Detailed Information on the
Navy Base Operations & Support Assessment

Develop, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, definitions for all base support services that are common across all military services.

Develop, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, levels of performance for all base support services that are common across all military services.

Develop, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, cost models and performance metrics for all base support services that are common across all military services.

Fall 2007. Develop a quarterly Common Output Level bor base support services based on resources, units delivered, readiness, and customer feedback.

Measure: Airfield Operations Common Output Level

Explanation:This metric measures the performance of Navy Airfield Operations on a scale of one to four--with a one representing a level of services provided that entail no risk to Navy readiness, four representing a level of services that would require considerable effort to maintain readiness. Specific criteria for this performance measure are obtained in the Chief of Naval Operations, N46 Ashore Readiness Capability Plans. Historical performance is published in the CNIC Stockholders' Report FY2005.

Measure: Port Operations Common Output Level

Explanation:This metric measures the performance of Navy Port Operations on a scale of one to four--with a one representing a level of services provided that entail no risk to Navy readiness, four representing a level of services that would require considerable effort to maintain readiness. Specific criteria for this performance measure are obtained in the Chief of Naval Operations, N46 Ashore Readiness Capability Plans. Historical performance is published in the CNIC Stockholders' Report FY2005.

Measure: Supply Common Output Level

Explanation:This metric measures the performance of Navy Supply Operations on a scale of one to four--with a one representing a level of services provided that entail no risk to Navy readiness, four representing a level of services that would require considerable effort to maintain readiness. Specific criteria for this performance measure are obtained in the Chief of Naval Operations, N46 Ashore Readiness Capability Plans. Historical performance is published in the CNIC Stockholders' Report FY2005.

Measure: Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Common Output Level

Explanation:This metric measures the performance of Navy Morale, Welfare, and Recreation programs on a scale of one to four--with a one representing a level of services provided that entail no risk to Navy readiness, and four representing a level of services that would require considerable effort to maintain readiness. Specific criteria for this performance measure are obtained in the Chief of Naval Operations, N46 Ashore Readiness Capability Plans. Historical performance is published in the CNIC Stockholders' Report FY2005.

Measure: Child and Youth Programs Common Output Level

Explanation:This metric measures the performance of Navy Child and Youth programs on a scale of one to four--with a one representing a level of services provided that entail no risk to Navy morale, and four representing a level of services that would require considerable effort to maintain morale. Specific criteria for this performance measure are obtained in the Chief of Naval Operations, N46 Ashore Readiness Capability Plans. Historical performance is published in the CNIC Stockholders' Report FY2005.

Measure: Galley Common Output Level

Explanation:This metric measures the performance of Navy Galley services on a scale of one to four--with a one representing a level of services provided that entail no risk to Navy readiness, and four representing a level of services that would require considerable effort to maintain readiness. Specific criteria for this performance measure are obtained in the Chief of Naval Operations, N46 Ashore Readiness Capability Plans. Historical performance is published in the CNIC Stockholders' Report FY2005.

Measure: Fleet and Family Support Program

Explanation:This metric measures the performance of Navy Fleet and Family support programs on a scale of one to four--with a one representing a level of services provided that entail no risk to Navy morale, and four representing a level of services that would require considerable effort to maintain morale. Specific criteria for this performance measure are obtained in the Chief of Naval Operations, N46 Ashore Readiness Capability Plans. Historical performance is published in the CNIC Stockholders' Report FY2005.

Measure: Housing Common Output Level

Explanation:This metric measures the performance of Navy housing on a scale of one to four--with a one representing a level of services provided that entail no risk to Navy morale, and four representing a level of services that would require considerable effort to maintain morale. Specific criteria for this performance measure are obtained in the Chief of Naval Operations, N46 Ashore Readiness Capability Plans. Historical performance is published in the CNIC Stockholders' Report FY2005.

Measure: Utilities Common Output Level

Explanation:This metric measures the provision of utilities to naval facilities on a scale of one to four--with a one representing a level of services provided that entail no risk to Navy readiness, and four representing a level of services that would require considerable effort to maintain readiness. Specific criteria for this performance measure are obtained in the Chief of Naval Operations, N46 Ashore Readiness Capability Plans. Historical performance is published in the CNIC Stockholders' Report FY2005.

