BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON, DC 20401 In the Matter of ) ) the Appeal of ) ) CUSTOM PRINTING COMPANY ) Docket No. GPO BCA 28-94 Jacket No. 547-782 ) Purchase Order G-3283 ) For the Appellant: Custom Printing Company, Owensville, Missouri, by Frederic G. Antoun, Jr., Attorney-at-Law, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. For the Government: Kerry L. Miller, Associate General Counsel, U.S. Government Printing Office. Before FOSS, Administrative Judge. DECISION AND ORDER I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE This appeal, timely filed by Custom Printing Company (Appellant or Contractor), 1005 Commercial Drive, Owensville, Missouri 65066, is from the final decision, dated July 14, 1994, of Contracting Officer Thomas E. Nepi, of the U.S. Government Printing Office's (Respondent or GPO or Government) Chicago Regional Printing & Procurement Offices (CRPPO), 200 West Adams Street, Suite 1460, Chicago, Illinois 60606-5299, rejecting the pamphlet printed by the Contractor pursuant to Jacket No. 547-782, Purchase Order G-3283, and announcing the Respondent's intention to terminate the contract for default. R4 File, Tab F.1 Although the Government subsequently rescinded the default when the Appellant agreed to reprint the order in its entirety, see R4 File, Tab H, the Contractor expressly noted its disagreement with the initial decision and retained its right to appeal, see R4 File, Tab I. On June 6, 1995, the Board conducted an evidentiary hearing in the appeal, in which the Appellant appeared pro se, while the Government was represented by Counsel.2 Board Rules, Rules 17 through 22, 24, 26 and 27. Thereafter, both parties filed timely briefs on the issues involved.3 Board Rules, Rule 23. Based on the record in this case, the Contracting Officer's final decision is hereby REVERSED, and the appeal ALLOWED to the extent of the claim for the cost of the original printing. However, the Appellant's claim for the increased costs incurred in the reprinting is DENIED. II. BACKGROUND The relevant facts in this case are essentially uncontroverted, and are set forth here as presented in the R4 File, and the hearing record, including the exhibits of the parties. 1. In April 1994, the CRPPO issued an Invitation for Bid (IFB) for the production of two saddle-stitched booklets for the Department of Defense's U.S. Military Enlistment Processing Command (MEPCOM);4; i.e., 650,000 copies of a 28-page plus cover pamphlet entitled "Student and Parent Guide" (Student Guide),5 and 65,600 copies of a 24-page plus cover publication called "Educator and Counselor Guide" (Counselor Guide). Tr. 85; R4 File, Tab A. The Student Guide was assigned Jacket No. 547-782, while the Counselor Guide was purchased under Jacket No. 547-783. Id., at 2. Only Jacket No. 547-782 is involved in this case. See Report of Prehearing Telephone Conference, dated April 17, 1995, at 2, n. 2 (hereinafter RPTC). 2. Among other things, the IFB specifications provided: GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS: Any contract which results from this Invitation for Bid will be subject to all terms and conditions of U.S. Government Office Contract Terms (GPO Pub. 310.2, effective December 1, 1987, Rev. September 1988) and Quality Assurance Through Attributes Program Contract Terms (GPO Pub. 310.1, Rev. November 1989).6 * * * * * * * * * * TRIM SIZE: 178 x 216 mm (7 x 8-1/2"). * * * * * * * * * * PROOFS: Two sets Grey DYLUX 535-2 or equal dark image proofs in book format. * * * * * * * * * * Contractor must not print prior to receipt of an "OK TO PRINT". * * * * * * * * * * PRIOR TO SHIPPING APPROVAL COPIES: Prior to any other shipping, Contractor must deliver 5 copies each jacket to the North Chicago address below. Agency will hold 2 workdays from receipt to telephone approval/problem. * * * * * * * * * * PRINTING: For both jackets, text prints in blue and black (with some screened type). Line copy with solid bands or areas of blue, some with reverses. Colors doe not trap except small ruled area on one page. There is one blank text page on Jacket 547-783 and 2 blanks on Jacket 547-782. * * * * * * * * * * BINDING: Score covers and fold with grain parallel to spine. Separate covers wraparound. Saddle wire stitch in two places along 216 mm (8-1/2") bind. Trim 3 sides. * * * * * * * * * * QUALITY ASSURANCE LEVELS AND STANDARDS: The following levels and standards shall apply to these specifications: Product Quality Levels: (a) Printing (page related) Attributes- Level III . . . (b) Finishing (item related) Attributes-Level III. * * * * * * * * * * Prior to any other shipping, deliver 5 approval copies each jacket to: HQ USMEPCOM/MEPCP-PO, 2500 Green Bay Road, North Chicago, IL 60064. * * * * * * * * * * SCHEDULE: Award will be made and Government furnished material and purchase order will be available for pickup at [the CRPPO] by May 5, 1994. Proofs must be received by May 19, 1993. Proofs will be withheld not more than 5 workdays , from receipt in GPO to call for pickup. * * * * * * * * * * Prior to shipping approval copies must be received no later than June 23, 1994, and will be held 2 workdays from receipt to telephone approval/rejection. Ship complete on or before June 30, 1994. R4 File, Tab A, at 1-6.7 [Emphasis added.] 3. As indicated above, the IFB incorporated, by reference, GPO Contract Terms, which contains the following provision: Printing and binding shall be held to a high standard of imposition; makeready; press running; clear, sharp printing; binding; and good quality in every respect. GPO Contract Terms, Supplemental Specifications, ¶ 1.(b)(1) (General: Quality). 4. The Respondent mailed the IFB to 24 potential contractors and advertised it in the Commerce Business Daily, and received four (4) responsive bids-from the Appellant ($105,388.00), Gateway Press ($114,547.00), Monarch Litho ($121,121.00), and Strathmore Printing ($141,265.00). Tr. 83, 218-19; G. Exh. No. 6. The Appellant was the incumbent contractor for the Student Guide and the Counselor Guide.8 Tr. 50, 84, 116, 215. See Gov. Exh. Nos. 1 and 4. 5. Since the procurement exceeded $50,000.00, the GPO's regulations required the concurrence of GPO's Contract Review Board (CRB) before the contract could be awarded. See Printing Procurement Regulation, GPO Publication 305.3 (Rev. 10-90), Chap. I, Sec. 10, ¶ 4.a.(vii) (hereinafter PPR). Therefore, on April 29, 1994, the Contracting Officer sent a memorandum to the CRB asking it to approve award of the contract to the low bidder, the Appellant. Gov. Exh. No. 6. On May 2, 1994, the CRB concurred in the award. Id. Accordingly, on May 3, 1994, the Respondent issued Purchase Order G-3283 to the Appellant awarding it the job to produce both the Student Guide and the Counselor Guide at its quoted price of $105,388.00 "per specifications."9 Tr. 83; R4 File, Tab B. In that regard, the record shows that the estimated cost of the Student Guide-the publication involved in this dispute-was $88,701.00.10 See RPTC, at 2. 6. To produce the previous edition of the Student Guide, the Appellant had configured its two presses as a 24-pager and a 4- pager, which resulted in a pamphlet which had no binding stubs. Tr. 87, 145, 213-14; Gov. Exh. No. 1. Such a setup basically involves two operations, since the smaller press is in a separate room at the Contractor's plant. Tr. 55, 79. In printing the follow-up version of the Student Guide, the Contractor changed the press configuration to a 16-pager and a 12-pager so that it could produce the publication in a single operation. Tr. 79-80, 214. As a consequence, however, the new Student Guide had two binding stubs or "lips" approximately 3/8" wide between pages 20 and 21 and 24 and 25. Tr. 79-80; App. Exh. No. 9. See also RPTC, at 5. At the hearing, Cooper explained the reason for the lips, in pertinent part: . . . It was ran [sic] as two webs, . . . A 16-page web, which is a 36-inch web, we call it a full web. And then in the case of the additional pages, it was ran [sic] as a 12-pager. The 12-page in this case is a three-quarter size web. Based on the folding operations of those presses, . . . it not being in increments of eight pages, you get lips because the-the way the folding operation is on the press, when it folds down anything that is not divisible by eight, it will create a lip. . . . The only way that you can run a 28-pager divisible by four- not using lips is [to] run two operations, . . . a 24 and a four, . . .11 Tr. 79. [Emphasis added.] See also Tr. 213-14 . Furthermore, it is abundantly clear from the record that the Contractor changed its press configuration in order to reduce its production costs and improve its competitive position; i.e., Cooper testified that it cost $4,000.00 to $5,000.00 less to produce a job with a binding stub than a complete 4-pager.12 Tr. 52, 56-57, 80, 142-43. Similarly, it is undisputed that the Appellant did not inform the CRPPO of its intention to reconfigure its presses and produce a pamphlet containing binding stubs prior to printing the job-it "saw no reason to call GPO." Tr. 50-51, 91. 7. Before printing the job, the Appellant, as required by the contract, provided the CRPPO with two (2) sets of Dylux proofs which had been prepared by its Pre-Press Department.13 Tr. 52, 91-92, 129-30; R4 File, Tab A, at 2; Gov. Exh. No. 2. After noting the receipt of the proofs in its records, the CRPPO forwarded them to MEPCOM for review. Tr. 129-30. It is undisputed that the Dylux proofs did not show the two binding stubs as they later appeared in the final product.14 Tr. 53, 93-94. It is also uncontroverted that the Government approved the Dylux proofs and gave the required "OK TO PRINT." Tr. 95. 8. The contract also required the Appellant, prior to shipping the order, to send 5 copies each of the Student Guide and the Counselor Guide to MEPCOM for approval. R4 File, Tab A, at 3, 5. Shortly after the Contractor furnished the approval copies to the customer agency, the CRPPO received a telephone call from MEPCOM's Printing Officer, First Lieutenant (USAF) Mary C. Lechner, complaining about the job. Tr. 96. As he recalled the conversation, the Contracting Officer said that Lechner never used the words "binding stubs" or "lips," but rather spoke in terms of "incomplete pages." Tr. 97. She followed-up her complaint with a memorandum (undated), which stated: 1. This letter is to inform you that the approval sample sent to me on this job is unacceptable. The error contained therein is visually offensive and presents a poor impression of HQ USMEPCOM and the military services. 2. Please have the job reaccomplished. Delivery is required not later than 15 August 1994. R4 File, Tab C.15 9. After receiving MEPCOM's complaint, and before he actually saw the approval copies of the Student Guide, the Contracting Officer telephoned the Appellant to find out what the problem was, and was told that the customer-agency was objecting to the use of binding stubs in the product-a problem which was unique in the Contracting Officer's experience.16 Tr. 97, 100. Thereafter, the Contracting Officer received MEPCOM's approval copies, examined them, and because the Contractor claimed that the use of binding stubs in saddle-stitched publications was routinely accepted by procurement officials at the Respondent's main plant in Washington, DC, he telephoned the central office to see if there was any policy or guidelines regarding this issue.17 Tr. 99, 100-01. In response to his inquiry, the Contracting Officer was provided with a copy of a memorandum, dated December 12, 1991, from W. L. Gardner, who was the Superintendent of the Purchase Division at the time, which states, in pertinent part: Saddle-stitched pamphlets delivered by vendors using short pages or "binding lips" as a production convenience are not acceptable and shall be rejected. Not only does the use of these lips result in an unprofessional product, but industry standards require wire stitches in the "center of the signature" (see attached).18 This definition prohibits the use of short pages-or binding lips-in the production of saddle-stitched pamphlets. The use of SPECS language to help preclude this is acceptable and encouraged, but failure to use the language does not obligate the Government to accept the product. Gov. Exh. No. 3.19 [Emphasis added.] See Tr. 102, 128, 133-34, 136. It is undisputed that this was the first time that Nepi had learned of the Purchase Division's policy, since the memorandum was never disseminated outside of that organization. Tr. 139, 160, 166, 203. On the other hand, the record also makes clear that the policy was not binding on him because the CRPPO was in the Regional Operations Office, not the Purchase Division, and his organization had issued nothing similar.20 Tr. 139-40. 10. After considering all of the information he had gathered, including Gardner's memorandum and the definitions of saddle- stitching in BOOKBINDING, FUNDAMENTALS, and POCKET PAL, the Contracting Officer determined that the Student Guide produced by the Appellant was rejectable. Tr. 100-02, 112-13, 128, 133-34, 136. Accordingly, by letter dated July 6, 1994, addressed to Matthew P. Lenauer, the Appellant's Customer Service Manager, Nepi notified the Contractor that the pamphlet was defective, and thus rejectable, and might have to be reprinted. Tr. 98; R4 File, Tab D. In that regard, the Contracting Officer explained: Our specifications called for a saddle stitched product. A binding "stub" of approximately 3/8" appears between pages 20/21 and 24/25, creating a very visible, objectional defect. GPO Contract Terms (Publication 310.2) states, "Printing and binding shall be held to a high standard of imposition . . . binding, and good quality in every respect. R4 File, Tab D. 11. Lenauer responded by letter dated July 8, 1994,, in pertinent part: We regret your disapproval of the binding style in which this pamphlet was produced. However, for many years the GPO has set a precedent by accepting this type of binding style. In the past, if the GPO wanted a particular job without this type of binding style it was clearly stated in the specs as shown in the sample attached. Those jobs with specs not stating complete 4-page signatures allowed the contractor to be creative in determining competitive cost. As to the statement in contract terms regarding printing and binding being held to a high standard of imposition . . . [w]e feel this product is of high standard in terms of print and bind quality. In addition, we feel the pamphlet is perfectly usable to the public and do not deem this product to be rejectable. R4 File, Tab E.21 See Tr. 98. [Emphasis added.] 12. On July 14, 1994, the Contracting Officer issued his "Final Decision," which gave the following reasons for rejecting the Student Guide: • The specifications required saddle stitched binding. Saddle stitched binding, as defined in The Printing Industry, by Victor Strauss, "is where individual signatures are fastened through the centerfold by means of wire staples." The pamphlets produced did not include complete signatures. Two leaves, each with a face and back page, were inserted and held in the bind with approximately 3/8" wide stubs. The stubs, which appear between pages 20-21 and 24-25, are crude, objectionable, and not complete signatures. • Government Printing Office Contract Terms (GPO Pub. 310.2) state[s] under quality, "Printing and binding shall be held to a high standard of imposition; makeready; press running; clear, sharp printing; binding; and good quality in every respect." The stubs give the appearance of a pamphlet which has been pieced together and not one of good quality. • The dylux proof which your firm submitted to the Government did not show any stubs. The Contraction [sic] Officer was never notified either orally or in writing, of your firm's intention to bind the pamphlets with incomplete signatures. • The stubs are a nonspecified trim size and a major deviation defect in accordance with the applicable Level III Quality Assurance Through Attributes Program for Finishing (F-1). Additionally, under Level III Typical Physical Description, finishing must be held to above average standards or accuracy, durability, and appearance. • Your firm gained an unfair competitive advantage as none of the other bidders were afforded the opportunity to formulate a bid for a pamphlet with a binding stub option. • Your firm produced the previous printing of this publication, requiring the exact number of pages and cover, without this deviation to the binding specifications. • Saddle stitched pamphlets with binding stubs is [sic] not an acceptable trade practice.22 R4 File, Tab F, at 1-2. See Tr. 106-07, 121, 124-25, 128. See also RPTC, at 5, n. 4. Accordingly, the Contracting Officer told the Appellant that the order was rejectable for finishing defects,23 and that the contract would be terminated pursuant to the "Default" clause in the agreement. R4 File, Tab F, at 2. See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 20 (Default). 13. Subsequent discussions between the parties resulted in the Appellant's offer to reprint the Student Guide, while at the same time preserving its right to appeal the rejection decision. R4 File, Tab I. Therefore, on July 15, 1994, the Contracting Officer rescinded the termination for default, and allowed the Contractor to reprint the order in its entirety with a promised shipping date of August 5, 1994. R4 File, Tab H. The record discloses that in reprinting the Student Guide, the Appellant returned to the web press configuration which it had used for the previous year's edition-a 24-pager and a 4-page-and produced a stubless product.24 Tr. 214-15. 14. By letter dated July 29, 1994, the Appellant timely appealed the Contracting Officer's final decision rejecting the initial order of the Student Guide to the Board.25 R4 File, Tab L. III. ISSUES PRESENTED From the discussions during the prehearing conference, the Board concluded that four issues were involved in this case.26 RPTC, at 7. However, after further development of the record by the parties, the Board believes that their dispute boils down to the following questions: 1. Is the "BINDING" specification in the contract vague or ambiguous with respect to the use of binding stubs in the production of the Student Guide, and if so, was the ambiguity patent or latent? Stated otherwise, could the Appellant reasonably interpret the absence of language in the "BINDING" specification expressly prohibiting the use of binding lips to mean that a pamphlet with such stubs conformed to the contract, thus entitling it to the benefit of the doctrine of contra proferentem, or is that interpretation inconsistent with QATAP, trade practice and/or an established prior course of dealings between the parties which governed whether or not binding stubs were acceptable in "saddle-stitched" publications such as the Student Guide? 2. Assuming that the contract was not ambiguous, did the Contracting Officer properly exercise his discretion in rejecting the original printing of the Student Guide under the provisions of QATAP and GPO Contract Terms because the pamphlets contained two binding stubs, or was he in error because he applied standards which had no contractual basis? Stated otherwise, was the Contracting Officer's decision reasonable and proper under the circumstances, or was it arbitrary and capricious? 3. If the Contracting Officer erroneously rejected the original version of the Student Guide, is the Contractor entitled to the full amount of its claim for reprinting ($104,427.00), or is some lesser amount appropriate? Specifically, is so much of the Appellant's claim seeking reimbursement for its increased paper and manufacturing costs in reprinting the Student Guide ($15,726.00), properly before the Board? IV. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES A. The Appellant In this case, the Appellant seeks to recover a total of $104,427.00 from the Government on two claims: (1) $88,701.00 for the erroneous rejection of the original printing of the Student Guide; and (2) $15,726.00 in increased paper and manufacturing costs incurred in reprinting the pamphlet. See App. Brf., at 11; App. R. Brf., at 8; RPTC, at 5-6; Complaint, dated September 9, 1994, at 2. The Contractor advances four arguments in support of its claims. First, the Appellant contends that while the Contracting Officer rejected the Student Guide because it contained binding stubs, the contract itself failed to provide any specific or objective criteria regarding the use of such a finishing method. App. Brf., at 5-6 (citing Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra; Wornick Family Foods Co., ASBCA Nos. 41317, 41318, 41319, 94-2 BCA ¶ 26,808; Shirley Contracting Corp. and ATEC Contracting Corp., ENGBCA No. 4650, 85-3 BCA ¶ 18,214); App. R. Brf., at 3; RPTC, at 6. The Contractor believes that the absence of such standards is fatal to the Government's position that the rejection of the product was justified. App. Brf., at 6 (citing Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra); App. R. Brf., at 3. Second, the Appellant says that a reasonable interpretation of the express language of the contract itself warrants the conclusion that the use of binding stubs was not prohibited. App. Brf., at 7-8 (citing Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra; Web Business Forms, Inc., GPO BCA 16-89 (September 30, 1994), 1994 WL 837423; McDonald & Eudy Printers, GPO BCA 25-92 (April 11, 1994), 1994 WL 275093). In essence, the Contractor contends that an examination of the contract, including QATAP and GPO Contract Terms, discloses nothing therein, one way or another, about the use of binding lips. App. Brf., at 7; App. R. Brf., at 3. Therefore, the meaning ascribed by the Government to much of the Quality Level III standards which state that finished work at that level must be of "above average . . . appearance, " see QATAP Manual, at viii, namely that it ipso facto precludes binding stubs, has no contractual basis whatsoever.27 App. Brf., at 7; App. R. Brf., at 3. Furthermore, assuming arguendo that the language in question was ambiguous, the Appellant asserts that any such ambiguity would be latent not patent. App. Brf., at 8. Besides, the Contractor believes that in light of its experience in printing products with binding stubs for GPO "on numerous prior occasions" in the past, e.g., the 1993 "S" Corporation Tax Package (App. Exh. Nos. 1 and 2), its interpretation of the contract was reasonable in this case. App. Brf., at 8 (citing Ceccanti, Inc. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 526 (1984); Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra; Web Business Forms, Inc., supra); App. R. Brf., at 7; RPTC, at 6. Therefore, the Contractor urges the Board to resolve the ambiguity issue in its favor. App. Brf., at 8; RPTC, at 6. Third, the Appellant disagrees with the Respondent that it did not produce a "saddle-stitched" pamphlet, as required by the specifications. App. Brf., at 9. The Contractor generally concurs with the Respondent's view that the traditional definition of "saddle-stitching" means placing a wire staple through the centerfold of a signature or pamphlet.28 Id.; App. R. Brf., at 3-4. Furthermore, there seems to be no dispute that the term "signature" refers to a folded sheet of printed paper divisible by multiples of four.29 However, the Appellant insists that the way it produced the Student Guide, namely as a single 28-page signature (using a 16-page full web and a 12-page 2/4 web simultaneously on its 36 inch web press) does not violate these precepts,30 since the wire stitches were, in fact, placed in the center of the signature. App. Brf., at 9. Thus, the Contractor believes that the pamphlet, as originally manufactured, satisfies the definition of a "saddle-stitched" publication, as that term is understood in the industry.31 App. Brf., at 9. Furthermore, the Appellant asserts that while the Respondent may have either intended or assumed that the Student Guide it ordered would not be delivered with binding stubs, the simple fact is that no such restriction was contained in the specifications. Id. Moreover, the Contractor observes that GPO tells bidders in other contracts that binding stubs are not allowed by including language in the specifications expressly stating that saddle-stitched publications must have 4-page signatures and no bindings stubs or lips. App. Brf., at 10; App. R. Brf., at 4; RPTC, at 6. The Appellant contends that since the disputed contract contained no such prohibitionary language, it was allowed to use stub binding, especially as it seems excluding such lips is a special feature of certain jobs, and not a general proscription for all saddle- stitched publications.32 App. Brf., at 10; App. R. Brf., at 7-8 (citing RD Printing Associates, Inc., GPO BCA 2-92 (December 16, 1992), 1992 WL 516088; Gresham & Co., Inc. v. United States, 200 Ct. Cl. 97, 470 F.2d 542 (1972)); RPTC, at 6. Thus, the Contractor submits that the Respondent is bound by its past interpretation of these other contracts.33 App. Brf., at 10; App. R. Brf., at 7. Finally, the Appellant alleges that the Respondent erroneously applied the provisions of QATAP in rejecting the original printing of the Student Guide. App. Brf., at 10; App. R. Brf., at 3. In the Contractor's opinion, the Contracting Officer misapplied finishing attribute F-1 (Trim Size) by measuring the individual stub, which he viewed as analogous to a "page," instead of evaluating the entire pamphlet, as required by QATAP. App. Brf., at 10 (citing QATAP, at 27); App. R. Brf., at 3. Furthermore, the Appellant asserts that the Government's logic is doubly flawed for the simple reason that binding stubs are not "pages," which the Contracting Officer conceded at the hearing. App. Brf., at 10 (citing QATAP, at 27); App. R. Brf., at 3. See Tr. 107. In essence, the Contractor believes that the Contracting Officer evoked finishing attribute F-1 as an afterthought in order to reject the Student Guide-a product which met the contract specifications in all other respects. App. Brf., at 10-11. Accordingly, the Appellant asserts that the Respondent erroneously rejected the pamphlet, and therefore, it is entitled to compensation of $104,427.00, as claimed. App. Brf., at 11; App. R. Brf., at 8; RPTC, at 6. B. The Respondent The Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Contractor's claim is without merit because the Contracting Officer properly rejected the original Student Guide. R. Brf., at 20; RPTC, at 6. The Government contends that the first Student Guide was a nonconforming product when measured against the contract's QATAP standards and the supplemental specifications set forth in GPO Contract Terms. R. Brf., at 6-13. With respect to QATAP, GPO says that the pamphlet fails to measure up in at least two ways: (1) the binding stubs are a major deviation from the acceptable trim tolerance for Quality Level III products (1/8" or 3.2 mm) warranting rejection under finishing attribute F-1 (Trim Size), see R. Brf., at 7 (citing QATAP Manual, at 27-28); and (2) the lips are tantamount to extra blank pages (which means that the booklet has four blanks instead of just the two required), which is a defect covered by finishing attribute F-15 (Blank Pages- Other Than Specified), see R. Brf., at 8 (citing QATAP Manual, at 44).34 See also R. R. Brf., at 2. Apart from the "minimal standards" contained in QATAP, the Respondent asserts that the supplemental specification concerning quality in GPO Contract Terms, which provides that "[p]rinting and binding shall be held to a high standard of imposition; makeready; press running; clear, sharp printing; binding; and good quality in every respect," provides an independent basis for rejection. R. Brf., at 9 (citing B. P. Printing & Office Supplies, GPO BCA 22-91 (February 5, 1993), 1993 WL 311371; GPO Contract Terms, Supplemental Specifications, ¶ 1.