WPC= 2BBcR Z33|[ "m^36Gff%==\o3=33ffffffffff33oooQzKfzztzp=o=o\%ffQi\=bp:6m:p\ifQUGpbbbX=o=o=3============i:fffffQ\\\\K:K:K:K:p\\\\ppppbfi\\b\zifffQQQQi\\\\bbbbbbppK:K:K:K:fmz:z:z:z:z:pppp\\QQQtUtUtUtUzGzGzGppppppbpXpXpXiz:pQtUzGbbi\pNo3o\6QNNfff=7f=f=%GGf//\\pp%G=ooee3o<HYYY66^E@@@@(JEEE66;,1N11@@@A9<16%7,7(7,A6C/A1>1P7A/:,A1E12156(7(>4E/A1H>E>9(6144>986@9999999999999999999(((((((666666666666666666661111111444444444444>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>A7AA>E>1New Century SchoolbookTimes RomanTimes Roman BoldNew Century Schoolbook Italic"m^*,:SS}z22K[*2**SSSSSSSSSS**[[[Collluldu}=Sudzudul_dzljj\2[2[KSSCVK2Q\/,Y/\KVSCE:\QuQQH2[2[2*222222222222V/lSlSlSlSlSwlClKlKlKlK=/=/=/=/z\uKuKuKuKz\z\z\z\jQlSuVuKuKjQuKdVlSlSlSlClClClCuVlKlKlKlKuQuQuQuQuQuQ}\}\=/=/=/=/SuYd/d/d/d/d/z\z\z\z\uKuK}lClClC_E_E_E_Ed:d:d:z\z\z\z\z\z\ujQ\H\H\HuVd/z\lC_Ed:jQjQuVuKz\N[*[K,C@@SSS2-}}S2ooS}2::S''KK\\:2[[RRk*[11RRRkskk[ZZ<[){kJ%>gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR2 c!ccJ"m^!+==\Z%%7C%==========CCC1QOOOVOIV\-=VIhZVIVOEIZOlMMC%C%C7==1?7%;C#!A#bC7?=13+C;V;;5%C%C%%%n%%%%%%%%%%?#O=O=O=O=O=nXO1O7O7O7O7-#-#-#-#ZCV7V7V7V7ZCZCZCZCM;O=V?V7V7M;V7I?O=O=O=O1O1O1O1V?O7O7O7O7V;V;V;V;V;V;\C\C-#-#-#-#=VAI#I#I#I#I#ZCZCZCZCV7V7n\O1O1O1E3E3E3E3I+I+I+ZCZCZCZCZCZClVM;C5C5C5V?I#ZCO1E3I+M;M;V?V7ZCNCC7!1//===%!\\=%QQ=\%++=n77nCCn+n%CC<gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^3=Iff%==\o3=3offffffffff33oooQzKpzzz~~z=o=o\%ifQpQ=bp=:f=p\ifQQAp_\\U=o=o=3============f=iiiiiQQQQQK=K=K=K=p\\\\pppp~\ip\\~\\ziiiiQQQQpQQQQbbbbbbppK=K=K=K=pfz=z=z=z=z=pppp\\QQQzQzQzQzQ~A~A~Apppppp~\zUzUzUpz=pQzQ~A~\~\p\pNo3w\=QNNfffMDf=f=3GG\==\\pp%G=ooee3o<gn|g|n|SR}{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS21 c&c'*^-"X^?S}}SSS}?S?F}}}}}}}}}}SS}a}SFS}S}ooS}FSF}oaS}}}oc7cS?SS*SSSSSSSSSSF}}}}}oooooaFaFaFaF}}}}}}}}}}}}}oooooooo}}}}}}aFaFaFaF}FFFFF}}oooaaaaSSS}oooFoaS}}}NX?}S}}}}}}KS}K}KF}}}SS}}S}KF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"m^)+9RRzx11IY)1))RRRRRRRRRR))YYYAljjjrjbrz>RRR1,zzR1llRz199R&&IIZZ91YYQQi)Y00QQQiqiiYXX;Y(yiH$<euXXqiiii@yqqqXXaHQQQiiij]bQX [respondents] against Northbrook in this case). In GTE  J Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 386 (1980), we reaffirmed the well established rule that persons subject to an injunctive order issued by a court with jurisdiction are expected to obey that decree until it is modified or reversed, even if they have proper grounds to object to the order. In  J& GTE Sylvania, we went on to say:BQ &C   , , (  There is no doubt that the Federal District Court in Delaware had jurisdiction to issue the temporary restraining orders and preliminary and permanent injunctions. Nor were those equitable decrees challenged as only a frivolous pretense to validity,  Jy although of course there is disagreement over whether the District Court erred in issuing the permanent injunction. Under these circumstances, the CPSC was required to obey the injunctions out  J of respect for judicial process. Id., at 386!387 (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted).CBQ d "  Ԍ ( , , This rule was applied in the bankruptcy context more  J than 60 years ago in Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358 (1929), where the Court held that turnover orders issued under the old bankruptcy regime could not be collaterally attacked in a later contempt proceeding. Respondents acknowledge the validity of the rule but contend that it has no application here. They argue that the Bankrupt J cy Court lacked jurisdiction to issue the Section 105 Injunction, though much of their argument goes to the correctness of the Bankruptcy Court's decision to issue the injunction rather than to its jurisdiction to do so.  The jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, like that of other federal courts, is grounded in and limited by statute. Title 28 U.S.C. 1334(b) provides that the district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11. 28 U.S.C. 1334(b). The district courts may, in turn, refer any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11 ... to the bankruptcy judges for the district. 28 U.S.C. 157(a). Here, the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction to enjoin respondents' proceeding against Northbrook must be based on the arising under, arising in, or related to language of 1334(b) and 157(a).  