Habilitation or Harm: Project Greenlight and the Potential
Consequences of Correctional Programming
by James A. Wilson, Ph.D.
About the Author
Dr. Wilson is an assistant professor of sociology at Fordham
University in New York.
Not long ago, I facilitated a discussion among policymakers,
criminal justice professionals, and representatives from
community organizations about the large number of incarcerated
individuals, the recidivism rate after release, and the
effect of both on resources, especially local jails.
As we discussed what we know about effective rehabilitative
programming, one attendee could not contain his ire. He
strongly asserted that the individuals in his jails had
been in program after program after program until they had
been programmed nearly to death, and it had not made a whit
of difference.
I believe he took offense when I asked him what evidence
he had that they actually were good programs and that they
worked. We know theyre good programsand they dont
work, he responded.
His response is emblematic of the continuing nationwide
debate on rehabilitation and correctional programs. The
perceived failure of prison to deter criminal behavioras
evidenced by high recidivism rates and the substantial costs
associated with an increasing number of ex-prisoners who
unsuccessfully return to the communityhas renewed
interest in promising rehabilitative approaches. Nothing
has fueled this renewed interest like the recent discussions
on Project Greenlight.
Project Greenlight was a short-term, prison-based reentry
demonstration program. It was jointly operated by the New
York State Department of Correctional Services and the New
York State Division of Parole and administered by program
developers from the Vera Institute of Justice. Here, I offer
a basic overview of the program and, most importantly,
discuss the somewhat controversial findings from an evaluation
sponsored by the National Institute of Justice.[1]
What Did Project Greenlight Offer?
Offenders tend to leave prison much as they enter: lacking
practical and interpersonal skills and possessing few economic
and social resources. They tend to encounter significant
barriers, both formal and informal, when they return to
the community.[2]
In an effort to help offenders meet some of these challenges,
Project Greenlight was designed as an intensive, prison-based
reentry program to be delivered during the 8 weeks immediately
preceding an inmates release from prison.
The developers of the Project Greenlight program drew
extensively from the literature on correctional interventions
and from anecdotal evidence about the services that offenders
need to succeed when they return home. The key elements of
Project Greenlight were:
- Cognitive-behavioral skills training. The
foundation of the Project Greenlight program was
cognitive-behavioral skills training because the
research indicates that this type of program shows the
most consistent results in reducing offender
recidivism.[3]
Cognitive-behavioral programming is based on the theory
that if offenders commit crime due to poor socialization,
they can be resocialized toward more prosocial thinking
and behavior.
- Employment. Project Greenlight employed a job
counselor to work with program participants on how to
write a résumé and improve their interview
skills. If inmates were perceived to be job-ready, the
counselor matched them with employment opportunities
that might lead to stable work upon release.
- Housing. Because homeless shelters generally
do not provide good living situations, the program
worked with the New York City Department of Homeless
Services to find short- and long-term housing for
inmates who did not have a place to go upon release.
- Drug education and awareness. Participants were
required to attend drug education or relapse prevention
classes to help them deal with addictive behaviors.
- Family counseling. When a person returns home
after a long absence, the adjustment can be difficult
for the entire family. A counselor worked in the evenings
with some Project Greenlight participants and their
families to help them prepare for the inevitable strains
that arise when an absent family member returns home.
- Practical skills training. Classes in practical
skills offered guidance to Project Greenlight participants
on a wide variety of taskssome straightforward,
such as how to use a subway card; some complex, such
as how to open and manage a bank account, access emergency
sources of food or cash, and regain voting rights. The
program also helped participants obtain proper
identification documents and Medicaid coverage before
leaving prison.
- Community-based networks. Project Greenlight
developed a network of community-based organizations
to provide participants with social support after they
were released.
- Familiarity with parole. Participants were
introduced to parole officers and familiarized with
the parole process to promote greater adherence to the
conditions of parole.
