Yes We Are Safer

Last week, the nation marked the seventh anniversary of the 9/11 attacks in solemn fashion, focusing on memorials and reflection, rather than on point scoring. Too bad Richard Clarke couldn’t manage to do the same.

Clarke, the official in charge of antiterrorism efforts before 9/11, commemorated the anniversary of the attacks by publishing a finger-pointing screed in U.S. News and World Report.

Clarke’s argument went something like the following: Here we are, seven years after 9/11. We haven’t been attacked. But we could be. Al Qaeda still exists, Bin Laden remains at large, and terrorists still commit terrorism. We’re backsliding, and no safer now then we were then. On the home front, our borders are still porous, we’re still not screening people, and security grants are too much about pork and not enough about real risk.

Clarke is mostly wrong.

In fact, we are safer today than we were seven years ago. We haven’t been attacked since 9/11 in part because we have destroyed al Qaeda’s headquarters, enhanced our intelligence assets across the globe, captured and killed terrorists on nearly every continent, and partnered with our allies on information sharing and other security-related efforts.

Today, al Qaeda no longer has a state sponsor. Contrary to Clarke’s claims, most of its original leadership has been captured or killed. It is losing in Iraq -- thanks to the surge and to the Awakening movement among the Sunni tribes--and its savage attacks on innocents have reduced its popularity there and across the Muslim world. Muslim scholars and clerics are increasingly condemning its beliefs and behavior as a desecration of Islam.

This progress has come because we abandoned the practice of treating terrorism solely as a criminal matter – exactly the kind of September 10 policy that Clarke celebrates in his article.

Closer to home, the Department of Homeland Security has made clear progress that belies Clarke’s claims.

At the border that Clarke thinks is so porous, DHS has built hundreds of miles of fence and will double the size of the Border Patrol. We’ve also deployed fingerprint-based screening and radiation portal monitors at all of our border entry points.

To protect against a repeat attack, DHS has built nearly two dozen layers of security into our aviation system, and it has developed comprehensive security plans for other critical infrastructure.

Clarke claims that the executive branch has proved incapable of managing new terrorism programs to success. Tell that to US-VISIT – a massive government IT project that compares fingerprints of travelers to a database of millions and does it in 30 seconds for officials all across the country and the world. We got it up and running from scratch, despite the doubters. And it’s so successful that we’re expanding it to collect all ten prints and to compare them to prints found in terrorist safe houses around the world. We’ve done all that since Dick Clarke left government – and without a word of support from him.

Despite his claims of backsliding, it’s DHS that has been battling complacency, and Clarke who seems to have been sitting on the sidelines.

We’re the ones who’ve been fighting for the carefully targeted, risk-based homeland security grants he favors. It’s Congress that has added billions and made them less risk-based. Has Clarke criticized Congress or praised DHS for our risk based approach? If so, I missed it.

On our southern border, DHS’s fence-building and increased border enforcement have been hampered by local NIMBY (“not-in-my-backyard”) forces and advocates for illegal immigration. Did Dick Clarke speak out against them? Not so I’ve noticed.

To secure our northern border, we’re implementing tougher document standards, and we were ready to require all travelers to produce a passport or passport-equivalent by the end of this year. Where was Dick Clarke when Congress decided to push back that deadline to mid-2009? I don’t remember an op-ed then complaining about how porous this would make our Canadian border.

Clarke says that terrorists who look European have been trained by al Qaeda and may have European Union passports and clean identities unknown to intelligence agencies. He thinks such people could enter the United States almost as easily as did the 9/11 hijackers. It’s indeed true that during Dick Clarke’s tenure, Europeans could come to the US without any opportunity to screen them before they were in the air. As of this January, though, no foreign travelers other than Canadians will be able to come to the US without supplying -- in advance -- the information we need to screen them. At last, we’ll have the time and information we need to investigate risky travelers (and to prepare a rude surprise for terrorists who try this route). That’s all happened since Dick Clarke left government, and without any support from him.

There’s no question that Dick Clarke contributed to strengthening our national security, but his recent assertions are not only incorrect, they disrespect the work of many national security professionals he once called colleagues. That is indeed unfortunate.