Respondents argue that the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to issue the Section 105 Injunction only if their proceeding to execute on the bond was related to the Celotex bankruptcy. Petitioner argues the Bankruptcy Court indeed had such related to jurisdiction. Con JP gress did not delineate the scope of related to)Pi uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf <  FTN    XFrXFr ff Proceedings related to the bankruptcy include (1) causes of action owned by the debtor which become property of the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 541, and (2) suits between third parties which have an effect on the bankruptcy estate. See 1 Collier on Bankruptcy 3.01[1][c][iv], p. 3!28 (15th ed. 1994). The first type"## of related to proceeding involves a claim like the state law breach  uBG of contract action at issue in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.  uB Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). The instant case involves the second type of related to proceeding.) jurisPl"  Ԯdiction, but its choice of words suggests a grant of some breadth. The jurisdictional grant in 1334(b) was a distinct departure from the jurisdiction conferred under previous acts, which had been limited to either possession of property by the debtor or consent as a basis for jurisdiction. See S. Rep. No. 95!989, pp. 153!154 (1978). We agree with the views expressed by the Court  J of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Pacor, Inc. v.  J ԚHiggins, 743 F.2d 984 (1984), that Congress intended to grant comprehensive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts so that they might deal efficiently and expeditiously with all matters connected with the bankruptcy  J estate, id., at 994; see also H. Rep. No. 95!595, pp. 43!48 (1977), and that the related to language of 1334(b) must be read to give district courts (and bankruptcy courts under 157(a)) jurisdiction over more than simply proceedings involving the property of the debtor or the estate. We also agree with that Court's observation that a bankruptcy court's related to jurisdiction  J cannot be limitless. See Pacor, supra, at 994; cf. Board  J of Governors v. MCorp Financial, 502 U.S. 32, 40 (1991) (stating that Congress has vested limited  J authority in bankruptcy courts).r & li uB ԍ   XgEpXFrIn attempting to strike an appropriate balance, the Third Circuit in  uB Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984 (1984), devised the following test for determining the existence of related to jurisdiction:   The usual articulation of the test for determining whether a civil  uB proceeding is related to bankruptcy is whether the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being  uB administered in bankruptcy.... Thus, the proceeding need not necessarily be against the debtor or against the debtor's property. An action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively orC"## negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and  uBG administration of the bankrupt estate. Id., at 994 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).  The First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh  uBl Circuits have adopted the Pacor test with little or no variation. S FTN  L XFrXFr  ddf < ee In  uB# re G. S. F. Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1475 (CA1 1991); A. H. Robins  uB Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1002, n. 11 (CA4), cert. denied, 479  uB U.S. 876 (1986); In re Wood, 825 F.2d 90, 93 (CA5 1987); Robinson  uBH v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 918 F.2d 579, 583!584 (CA6 1990); In  uB re Dogpatch U.S. A., Inc., 810 F.2d 782, 786 (CA8 1987); In re  uB Fietz, 852 F.2d 455, 457 (CA9 1988); In re Gardner, 913 F.2d  uBm 1515, 1518 (CA10 1990); In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc., 910 F.2d 784, 788, and n. 19 (CA11 1990). The Second and Seventh Circuits, on the other hand, seem to have adopted a slightly different test. See  uB  FTN  ,  XFrXFr ff In re Turner, 724 F.2d 338, 341 (CA2 1983); In re Xonics, Inc., 813  uBI F.2d 127, 131 (CA7 1987); Home Ins. Co. v. Cooper & Cooper, Ltd., 889 F.2d 746, 749 (CA7 1989). But whatever test is used, these cases make clear that bankruptcy courts have no jurisdiction over proceedings that have no effect on the debtor.r %"  Ԍ J BQ C  , , ( evBQ Cd  ( , ,  We believe that the issue of whether respondents are entitled to immediate execution on the bond against Northbrook is at least a question related to Celotex'  J/ bankruptcy.&' J/%i uB, ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < The dissent agrees that respondents' proceeding to execute on the  uB supersedeas bond is related to Celotex' bankruptcy, post, at 6 n. 5, but noting that only the district court has the power [under 28 U.S.C. 157(c)(1)] to enter `any final order or judgment' !  in related  uB  noncore proceedings, post, at 9, the dissent concludes that the Bankruptcy Court here did not possess sufficient related to juris uBv diction to issue the Section 105 Injunction. Post, at 10. The  uB- Section 105 Injunction, however, is only an interlocutory stay which  uB respondents have yet to challenge. See infra, at 13. Thus, the Bankruptcy Court did not lack jurisdiction under 157(c)(1) to issue the Section 105 Injunction because that injunction was not a final order or judgment.  