Measure: Facility Management Common Output Level

Explanation:This metric measures the performance of Navy facilitiy management programs on a scale of one to four--with a one representing a level of services provided that entail no risk to Navy readiness, and four representing a level of services that would require considerable effort to maintain readiness. Specific criteria for this performance measure are obtained in the Chief of Naval Operations, N46 Ashore Readiness Capability Plans. Historical performance is published in the CNIC Stockholders' Report FY2005.

Measure: Facility Services Common Output Level

Explanation:This metric measures the provision of facility services to Naval installations on a scale of one to four--with a one representing a level of services provided that entail no risk to Navy readiness, and four representing a level of services that would require considerable effort to maintain readiness. Specific criteria for this performance measure are obtained in the Chief of Naval Operations, N46 Ashore Readiness Capability Plans. Historical performance is published in the CNIC Stockholders' Report FY2005.

Measure: Base Support Vehicle & Equipment Common Output Level

Explanation:This metric measures the support of Navy base vehicles and equipment on a scale of one to four--with a one representing a level of services provided that entail no risk to Navy readiness, and four representing a level of services that would require considerable effort to maintain readiness. Specific criteria for this performance measure are obtained in the Chief of Naval Operations, N46 Ashore Readiness Capability Plans. Historical performance is published in the CNIC Stockholders' Report FY2005.

Measure: Environmental Common Output Level

Explanation:This metric measures the performance of Navy environmental compliance programs on a scale of one to four--with a one representing a level of services provided that entail no risk to Navy readiness, and four representing a level of services that would require considerable effort to maintain readiness. Specific criteria for this performance measure are obtained in the Chief of Naval Operations, N46 Ashore Readiness Capability Plans. Historical performance is published in the CNIC Stockholders' Report FY2005.

Measure: Force Protection Common Output Level

Explanation:This metric measures the performance of Navy force protection programs on a scale of one to four--with a one representing a level of services provided that entail no risk to Navy readiness, and four representing a level of services that would require considerable effort to maintain readiness. Specific criteria for this performance measure are obtained in the Chief of Naval Operations, N46 Ashore Readiness Capability Plans. Historical performance is published in the CNIC Stockholders' Report FY2005.

Measure: Fire and Emergency Services Common Output Level

Explanation:This metric measures the provision of Navy fire and emergecy services on a scale of one to four--with a one representing a level of services provided that entail no risk to Navy readiness, and four representing a level of services that would require considerable effort to maintain readiness. Specific criteria for this performance measure are obtained in the Chief of Naval Operations, N46 Ashore Readiness Capability Plans. Historical performance is published in the CNIC Stockholders' Report FY2005.

Measure: Emergency Management Common Output Level

Explanation:This metric measures the provision of emergency management programs on a scale of one to four--with a one representing a level of services provided that entail no risk to Navy readiness, and four representing a level of services that would require considerable effort to maintain readiness. Specific criteria for this performance measure are obtained in the Chief of Naval Operations, N46 Ashore Readiness Capability Plans. Historical performance is published in the CNIC Stockholders' Report FY2005.

Measure: Safety Common Output Level

Explanation:This metric measures the performance of Navy safety programs on a scale of one to four--with a one representing a level of services provided that entail no risk to Navy readiness, and four representing a level of services that would require considerable effort to maintain readiness. Specific criteria for this performance measure are obtained in the Chief of Naval Operations, N46 Ashore Readiness Capability Plans. Historical performance is published in the CNIC Stockholders' Report FY2005.

Measure: Information Technology Services

Explanation:This metric measures the provision of information technology services on a scale of one to four--with a one representing a level of services provided that entail no risk to Navy readiness, and four representing a level of services that would require considerable effort to maintain readiness. Specific criteria for this performance measure are obtained in the Chief of Naval Operations, N46 Ashore Readiness Capability Plans. Historical performance is published in the CNIC Stockholders' Report FY2005.