Stewart Baker
Assistant Secretary for Policy

Engaging the Public for a Better Security Process

One of my main priorities for TSA in 2008 is to get passengers and TSA on the same side, working together toward a better security process for everyone. That’s why TSA has launched a blog called “Evolution of Security” to get a two-way conversation going between our workforce and the public. While I’ll still be posting here on TSA’s many transportation security initiatives, I invite you to check out www.tsa.gov/blog to interact with some TSA employees, learn about the innovations we have in the works for checkpoints, and give us your feedback. I wanted to share with Leadership Journal readers an excerpt of my initial Evolution of Security blog post:

Our ambition is to provide here a forum for a lively, open discussion of TSA issues. While I and senior leadership of TSA will participate in the discussion, we are turning the keyboard over to several hosts who represent what’s best about TSA (its people). Our hosts aren’t responsible for TSA’s policies, nor will they have to defend them -- their job is to engage with you straight-up and take it from there. Our hosts will have access to senior leadership but will have very few editorial constraints. Our postings from the public will be reviewed to remove the destructive but not touch the critical or cranky.

Please be patient and good-humored as we get underway. The opportunity is that we will incorporate what we learn in this forum in our checkpoint process evolution. We will not only give you straight answers to your questions but we will challenge you with new ideas and involve you in upcoming changes.

I encourage the readers of the Leadership Journal to visit our new blog and contribute to the conversation with TSA front line employees. This is your chance to let us know what you think, ask questions, and help us improve the screening process so it is more effective for everyone. Please stay tuned to this Journal as I will continue to be a major contributor.

Kip Hawley

TSA Administrator

Travel Safe, Travel Simple

As we take to the skies to visit friends and loved ones this holiday season, I’d like to share a few thoughts with you.

First, I want to point out the “non-news” story that failed to generate many headlines last month: the fact that most air travelers had an efficient, hassle-free experience during the week of Thanksgiving. Instead of long lines at security checkpoints and frustrated passengers, most will agree that air travel during Thanksgiving was relatively painless.

In fact, despite a record number of air travelers, (some 17 million) peak wait times at the busiest airports rarely exceeded 13 minutes, and in most places were substantially lower.

This was due in no small part to the thousands of TSA security officers who volunteered for extra shifts to ensure checkpoints were at full capacity during peak travel times (30,000 Transportation Security Officers worked on Thanksgiving Day). And it represents close cooperation by the traveling public and our partners at the airports and airlines.

To extend this safety and efficiency beyond Thanksgiving, we’ll again need your help. Please remember the liquid and gel ban for carry-on luggage. The formula is simple
3-1-1: three ounce containers or smaller in one quart-sized, clear, zip-top bag, with a limit of one bag per passenger. And of course, you can always place larger quantities in your checked luggage.

At Thanksgiving we launched a public awareness effort called SimpliFLY, which provides tips on packing smarter to get through security checkpoints faster. Keep your carry-on luggage organized by layering items. Be prepared by having your boarding pass and ID ready. Remember to wear easily removable shoes and outer garments. And please do not wrap gifts in carry on luggage, as we may need to inspect packages.

For more information on these programs and other travel tips, visit our website.

TSA’s highly trained security officers are there to help you reach your destination safely. By coming prepared to the checkpoint, travelers can improve their own experience and get through the screening process securely and efficiently.

On behalf of everyone at TSA, we wish you safe travels and happy holidays.

Kip Hawley
TSA Administrator

SimpliFLY for Smooth Thanksgiving Travel

Thanksgiving is one of the busiest travel periods of the year. This week promises to be challenging, as the Air Transport Association has predicted a four percent rise in Thanksgiving passenger levels from last year, when 23.6 million people went through the country’s commercial airports. It’s a stressful time for air travelers with lines at the sky cap, lines at the check-in counter, lines for coffee and snacks, and lines at the checkpoint.

We can’t do anything to speed up the other lines, but I can assure you that we are doing everything we can at TSA to make your holiday security experience an efficient and smooth one. Our Thanksgiving operations strategy involves running checkpoints throughout the country at full capacity, with extended hours, to accommodate the holiday travel crowds. Our National Deployment Officers, a mobile force that provides additional screening support nationwide, will be deployed to eight of the nation’s busiest airports, including Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport, Chicago O’Hare Airport and Washington-Dulles International Airport – and they can be redeployed to another airport at a moments’ notice if the need arises.

We’ve authorized the maximum overtime usage for Transportation Security Officers, who will be missing holiday time with their families so they can assist you in making it safely to see yours. TSA headquarters and local airport administrative staff will also be volunteering throughout the holiday weekend to assist passengers.

