã Promised Shipping DateÄ 20006 May 29, 1990 20008 July 16, 1990 20009 July 13, 1990 20016 June 11, 1990 20017 June 11, 1990 20018 June 27, 1990 20019 June 26, 1990 20020 June 26, 1990 20021 July 12, 1990 20022 July 12, 1990 20023 July 12, 1990 20025 June 29, 1990 20026 June 29, 1990 20027 June 29, 1990 20029 July 10, 1990 20030 June 27, 1990 20031 June 27, 1990 20032 June 27, 1990 20033 June 27, 1990 20036 July 16, 1990 (R4 File, Tab J). The record also shows that between July 11, 1990, and July 12, 1990, the Respondent made two requests to the Appellant for the signed shipping receipts for the Print Orders which Labor claimed had not been delivered (R4 File, Tab J). The Appellant gave the Respondent those receipts on July 13, 1990 (R4 File, Tab K). In the meantime, on July 11, 1990, the Appellant wrote to Scott in response to his "letter dated July 2, 1990," and basically admitted that there was a problem with delinquent deliveries but that corrective measures had been taken to rectify the situation (R4 File, Tab J). As for the specific reasons which caused the delays, the Appellant stated: Ð First, we had ordered a new press from Heidelberg that was scheduled for delivery on April 14, 1990. Due to some damaged parts that had to be obtained from Germany, the press was not delivered until late June. This press was what we had planned to run the [Program C460-S] contract on. The press is now in place and running and we are almost completely caught up on the contract. Second, we have one other press that is an older model 2 color that we were using to perform on this contract until our new press came in. In late May/early June the press threw several bushings and seized up. The press required major work to un- seize it and this is where our lateness developed. Of course, the break-down was unforeseen, but since that time the press has been repaired and has been used to help catch up on the [Program C460-S] contract. Finally, on top of our two problems, the agency issued more work than the maximum allowed under the contract. In June the agency issued 34 Print Orders, almost 15% more than the maximum and almost 2 1/2 times the minimum expected quantity. Furthermore, they had an extremely large number of larger jobs (Bulletins) and many of these had run lengths longer than the contract called for and all of them Ð were at the maximum end of the scale which ran from 250 to 2500 copies. Unfortunately, Murphy's Law prevailed, [and] we had several problems reducing our productive capability, and the agency at the same time required extraordinary productive capability. . . . Ð (R4 File, Tab J). Despite these difficulties, however, the Appellant assured the Respondent that "[a]ll is on track and we expect to be completely current on the contract before July 23" (R4 File, Tab J). Although the Appellant promised to have the delivery situation under control before the end of July, the record discloses that it was unable to meet the delivery schedule on nine of the 14 Print Orders issued that monthÀ" numbers 20042, 20043, 20044, 20045, 20046, 20048, 20049, 20050 and 20051 À" or approximately 64 percent of them (R4 File, Tab W). 8/ Similarly, of the 14 Print Orders received by the Appellant in August 1990, publications covered by of themÀ" numbers 20057, 20058, 20059, 20060, 2006À" were sent to Labor after the contract due date (nearly 36 percent) (R4 File, Tab W). Overall, the record shows that of the 69 Print Orders issued to the Appellant under Program C460-S, it was unable to deliver 43 of them on time (approximately 62 percent) (R4 File, Tab W). 9/ On August 10, 1990, after Labor had notified the Respondent that the Appellant was late on eight Print Orders which were due in July 1990À" numbers 20042, 20043, 20044, 20045, 20046, 20048, 20049, and 20050À" the Contracting Officer (Lowery) sent a third a "Cure Notice" to the Appellant (R4 File, Tab O). This "Cure Notice" was identical in all respects to the previous two, except that the Appellant was only given five days to inform the Respondent, in writing, of the measures that it had taken or would take to cure its continuing failure to meet the contract delivery schedule (R4 File, Tab O). The record shows that the Appellant never replied to this "Cure Notice." Consequently, on August 22, 1991, the Contracting Officer wrote to the Respondent's CRB seeking its concurrence in terminating the Appellant's Program C460-S contract for default (R4 File, Tab Q). See, GPOPPR, Chap. I, Sec. 10, À 4.b.(i). As he explained to the CRB, the Contracting Officer believed the proposed action was justified for the following reasons: To date, [the Appellant] has received 61 print orders with 31 of them being delivered late and 17 of them have not been given a promised ship date, even though the action ship date has already passed. On July 2, 1990 and July 6, 1990 a cure notice was sent to [the Appellant]. On July 11, 1990 a reply was received from Richard Swanson. He claimed that their delivery problems were due to the late arrival of a new press (it had been due in April and not received until June) and mechanical problems on their old press. Mr. Swanson expected Program C460-S to be on schedule by July 23, 1990. As of August 10, 1990 [the Appellant] was still not on schedule on Program C460-S. Another cure notice, dated August 10, 1990, was sent to [the Appellant]. No reply has been received. * * * * * * * * * * Based on [the Appellant's] continuing failure to comply with the delivery requirements of Program C460-S, concurrence is sought to terminate for default, the balance of the contract and to procure the requirements with any excess reprocurement costs to [the Appellant]. Ð (R4 File, Tab Q). The CRB gave its approval to the action recommended by the Contracting Officer that same day (R4 File, Tab Q). 10/ On August 23, 1990, the Contracting Officer, sent the Appellant a letter, entitled "Notice of Termination/Complete," informing the contractor that its contract ". . . identified as Purchase Order 82905, Program C460-S, Print Order 20070 and the balance of the contract, Jacket No. 262-267, is hereby terminated for default because of your continuing failure to comply with the delivery requirements" (R4 File, Tab S). The notice also told the Appellant that the termination action was effective immediately, and that it was liable for any excess costs in the event that the Government decided to reprocure the work covered by the canceled contract (R4 File, Tab S). The Appellant responded with this appeal to the Board. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES Neither party has filed a brief with the Board in this appeal. See, Order Closing the Record and Filing of Briefs, dated August 22, 1991, pp. 2-3. Therefore, the Board's understanding of their respective positions is based on the documents in the record, other material they have submitted, and their statements during the prehearing telephone conference held on December 12, 1990. The Appellant admits that it had problems making timely deliveries of Program C460-S work for the first three months of its contract. On the other hand, it is uncontroverted in the record that the last eight Print Orders À" numbers 20062, 20063, 20064, 20065, 20066, 20067, 20068 and 20069 À" were received by Labor on the scheduled delivery dates in August 1990 (R4 File, Tab V). However, as the Board understands the Appellant's position it essentially places the blame for its failure to timely deliver so many of the early Print Orders on the Government. In the Appellant's view, if Labor had not issued an excessive number of Print Orders À" that is, more than the number of jobs allowed in a given period by the contract itself À" the default would not have occurred. The Appellant supports its position with several arguments, most of them predicated on averaging Labor's requirements under the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause over the life of the contract (R4 File, Tab V). Indeed, during the prehearing telephone conference the Appellant stated that it had relied on such averages to develop its cost estimates for bidding purposes. PHR, p. 13. First, the Appellant argues that the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause told potential bidders that the range of total orders over the contract term (12 months) for AWSBs, AWSSs, IWSBs and IWSSs, would be between 104 and 265 Print Orders (R4 File, Tab B, p. 5). To the Appellant, this meant that it could expect to receive between 8.6 and 22 orders a month, or 15.3 jobs per month, on average (R4 File, Tab V). See also, PHR, p. 13. When this figure is subdivided into work days (the average month has 23 work days), the Appellant expected an average of .66 jobs a day. According to the Appellant, however, Labor issued 69 Print Orders between May 15, 1990 and August 20, 1990 (a period containing 65 work days), requiring the Appellant to work on an average of 1.06 jobs per day, or at 160.61 percent of the "average expected volume" (R4 File, Tab V). Second, the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause states that "[n]o more than 30 print orders will be placed in any one month" (R4 File, Tab B, p. 5). In contrast to the Respondent, whose position is that the underscored phrase means a "calendar month," the Appellant interprets those words to mean "any 30-day period." PHR, pp. 13, 16. The Appellant argues that the meaning it imputes to these words is the only fair and equitable interpretation because under the Government's view 60 Print Orders could be issued in a two day periodÀ" 30 on the last day of one month and 30 on the first day of the next. PHR, p. 16. Furthermore, the Appellant believes that the meaning it ascribes to the phrase is in accord with good business practices because a reasonable agency would spread the work over the 30-day period. Id. In this case, however, the Appellant notes that during the first 30 days of its contract (May 15, 1990 to June 15, 1990), Labor issued 35 Print Orders. When those orders are considered in light of the 19 work days available to the Appellant, this meant that it had to accomplish 1.84 jobs per day, or work at 278.79 percent of the average expected volume (R4 File, Tab V). A similar amount of work was received by the Appellant over the 30 days between June 4, 1990 and July 5, 1990 (R4 File, Tab V). Although Labor issued less Print Orders between July 5, 1990 and August 7, 1990 (20), and July 19, 1990 and August 20, 1990 (19), the Appellant nonetheless was compelled to work on an average of .87 jobs a day (131.83 percent above the average expected volume) and 1.19 jobs daily (180.30 percent over expected volume), respectively (R4 File, Tab V). Consequently, the Appellant contends that the number of Print Orders issued by Labor not only exceeded the allowable maximums under the contract for the first 30-day period, but generally was above the expected volume of work the entire time that it had the contract (R4 File, Tab V). See also, PHR, p. 15. Third, the Appellant argues that while the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause forecast between 20 and 50 Print Orders for AWSBs (the "larger jobs"), Labor issued orders for them at a much faster rate (R4 File, Tab V). In that regard, the Appellant claims that even though it had the Program C460-S contract for only 21.57 percent of its term, Labor issued 13 Print Orders for AWSBs during that period, which represented 65 percent of the minimum number of orders and 26 percent of the maximum number (R4 File, Tab V). Assuming, as the Appellant does, that an average of 35 AWSBs would be required a year, then it accomplished 37.14 percent of the annual work load, which meant that Labor was issuing AWSB Print Orders at 172.18 percent of the expected volume, or at an accelerated rate above the maximum number of such orders (R4 File, Tab V). Finally, the Appellant points to the "DETERMINATION OF AWARD" provision of the contract, and states that it requires the printing of four million impressions and 2,416 pages over the contract term (R4 File, Tab B, p. 11). See also, PHR, p. 17. The Appellant argues that since it held the contract for about one-quarter of the contract term, it expected to accomplish one-fourth of that work, i.e., one million impressions and 604 pages (R4 File, Tab V). However, according to the Appellant, it received and completed Print Orders for two million impressions and 1,052 pages (R4 File, Tab V). In the Appellant's view, these figures also demonstrated that Labor was sending it work at twice the rate estimated in the contract (R4 File, Tab V). 11/ PHR, p. 17. The Appellant says that it informed the Contracting Officer that it was having problems meeting the delivery schedule because Labor was issuing Print Orders at a rate above the contractual limits, and also because the installation of its new press was delayed, but the Respondent was not sympathetic to this explanation and terminated the contract for default (R4 File, Tab V). The Appellant believes that the contract clearly underestimated Labor's needs, and the Contracting Officer should have shown some understanding of the situation. In the Appellant's view, the termination for default in this case was clearly unjustified. Therefore, since the Appellant had caught up with the Program C460-S work and was making timely deliveries after August 8, 1990, it believes that it has demonstrated its ability to meet the greater demand and, therefore it asks the Board to reinstate its contract (R4 File, Tab V). The Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Appellant's contract for Program C460-S was properly terminated for default because of its inability to meet the contractual delivery dates (R4 File, Tab S). See also, PHR, p. pp. 12-13. The Respondent observes that as a "requirements" contract, Program C460-S obligated the Government to procure all the needed work from the Appellant. PHR, p. 13. However, the "REQUIREMENTS" clause of the contract clearly stated that "[t]he quantity of items specified herein are estimates only, and are not purchased hereby," and did not guarantee a specific amount of work to be procured. Id. Furthermore, the estimated frequency and number of orders shown in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause were just the Respondent's "best guess" based on projections from the previous year, and were merely intended to inform bidders that orders could be expected in a wide range of quantities. Id. Consequently, the Respondent rejects the Appellant's contention that the failure to meet the scheduled shipment dates was due to an excess volume of work because the contract does not fix a specific figure (only ranges are given) against which to measure the frequency or number of Print Orders issued by Labor. The Respondent also disagrees with the Appellant's interpretation of the phrase "any one month" in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause. It argues that the disputed phrase is commonly understood to mean a "calendar month," not "any 30-day period," as contended by the Appellant. PHR, p. 15. The Respondent contends that the "calendar month" meaning is consistent with the way it keeps its business records. PHR, p. 17. Furthermore, even if one were to accept the Appellant's interpretation of the disputed phrase, the Respondent does not believe it would help or advance the contractor's position, because "any 30- day period" could also be manipulated to produce results different from those asserted by the Appellant. Id. Finally, the Respondent states that if the Appellant had any doubts about the meaning of the term "any one month," it was obligated to ask the Contracting Officer for a clarification before submitting its bid and accepting the contract. Id. Contrary to the Appellant, the Respondent claims that Labor never issued more than 30 Print Orders in any one calendar month (R4 File, Tab AA). PHR, p. 15. Furthermore, the Respondent points to the "SCHEDULE" clause of the contract which provides that "[s]chedule for orders placed in excess of the stated limitations (30 per month) shall be arranged by mutual agreement with the contractor," and states that under this provision the Appellant could have sought an extension of the delivery schedule in the event that more than 30 Print Orders were issued in a month (R4 File, Tab B, p. 9). PHR, p. 13. An extension of delivery time would have been particularly appropriate in such a case because the "SCHEDULE" clause also holds the contractor to making a "quick turn around" of work; i.e., "complete production, distribution and mailing must be made within five work days" (R4 File, Tab B, p. 9). PHR, pp. 13-14. Finally, the Respondent contends that the Appellant's poor performance in making timely deliveries under the contract is amply supported in the record, and fully justified the Contracting Officer's termination action in this case (R4 File, Tab W). PHR, p. 15. Accordingly, for all of these reasons, the Respondent asks the Board to affirm the Contracting Officer's partial termination of the Appellant's contract for default (R4 File, Tab S). DECISION 12/ The sole issue before the Board is whether or not the Contracting Officer was in error in terminating the remainder of the Appellant's contract for Program C460-S for default. Because a default termination is a drastic action, it may only be taken for good cause and on the basis of solid evidence. 13/ See, e.g., Stephenson, Inc., GPO BCA 02-88 (December 19, 1991), Sl. op. at 20 (citing, Mary Rogers Manley d/b/a Mary Rogers Real Estate, HUDBCA No. 76-27, 78-2 BCA À 13,519; Decatur Realty Sales, HUDBCA No. 75-26, 77-2 BCA À 12,567.) If the Contracting Officer erroneously exercised his default authority, then the termination is converted into one of convenience and the Appellant would be allowed to recover for the work performed. 14/ See, e.g., Stephenson, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 17; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 9; Bonnar-Vawter, GPOCAB [No Docket Number], at 5 (1975) (citing, Racon Electric Company, ASBCA No. 8020, 1962 BCA À 3,528. 15/ See also, 1988 Contract Terms, À 20.(g). In the judgment of the Board, the Appellant has admitted to facts, amply supported in the record, concerning its inability to meet the delivery schedules on numerous Print Orders, which justified the termination of its Program C460-S contract. Under the standard "Default" clause in GPO contracts, a Contracting Officer may, by written notice of default to the contractor, terminate a contract, in whole or in part, if the contractor fails to: (1) deliver the supplies or perform the required services within the time specified or any extension which may have been granted; (2) make progress on the work, so as to endanger performance of the contract; or (3) perform any of the other provisions of the contract. 1988 Contract Terms, À 20.(a)(1)(i), (ii),(iii). Furthermore , where a contract is terminated for default and the work must be reprocured, the contractor will be held responsible for excess procurement costs and possible liquidated damages. Id., À 20.(b), 22.(d). However, the contractor must continue the work not terminated. Id., À 20.(b). Moreover, 1988 Contract Terms provides that where the default termination is based on the failure to ship/delivery or perform the work within the time specified, the contractor will not be liable for any excess costs if such a delinquency arises from causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor. Id., À 20(c) ("Default" clause), 22(e) ("Liquidated Damages" clause), 23 ("Delay in Deliveries" clause). Such causes include, but are not limited to, acts of God or of the public enemy, acts of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual capacity, fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine restrictions, strikes, freight embargoes, and unusually severe weatherÀ" but in each case, the failure to perform must be beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor. Id., À 20.(c). 