(b)(1) (General: Quality); R. R. Brf., at 2. In the Government's view, this supplemental provision "engrafts" the industry's "high standard" for printing and binding onto the contract, and those norms "do not allow the use of binding stubs to affix individual leaves in a saddle- stitched publication."35 R. Brf., at 9-13; R. R. Brf., at 3. Therefore, GPO concludes that since the original Student Guide did not meet these high industry standards rejection of the product was justified. R. Brf., at 13; R. R. Brf., at 3. The Respondent's second argument is rooted in "black letter" law which says that the Government is entitled to strict compliance with its contract specifications, including those of fixed-price supply contracts.36 R. Brf., at 13-14 (citing American Electric Contracting Corp. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl. 338, 579 F.2d 602 (1978); Red Circle Corp. v. United States, 185 Ct. Cl. 1, 398 F.2d 836 (1968); Jefferson Construction Co. v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl. 75 (1960); Dependable Printing Co., Inc., supra). One purpose of the rule is to protect the integrity of the bidding system by discouraging low bids based on an intention to provide products of lesser quality.37 R. Brf., at 14 (citing Ideal Restaurant Supply Co., VACAB No. 570, 67-1 BCA ¶ 6,237). Under this principle, whenever a contractor delivers nonconforming supplies, the Government, at its discretion, can either accept the work at a reduced price or reject it. R. Brf., at 14 (citing Stephenson, Inc., GPO BCA 02-88 (December 20, 1991), 1991 WL 439274; Famous Model Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 12526, 68-1 BCA ¶ 6902). Furthermore, the Government cannot be forced to accept nonconforming products at a reduced price, even if the defects are relatively minor. R. Brf., at 14 (citing Stephenson, Inc., supra; Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., ASBCA No. 8974, 1963 BCA ¶ 3937). Conversely, a contractor cannot compel the Government to accept substituted products, even if the substitutes are superior; i.e., the Government is entitled to receive exactly what it asked for. R. Brf., at 15 (citing Fry Communications, Inc., supra; Copigraph, Inc., GPO BCA 20-86 (May 25, 1989), 1989 WL 385174; Vogard Printing, GPOCAB 7-84 (January 7, 1986)).38 The Respondent states that in this case the Contracting Officer, after considering all factors including the purpose of the product and the needs of the customer agency,39 properly rejected the original Student Guide and ordered a reprint, and the exercise of his discretion was reasonable under the circumstances. R. Brf., at 15 (citing QATAP, at 2). Moreover, the Government asserts that while the Contracting Officer's decision is presumptively subjective, because his determination was contractually authorized the Board may not substitute its judgment for his. R. Brf., at 16 (citing Stephenson, Inc., supra; Stabbe Senter Press, supra; Fry Communications, Inc., GPO BCA 22-84 (February 20, 1986) (hereinafter Fry II), 1986 WL 181462; Monarch Enterprises, Inc., ASBCA No. 31375, 86-3 BCA ¶ 19,227; John T. Brady & Co., VACAB No. 1300, 84-1 BCA ¶ 16,925; Thomas W. Yoder Co., Inc., VACAB No. 997, 74-1 BCA ¶ 10,424; Henry C. Beck Co., VACAB No. 523, 66-1 BCA ¶ 5323). Instead, the Board's review is limited to judging whether or not the Contracting Officer's action was unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and in the absence of a "gross error" his decision should be affirmed. R. Brf., at 16 (citing Squirrel Creek Associates v. United States, 11 Ct. Cl. 212 (1986); John T. Brady & Co., supra; Cleveland Electric Co. of South Carolina, VACAB No. 556, 67-1 BCA ¶ 6293). Additionally, the Respondent contends that the burden of proving an abuse of discretion by the Contracting Officer was on the Appellant, since good faith on the part of the Government is always presumed. R. Brf., at 17 (citing Torncello v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 20, 681 F.2d 756 (1982); Solis Enterprises, Inc., VACAB No. 1576, 84-3 BCA ¶ 17,606). GPO states that the Contractor has not provided such evidence or met its burden, and therefore, the Contracting Officer should be sustained. R. Brf., at 17. Finally, the Respondent asserts that the Appellant has not proved its allegation that GPO has a past practice of accepting publications with binding stubs; rather, the evidence shows just the opposite; i.e., the agency's past practice was not to accept products with such lips. R. Brf., at 18; R. R. Brf., at 3. GPO agrees that a prior course of dealings between the parties in earlier contracts is relevant to interpreting their current agreement. R. Brf., at 18 (citing RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra; Gresham & Co., Inc. v. United States, supra; L.W. Foster Sportswear Co. v. United States, 186 Ct. Cl. 499, 405 F.2d 1285 (1969); Coastal States Petroleum Co., ASBCA No. 31059, 88-1 BCA ¶ 20,468). However, the Government believes that the single item proffered by the Appellant to prove GPO's binding stub practice- the 1993 "S" Corporation Tax Package produced for the IRS under Jacket No. 345-048-is inadequate to prove that the agency had a general policy of accepting stub binding.40 R. Brf., at 18 (citing App. Exh. No. 2). On the other hand, the Respondent states that it is entitled to the benefit of the rule of construction which says that the meaning which the parties gave, either by word or action, to the terms of a similar, previously performed contract, is presumed to apply to those same terms in later agreements, all other things being equal.41 R. Brf., at 19 (citing Cresswell v. United States, 146 Ct. Cl. 119, 173 F.Supp. 805 (1959); Benning Aviation Corp.,ASBCA No. 19850, 75-2 BCA ¶ 11,355; Dynaport Electronics, Inc., ASBCA No. 17895, 73-2 BCA ¶ 10,324). Since the Appellant, just a year earlier, had printed the previous version of the Student Guide without binding stubs, the Contracting Officer could rely on that past performance in concluding that the disputed pamphlet was unacceptable. R. Brf., at 19-20 (citing Gov. Exh. No. 4); R. R. Brf., at 4-5. Accordingly, the Respondent submits that the Contractor's claims are without merit, and the Contracting Officer's decision should be sustained. R. Brf., at 20; R. R. Brf., at 5; RPTC, at 6. V. DISCUSSION42 From the detailed and well-reasoned briefs of the parties one might think that this appeal involves complex issues of fact and law. In reality, however, this is a very simple case. Basically, all that is involved here are two parties to consecutive contracts for the same pamphlet, and with the same terms and conditions, where the Government received two different looking products. Specifically, under the first contract, which is not in dispute, the Appellant configured its presses to manufacture a stub-free booklet, while it used another press configuration for the second agreement-the one at issue-and produced a pamphlet containing two binding lips; otherwise, the two products were exactly the same. The Respondent, which had accepted the first pamphlet, rejected the second on the ground that the binding stubs violated the contract's quality assurance standards. Therefore, the two issues confronting the Board are simply these: (1) is there anything either in the specifications or in the applicable rules of law, which requires the Appellant to produce a stub-free pamphlet (by adhering to a specific method of production) from contract-to-contract; and (2) if there are restrictions on the use binding lips in the Student Guide, what are the quality assurance standards against which the product can be measured, and where are they? In short, the two questions relate to matters of contract ambiguity and arbitrary conduct, the first by the parties offering different interpretations of the "BINDING" specification, and the second by the Appellant's contention that the Contracting Officer's evaluation and subsequent rejection of its product was not based on any standard in the "BINDING" clause or elsewhere in the contract. Each of these questions will be answered seriatim. A. The "BINDING" specification at issue is clearly vague and ambiguous regarding the use of binding stubs in the production of the Student Guide. Furthermore, the evidence on the prevailing trade practice concerning the use of binding stubs in saddle- stitched publications is conflicting and insufficient, and of little probative value as a guide to interpreting the contract. Similarly, it cannot be said on this record that an established prior course of dealings exists with respect to binding the Student Guide. Moreover, the ambiguity is latent, not patent. Therefore, under the doctrine of contra proferentem the Appellant is entitled to recover on its claim. Finally, recovery is also possible under the doctrine of constructive change, since the Appellant's "single signature" press configuration is not unreasonable under the circumstances. Weighing the propriety of a contracting officer's determination that a product procured for the Government failed to meet the quality standards of the contract and hence was rejectable-the Board's central task in this appeal-is not unique or novel. Indeed, the Board has observed that "QATAP questions are among the most common issues presented to the Board for resolution." See McDonald & Eudy II, supra, slip op. at 17. On the other hand, this case does present a factual matter of first impression with respect to the application of QATAP, namely, whether finishing attribute F-1 (Trim Size) supports the rejection of an otherwise conforming product because the contractor chose a production method which resulted in two binding stubs, even though there is no express prohibition against such lips in the contract specifications themselves.43 However, while the Board is in uncharted waters, the legal principles which provide the "philosophical compass for navigating a way through the shoals of this . . . dispute," see Banta Co., GPO BCA 03-91 (November 15, 1993), slip op. at 25, 1993 WL 526843, are well-known and, for the most part, have been adequately briefed by the parties. The ambiguity issue in this appeal centers on the contract's "BINDING" specification. The Appellant argues that the Respondent's failure to use language in the "BINDING" specification prohibiting binding stubs, similar to the phraseology employed to proscribe such lips in other GPO contracts, e.g., Programs A814-M and C181, means that the first printing of the Student Guide was not rejectable simply because it had them; i.e., the Government's silence constitutes its consent to a pamphlet with binding stubs. App. Brf., at 7-8, 10; App. R. Brf., at 3; RPTC, at 6. The Respondent, on the other hand, tacitly admits that the "BINDING" specification looks ambiguous, on its face, but says that when properly viewed against other provisions of the contract, trade practice, and the prior dealings between the parties, any ambiguity fades away, leaving just one possible interpretation-the agreement called for a Student Guide without any binding stubs whatsoever. R. Brf., at 6-13, 18-19; R. R. Brf., at 2-5. Since the parties have drawn different meanings from the disputed specification, the Board must decide which of the two conflicting interpretations is correct, or whether both readings may be reasonably derived from the contract terms; in other words, is the contract ambiguous?44 See MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 42; The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 40-41; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 47; Web Business Forms, Inc., GPO BCA 16-89 (September 30, 1994) slip op. at 17, 1994 WL 837423; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, slip op. at 41, fn. 22; General Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 16. Resolving an ambiguity is a question of contract interpretation, and in such cases the Board confines itself to the "four corners" of the contract. See MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 42; The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 41; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 46; Web Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 17; Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 26, n. 27; RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra, slip op. at 9, 13, ns. 9 and 15. Furthermore, the basic rules followed by the Board in these sorts of cases are well- known. They have been enunciated by the Board numerous times, most recently in MPE Business Forms, Inc.: First, two different interpretations of the same contract language raise the possibility that the specifications may be ambiguous. See McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., supra, slip op. at 13; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., GPO BCA 31-90 (February 6, 1992), slip op. at 41, 1992 WL 487874, aff'd, Civil Action No. 92-128C (Cl. Ct. October 2, 1992). Second, contractual language is ambiguous if it will sustain more than one reasonable interpretation. [Footnote omitted.] See The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 41; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 47; Webb Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 17; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, slip op. at 41, fn. 22; General Business Forms, Inc., GPO BCA 2-84 (December 3, 1985), slip op. at 16, 1985 WL 154846. See also Neal & Co. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 463, 471 (1990), aff'd 945 F.2d 385 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Edward R. Marden Corp. v. United States, 803 F.2d 701, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 358, 372 (1968). Third, in analyzing disputed contract language, the courts and contract appeals boards place themselves in the shoes of a reasonably prudent contractor, and give the language of the contract that meaning which a reasonably intelligent contractor acquainted with the circumstances surrounding the contract would give it. See The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 41-42; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 47; McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., supra, slip op. at 14; General Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 18 (citing, Salem Engineering and Construction Corp. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 803, 806 (1983)). See also Norcoast Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 196 Ct. Cl. 1, 9, 448 F.2d 1400, 1404 (1971); Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. United States, 195 Ct. Cl. 21, 30, 444 F.2d 547, 551 (1971). A dispute over contract language is not resolved simply by a decision that an ambiguity exists-it is also necessary to determine whether the ambiguity is latent or patent. Courts will find a latent ambiguity where the disputed language, without more, admits of two different reasonable interpretations. See Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 497, 503 (1991) (citing Edward R. Marden Corporation v. United States, supra, 803 F.2d at 705); The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 42; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 48; Web Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 18; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, slip op. at 41, fn. 22. In such cases, the doctrine of contra proferentem applies and the dispute language will be construed against the drafter, see Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, supra, 22 Cl. Ct. at 503 (citing William F. Klingensmith, Inc. v. United States, 205 Ct. Cl. 651, 657 (1974)); The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 42, fn. 33; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 48, fn. 64; Web Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 18, fn. 18; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, slip op. at 41, fn. 22, if the non-drafter can show that he/she relied on the alternative reasonable interpretation in submitting his/her bid, see Fry Communications, Inc./ InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, supra, 22 Cl. Ct. at 510 (citing Fruin-Colon Corp. v. United States, 912 F.2d 1426, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Lear Siegler Management Services v. United States, 867 F.2d 600, 603 (Fed. Cir. 1989)); Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 48, fn. 64; Web Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 19, fn. 18. On the other hand, a patent ambiguity would exist if the contract language contained a gross discrepancy, an obvious error in drafting, or a glaring gap, as seen through the eyes of a "reasonable man" on an ad hoc basis. See Fry Communications, Inc./ InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, supra, 22 Cl. Ct. at 504 (citing Max Drill, Inc. v. United States, 192 Ct. Cl. 608, 626, 427 F.2d 1233 (1967); WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 1, 6, 323 F.2d 874 (1963)); The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 42-43; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 48; Webb Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 19; General Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 17 (citing Enrico Roman, Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 104, 106 (1983)). Where there are such discrepancies, errors, or gaps, the contractor has an affirmative obligation to ask the contracting officer to clarify the true meaning of the contract language before submitting its bid. See Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, supra, 22 Cl. Ct. at 504 (citing Newsom v. United States, supra, 230 Ct. Cl. at 303); The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 43, fn. 34; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 48-49, fn. 65. See also Interstate General Government Contractors, Inc. v. Stone, 980 F.2d 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Enrico Roman, Inc. v. United States, supra, 2 Cl. Ct. at 106; S.O.G. of Arkansas v. United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 125, 546 F.2d 367 (1976); Beacon Construction v. United States, 314 F.2d 501 (Ct. Cl. 1963)); Universal Construction Co., NASA BCA No. 83-1092, 93-3 BCA ¶ 26,173; Harwood Construction Co., NASA BCA No. 1165-45, 68-1 BCA ¶ 6768. However, the rules governing ambiguous contract language come into play only if the meaning of the disputed terms are not susceptible to interpretation through the usual rules of contract construction. See The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 43; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 49; Webb Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 19; McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., supra, slip op. at 16; Shepard II, supra, slip op. at 19; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, slip op. at 42. The most basic principle of contract construction is that the document should be interpreted as a whole. [Footnote omitted.] See Hol-Gar Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 384, 388, 351 F.2d 972, 975 (1965); The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 43; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 49; Webb Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 19-20; General Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 16. Hence, all provisions of a contract should be given effect and no provision is to be rendered meaningless. See The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 43-44; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 49-50; Webb Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 20; General Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 16 (citing, Raytheon Co. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 763 (1983)). See also Pacificorp Capital, Inc. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 707, 716 (1992), aff'd 988 F.2d 130 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Avedon Corp. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 771, 776 (1988); Fortec Constructors v. United States, 760 F.2d 1288, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 1985); United States v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 713 F.2d 1541, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Jamsar, Inc. v. United States, 442 F.2d 930 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Martin Lane Co. v. United States, 193 Ct. Cl. 203, 215, 432 F.2d 1013, 1019 (1970); Grace Industries, Inc., ASBCA No. 33553, 87-3 BCA ¶ 20,171. In other words, a contract should be interpreted in a manner which gives meaning to all of its parts and in such a fashion that the provisions do not conflict with each other, if this is reasonably possible. See The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 44; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 50; Webb Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 20. Accord Granite Construction Co. v. United States, 962 F.2d 998 (Fed. Cir. 1992); B. D. Click Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 748 (Ct. Cl. 1980). That is, an interpretation which gives a reasonable meaning to all parts of a contract will be preferred to one which leaves a portion of it "useless, inexplicable, inoperative, void, insignificant, meaningless, superfluous, or achieves a weird and whimsical result." See The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 44-45 (citing Gould, Inc. v. United States, 935 F.2d 1271, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1991), quoting Arizona v. United States, 216 Ct. Cl. 221, 235-36, 575 F.2d 855, 863 (1978)); Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 50-51. See also ITT Arctic Service, Inc. v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 743, 524 F.2d 680, 684 (1975) (contract interpretation should be "without twisted or strained out of context [and without] regard to the subjective unexpressed intent of one of the parties. . ."). An interpretation that effectively deletes a major portion of the contract cannot and will not be sanctioned. See Avedon Corp. v. United States, supra, 15 Cl. Ct. at 776 (citing W.G. Cornell Co. v. United States, 179 Ct. Cl. 651, 666-67, 376 F.2d 299, 309 (1967)). See MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. 42-47. [Original emphasis.] See also Graphic Communications, Inc., GPOCAB 5-83 (October 25, 1983), slip op. at 5, 1983 WL 160718 (citing WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, supra; Western Contracting Corp. v. United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 318 (1958)). Apart from these overarching principles, there are several specific rules of contract construction which apply when interpreting an agreement, one of which-"trade usage"-is particularly relevant here.45 First, within the contract itself, it is well-established that where the provisions of a contract are phrased in clear and unambiguous language, "the words of those provisions must be given their plain and ordinary meaning by the court in defining the rights and obligations of the parties. . . ." See MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. 47 (citing The George Hyman Construction Co. v. United States, 832 F.2d 574, 579 (Fed. Cir. 1987), (quoting Elden v. United States, 617 F.2d 254, 260-61 (Ct. Cl. 1980), aff'g, The George Hyman Construction Co., GSBCA No. 7913, 86-3 BCA ¶ 19,200; Julius Goldman's Egg City v. United States, 697 F.2d 1051, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814, 104 S.Ct. 68, 78 L.Ed.2d 83 (1983); American Science and Engineering, Inc. v. United States, 663 F.2d 82, 88 (Ct. Cl. 1981)); The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 44, n. 36; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 50, n. 67. Similarly, technical terms are given their technical meaning. See MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. 47 (citing Coastal Drydock and Repair Corp., ASBCA No. 31894, 87-1 BCA ¶ 19,618; Industrial Finishers, Inc., ASBCA No. 6537, 61-1 BCA ¶ 3,091); The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 44, n. 36; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 50, n. 67. Likewise, terms special to Government contracts will be given their technical meanings. See MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. 47 (citing General Builders Supply Co. v. United States, 187 Ct. Cl. 477, 409 F.2d 246 (1969) (meaning of "equitable adjustment"); The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 44, n. 36; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 50, n. 67. As for extrinsic evidence of the intent of the parties, the rules of construction allow, inter alia, custom and trade usage to explain undefined terms. See MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. 47-48 (citing Moore v. United States, 196 U.S. 157, 166, 25 S.Ct. 202, 203-04, 49 L.Ed. 428 (1905); Haehn Management Co. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 50, 59 (1988); Northwestern Industrial Piping, Inc. v. United States, 199 Ct. Cl. 540, 550-51, 467 F.2d 1308, 1314 (1972); W.G. Cornell Co. v. United States, supra; Harold Bailey Painting Co., ASBCA No. 27064, 87-1 BCA ¶ 19,601 (definition of "spot painting")); The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 44, n. 36; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 50, n. 67. However, custom and trade usage may not contradict plain contractual language, or clear and unambiguous terms. See MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. 48 (citing Avedon Corp. v. United States, supra, 15 Cl. Ct. at 778; The George Hyman Construction Co. v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 70, 81, 564 F.2d 939, 945 (1977)); WRB Corp. v. United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 409, 436 (1968)); The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 44, n. 36; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 50, n. 67. See also R.B. Wright Construction Co. v. United States, 919 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Chevron U.S.A., Inc., ASBCA No. 32323, 90-1 BCA ¶ 22,602, at 113,426 ("Since the term ["FOB destination"] was clear in the contract and defined by [the] FAR, there is no need to resort to trade custom or practice at all." Citing Sea-Land Service, 553 F.2d 651 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978)). 