Newark, NJ, February 4, 2005 - The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board today announced that it is conducting a full investigation to determine the causes of the fatal January 25 explosion at the Acetylene Service Co. in Perth Amboy.

CSB investigators arrived at the site Jan. 25 and since then have been interviewing plant managers and employees, examining blast damage and debris, reviewing plant schematic diagrams, and studying plant records and procedures. Acetylene Service Co. is a manufacturer, repackager, and distributor of acetylene gas used primarily for welding.

Based on preliminary evidence, the explosion originated in an outdoor plywood and particle-board shed that partially enclosed six large steel waste storage tanks. The tank shells formed part of the exterior wall of the shed. The waste tanks received lime-water slurry from inside the main building, where calcium carbide and water were mixed to produce acetylene gas. Inside the shed was a water recirculating line that connected the waste tanks with the acetylene-making system in the main building. The shed was also equipped with two water and lime pumps and a small propane-fired heater used to keep the water pipes thawed in cold weather.

Approximately 40 minutes prior to the explosion, the acetylene generator inside the main building was started up. At approximately 10:30 a.m., a powerful explosion leveled the wooden shed and injured four workers who were outdoors performing snow removal. None of the workers were inside the shed at the time. Three of the workers died from traumatic injuries.

CSB Investigation Manager Stephen Selk said, "The wooden shed was disintegrated by the force of the blast and was largely reduced to splinters. This type of damage is consistent with a detonation or high-order explosion. We have been pursuing two theories about the cause of the blast. First, we have determined that the water recirculation line provided a direct path from the acetylene generator to the shed and the tanks. Inside the shed, the water line had a drain valve that was typically left open overnight. Through misalignment or failure of valves inside the main building, acetylene gas could therefore have entered the shed through the open drain and then exploded. Alternatively, it remains conceivable that the fuel source was a propane leak from an as yet unidentified fault in the heating system. In either case the propane heater was a possible ignition source."

CSB Chairman Carolyn W. Merritt stated: "Acetylene production is a common process that uses established technology. To the extent there are hazards that are not well recognized or controlled, it is important to thoroughly understand the root causes of this accident, and we are therefore proceeding with a full investigation. Our hope is that hundreds of other similar operations around the country can operate with heightened safety once the causes of this tragedy are known." Merritt said the full investigation could take a year or more to complete and would typically conclude with safety recommendations to prevent the recurrence of similar accidents. "Although our investigation will be independent and separate, we appreciate the good cooperative relationship established with OSHA, New Jersey state and local authorities, and the Acetylene Service Company," Merritt added.

The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents. The agency's board members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. CSB investigations look into all aspects of chemical accidents, including physical causes such as equipment failure as well as inadequacies in safety management systems. Typically, the investigations involve extensive witness interviews, examination of physical evidence, and chemical and forensic testing.

The Board does not issue citations or fines but does make safety recommendations to plants, industry organizations, labor groups, and regulatory agencies such as OSHA and EPA. The Board designates formal responses to its recommendations as acceptable or unacceptable, open or closed. Further information about the CSB is available from www.csb.gov.

For more information, contact Daniel Horowitz at 202-441-6074 (cell) or Kara Wenzel at 202-261-7642 / 202-577-8448 cell.