Measure: Command Common Output Level

Explanation:This metric measures the provision of services to Navy command activities on a scale of one to four--with a one representing a level of services provided that entail no risk to Navy readiness, and four representing a level of services that would require considerable effort to maintain readiness. Specific criteria for this performance measure are obtained in the Chief of Naval Operations, N46 Ashore Readiness Capability Plans. Historical performance is published in the CNIC Stockholders' Report FY2005.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: The purpose of the Navy's Base Operations and Support program is to enable and enhance Navy combat power by providing the most effective and efficient shore services and support. Base support covers a wide range of activities that include: port and airfield operations; operation of utility systems; public works services; base administration; supply operations; support of base vehicles and equipment; environmental and hazardous waste management; security; bachelor quarters; and morale, welfare, and recreation operations.

Evidence: The mission of Naval Base Operations and Support is outlined in the Commander, Navy Installations Command's Stockholder's Report.

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: The Navy could not function without an adequate shore support infrastructure. The Base Operating Support (BOS) program provides the backbone that is necessary for the Navy to accomplish its core missions. BOS includes the operation and provision of utilities to Naval installations, maintenance and operation of the Navy's motor fleet, and the provision of supplies and services necessary to keep Navy installations operational.

Evidence: Naval leadership uses military judgment to determine the Navy's force requirements. Navy Installations Command bases its activities on what is required to provide adequate shore support to the Naval Fleet. These requirements, as well as previous years' performance, are outlined in the Navy Installations Command's Stockholder's Report.

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: No other government agencies outside of the Department of Defense provide for operations at Navy Shore Activities.

Evidence: The private sector provides many services that are similar to services provided in this program??such as utilities and information technology. But, the Department of Defense has a bona fide need for these services at its facilities. They cannot operate, for example, without electricity. The Navy obtains these services from the private sector when it is both possible and most cost-effective to so. While the private sector supplies many of these services, the Navy would not receive them without Federal funding.

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: In 2003 the Navy developed its metrics to measure Common Output Levels for base support services and centralized installations management. Prior to this, the Navy lacked an effective way to measure base service support requirements. In addition, mission commanders frequently moved funds from base service support activities to other programs that they deemed more important to immediate readiness of the Naval fleet. This resulted in inefficiencies and was detrimental to long-term readiness that are now successfully addressed.

Evidence: The Commander Naval Installation Command's sole responsibility is the management of Naval installations. By centralizing the control of base service support funds with the Commander Naval Installations Command, the Navy has been able to prevent the siphoning off of these funds for short-term requirements at the expense of long-term efficiency.

Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?

Explanation: The Base Operations Support Program is funded as a sub-activity within the Navy's Operation and Maintenance appropriation. This enables the Navy to easily divert funds from this program to others funded by the same appropriation, which also funds ship and air operations. This has, in some cases, reduced the effectiveness of the program.

Evidence: The GAO has reported that the Navy has withheld funds intended for base operating support to help pay for the Global War on Terror. While the Navy has received supplemental funding to offset these withheld funds, the GAO notes that "such turbulence occurring during the year makes it difficult to execute planned programs effectively."

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: The Navy divides the various activities that make up base operating support into 26 Special Interest Areas. Each of these areas has a specified measure, called a "Common Output Level Standard" (COLS). The COLSs for each area measure a range of service capabilities on a scale of 1 (most capable) to 4 (least capable). These allow Naval leadership to assess the risk to readiness associated with various funding levels for each area.