1. The Disputed "BINDING" Specification Curiously, what divides the parties in this case, unlike similar appeals considered by the Board in the past, is not what the disputed specification actually states, but rather what it does not say. In that regard, the provision at issue simply provides: BINDING: Score covers and fold with grain parallel to spine. Separate covers wraparound. Saddle wire stitch in two places along 216 mm (8-1/2") bind. Trim 3 sides. R4 File, Tab A, at 4. A glance at the previous contract for the Student Guide discloses that with one minor technical change (the disputed contract sets forth bind length in both millimeters and inches, while the prior agreement expresses the length in inches only), the "BINDING" specification in both contracts is exactly the same. See Gov. Exh. No. 4, at 4. Because the Respondent is insisting on strict compliance with the specifications, the Board believes that it is important to take a close look at the "BINDING" specification and understand exactly what kind of provision we are dealing with; i.e., is it a "design" or a "performance" specification? See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 56 (citing Aleutian Constructors v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 372 (1992)). The law makes a clear distinction between "design" and "performance" specifications in determining the respective rights and obligations of the parties to a Government contract. Generally, design specifications explicitly state how the contract is to be performed and permit no deviations, while performance specifications focus on the results to be obtained, and leave it to the contractor to determine how to achieve that objective. See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 57 (citing Neal & Co. v. United States, supra; Stuyvesant Dredging Co. v. United States, 834 F.2d 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1990); J.L. Simmons Co., Inc. v. United States, 188 Ct. Cl. 684, 412 F.2d 1360 (1969)). As the Board has explained: [There are] DESIGN specifications which set forth precise measurements, tolerances, materials, in process and finished product tests, quality control, inspection requirement, and other specific information. Under this type specification, the Government is responsible for design and related omissions, errors, and deficiencies in the specifications and drawings. PERFORMANCE specifications set forth operational characteristics desired for the item. In such specifications, design, measurements and other specific details are not stated or considered important so long as the performance requirement is met. Where an item is purchased by a performance specification, the contractor accepts general responsibility for design, engineering, and achievement of the stated performance requirements. The contractor has general discretion and election as to detail but the work is subject to the Government's reserved right of final inspection and approval or rejection. See Colorgraphics Corp., GPO BCA 16-87 (March 31, 1989), slip op. at 23, 1989 WL 384970 (quoting Monitor Plastics Co., ASBCA No. 14447, 72-2 ¶ 9,626 (1972)). [Original emphasis.] See also Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 57. This distinction is important because, while the Government is entitled to performance in strict compliance with design specifications, performance specifications are not as rigidly enforced since the contractor is expected to exercise his ingenuity and select the means for achieving the standard of performance required. Id., slip op. at 58 (citing Centre Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 115, 392 F.2d 229 (1968); J.D. Hedin Construction Co. v. United States, 171 Ct. Cl. 70, 347 F.2d 235 (1965), Carmon Construction, Inc., GSBCA No 11227, 92-2 BCA ¶ 25,001; Falcon Jet Corp., DOT CAB 78-32, 82-1 BCA ¶ 15,477; R&M Mechanical Contractors, Inc., DOT CAB [No.] 75-51, 76-2 BCA ¶ 12,084; Santa Fe Engineers, Inc., ASBCA [No.] 22950, 79-2 BCA ¶ 14,084). The "BINDING" provision in this case is a pure design specification. The four sentences which comprise the specification-"Score covers and fold with grain parallel to spine[.]," "Separate covers wraparound[.]," "Saddle wire stitch in two places along 216 mm (8-1/2") bind[.]," and "Trim 3 sides[.]"-are wholly design in nature and totally the Government's responsibility; i.e., nothing in those requirements give the Appellant any discretion in performance. See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 59 (citing Neal & Co. v. United States, supra, 19 Cl. Ct. at 468; Falcon Jet Corp., supra, 82-1 BCA at 76,691). Accord Big Chief Drilling Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1276, 1294 (1992) ("Design specifications set forth in detail the materials to be employed and the manner in which the work is to be performed, and the contractor is 'required to follow them as one would a road map.' [Citation omitted.] Whereas, performance specifications simply set forth an objective or end result to be achieved, and the contractor may select the means of accomplishing the task. [Citation omitted.]"). It is undisputed that the Contractor followed and completely satisfied all of these specification requirements in the original printing of Student Guide. Therefore, if the Appellant delivered a pamphlet which MEPCOM found "visually offensive" because it had two binding stubs, the fault is the Respondent's for failing to include language in the "BINDING" specification telling the contractor that binding lips would not be allowed. GPO could not shift the blame to the Appellant because, as previously indicated, the Government is wholly responsible for "related omissions" in design specifications. See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 57; Colorgraphics Corp., supra, slip op. at 23. Consequently, since the only requirement placed on the Contractor is to show that its interpretation of the "BINDING" specification, standing alone, is reasonable, it would seem that it has crossed that threshold to recovery in this case.46 See MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 42; The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 41; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 47; Webb Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 17; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, slip op. at 41, n. 22; General Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 16. See also Great Lakes Lithograph Co., GPO BCA 18-84 (May 22, 1985), slip op. at 27-28, 1985 WL 154849 ("[W]here one contractor has misread the intentions of the specifications to permit production by using only one set of lithographs and the Government has itself determined that two sets are necessary, and the specifications are ambiguous in such regard, we believe the Government has an affirmative duty to spell out the limitation or method of production in unequivocal terms; i.e., by saying in plain English, 24 color separations rather than by merely pointing out problems in dot gain and two types of stock."); Electronic Composition, Inc., [GPOCAB] (December 22, 1978), slip op. 29-30, 1978 WL 22339 (". . . [I]n interpreting contracts, the intent of the parties which is not expressed in the contract specifications, cannot create an obligation on the part of the contractor to comply with such intent." Citing John C. Kohler Co. v. United States, 204 Ct. Cl. 777, 787, 498 F.2d 1360 (1974); Dana Corp. v. United States, 200 Ct. Cl. 200, 214, 470 F.2d 1032 (1972); Elgin National Watch Co., ASBCA Nos. 10421, 10589, 10698, 10730, 11721, 67-2 BCA ¶ 6400). 2. Trade Practice However, it is not enough to simply look at the "BINDING" specification in isolation. The Board's obligation is to interpret the contract as a whole and give meaning to all of its parts, if at all possible without causing a clash between the provisions of the agreement. See MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 45-46; The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 43-44; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 49-50; Webb Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 19-20. Accord Granite Construction Co. v. United States, supra; B. D. Click Co. v. United States, supra; Hol-Gar Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, supra. In that regard, setting aside for the moment the parties' disagreement about the relationship between the "BINDING" specification and QATAP, discussed infra, the Respondent, who concedes the provision's silence on the matter of binding stubs creates the appearance of an ambiguity, says that its four sentences cannot be read without also considering: (1) the meaning of a "saddle-stitched" publication within the printing industry; and (2) the "prior course of dealings" between the parties on the predecessor contract. The Government asserts that when those two factors are taken into account, the contract clearly and unambiguously tells the Appellant to produce a stubless Student Guide. As a matter of fact, both parties claim the benefit of the so-called "trade practice" and "prior course of dealings" doctrines in this case, especially since the contract itself does not define the critical term "saddle- stitching." Cf. MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 54. Accord Harold Bailey Painting Co., supra. The Board has long recognized that as an interpretative device custom and trade usage is not only a valuable tool for explaining undefined terms in an agreement, see e.g., MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 54 (citing Haehn Management Company v. United States, supra; Northwestern Industrial Piping, Inc. v. United States, supra; W.G. Cornell Co. v. United States, supra); The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 44, n. 36; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 50, n. 67, but is also useful in analyzing the reasonableness of the parties' respective positions, id. (citing Avedon Corp. v. United States, supra). It is also well-settled that evidence of trade usage or practice may be used to either expand or narrow the scope of a contractor's obligation beyond the literal meaning of the contract language. See Hoffman Construction Co., DOT BCA No. 2150, 93-2 BCA ¶ 25,803, at 128,423 (citing Anthony P. Miller, Inc. v. United States, 191 Ct. Cl. 292, 422 F.2d 1344, 1352 (1970); Stoeckert v. United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 152, 391 F.2d 639, 647 (1968); Gholson Byars & Holmes Construction Co. v. United States, supra, 351 F.2d at 999-1000). The basis for that rule is that parties draw their agreement in light of the trade customs and practices of the relevant business community. See Hoffman Construction Co., supra, at 128,423 (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 195 Ct. Cl. 21, 444 F.2d 547, 551 (1971); W.H. Edwards Corp. v. United States, 161 Ct, Cl. 322, 328 (1963)). Furthermore, the decisions tell us that ". . . [p]roving a trade practice or custom takes more than mere allegations or a single statement by one supplier. A trade custom has to be something which is well-established within a specified geographic area," see Bruce-Anderson Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 29460, 88-3 BCA ¶ 20,998, at 106,091, or "has become established to the extent it can be recognized as such" throughout the industry, see Prince Georges Center, Inc. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA No. 12289, 94-2 BCA ¶ 26,889, at 133,849 (citing Davho Co., VACAB No. 1004, 73-1 BCA ¶ 9848). Moreover, the existence of a trade practice can only be proven by instances of actual practice and not by the opinion of a witness alone. See MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. 49, n. 45 (citing Sinclair Oil Corp., EBCA No. 416-8-88, 90-1 BCA ¶ 22,462, at 112,775; Eder Electric Co., ASBCA No. 6692, 61-1 BCA ¶ 3096, aff'd sub nom. Eder Electric Co. v. United States, 205 F.Supp. 305, 306 (ED Pa 1962)). Accord Geo-Con, IBCA Nos. 2195, 2196, 89-2 BCA ¶ 21,674; Turner Construction Co., ASBCA No. 25602, 86-2 BCA ¶ 18,966. In addition, there must be "substantial evidence that the practice is well recognized," see J.A. Jones Construction Co., ENG BCA No. 4635, 85-2 BCA ¶ 17,952, at 89,945 (hereinafter Jones I) (citing WRB Corp. v. United States, supra, 183 Ct. Cl. at 444, 479; W.G. Cornell Co. v. United States, supra, 179 Ct. Cl. at 670-71; Gholson, Byars & Holmes Construction Co. v. United States, supra, 173 Ct. Cl. at 395), and be "so clear and uncontradictory and distinct so as to leave no doubt as to its nature," see Sinclair Oil Corp., supra, 90-1 BCA at 112,775 (quoting Eder Electric Co. v. United States, supra, 205 F.Supp. at 306). See also J.A. Jones Construction Co., ENG BCA No. 6164, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,482, at 136,893 (hereinafter Jones II). The Appellant's proof on this issue consists of Cooper's hearing testimony and documentary evidence-the 1993 "S" Corporation Tax Package procured for the IRS and various commercial publications from different sources-all with binding stubs. Tr. 16-21, 23-24, 30-33, 46-47; App. Exh. Nos. 1-2, 4-8.47 The Contractor believes that its evidence shows conclusively that absent an express provision in the contract prohibiting binding stubs (such as in Programs A814-M and C181), their use is perfectly acceptable in the trade for saddle-stitched pamphlets. App. Brf., at 9-10; App. R. Brf., at 3-4. Meanwhile, the Respondent has constructed its "trade practice" argument from three planks: (1) the traditional definition of "saddle-stitching" contained in three of the printing industry's standard references-BOOKBINDING, FUNDAMENTALS, and POCKET PAL- all of which speak in terms of placing wire staples through the "middle fold" or "center fold" of a pamphlet, signature, or sheet;48 (2) a 1991 memorandum, with an attachment, issued to employees of the Purchase Division, stating that "industry standards require wire stitches in the 'center of the signature'," and that henceforth "[s]addle- stitched pamphlets . . . using short pages or 'binding lips' . . . are not acceptable and shall be rejected[.]"; and (3) testimony from the Contracting Officer, and five other witnesses who were also long-time GPO employees.49 Tr. 77, 110-11, 158, 164, 170-71, 181-82, 184; Gov. Exh. No. 3; R4 File, Tab G. The Government submits that its evidence proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that where, as here, the total number of pages in a product are divisible by four, industry practice is not to use binding stubs, except for special jobs such as those with "tear out" postcards and envelopes; indeed, lips are uncommon on GPO products. R. Brf., at 10-11. In the Board's opinion, neither party has presented the requisite evidence of trade custom and practice to warrant a ruling in its favor on the issue. First, the Appellant's case is weak because Cooper's testimony about the printing industry's usage of binding stubs was too general and unspecific in nature, and was uncorroborated. See Sinclair Oil Corp., supra, 90-1 BCA at 112,775; Geo-Con, supra, 89-2 BCA at 109,000; Bruce-Anderson Co., Inc., supra, 88-3 BCA at 106,091. Second, the commercial publications employed to buttress Cooper's testimony (App. Exh. Nos. 4-8) are of little probative value because no evidence was presented establishing the contract specifications under which they were produced, and thus the exhibits have little bearing on what the Appellant was expected to provide under the disputed contract. See Edwards & Broughton Co., GPOCAB 6-84 (March 8, 1985), slip op. at 4, n. 6, 1985 WL 154876 (magazine samples). Moreover, four exhibits as functionally diverse as a college brochure and several television guides would seem to be too few, and too variable, to convey a "clear and uncontradictory and distinct" idea of the actual trade practice. See Eder Electric Co. v. United States, supra, 205 F.Supp. at 306; Sinclair Oil Corp., supra, 90-1 BCA at 112,775. Finally, as the Respondent suggests, the specifications for the 1993 "S" Corporation Tax Package are not sufficiently comparable with the requirements for the Student Guide to support a finding that the trade practice, and hence GPO's, is to allow binding stubs where no express prohibition against their use exists.50 Tr. 172-75; R. Brf., at 18-19; App. Exh. No. 2, at 9. The Respondent's proof is equally unavailing on the "trade practice" issue. First, GPO's reliance on the definitions of "saddle-stitching" in BOOKBINDING, FUNDAMENTALS, and POCKET PAL is misplaced. None of the standard references are incorporated in the contract. Thus, the Board finds the portions of BOOKBINDING, FUNDAMENTALS, and POCKET PAL submitted by the Government in R4 File, Tab G to be irrelevant and not controlling on the question concerning the meaning of the term "saddle- stitching" in the context of this contract, generally, or "[s] addle wire stitch" in the "BINDING" clause, specifically. See Olympic Graphic Systems, GPO BCA 01-92 (September 13, 1996), slip op. at 35, 1996 WL _____ (industry standard of measurement published by the Western Reprographic Association); MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 49, n. 45 (definition of "unit set" in excerpts from The Business Forms Handbook: An Illustrated Guide to Business Forms and Business Systems and the Business Forms Glossary of Design and Production Terms, two of the forms industry's standard lexicons); Industrial Printing Co., GPOCAB 7-83 (September 16, 1986), slip op. at 6, n. 3, 1986 WL 181500 (a document entitled "Policies, Ethics, Customs and Practices In the Business Forms Industry" (October 10, 1983), in a dispute involving forms burster specifications). See also Electronic Composition, Inc., supra, slip op. at 32 (where the ad hoc panel held that a proposal not incorporated into the formal specifications (albeit inadvertently), was not part of the contract. Citing Asiatic Petroleum Corp., ASBCA No. 17765, 74-2 BCA ¶ 10,833). Accord Hogan Construction, Inc., ASBCA No. 39679, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27, 428 (the board rejected as irrelevant portions of two publications submitted by the parties as evidence of industry standards for the thickness of the sand base to be used under replacement sidewalks because the contract in question did not incorporate those publications); Max J. Kuney Co., DOT BCA No. 2759, 94-3 BCA ¶ 27,245, at 135,751 (the board held that the Government could not enforce a prohibition against drilling certain holes for support brackets because it was not published in the agency's standard construction specifications, or referenced in the terms of a proposed contract, or in the subsequent supplements/modifications to the contract itself); Oakcreek Funding Corp., GSBCA No. 11244-P, 91-3 BCA ¶ 24,200 (the board dismissed a contention that the term "routine" in the context of maintaining computers meant "test software" even though there was evidence that the term was so understood in the industry, because there was no proof that it referred exclusively to software in the contract). In fact, if any source outside the contract should be referred to for the meaning of "saddle-stitch" in the context of this contract, it would seem to be GPO's Glossary of Graphic Arts Terms (December 1967) (hereinafter GPO Glossary), which defines that term as "[t]o fasten a booklet by stitching it through the spine of the pamphlet with wire." See GPO Glossary, at 13. Practically the same definition appears in the GPO Handbook, which says "saddle-stitch" means "[t]o fasten a booklet by stitching it through the spine with wire staples." See GPO Handbook, Glossary of Graphic Arts Terms, at 38. As previously mentioned, the GPO Handbook is the agency publication expressly designed for Federal agencies doing business with the Respondent's regional offices such as the CRPPO.51 Taking the meaning of "saddle-stitch" in these two publications as GPO's "official word" on the subject, it can be seen that no mention is made of stapling through the "centerfold" or "middle fold" of the pamphlet.52 However, there is no indication in the record that the Contracting Officer considered the definition of "saddle- stitch" in the GPO Handbook when he examined the Student Guide and found it defective. Second, for the same reason the Board believes that the 1991 Gardner memorandum to "Contracting Officers, Purchase Division" (Gov. Exh. No. 3) is inapposite; i.e., the memorandum's description of "industry standards" as requiring "wire stitches in the 'center of the signature'," and prohibiting "the use of short pages-or 'binding lips'-in the production of saddle- stitched pamphlets[,]" is simply not incorporated in the contract. See Olympic Graphic Systems, supra; MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra; Industrial Printing Co., supra. Furthermore, the contract at issue was not issued by the Purchase Division, and the Contracting Officer admitted that Gardner's memorandum was not binding on him since he was in the Regional Operations Office, a totally distinct GPO organization; i.e., it was supplied to him for informational purposes only. Tr. 139-40. See PPR, Chap. XIII, Sec. 1, ¶ 4.f(1) (Assistance from other Departments). Moreover, the Regional Operations Office has issued nothing similar, and the Respondent called no witnesses from that organization, other than the Contracting Officer, to testify as to whether the Regional Operations Office placed the same interpretation on the term "saddle-stitching" as the Purchase Division. Indeed, the Board cannot help but notice that when the GPO Handbook was revised in 1992, no attempt was made to incorporate the definition of "saddle-stitch" in the 1991 Gardner memorandum, because the revisors retained the same meaning for that term which GPO has consistently used since the publication of the GPO Glossary in 1967. Lastly, it also seems that taken together the GPO Handbook and GPO Glossary undermine the uniform testimony of the Respondent's witnesses that trade practice does not allow binding stubs, except in special circumstances, if the total number of pages in a product are divisible by four. Instead, it seems that the Appellant was not the only contractor who saw nothing in GPO's official definition which would have precluded the use of binding lips in a product like the Student Guide. The witnesses mentioned two specific instances where, like here, jobs with a total number of pages divisible by four were printed with binding stubs-Shepard Printing and Fry Communications, Inc. Tr. 163, 166, 191-192. 163, 166.) In both of them the GPO contractor took the same position as the Appellant; i.e., the product met industry standards, and in Fry's case, the Respondent accepted the job at a discount.53 Tr. 163. The Board does not doubt for a minute that, according to the overall testimony, binding stubs are "uncommon" (not unknown) in GPO products, or that other contractors have accepted the Government's interpretation of a "saddle-stitched" publication. Tr. 163-64, 166, 170-71, 191-92. However, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the Respondent, the most this proves is that it is the policy of the Purchase Division to ban binding stubs and other GPO procurement offices rarely approve them, but it does not show the existence of an industry-wide custom prohibiting such lips in printed products altogether. Consequently, the Board's position is analogous to that of the Corps of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals (ENG BCA) in Jones I, when it rejected the agency's argument that ". . . there existed a '[F]ederal custom and usage' whereby companies contracting with the Corps of Engineers acquiesced in its interpretation of the Equipment Ownership Expense clause." See Jones I, supra, 85-2 BCA at 89,945. In that case, the ENG BCA reasoned, in pertinent part: It would be truly extraordinary, however, to extend these accepted principles [regarding trade practice as an interpretive device] so as to create a new type of usage, requiring persons dealing with the Corps of Engineers to accept without question the Corps' unilateral interpretation of its own contracts merely because others had "acquiesced" therein. There may well have arisen a course of dealing between the Corps of Engineers and certain contractors wherein they tacitly accepted the Government's interpretation. . . . But unlike a trade custom, a course of dealing affects only the parties concerned. Appellant was not constrained to accept Respondent's construction of [the Equipment Ownership Expense clause] merely because others had done so. It is noteworthy that the only witnesses to the alleged course of dealing were employees of the Respondent. The only compliant contractor identified by name, Pine Bluff Sand and Gravel Company, did not testify. Respondent did not call any representatives of the construction industry to confirm that there was a trade practice as alleged. If it is true that Respondent's position was accepted by some or all contractors having knowledge thereof (and the evidence on the point is inconclusive) this does not necessarily mean that they agreed with Respondent's interpretation. They may have decided, for reasons of their own, not to contest the issue. Id. In the final analysis, the Board cannot tell from this record precisely what the treatment of binding stubs is in the printing industry. That is, the evidence concerning the trade practice at issue is not "so clear and uncontradictory and distinct so as to leave no doubt as to its nature." See Eder Electric Co. v. United States, supra, 205 F.Supp. at 306. Therefore, the record with respect to trade practice is of little help to the Board in deciding whether or not the Appellant stepped outside the "zone of reasonableness" in its interpretation of the contract. 