- Individualized release plan. Project Greenlight
staff worked one-on-one with participants to develop
an individualized release plan. At its most basic level,
this plan was akin to a day planner, reminding
offenders what they planned to do upon release and
when they would do it. The plan also attempted to
provide a degree of structure to the participants
postrelease activities, helping them add order to what
was likely to be a very disorienting time. The release
plan was given to the participants parole officers
to make them aware of the goals and tasks established
by parolees before their release.
The Greenlight Study
In the Project Greenlight Study, 735 inmates were divided
into three groups and followed for at least 1 year (some
for 2 years) after release. The intervention group of 334
inmates received the Project Greenlight programming. One
comparison group (referred to as the UPS group) comprised
113 inmates who were released directly from prisons in
upstate New York without any pre-release services. The
second comparison group comprised 278 inmates who
participated in the transitional services program (TSP)
already in existence at the facility (in the same prison
as the Greenlight participants).
Project Greenlight was designed to emphasize specific
services that would improve certain interim quality-of-life
outcomes and, as a result, would affect subsequent criminal
behavior. The developers believed, for example, that helping
parolees (who would otherwise end up in a homeless shelter)
find stable housing would reduce criminal behavior. The
program also had a job counselor to help participants develop
their interview skills and connect with potential employers,
with the goal of better employment, gained more quickly,
for a longer duration.
Interim Quality-of-Life Outcomes
Data from evaluation surveys of participants and parole
officers indicated:
- Employment, family relationships, and use of homeless
shelter. There were no differences between the Project
Greenlight group and the control groups.
- Parole knowledge and adherence. Although Project
Greenlight participants demonstrated significantly more
familiarity with parole conditions and were more positive
about parole, there was no difference in adherence to
parole conditions between the Project Greenlight group
and the control groups.
- Service referrals and contacts. Project Greenlight
participants received more service referrals and reported
more contacts with community services after release.
Recidivism Outcomes
Project Greenlight participants showed worse outcomes for
every type of recidivism at 6 and 12 months after release.
The chart Percent of Participants
Who Recidivated at 6 and 12 Months shows the
percentage of each group that experienced any kind of arrest
(misdemeanor or felony), felony arrest only, and parole
revocation. It is especially noteworthybecause it
is statistically significantthat the overall arrest
rate for the Project Greenlight group was 10 percent higher
than that for the TSP group at 12 months postrelease (34
percent versus 24 percent). Also statistically significant
is the 12 percent more parole revocations experienced by
the Project Greenlight group than the UPS group at 12 months
postrelease (25 percent versus 13 percent).
Several findings of the evaluation were at odds with program
expectations. Most notably, Project Greenlight participants
postrelease outcomes were significantly worse than those
of the TSP and UPS groups. The evaluation found that the
Project Greenlight program had no effect on the interim
outcomes that it was designed to addressincluding
housing, employment, and paroleand that Project
Greenlight participants fared significantly worse than
the two control groups in rearrest and parole revocation
rates at the 1-year mark. In addition, although Project
Greenlight participants displayed greater knowledge of
parole conditions, showed more positive attitudes toward
parole, received more service referrals, and reported
greater contact with service providers after release,
none of these translated into better outcomes.
Why Did Project Greenlight Participants Do Worse?
Project Greenlight had been viewed positively by many people:
program developers and staff, participants, corrections
officials, policymakers, and community advocates. Why,
therefore, were the results so different from the perceptions?
Why did the Project Greenlight intervention fail to reduce
recidivism? Indeed, why did participants show substantially
worse outcomes than both of the control groups?
Although selection bias is always a potential concerndid
more crime-prone individuals end up in the Project Greenlight
group than in the control groups?the strength of the
evaluation (both design and methodology) suggests that
selection bias was not responsible for the negative outcomes.
A more likely explanation is that something associated
with the program or its implementation contributed to the
negative findings. There are several potential
explanations.[4]
Obviously, Project Greenlights curricula had the potential
to yield positive outcomes. It also had the potential to
result in no difference among the three groups, but it
is difficult to imagine that the programs practical-skills
or cognitive-behavioral training, for example, were somehow
inherently criminogenic. The same curricula have been used
extensively elsewhere, under a variety of conditions with
a diversity of populations, with positive outcomes. It is
therefore highly unlikely that the programs content was
responsible for the negative results.