Evidence: An example of CNO directed Common Output Levels for Utilities is defined as follows: COLS 1: Utility is available to meet all mission requirements. Commodity availability has no negative impact to mission, quality of life, or routine station operations. Energy and water efficiency and awareness are utilized and no forced reduction measures are required. Other services are available to meet all mission requirements. COLS 2: Utility is available to substantially meet mission requirements with minor difficulty. Utilities funding status and/or weather conditions compel building occupants and supported tenants to make minor operational adjustments to meet mission requirements in accordance with health/ safety regulations. Minimal forced reduction measures include (but are not limited to): ?? Heating and Air Conditioning delayed/interrupted no more than two weeks ?? Climate control systems adjusted to achieve average temperature of 68 or 69 degrees in Winter (68<70) and higher than 76 degrees in the Summer (avg temp>76) ?? 5% or less reduction required for electrical service in facilities without a direct warfighter support function (e.g., ball field lighting, decorative lighting) ?? 5% or less reduction required for steam service in facilities without a direct warfighter support function (e.g., warehouses, gymnasiums) ?? 5% or less reduction required in water use for facilities without direct warfighter support function (e.g., irrigation, car washes). COLS 3: Utility is available to marginally meet mission requirements with major difficulty. Utilities funding status and/or weather conditions compel building occupants and supported tenants to make minor operational adjustments to meet mission requirements in accordance with health/ safety regulations. Forced reduction measures include (but are not limited to): ?? Heating and Air Conditioning availability delayed/interrupted no more than four weeks, ?? Climate control systems adjusted to achieve average temperature lower than 68 degrees in Winter and/or higher than 78 degrees in the Summer ?? 6% to 10% reduction required for electrical service delivery facilities without direct support function to the warfighter (e.g., ball field lighting, decorative lighting) ?? 6% to 10% reduction required for steam service delivery facilities without direct support function to the warfighter (e.g., warehouses, gymnasiums) ?? 6% to 10% reduction required in water use for facilities without direct support function to the warfighter (e.g., irrigation, car washes). COLS 4: Utility is not available to marginally meet mission requirements due to funding shortfalls and/or weather/ climate conditions even after making significant mission adjustments. While meeting bare minimum health/ safety regulations, building occupants and supported tenants will experience significant hardships that include: ?? Heating and AC availability delayed/interrupted more than four weeks; ?? Climate control systems adjusted to achieve average temperatures less than 66 degrees in Winter, and greater than 80 degrees in Summer ?? Greater than 10% reduction in all utilities service to all facilities without direct warfighter support function ?? Imposed 2 or more brief rolling blackout of utilities services in order to reduce usage

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: The goal of the Navy Base Operations Program is to achieve a Common Output Level of 2 (entailing minor risks to program performance) for the Air Operations, Port Operations, Utilities, and Overseas/Remote Morale Welfare and Recreation interest areas, while maintaining a Common Output Level of 3 (entailing moderate risks to program performance) for the remaining base operations support interest areas. Recently, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) encouraged efforts to raise the Common Output Level to 2 for Fleet and Family Service programs to meet the rising demands placed on service members and families due to the Global War on Terror. Given limited resources this will require the Base Operations Program to improve its cost efficiencies.

Evidence: The Navy's goals for its Base Operations Program are outlined in CNO guidance, the Navy Ashore Vision 2030, the Commander Navy Installations Command Strategic Plan, and the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Installations and Environment's Strategic Plan.

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: Each Base Operations Support special interest area has a defined Common Output Level metric that military leadership can use to assess the level of service provided by that area. Naval leadership uses military judgment to decide which areas are of the highest importance to naval readiness and the appropriate amount of risk for each area that the Navy can tolerate given limited resources.

Evidence: These outputs are evaluated after each fiscal year in Program Capabilities Plans, the Commander Navy Installations Command Strategic Plan, and the annual Commander Navy Installations Command Stockholders' Report.

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: The Navy uses a four-level system of Common Output Level Standards for describing its program outputs for delivery of shore services in support of each of its program areas. Each level describes a range of capabilities from 1 (most capable) to 4 (least capable). Given limited resources, Navy leadership determines the amount of capabilities required for each program area that will pose the most acceptable balance of risk toward naval readiness.

Evidence: The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has issued guidance that determines the correct level of output required for Air and Port Operations, Utilities, and overseas/isolated location Morale Welfare and Recreation is at Common Output Level (COL) 2. For all other Base Operating Support activities, the CNO has determined that the appropriate COL is 3. Given limited resources, this level of support will require the Navy to continuously find cost efficiencies.

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: All partners (ie - Commander Navy Installations Command, Navy Regions, Fleets, OPNAV HQ, and private and government suppliers) work toward the CNO Common Output Levels. The Navy uses performance-based contracting with its private-sector partners and bases performance on Common Output Levels.

Evidence: Base Inter Service Support Agreements and commercial contracts are written to meet Common output level standards and goals established in the Commander Naval Installations Command (CNIC) Stockholders Report and CNIC Strategic Plan.