3. Prior Course of Dealings Both parties also claim the benefit of the "prior course of dealings" doctrine in this case. The Board's lead case on "prior course of dealings" is Publishers Choice Book Manufacturing Co., in which it had this to say about the principle as an interpretive device in contract interpretation cases: On the question of the weight to be given a course of prior dealings, Professors Nash and Cibinic in examining the principal case of L.W. Foster Sportswear, Co. v. United States, 186 Ct. Cl. 499, 405 F.2d 1,285 (1969), tell us that in Government contract law "[w]here the parties to an interpretation dispute have interpreted, either expressly or by their actions, the provisions of a similar, previously performed contract in a certain manner, they will be presumed to have intended the same meaning for those provisions in the disputed contract. This presumption is rebuttable by clear evidence that the parties have changed their intent or are in disagreement at the time they enter into the disputed contract. See e.g., Lock[h]eed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 192 Ct. Cl. 36, 426 F.2d (1970)." Ralph C. Nash, Jr. and John Cibinic, Jr., Federal Procurement Law, Third Edition, The George Washington University, 1980, at 969 n.1 (emphasis added). They further tell us in footnote 2 that "[w]hen the contract language is clear and precise, the court or board will normally give lesser weight to a prior course of dealing. [T]he governing factor in such cases is the degree of clarity or exactness with which the disputed term or clause is written, Robert McMullan & Sons, Inc., ASBCA [No.] 21455, 77-1 BCA [¶] 12,456 (1977) . . . however, superficially exact language may not correctly express the parties agreement. Generally more convincing evidence of a course of prior dealing will be required to controvert contract language which is stated precisely. Cf. Doyle Shirt Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, 199 Ct. Cl. 150, 462 F.2d 1150 (1972)." Id. at 970, n.3. In addition, they tell us that "[t]he parties may be bound by their interpretation of prior contracts even though the language of the disputed contract has been altered." Id. at 971, n.3. Lastly, they tell us that "[t]he reasoning underlying the prior course of dealing rule requires that both parties have actual knowledge of the prior course of dealing and of its significance to the contract. Clearly, it would be unreasonable to find that a party had agreed to a term which he was not aware." Id. at 972, n.5 (emphasis added).54 See Publishers Choice Book Manufacturing Co., supra, slip op. at 10-11. [Original emphasis.] See also Swanson Printing Co., GPO BCA 27-94 and 27A-94 (November 18, 1996), slip op. at 29-30, 1996 WL _____; Olympic Graphic Systems, supra, slip op. at 32; MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 59. See generally, Cibinic & Nash, Administration, at 206-09. Publishers Choice Book Manufacturing Co. merely reiterates the rule established by the Court of Claims in a long line of cases that the parties' interpretation of a previous contract containing specifications identical to those currently in dispute may be determinative of how the disputed specifications should be construed. See e.g., Gresham & Co., Inc. v. United States, supra; L.W. Foster Sportswear Co., Inc. v. United States, supra; Franklin Co. v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 666, 381 F.2d 416 (1967); Greenberg Co., Inc. v. United States, 156 Ct. Cl. 434; Cresswell v. United States, supra; Minneapolis-Moline Co. v. United States, 137 Ct. Cl. 790, 149 F.2d 146 (1957). The rule is held to be applicable as an aid to ascertaining the partes intention as to the meaning of disputed contractual language even in cases where, as here, the language appears to be clear and unambiguous. See e.g., Gresham & Co., Inc. v. United States, supra; L.W. Foster Sportswear Co., Inc. v. United States, supra; Dillingham Shipyard, DOT CAB No. 76-20, 78-2 BCA ¶ 13, 299; Compudyn Corp., ASBCA No. 14556, 72-1 BCA ¶ 9218. However, it is also well-established that the basis for applying the doctrine is a "sequence of previous conduct between the parties" relating to their former agreements or transactions which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct. See Swanson Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 29, n. 42 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 223 ("agreement"); U.C.C. § 1-205 (1977) ("transaction")); Olympic Graphic Systems, supra, slip op. at 32, n.22; MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 29, n. 35. Accord Longmire Coal Corp., ASBCA No. 31569, 86-3 BCA ¶ 19,110, at 96,604-05. Essentially, what this means is that the Government will not be allowed to suddenly change its long- standing interpretation of contract language to the detriment or prejudice of a contractor who has acted in reliance on that historic definition or contractual practice. See Swanson Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 29, n. 42 (citing Gresham and Co., Inc. v. United States, supra; Western Avionics, Inc., ASBCA No. 33158, 88-2 BCA ¶ 20,662); Olympic Graphic Systems, supra, slip op. at 32-33, n.22; MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 29, n. 35. Thus, the cases, as well as logic, tell us that it takes something more than one or two contracts to establish a prior course of dealings. See e.g., Gresham and Co., Inc. v. United States, supra (prior course of dealings found based on 36 previous contracts with the same specifications, 15 of which were involved in the dispute); Western Avionics, Inc., supra (50 essentially identical prior contracts over a 16-year period); American Forest Products, AGBCA No. 79-170-1, 85-1 BCA ¶ 17,720 (the Government's interpretation prevailed based on evidence of nine specific prior contracts between the parties which had been administered in the same manner); Ambulance, Inc., VACAB No. 1309, 80-2 BCA ¶ 14,555 (three prior contracts); Dillingham Shipyard, supra (four previous contracts). But see e.g., Kvaas Construction Co., ASBCA No. 45965, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26,513 (no waiver found even though Government had approved a deviation on four prior contracts); T.L. Roof & Associates Construction Co., ASBCA Nos. 38928, 42621, 93-2 BCA ¶ 25,895 (no prior course of dealings even though two prior contracts were subject to the same Corps of Engineers Safety manual, because the same agency and the same contractor were not involved and neither party had actual knowledge of the prior conduct); General Secretarial Services Corp., GSBCA No. 11381, 92-2 BCA ¶ 24,897 (no waiver found although the Government had approved a specification deviation on six prior contracts); Western States Construction Co., ASBCA No. 37611, 92-1 BCA ¶ 24,418 (no waiver by course of dealing on two prior contracts-one with another contractor). See also, Cibinic & Nash, Administration, at 206-07. Indeed, the Board's settled rule is that one prior deviation from a contract is not enough evidence to establish a prior course of dealing. See Swanson Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 30-31; Olympic Graphic Systems, supra, slip op. at 33; MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 62; Publishers Choice Book Manufacturing Co., supra, slip op. at 11 (citing Doyle Shirt Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, supra). Accord Longmire Coal Corp., supra, 86-3 BCA at 96,604-05 (a single prior contract which gave the Government the option of inspecting, sampling, and analyzing all coal deliveries to a military base or only some shipments, and it chose to inspect all deliveries resulting in premium payments to the contractor, did not establish a prior course of dealings and waive the Government's right to engage in partial inspections of coal deliveries, with no premium payments, for the second contract with the same terms). Apart from the disputed agreement, there are two other contracts between the parties in this record-the 1993 "S" Corporation Tax Package (App. Exh. No. 2) and the previous agreement for the production of the Student Guide (Gov. Exh. No. 4). The Appellant rests its "prior course of dealings" case on the Tax Package,55 while the Respondent says that the prior Student Guide agreement controls. In short, each party relies on a single contract in contravention of the Board's settled rule. See Swanson Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 30-31; Olympic Graphic Systems, supra, slip op. at 33; MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 62; Publishers Choice Book Manufacturing Co., supra, slip op. at 11 (citing Doyle Shirt Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, supra). Moreover, the Respondent's reliance on Benning Aviation Corp. for the proposition that the Appellant was obligated to produce a stub-free Student Guide because it had done so under the previous contract, which included essentially the same "BINDING" specification, see App. Brf., at 19, is misplaced. In that case, the parties had discussed the "Chief Flight Instructor" issue in their negotiations, and the contractor was fully aware of the Government's position prior to signing what was to be their fourth agreement. See Benning Aviation Corp., supra, 75-2 BCA at 54,093-94. As the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) observed in resolving the dispute: On 28 June [the date of the final negotiating meeting between the parties] the appellant had a choice: either it could accept the contract knowing that the Flying Club expected the services of a Chief Flight Instructor, or it could refuse to accept an award of the contract until the contract language was changed in accordance with its wishes. Appellant says it had a third alternative namely, that because the contract did not contain a specific reference to a Chief Flight Instructor, appellant was free to furnish those services as a "volunteer" and was equally free to withdraw those services at any time. In the sense used here, "volunteer" would mean the performance of a service which the appellant had no contractual obligation to perform. The latter approach must fail for two reasons. First of all, if this was in fact appellant's interpretation of the contract, it should have communicated that interpretation to the Flying Club representative prior to the signing of the contract. This it failed to do. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, appellant was well aware that the Flying Club was interpreting the words "flight instructors sufficient to meet the requirements of the Club" to include a Chief Flight Instructor in accordance with the practice of the prior three and a half years. We think that the appellant's action in furnishing Chief Flight Instructors under the prior contracts containing the same language is the strongest evidence of its interpretation of the contract and takes precedence over its undisclosed intention to perform as a volunteer under the current contract. See Benning Aviation Corp., supra, 75-2 BCA at 54,096. [Emphasis added.] See also General Security Services Corp. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA No. 11381, 92-2 BCA ¶ 24,897 (the contractor was obligated to continue to provide training under its contract for guard services, even though similar requirements in prior contracts had not been enforced by the Government, because inquiries showed that the Government was not waiving the training requirements in the current contract). Here, while the Appellant was the incumbent contractor, the contract was awarded pursuant to sealed bid procedures, this was only the second contract between the parties, and no negotiations took place before award. Consequently, the Contractor could not have been aware of the Government's position that "saddle-stitched" publications did not contain binding stubs. Accordingly, for these reasons, the Board believes that neither party has established a "prior course of dealings" in its favor, and their contentions are rejected. 4. Quality Assurance Provisions The final area of disagreement between the parties concerns the impact of QATAP and GPO Contract Terms on the "BINDING" specification. In arguing that binding stubs were not barred by the contract, the Appellant observes that neither the QATAP Manual or GPO Contract Terms says anything, one way or another, about the subject, and therefore, it was allowed to use lips. App. Brf., at 7-8 (citing Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra; Web Business Forms, Inc., supra; McDonald & Eudy Printers supra); App. R. Brf., at 3. By contrast, the Respondent contends that the prohibition against the use of binding stubs is clear if the "BINDING" specification is read in conjunction with the "QUALITY ASSURANCE LEVELS AND STANDARDS" provision, establishing the Student Guide as a Quality Level III product, as well as QATAP and the supplemental specification regarding quality in GPO Contract Terms. R. Brf., at 6-13 (citing B. P. Printing & Office Supplies, supra); R. R. Brf., at 2; R4 File, Tab A, at 4-5; QATAP, at 27-28; GPO Contract Terms, Supplemental Specifications, ¶ 1.(b)(1) (General: Quality). The different meanings which the parties give to the disputed contract language are clearly at opposite ends of the spectrum. However, as emphasized above, for an ambiguity to exist the differing interpretations of the contract must be reasonable. See MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 42; The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 41; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 47; Webb Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 17; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, slip op. at 41, n. 22; General Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 16. Furthermore, as the Board has also noted, the Contractor's burden is not to prove that its interpretation is more reasonable than the Government's, only that, standing alone, its meaning is reasonable. See George Bennett v. United States, supra, 371 F.2d at 861 (citing Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., supra). In the Board's view, the Appellant has met its burden. Obviously, the quality assurance provisions of a contract, including QATAP, can be an important clue to the interpretation of disputed specifications. See e.g. The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 45-46; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 52-53. The underlying assumption is that while ". . . Government contracts are usually drafted in absolute terms, in the expectation that contractors will aim for perfect performance . . . we do not live in an ideal world, so some reasonable allowance must be made for failure-not total failure, but some acceptable level of imperfect performance which the parties can live with . . .". Id., slip op. at 53-54 (citing Thermal Electronic, Inc. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 671 (1992); Radiation Technology, Inc. v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 227, 366 F.2d 1003 (1966); Fry II, supra). Thus, whenever it analyzes disputed contract language, the Board is obliged to see if there is any relationship between the design and/or performance specifications at issue, and the quality assurance provisions which the Government has placed in the agreement to protect its interest in receiving an acceptable product. The governing rationale was set forth by the Board in Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., when it said: . . . [T]he "PRINTING" specification [which the Board held to be predominantly "design" in nature] does not stand in isolation, but rather there is a natural transition between the requirement for perfect performance and the contract's detailed quality assurance provisions, especially QATAP. [Footnote omitted.] A brief glance at the QATAP manual discloses the following explanation, in pertinent part, about the program's evaluation standards: For all but four of the numbered attributes and some paper characteristics, evaluation is made on an absolute basis, with defects assessed on deviation from explicit or implicit nominal values, rather than on comparisons to a specified physical object called the specified standard. . . . Tolerances specify how far the product may deviate from the nominal and still be acceptable. * * * * * * * * * * . . .[T]he evaluation for attributes P-7 through P-10, and some paper characteristics are made relative to a specified standard while the other attributes and paper characteristics are evaluated on an absolute basis. See QATAP, p. vi. [Emphasis added.] It seems to the Board that the "PRINTING" specification sentence in controversy, which expresses performance in absolute terms, merely echoes QATAP's evaluation philosophy, and is capable of being read against the contract's quality assurance provisions, taken as a whole, without negating the language of any part of the contract. [Citations omitted.] Thus, when properly read, the contract says that within the tolerances allowed by QATAP for defective SPFs [Security Prescription Forms] at the Quality Level indicated, based on an appropriate sample, the word "VOID" must appear three times when the forms are reproduced by electrostatic means. This plainly advises the Contractor that while it is expected to produce an SPF which works every time, some leeway would be allowed because of the nature of "VOID" pantograph work, beyond which the form would either be rejected or a discount taken. The Respondent's interpretation is in complete harmony with this view, while the Appellant's de minimis approach effectively reads the quality assurance provisions out of the contract. [Citations omitted.] See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 52-53. [Original emphasis.] The problem with the Respondent's quality assurance argument in this case is that, unlike the specification at issue in Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., which expressly set forth the critical absolute standard to be applied ("The word 'VOID' . . . must appear at least 3 times (vertically, horizontally and diagonally) and must not be visible on the printed sheet, but must appear when the sheet is reproduced by electrostatic means."), there is no language whatsoever in the "BINDING" specification about the use of binding stubs, which means that the Board would have to make the requisite connection to the quality assurance provisions by implication alone. The Government says that it is possible to do this because the contract incorporates both QATAP and GPO Contract Terms. However, there is no support for GPO's position in either the record or Board precedent. The weakness in the Government's position based on QATAP is an evidentiary one. Both the Contracting Officer and other witnesses for the Respondent candidly testified that QATAP was silent on the question of binding stubs, and that the definition of "saddle-stitching" they espoused was nowhere to be found in QATAP, or any other GPO publication for that matter. Tr. 60, 65, 74, 110, 120. Their testimony basically confirmed the Appellant's reading of QATAP. Tr. 16. Consequently, the Respondent's argument is undermined by its own admission that the Contractor's interpretation has some validity. See RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra, slip op. at 33-34 (the Government admitted to all facts necessary to prove the contractor's case that it relied on its interpretation of the contract in submitting its bid). Also cf. McDonald & Eudy II, supra, slip op. at 25, 32 (the contractor's admission that all of the books in the initial shipment were undertrimmed gave GPO the right under the contract to reject the first printing and have the publication reprinted at no cost to the Government; it was irrelevant whether or not the initial product was usable because the undertrim was minor); Stephenson, Inc., supra, slip op. at 20-21, n. 24 (the contractor's concession that the 18,000 books in question were defective obviated the need for proof that the Government's inspection results were invalid); Eastwood Printing, GPO BCA 3-88 (March 8, 1990), slip op. at 1 (the contractor, inter alia, admitted "against its own interest" that it had undertrimmed the product 1/16" from that required by the specifications). Accord Daly Construction, Inc., ASBCA No. 32457, 87-3 BCA ¶ 20,182 (letter from the contract administrator constituted an admission against the interest of the Government). Furthermore, insofar as the Contracting Officer measured the original version of the Student Guide against QATAP's finishing attribute F-1 and found it rejectable, it is clear that he looked only at the binding lips themselves to reach that conclusion. See R4 File, Tab F, at 1 ("The stubs are a nonspecified trim size and a major deviation defect . . ."). However, the Board has ruled that trim measurements for finishing attribute F-1 are to be taken of the whole publication and not its component parts, such as individual pages.56 Thus, the Board has indicated that: Under the QATAP, finishing attributes, such as trim size, are measured by inspecting individual copies of publications, and classifying each deviation from specifications as either a critical defect or major defect, in accordance with the tolerance table for that attribute. [Footnote omitted.] See, QATAP, p. 3 (Finishing Attributes). In that regard, QATAP tells us that a major defect must be assessed on a Quality Level III job if the trim size deviation is "greater than 1/8["] (3.2 mm)." Id., p. 28 (F-1. Trim Size). See McDonald & Eudy II, supra, slip op. at 24-25. [Emphasis added.] See also Stabbe Senter Press, supra, slip op. at 52-53 ("The Government will evaluate finishing attributes by inspecting individual copies of publications." [Emphasis added.]). Consequently, it is apparent that the Contracting Officer misapplied QATAP in this case.57 The supplemental specification in GPO Contract Terms is also not helpful to the Respondent as an interpretative device. The key to GPO's argument is that the supplemental specification places the industry's standards for printing and binding, which it claims are higher than QATAP, and independent of it, squarely into the contract. R. Brf., at 9; R. R. Brf., at 3. However, the Board has already indicated that the Government has not met its three-fold burden of showing: (1) exactly what the trade standard is for pamphlets like the Student Guide with regard to their appearance; (2) in what respect the industry's standard is higher than the expectations for Quality Level III work under QATAP; and (3) precisely how did the original printing of the Student Guide fail to meet the trade standards. Furthermore, the Board agrees with the Appellant that, as a contract provision, the supplemental specification is too general for the discrete purpose which the Respondent has in mind for it, namely, as the yardstick for testing a specific pamphlet at a specific quality level. App. R. Brf., at 4. The supplemental specification has never been capable of that sort of "heavy lifting," nor has that provision ever been asked to play such a sweeping role. Rather, to the extent that the supplemental specification provides that "[p]rinting and binding shall be held to a high standard of imposition; makeready; press running; clear, sharp printing; binding; and good quality in every respect[,]" the Board believes that the former ad hoc panels were correct when they said that similar supplemental wording in prior versions of GPO Contract Terms simply made the doctrine of "strict compliance" part of every GPO contract. See Veitch Printing, [GPOCAB] (November 5, 1979), slip op. at 6, 1979 WL 30157; National Graphics, Inc. [GPOCAB] (January 4, 1979), slip op. at 4, 1979 WL 28896. Consequently, the Board has adopted their interpretation as its own. Indeed, in B. P. Printing & Office Supplies, the decision cited by GPO, the Board found nothing more than that because of the supplemental specification the "substantial compliance" rule did not apply under the circumstances in that case. See B. P. Printing & Office Supplies, supra, slip op. at 14. No issue of contract interpretation was involved. In fact, in B. P. Printing & Office Supplies QATAP was not part of the contract, and the supplemental specification was the only quality assurance provision available to the Government. Id., at 3, n. 5. Accordingly, the Board concludes overall that it cannot be shown on this record in what manner the "BINDING" specification, as written, with no language prohibiting the use of binding stubs, adversely affected the Government's ability to administer the express requirements of the quality assurance provisions in the agreement. See e.g., The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 45-46. Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 53. Therefore, the Respondent's arguments to the contrary are rejected. 5. Latent or Patent Ambiguity All that remains for the Board to determine is whether the ambiguity in this case is latent or patent. Since it is clear from the record that the Appellant relied on its interpretation of the contract in submitting its bid,58 a finding that the ambiguity is latent will entitle it to the benefit of doctrine of contra proferentem. See Fry Communications, Inc./ InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, supra, 22 Cl. Ct. at 503, 510 (citing Fruin-Colon Corp. v. United States, supra, 912 F.2d at 1430; Lear Siegler Management Services v. United States, supra, 867 F.2d at 603; William F. Klingensmith, Inc. v. United States, supra, 205 Ct. Cl. at 657); MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 43; The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 42, n. 33; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 48, n. 64; Web Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 19, n. 18; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, slip op. at 41, n. 22. Indeed, to the extent that the Contracting Officer also based the rejection of the original version of the Student Guide on his perception that the Contractor "gained an unfair competitive advantage" over other bidders from its interpretation of the "BINDING" specification, see R4 File, Tab F, at 1, the simple answer is: [C]ontractors are businessmen, and in the business of bidding on Government contracts they are usually pressed for time and are consciously seeking to underbid a number of competitors. Consequently, they estimate only on those costs which they feel the contract terms will permit the Government to insist upon in the way of performance. They are obligated to bring to the Government's attention major discrepancies or errors they detect in specifications or drawings or else fail to do so at their peril. But they are not expected to exercise clairvoyance in spotting hidden ambiguities in the bid documents, and they are protected if they innocently construe in their own favor an ambiguity equally susceptible to another construction. See Jones II, supra, 95-1 BCA at 136,892 (quoting Blount Brothers Construction Co. v. United States, 171 Ct. Cl. 478, 496-97, 346 F.2d 962, 972-73 (1965)). For the Board to find a patent ambiguity in this case, it must conclude that the contract language contains a gross discrepancy, an obvious error in drafting, or a glaring gap, as seen through the eyes of a "reasonable man," in which event the Appellant would have had an affirmative duty to seek a clarification from the Contracting Officer before submitting its bid. See Fry Communications, Inc./ InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, supra, 22 Cl. Ct. at 504 (citing Newsom v. United States, supra, 230 Ct. Cl. at 303; Max Drill, Inc. v. United States, supra, 192 Ct. Cl. at 626; WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, supra, 163 Ct. Cl. at 6); MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 44; The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 42-43, n. 34; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 48-49, n. 65; Webb Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 19; General Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 17. However, its examination of the record convinces the Board that nothing within the contract itself amounts to the sort of gross discrepancy, obvious error in drafting, or a glaring gap, which would trigger the Appellant's obligation to ask the Contracting Officer for his opinion on whether the "BINDING" specification precluded the use of binding stubs in the production of the Student Guide. See RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra, slip op. at 31 (meaning of the term "leaf" in the schedule of prices for collating before establishing its bid price for collating "per 100 leaves"); Castillo Printing Co., GPO BCA 10-90 (May 7, 1991), slip op. at 36-37, reconsid. denied, GPO BCA 10-90 (March 30, 1992) (whether the contractor was also required to gather and collate under a "Binding" specification which only provided for drilling, trimming and shrink-wrapping); General Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 21 (contractor not responsible for realizing the word "over" in the paper specification should actually have been "cover"). Furthermore, to paraphrase its decision in Castillo Printing Co., which also involved missing language in the disputed specification, the Board notes that there is nothing inherent in the binding process itself which would lead a reasonable contractor, at the time it submitted its bid, to suspect that the pamphlet would have to be stub-free in order to satisfy the "BINDING" provision under the contract. See Castillo Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 37. The facts in this case support the conclusion that the Appellant did not become aware of the Respondent's contrary view of the contract language until it heard from the Contracting Officer that MEPCOM was dissatisfied with the approval copies of the Student Guide. Tr. 97, 100. See General Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 21. Moreover, even if the Board agreed with the Respondent that the Contractor should have seen that its reading of the "BINDING" specification conflicted with the Government's interpretation of "saddle-stitching," it cannot say that the Appellant also would have recognized that the ambiguity which existed was so "gross," "glaring" or "obvious" that it had a duty to ask the Contracting Officer to resolve it. See RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra, slip op. at 31-32; Castillo Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 36-37. Accordingly, for these reasons, the Board concludes that the ambiguity in this case is latent, not patent, and thus the Appellant was under no duty to contact the Contracting Officer for a clarification about whether the binding stubs were prohibited in the production of the Student Guide. See RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra, slip op. at 31-32; Castillo Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 36-37; General Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 21. See also WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, supra, 163 Ct. Cl. at 6. Therefore, since the Board has already found that the Contractor relied on its interpretation in submitting its bid, the doctrine of contra proferentem applies, and it is entitled to payment for the first version of the Student Guide. See RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra, slip op. at 36; General Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 23. 