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By way of explanation, Justice O'Connor advises the federal agencies and private parties that have made countless decisions in reliance on those cases that we do not depart from the fabric of the law; we  J& restore it. Ante, at 32. A skeptical observer might ask whether this pronouncement is a faithful application of  J the doctrine of stare decisis.  uB> ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Our skeptical observer might also notice that Justice  uB ԚO'Connor's explanation for departing from settled precedent is  uB joined only by Justice Kennedy. Ante, at 1. Three members of the majority thus provide no explanation whatsoever for their  uB unwillingness to adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis. A brief comment on each of the two ailing cases may provide the answer.  J  In the Court's view, our decision in Metro Broadcast J^ ing was inconsistent with the rule announced in Rich J6 mond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Ante, at 23!24. But two decisive distinctions separate those# "    J two cases. First, Metro Broadcasting involved a federal  J program, whereas Croson involved a city ordinance.  J Metro Broadcasting thus drew primary support from  J Fullilove, which predated Croson and which Croson distinguished on the grounds of the federalstate dichotomy that the majority today discredits. Although members of today's majority trumpeted the importance of  J that distinction in Croson, they now reject it in the name of congruence. It is therefore quite wrong for  J the Court to suggest today that overruling Metro  Jp Broadcasting merely restores the status quo ante, for the law at the time of that decision was entirely open to the  J result the Court reached. Today's decision is an unjustified departure from settled law.  J  Second, Metro Broadcasting's holding rested on more than its application of intermediate scrutiny. Indeed, I have always believed that, labels notwithstanding, the FCC program we upheld in that case would have satisfied any of our various standards in affirmativeaction cases"including the one the majority fashions  J today. What truly distinguishes Metro Broadcasting from our other affirmativeaction precedents is the distinctive goal of the federal program in that case. Instead of merely seeking to remedy past discrimination, the FCC program was intended to achieve future benefits in the form of broadcast diversity. Reliance on race as a legitimate means of achieving diversity was  J first endorsed by Justice Powell in Regents of Univ. of  J California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311!319 (1978).  Jx Later, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Ed., 476 U.S. 267 (1986), I also argued that race is not always irrelevant  J( to governmental decisionmaking, see id., at 314!315  J (Stevens, J., dissenting); in response, Justice O'Connor correctly noted that, although the School Board had relied on an interest in providing black teachers to serve as role models for black students, that interest should not be confused with the very different goal of promoting` "    J racial diversity among the faculty. Id., at 288, n. She then added that, because the school board had not relied on an interest in diversity, it was not necessary to discuss the magnitude of that interest or its applicability  J` in this case. Ibid.  J8  Thus, prior to Metro Broadcasting, the interest in diversity had been mentioned in a few opinions, but it is perfectly clear that the Court had not yet decided whether that interest had sufficient magnitude to justify  J a racial classification. Metro Broadcasting, of course, answered that question in the affirmative. The majority  JH today overrules Metro Broadcasting only insofar as it is inconsistent with [the] holding that strict scrutiny applies to benign racial classifications promulgated by  J the Federal Government. Ante, at 26. The proposition that fostering diversity may provide a sufficient interest  J to justify such a program is not inconsistent with the Court's holding today"indeed, the question is not remotely presented in this case"and I do not take the Court's opinion to diminish that aspect of our decision  J in Metro Broadcasting.  The Court's suggestion that it may be necessary in the  J future to overrule Fullilove in order to restore the fabric  Jh of the law, ante, at 34, is even more disingenuous than  J@ its treatment of Metro Broadcasting. For the Court endorses the strict scrutiny standard that Justice Powell  J applied in Bakke, see ante, at 22!23, and acknowledges  J that he applied that standard in Fullilove as well, ante, at 16!17. Moreover, Chief Justice Burger also expressly  Jx concluded that the program we considered in Fullilove  JP was valid under any of the tests articulated in Bakke, which of course included Justice Powell's. 448 U.S., at  J 492. The Court thus adopts a standard applied in Fulli J love at the same time it questions that case's continued vitality and accuses it of departing from prior law. I  J continue to believe that the Fullilove case was incor J` rectly decided, see id., at 532!554 (Stevens, J., dissent` "  Ԯing), but neither my dissent nor that filed by Justice  J Stewart, id., at 522!532, contained any suggestion that the issue the Court was resolving had been decided be J fore.  uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Of course, Justice Stewart believed that his view, disapproving of racial classifications of any kind, was consistent with this Court's  uB^ precedents. See ante, at 33, citing 448 U.S., at 523!526. But he did not claim that the question whether the Federal Government could engage in raceconscious affirmative action had been decided  uB before Fullilove. The fact that a justice dissents from an opinion means that he disagrees with the result; it does not usually mean that he believes the decision so departs from the fabric of the law that its reasoning ought to be repudiated at the next opportunity. Much less does a dissent bind or authorize a later majority to  uB reject a precedent with which it disagrees. FTN   XFrXFr ff ۈ As was true of Metro Broadcasting, the Court in  J` Fullilove decided an important, novel, and difficult question. Providing a different