In any event, respondents have waived any claim that the granting of the Section 105 Injunction was a noncore proceeding under 157(c)(1). Respondents base their arguments solely on 28 U.S.C. 1334, and concede in their brief that the bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction to issue orders affecting the bond, then,"## only if the proceedings on the bond were `related' to the Celotex bankruptcy itself within the meaning of 1334(b). Brief for Respondent 22. We conclude, and the dissent agrees, that those proceed uB ings are so related. See post, at 5"6, and n. 5. We thus need not (and do not) reach the question whether the granting of the Section 105 Injunction was a core proceeding.& Admittedly, a proceeding by respondents/ "   against Northbrook on the supersedeas bond does not directly involve Celotex, except to satisfy the judgment against it secured by the bond. But to induce Northbrook to serve as surety on the bond, Celotex agreed to allow Northbrook to retain the proceeds of a settlement resolving insurance coverage disputes between Northbrook and Celotex. The Bankruptcy Court found that allowing respondents"and 227 other bonded judgment creditors"to execute immediately on the bonds would have a direct and substantial adverse effect on Celotex' ability to undergo a successful reorganization. It stated:BQ H C   , , (  [I]f the Section 105 stay were lifted to enable the judgment creditors to reach the sureties, the sureties in turn would seek to lift the Section 105 stay to reach Debtor's collateral, with corresponding actions by Debtor to preserve its rights under the settlement agreements. Such a scenario could completely destroy any chance of resolving the prolonged insurance coverage disputes currently being adjudicated in this Court. The settlement of the insurance coverage disputes with all of Debtor's insurers may well be the linchpin of Debtor's formulation of a feasible plan. Absent the confirmation of a feasible plan, Debtor may be liquidated or cease to exist after a carrion feast by the victors in a race to the  J3 courthouse. In re Celotex (Celotex II), 140 B. R. 912, 915 (MD Fla. 1992).qBQ d o "  Ԍ ( , ,  In light of these findings by the Bankruptcy Court, it is relevant to note that we are dealing here with a reorganization under Chapter 11, rather than a liquidation under Chapter 7. The jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts may extend more broadly in the former case than  J8 in the latter. Cf. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust  J Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 676 (1935). And we think our holding"that respondents'  J immediate execution on the supersedeas bond is at least related to the Celotex bankruptcy"is in accord with representative recent decisions of the Courts of Appeals.  JH See American Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp., 885 F.2d 621, 623 (CA9 1989) (finding related to jurisdiction where enforcement of state court judgment by creditor against debtor's guarantors would affect administration of debtor's reorganization plan); cf.  J MacArthur Co. v. JohnsManville Corp., 837 F.2d 89, 93 (CA2) (noting that a bankruptcy court's injunctive powers under 105(a) allow it to enjoin suits that might impede the reorganization process), cert. denied, 488  J U.S. 868 (1988); In re A. H. Robins Co., 828 F.2d 1023, 1024!1026 (CA4 1987) (affirming bankruptcy court's 105(a) injunction barring products liability plaintiffs from bringing actions against debtor's insurers because such actions would interfere with debtor's  J reorganization), cert. denied sub nom., 485 U.S. 969  J (1988).i uBX ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < We recognize the theoretical possibility of distinguishing between the proceeding to execute on the bond in the Fifth Circuit and the 105 stay proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court in the Eleventh Circuit. One might argue, technically, that though the proceeding to execute on the bond is related to the title 11 case, the stay proceeding arises under title 11, or arises in the title 11 case.  uB See In re Monroe Well Serv., Inc., 67 B. R. 746, 753 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Pa. 1986). We need not and do not decide this question here. H"  Ԍ J  Respondents, relying on our decision in Board of  J Governors v. MCorp Financial, 502 U.S. 32 (1991), contend that 1334(b)'s statutory grant of jurisdiction must be reconciled and harmonized with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65.1, which provides an expedited procedure for executing on supersedeas bonds. In  J MCorp, we held that the grant of jurisdiction in 1334(b) to district courts sitting in bankruptcy did not authorize an injunction against a regulatory proceeding, but there we relied on the specific preclusive language of 12 U.S.C. 1818(i)(1) which stated that no court shall have jurisdiction to affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or enforcement of any [Board] notice or order.  