16/ The Government's initial burden in default cases is to show that the contractor has failed, in some respect, to perform on the contract. See, e.g., Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 11 ; Vogard Printing Corporation, GPOCAB 7-84 (January 7, 1986), Sl. op. at 5 (citing, Caskel Forge, Inc., ASBCA No. 6205, 61-1 BCA À 2,891; National Aviation Electronics, Inc., ASBCA No. 18256, 74-2 BCA À 10,677). Because the findings and determinations of contracting officers are, as a rule, considered prima facie correct, once the default has been established, the contractor must then demonstrate that the default was excusable. See, Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 11; Remco Business Systems, Inc., GPOCAB [No Docket Number] (October 5, 1977), Sl. op. at 2-3 (citing, Norm Evans Construction Company, AGBCA No. 341, 75-1 BCA À 11,229); Mill River Press Lithographers, Printers, GPOCAB [No Docket Number] (August 12, 1977), Sl. op. at 4 (citing, Beco, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 9702, 9734, 1964 BCA À 4,493; Highway Products, Inc., ASBCA No. 14212, 69-2 BCA À 8,064); Vogard Printing Corporation, supra (citing. B. M. Harrison Electrosonics, Inc., ASBCA No. 7684, 1963 BCA À 3,736; Hy-Cal Engineering Corporation, NASA BCA Nos. 871-18 and 772-7, 75-2 BCA À 11,399). If the default termination is based on untimely performance, the contractor's burden is four-fold: (1) to prove affirmatively that the delay was caused by or arose out of a situation which was beyond the contractor's control and it was not at fault or negligent; (2) to show that performance would have been timely but for the occurrence of the event which is claimed to excuse the delay; (3) to show that it took every reasonable precaution to avoid foreseeable causes for delay and to minimize their effect; and (4) to establish a precise period of time that performance was delayed by the causes alleged. See, Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 12; Loose Leaf Devices Company, GPOCAB [No Docket Number] (1977), Sl. op. at 4-5 (citing, Ace Electronics Associates, Inc., ASBCA No. 13899, 69-2 BCA À 7,922); Allegheny Plastics, Inc., GPOCAB [No Docket Number] (1975), Sl. op. at 5; Scanforms, Incorporated, GPOCAB [No Docket Number] (September 24, 1975), Sl. op, at 3; American Printing and Publishing, Inc., GPOCAB [No Docket Number] (September 19, 1975), Sl. op. at 3-4 (citing, Lee K. Geiger Construction Company, GSBCA Nos. 2152, 2164, 67-1 BCA À 6,189; American Construction Company, Inc., GSBCA No. 1097, 65-2 BCA À 4,964). This burden must be carried by substantial evidence À" unsupported reasons by way of explanation are not enoughÀ" and the contractor must also show that the delay in contract performance was due to unforeseeable causes beyond its control and without any contributory negligence on its part. See, Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 12-13; Kaufman DeDell Printing, Inc., GPOCAB [No Docket Number] (November 6, 1979), Sl. op. at 5 (citing, Empire State Tree Service, VACAB No. 949, 71-1 BCA À 8,716); Bonnar-Vawter, Incorporated, supra, Sl. op. at 5-6 (citing, H. C. Thode, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 18177, 18294, 74-1 BCA À 10,418); Loose Leaf Devices Company, supra, Sl. op. at 7 (citing, Aargus Poly Bag, GSBCA Nos. 4314, 4315, 76-2 BCA À 11,927). The Appellant in this case acknowledges that it failed to meet the contract delivery dates for a substantial number of Print Orders under the Program C460-S contract; i.e., the Appellant admits that it was in default on those orders. See, e.g., Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 13. As a general rule, the Government is entitled to strict compliance with its specifications. 17/ See, e.g, Rose Printing Company, GPO BCA 2-87 (June 9, 1989), Sl. op. at 6 (and cases cited therein); Fry Communications, Inc., GPO BCA 1-87 (June 1, 1989), Sl. op. at 5; Mid-America Business Forms Corporation, GPO BCA 8-87 (December 30, 1988), Sl. op. at 18-19. See also, Astro Dynamics, Inc., ASBCA No. 28320, 83-2 BCA À 16,900; Arnold Diamond, Inc., ASBCA No. 12335, 68-1 BCA À 8,672. Therefore, on June 26, 1990, when Labor first notified the Respondent that seven of the Print Orders issued to the AppellantÀ" numbers 20008, 20015, 20024, 20025, 20026, 20027, and 20029À" had not been delivered on time and were "now long overdue," it would have been within its rights to terminate the contract immediately. See, e.g., Stephenson, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 21 (citing, Nuclear Research Associates, Inc., ASBCA No. 13563, 70-1 BCA À 8,237 (where the contractor's delivery was late by one day, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals upheld the default termination, stating that "once an appellant has failed to deliver on time, the Government, absent excusable cause of delay, has an indefensible right to terminate the contract, unless its own conduct deprives it of that right."). See also, e.g., Northeastern Manufacturing and Sales, ASBCA No. 35493, 89-3 BCA À 22,093; Appli Tronics, ASBCA No. 31540, 89-1 BCA À 21,555; Riggs Engineering Co., ASBCA No. 26509, 82-2 BCA À 15,955; R & O Industries, Inc., GSBCA No. 4804, 80-1 BCA À 14,196. As a practical matter, however, the Government rarely terminates contracts for slight delays, muchless immediately. 18/ See, e.g., Stephenson, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 21-22; ACL-FILCO Corporation, ASBCA No. 26196, 83-1 BCA À 16,151 ("It has often been noted, . . . , that neither the Government nor the contractor is well served by a precipitously taken decision to terminate a contract for default . . .".). Consequently, it is well-settled that the Government does not waive its right to terminate a defaulted contract because it fails to do so immediately when the right to terminate accrues. 19/ See, Frank A. Pelliccia v. United States, 208 Ct. Cl. 278, 525 F.2d 1035 (1975). The decision to terminate a defaulted contract is a matter largely within a contracting officer's discretion. See, e.g., Stephenson, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 23. As indicated above, however, where the default action is based on the failure to meet the delivery schedules specified, certain provisions in the contract itself will excuse the delay if it arose from causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor. 20/ See, 1988 Contract Terms, À 20(c), 22(e), 23. Although the "Default" clause lists some types of events which will excuse delays by contractorsÀ" acts of God or of the public enemy, acts of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual capacity, fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine restrictions, strikes, freight embargoes, and unusually severe weatherÀ" these are examples only and the clause is not intended to be all inclusive. 1988 Contract Terms, À 20.(c) In this case, the Appellant essentially tenders two reasons for its failure to meet the Program C460-S delivery schedules: (1) the Appellant experienced major machinery problems at the beginning of its contract because its new Heidelberg press was not delivered until late June, and its older model 2 color press (which was being used for Program C460-S work in the interim) broke down in late May/early June and it took time to fix it; and (2) Labor issued more Print Orders in terms of frequency and number than the maximum allowed by the contract itself. The Board believes that neither of these reasons falls within the range of acceptable occurrences or events which would excuse the Appellant's failure to perform. 1. Machinery Problems It is accepted that a contractor has an obligation to reasonably assure itself of the availability of necessary supplies and machinery prior to making a contract commitment with the Government. See, Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 13-14; Scanforms, Incorporated, supra, Sl. op. at 4 (citing, Woodhull Construction Company, ASBCA No. 3628, 57-1 BCA À 1,260; First Dominion Corporation (1967), GSBCA No. 2659, 69-1 BCA À 7,488); American Printing and Publishing, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 4; Allegheny Plastics, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 5-7 (citing, Vereinigte Osterreichische Eisen and Stahlwerke Aktiengesellschaft, IBCA No. 327, 1962 BCA À 3,503). Indeed, as a general rule the unexplained breakdown of machinery is not excusable per se; in fact, the difficulty attending the performance of a contract is not an excusable cause of delay. See, Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 14; Allegheny Plastics, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 7 (citing, Carnegie Steel Company v. United States, 240 U.S. 156 (1916)). The reason for these rules is simpleÀ" implicit in a contractor's promise to perform is its assurance that it has the ability to perform; i.e., that there is available machinery and replacement parts so that performance will not be delayed due to machinery breakdown. See, Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 14; Allegheny Plastics, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 7. See also, Jomar Enterprises, Inc., GPO BCA 13-86 (May 25, 1989), Sl. op. at 3. As explained by one of GPO's ad hoc boards: Ð Every contractor impliedly represents, when he makes his bid, that he can accomplish what he sets out to do, within the time upon which there was an agreement; and by such implied representation, he is not, in the eyes of the law, entitled to maintain a mental reservation, to the effect, that he can perform within the time required provided the material suppliers lives [sic] up to their commitment and he can obtain the paper stock in time to maintain the required schedule. [Citation omitted.] The failure of the paper supplier to make timely delivery of the necessary stock does not excuse the contractor from resulting delays in contract completion. [Citation omitted.] Ð Scanforms, Incorporated, supra, at 4. In short, it is the contractor's responsibility to have labor, plant, equipment, finances and material adequate for contract performance. See, Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 14-15; Allegheny Plastics Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 7 (citing, Fulton Shipyard, IBCA No. 735-10-68, 71-1 BCA À 8,616). Therefore, the unexplained mechanical failure of the Appellant's older model 2 color press in this case is not an acceptable excuse which, under the law, would allow the Appellant to escape the consequences of its failure to perform the tasks required of it under the contract. Similarly, although the Appellant asserts that the reason its new press was unavailable when it commenced performance under the contract was because of some damaged parts that had to be obtained from Germany, it has offered no evidence which would demonstrate that the failure of HeidelbergÀ" its press supplierÀ" to deliver the new machine on