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: The Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) conducts annual performance reviews at the end of each fiscal year. These reviews grade performance against quantity and quality standards as well as detailed performance metrics specific to each base operations support interest area. The CNIC also conducts an annual command and program assessment survey, completed by installation tenants, to gauge their satisfaction with base services. In addition, the GAO conducts periodic assessments of base operating support services Defense Department-Wide. The Navy has used these assessments to modify program management and improve services.

Evidence: The CNIC publishes the results of program reviews and satisfaction surveys each year in an annual Stockholders' Report. And numerous GAO reports address the Navy's Base Operations Support activities.

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: Budget requests reflect the amount of funding required to support Chief of Naval Operations mandated capability levels. But, Navy budget exhibits do not show how legislative funding decisions would affect policy. The exhibits show no link between funds and Common Output Level Standards for each interest area.

Evidence: The Navy's Congressional Budget Justification Books contain useful metrics, such as the amount of megawatt hours funding requests will support. But they do not connect this data with the Common Output Level Standards that the Navy uses to measure outcomes and manage the program.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: In 2004, the Navy centralized its installation management with the Commander Naval Installations Command (CNIC). This allowed the Navy to increase its visibility over installations management and to allocate resources as needed to best serve the overall Navy. The CNIC addressed the need to develop analytically-based base operating support measures with the adoption of Common Output Level Standards, which allow decision makers to see what risks they face when selecting alternative levels of funding.

Evidence: The Navy identifies strategic planning deficiencies through annual reviews by the Commander Naval Installations Command. They Navy developed Common Output Level Standards in response to the need to have an analytic process for developing base operating support requirements that is comparable to its analytic process for identifying facilities sustainment needs.

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: Throughout the year, installations collect performance data for each of the 26 base operating support special interest areas. The Navy collects performance data from each Navy Region annually and includes this information during the programming process for future budgets. During this process, the Navy reviews past performance along with efficiencies and challenges identified during the current year. This information is used to update Common Output Level requirements and assess program risk.

Evidence: The program collects regular information about each of the 26 base operating support special interest areas. When this information highlights efficiencies or challenges, the Navy is able to take action or move funds to address shortfalls. For example, in FY 2005 rising energy costs resulted in a shortfall in the Navy's utilities budget. To offset this demand the Navy reprogrammed funds to cover a portion of the shortfall. In addition to the transfer of funds, the Navy stepped up efforts to increase energy efficiency??exceeding federally mandated energy efficiency goals three months ahead of schedule.

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: The Commander Navy Installations Command (CNIC) is responsible for implementing the Base Operations Support Program. Each functional area has a Program Director who is responsible for the area's performance in each of 16 different Naval Regions. In addition, contractors are held accountable through the use of performance-based contracting.

Evidence: Program performance is a critical component of the personnel performance evaluations for the CINC and Program Directors. The Navy uses performance-based contracting to ensure that contractors are held accountable for performance results. An example would be the Navy's Fire & Emergency Services contracts, where the Navy experienced 13 fire injuries per million people protected, versus a civilian rate of 61 injuries per million people.

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner, spent for the intended purpose and accurately reported?

Explanation: The Navy has had numerous Anti-Deficiency Act violations in the past, and has not provided sufficient evidence that it has adequately addressed funds control issues.

Evidence: Department of Defense financial management weaknesses are well-known and are documented in numerous GAO reports.

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: The Navy uses A-76 strategic sourcing to achieve efficiencies in its Base Operations Support Program. In addition, the Navy has numerous metrics to measure the cost-efficiency of its base operating support functional areas. These metrics are reflected in the cost to obtain each level of the Common Output Level Standard for each special interest area. But these costs are not linear and are difficult to interpret.

Evidence: In FY 2004, the Navy fire & emergency services program was able to show that it saved at least $360 million (at a cost of $238 million) in averted losses, which may make it the first fire service in the United States to be able to prove that it saves more taxpayer dollars than it costs.

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: A lack of common definitions and standards for base operating support across the entire Department of Defense prohibits the Navy from effective coordination and collaboration with other military services. This lack of effective collaboration is particularly pronounced when other services occupy Naval installations.

Evidence: The lack of common Department of Defense definitions for Base Operating Support programs has been well-documented by the GAO. This has resulted in poor collaboration when other services occupy Naval installations (as well as when the Navy occupies other services' installations). For example, at the Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, Texas, the Coast Guard has been unable to meet its requirements for nighttime air missions because the base has cut back on operating hours.