6. Constructive Change Before turning its attention to the second substantive issue in this appeal, the Board is inclined to make one last observation concerning the parties' dispute over the 'BINDING" specification. Even without disregarded Programs A814-M and C181, the record clearly indicates that GPO knows how to prevent a contractor from producing a publication with binding lips-it simply tells them not to by adding the appropriate sentence or phrase to the specifications. Tr. 31, 158-60; R4 File, Tab E. See RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra, slip op. at 23-24 (the Board found "not without some significance" that the IFB failed to define the term "leaf" in the disputed paragraph of the schedule of prices when it was obvious that the drafter of the solicitation "went out of his/her way to give special meanings to the word 'leaf' in those places where it was deemed important [in the same provision]," and thought that if the Government "wished the word "leaf' to be synonymous with a 'fold-in' for the purpose of calculating the charges for collating . . . the drafter could have made that clear by adding a phrase such as 'per 100 leaves (or plies) of fold-ins of any size,' or something equally appropriate.").59 Indeed, the Respondent's interpretation of the "BINDING" specification in this case would render this precautionary practice superfluous. But since the Government did not do so in this contract, it cannot now be heard to say that the Appellant should have known (actually guessed) that MEPCOM wanted a pamphlet produced the same way as the previous year-without binding lips-and that its choice of production methods was limited. If that was GPO's wish, then it should have told the Contractor so directly, and not left it to the Appellant to draw that conclusion for itself. See RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra, slip op. at 24; Electronic Composition, Inc., supra, slip op. at 32. Accord Max J. Kuney Co., supra, 94-3 BCA at 135,751 ("Bidders are not responsible for knowing of construction policies which a [F]ederal agency has not published . . . and which are neither stated nor referenced in the terms of a proposed contract. If the [Government] deemed it to be important that contractors not drill holes for support brackets, then it was incumbent upon the [Federal Highway Administration] to include such a prohibition in the [Standard Specifications For Construction of Roads and Bridges] or in the supplements/modifications thereto in the contract itself, so that bidders would be forewarned as to the required method to be followed in achieving the finished product."). In the final analysis, the Respondent's direction to the Appellant to reprint the Student Guide without binding stubs, in the absence of any language in the specifications precluding such lips, is tantamount to a constructive change in the contract.60 See Graphicdata, Inc., supra, slip op. at 103 (Government changed the contract in mid-stream by dropping the requirement for patents produced on CD-ROMs and increasing its requirements for paper sets); Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 76 (GPO constructively changed the contract when, in the absence of contractual standards, it rejected the contractor's security prescription forms and requiring a reprinting with a different "drop out" pattern). Thus, the Department of Transportation Board of Contract Appeals states that the rule is: Where, as here, the contract does not designate the method of performance to be utilized, the contractor's reliance upon its own expertise and ingenuity is particularly significant in selecting the method of performance. It is also axiomatic that the rejection of a method of performance selected by the contractor, which is permitted by the contract, constitutes a constructive change. See Max J. Kuney Co., supra, 94-3 BCA at 135,751 (citing DOT Systems, Inc., DOTBCA No. 1992, 82-2 BCA ¶ 15,817, at 78,373). [Emphasis added.] See Blake Construction Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 36651, 90-3 ¶ 23,074 (where the contractor correctly construed the disputed specification in light of industrywide practice to require only carbon steel heat exchangers, the Government's erroneous insistence on stainless steel heat exchangers being furnished amounted to a constructive change entitling the contractor to an equitable adjustment). This does not mean that the Government's silence operates as a license for the contractor to select any method it wishes, because the planned approach must still be reasonable and consistent with the practices in the trade. See Max J. Kuney Co., supra, 94-3 BCA at 135,751. Accordingly, since there is nothing in the record to warrant the conclusion that the Appellant's "single signature" press configuration was unreasonable, the "constructive change" doctrine provides a second ground for allowing the Contractor's claim in this case. See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 76. B. The Contracting Officer's rejection of the original printing of the Student Guide was in error. Although he concluded that the pamphlet failed to satisfy QATAP finishing attribute F-1 (Trim Size), the parties agree that neither the contract, QATAP, or GPO Contract Terms expressly address, or provide evaluation standards for products which use binding stubs. In the absence of such measurement criteria either in the contract or GPO's regulations, the basis of the rejection cannot be established. In light of the Board's holding on the ambiguity question, no lengthy analysis of the second issue presented by the parties is required. However, that question essentially comes down to an inquiry into what standards, if any, the Contracting Officer used in determining that the first version of the Student Guide was rejectable, and tests the reasonableness of his decision. In that regard, the Board concludes from the record before it that even if it had decided the ambiguity issue in the Respondent's favor, it nonetheless would have still ruled against GPO on the standards question. At the outset, the parties should realize that in analyzing the evidence the Board has refused to enter the arena now occupied by their dispute over whether the Student Guide was a "promotional" piece or not,61 although it cannot help but notice that the rejected pamphlet does contain a "tear out" page (page 13). That argument is basically about the appropriate Product Quality Level (PQL) for the Student Guide. Suffice it to say, the Board believes that the function of the booklet is irrelevant to its decision. It is enough for the Board to know that the task of selecting the appropriate PQL for a particular job has been assigned to the customer-agency, with occasional assistance from GPO. See PPR, Chap. XIII, Sec. 1, ¶ 4.a (Initial Determination of Required Quality); QATAP Manual, at vii; GPO Handbook, Sec. V, ¶ 3.a (Product Quality Level Selection). In this case, MEPCOM determined that the Student Guide was a Quality Level III product, the Contracting Officer obviously agreed with that decision, and the Board will not disturb their judgment. See Rose Printing, Inc., GPO BCA 32-95 (December 16, 1996), slip op. at 24-25, 1996 WL _____; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 37-39; K.C. Printing Co., GPO BCA 02-91 (February 22, 1995), slip op. at 14, n. 19, 1995 WL 488531; Shepard Printing, supra, slip op. at 14-15, n. 20; Stabbe Senter Press, supra, slip op. at 53; French/Bray, Inc., GPO BCA 18-85 (October 23,, 1986), slip op. at 17, 1986 WL 181454. Besides, even if the Board thought that the appropriate PQL for the Student Guide was something other than Quality Level III, it has no authority to revise or tinker with the express terms of the contract, but rather it must take the agreement as it finds it. See Rose Printing, Inc., supra, slip op. at 28-29; Olympic Graphic Systems, supra, slip op. at 37; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, slip op. at 40-41. Like their dispute over the meaning of the "BINDING" specification, the "standards" issue arises because the parties disagree on the proper interpretation of so much of QATAP's general description of finishing for a typical Quality Level III product which says it ". . . must be held to above average standards of . . . appearance." See QATAP Manual, at viii; GPO Handbook, Sec. V, ¶ 5.a (3), at 12. Thus, even though the parties agree that there is no mention of binding lips in QATAP, the Respondent views the words "above average . . . appearance" as clearly prohibiting such stubs in a product at that PQL, while the Appellant sees no such proscription in that language. In so many words, the Contractor's assertion that the Contracting Officer applied imprecise or indefinite standards in rejecting the first Student Guide , and hence his action was arbitrary and unreasonable, is just another way of saying that the decision was too subjective.62 The law is clear that before the Government can reject a contractor's product, either as a prelude to default or some lesser action, it must first establish specific, quantifiable, objective, and firm criteria indicating the level of quality which the product is expected to meet. See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 68 (citing Wornick Family Foods Co., supra; Shirley Contracting Corp. and ATEC Contracting Corp., supra; John L. Hall dba Taiga Resource Consultants, AGBCA No. 92-217-1, 93-3 BCA ¶ 26,212; Chandler-Wilbert Vault Co., VACAB No. 1444, 80-2 BCA ¶ 14,682; Mid-American Engineering and Manufacturing, ASBCA No. 20939, 78-1 BCA ¶ 12,870). See also Elgin Business Forms, GPOCAB 10-84 (October 19, 1984), slip op. at 5-8, 1984 WL 148108; Electronic Composition, Inc., supra, slip op. at 34 (citing Elgin National Watch Co., supra; ITT Arctic Services, Inc. v. United States, supra). Usually, such standards are spelled out in the parties' contract. However, where the contract fails to establish acceptance criteria, the standard against which contract work is measured is the standard customary within the industry. See Total Reproductions, Inc., GPO BCA 16-88 (February 2, 1990), slip op. at 17, 1990 WL 454979 ("The Board also finds that the contract is silent respecting the application of any special paper standard for the small poster paper, although "Government Paper Specification Number 8," dated April 1977, is made applicable to the white offset book paper specified for the letter. Given this, the Board must conclude that the parties intended sub-silentio the adoption of those standards extant in the paper industry."). Accord WRB Corp. v. United States, supra, 183 Ct. Cl. at 445; Max J. Kuney Co., supra, 94-3 BCA at 135,751; D.E.W., Inc., ASBCA No. 37232, 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,444, at 126, 712. On the other hand, the law also recognizes that there is always an element of subjectivity in any product evaluation, and boards of contract appeals will sustain the subjective findings of an inspector or contracting officer as long as the test method used is reasonable. See Interstate Reforesters, Dale Whitley, AGBCA No. 87-374-3, 89-1 BCA ¶ 21,375. In that regard, any test which conforms to generally accepted industry practice is usually considered reasonable. See M.J.W. Enterprises, ENGBCA No. 5813, 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,405; DiCecco, Inc., ASBCA No. 11994, 69-2 BCA ¶ 7821. Furthermore, the law allows the application of subjective standards to enforce contract specifications expressing a requirement in absolute or imprecise language because such terms are not suited for application of the strict compliance doctrine- absolute requirements especially cannot be literally attained. See Mid-American Engineering and Manufacturing, supra; Canon Construction, Inc., GSBCA No. 11227, 92-2 BCA ¶ 25,001; Bonny Products, Inc., GSBCA No. 4577, 76-2 BCA ¶ 12,158; Dirigo Compass & Instrument Co., ASBCA No. 9162, 65-2 BCA ¶ 4938. Moreover, Board precedent recognizes that just because a judgment is subjective it is not necessarily invalid, since the qualifications of the person making the evaluation is relevant and must always be taken into consideration. See Fry II, supra, slip op. at 17-18. Accord Interstate Reforesters, Dale Whitley, supra. Where a contractor challenges the results of an inspection on the ground that the test was subjective, the main focus of the Board's inquiry is on whether or not the evaluator applied the appropriate or correct standards, not whether his judgment was right or wrong.63 See Fry II, supra, slip op. at 18-20. To that extent, the Board agrees with the ad hoc panel which said that GPO's quality assurance program "was established to reduce subjective judgments in determining the quality and acceptability of a given product through an established system," see Printers II, Inc., GPOCAB 4-80 (July 8, 1980), slip op. at 6, 1980 WL 81259, and it believes that QATAP is the best check on the subjectivity of Government officials crossing the line into whimsy. However, the Board must also be realistic and recognize, as the Respondent suggests, that the drafters of QATAP could not foresee all possible problems, and hence the QATAP Manual only deals with the most common printing and finishing defects.64 R. Brf., at 8; R. R. Brf., at 1. This case shows what can happen when a GPO contracting officer is caught in the gray area between his or her own subjective judgment and the requirements of QATAP. The Contracting Officer has made it very clear that only a stub-free Student Guide would have been acceptable to him; i.e., that he wanted a product with zero defects. Therefore, the Contracting Officer instinctively looked to the written requirements of QATAP, as well as to other GPO procurement organizations, for guidance in helping him solve a problem he probably never expected to face-the production of a pamphlet which was not stub-free. However, instead of testing the Student Guide against the question "Is this product unacceptable?," it is apparent that the Contracting Officer analyzed the pamphlet by asking "Why is this product unacceptable?" Indeed, it seems to the Board that rather than responding to MEPCOM's complaint with an open mind, what the Contracting Officer was really after was some sort of contractual "hook" upon which to hang his preconceived rejection of the Student Guide. The Contracting Officer selected QATAP's finishing attribute F-1 (Trim Size) for that purpose. See R4 File, Tab F, at 1. However, the Board has already found that in testing the original version of the Student Guide by examining only the two binding lips, he misapplied that QATAP finishing attribute. See McDonald & Eudy II, supra, slip op. at 24-25; Stabbe Senter Press, supra, slip op. at 52-53. The record fails to disclose any other valid quantifiable, objective, and firm criteria in the contract or GPO's regulations, which the Contracting Officer could have used to evaluate the pamphlet. This is precisely the same territory the Board explored not long ago in Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc. In that case, the Board was confronted by a contractor's equitable adjustment claim for reprinting medical prescription forms ordered for the (then) Veterans Administration (VA), which GPO originally rejected for quality defects. The forms in question, which were to be shipped in two installments, contained two main security features; i.e., sequential numbering and a "Void" pantograph which was supposed to appear when the form was reproduced on a copy machine. Although the contractor tested the copying quality of the first installment of forms prior to shipment with satisfactory results, the customer-agency complained that the "Void" pantograph would not reproduce on its copiers. When GPO's test of the forms also failed to produce the "Void" pantograph, the contracting officer rejected the shipment and required the contractor to reprint to order with a changed "drop out" pattern. After it had complied with the reprint request, the contractor sought an equitable adjustment for the first shipment. The Board found that the contractor's claim was supported by the record evidence. First, the Board held that an inadequate or defective Government design, and not any deficiency in the contractor's production processes or method of performance, was the real reason the "Void" pantograph on the original forms would not reproduce; thus, under the doctrine of "implied warranty of specifications" the Government bore the responsibility for nonperformance. See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 62-63 (citing Colorgraphics Corp., supra, slip op. at 22-24). Accord Blake Construction Co. v. United States, 987 F.2d 743 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Hol-Gar Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, supra; D.E.W. Inc., ASBCA No. 35896, 94-3 BCA ¶ 27,182. Second, and most importantly for purposes of this case, the Board held that the major problem with the Contracting Officer's rejection of the initial forms was the fact that nothing in the record disclosed what evaluation criteria he employed in reaching the conclusion that they were defective, and without such standards his decision rejecting the forms was erroneous. See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 63, 80-81. Relying heavily on a prior decision of an ad hoc panel in Elgin Business Forms, the Board ruled that the absence of such testing or measurement criteria in the specifications, elsewhere in the contract, or in GPO's quality assurance regulations, the basis for rejection could not be established.65 Id., at 75-77 ( citing Elgin Business Forms, supra). Accord Wornick Family Foods Co., supra; Shirley Contracting Corp. and ATEC Contracting Corp., supra; John L. Hall dba Taiga Resource Consultants, supra; Chandler-Wilbert Vault Co., supra; Mid-American Engineering and Manufacturing, supra. The Board's rationale, in pertinent part, was: The GPOCAB ad hoc panel [in Elgin Business Forms] held that GPO had not sustained its burden of proof of showing that the contractor's forms failed to meet the contract specifications, and overturned the contracting officer's default determination. See, Elgin Business Forms, supra, Sl. op. at 11. The panel used a three-pronged rationale to explain why the default was inappropriate under the factual situation in that case, namely: (1) neither the contract nor the specifications provided specific performance and testing standards or requirements; (2) a default cannot be based on unstated specifications; and (3) the inspection and tests conducted on the forms were not dispositive. See, Elgin Business Forms, supra, Sl. op. at 5-10. . . . [Extensive quotation from Elgin Business Forms, supra, slip op. at 5-8, omitted.] * * * * * * * * * * The Board has no doubt that the holding in Elgin Business Forms was correct as a matter of law. Consequently, . . . its teachings can be applied to the facts in this case, which are substantially similar. [Footnote omitted.] . . . * * * * * * * * * * In Elgin Business Forms, the GPOCAB was dealing with performance specifications in the contract which were indefinite or vague. Here, the Board has diligently searched the four corners of the agreement, including QATAP and its supporting manuals and reports, in vain for some clue as to what reasonable standard the Contractor was expected to meet for its forms to be considered acceptable in copying the "VOID" pantograph. The problem, as the Board sees it, is that no QATAP category precisely fits the alleged defect in this case. . . . In short, unless there is an undisclosed standard somewhere which provided the yardstick for measuring the nonappearance of the word "VOID" when the form was photocopied, the quality problem at issue must be seen as sui generis and one without any established norm or tolerances. . . . Thus, the question remains-what standard did the Contracting Officer use to reject the forms? At the hearing, the Contracting Officer testified that he used a very simply litmus test-the word "VOID" either appeared or did not appear when the SPF was photocopied, was legible or not legible, was visible to the naked eye or not visible (Tr. 267-68). The Appellant applied the same standard in its pre-delivery tests of the forms (Tr. 126-27). However, by definition, such a standard is not an objective one, but rather is subjective and capable of creating great discrepancies in test results among individual evaluators in different locations, as occurred here. See, Wornick Family Foods Company, supra, 94-2 BCA at 133,341; Shirley Contracting Corporation and ATEC Contracting Corporation, supra, 85-3 BCA at 91,428-29. . . . * * * * * * * * * * In summary, when the Board considers the record evidence in this case, it finds that the absence of clear and objective standards for evaluating and measuring the copying capability of the ordered SPFs is a fatal defect in the contract. Without such criteria, testing performance against the specifications becomes untrustworthy, vague and inadequate for the principle purpose of the contract, providing the VA with a product which would meet its particular needs. . . . See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 71, 74-77, 80-81.66 [Emphasis added.] See also Elgin Business Forms, supra, slip op. at 5-6 ("The deficiency in the specifications in the contract is the glaring failure of the government to precisely state what its performance requirements were and how it would test to determine conformity with those requirements. While the specifications informed the Appellant that the forms would be run on a Honeywell PRU 1200 Printer they did not indicate the expected performance level. [Record citation omitted.] Likewise the specifications did not contain a performance standard for the decollator which is an integral part of the process. Although the specifications fail to contain a particular brand of decollating equipment, the Panel finds that the failure to state any performance level for the decollator is a critical deficiency on the part of the government."); Electronic Composition, supra, slip op. at 34 ("If the Government felt these ['production' system] capacities were critical to the successful incorporation into GPO of the advanced software system ECI offered, it should have made them performance requirements of the contract. . . . We have scrutinized the subject contract in vain for any stated requirements that [the electronic typography system] perform 'economically', or that it have multi-reel or automatic restart capability or that it should produce pages at a specified rate. As we stated earlier, the contractor will not be bound by the unexpressed intent of the Government." Citing Tecon Corp. V. United States, 188 Ct. Cl. 15, 411 F.2d 1262 (Ct. Cl. 1969); L. Rosenman Corp. V. United States, 182 Ct. Cl. 586, 591, 390 F.2d 711 (1968); Elgin National Watch Co., supra; ITT Arctic Services, Inc. v. United States, supra). In the Board's view, the rule of Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc. and Elgin Business Forms, controls the second issue in this case. At its core, the "standards" dispute really involves a cosmetic defect in the Student Guide-there is no other way to interpret this sort of controversy over the "appearance" of the pamphlet. Cf. The American Press, GPOCAB 1-84 (September 4, 1991), slip op. at 12, 1991 WL 439269 (the contracting officer acted reasonably in rejecting navigational charts ordered under the contract and requiring them to be reprinted because "the defects in the product were not merely cosmetic, but were ones that jeopardized the safety of boaters relying on the charts' depiction of the Ohio River channel line."). Indeed, there seems to be no doubt on this record that but for the binding stubs, the original version of the Student Guide would have been accepted by the Government. No one questions the Government's right to require complete or perfect performance in its specifications. See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 64; McDonald & Eudy II, supra, slip op. at 19-20; Shepard Printing, supra, slip op. at 19-20; Stephenson, Inc., supra, slip op. at 20-21; Copigraph, Inc., supra, slip op. at 2. Accord Thermal Electronic, Inc. v. United States, supra, 25 Cl. Ct. at 673. However, while the Board does not see its role as "second guessing" the Contracting Officer with respect to the appearance of the pamphlet, see Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 78, it cannot ignore the fact that his determination was purely subjective. Consequently, what the Board can require in the context of this case, as Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc. and Elgin Business Forms make clear, is that before the Respondent imposes its subjective judgment regarding the looks of the Student Guide on otherwise unsuspecting contractors, that it alert them in the specifications that anything less than a stub-free Student Guide would not be acceptable. Id., slip op. at 75 ("If the Respondent intended the "VOID" pantograph to reproduce on all photocopiers, it should have expressly told the Contractor so."). See also RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra, slip op. at 23-24. Accord Max J. Kuney Co., supra, 94-3 BCA at 135,751. One final observation is in order. The "standards" issue aside, the Board strongly suspects that the Contracting Officer's rejection of the first version of the Student Guide was subconsciously motivated by a wish to mollify MEPCOM. Thus, the transcript discloses the following colloquy between Government Counsel and the Contracting Officer: Mr. Miller: You had the option, did you not, of accepting this product at a discount? Mr. Nepi: Yes. Mr. Miller: And you chose not to? Mr. Nepi: Yes. Mr. Miller: Could you explain to the Board why you chose that path? Mr. Nepi: Well, we proceed, on any complaint, based on the customer's desires. For instance, if a product is urgently needed, we may be forced to accept the product at a discount because it needs to be distributed and used right away. In this case, the agency did not want to put out this product to all their component activities and for mass distribution because they-they stated that it-to use their words, I think, it is 'visually offensive and presents a poor impression of the headquarters, U.S. MEPCOM, and the military services.' That is their words. So, based on the way the agency requested-their request-their