time was due to Heidelberg's negligence or reasons beyond its control. Cf., Loose Leaf Devices Company, supra, Sl. op. at 7 (citing, Williamsburg Drapery Co. v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 776, 799, 369 F.2d 729 (1966)). In the Board's judgment, the Appellant's reliance on the delay of its vendor of machinery to excuse its own failure to meet the delivery schedules under the Program C460-S contract, affords it no protection under the law. The Appellant had an obligation under the contract to plan for its performance, including, prior to submitting its bid and binding itself to the delivery terms of the contract, assuring that essential materials and machinery would be available. In the absence of any evidence from the Appellant that the Heidelberg press was delivered late because of the negligence on the part of its press supplier, the Board must conclude that the untimely shipment under Program C460-S was attributable to the Appellant's own failure to properly plan for its performance. The burden of proof was on the Appellant to demonstrate that its failure to perform was due to causes beyond its control and without its fault or negligence. However, in the Board's opinion, the reasons offered by the Appellant to excuse its delay were not unforeseeable and beyond its control and without its fault or negligence. Accordingly, as to this aspect of its defense, the Appellant has not met its burden of proof with respect to excusing its failure to make timely shipments under Program C460-S. 2. Excessive Print Orders Issued by Labor The Appellant's principal excuse for its failure to meet the Program C460-S delivery schedules is its claim that Labor overtaxed its production capacity by issuing more Print Orders than the maximum allowed under the contract. The Appellant's position, detailed above, is based on its view of Labor's "average" requirements over the life of the contract. Interpreting the contract in that light, the Appellant contends that: (1) the 69 Print Orders issued by Labor between May 15, 1990 and August 20, 1990 represented 160.61 percent of the average expected volume; (2) Labor ignored the contractual restriction against generating more than the 30 Print Orders in "any one month," compelling the Appellant to work at 278.79 percent of the average expected volume between May 15, 1990 and July 5, 1990, and never less than 131.83 percent above the average expected volume at any time during its performance of the contract; (3) Labor issued Print Orders for the larger AWSB Print Orders at 172.18 percent of the expected volume and required the Appellant to complete 37.14 percent of the annual work load between May 15, 1990 and August 23, 1990; and (4) the Print Orders received from Labor required the Appellant to produce two million impressions and 1,052 pages, or nearly one-half the amount expected over the contract term. In summary, the gravamen of the Appellant's challenge to the default termination action, and indeed the main reason it claims that it was unable to meet the scheduled shipment dates, was that Labor was ordering work at a rate nearly 200 percent, or double, the quantities estimated in the contract specifications. PHR, p. 17. In the Board's view, the Appellant's assertion blaming its failure to meet the required delivery schedules under the contract because Labor sent it excessive work is without foundation in the record. At the outset, the Board is mindful that Program C460-S was a "direct-deal term contract," which allowed Labor to place Print Orders directly with the Appellant rather than routing them through the Respondent. GPO Handbook, Section IV, À 1, at 8. As indicated previously, agency direct-deal authority ". . . extends only the placement of print orders and to the transmission of copy and proofs". GPO Handbook, Section IV, À 2, at 9. See, Castillo Printing Co., supra, Sl. op. at 3-4. The authority of a customer agency's Printing Officer is strictly circumscribed by the GPO Handbook, 1988 Contract Terms, and the contract itself. Id., Sl. op. at 47. Generally, it is limited to such tasks as issuing Print Orders, issuing bills of lading, giving specific instructions regarding production, and determining the production schedule for each Print Order. Id. The Board sees nothing in this record to indicate that Fennell, Labor's Printing Officer, deviated from these guidelines or misunderstood his authority. Id., Sl. op. at 4, 47-48. The key concept in the Appellant's position is that there was an "average expected volume" of work arising from the estimates contained in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause. As the Board understands it, the concept is based on certain assumptions about the language in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" (and the "DETERMINATION OF AWARD" clause to some degree), namely: (1) the language regulates the frequency at which such orders could be issued over the life of the contract (a maximum of 30 orders per month); and (2) the clause guarantees the contractor a range of work over the contract term with respect to number of orders, types of publications, size of jobs and overall number of impressions and pages. The concept also assumes that Labor would issue orders at a reasonably uniform rate over the contract term. Accordingly, taking these assumptions into account, the Appellant made certain business calculations which apportioned the annual estimates of work contained in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause on a monthly and work day basis, to arrive at its bid for Program C460-S. The Appellant's conclusion that Labor was ordering work at an accelerated rate nearly double the quantities estimated in the contract specifications is rooted in this "per month" and "per work day" interpretation of the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause. While the Board appreciates the business reasons which may have led the Appellant to try to forecast a steady rate of work and income, we believe that it has misconstrued the contract. The first assumption made by the Appellant involves its interpretation of so much of the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause which provides: "No more than 30 print orders will be placed in any one month" (R4 File, Tab B, p. 5). The Appellant sees the key phrase "any one month," as meaning "any 30-day period." PHR, pp. 13, 16. Under this view, the Appellant is correct when it says that during the first 30 days of its Program C460-S contract (May 15, 1990 to June 15, 1990), Labor issued Print Orders (35) in excess of the number of allowable number (30) (R4 File, Tab AA). However, the Appellant's contention that Labor issued the same number of Print Orders in the 30 days between June 4, 1990 and July 5, 1990, is not borne out by the record; i.e., only 29 Print OrdersÀ" numbers 20018 to 20046À" were issued in that period (R4 File, Tab AA). 21/ Nonetheless, if one accepts the Appellant's further refinement of its concept and considers only the work days available for contract performance, then its conclusion that Labor issued Print Orders at a rate exceeding "average expected volume" throughout the contract is probably true; e.g., 278.79 percent of the average expected volume in the first 30 days under the contract, never less than 131.83 percent above the average expected volume at any time during the Appellant's performance, and 160.61 percent overall for the period May 15, 1990 to August 20, 1990 (R4 File, Tab V). See also, PHR, p. 15. Furthermore, applying the Appellant's formula to the "DETERMINATION OF AWARD" clause in the contract, there is some justification, at least mathematically, for its statement that Labor was ordering work at a rate nearly 200 percent, or double, the quantities estimated in the contract specifications. PHR, p. 17. Against the Appellant's "30 Print Orders in 30 days" view of the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause, the Respondent's interposes a much simpler interpretationÀ" the disputed phrase "any one month," in common parlance, means a "calendar month." PHR, p. 15. According to the Respondent, this is particularly true because it keeps its business records on a calendar month basis. PHR, p. 17. Certainly, the record supports the Respondent's contention that Labor never issued more than 30 Print Orders in any one calendar month; i.e., the documentary evidence confirms that Labor issued 69 Print Orders to the Appellant in the following sequenceÀ" 11 in May 1990, 30 during June 1990, 14 in July 1990 and 14 during August 1990 (up to August 20) (R4 File, Tabs W and AA). (PHR, p. 15. However, by asserting during the prehearing telephone conference that if the Appellant was unsure of the intent of the phrase "any one month" in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" provision it was obligated to ask the Contracting Officer for a clarification before submitting its bid, the Respondent has raised, by implication, the possibility that the phrase may be ambiguous. 22/ PHR, p. 17. In fact, the word "month" can have the meaning ascribed to it by both parties in this case; i.e., standard reference sources define the word as either (1) a "calendar month," or (2) the time from any date of one month to the corresponding date of the next. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 880 (3d Coll. ed. 1988); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1159 (4th ed. 1968). Consequently, on the surface at least, there might appear to be an inherent ambiguity in the IFB's "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause. However, the Board has observed in the past that the rules concerning ambiguous provisions come into play only if the meaning of the disputed terms are not susceptible to interpretation through the usual rules of contract construction. Castillo Printing Co., supra, Sl. op. at 27. The most basic principle of contract construction is that the document should be interpreted as a whole. 