answer to a similar question today cannot fairly be characterized as merely restoring previously settled law.  9H1 d d8V؃  J  2  The Court's holding in Fullilove surely governs the result in this case. The Public Works Employment Act of 1977 (1977 Act), 91 Stat. 116, which this Court  J upheld in Fullilove, is different in several critical respects from the portions of the Small Business Act  Jf (SBA), 72 Stat. 384, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 631 et  J> seq., and the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 (STURAA), 101 Stat. 132, challenged in this case. Each of those differences makes the current program designed to provide assistance to disadvantaged business enterprises (DBE's) significantly less objectionable than the 1977 categorical grant of $400 million in exchange for a 10% setaside in public contracts to a class of investors defined solely by  J racial characteristics. Fullilove, 448 U.S., at 532  J (Stevens, J., dissenting). In no meaningful respect ism "   the current scheme more objectionable than the 1977 Act. Thus, if the 1977 Act was constitutional, then so must be the SBA and STURAA. Indeed, even if my  J dissenting views in Fullilove had prevailed, this program would be valid.  Unlike the 1977 Act, the present statutory scheme does not make race the sole criterion of eligibility for participation in the program. Race does give rise to a rebuttable presumption of social disadvantage which, at  J least under STURAA,o uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < STURAA accords a rebuttable presumption of both social and economic disadvantage to members of racial minority groups. 49 CFR 23.62 (1994). In contrast, 8(a) of the SBA accords a presumption only of social disadvantage, 13 CFR 124.105(b) (1995); the applicant has the burden of demonstrating economic disadvantage,  uB id., 124.106. Finally, 8(d) of the SBA accords at least a presumption of social disadvantage, but it is ambiguous as to whether economic disadvantage is presumed or must be shown. See 15 U.S.C. 637(d)(3) (1988 ed. and Supp. V); 13 CFR 124.601 (1995). gives rise to a second rebutta ble presumption of economic disadvantage. 49 CFR 23.62 (1994). But a small business may qualify as a DBE,  byshowing that it is both socially and economically disadvantaged, even if it receives neither of these presumptions. 13 CFR 124.105(c), 124.106 (1995); 48 CFR 19.703 (1994); 49 CFR pt. 23, subpt. D., Appendixes A and C (1994). Thus, the current preference is more inclusive than the 1977 Act because it does not make race a necessary qualification.  More importantly, race is not a sufficient qualification. Whereas a millionaire with a long history of financial successes, who was a member of numerous social clubs and trade associations, would have qualified for a preference under the 1977 Act merely because he was an  J@ Asian American or an African American, see Fullilove, 448 U.S., at 537!538, 540, 543!544, and n. 16, 546  J (Stevens, J., dissenting), neither the SBA nor STURAA creates any such anomaly. The DBE program excludes"   members of minority races who are not, in fact, socially  J or economically disadvantaged. uB@ ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < The Government apparently takes this exclusion seriously.  FTN   XFrXFr ff See  uB Autek Systems Corp. v. United States, 835 F.Supp. 13 (DC 1993) (upholding Small Business Administration decision that minority business owner's personal income disqualified him from DBE status under 8(a) program), aff'd, 43 F. 3d 712 (CADC 1994). 13 CFR 124.106(a)(ii) (1995); 49 CFR 23.69 (1994). The presumption of social disadvantage reflects the unfortunate fact that irrational racial prejudice"along with its lingering effects"still  J8 survives.o8# uB3 ԍ The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting  uBX in response to it. Ante, at 35.  uB   FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf <  Our findings clearly state that groups such as black Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Native Americans, have been and continue to be discriminated against and that this discrimination has led to the social disadvantagement of persons identified by society as members of those groups. 124 Cong. Rec. 34097 (1978) The presumption of economic disadvantage embodies a recognition that success in the private sector of the economy is often attributable, in part, to social skills and relationships. Unlike the 1977 setasides, the current preference is designed to overcome the social and economic disadvantages that are often associated with racial characteristics. If, in a particular case, these disadvantages are not present, the presumptions can be rebutted. 13 CFR 124.601!124.610 (1995); 49 CFR 23.69 (1994). The program is thus designed to allow race to play a part in the decisional process only when there is a meaningful basis for assuming its relevance.  In this connection, I think it is particularly significant that the current program targets the negotiation of subcontracts between private firms. The 1977 Act applied entirely to the award of public contracts, an area of the economy in which social relationships should be irrelevant and in which proper supervision of govern "  Ԯment contracting officers should preclude any discrimination against particular bidders on account of their race. In this case, in contrast, the program seeks to overcome barriers of prejudice between private parties"specifically, between general contractors and subcontractors. The SBA and STURAA embody Congress' recognition that such barriers may actually handicap minority firms seeking business as subcontractors from established leaders in the industry that have a history of doing business with their golfing partners. Indeed, minority subcontractors may face more obstacles than direct, intentional racial prejudice: they may face particular barriers simply because they are more likely to be new in the business and less likely to know others in the business. Given such difficulties, Congress could reasonably find that a minority subcontractor is less likely to receive favors from the entrenched businesspersons who award subcontracts only to people with whom"or with whose friends"they have an existing relationship. This program, then, if in part a remedy for past discrimination, is most importantly a forwardlooking response to practical problems faced by minority subcontractors.  