complaint is a [request] submitted to us, the request is that we reject the order. We evaluated the order and we rejected it. Mr. Miller: Now, in making your decision, I want to make clear whose decision this was. Mr. Nepi: This was my decision. Tr. 111-12. [Emphasis added.] However, the Board has never regarded the desire to mollify a customer-agency as a valid basis for a contracting officer's action. See e.g., Graphics Image, Inc., GPO BCA 13-92 (August 12, 1992), slip op. at 28, 1992 WL 487875; Colorgraphics Corp., supra, slip op. 24. Accordingly, for all of these reasons, the Board concludes that the Contracting Officer's decision rejecting the first version of the Student Guide was in error and should be REVERSED. C. The Appellant's claim for additional compensation for the increased paper and manufacturing costs incurred in reprinting the Student Guide is properly before the Board. However, while the Contractor is entitled to payment for the original version of the Student Guide at the contract price, it has offered no evidence as to its increased costs. Therefore, the Appellant's claim for an additional $15,726.00 fails for want of proof. The remaining matter concerns the Appellant's claim for $15,726.00 to cover the increased paper and manufacturing costs it incurred in reprinting the Student Guide. This claim raises two issues for the Board's consideration, one involving the Board's jurisdiction to entertain it, and the other a matter of proof. Each of these questions can be quickly disposed of. First, the appeal record discloses that the Appellant never raised its claim for increased costs in either its initial (albeit mistaken) protest to GAO on July 25, 1994, or its properly filed notice of appeal to the Board on July 29, 1994. R4 File, Tabs J and L. Both of those appeals show clearly that the only matter being challenged by the Contractor was the Contracting Officer's final decision rejecting the original version of the Student Guide and directing that the pamphlet be reprinted. Instead, the Appellant first mentioned its $15,726.00 claim in its Complaint. Board Rules, Rule 6(a). Therefore, the issue arises whether the Contractor's demand for the additional $15,726.00 is properly before the Board on appeal, or is it a new claim which must be first presented to the Contracting Officer?67 Although the answer to that question is not free of doubt, the Board believes that in the context of this case the Appellant has not raised a new matter, but instead has merely amended its original claim. See New South Press, GPO BCA 45-92 (November 4, 1994), 1994 WL 837425 (hereinafter New South II) (even though the contractor asserted a new legal theory and increased the amount of its claim on appeal to the Board, jurisdiction was asserted because, inter alia, GPO never objected to the amendment either at the prehearing conference or in his brief, the parties had already briefed the threshold issue, and besides it was clear from the record that no matter what amount the contractor claimed the contracting officer would still have denied it because he was acting on his understanding of the contract's "Extension of Schedules" clause); Pikes Peak Lithographing Co., GPOCAB 77-7 (October 6, 1978), 1978 WL ______ (while there was technically no final decision by the contracting officer, the ad hoc panel asserted jurisdiction over a contractor's equitable adjustment claim to cover the cost of reprinting an order of maps because the positions of the parties were fully crystallized, and no purpose would be served in sending the case back to the contracting officer for a formality. Citing Conrad, Inc., ASBCA No. 14239, 70-1 BCA ¶ 8116 (1970)). See also Universal Printing, supra, slip op. at 21-22, n. 20 (no need for a contractor to go through the "charade" of filing a claim and requesting a decision from the contracting officer where the Government has issued a unilateral modification reducing the contract price, because that would be an unnecessary, delaying and expensive formality. Citing P.X. Engineering Co., ASBCA No. 38215, 89-2 BCA ¶ 21,859). In Shepard II, the Board adopted and applied the ASBCA's "essential difference" test as the touchstone for deciding whether or not it had jurisdiction over the contractor's amended claim based on the customer-agency's failure to place certain work under its "requirements" contract instead of issuing new printing requisitions. See Shepard II, supra, slip op. at 30-31 (citing Santa Fe Engineers, Inc., supra, 86-3 BCA at 96,508).68 In essence, that test requires the Board to determine if the pending claim is "essentially different" from the one presented to the contracting officer, and from which the appeal is taken. This does not mean that evidence developed during discovery cannot be the basis for amending an existing and valid claim. See Graphicdata, Inc., supra, slip op. at 4, n. 4; New South II, supra, slip op. at 1-2, n. 1; Shepard II, supra, slip op. at 30. Rather, it is the duty of the Board to ensure that such an amendment is not, in reality, a new claim; i.e., a claim not previously presented to the contracting officer for decision. See Shepard II, supra, slip op. at 30-31 (citing J.F. Shea Co., Inc. v. United States, supra; Santa Fe Engineers, Inc., supra). One significant clue in identifying whether there is an "essential difference" between two claims is the nature of the legal theory relied on to support recovery; i.e., is it the same theory or totally different? See Shepard II, supra, slip op. at 32; Datagraphics Press, Inc., supra, slip op. at 6. Another key indicator is if the claim stems from the same set of operative facts, regardless of the legal theory. See New South II, supra, slip op. at 1-2, n. 1. In this case, the Board is convinced that the Appellant's claim for increased costs in the amount of $15,726.00 is not a new claim. Although the Contractor's appeal, as filed, only challenged the Contracting Officer's final decision that the first Student Guide did not satisfy the specifications for a saddle-stitched pamphlet, and made no demand for its increased costs, it is also clear from the record that on the date the appeal was submitted to the Board (July 29, 1994), the revised pamphlet had not yet been shipped; i.e., August 5, 1994 was the new shipping date. Consequently, at the time it appealed, even if the Appellant knew that it would incur increased paper and manufacturing costs, in all likelihood it did not know their exact scope and amount. Therefore, in seeking the added expenses associated with reprinting the Student Guide under these circumstances it cannot be said that the Contractor is changing its legal theory of recovery. Rather, it seems to the Board that the Appellant is merely stating its belief that it is entitled to all costs associated with producing the second pamphlet; i.e., the complaint has simply been amended to include both the original contract price and the additional costs because together they represent the adverse financial impact of the Respondent's decision that the first Student Guide was rejectable and should be reprinted. See Graphicdata, Inc., supra, slip op. at 4, n. 4; New South Press II, supra, slip op. at 1-2, n. 1. Cf. Shepard II, supra, slip op. at 32 (contractor's amended claim was based on a "breach of contract" theory which was totally different from the "constructive change" theory advanced in support of its original claim); Datagraphics Press, Inc., supra, slip op. at 6 (contractor confused the issues stemming from the contracting officer's final decision with other questions concerning the propriety of the subsequent termination for convenience, which even though similar, if not identical, could not be considered by the ad hoc panel). Moreover, even if there was a difference in legal theory, these circumstances would fall "four square" within the Board's rationale in New South II, where it said, in pertinent part: In the Board's view, the Appellant's assertion of a new legal theory of recovery on appeal . . . does not constitute a new claim requiring a final decision from the Contracting Officer before the Board can exercise its jurisdiction, see, Shepard Printing, GPO BCA 37-92 (January 28, 1994), Sl. op. at 28; Epco Associates, GPO BCA 26-93 (November 18, 1993), Decision and Order Granting Appellant's Motion Under Rule 1(c) and Staying Proceedings Under Rule 1(d), Sl. op. at 3, because it is based upon the same operative facts underlying the original claim, see, Blaze Construction Company, Inc., IBCA No. 2863, 91-3 BCA ¶ 24,071, at 120,503 (citing, Placeway Construction Corporation v. United States, 910 F.2d 835, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Trepte Construction Company, ASBCA No. 38555, 90-1 BCA ¶ 22,595, at 113,385-86; Flores Drilling & Pump Company, AGBCA No. 82-204-3, 83-1 BCA ¶ 16,200, at 80,484). Furthermore, despite the different approach taken by the Appellant before the Board, the Contracting Officer certainly had no misapprehension about the basic factual allegations in reaching his decision to deny the claim. See, Contract Cleaning Maintenance, Inc. v. United States, 811 F.2d 586, 592 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Paragon Energy Corporation v. United States, 645 F.2d 966, 976 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Cerberonics, Inc. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 415, 418 (1987); Holk Development, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 40579, 40609, 90-3 BCA ¶ 23,086 at 115,938 . . . Moreover, no useful purpose would be served by requiring resubmission of the claim to the Contracting Officer and asking for his final decision, since Counsel for GPO neither objected to the amendment at the prehearing conference nor in his brief, the parties have already briefed the threshold issue, and besides it is clear from the record that whether the Appellant's claim had been for $2,000.00, $4,020.92, or 100 times those amounts for that matter, the Contracting Officer would still have denied it because he was acting on his understanding that the "Extension of Schedules" clause in the contract only authorized an adjustment of the delivery schedule for a Government delay. See, GPO Contract Terms, Solicitation Provisions, Supplemental Specifications, and Contract Clauses, GPO Pub. 310.2, Effective December 1, 1987 (Rev. 9-88), Contract Clauses, ¶ 12(c) (Extension of schedules) (GPO Contract Terms). See also, So-Pak-Company, Inc., ASBCA No. 38906, 93-3 BCA ¶ 26,215, at 130,469 (citing, ACS Construction Company, ASBCA No. 365535, 89-1 BCA ¶ 21,406; Emerson Electric Company, ASBCA No. 31184, 86-2 BCA ¶ 18,979; cf., Continental Products, Inc., ASBCA No. 45293, 93-2 BCA ¶ 25,879). Thus, under the circumstances of this case, which shows that the same or related evidence is involved in connection with the original claim and the claim as amended at the prehearing conference, that there is no prejudice to the contracting officer from the Board's consideration of the revised claim, and that no useful purpose would be served by requiring resubmission of the claim to the Contracting Officer, the Board concludes that it has jurisdiction to decide the issue presented by the parties. See New South II, supra, slip op. at 1-2, n. 1. [Emphasis added.] Accordingly, since the Appellant's claim for additional costs in this case stems from the same transaction as its claim for the original contract price (the Contracting Officer's rejection of the initial version of the Student Guide and his order to reprint it), the Board has jurisdiction to hear the matter. See New South II, supra, slip op. at 1-2, n. 1. Pikes Peak Lithographing Co., supra, slip op. at 1, n. 1. Second, even though jurisdiction is not a problem, the Contractor, who had the burden of proving its claim both as to entitlement and amount, has failed to do so on this record. See Swanson Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 21; New South Press & Associates, supra, slip op. at 49; Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 40. Accord Michael-Mark, Ltd., IBCA Nos. 2697, 2890, 2891, 2892, 2893, 2894, 2895, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26,453; Lemar Construction Co., ASPCA Nos. 31161, 31719, 88-1 BCA ¶ 20,429; Lawrence D. Krause, AGBCA No. 76-118-4, 82-2 BCA ¶ 16,129; Onetta Boat Works, Inc., ENGBCA No. 3733, 81-2 BCA ¶ 15,279; Globe Construction Co., ASPCA No. 21069, 78-2 BCA ¶ 13,337. See generally, Cibinic & Nash, Administration, at 698. In that regard, although the Appellant raised the matter of additional compensation in its Complaint, discussed it at the prehearing conference, and mentioned it again in its post-hearing briefs, see App. Brf., at 11; App. R. Brf., at 8; RPTC, at 5-6; Complaint, at 2, it neglected to introduce any affirmative evidence of its increased costs at the hearing, either by way of actual cost figures, see Swanson Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 22; Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 40-41; Banta Co., supra, slip op. at 37, or estimates supported by detailed, substantiating data, see Swanson Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 23; Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 41; Banta Co., supra, slip op. at 38. Accord Dawco Construction, Inc. v. United States, supra, 930 F.2d at 882; American Line Builders, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 115 (1992); Cen-Vi-Ro of Texas v. United States, 210 Ct. Cl. 684 (1976); Cherry Hill Construction, Inc. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA No. 12087-REIN, 93-2 BCA ¶ 25,810; R. G. Robbins & Co., ASPCA No. 27516, 83-1 BCA ¶ 16,420; Buck Brown Contracting Co., IBCA No. 1119-7-76, 78-2 BCA ¶ 13,360; Engineered Systems, Inc., DOTCAB No. 75-5, 76-2 BCA ¶ 12,211. See generally, Cibinic & Nash, Administration, at 703. Consequently, there is nothing in the record whatsoever to show how much the Contractor incurred in extra costs when it reprinted the pamphlet, or whether those additional costs were reasonable. See Swanson Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 23; New South Press & Associates, supra, slip op. at 49; Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 41-42. Accord General Builders Supply Co. v. United States, 187 Ct. Cl. 477, 409 F.2d 246 (1969); Michael-Mark Ltd., supra; Zurfluh Enterprises, Inc., VABCA No. 1941, 85-1 BCA ¶ 17,789; Lawrence D. Krause, supra; Celesco Industries; ASPCA No. 22251, 79-1 BCA ¶ 13,604. Without such proof the Appellant's case is essentially an unverified assertion that it incurred certain additional in reprinting the Student Guide. Such a contention is little more than argument, which standing alone cannot substitute for proof. See Swanson Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 32; Univex International, GPO BCA 23-90 (July 31, 1995), slip op. at 31, 1995 WL 488438, reconsid. denied, 1996 WL 112554 (February 7, 1996). Cf. Reese Manufacturing, Inc., ASBCA No. 35144, 88-1 BCA ¶ 20,358. Indeed, the Board has never allowed such unsubstantiated contentions to form the basis of recovery. See e.g., Swanson Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 32; Univex International, supra, slip op. at 31-32; B & B Reproductions, GPO BCA 9-89 (June 30, 1995), slip op. at 39, 1195 WL 488447; Stephenson, Inc., supra, slip op. at 57. Accord Singleton Contracting Corp., GSBCA No. 8548, 90-2 BCA ¶ 22,748; Tri-State Services of Texas, Inc., ASBCA No. 38019, 89-3 BCA ¶ 22,064)); Gemini Services, Inc., ASBCA No. 30247, 86-1 BCA ¶ 18,736. Accordingly, the Board concludes that the Appellant's claim for additional costs incurred in reprinting the Student Guide must be DENIED for want of proof. VI. ORDER For all of the above reasons, the Board finds and concludes that: (1) the Appellant is entitled to recover on its principal claim of $88,701.00 for the original printing of the Student Guide under the doctrine of contra proferentem because the disputed "BINDING" specification is clearly ambiguous regarding the use of binding stubs, the ambiguity is latent, and the record evidence on prevailing trade practice and prior course of dealings is insufficient to show that the Contractor's interpretation, which it relied on in submitting its bid, was unreasonable; (2) the Appellant is also entitled to recover under the theory of constructive change, since its "single signature" press configuration does not appear to be unreasonable under the circumstances; (3) the Contracting Officer's decision that the original printing of the pamphlet was rejectable was incorrect, because without evaluation standards in the contract specifications, QATAP, or GPO Contract Terms, or elsewhere in GPO regulations, the basis of the rejection cannot be established; and (4) the Contractor is not entitled to recover on its $15,726.00 claim for the increased paper and manufacturing costs it allegedly incurred in reprinting the Student Guide, because it has offered no evidence to support the claim. THEREFORE, the Board REVERSES the Contracting Officer's final decision, ALLOWS the appeal to the extent of the Appellant's claim for the original contract price of $88,701.00, and REMANDS the case with instructions that appropriate arrangements be made to pay the Contractor in accordance with this opinion. See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 87; Universal Printing Company, supra, slip op. at 56; Banta Company, supra, slip op. at 62; RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra, slip op. at 37. HOWEVER, insofar as the Appellant claims reimbursement for increased costs in reprinting the pamphlet, its appeal is DENIED. It is so Ordered. March 12, 1997 STUART M. FOSS Administrative Judge _______________ 1 The Contracting Officer's appeal file, assembled pursuant to Rule 4 of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure, was delivered to the Board on September 7, 1994. GPO Instruction 110.12, Subject: Board of Contract Appeals Rules of Practice and Procedure, dated September 17, 1984, Rule 4(a) (Board Rules). It will be referred to hereafter as the R4 File, with an appropriate tab letter also indicated. The R4 File contains twelve (12) documents, identified as Tabs A-L. 2 The court reporter's transcript shall be referred to hereinafter as "Tr." followed by a colon and an appropriate page number thereafter. Furthermore, at the hearing both the Contractor and the Government introduced additional documentary evidence, which shall be referred to hereinafter as "App. Exh. No.," and "Gov. Exh. No.," respectively, with an appropriate number thereafter. 3 Following the hearing, the Contractor obtained the services of Counsel for the purpose of briefing this matter. On August 24, 1995, both the "Appellant's Brief" and the "Respondent's Brief" were filed with the Board, and shall be cited hereinafter as "App. Brf." and "R. Brf.," respectively, followed by an appropriate page number. Subsequently, on September 7, 1995, the parties submitted reply briefs, which shall be referred to hereinafter as "App. R. Brf." and "R. R. Brf.," respectively, with an appropriate page citation thereafter. Attached to the Appellant's initial brief was an affidavit from Ronal Cooper, the Contractor's Director of Business Development, who also testified at the hearing. The purpose of Copper's affidavit was to authenticate a second attachment, namely an illustration of the way the Contractor produced the Student Guide as a single 28-page signature, and to have it received into evidence. The Respondent has objected to that "construction sample" as irrelevant to the issues in this case. R. R. Brf., at 4. The Board believes that the Government's objection is well taken. More importantly, in the Board's opinion, the affidavit and illustration are objectionable on two additional grounds: (a) the information is outside the record and is tantamount to a request for judicial notice by the Board; and (b) the sample was not introduced during the hearing and thus GPO had no opportunity to test the validity of the evidence at the trial by examining Cooper about it. Accordingly, the Board rejects both Cooper's affidavit and the example of a 28-page signature, and has not considered them in the context of this decision. See MPE Business Forms, Inc., GPO BCA 10-95 (August 16, 1996), slip op. at 50, n. 47, 1996 WL _____; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., GPO BCA 02-93 (May 19, 1995), slip op. at 28-29, n. 43, 1995 WL 488488; Sterling Printing, Inc., GPO BCA 20-89 (July 5, 1994), Decision on Motion for Reconsideration and Order, slip op. at 12, 1994 WL 377592 (hereinafter Sterling Reconsideration) (citing Goetz Demolition Co., ASBCA Nos. 40605, 41346, 93-2 BCA ¶ 25,886; Marshall Logging, Inc., AGBCA No. 87-283-1, 88-2 BCA ¶ 20,726; Pascal Redfern, PSBCA No. 1512, 87-3 BCA ¶ 19,983; Jim Davis, AGBCA Nos. 86-103-1, 86-104-1, 86-1 BCA ¶ 18,634; Polarad Electronics Corp., ASBCA No. 20636, 79-1 BCA ¶ 13,777; Canadian Commercial Corp., ASBCA No. 17187, 76-2 BCA ¶ 12,145). Accord Preventive Maintenance Service, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 41445, 44661, 94-3 BCA ¶ 27,115 (revisions to spreadsheets originally submitted to contracting officer); Lockheed Shipbuilding and Construction Co., DOT CAB No. 73-36C, 76-1 BCA ¶ 116,698 (additional documents); American Structures, Inc. and Mining Equipment Manufacturing Corp. (A Joint Venture, ENGBCA No. 3372, 75-1 BCA ¶ 11,284 (diagrams not presented at prior hearing). See also Board Rules, Rule 13(b) ("Except as the Board may otherwise order in its discretion, no proof shall be received in evidence after completion of an oral hearing, nor in cases submitted on the record will proof be received after notification by the Board that the case is ready for decision." [Emphasis added.]). As the Board has noted: "This well-established rule is really nothing more than a judicial proscription against a party having 'two bites at the apple.'" See Sterling Reconsideration, supra, slip op. at 13 (citing Goetz Demolition Co., supra, 93-2 BCA at 128,768). Accord Sunshine Cordage Corp., ASBCA No. 38904, 90-1 BCA ¶ 22,572; USD Technologies, Inc., ASBCA No. 31305, 87-2 BCA ¶ 19,680 at 99,616, aff'd sub nom. USD Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 845 F.2d 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 4 As its name implies, MEPCOM is a joint recruiting organization run by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard. Tr. 85. 5 According to the Contracting Officer, the Student Guide is a recruitment brochure designed to encourage young men and women to join the various armed services, primarily out of high school. Tr. 85. The Appellant disagrees with the Respondent's view that it was producing a "promotional piece," but rather believed it was printing nothing more than a "test booklet for students." Tr. 38, 44. During the hearing the Contractor introduced five Army publications- "Opportunities & Options: U.S. Army Service of Choice for America's Youth and Employers," (a mechanically bound booklet), "Living with the Army," " You and the Army," "The United States Army Reserve: Benefits," "Army Adventure, Good for a Lifetime"-as examples of what it thought were true promotional materials. Tr. 40-44; App. Exh. Nos. 10-14. The Board admitted these exhibits for that limited purpose only (to illustrate the Appellant's idea of a "promotional piece"). Tr. 43. See FED. R. EVID. 105. 6 The complete and correct titles of these regulations are: (a) GPO Contract Terms, Solicitation Provisions, Supplemental Specifications, and Contract Clauses, GPO Publication 310.2, Effective December 1, 1987 (Rev. 9-88) (hereinafter GPO Contract Terms); and (b) GPO Contract Terms, Quality Through Attributes Program for Printing and Binding, GPO Publication 310.1, Effective May 1979 (Revised November 1989) (hereinafter QATAP). 7 The above specifications with respect to binding, size, page count, and Quality Level are the same as the specifications for Jacket Nos. 747-463 and 747-464, under which the previous versions of the Student Guide and the Counselor Guide were printed. Tr. 141-42, 146; Gov. Exh. No. 4. 8 The Student Guide and Counselor Guide are publications for which MEPCOM has a recurring need. Tr. 86. 9 The Appellant's winning bid of $105,388.00 was nearly $30,000.00 lower than its successful offer for this work the previous year; i.e., $135,299.00. Tr. 146; Gov. Exh. No. 4. 10 The estimated cost of the Counselor Guide (Jacket No. 547-783) was $16,687.00. See RPTC, at 2, n. 2. 11 During the hearing, one of the Respondent's employees, Patrick Morrisey, was called as a witness by the Appellant, and disagreed with Cooper's analysis. Morrisey testified that the number of pages in any saddle-stitched product must be divisible by four. Tr. 63. In his view, there was no need for the two binding stubs in this case since the number of pages in the publication (28) "is already divisible by four . . .". Tr. 70. See also Tr. 197 (testimony of Respondent's witness James E. Willard, who was asked his opinion of the Student Guide printed by the Contractor (App. Exh. No. 9): "If we were to take the number of pages here you would find this should be produced as a 28-page document. Now there would normally be two blanks in this, which are the two blanks at the end of a book."). 12 Indeed, the Appellant bid on the contract with the idea of using binding stubs. Tr. 57. In the Contracting Officer's view, the binding lips gave the Contractor an unfair competitive advantage because "none of the other bidders were afforded an opportunity to submit a bid with binding stub[s]." Tr. 108-09. Furthermore, he wondered ". . . [W]ho knows how many bidders we could have chased away or weren't interested because of [binding stubs] not being allowed in the specification." Tr. 118. The scope of the potential savings was indicated by Willard, who said that the number of copies ordered by the contract would make it economically advantageous to use binding stubs; i.e., " . . . [Y] ou are talking about 650,000 copies and you are taking about two leaves, effectively, which you are not producing. That is two sheets, four pages. Two pieces of paper times 650,000. You are talking about over a million some leaves of paper, which is a substantial amount of paper." Tr. 211-12. 13 At the hearing, the Contracting Officer testified that a Dylux proof is simply a proof made " . . . from films . . . on sensitized paper . . . [but] not [in] the ink [or] on the paper ordered, . . ." which is supposed to represent how the final product will look. Tr. 91-92. The Appellant added that the purpose is to show the positioning of the pages in the publications. Tr. 52. The parties agree that the Dylux proof submitted by the Contractor was not a so-called "construction" sample. Tr. 52, 54, 91. 14 The Appellant said that the lips were not on the Dylux proof because of the way the signatures were folded. Tr. 54. The record indicates that when the proof was received by the CRPPO no one noticed a place for a binding lip. Tr. 93-94, 132. However, when the Contracting Officer examined the proof at the hearing, he saw a ragged edge where the stubs should have been, expressed the opinion that the binding lips might have been removed at the Contractor's plant before the proof was submitted to GPO. Tr. 95. The proofs retrieved from MEPCOM by the CRPPO showed that the two pages which would have had binding stubs were securely attached by some other means; e.g., by pasting-in or tipping-in. Tr. 53-54, 131, 133. The record also indicates that lips would have been clearly visible if the proof had been a construction sample instead of a Dylux proof. Tr. 54. 