It seems equally unlikely that referrals to community
organizations, housing providers, and other community services
would lead the Project Greenlight group to be rearrested
at higher rates. In short, the program curricula seem
relatively innocuous in their potential for creating negative
outcomes.
There are reasons to suspect, however, that program
implementation, including program design, might have resulted
in the negative outcomes.
First, the standard cognitive-behavioral program that, in
the past, has produced robust results in reducing offender
recidivism was radically restructured in the Project
Greenlight program. The recommended class size for
cognitive-skills training is 10 to 13 participants; the
Project Greenlight class size was 26. Given that many
incarcerated people have limited interpersonal skills and
education and are likely to be impulsive, a small class
size is considered crucial in helping them maintain attention
and helping instructors deliver material.
The cognitive-behavior model upon which Project Greenlight
was based typically delivers services twice weekly for 4-6
months. The Project Greenlight program compressed the delivery
of services, however, into daily classes for 8 weeks. These
and other changes to the standard cognitive-behavior program
model raise questions about how effective Project Greenlight
could have been considering the deviations from what has
long been considered the optimal program. In addition,
participants in the Project Greenlight group were transferred
from one prison to anotherand were required to
participatesuggesting the possibility that they could
have been overwhelmed and perhaps even frustrated and angry
about their participation.
The relatively short nature of the program might not have
given participants enough time to get past any negative
emotions and resistance generated by coerced participation.
Although the developers of Project Greenlight drew elements
from the literature on correctional interventions, there were
some key failuresmost notably, ignoring the treatment
principles that form the foundation of effective programming.
There is general agreement that interventions should be
directed toward high-risk participants and that assessing
risk and needs should be a part of any intervention protocol.
Project Greenlight staff found, however, that the assessment
tool was too cumbersome and time-consuming to administer
and therefore dropped it.
Another basic treatment principle is that interventions
should target participants specific needs. Project Greenlight
was a broad-based intervention in which everyone in the group
was exposed to the same program elements. Postrelease interviews
indicated that some participants felt significant frustration
and anger about being forced to attend drug education sessions
when they had no history of substance use. It should also
be noted that an emerging body of evidence suggests that
the delivery of intensive services to low-risk individuals
may be counterproductive.[5]
In addition to program design problems, Project Greenlight
could have been poorly implemented. As a general proposition,
implementation has clearly been identified as one of the
most significant obstacles to an effective
intervention.[6]
The evaluation found a correlation between Project Greenlight
participants who worked with specific case managers and
the programs negative outcomes. Additionally, some
participants in the Greenlight group were observed to be
disengaged and appeared uninterested.
Project Greenlight attempted to create a comprehensive
intervention by pulling together diverse program elements to
address the multiple needs of participants. The program
was clearly attractive to policymakers and corrections
officials because of its short duration and the large
number of individuals who could receive the programming.
Based on the evaluation, however, one can seriously question
whether Project Greenlight was a hodgepodge of unproven
and unstandardized clinical interventions all lumped
together.[7] Although
this may seem to be a harsh characterization, it might be
an accurate portrayal of the program that was finally
implemented.
What Have We Learned?
I considered beginning this article, as many discussions
of corrections do, with the standard description of the
U.S. social experiment in mass incarceration: the consequences
to our society, communities, and families of having more
than 2 million people incarcerated and nearly 700,000
admitted to and released from prison every year. I hope,
however, that the experience I described in the opening
of this article demonstrates the frustration of many
criminal justice professionals. We do not really know
about many of the programs currently being used, and some
real lessons can be learned from the negative outcomes
of a program like Project Greenlight.
First, whenever an intervention is contemplated and
implemented, there is always an implicit assumption that
good is going to come of it. Human behavior is complex,
however, and we are still trying to understand it in a
variety of ways, from the biological to the sociological
to the philosophical. Perhaps we should also hold the
assumption that an intervention program might do harm.
Clearly, the implementation of every program should have
precisely stated outcomes and a way to assess those outcomes
on a regular basis.