J MCorp, supra, at 39, 42. There is no analogous statutory prohibition against enjoining the maintenance of a proceeding under Rule 65.1. That Rule provides:BQ C   , , (  Whenever these rules ... require or permit the giving of security by a party, and security is given in the form of a bond or stipulation or other undertaking with one or more sureties, each surety submits to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of the court as the surety's agent upon whom any papers affecting the surety's liability on the bond or undertaking may be served. The surety's liability may be enforced on motion without the necessity of an independent action.... Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 65.1.BQ 3d   Jo  ( , , This rule outlines a streamlined procedure for executing on bonds. It assures judgment creditors like respondents that they do not have to bring a separate action against sureties, and instead allows them to collect on the supersedeas bond by merely filing a motion. Just because the rule provides a simplified procedure for collecting on a bond, however, does not mean that such a procedure, like the more complicated procedure of aW "   fullfledged law suit, cannot be stayed by a lawfully entered injunction.  J  Much of our discussion dealing with the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court under the related to language of 1334(b) and 157(a) is likewise applicable in determining whether or not the Bankruptcy Court's Section 105 Injunction has only a frivolous pretense to validity.  J GTE Sylvania, 445 U.S., at 386 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Fourth Circuit has upheld the merits of the Bankruptcy Court's Section 105  Jp Injunction, see Willis, 978 F.2d, at 149!150, and even the Fifth Circuit in this case did not find that the bankruptcy court in Florida was necessarily wrong. See  J Edwards II, 6 F. 3d, at 321. But we need not, and do not, address whether the Bankruptcy Court acted  J properly in issuing the Section 105 Injunction.  i uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < The dissent contends that Celotex' attempts to set aside the supersedeas bond are patently meritless because none of Celotex'  uB~ claims can impair Northbrook's obligation to respondents. See post, at 14. That premise, however, is not so clear as to give the Section 105 Injunction only a frivolous pretense to validity. There is authority suggesting that, in certain circumstances, transfers from the debtor to another for the benefit of a third party may be recov uB ered from that third party. See In re Air Conditioning, Inc. of  uB Stuart, 845 F.2d 293, 296!299 (CA11), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 993  uB (1988); In re Compton Corp., 831 F.2d 586, 595 (1987), modified on other grounds, 835 F.2d 584 (CA5 1988). Although we offer no opinion on the merits of that authority or on whether it fits the facts here, it supports our conclusion that the stay was not frivolous.  J  We have made clear that  `! `[i]t is for the court of first instance to determine the question of the validity of the law, and until its decision is reversed for error by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher court, its orders based on its decision are to be respected.' O!   J Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 314 (1967)  J (quoting Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189!190 "   (1922)). If respondents believed the Section 105 Injunction was improper, they should have challenged it in the Bankruptcy Court, like other similarly situated bonded  J judgment creditors have done. See Celotex II, 140 B. R., at 912. If dissatisfied with the Bankruptcy Court's ultimate decision, respondents can appeal to the district court for the judicial district in which the bankruptcy judge is serving, see 28 U.S.C. 158(a), and then to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. See 158(d). Respondents chose not to pursue this course of action, but instead to collaterally attack the Bankruptcy Court's Section 105 Injunction in the Federal Courts in Texas. This they cannot be permitted to do without seriously undercutting the orderly process of the law.  The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is  J reversed.  J ` BIt is so ordered.ă