Lastly, TSA will be in contact with the Federal Aviation Administration and our stakeholders to monitor any issues, including weather, that could cause problems in the aviation system. Our Federal Security Directors, who manage security on-site in airports, have already met with their airport partners and appreciate their active participation in efforts to keep the security process moving.

We’re doing all we can, but we need your help as well for this holiday travel season to be a success. What can you do? Help us quickly diagnose that you’re not a threat by packing and dressing security-smart. It will get you through the checkpoint faster and help us keep wait times down.



Lots of common, harmless items can look like threats in an x-ray image, especially if they are hidden by lots of clutter. To help you prepare for your next flight, TSA has launched an awareness campaign called SimpliFLY. Here are some quick tips to SimpliFLY your trip:

• Pack an organized carry-on bag using layers – a layer of clothes, then electronics, more clothes, and then a layer of other items like toiletries. This will help security officers see what’s in your bag.
• Have your boarding pass and ID ready for inspection when you get to the checkpoint.
• Remove your shoes, suit jacket, coat and bulky sweaters and place them in a bin for the x-ray machine. If the officer can get an unobstructed view, there’s less of a chance you’ll get held up with additional screening. Don’t wear complicated lace-up shoes or boots that are difficult to remove and put back on.
• Place any oversized electronics (laptops, full-size video game consoles, DVD players and video cameras that use cassettes) in a separate bin. iPods and other smaller electronics can stay in your carry-on bag.
• Follow the 3-1-1 rule for liquids and put your one quart baggie in the bin to be x-rayed. Even better, put all your liquids in your checked bag.
• If you’re not sure about whether you can bring an item through the checkpoint, put it in your checked bag or leave it at home. Click here to see the list of prohibited items.
• Specifically for the holidays, remember that food and gift items (liquor, perfume, antique weapons) can fall under the 3-1-1 rules or be on the prohibited items list.

By following these simple rules, you can play a critical role in security by letting us focus on the real threats. Thank you for your efforts to make this Thanksgiving travel season a safe one.

Kip Hawley
TSA Administrator

The Long-term Business of Travel Security

This week, TSA has been the subject of two different congressional committees to talk about covert checkpoint testing [here and here], and the headlines would grab anyone's attention. Assuming that you missed the actual hearings and viewed only the headlines or the videos, below is my summary of the hearing I wish I had:

Q: Are there vulnerabilities in TSA's checkpoint security -- specifically related to IED's?

A: Yes, there are vulnerabilities to any and every security measure.

Q: Is that dangerous?

A: Only if you don't identify the vulnerabilities and don’t do something about them.

Q: What vulnerabilities have you identified?

A: For carry-on bags, our current x-rays don't automatically identify all kinds of explosives so we have to depend on the Transportation Security Officer (TSO) at the x-ray to identify potential threats, call for a bag search and resolve the issue. This is of course subject to human error -- there are something like ten million images a day we examine.

For shoes, magnetometers and the old "shoe profile" don't necessarily identify all threats.

For people, magnetometers alone don't necessarily identify all threats.

Q: What have you done about it?

A: For carry-on bags: complete workforce re-training by professional bomb techs supported by 300 full-time bomb techs deployed at checkpoints for hands-on help and training. Checkpoint IED drills using bomb components and simulated explosives, every lane, every shift, every day, every airport. New Advanced Technology x-ray equipment will be deployed during 2008 (about 500) as well as explosive liquids detectors (about 200).

For shoes: we X-ray all shoes, which is very effective at identifying shoes that have been tampered with.

For people: We are conducting random and selective explosives detection on passengers using Explosives Trace Detection as well as pat-down procedures. We are testing Backscatter and Millimeter Wave whole body imaging portals.

For the unknown evolving threat, we’ve added extra layers of security, better technology, a strategy of flexible, unpredictable security measures, and constantly train and test our TSOs. We could reduce risk further by eliminating carry on bags all together, but that would cause additional inconvenience for the people we are trying to serve.

TSA has a very good story to tell that you would have missed if you only saw the videos and the headlines. Here it is:

Shortly after I became Administrator of TSA in July 2005, I asked our Office of Inspection, the office that conducts covert testing for TSA, to identify the vulnerabilities in our system at that time. We looked at technology vulnerabilities, people vulnerabilities and strategy vulnerabilities, and learned that we had work to do in all three areas.