23/ See, e.g., Hol-Gar Manufacturing Corporation v. United States, 352 F.2d 972 (1965); Restatement (Second) Contracts, À 202(2) (1981). Hence, it is well-accepted that all provisions of a contract are to be given effect and no provision is to be rendered meaningless. See, e.g., Fortec Constructors v. United States, 760 F.2d 1288, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Jamsar, Inc. v. United States, 442 F.2d 930 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Grace Industries, Inc., ASBCA No. 33553, 87-3 BCA À 20,171. Stated otherwise, a contract should be interpreted in a manner which gives meaning to all its parts and in such a fashion that the provisions do not conflict with each other, if this is reasonably possible. See, e.g., B. D. Click Company v. United States, 614 F.2d 748 (Ct. Cl. 1980). In this particular case the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause does not exist in a vacuum, but rather it must read in conjunction with the "SCHEDULE" clause. When the Board construes the relevant provisions as a whole, the contractual scheme becomes readily apparentÀ" normally no more than 30 Print Orders will be placed in any one month ("FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause) but where the Government issues more than 30 Print Orders, the contractor will be entitled, on request, to an extended delivery schedule for the additional work ("SCHEDULE" clause). Since the "SCHEDULE" clause also envisions a brief performance period on Print Orders À" "[c]omplete production, distribution and mailing must be made within five workdays"À" the Board finds itself in agreement with the Respondent that an opportunity for longer due dates on orders in excess of 30 is a reasonable accommodation to the extra strain on a contractor's productive capacity. Furthermore, it seems highly unlikely to the Board that if a contractor, attempting to satisfy the Government's increased needs, asked for such an extension that the Government would deny it, because such an adverse decision could be construed as a breach of its implied duty to cooperate. 24/ See, e.g., Stephenson, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 38-41. In short, the contract itself foresees the possibility of additional work and provides the appropriate relief. Under this interpretation, whether a "month" is a calendar month or any 30- day period extending from a given date of one month to the corresponding date of the next, is immaterial; i.e., the subject matter and principal concern of the relevant language in the contract is the number of orders, not the number of days. Therefore, because the Board sees no conflict between the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause and the "SCHEDULE" clause, it also finds that there is no ambiguity in the intent of the phrase "any one month" in the former provision. 25/ While the Appellant contends that it was receiving more than 30 Print Orders a month, contrary to the limitation contained in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause, there is nothing in the record to indicate that it sought the relief provided for in the "SCHEDULE" clause of the contract when it found its production capacity inadequate to adhere to the order delivery schedules under those circumstances. Although the Appellant asserts that it had informed the Contracting Officer that Labor was exceeding the volume indicated in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause (R4 File, Tabs J (letter of July 11, 1990) and V; PHR, pp. 16-17), the record is devoid of any evidence prior to the termination date of the contract to show that it either formally asked for an extension of the required delivery schedules or lodged an official protest with the Contracting Officer about Labor's issuing an excessive number of Print Orders. The Appellant's assertion in its complaint that it "notified the Contracting Officer that the Agency was exceeding the volume limits" is an insufficient basis for inferring that it initiated either of these actions at the appropriate time (R4 File, Tab V). Cf., Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture, GPO BCA 9-85 ((Decision on Remand, August 5, 1991), Sl. op. at 33, n. 31 ("As the Claims Court observed [in Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, No. 174-89C (Cl. Ct. February 5, 1991), Sl. op at 25], such allegations and statements are not sufficient to enable an appellant to carry its burden of proof on the reliance issue."). Also cf., Singleton Contracting Corporation, GSBCA No. 8548 (January 18, 1990), 90-2 BCA À 22,748; Tri-State Services of Texas, Inc., ASBCA No. 38019, 89-3 BCA À 22,064 (citing, Gemini Services, Inc., ASBCA No. 30247, 86-1 BCA À 18,736). Accordingly, even if the Board accepted the Appellant's theory that the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause absolutely limited Labor to issuing no more than 30 Print Orders a month, and believed that the customer agency's generation of a larger number of orders amounted to a violation of the contract and was the principal cause for the contractor's failure to meet the delivery schedules, there would be no basis for the Board to reverse the Contracting Officer's termination decision because it is well-settled that no recovery may be had if the contract itself provides a remedy. Cf., Triax-Pacific, A Joint Venture, ASBCA No. 36353, 91-2 BCA À 23,724. Like its first assumption, the Appellant's second supposition À" that the contract guarantees the contractor a range of work over the contract term with respect to number of orders, types of publications, size of jobs and overall number of impressions and pages À" will not withstand scrutiny when measured against the express language of the contract. Thus, the "REQUIREMENTS" clause plainly states that it ". . . is a requirements contract for the items and for the period specified herein. . . ." and that ". . . [t]he quantities of items specified herein are estimates only, and are not purchased hereby" (R4 File, Tab B, p. 4). Furthermore, while providing that ". . . the Government shall order from the contractor all the items set forth which are required to be purchased by the Government . . .", the "REQUIREMENTS" clause also makes clear that ". . . if the Government's requirements for the items set forth herein do not result in orders in the amounts or quantities described as 'estimated', it shall not constitute the basis for an equitable price adjustment under this contract." Id. Moreover, the "REQUIREMENTS" clause states that ". . .[s]ubject to any limitations elsewhere in this contract, the contractor shall furnish to the Government all items called for by the print orders issued in accordance with the 'Ordering' clause of this contract." Id. Similarly, the first sentence in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause clearly states that "[i]t is impossible at this time to predetermine the frequency or number of orders that will be placed on this contract," and the next one observes that ". . . based on past history, it is anticipated that approximately 104-265 orders will be placed during the contract term . . ." (R4 File, Tab B, p. 5). Indeed, the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause also lists the potential number of orders for AWSBs, AWSSs, IWSSs, and IWSBs, in terms of approximations of orders per year, copies per order, and pages per copy. Id. Finally, the pertinent language in the "DETERMINATION OF AWARD" provision states ". . . the following units of production . . . are the estimated requirements to produce one year's production under this contract. These units do not constitute, nor are they to be construed as, a guarantee of the volume of work which may be ordered under this contract . . . " (R4 File, Tab B, p. 11). When these several provisions are considered as a whole, it is clear that while the Government agreed to procure all of its AWSB, AWSS, IWSS, and IWSB requirements between May 1, 1990 and April 30, 1990, from the Appellant, it made no commitment as to a specific quantity of work. There is no other way to read phrases such as "estimates only," "amounts or quantities described as 'estimated'," "impossible at this time to predetermine the frequency or number of orders," "approximately 104-265 orders," "estimated requirements," and "[t]hese units do not constitute, nor are they to be construed as, a guarantee of the volume of work which may be ordered," without distorting the clear meaning of the contract. Cf., Tamms Lithography, Inc., GPO BCA 14-89 (July 13, 1990), Sl. op. at 7. These terms, all conveying the same thought and appearing in several critical provisions, should have alerted a reasonably prudent contractor that the Respondent merely making a good faith guess, based on past experience, as to the wide range of potential work which could be expected under the contract. Accordingly, the Board agrees with the Respondent that absent a specific commitment from the Government with respect to an exact volume of work, the Appellant's "average expected volume" theory falls because there is no standard against which to measure the frequency or number of Print Orders generated by Labor in order to determine if the rate at which it issued them was excessive. This is not to say that the Appellant's "average expected volume" concept has no usefulness whatsoever. Certainly, from a business point of view, calculations based on an average of anticipated work may serve as a convenient device for determining contractor costs for the purpose of bidding and for scheduling work in the plant, but it has nothing to do with the scheduling of work under the contract by the agency which requires it. Furthermore, the idea of an "average expected volume" cannot be used to rewrite the contract. That is, when the Appellant refines its concept into anticipated amounts of work on a monthly and daily basis, it is, in effect, attempting to impose its own view of good business practicesÀ" in which orders are spread evenly over a fixed period of timeÀ" on the express language of the contract. PHR, p. 16. Contrary to the Appellant's calculations, nothing in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause either mentions or can be construed as promising work on an average "per month" or "per working day" basis; instead the provision talks of approximate "orders per year," "copies per order," and "pages per copy." These terms are not synonymous, and it is clear that the Government could order more or less than one order, more or less copies per order or more or less pages per copy of several types of publications and still be within the approximate