15 The Printing Procurement Regulation requires that any customer-agency complaint about the quality of the product received be submitted on "Notice of Quality Defects" (GPO Form 1815). See PPR, Chap. XIII, Sec. 1, ¶ 5(a) (Customer Agency Quality Complaints). The same requirement is spelled out in the GPO Agency Procedural Handbook for the Procurement of Commercial Printing Services with the U.S. Government Printing Office Regional Procurement Offices, GPO Publication 305.1 (Revised January 1992), Sec. V, ¶ 3.d, at 11 (hereinafter GPO Handbook), a publication addressed to the "Heads of Federal Departments, Their Printing and Publications Representatives, and Printing Administrative Officers," and designed, inter alia, to "guide [GPO's customer-agency's] through the laws, regulations, and procedures that frame Federal printing policy and GPO's procurement process, . . .". See GPO Handbook, Foreword, at i. Thus, the GPO Handbook tells customer-agencies, in pertinent part, that: "All complaints regarding product quality shall be submitted on GPO Form 1815 through an authorized agency printing representative and must be accompanied by samples . . . . This requirement does not preclude prompt verbal notifications when the nature of the quality problem(s) warrants immediate attention." See GPO Handbook, Sec. V, ¶ 3.d (Registering Complaints), at 11. [Emphasis added.] The publication also provides an example of a completed "Notice of Quality Defects" form. See GPO Handbook, Sec. VI, at 27-28. There is no "Notice of Quality Defects" from MEPCOM in the record, nor is there any evidence in this case that the customer-agency completed one and sent to the CRPPO; i.e., the only written notification received by the CRPPO concerning MEPCOM's problems with the quality of the product was Lieutenant Lechner's undated memorandum. Nonetheless, the Contracting Officer processed the complaint in the form submitted by MEPCOM, even though it was procedurally defective. However, it is the Board's policy not to disturb the procedural decisions of GPO contracting officers, in the absence of some "compelling reason," particularly where, as here, the contractor has not challenged the exercise of that discretion. See Graphicdata, Inc., GPO BCA 35-94 (June 14, 1996), slip op. at 97-98; 1996 WL _____; Universal Printing Co., GPO BCA 9-90 (June 27, 1994), slip op. at 33-34, 1994 WL 377586. Accord Condor Reliability Services, Inc., ASBCA No. 40538, 90-3 BCA ¶ 23,254; Goetz Demolition Co., ASBCA No. 39129, 90-3 BCA ¶ 23,241; Kinetic Engineering & Construction, Inc., ASBCA No. 30726, 89-1 BCA ¶ 21,397. There is no "compelling reason" shown in this record which would warrant review of the decision to process MEPCOM's complaint without a "Notice of Quality Defects," effectively waiving that procedural requirement, and the Board will proceed on the basis that the QATAP issues are properly before it. 16 Nepi said that the neither the Appellant, nor any other contractor, had ever provided a product with binding lips for the CRPPO prior to this contract. Tr. 106, 111. As he recalled, contractor's did not produce publications with binding stubs on their own, and that contracts with such requirements were limited to those that had "tear out" sheets or cards on paper other than the stock specified for text pages. Tr. 106. 17 See PPR, Chap. XIII, Sec. 1, ¶ 4.f(1) ("Assistance from other Departments. When the Printing Procurement Department is unable to make a proper determination as to whether items submitted, or produced by, contractors in response to quality assurance requirements are equal to the specifications, they shall request assistance from other sources. However, the final determination as to conformance with the specifications rests with the Contracting Officer."). 18 The attachment was a single-page commentary, dated December 9, 1991, entitled "Jim Willard's Comments Regarding Saddle-Stitched Products." The crux of his comments were that binding stubs were contrary to the "historical common sense" definition of a saddle- stitched product; i.e., " . . . bound in combinations of four- page signatures, or multiples thereof, with the inner signatures inset into the outer ones. All pages of the signatures will be the full specified trim size; . . .". Gov. Exh. No. 3; Attachment. Willard, who testified at the hearing, said that the original controversy stemmed from a saddle-stitched publication produced by Shepard Printing with two leaves (four pages) secured by binding lips, which the customer-agency rejected, but which the contractor insisted met the industry standards for a saddle- stitched product. Tr. 191-92. (Another witness for the Respondent, Jack Marken, remembered the issue being raised by a job produced by Fry Communications, Inc. Tr. 163, 166.) Willard argued that the traditional meaning of saddle-stitching- "the process of securing the leaves of a section, e.g., a periodical issue or pamphlet, through the center fold by means of 'wire staples'" or "[fastening] a booklet by wiring it through the middle fold of the sheets"-required all leaves in a book to be uniform, and precluded binding stubs or lips except where there was an insert which was not on the same paper or in the same form; e.g., a "tear-out" reply card. Tr. 192-95 (citing Matt T. Roberts and Don Etherington, BOOKBINDING AND THE CONSERVATION OF BOOKS: A DICTIONARY OF DESCRIPTIVE TERMINOLOGY, at 225 (Library of Congress 1982) (hereinafter BOOKBINDING); John E. Cogoli, PHOTO OFFSET FUNDAMENTALS, at 309 (McKnight & McKnight, 3rd ed., 1973) (hereinafter FUNDAMENTALS); Michael H. Bruno, ed., POCKET PAL at 204 (International Paper Co., 14th ed., 1989). See R4 File, Tab G. See also Tr. 152 (testimony of Larry McHugh, Chief of the Printing Procurement Department's Quality Assurance Section: "[A saddle-stitched publication is one with] . . . stitching through the centerfold or the middle fold." ). Willard's view was adopted by Gardner in his memorandum of December 12, 1991. Tr. 192. 19 Gov. Exh. No. 3 was admitted into evidence over the objection of the Appellant. Tr. 103-04. As the Board explained, the only basis for objecting to the memorandum would be that it is hearsay. Tr. 104. However, the document clearly falls within the "business records" exception to the hearsay rule. Tr. 104. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (Records of regularly conducted activity). Besides, as the Board has mentioned numerous times, the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings such as this. See e.g., Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., GPO BCA 06-95 (August 29, 1995), slip op. at 12, n. 16, 1995 WL 818784, reconsid. denied, 1996 WL _____ (February 13, 1996); Vanier Graphics, GPO BCA 12-92 (May 17, 1994), slip op. at 36, n. 29, 1994 WL 275102. Accord Southwest Marine, Inc., DOTBCA No. 1661, 93-3 BCA ¶ 26,168; Rocky Mountain Trading Co., GSBCA No. 8671-P, 87-1 BCA ¶ 19,406; Johnson & Son Erector Co., ASBCA No. 23689, 86-2 BCA ¶ 18,931; Hof Construction, Inc., GSBCA No. 7012, 84-1 BCA ¶ 17,009. 20 However, the record tells us that the policy was binding on Purchase Division contracting officers, and non-approval of binding lips is still the policy of that organization. Tr. 166, 183. 21 Attached to Lenauer's letter was a copy of page 11 from the 1994 specifications for Program A814-M, a GPO general usage contract. Tr. 158-59. See New South Press & Assoc., Inc., GPO BCA 14-92 (January 31, 1996), slip op. at 20, n. 28, 1996 WL 112555. As such it covers a variety of binding styles for publications with a wide range of page numbers. Tr. 158-59. For "Saddle Stitched Products" Program A814-M requires: "Saddle-wire stitch in two places and trim three sides. Each product must contain complete 4-page signature after trimming. Single leaves connected with a lip (i.e., binding stub) to left or right side of stitches will not be allowed." [Emphasis added.] See also Tr. 159-60. At the hearing, Cooper testified that the Appellant had never bid on, or produced a job with a binding lip if the specifications precluded the stub. Tr. 31. 22 During the hearing, both parties fully litigated the "trade practice" issue with respect to binding stubs. The Appellant introduced several saddle-stitched publications which it had printed, including the 1993 "S" Corporation Tax Package it had produced for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) under Jacket No. 345-048, a copy of the Queensboro Community College's continuing education course catalogue which it had also produced, and several television guides from the St. Louis Post Dispatch, the local newspaper, all of which contained binding lips. Tr. 17-21, 23-24, 30-31, 33, 46-47; App. Exh. Nos. 1-2, 4-8. (At the prehearing conference the Contractor also cited the publication printed for GPO under Jacket No. 375-005 to illustrate its point, but did not introduce it at the hearing. See RPTC, at 6, n. 5.) The Appellant basically argued that nothing in QATAP precludes binding stubs, and in the absence of an express provision in the specifications doing so, their use is perfectly acceptable in the trade. Tr. 16, 31-32. For the Respondent, Morrisey likewise agreed that QATAP was silent on the question of binding lips. Tr. 60, 65, 74. However, he also said that: ". . . industry standards . . . say that binding stubs, unless necessary, are not used." Tr. 77. The Contracting Officer also concurred that the definition of "saddle-stitching" he relied on is not reflected in QATAP, or any other GPO publication for that matter, but he testified that binding lips normally required the permission of the customer, and added that ". . . it is not trade practice where a contractor unilaterally makes a decision on their customer's behalf . . . on stub binding." Tr. 110, 120. He also stated that binding stubs were not used in the trade as the Appellant employed them in the Student Guide. Tr. 111. McHugh testified that for saddle-stitched products ". . . the trade practice is clearly understood . . ." and that ". . . the only time that you would need to go to a binding stub is if you had a total number of pages that is not divisible by four. I think everyone in the industry's expectation would be that you are going to get a full, four-page signature, not a two-page tipped [sic] in." Tr. 158. Marken also testified for the Government that binding stubs were not commonly used on GPO products. Tr. 164. Finally, M. Clive Walker, the current Superintendent of the Purchase Division, corroborated Marken's testimony regarding the Respondent's policy disallowing binding stubs, and said he could only recall their use in the private sector for special purposes; e.g., "tear out" postcards and envelopes. Tr. 170-71. Indeed, Walker believed that Gardner's memorandum (Gov. Exh. No. 3) merely restated the practice in the printing industry. Tr. 184. As for the IRS publication introduced by the Appellant (App. Exh. No. 1), Walker said that stubs were probably allowed because it was a QATAP Level IV job and the lips did not impair the function of the product. Tr. 172-75. In that regard, QATAP Level IV only requires "[b]asic quality, informational quality, and utility quality," and includes publications such as "[t]elephone directories, indexes, project reports . . .". Tr. 176, 182; QATAP, at viii-ix. However, on QATAP Level III contracts, such as the one in dispute here, which ask for "[g]ood quality, above average quality," as would be required for "[a]nnual reports, general process color work, court decisions, budget reports, catalogs, textbooks . . .", Walker stated that the trade practice is not to use binding stubs. Tr. 173, 176, 181-82; QATAP, at viii. 23 At the hearing, the Contracting Officer also indicated that the binding stubs could also be considered extra blank pages, and thus rejectable under finishing attribute F-15 (Blank Pages-Other Than Specified). Tr. 107, 125; QATAP, at 44. See also Tr. 153-54 (McHugh testimony). However, he thought that finishing attribute F-1 (Trim Size) was most applicable. Tr. 125-26. 24 It is undisputed that the reprint met the specifications for the Student Guide, that it was accepted by the Government, and that the Appellant has been paid for the job. See RPTC, at 5. 25 The Contractor initially submitted its appeal to the General Accounting Office (GAO). R4 File, Tab J. However, on July 29, 1994, GAO notified the Appellant that it was without jurisdiction because its appeal concerned a matter of contract administration not award. R4 File, Tab K (Custom Printing Co., GAO File No. B-257991, dated July 29, 1994). The Contractor filed this appeal with the Board the same day. See Board Rules, Rules 1(a) and 2. 26 Those questions, as articulated by the Board, were: (a) [w]as the contract's "BINDING" specification ambiguous or vague regarding the use of a binding stub in the production of the Student Guide, and if so, was the ambiguity patent or latent; (b) [i]f the "BINDING" specification was vague or ambiguous, was the Contractor obligated to bring the discrepancy to the attention of the Contracting Officer prior to performance of any work under the contract, and if so, did the Appellant meet this duty, either directly or when it submitted the Dylux proofs for approval; (c) [w]as there an established prior course of dealing between GPO and the Contractor concerning the use of binding stubs for saddle-stitched products, which would have allowed the Appellant to use such stubs in binding the Student Guide, notwithstanding the absence of such language in the contract specifications; and (d) [w]as the Contracting Officer's decision to reject the original printing of the Student Guide improper, and if so, is the Contractor entitled to compensation of $104,427.00 or some other amount? RPTC, at 7. 27 The Appellant rejects as irrelevant GPO's "creative" interpretation of the words "above average" in describing why the original order of the Student Guide did not meet Quality Level III standards, because the phrase it taken from a part of the QATAP manual-the Foreword-which is expressly not part of the contract, but rather is provided for informational purposes only. App. Brf., at 7. Moreover, the Contractor believes that the Respondent is overreaching in its reliance on the supplemental specification concerning quality in GPO Contract Terms, because that provision applies to all GPO contracts and all QATAP quality levels. App. R. Brf., at 4. 28 The Appellant believes that the definitions of "saddle- stitching" set forth in BOOKBINDING and FUNDAMENTALS state the majority view, while the meaning used by POCKET PAL, which speaks of fastening a booklet by placing a wire "through the middle fold of the sheets", id., at 204 [emphasis added], is the minority usage. App. Brf., at 9. See R4 File, Tab G. It is undisputed that these reference sources or their definitions are not incorporated in the contract, nor are they found in GPO Contract Terms or QATAP. App. Brf., at 9. See also Tr. 119-20. 29 See BOOKBINDING, at 235 (defines a signature as "[a] section or GATHERING of a book, either in the flat or folded state, to which a SIGNATURE MARK has been assigned. Technically, the sets of 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, or 128 printed pages, when folded, constitute a 'section,' while a 'signature' is only the sequential mark of identification printed on the initial page of the section; today, however, little if any distinction is made between the two expressions."); POCKET PAL, at 204 (defines a signature "in printing and binding" as "the name given to a printed sheet after it has been folded."). See also GPO Handbook, Glossary of Graphic Arts Terms, at 39 (defining a "signature" as a "printed sheet containing four pages, or multiples of four pages, folded and numbered to form one unit of a book or pamphlet."). The GPO Handbook definition was read into the record by Contracting Officer Nepi during his testimony, to which the Appellant's representative replied, "We don't disagree with that." Tr. 139. Furthermore, it should be noted that like BOOKBINDING, FUNDAMENTALS, and POCKET PAL, the GPO Handbook is also not incorporated by reference in the contract. 30 During the hearing, the Appellant also stated that: "[a] signature is a folded group of pages that come off a press-given a 12-pager, 32-pager, 24-whatever comes off that press is considered as a signature when it comes off in one operation. Tr. 48. [Emphasis added.] 31 Although the Appellant agrees with the Government that for the purposes of QATAP the signatures in saddle-stitched publications must be in increments of four pages, see App. R. Brf., at 3-4 and note 11 supra, it challenges that proposition as a general rule, essentially on the ground that the Respondent failed to support it with any relevant or cogent evidence, see App. Brf., at 10. 32 In that regard, the Contractor relies on Program A814-M (as well as Program C181) for the proposition that GPO will prohibit binding lips in its specifications if it does not want them; otherwise a product is not necessarily rejectable if the product has stubs. App. Brf., at 10. See note 21 supra. The Respondent, however, points out that these Programs are "requirements" term contracts covering publications with varying page counts, and not a one-time purchase with a fixed page count, such as here, so the Appellant's examples are inapposite. R. R. Brf., at 2. 33 The Government, on the other hand, argues that the language in other contracts, particularly agreements involving different parties, cannot be used to interpret the terms of the disputed contract. R. R. Brf., at 1. 34 The Respondent rejects the Appellant's argument that just because QATAP omits mentioning binding stubs they are therefore allowed. R. Brf., at 8; R. R. Brf., at 1. In GPO's view, the attributes published in the QATAP Manual only address the most common printing and finishing problems, and are not intended to be exhaustive. R. Brf., at 8, (citing McHugh's testimony, Tr. 150-51); R. R. Brf., at 1. Therefore, the Government's consent to the use of binding stubs cannot be drawn from the mere absence of a QATAP attribute concerning them. R. Brf., at 8. 35 As indicated previously, much of the Respondent's evidence is not challenged by the Appellant. See notes 28 and 29 supra. Similarly, the Government's description of the differences between its evidence and the Contractor's regarding industry practice with respect to the use of binding stubs, see R. Brf., at 10-13; R. R. Brf., at 3, has already been summarized. See note 22 supra. Suffice it to say, the crux of GPO's argument is that the 28-page Student Guide was an ideal publication for saddle-stitching because its page count was divisible by four, but in producing the pamphlet as a single signature product which resulted in two binding lips in addition to the contract specification's two blank pages at the end of the booklet, the Appellant did not furnish a "saddle-stitched" publication, as that process is understood in the industry; i.e., in the trade such stubs are typically used only to affix "odd" pages, inserts, reply cards, tear out pages, envelopes of similar items. R. Brf., at 10-11. In that regard, the Government says that where, as here, a contract between two parties in the same trade or business is silent about technical details, the law holds that an implied agreement exists that the usual and customary trade practices will apply. R. Brf., at 11, n. 6 (citing Geographics, Inc., GPOBCA 8-85 (January 8, 1987), 1987 WL 228966; Gholson Byars & Holmes Construction Co. v. United States, 173 Ct. Cl. 374, 351 F.2d 987 (1965). See also W.G. Cornell Co. v. United States, 179 Ct. Cl. 651, 376 F.2d 299 (1967). 36 See also Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 64; McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., GPO BCA 06-91 (May 6, 1994), slip op. at 20, 1994 WL 377581 (hereinafter McDonald & Eudy II); Shepard Printing, GPO BCA 23-91 (April 29, 1993), slip op. at 19, 1993 WL 526848; Chavis and Chavis Printing, GPO BCA 20-90 (February 6, 1991), slip op. at 16, 1991 WL 439270; Rose Printing Co., GPO BCA 2-87 (June 9, 1989), slip op. at 6, 1989 WL 384982; Fry Communications, Inc., GPO BCA 1-87 (June 1, 1989), slip op. at 5, 1989 WL 384980; Stabbe Senter Press, GPO BCA Nos. 13-85 and 19-85 (May 12, 1989), slip op. at 48, 1989 WL 384977; Dependable Printing Co., Inc., GPO BCA 5-84 (September 12, 1985), slip op. at 23-24, 1985 WL 154847. Accord Mega Construction Co., Inc. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 735, 741 (1992); S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. United States, 193 Ct. Cl. 269, 433 F.2d 1314 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Wholesale Tire and Supply Co., Ltd., ASBCA No. 42502, 92-2 BCA ¶ 24,960; Orlando Williams d/b/a Orlando Williams Janitorial Service, ASBCA Nos. 26099, 26872, 84-1 BCA ¶ 16,983. Strict compliance can be enforced either by rejecting the defective product, or accepting the work at a discount if that is in the Government's best interest. See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 64; McDonald & Eudy II, supra, slip op. at 21. The Appellant contends that except for the dispute concerning binding stubs, GPO has waived this argument with respect to the rest of the original printing of the Student Guide. App. R. Brf., at 6. In other words, but for the binding lip problem, the Government would agree that the publication fully meets all contract requirements. 37 The Respondent implies that this is precisely what the Appellant did in this case; i.e., it based its offer on a product with binding lips, and thereby obtained a competitive advantage over other bidders. R. Brf., at 14. 38 The Board was created by the Public Printer in 1984. See GPO Instruction 110.10C, Subject: Establishment of the Board of Contract Appeals, dated September 17, 1984. Before then, ad hoc panels considered disputes between contractors and GPO. Even though it was decided in January 1986, Vogard Printing was an ad hoc panel case. The Board cites the decisions of these ad hoc boards as GPOCAB. While the Board is not bound by ad hoc panel rulings, its policy is to follow them where applicable and appropriate. See Big Red Enterprises, GPO BCA 07-93 (August 30, 1996), slip op. at 22, n. 22, 1996 WL _____; The George Marr Co., GPO BCA 31-94 (April 23, 1996), slip op. at 50, n. 40, 1996 WL ______; New South Press & Assoc., Inc., supra, slip op. at 32, n. 45; Shepard Printing, supra, slip op. at 14, n. 19; Stephenson, Inc., supra, slip op. at 18, n. 20; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, slip op. at 9, n. 9. 39 Specifically, according to GPO, the Contracting Officer took the following factors into account: (a) the Student Guide was "an integral part" of the military recruiting program; (b) the target audience consisted of high school students and their parents; (c) the Government felt it was "important" for the publication "to project a positive image of the military and aid in inducing students to volunteer for the armed services;" and (d) both MEPCOM and the Contracting Officer thought that the two binding stubs were "visually offensive" and made it appear as if the Student Guide was pieced together. R. Brf., at 17. Furthermore, GPO says that insofar as the Appellant challenges the Respondent's view that the Student Guide was a "promotional piece," see note 5 supra, a contractor is not allowed to substitute its judgment for that of the Government about what constitutes a suitable product under the contract. R. Brf., at 17, n. 8 (citing D.E.W., Inc., ASBCA No. 17030, 72-2 BCA ¶ 9,494). 40 Indeed, the Respondent argues that the "S" Corporation Tax Package is irrelevant because of differences with the disputed contract. R. Brf., at 18-19. In that regard, GPO notes that App. Exh. No. 2: (a) was a Quality Level IV product not Quality Level III; (b) it contained pages of forms which were meant to be torn out, leaving a stub in the booklet; (c) was intended to be thrown away once the forms were removed; and (d) had a "binding" specification which was completely different because it allowed for either saddle-stitch wire staples or paste. Id. See App. Exh. No. 2, at 9. Moreover, before the tax package was printed, the IRS approved a construction sample which showed the binding stubs, in contrast to the situation here where the proof submitted by the Appellant did not have such lips, and did not alert GPO to the Contractor's intention "to deviate from generally accepted trade practices." R. Brf., at 19. 41 The presumption is, of course, rebuttable by clear evidence that the parties have changed their intent or were in disagreement at the time they entered into the disputed contract. See MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 59; Publishers Choice Book Manufacturing Co., GPO BCA 4-84 (August 18, 1986), slip op. at 10, 1986 WL 181457 (citing Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 192 Ct. Cl. 36, 426 F.2d 322 (1970). 42 The record on which the Board's decision is based consists of: (a) the Notice of Appeal, dated July 29, 1994; (b) the R4 File, Tabs A-L; (c) the Appellant's Complaint, dated September 9, 1994; (d) the Respondent's "general denial," dated October 7, 1994; (d) the Report of Prehearing Telephone Conference, dated April 17, 1995; (e) the transcript of the hearing held on June 6, 1995; (f) the exhibits submitted by the parties at the hearing, with the exception of App. Exh. No. 3, which was withdrawn, and Gov. Exh. No. 5, which was rejected; (g) the initial briefs filed by the Appellant and the Respondent on August 24, 1995; and (h) the parties' reply briefs submitted on September 7, 1995. 43 In his final decision of July 14, 1994, the only QATAP reference made by the Contracting Officer was to finishing attribute F-1 (Trim Size). See R4 File, Tab F, at 1. Furthermore, as previously noted, at the hearing the Contracting Officer stated that the original version of the Student Guide was also rejectable on the basis of finishing attribute F-15 (Blank Pages-Other Than Specified). See note 23 supra. However, because the Board functions as an appellate body to consider properly filed appeals from final decisions of GPO contracting officers, it only deals with issues and facts as they existed at the time of the final decision, and not with those which may have arisen subsequently. See Datagraphics Press, Inc., [GPOCAB] (June 23, 1978), slip op. at 6, 1978 WL 22342. See also Board Rules, Preface to Rules, ¶ I (Jurisdiction for Considering Appeals). Therefore, since finishing attribute F-15 was not a reason given by the Contracting Officer for his rejection of the product in his final decision, the Board will not consider that element of QATAP in the context of this opinion. 