Checkpoint technology needed to be upgraded to eliminate the possibility of bringing IED components, not an assembled bomb, through the checkpoint – a much harder task.

Our workforce was too checklist-oriented. Security officers were looking to find prohibited items and pull them out of bags, but they weren’t thinking outside the box.

Our strategy was stagnant and reactive. We needed to change up what we do and not be a sitting duck at the checkpoint. We needed to go on offense.

The analysis that resulted from covert testing gave us the path forward to better security. We retrained the entire TSA workforce using professional bomb tests directed at finding IED components, and changed our protocols to require us to train and test to the standard of IED components.

We’ve tested and deployed new technologies, including advanced technology X-ray, passenger imaging technology and other enhanced explosives detection technologies.

In the past two years, we’ve also added four additional layers of security – to give us a total of 19 - to address vulnerabilities and go on the offensive. Behavior observation identifies suspicious behaviors related to surveillance or pre-attack planning. Assuming document checking responsibilities enables us to use new technology to detect fraudulent documents while also tying in the behavior detection aspect.

VIPR (Visible Intermodal Protection and Response) teams utilize Federal Air Marshals who are not flying on aircraft. They now move under cover – and overtly – to do random patrols everywhere in the airport environment. And lastly, employee screening allows us to look at what employees are doing inside the airport - at the fuel pump, in the parking garage, around the perimeter of the airport.

So while the media reports focus on today’s hot topic of professional testers getting simulated bombs through checkpoints, the American public should know that TSA is very serious about the long-term business of preventing the real ones from getting through. We’ve implemented a risk-based strategy, rooted in intelligence and multi-layered to address vulnerabilities, that is sound enough to address the threats we know about today and flexible enough to deal with the ones we’ll find out about tomorrow.

Kip Hawley
TSA Administrator

Secure Flight – Opportunity Knocks

Keeping known terrorists off airplanes is one of the obvious first steps of transportation security. The No-Fly list is the primary method that makes this possible. Today, anybody identified as a “No-Fly” is kept from boarding any flight to or in the United States. That’s the good news. The bad news is that today, the government has to rely on the airlines – including international carriers – to do the matching. There is no reason to think that this system is letting “No-Flys” on planes, but there is plenty of evidence that many ordinary passengers get wrongly drawn into the no-fly filter of a given airline.

Most people who cannot get a boarding pass at home or at a kiosk are caught in that filter – their name is probably similar to someone on the real No Fly (not allowed to fly) or Selectee (subject to extra screening) watchlists. The watchlists aren’t excessively long, but often that’s the perception based on the number of people who think they must be watchlisted if they have to report to an airline counter. My experience is that people who are watchlisted, especially “No-Flys,” are well-aware of the reason and do not usually seek out conversations with security or law enforcement personnel. On the other hand, people who are confused with “No-Flys” are vocal indeed.

How do we fix this? Secure Flight is the program that will take the watchlist-matching process inside the government. This will have obvious security benefits and should solve the “false positive” issue where ordinary passengers have to explain that they are not the person on the list. This is especially true of those with non-Western names where there are spelling inconsistencies. That--essentially a software matching issue--is often taken as an indication that the government is doing inappropriate racial or ethnic profiling. We are not and will not.

So, when is this going to be fixed? The government wants it quickly for the security reasons (it is a core recommendation of the 9/11 Commission), travelers want it quickly for that reason and to eliminate the hassle that comes with false positive matches.

Implementation of this advanced prescreening system is also one of the key aviation security performance expectations established by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in its assessment of the Department’s progress toward protecting the nation’s transportation network.

We have made major strides toward implementing Secure Flight. In the past, there have been valid privacy and program concerns, but the program released for public comment fixed those issues. In March 2007, TSA completed a total rebaselining, or redesign, of the program. It is now streamlined around name-based matching against the terrorist watch lists and has built-in privacy protections.

In August 2007, TSA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) proposing implementation of the Secure Flight program. The Department, TSA, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection have released a Consolidated User Guide to airlines, which includes proposed guidance for program compliance. Airlines have been asked to provide comments to TSA on that guidance.

Over the next few months, TSA expects to begin a benchmark testing period using information volunteered from airlines for the purpose of validating program assumptions.