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: The Defense Department's financial management weaknesses are well-documented. While DoD continues to make efforts to improve it, the Department has yet to obtain an unqualified audit opinion. The Navy does not have audit reports demonstrating that its base operations support program is free from internal weaknesses.

Evidence: Numerous audits document the Department's financial management weaknesses. Because of the magnitude of its problems, DoD is unlikely to obtain an unqualified audit for some time. GAO has specifically identified support infrastructure as one of the Department's weaknesses.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: The Navy has consolidated base support under one budget submitting office and a single execution agent for offshore services and support through the establishment of the Commander Navy Installations Command. This has allowed mission commanders to focus on their core mission while moving responsibilities for installations support to a dedicated command that can better determine the optimal resource allocation across the entire Navy. In addition, this has prevented the siphoning-off of critical resources for other functions. The Commander Navy Installations Command has a management control program that includes control mechanisms for non-Defense Department contract vehicles and training in fiscal laws and regulation for delegated funding officials. In addition, the annual review of each program identifies efficiencies and shortfalls so senior leadership can address them.

Evidence: The Commander Naval Installations Command (CNIC) has issued a management control program Statement of Assurance that outlines its steps to review management deficiencies. The Annual Stockholders' Report identifies management weaknesses and challenges that need to be addressed.

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: The establishment of the Commander Navy Installations Command in 2003 enabled the Navy to develop common standards for measuring base support services. Since that time, the Navy has been able to meet the long-term requirements that the Chief of Naval Operations has determined are necessary to allow the Navy to perform its core mission of defending U.S. national security.

Evidence: Performance measures indicate that special interest areas have been meeting their targeted output levels, as required to accomplish the naval mission.

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: Common Output Levels were established for most Base Operating Support special interest areas in Fiscal Year 2003. Since that time, the program has largely achieved its goals. Achievement has been challenged by congressional funding reductions, fuel price increases, and deregulation of utilities??which have decreased the availability of already-limited resources.

Evidence: The Commander Naval Installations Command Stockholders' Report provides current and historical performance data that shows that the Navy has been largely successful in meeting its annual performance goals.

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: The efficiency metrics for most Navy Base Operating Support activities are difficult to apply directly to desired outcomes. Nonetheless, the Navy does track the costs of numerous sub-activities. These metrics show that the Navy has a mixed result in improving cost efficiency from year to year, but some programs compare so favorably to similar activities performed in the private sector that efficiencies would be very difficult to achieve.

Evidence: The Navy's efficiency metrics are contained in its annual stockholders' report. While they do not show a direct link with the Common Output Levels, they do meaningfully reflect program performance. For example, from 2004 to 2005, the Navy's janitorial costs decreased from $1.09 to $0.93 per square foot.

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: The lack of common metrics prevents a fruitful comparison of base support services between the Navy and other military services. But, where the Navy is able to compare its services with similar services provided in the private sector the Navy compares quite favorably.

Evidence: The Navy can compare its Fire and Emergency Services with those provided by municipalities across the United States. The Navy's Fire and Emergency Services outperform national averages by a considerable amount. Navy firefighters average 0.5 injuries per 100 fires versus an average of 3.6 in civilian fire departments. Non-firefighter injuries average around 13 per million people on installations served by Navy firefighters versus 61 per million in facilities served by civilian firefighters. Similarly, Navy firefighters are able to limit dollar loss from structural fires to $3 per capita, versus an average of $28 per capita in the civilian sector. As the Commander Naval Installations Command Stockholders' Report notes: "One is far safer from fire on a Navy installation that at home in America!"

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: The Navy has received awards from the Federal Energy Management Program as well as recognition from the Commission on Fire Accreditation. But, the GAO has noted that the Base Operating Support program as a whole has achieved mixed results in providing services from year to year.

Evidence: The GAO has listed support infrastructure as a high-risk area and has documented numerous examples of mixed performance. Nonetheless, the GAO has acknowledged that the Navy is making progress in its management of base support services. Still, the Navy needs a more mature analytical framework for providing and measuring base support services to ensure that they are adequately provided to its installations.