or annual quantity of work listed. Moreover, the Appellant's "per month" or "per working day" averages disappear when one considers that under the express language of the contract, assuming the maximum estimate of 265 orders were placed at the maximum rate of 30 a month, the Government could have satisfied its contractual obligations in less than nine months; i.e., nothing in the contract required Labor to evenly distribute its Program C460-S Print Orders over the entire contract term of 12 months, all that was necessary was that the agency place most of its orders within that period. Cf., Tamms Lithography, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 7. Because there was no "average expected volume" of work under the contract, and thus no standard against which to measure the frequency or number of Print Orders issued by Labor, the Appellant's claim that the amount of work ordered by the agency exceeded by 200 percent the quantities estimated in the contract specifications has no factual support. As a consequence, the Board finds no merit to the Appellant's assertion that its failure to meet the Print Order delivery schedules under the contract was excusable because it resulted from an excess of work required by Labor. Indeed, based on this record, the Board believes that rather than being the major source of the Appellant's delivery delays, the frequency and number of Print Orders issued by Labor only became a problem when the Appellant's new press failed to arrive on time and its old press broke down. This view is reenforced by the fact that the Appellant not only continued to accept the work which it now contends was "excess," but also informed the Contracting Officer, on July 11, 1990, in response to the first "Cure Notice," that everything was "on track" and that it expected "to be completely current on the contract before July 23," because its new Heidelberg press was "now in place and running and we are almost completely caught up" (R4 File, Tab J). 26/ Accordingly, having examined the contract terms and the facts in the record, the Board concludes that there is no merit to the Appellant's contention that Labor was ordering work at a rate nearly double the estimated quantities shown in the contract specifications, and therefore, its defense to the termination action based on that view must fail. CONCLUSION The Board's analysis of the record leads it to the conclusion that the Contracting Officer was fully justified in terminating the remainder of the Appellant's Program C460-S contract for default for the grounds stated in his "Notice of Termination/Complete," dated August 23, 1990. The "SCHEDULE" clause of the contract clearly states that "[a]dherence to this schedule must be maintained" (R4 File, Tab B, p. 9). That time was of the essence in this contract should have been apparent to the Appellant from the three "Cure Notices" it received and the numerous telephone calls concerning overdue Print Orders and requests for rescheduled shipping dates. 27/ The Appellant only replied to the first "Cure Notice." The Appellant then admitted it was having problems meeting the Print Order delivery schedules but sought to excuse the delays because of (1) the late arrival of a new press; (2) the mechanical breakdown of its old press; and (3) the issuance of an excessive number of orders by Labor. Although the Appellant assured the Contracting Officer that with its new press the backlog of work would be eliminated by July 23, 1990, subsequent complaints from Labor disclosed continued unsatisfactory performance by the Appellant with respect to meeting the Print Order delivery schedules. The Contracting Officer's second and third "Cure Notices" elicited no response from the Appellant. Because of the Appellant's continuing failure to comply with the delivery requirements of Program C460-S, the Contracting Officer terminated the balance of its contract effective August 23, 1990 (R4 File, Tab S). 28/ Considering the record before it as a whole, the Board is unable to say that the Contracting Officer's decision to partially terminate the contract for Program C460-S for default under the circumstances described herein is clearly erroneous. Therefore, the Board AFFIRMS the Contracting Officer's decision and DENIES the appeal. Á It is so Ordered. _______________ The Contracting Officer's appeal file, assembled pursuant to Rule 4 of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure, was delivered to the Board on October 19, 1990. GPO Instruction 110.12, Subject: Board of Contract Appeals Rules of Practice and Procedure, dated September 17, 1984 (Board Rules), Rule 4. It will be referred to hereafter as R4 File, with an appropriate Tab letter also indicated. As originally submitted, the R4 File consisted of documents identified as Tab A through Tab XYZ. However, at the prehearing telephone conference held on December 12, 1990, Counsel for GPO requested permission to introduce copies of all 69 Print Orders issued to the Appellant under the contract as Tab AA. See, Prehearing Conference Report, dated May 8, 1991, p. 15 (hereinafter PCR). On December 20, 1990, the Board received the Print Orders in question and made them part of the record. A copy of the documents were also provided to the Appellant. à With the consent of the parties, this case was joined for the purposes of a prehearing telephone conference with another appeal filed by the Appellant, GPO BCA Docket No. GPO BCA 15-90. During the prehearing telephone conference, however, the parties were assured by the Board that even though the appeals had been consolidated for that limited purpose, separate decisions would be rendered in each. See, PCR, p. 1 By Order, dated August 22, 1991, the Board officially severed both cases. See, Order Closing the Record and Filing of Briefs, dated August 22, 1991, p. 1. à The record discloses that the Program C460-S QATAP standards for both Product Quality Levels (Printing Attributes and Finishing Attributes) was Level IV (R4 File, Tab B, p. 2). The Inspection Level standard for Non-Destructive tests was General Inspection Level I, while the measurement for Destructive tests was Special Inspection Level S-2 (R4 File, Tab B, p. 2). There were also two specified standardsÀ" one relating to the Type Quality and Uniformity attribute (Camera Copy/Films) and the other to the Solid and Screen Tint Color Match attribute (Pantone Matching System) (R4 File, Tab B, p. 2). à The contract in question was a "direct-deal term contract." As explained in the GPO Agency Procedural Handbook, GPO Publication 305.1, dated March 1987 (GPO Handbook): "[d]irect-deal term contracts allow the customer agency to place print orders (GPO Form 2511) directly with contractors rather than routing them through the GPO for placement." GPO Handbook, Section IV, À 1, at 8. The purpose of this method of contract administration is " . . . to ensure that agency printing needs are met in the most effective and efficient manner possible." Id. It should be noted, however, that agency direct-deal authority ". . . extends only the placement of print orders and to the transmission of copy and proofs. . . .All other authority rests with GPO's Contracting Officers." GPO Handbook, Section IV, À 2, at 9. See, Castillo Printing Co., GPO BCA 10-90 (May 8, 1991), Sl. op. at 3-4. 5. The record does not clearly identify who served as Labor's Printing Officer for the Program C460-S contract. Both Fennell and a "D. Rucker" issued Print Orders for Labor, although Rucker signed the vast majority of them (53) (R4 File, Tab AA). However, no question has been raised in this case concerning an improper exercise of direct deal authority by Labor's Printing Officer, thus his/her exact identity is immaterial. See, Castillo Printing Co., supra, Sl. op. at 14, 42-51. Therefore, for the purposes of this decision, the Board will assume that Fennell was Labor's Printing Officer because he was clearly the Respondent's principal contact at the customer agency (R4 File, Tabs J and P). à The complaints in question concerned quality shortcomings with respect to Print Orders 20006 and 20007 (R4 File, Tabs H and I). Print Order 20006 had several defects in printing and finishing, including missing pages and the wrong binding, and Labor asked that the order be reprinted (R4 File, Tab H). Similarly, Print Order 20007 was delivered with several printing defects, but Labor was willing to accept the order at a discount (R4 File, Tab I). Apart from the two Print Orders mentioned by Fennell, the record indicates that the Appellant had quality control problems with some other deliveries, particularly with regard to "short shipments;" i.e., Print Order 20001 (90 copies missing), Print Order 20015 (135 copies missing), Print Order 20042 (19 copies missing) and Print Order 20043 (40 copies missing) (R4 File, Tabs M, N, X and Y). In addition, the record shows that Print Orders 20036, 20047, 20048 were shipped in the wrong containers, which resulted in damage to the contents (R4 File, Tabs P, À 2, and U). However, since the Contracting Officer based the termination action on the Appellant's failure to comply with the contract's delivery requirements, and not on any quality problems with the products shipped, the contractor's inability to satisfy any other provision of the contract has not been considered in the context of this decision. à The record indicates that on July 6, 1990, Scott believed that his "Cure Notice" of July 2, 1990, had not been sent to the Appellant (R4 File, Tab J). However, there is other evidence in the record which indicates that Scott was mistaken. First, on July 11, 1990, while not specifically referring to a "Cure Notice," the Appellant wrote to Scott in response to his "letter dated July 2, 1990," and proceeded to explain the reasons for the late deliveries on Program C460-S, and to tell him of "the corrective measures we have taken" to remedy the problem (R4 File, Tab J). Second, on August 22, 1990, when Lowery, who had replaced Scott as Contracting Officer for Program C460-S, wrote to the Respondent's Contract Review Board (CRB) seeking permission to terminate the Appellant's contract for default, he stated that "[o]n July 2, 1990, . . . a cure notice was sent to [the Appellant]" (R4 File, Tab Q). Consequently, the Board concludes that the "Cure Notice" of July 2, 1990, was in fact sent to the Appellant, was received, and was answered on July 11, 1990. à The record contains two exhibits, both computer printouts, which show the adjustments made in the delivery schedules of Print Orders received by the Appellant under Program C460-S (R4 File, Tabs R and W). One document, entitled "Contract Compliance Section Exception Report, As of 8/20/90," was received from the Appellant on August 22, 1990, and is labeled Tab R. The other, identified as Tab W, is entitled "Contractor Performance History on Program 460-SÀ" Prior 5 Months to Present." The Board will refer to the latter computer printout in this decision because it is a more complete listing. à After the prehearing telephone conference in this case, by letter dated February 12, 1991, Counsel for GPO informed the Appellant that the Respondent would recommence setoff procedures to recoup an additional amount of excess reprocurement costs on Program C460-S Print Orders. See, Letter from Drew Spalding, Deputy General Counsel to Mr. Richard Swanson, dated February 12, 1991. Enclosed with his letters was a listing of reprocured orders. According to this listing, 59 Print Orders had to be reprocured. à The Contracting Officer's memorandum is dated August 22, 1990. By that date, however, all 69 Print Orders received by the Appellant under Program C460-S had been issued by Labor, not the 61 indicated in the memorandum to the CRB (R4 File, Tab AA). Apparently, the Contracting Officer, became aware of the remaining eight Print Orders in the Appellant's hands after August 22, 1990, since the termination notice issued the following day reflects this knowledge; i.e., the cancellation is effective beginning with Print Order 20070 (R4 File, Tab S). à At the prehearing telephone conference, the Appellant offered two additional reasons the Government was at fault for its delivery problems, namely (a) Labor erroneously gave Print Orders meant for the Appellant to another company and it took time to retrieve them, and (b) Labor issued some Print Orders with insufficient or wrong information. PHR, p. 16. However, from the context of the conference proceedings, it is clear to the Board that these incidents, if true, are only marginal considerations. The Appellant's main claim, and indeed the one which is the linchpin of its position, is that Labor was ordering work far in excess of the limits in the contract. PHR, p. 17. à The record on which the Board's decision is based consists of: (a) the R4 File, consisting of documents labeled Tab A through Tab XYZ, as originally filed by the Respondent on October 19, 1990; (b) the multi-document exhibit submitted by the Respondent on December 20, 1990, consisting of the 69 Print Orders issued under Program C460-S, and added to the R4 File as Tab AA; (c) the Appellant's letter, dated August 31, 1990, protesting the Contracting Officer's termination action and serving as the Complaint in this case; (d) the Prehearing Conference Report; and (6) the Respondent's letter, dated February 12, 1991, to the Appellant concerning excess reprocurement costs on Program C460- S. The record was officially closed on September 9. 1991, pursuant to the Board's Order, dated August 22, 1991. See, Order Closing the Record and Filing of Briefs, dated August 22, 1991, p. 2. On November 12, 1991, the Board received a Request for Decision (Request), dated November 8, 1991, from the Appellant in which it sought, among other things, to present additional information concerning excess reprocurement costs. Because the Appellant's Request was received after the record was closed, it has not been considered by the Board in the context of this decision. 13. Default terminations À" as a species of forfeiture À" are strictly construed. See, D. Joseph DeVito v. United States, 188 Ct. Cl. 979, 413 F.2d 1147, 1153 (1969). See also, Murphy, et al. v. United States, 164 Ct. Cl. 332 (1964); J. D. Hedin Construction Co. v. United States, 187 Ct.Cl. 45, 408 F.2d 424 (1969). à As indicated above, the remedy requested by the Appellant in its complaint letter of August 31, 1990, was reinstatement of its Program C460-S contract (R4 File, Tab V). The Board has stated on numerous occasions that it derives powers solely from the "Default" clause of the contract. See, e.g. Chavis and Chavis Printing, GPO BCA 20-90 (February 6, 1991), Sl. op. at 10; Ascot Tag and Label Company, Inc., GPO BCA 14-85 (August 7, 1987), Sl. op. at 23; Peak Printers, Inc., GPO BCA 12-85 (November 12, 1986), Sl. op. at 6. This case is before the Board under the "Disputes" clause because the Appellant is protesting the final decision of a GPO Contracting Officer terminating the remainder of its contract for default (R4 File, Tab S). 1988 Contract Terms, À 5.(b). It is well-accepted in Government contract law that even where jurisdiction exists, as here, a Board of Contract Appeals will not grant a terminated contractor's request for reinstatement of the contract because that is a matter within the authority of the agency, as exercised by its contracting officers. See, e.g., Crow Fitting Company, Inc., ASBCA No. 25378, 81-1 BCA À 14,951. The Board follows this general rule. à The Board was created by the Public Printer in 1984. GPO Instruction 110.10C, Subject: Establishment of the Board of Contract Appeals, dated September 17, 1984. Prior to the Board's creation, appeals from decisions of GPO Contracting Officers were considered by ad hoc Contract Appeals Boards (the decisions of these ad hoc boards are hereinafter cited as GPOCAB). While the decisions of these ad hoc boards are not legally binding on the Board, it is the Board's policy to follow them where applicable and appropriate. à Where the failure to deliver or perform is caused by the default of a supplier or subcontractor, the cause of the default must be beyond the control of both the prime contractor and subcontractor, and without the fault or negligence of either, in order for the prime contractor not to be liable for any excess costs for failure to perform, unless the subcontracted supplies or services could have been secured from other sources in sufficient time to meet the required delivery schedule. 1988 Contract Terms, À 20.(d). 17. It is "black letter" Government contract law that time is of the essence in any contract containing fixed dates for performance. See, e.g., Clay Bernard Systems International, Ltd. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 804 (1991); D. Joseph DeVito v. United States, supra, 413 F.2d at 1154. "Time is of the essence" means that asserted facts regarding urgency are legally irrelevant; i.e., there is simply no necessity that there be an urgency to a delivery date requirement for time to be of the essence. See, e.g., Kit Pack Company, Inc., ASBCA No. 33135, 89-3 BCA À 22,151; Control Mechanisms, Inc., ASBCA No. 27180, 84-2 BCA À 17,330. Although a contrary view was expressed in the Trial Judge's opinion adopted by the Claims Court in Franklin E. Penney Co. v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 842, 524 F.2d 668 (1975)À" i.e., whether time is of the essence depends upon the nature of the contract and the particular circumstances of the caseÀ" cases both before and after Penney have reinforced the absolute "time is of the essence" rule. See, e.g., Clay Bernard Systems International, Ltd. v. United States, supra, 22 Cl. Ct. 804 (1991); Simmons Precision Products, Inc. v. United States, 546 F.2d 886 (Ct. Cl. 1976); D. Joseph DeVito v. United States, supra, 413 F.2d 1147 (Ct. Cl. 1969). See also, Stephenson, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 25, n. 29, where the Board expressed its view that the Penney factors are just additional considerations in deciding whether a waiver has occurred and that the general ruleÀ" time is of the essence in any contract containing fixed dates for performanceÀ" still holds. 18. See, John Cibinic, Jr. & Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Administration of Government Contracts 2d ed., (The George Washington University, 1986), p. 677 (hereinafter Cibinic and Nash). As the Court of Claims observed in DeVito: "[t]he Government is habitually lenient in granting reasonable extensions of time for contract performance, for it is more interested in production than in litigation." D. Joseph DeVito v. United States, supra, 413 F.2d at 1153. à The law gives a contracting officer a reasonable period of time to investigate the facts and to determine what course of action would be in the best interest of the Government as the non- defaulting party. During this forbearance period the Government may terminate the contract at any time, without prior notice. See, e.g., Raytheon Service Co., ASBCA No. 14746, 70-2 BCA À 8,390; Lapp Insulator Co., ASBCA No. 13303, 70-1 BCA À 8,219, mot. for reconsid. denied 70-2 BCA À 8,471. The extent of a reasonable forbearance period depends on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. See, e.g., H. N. Bailey & Associates v. United States, 196 Ct. Cl. 156, 449 F.2d 387 (1971); Methonics, Incorporated v. United States, 210 Ct. Cl. 685 (1976). à The primary function of the excusable delays provision is to protect the contractor from sanctions for late performance. To the extent that his/her delay is excusable, the contractor is protected from default termination, liquidated damages, actual damages, or excess costs of reprocurement or completion. See, Cibinic and Nash, note 18 supra, p. 410. à The Board notes that 18 of these 29 Print Orders À" numbers 20018 to 20035 À" would already be included in the initial 30-day period of May 15, 1990 to June 15, 1990. Consequently, the Appellant seems to be engaging in a blatant case of double counting in order to make a point. à Contractual language is ambiguous if it will sustain different reasonable interpretations. See, e.g., Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture, supra (Decision on Remand), Sl. op. at 9; Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, supra, Sl. op at 11 (citing, Edward R. Marden Corporation v. United States, 803 F.2d 701, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 358, 372 (1968)); Castillo Printing Co., supra, Sl. op. at 26. In cases involving a contest between two contrasting interpretations of contract language, the