Brazenly Prepared

Maybe the New York Times is miffed because I’ve criticized their article about the 9/11 anniversary ("As 9/11 Nears, a Debate Rises: How Much Tribute Is Enough?" Sept. 2, 2007). But Thursday's editorial page featured a broadside against our Department of Homeland Security that was a perfect storm of misrepresentation and misunderstanding. Titled, “Department of Brazen Bureaucracy,” the Times charged that we had “flouted” Congressional lawmakers by “claiming” that the Secretary (whether me or my successors) has the responsibility to coordinate national emergencies. The Times also editorialized that our proposed national response framework worsens bureaucratic inertia by creating 15 regional disaster areas with 15 separate plans.

I wish the writers had done their homework. They’ve misread the law and the new national response framework. Worse yet, they are arguing against the very type of detailed planning that is required if we are to successfully confront the wide range of emerging catastrophic threats that can surface in our new century. And this is where the danger of pre-9/11 thinking arises.

First, let’s clear the legal underbrush. Contrary to the Times, the Secretary of Homeland Security has the legal authority to coordinate federal domestic emergency response. This is made clear in both the Homeland Security Act of 2002 which established the Department and the 2006 Amendments to the Act mentioned in the Times editorial. The amendments state that the Administrator of FEMA “shall report to the Secretary” and “is the principal advisor to the President, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary for all matters relating to emergency management in the United States.”

All of these statutory elements are captured in – and consistent with – the new national response framework.

Accusing us of flouting laws which they misread is, however, the tip of iceberg of what’s wrong with the Times editorial piece. There appears to be something deeper going on as well.

It’s revealed by a parting shot in the editorial, where it charges that DHS will feed “bureaucratic inertia” by creating “15 regional disaster areas with separate operational and strategic plans.” This just misreads the new policy. The national response framework, in fact, does not create 15 new geographic regions with separate plans. What we are doing is creating 15 different nationwide plans to deal with 15 very different types of disaster scenarios that are concrete threats to our country. This planning effort includes not only upgrading plans for traditional disasters, such as major earthquakes and major hurricanes. It embraces planning to address newly emerging risks, such as multiple attacks by improvised explosive devices; an attack by radiological (“dirty”) bombs; food contamination; cyber attack; and pandemic influenza.

Developing, training to, and exercising plans for multiple threats and very different threat scenarios isn’t a recipe for “bureaucratic inertia” as the Times asserts. It’s simple common sense. The plan for mass evacuation from an approaching major hurricane must be very different from the plan to shelter in place and minimize human contact during a biological attack. And both of these plans would be very different from the plan to mitigate a cyber attack. It would be reckless indeed to believe that one plan can fit all these varied threats.

Why are we broadening the nature of planning like this? Simply put, before 9/11, the main focus of FEMA was natural disasters. But our current 15 planning scenarios reflect the fact that we live now in a post-9/11 world. Natural disasters remain at the forefront of preparation. But so, too, must bomb attacks like those in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Biological threats also cannot be ignored. Congress’ purpose in establishing a broad-gauged Department of Homeland Security was precisely to integrate the ability to respond to all hazards, including those posed by 21^st century terrorism and the existence of weapons of mass destruction. We owe the public a planning process that takes account of these new hazards.

Perhaps this truth is inconvenient to the Times writers. But nostalgia for a time when terrorist WMDs were not a real risk is not a reason to return to pre-9/11 thinking.

Michael Chertoff

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