TSA is working with the Congress to fund the program as part of Fiscal Year 2008 appropriations. With the necessary funding for Secure Flight, TSA can move forward with important contract awards and benchmark testing with airlines and later, parallel operations with airlines and the stand up of the Secure Flight Service and Operations Centers. When Secure Flight is up and running, the trip through the airport will be easier for passengers and more difficult for those who would do us harm.

Kip Hawley
Administrator
Transportation Security Administration

Beyond the Checkpoint

A discussion on aviation security almost always starts at the familiar TSA security checkpoint. For the two million travelers a day who fly, the checkpoint is TSA. We look at the checkpoint, however, as a piece - an important piece - of a much larger picture.

TSA looks at the entire transportation network in evaluating risk. A large part of our work involves daily interaction with the intelligence and law enforcement communities and our global partners to try to stay ahead of evolving threats and emerging vulnerabilities.

Risk-based security means taking the whole picture into account and implementing selective and unpredictable security measures -- deny the terrorists a stationary target where they can take the time to plan an attack with high odds of success. To be successful in the long run, we need to play offense, not just defense.

Playing offense means getting out past the checkpoint to identify people with hostile intent or conducting surveillance. By spreading our layers of security throughout the airport environment and elsewhere, we have multiple opportunities to detect terrorists and leverage the capabilities of our workforce, our partners, and our technology.

One of these layers involves placing specially trained Transportation Security Officers at the front of the checkpoint to review travel documents, find fraudulent identification and identify and disrupt a problem before it becomes dangerous. We are making it harder for people to use fraudulent documents and IDs by raising the standard of inspection and providing additional equipment for our security officers to do their jobs.

We also continue to expand our behavior detection program, which uses non-intrusive behavior observation and analysis techniques to identify potentially high-risk passengers throughout airports. This added element of the screening process is transparent for normal passengers but makes it troublesome to someone conducting surveillance or doing something that could be dangerous to the public. It requires no additional specialized screening equipment and TSA frequently deploys our specialized officers in support of transit, rail, and ferry systems.

Another security program beyond the checkpoint involves employee screening. We deploy Transportation Security Officers and Inspectors throughout airports to screen airport, airline and other employees, their accessible property and vehicles. This random screening at unexpected locations cannot be avoided and allows airport workers to perform their duties with minimal impact on airport operations.

We recognize that the checkpoint is an interruption in the way of boarding a flight and often can be a source of frustration for travelers. TSA is moving to an approach where we spread out and calm down the security process. This should decrease stress at checkpoints, improve security, and improve the passenger experience. We're working with our airport and airline partners to establish a more calm security environment while leveraging emerging technologies such as millimeter wave, backscatter, liquid bottle scanners and advanced x-ray systems to help security officers detect explosives and other threats.

Getting away from the tunnel vision of looking for prohibited items at the checkpoint and moving toward a calmer, more nimble process focused on finding people with clever as well as obvious weapons will be good for security - and we hope it will also be better for passengers.

Kip Hawley
Administrator
Transportation Security Administration

An American Story

As Secretary of Homeland Security, I am deeply inspired by our 208,000 employees who go to work each day to protect America. Combining hard work, initiative, and ingenuity with a heartfelt love of country, they exemplify what is truly great about this nation and its people. Coming from every background and walk of life, they are indeed a microcosm of America.

I am particularly inspired by immigrants and their children who have made this nation their own and are serving our Department with pride and patriotism. I was reminded of this while reading an outstanding op-ed piece by Jason Lim in last Sunday’s Washington Post.

In the article, he tells the remarkable story of how his father, a hardworking Korean immigrant, drove him to downtown New York City after September 11, and there, in the shadow of where the Twin Towers had stood, asked him to give up a promising corporate career and work for the United States government.

I am honored and proud that Jason now serves our Department at the Transportation Security Administration. I can imagine how proud his dad must be.

It takes a special courage to leave one’s native land as Jason’s dad once did in order to pursue the promise of a better life elsewhere. It takes a special person to make that choice and a special country like America to attract special people like Mr. Lim.

Mr. Lim and Jason, like so many other immigrants and their children, had already given much to our country – Mr. Lim through his small business in New York and Jason through completing a superb education and deploying his talents in the private sector. But after September 11, in gratitude for the opportunities they’ve had, they decided to give more.

What an inspiring example! The Lims, like so many others at DHS and elsewhere – in federal, state, and local governments – demonstrate the spirit of America.

Michael Chertoff