The current program contains another forwardlooking component that the 1977 setasides did not share. Section 8(a) of the SBA provides for periodic review of the status of DBE's, 15 U.S.C. 637(a)(B)!(C) (1988  J ed., Supp. V); 13 CFR 124.602(a) (1995), uBX ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < The Department of Transportation strongly urges States to institute periodic review of businesses certified as DBE's under STURAA, 49 CFR pt. 23, subpt. D, App. A (1994), but it does not mandate such review. The Government points us to no provisions for review of 8(d) certification, although such review may be derivative for those businesses that receive 8(d) certification as a result of 8(a) or STURAA certification. and DBE status can be challenged by a competitor at any time under any of the routes to certification. 13 CFR"   124.603 (1995); 49 CFR 23.69 (1994). Such review prevents ineligible firms from taking part in the program solely because of their minority ownership, even when those firms were once disadvantaged but have since become successful. The emphasis on review also indicates the Administration's anticipation that after their presumed disadvantages have been overcome, firms will graduate into a status in which they will be able to compete for business, including prime contracts, on an equal basis. 13 CFR 124.208 (1995). As with other phases of the statutory policy of encouraging the formation and growth of small business enterprises, this program is intended to facilitate entry and increase competition in the free market.  Significantly, the current program, unlike the 1977 setaside, does not establish any requirement"numerical or otherwise"that a general contractor must hire DBE  JX subcontractors. The program we upheld in Fullilove required that 10% of the federal grant for every federally funded project be expended on minority business enterprises. In contrast, the current program contains no quota. Although it provides monetary incentives to general contractors to hire DBE subcontractors, it does not require them to hire DBE's, and they do not lose their contracts if they fail to do so. The importance of this incentive to general contractors (who always seek to offer the lowest bid) should not be underestimated; but the preference here is far less rigid, and thus more  J narrowly tailored, than the 1977 Act. Cf. Bakke, 438 U.S., at 319!320 (opinion of Powell, J.) (distinguishing between numerical setasides and consideration of race as a factor).  Finally, the record shows a dramatic contrast between the sparse deliberations that preceded the 1977 Act, see  J Fullilove, 448 U.S., at 549!550 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and the extensive hearings conducted in several"    J Congresses before the current program was developed. N uBh ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < The Government points us to the following legislative history: H.R. 5612, To amend the Small Business Act to Extend the current SBA 8(a) Pilot Program: Hearing on H.R. 5612 before the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); Small and Minority Business in the Decade of the 1980's (Part 1): Hearings before the House Committee on Small Business, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Minority Business and Its Contribution to the U.S. Economy: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Small Business, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Federal Contracting Opportunities for Minority and WomenOwned Businesses"An Examination of the 8(d) Subcontracting Program: Hearings before the Senate Committee on Small Business, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); Women Entrepreneurs"Their Success and Problems: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Small Business, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); State of Hispanic Small Business in America: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on SBA and SBIC Authority, Minority Enterprise, and General Small Business Problems of the House Committee on Small Business, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Minority Enterprise and General Small Business Problems: Hearing before the Subcommittee on SBA and SBIC Authority, Minority Enterprise, and General Small Business Problems of the House Committee on Small Business, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Disadvantaged Business SetAsides in Transportation Construction Projects: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Procurement, Innovation, and Minority Enterprise Development of the House Committee on Small Business, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Barriers to Full Minority Participation in Federally Funded Highway Construction Projects: Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Surety Bonds and Minority Contractors: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Small Business Problems: Hearings before the House Committee on Small Business, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). See Brief for Respondents 9!10, n.9. However we might evaluate the benefits and costs"both fiscal and social"of this or any other affirmativeaction program, our obligation to give deference to Congress' policy choices is much more demanding in this case than  J8 it was in Fullilove. If the 1977 program of racebased8"   setasides satisfied the strict scrutiny dictated by Justice Powell's vision of the Constitution"a vision the Court expressly endorses today"it must follow as night follows the day that the Court of Appeals' judgment upholding this more carefully crafted program should be affirmed.  9H1 d d7VI؃  t2  My skeptical scrutiny of the Court's opinion leaves me in dissent. The majority's concept of consistency ignores a difference, fundamental to the idea of equal protection, between oppression and assistance. The majority's concept of congruence ignores a difference, fundamental to our constitutional system, between the Federal Government and the States. And the majority's  J concept of stare decisis ignores the force of binding precedent. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.