dispute usually turns on whether the ambiguity is latent or patent. Courts will find a latent ambiguity where the disputed language, without more, admits of two differing reasonable interpretations. See, e.g., Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, supra, Sl. op at 11 (citing, Edward R. Marden Corporation v. United States, supra, 803 F.2d at 705; Castillo Printing Co., supra, Sl. op. at 37-38. In such cases, courts will apply the doctrine of contra proferentem and construe the dispute language against the drafter, see, e.g., Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, supra, Sl. op at 11 (citing, William F. Klingensmith, Inc. v. United States, 205 Ct. Cl. 651, 657 (1974)); Castillo Printing Co., supra, Sl. op. at 38, provided that the non-drafter can show that he/she relied on the alternative reasonable interpretation in submitting his/her bid. See, e.g, Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, supra, Sl. op at 23-24 (citing, Fruin-Colon Corporation v. United States, 912 F.2d 1426, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); Lear Siegler Management Services v. United States, 867 F.2d 600, 603 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Castillo Printing Co., supra, Sl. op. at 38-39. On the other hand, a patent ambiguity would exist if the contract language contained a gross discrepancy, an obvious error in drafting, or a glaring gap, as seen through the eyes of a "reasonable man" on an ad hoc basis. See, e.g, Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, supra, Sl. op. at 22 (citing, Max Drill, Inc. v. United States, 192 Ct. Cl. 608, 626 (1970); WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 1, 6 (1963)). Where such discrepancies, errors, or gaps are present, the contractor has an affirmative obligation to seek a clarification from the contracting officer as to the true meaning of the contract language before submitting its bid. Id., Sl. op. at 11-12 (citing, Newsom v. United States, 230 Ct. Cl. 301, 303 (1982)); Enrico Roman, Inc. v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 104 (1983); S.O.G. of Arkansas v. United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 125, 546 F.2d 367 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Beacon Construction v. United States, 314 F.2d 501 (Ct. Cl. 1963). The patent ambiguity doctrine is aimed at avoiding costly post-award litigation, as well as protecting the integrity of the bidding process by ensuring that all offerors bid on the same specifications. Id., Sl. op. at 12 (citing, S.O.G. of Arkansas v. United States, supra, 212 Ct. Cl. at 125; Newsom v. United States, supra, 230 Ct. Cl. at 303). In this case, by asserting that the Appellant had a duty to ask the Contracting Officer to clarify the phrase "any one month" in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause before submitting its bid, the Respondent implies that the ambiguity, if any, would be patent. à The purpose of any rule of contract interpretation is to carry out the intent of the parties. Hegeman-Harris and Company, 440 F.2d 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1979). The test for ascertaining intent is an objective one; i.e., the question is what would a reasonable contractor have understood, not what did the drafter subjectively intend. Corbetta Construction Company v. United States, 198 Ct. Cl. 712, 461 F.2d 1330 (1972). The provisions of the contract itself should provide the evidence of the objective intent of the parties. à See, Cibinic and Nash, note 18 supra, at pp. 221-22, 223-25. There is also an implied negative obligation on the part of the Government that it will not do that which will interfere with the contractor in the performance of the contract. Id., at pp. 222-23. See, e.g., Nanofast, Inc., ASBCA No. 12545, 69-1 BCA À 7,566 (citing, George A. Fuller Company, A Corporation v. United States, 108 Ct. Cl. 70, 69 F.Supp. 409 (1947); Fern E. Chalender d/b/a Chalender Construction Company of Springfield, Missouri v. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 557; Restatement, Contracts, À 295 and 315). Both implied duties are part of every Government contract. George A. Fuller Company, A Corporation v. United States, supra, 69 F.Supp. 409. In essence, the Government's duty of cooperation means that it has implied affirmative obligation to do whatever is necessary to enable the contractor to perform. See, e.g., Nanofast, Inc., supra, 69-1 BCA À 7,566. (citing, The Kehm Corporation v. United States, 119 Ct. Cl. 454, 93 F.Supp. 620 (1950); United States v. Speed, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 77 (1868)). Under this doctrine, the Government will be held liable for breaching its implied duty to cooperate if it wrongfully fails or refuses to take some action, within its control, which is essential for the contractor to perform. In most cases applying this principle to excuse a contractor's default, there is a clear nexus between the Government's breaching conduct and the performance period itself. See, e.g., Maitland Brothers Company and Maitland Brothers Company and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, ASBCA Nos. 30089, 30764, 31032, 32071, 32605, 34659, 90-1 BCA À 22,367; Singleton Contracting Corporation, GSBCA No. 8552, 90-1 BCA À 22,298; G. W. Galloway Company, ASBCA Nos. 17436, 17723, 17836, 17911, 18324, 77-2 BCA À 12,640. 25. This conclusion was indirectly expressed by the Board when it told the parties that its ". . . review of the record discloses no factual dispute between the parties which would warrant an evidentiary hearing" and that it would ". . . decide the matter on the basis of the record . . .". See, Order Closing the Record and Filing of Briefs, dated August 22, 1991, p. 2. The Board's view was buttressed by the agreement of the parties at the prehearing telephone conference that the case was ripe for decision in its present form, and that there were sufficient facts in the record for the Board to make a decision. PHR, pp. 16-17. Furthermore, the Board thought it significant that the Appellant had not requested a hearing, and had expressed the view that the difference between the parties concerning the meaning of the word "month" in the "FREQUENCY OF ORDERS" clause was not a "major" one, but rather was only meant to emphasize that Labor was ordering work at a rate 200 percent above the estimated quantities set forth in the contract specifications, which the Appellant contended was the main reason for its inability to meet the scheduled shipment dates. PHR, p. 17. 26. Notwithstanding the Appellant's assurances, it was still late on nine Print Orders after July 23, 1990À" numbers 20048, 20049, 20050, 20051, 20057, 20058, 20059, 20060 and 20061. 27. Overall, the "Cure Notices" covered 35 Print Orders of the 69 issued to the AppellantÀ" numbers 20008, 20015, 20024, 20025, 20026, 20027, and 20029 (the first "Cure Notice"); numbers 20006, 20008, 20009, 20016, 20017, 20018, 20019, 20020, 20021, 20022, 20023, 20025, 20026, 20027, 20029, 20030, 20031, 20032, 20033, and, 20036 (the second "Cure Notice"); and numbers 20042, 20043, 20044, 20045, 20046, 20048, 20049, and 20050 (the third "Cure Notice"). à The termination notice of August 23, 1990, clearly advised the Appellant that it could be liable for any excess costs associated with the Respondent's reprocurement of the work covered by the contract (R4 File, Tab S). The only documentation in the R4 File concerning such reprocurement costs is a memorandum from George Berard, Financial Management Service, to Rose Green, Term Contracts, Section C, identifying the new contractor (R4 File, Tab XYZ). During the prehearing telephone conference held on December 12, 1990, the parties agreed that excess reprocurement costs should not be recovered from the Appellant's invoices unless these costs could first be established. PHR, p. 15. Furthermore, while the Appellant claimed that excess costs in the amount of $6,500 to $7,500 had already been recovered from its account, Counsel for GPO informed the Board that the Respondent's claim for excess costs would be finalized after April 30, 1991. Id. Both parties, however, agreed that any question of excess reprocurement costs could be the subject of a separate appeal; indeed, the Appellant expressly reserved the right to raise the quantum of excess costs in a separate proceeding. PHR, p. 16. By letter dated December 20, 1990, Counsel for GPO notified the Appellant that recoupment of excess costs incurred under the defaulted contract would be suspended until the Respondent could establish that the excess costs actually exceeded the amounts that had been withheld from the Appellant's billings. At the time, $6,004.76 had been withheld from the Appellant's invoices. Thereafter, by letter dated February 12, 1991, Counsel for GPO informed the Appellant that as of January 17, 1991, the excess costs amounted to $7,804.55, and that the Respondent would recommence setoff procedures to recoup the additional $1,799.79. See, Letter from Drew Spalding, Deputy General Counsel to Mr. Richard Swanson, dated February 12, 1991 (and enclosures), note 9 supra. The letter also told the Appellant that it could expect additional charges against its account as excess costs were incurred until the end of the term of the defaulted contract. Id. The Board settled the record on September 9, 1991. See, Order Closing the Record and Filing of Briefs, dated August 22, 1991, pp. 2-3. On November 12, 1991, the Appellant filed its Request with the Board stating, among other things, that on October 17, 1991, it had been informed by the Respondent that an additional $17,183.71 in excess reprocurement costs had been subtracted from the Appellant's account, bringing the total excess reprocurement costs recovered on Program C460-S to $24,988.26. See, Appellant's Request for Decision, note 12 supra, p. 1. In light of the agreement of the parties at the prehearing telephone conference, however, the Board has not considered the issue of excess reprocurement costs as part of this appeal. It is not clear to the Board at this time whether those excess costs have now been finalized. If so, upon receipt of a properly filed claim by the Appellant, the matter of excess reprocurement costs is now ripe for consideration by the Board in a separate proceeding.