44 The United States Claims Court has observed that: "[a] mere dispute over the terms does not constitute an ambiguity, and an interpretation which is merely possible is not necessarily reasonable." See Ceccanti, Inc. v. United States, supra, 6 Cl. Ct. at 528. An ambiguity must have two or more reasonable interpretations and the intent of the parties must not be determinable by the normal rules of interpretation. See McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., supra, slip op. at 14, n. 12; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, slip op. at 42. See also International Business Investments, Inc. v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 122 (1989), aff'd, 895 F.2d 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (contract terms are not rendered ambiguous by the mere fact that the parties disagree as to their meaning; there must be reasonable uncertainty of meaning); Perry & Wallis, Inc. v. United States, supra, 192 Ct. Cl. at 315, 427 F.2d at 725 (quoting Bishop Engineering Co. v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 411, 416 (1967)). Furthermore, a contractor claiming an ambiguity in drafting does not have to prove its interpretation is more reasonable than the Government-the test is whether or not the contractor's interpretation standing alone is reasonable. See George Bennett v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 61, 371 F.2d 859, 861 (1967) ("To prevail . . . it is not essential that [the contractor] demonstrate his position to be the only justifiable or reasonable one. A specification susceptible to more than one interpretation, found to be consistent with the contract's language and the parties' objectively ascertainable intentions becomes convincing proof of an ambiguity; the burden of that ambiguity falls solely upon the party who drew the specification." Citing Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 109 Ct. Cl. 390, 74 F.Supp. 165 (1947)). 45 The purpose of any rule of contract interpretation is to carry out the intent of the parties. See Hegeman-Harris & Co., 194 Ct. Cl. 574, 440 F.2d 1009 (1971). The test for ascertaining intent is an objective one; i.e., the question is what would a reasonable contractor have understood, not what did the drafter subjectively intend. See Corbetta Construction Co. v. United States, 198 Ct. Cl. 712, 461 F.2d 1330 (1972). See also Salem Engineering and Construction Corp. v. United States, supra, 2 Cl. Ct. at 806. The provisions of the contract itself should provide the evidence of the objective intent of the parties. 46 See note 44 supra. 47 As previously indicated, App. Exh. Nos. 10-14 were admitted only to show what the Appellant thought a promotional pamphlet should look like, and are not relevant to this discussion of trade practice. See note 5 supra. 48 For some reason, the relevant excerpt from Strauss' THE PRINTING INDUSTRY, which the Contracting Officer cited in his final decision letter, was never introduced by the Respondent. See R4 File, Tab F, at 1. 49 In its post-hearing brief, the Appellant, for the first time, challenged the credentials of the Respondent's witnesses as "experts" with respect to commercial printing practices. App. Brf., at 3. GPO, naturally, defended their expertise. R. R. Brf., at 3. However, the simple answer is that the Contractor's objections come too late to be heard by the Board-it had ample opportunity to test the experience of the Government's witnesses at the hearing, but it failed to do so. That matter is now closed. See Coastal Structures, Inc., DOT BCA Nos. 1670, 1693, 1787, 88-3 BCA ¶ 20,956 (post-trial motion to strike testimony of Government's expert witness was denied, even though the Government had not complied with an order to disclose the basis of the expert's testimony prior to the trial, because the contractor could have presented rebuttal expert testimony). Besides, the issues involved in this appeal do not concern a question of credibility, but of judgment. The parties difference of opinion about whether the Student Guide satisfied the contract specifications basically involves a clash between their subjective viewpoints. In the Board's view, all of the witnesses were technically qualified and credible, and what really exists here is a situation where the failure to be more specific in the 'BINDING" specification left a wide range of possibilities. See ITT Gilfillan Division, ASBCA No. 37834, 92-1 BCA ¶ 24,490, at 122,226. 50 In its analysis of the "trade practice" issue, the Board has disregarded the Appellant's evidence of other GPO contracts, such as Programs A814-M and C181, for two reasons. First, the Board shares GPO's doubts about the relevancy of these term contracts to the facts of this case. R. R. Brf., at 1-2. See MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 2-3, n. 3 (copy of a term contract for a different Program other than the one in dispute and unrelated to it); Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 23-24, n. 38 (copies of samples printed by another contractor, and copies of forms subsequently printed by the appellant and approved in a press-sheet inspection were irrelevant to a dispute involving rejected forms); Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 26, n. 27 (price quotation from a company which did no work for contractor was inadmissible); RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra, slip. op. at 10, 13, ns. 11, 15 (memorandum from customer-agency employee supporting contractor's interpretation of the contract, and the revised pricing specification from the succeeding contract were inadmissible). Accord Tecom, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 44122, 44123, 44516, 44959, 45158, 45555, 45800, 94-1 ¶ 26,483; Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., ASBCA No. 39666, 91-1 BCA ¶ 23,372 (citing, Delco Electronics Corp. v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 302 (1989)); Atlantic Electric Co., GSBCA No. 6016, 83-1 BCA ¶ 16,484; Hildebrand and Day, AGBCA No. 82-183-1, 82-188-1, 83-1 BCA ¶ 16,321. Second, and perhaps more importantly, regardless of any relevancy considerations, its narrow jurisdictional mandate prevents it from considering matters outside the scope of the disputed contract. See Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd, supra, slip op. at 14, n. 19; Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 26, n. 27; Shepard Printing, Inc., GPO BCA 37-92 (January 28, 1994), slip op. at 9, n. 8, 1994 WL 275077 (hereinafter Shepard II); Shepard Printing, supra, slip op. at 7, n. 11; RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra, slip op. at 9, 13, ns. 9, 15; B. P. Printing and Office Supplies, supra, slip. op. at 14-15; Automated Datatron, Inc., GPO BCA 20-87 (March 31, 1989) slip op. at 4-5, 1989 WL 384973; Peak Printers, Inc., GPO BCA 12-85 (November 12, 1986), slip op. at 6, 1986 WL 181453. See generally, Matthew S. Foss, U.S. Government Printing Office Board of Contract Appeals: The First Decade, 24 PUB. CONT. 579, 585-86 (1995) (hereinafter Foss, The First Decade). While there is a limited exception to this jurisdictional prohibition, namely other related contracts for the purpose of seeing how certain contract language was interpreted in the past, see e.g., Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 2, n. 4 (exhibits relating to a previous printing of the product at issue by another contractor), Programs A814-M and C181 do not fall within that narrow range. 51 See note 15 supra. 52 This probably accounts for Willard's "dismay" at finding that some GPO employees were accepting printed products with binding stubs even though the page count was divisible by four, and were "incorporating language in the specifications to insure the exclusion of the binding stubs (or binding lips) on all saddle- stitched products." Gov. Exh. No. 3, Attachment. See note 18 supra. 53 Leaving aside for the moment the fact that GPO contracting officers act independently within the scope of their authority, the Board cannot help but wonder what standards were applied to determine the Government's discount for the product printed by Fry? Discounting implies some relationship to QATAP. The Contracting Officer also said he could have accepted the Student Guide at a discount, and it is clear that in his mind that the nexus between the pamphlet and QATAP was finishing attribute F-1 (Trim Size). Tr. 111-12. However, there is nothing in the record to indicate that other contracting officers from different GPO procurement offices (aside from the Purchase Division), who had received Quality Level III products with binding stubs, saw things the same way. 54 The authorities also tell us that in Government contracts law proof of a "prior course of dealing" is an important type of extrinsic evidence which can be used by a party in two ways: (a) as an aid to interpretation of ambiguous contract language; or (b) as an estoppel or waiver to demonstrate that an explicit requirement of the contract is not binding because the requirement was not enforced in the past. See John Cibinic, Jr. and Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Administration of Government Contracts, at 199 (The George Washington University, 3rd ed. 1995) (hereinafter Cibinic & Nash, Administration). The Appellant's reliance on Gresham and Co., Inc. v. United States, see App. R. Brf., at 7-8, seems to indicate that the Contractor is raising a "prior course of dealing" as a waiver claim, rather than as an interpretive device. See Cibinic & Nash, Administration, at 206. 55 Two other GPO contracts relied on by the Contractor-Programs A814-M and C181-have been disregarded by the Board on relevancy and jurisdictional grounds. See note 50 supra. 56 The Board has already indicated that it will not consider the Contracting Officer's examination of the Student Guide under finishing attribute F-15 (Blank Pages-Other Than Specified) in this case because it was not a reason he gave in his final decision for rejecting the product. See note 43 supra. However, it should be additionally noted that not only did the Contracting Officer admit at the hearing that binding stubs are not "pages," Tr. 107, but the Board itself has held that a "page" generally refers to "one of the leaves of a book, magazine, letter, or manuscript; also a single side of one of these leaves[']" see Stabbe Senter Press, supra, slip op. at 51. [Original emphasis.] See also GPO Handbook, Glossary of Graphic Arts Terms, at 38 (A "page" is defined as "[o]ne side of a written or printed leaf."); GPO Glossary, at 11 (same). 57 It should be noted that the Government's evidence in McDonald and Eudy II contained copies of two relevant inspection reports showing that the trim deviation in the samples it inspected was more than 1/8", or greater than the allowable tolerance for finishing attribute F-1. See McDonald & Eudy II, supra, slip op. at 25. In this case, not only is there no "Notice of Quality Defects" (GPO Form 1815) in the record, see note 15 supra, but the Board has also searched in vain for an "Inspection Report," (GPO Form 916), showing how the Contracting Officer figured the extent to which the binding stubs were major defects under QATAP sufficient to reject the Student Guide. However, there is no such documentary proof in this case because, as the Board has already observed, MEPCOM's complaint was treated as an exception to the usual quality complaint procedures. On the other hand, since the Board has found the Contracting Officer misapplied the QATAP requirements, such a report, by itself, would not support his decision. See Shepard Printing, supra, slip op. at 18-19. 58 Proof enough of the Appellant's reliance is the fact that its interpretation of the contract resulted in bid that was approximately $30,000.00 less than its successful offer the previous year. See note 9 supra. 59 In RD Printing Associates, Inc., the Board posed essentially the same question it asked here; i.e., can a critical missing term be implied to fill in the gap between GPO's interpretation of the contract and the contractor's understanding of the actual words used in the solicitation? The Board answered that question in the negative. See RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra, slip op. at 23 -24, n. 24. In so holding, the Board said, in pertinent part: ". . . since it is presumed that the drafter of a document acts intentionally, the rule is clear that where a term is carefully employed in one place and excluded in another, it should not be implied where excluded. Cf. Rusello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983); United States v. Espinoza-Leon, 873 F.2d 743 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 3257 (1989); Marshall v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 621 F.2d 1246 (3rd Cir. 1980). This maxim of construction, called 'inclusio unius est exclusio alterius,' simply means that the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of another. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 906 (4th ed. 1968). Therefore, without some other indication in the contract that potential bidders were expected to quote prices for collating by the same or similar method that they were to use to calculate prices for drilling, there is no basis for the Board to assume that the drafter of the IFB intended such a result." Id. 60 The general understanding of a "constructive change" was expressed by the ad hoc panel in Merchant Service Co., which described the doctrine as "the mechanism used to direct the Government to retroactively compensate the contractor for work which it should have been properly compensated for under the 'Changes' or 'Extra' clauses during the term of the contract." See Merchant Service Co., [GPOCAB] (February 11, 1980), slip op. at 16, 1980 WL 81262 Accord Service Engineering Co., ASBCA No. 40275, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26,382; Gary Aircraft Corp., ASBCA No. 21731, 91-3 BCA ¶ 24,122; Pinay Flooring Products, Inc., GSBCA No. 9286, 91-2 BCA ¶ 23.682; Harris System International, Inc., ASBCA No. 33280, 88-2 BCA ¶ 20,641; Kahn Communications, Inc., ASBCA No. 27461, 86-3 BCA ¶ 19,249; AGH Industries, Inc., supra, 85-1 BCA ¶ 17,784; McCrory Electric Co., GSBCA No. 5363, 80-2 BCA ¶ 14,686. See also Cibinic & Nash, Administration, at 429 ("A constructive change occurs when the contract work is actually changed but the procedures of the Changes clause have not been followed."). 61 See notes 5 and 39 supra. 62 A contention that a contracting officer has been arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, should not be confused with an allegation that he/she has acted in bad faith in dealing with the contractor. As the Board has said on numerous occasions, bad faith must be established by "well-nigh irrefragable proof"- evidence which is incapable of being refuted; i.e., indisputable evidence-because there is a strong presumption that Government officials properly and honestly carry out their functions. See Rose Printing, Inc., supra, slip op. at 25; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 36-37; MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 27-28, n. 34; New South Press & Assoc., Inc., supra, slip op. at 36; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 12, n. 16; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 43, n. 58; Universal Printing Co, supra, slip op. at 24, n. 24. Accord Brill Brothers, Inc., ASBCA No. 42573, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26,352; Karpak Data and Design, supra; Local Contractors, Inc., ASBCA No. 37108, 92-1 BCA ¶ 24,491. The key to such evidence is that there must be a showing of specific intent on the part of the Government to injure the Contractor. See Rose Printing, Inc., supra, slip op. at 26; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 37; MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 27-28, n. 34; New South Press & Assoc., Inc., supra, slip op. at 36, n. 52. Accord Kalvar Corp. Inc. v. United States, supra, 211 Ct. Cl. at 199, 543 F.2d at 1302. See also Solar Turbines, Inc. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 142 (1991). The Appellant has not accused the Respondent of "bad faith" in this case, and certainly nothing in the record amounts to the sort of "irrefragable proof" required to support such a claim. 63 Where, as here, the Government insists on strict enforcement of the specifications, it must prove that the product does not meet the requirements of the contract; i.e., it bears the initial "burden of persuasion" of showing that the rejected work does, in fact, deviate from the specifications. See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 64; McDonald & Eudy II, supra, slip op. at 23-24; Stabbe Senter Press, supra, slip op. at 49. See also International Lithographing, GPO BCA 1-88 (December 19, 1989) slip op. at 20, 1989 WL 384986; Mid-America Business Forms Corp., supra, slip op. at 18-19. Accord ABM/Ansley Business Materials, GSBCA No. 9367, 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,246; Goal Chemical Sealants Corp., GSBCA Nos. 8627, 8628, 88-3 BCA ¶ 21,083; Churchill Chemical Corp., GSBCA Nos. 4321, 4322, 4346, 4353, 77-1 BCA ¶ 12,318, at 59,5000, aff'd, Churchill Chemical Corp. v. United States, 221 Ct. Cl. 284, 602 F.2d 358 (1979); Ramar Co., ASBCA No. 16060, 72-2 BCA ¶ 9644; Pams Products, Inc., ASBCA No. 15847, 72-1 BCA ¶ 9401; Hardeman-Monier-Hutcherson, ASBCA No. 11785, 67-1 BCA ¶ 6210. The Government usually meets this burden by advising the contractor of the results of the inspection it has conducted. See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 65; McDonald & Eudy II, supra, slip op. at 24; Stabbe Senter Press, supra, slip op. at 49. The burden then shifts to the contractor to prove the Government's findings are invalid for one reason or another. See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 65; McDonald & Eudy II, supra, slip op. at 24; Stabbe Senter Press, supra, slip op. at 49; International Lithographing, supra, slip op. at 21. Accord Nuclear Research Corp. v. United States, 814 F.2d 647, 650 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Riverport Industries, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 28089, 28090, 28091, 29577, 86-2 BCA ¶ 18,835, reconsid. den., 86-3 BCA ¶ 19,050; Continental Chemical Corp.,, GSBCA No. 4483, 76-2 BCA ¶ 11,948; Shamrock Industrial Maintenance, DOT CAB No. 72-11, 72-2 BCA ¶ 9482; C.W. Roen Construction Co., DOT CAB No. 75-43, 76-2 BCA ¶ 12,215. Otherwise, the presumption that the Government's tests are conducted correctly will prevail. See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 66. Accord Astro Science Corp. v. United States, 200 Ct. Cl. 354, 471 F.2d 624 (1973); Integrated Systems Group, Inc., GSBCA No. 11602-P, 92-1 BCA ¶ 24,762; Donald R. Stewart & Associates, AGBCA Nos. 84-226-1, 84-227-1, 84-228-1, 84-239-1, 84-240-1, 84-241-1, 85-168-1, 89-222-1, 89-223-1, 89-224-1, 89-225-1, 92-1 BCA ¶ 24,705; Goal Chemical Sealants Corp., supra; Horn Waterproofing Corp., DOT CAB No. 73-24, 74-2 BCA ¶ 10,933. On the other hand, if the contractor comes forward with evidence that casts doubt on the Government's test results, or somehow dilutes or neutralizes their impact, and the Government presents no additional evidence in support of its findings, then the so-called "validity" issue will be decided against it. See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 79-80 (citing Unlimited Supply Co., Inc., GSBCA No. 12371, 94-3 BCA ¶ 27,170, at 135,393; Praoil, S.r.L., ASBCA Nos. 41499, 44369, 94-2 BCA ¶ 26,840; Air-O-Plastik Corp., GSBCA 4802, 4870, 4925, 4965, 81-2 BCA ¶ 15,338; Communications, Ltd., ASBCA Nos. 23261, 80-1 BCA ¶ 14,368). Simply stated, the rule is: "[W]here there is proof of differing tests results and no additional evidence is presented, the issue of conformity with specification must be decided against the party having the burden of proof." See Praoil, S.r.L., supra, 94-2 BCA at 133,502 (citing Lisbon Contractors v. United States, 828 F.2d 759, 764-65 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Universal Steel Strapping Co., ASBCA No. 13686, 69-2 BCA ¶ 7799 at 36,212). 64 See note 34 supra. 65 The regulatory foundation for the Board's reasoning was the PPR, which it said establishes the basic framework for the inspection and testing of procured products. See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 66. In that regard, the Board said that: "[ a]part from providing the foundation for QATAP, and establishing the program as an integral part of most procurement contacts, the PPR also states that such inspection and testing 'shall be performed in accordance with article 14 'Inspection and Tests' of Contract Clauses in GPO Contract Terms (Pub. 310.2).' [Footnote omitted.] See, PPR, Chap. XIII, Sec. 1, ¶¶ 3(a),(b), 4(c)(2),(g). Furthermore, the PPR, inter alia: (1) provides guidance for gathering inspection samples; (2) sets forth basic inspection procedures; (3) makes special provisions for the inspection of departmental random copies (blue label copies); and (4) requires that appropriate records and documentation of all quality assurance actions be maintained. See, PPR, Chap. XIII, Sec. 1, ¶¶ 4(g)(1)-(4), h." See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 66-67. As the Board read the PPR, the various QATAP manuals incorporated by reference therein, and the "Inspections and Tests" article of GPO Contract Terms, it was clear that: ". . . the proper inspection and testing of procured products consists of three things: (1) a sample which is randomly selected and adequate enough to be representative of the lot; (2) the use of proper testing procedures and techniques; and (3) the presence of objective standards by which to measure the procured product. [Citations omitted.] . . . [A] contracting officer who shows that he has adhered to the testing and inspection requirements of the contract is entitled to have his determination of product quality upheld. [Citation omitted.]" See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 67. [Emphasis added.] 66 The Board noted, inter alia, that the ad hoc panel in Elgin Business Forms was "not persuaded that two or three brief stoppages in two boxes out of 540 constituted a failure to meet the requirements of the contract." See Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., supra, slip op. at 74, n. 77 (citing Elgin Business Forms, supra, slip op. at 8-9). 67 As a rule, proceedings before the Board are conducted de novo. See The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 33; Sterling Printing, Inc., GPO BCA 20-89 (August 12, 1994), Decision on Second Motion for Reconsideration and Order, slip op. at 1-2, fn. 1, 1994 WL_____. Accord Wilner v. United States, 24 F.3d 1397, 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Assurance Co. v. United States, 813 F.2d 1202, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Blount Brothers Corp. v. United States, 191 Ct. Cl. 784, 424 F.2d 1074, 1085 (1970); Southwest Welding and Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 188 Ct. Cl. 925, 413 F.2d 1167, 1184 (1969); Minority Enterprises, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 45549, 45553, 45683, 45696, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,461, at 136,829; Allen County Builders Supply, ASBCA No. 41836, 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,398, at 126,491-92. However, the prerequisite to the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over an appeal is the issuance of a final decision by a GPO contracting officer. Board Rules, Preface to Rules, ¶ I, Jurisdiction for Considering Appeals; GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 5 (Disputes); PPR, Chap. X, Sec. 1, ¶¶ 2, 4. See Graphicdata, GPO BCA 35-94 (December 21, 1994), slip op. at 5, 1994 WL 837428 (hereinafter Graphicdata II); Shepard II, supra, slip op. at 28; Epco Associates, GPO BCA 26-93 (November 18, 1993), Decision and Order Granting Appellant's Motion Under Rule 1(c) and Staying Proceedings Under Rule 1(d), slip op. at 3, 1993 WL 526919 (citing Associated Contract Specialties Corp., ASBCA No. 37437, 90-3 ¶ 23,258; Spruill Realty/Construction Co., ASBCA No. 40477, 90-3 BCA ¶ 23,255). See also Foss, The First Decade, at 588. Thus, the underlying precepts of the Board Rules are essentially the same as those of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., which places great emphasis on the role of the contracting officer in resolving contract claims, makes his/her decision an indispensable precondition to the assertion of a contract appeal, and characterizes that final decision as "the linchpin" for the contract appeal process. See Graphicdata II, supra, slip op. at 5 (citing Paragon Energy Corp. v. United States, 645 F.2d 966 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Continental Products, Inc., ASBCA No. 45193, 93-2 BCA ¶ 25,879; John C. Grimberg Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 42695, 91-3 BCA ¶ 24,074; DHR, Inc., EBCA No. 401-12-87, 88-1 BCA ¶ 20,451). See also Dawco Construction, Inc. v. United States, 930 F.2d 872 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Santa Fe Engineers, Inc. v. United States, 818 F.2d 856 (Fed. Cir. 1987), aff'g, sub nom. Santa Fe Engineers, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 28058 and 29362, 86-3 BCA ¶ 19,092; Tecom, Inc. v. United States, 732 F.2d 935 (Fed. Cir. 1984); W.M. Schlosser Co. v. United States, 705 F.2d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1983); J.F. Shea Co., Inc. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 46 (1983); Lee Ann Wyskiver, PSBCA No. 3621, 95-2 BCA ¶ 27,755; R & E Electronics, Inc., VABCA Nos. 2227, 2299, 2300, 85-3 BCA ¶ 18,316. In that regard, the requirement for a contracting officer's final decision is not a mere technical formality. As indicated in the PPR: "The decision of the Contracting Officer is vital to the administrative process of resolving disputes. Without it there is no immediate issue, appeal, or review. It directs the way the contract will proceed in the interim. The final decision should be rendered promptly since the contractor must continue to perform while an appeal is pending. If there is a delay in the final decision, this very delay may become an issue in the dispute or the failure to make a final decision may itself be appealed. Finally, the decision is the basis for the GPO's position on appeal. With supplementary data, it forms the record that the Board of Contract Appeals reviews in deciding the case." PPR, Chap. X, Sec. 1, ¶¶ 2, 4.c. See Shepard II, supra, slip op. at 28-29. Thus, the Board will not entertain new claims raised for the first time in the appeal process. Id., slip op. at 32. Accord Dawco Construction, Inc. v. United States, supra, 930 F.2d at 877; J.F. Shea Co., Inc. v. United States, supra, 4 Cl. Ct. at 54. See also Foss, The First Decade, at 589. 68 Santa Fe Engineers, Inc. involved a construction contractor's claim for "all problems, changes and directives that were issued on the project." The ASBCA dismissed the claim because the claims presented to the contracting officer pertained only to the amount of additional compensation, if any, to which the contractor was entitled for three specific changes. In so ruling, the ASBCA reasoned, in pertinent part: "It is quite evident, as strenuously asserted by the Government, that the claim developed by appellant before the Board was essentially different from the claims presented by it to the contracting officer as to which the subject appeals were taken. The claims before the contracting officer pertained only to the amount of additional compensation, if any, to which appellant was entitled for changes 'AD,' 'CD' and 'HK.' They did not include one for 'all the problems, changes and directives that were issued on the project,' . . . Appellant has elected to proceed under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978. Under said Act the 'claim' is the centerpiece of the disputes resolution process. [Citation omitted.] It is necessary that a claim be presented in writing to the contracting officer for decision prior to its assertion to the Board. . . . The claim ultimately presented to the Board in the subject appeals was beyond the Board's jurisdiction, due to its not having first been submitted to the contracting officer . . . [Citations omitted.]". See Santa Fe Engineers, Inc., supra, 86-3 BCA at 96,508.