Second, the what works literature on correctional
interventions discusses programming that is known to work.
Often, these discussions focus on the programs themselves
without exploring why they work. The treatment principles
that underlie effective programming were often ignored in
Project Greenlight. This opened the program developers to
the critique that they created a kitchen sink
program[8]and
one with negative outcomes at that.
Third, although Project Greenlight was labeled a reentry
demonstration program, it had in fact no real reentry
component. It was prison-based, with no structured followup
in the community. Given what the reentry literature says
about the need for postrelease services, it appears that
an individualized release plan such as the one developed
for Project Greenlight participants does not provide the
necessary structured followup. Some States recognize the
potential for structured postrelease assistancefor
example, although still untested, Connecticuts Building
Bridges program allows parolees to work with a case manager
for up to 1 year after release.[9]
Finally, it is crucial to recognize that if Project
Greenlight had not been evaluated, the program would be
regarded as an unqualified success, based solely on the
positive perceptions of those involved. Despite all the
promise and positive perceptions, the program resulted
in more harm than good. Could there be a clearer example
of why program evaluations are needed?
I can understand the frustration expressed by the
professional I mentioned in the opening of this article.
We might continue to talk about the positives of
rehabilitation, but when practitioners and the public see
the constant churning of individuals through the criminal
justice system, they see a failed system based on programs
that do not work. If we continue to place offenders in
programs that are positively perceived but that remain
untested, we might continue to produce outcomes similar
to Project Greenlight. Without effective evaluations
of our programs, we run the risk of programming offenders
nearly to deathand it still will not make one whit
of difference.
NCJ 218258
Chart
Percent of Participants Who Recidivated at 6 and 12 Months
Recidivism Outcome |
Project Greenlight (344 inmates) |
TSP (278 inmates) |
UPS (113 inmates) |
All arrests |
6 months |
17.2 |
13.0 |
14.4 |
12 months |
34.1* |
24.2* |
26.8 |
Felony arrests |
6 months |
8.3 |
6.6 |
7.2 |
12 months |
18.0 |
13.0 |
12.0 |
Parole revocations |
6 months |
9.8 |
9.4 |
7.4 |
12 months |
25.1* |
21.0 |
13.2* |
* Difference
in the indicated pairs (by row) is statistically significant
at p < .05.
Return to text
For More Information
- Wilson, J.A., and R. Davis, Hard Realities
Meet Good Intentions: An Evaluation of
the Project Greenlight Reentry Program,
Criminology and Public Policy 5 (2) (2006):
303-338.
- Brown, B., R. Campbell, J.A. Wilson,
Y. Cheryachukin, R.C. Davis, J. Dauphinee,
R. Hope, K. Gehi, Smoothing the Path
From Prison to Home, final report submitted
to the National Institute of Justice,
Washington, DC: 2006 (NCJ 213714),
available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/213714.pdf.
Notes
NIJ does not exercise control over external Web sites. Read our Exit Notice.
[1] |
The JEHT Foundation contributed the
initial funding to begin the Project Greenlight
evaluation. For more information on the JEHT
Foundation, visit www.jehtfoundation.org. |
[2] |
This literature has grown extensively.
See Travis, J., A. Solomon, and M. Waul,
From Prison to Home: The Dimensions
and Consequences of Prisoner Reentry,
Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2001,
available at www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/from_prison_to_home.pdf. |
[3] |
More information on cognitive-behavior
research is included in Andrews, D.A.,
I. Zinger, R.D. Hoge, J. Bonta, P. Gendreau,
and F.T. Cullen, Does Correctional
Treatment Work? A Clinically Relevant and
Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis,
Criminology 28 (1990): 369-404. |
[4] |
Frank Porporino, codeveloper of the
Reasoning and Rehabilitation programa
multifaceted cognitive-behavior program
used throughout Canada and the United
States to teach juvenile and adult offenders
cognitive skills and valuesassisted me in
clarifying some of my explanations of the
negative findings. |
[5] |
Lowenkamp, C.T., and E.J. Latessa,
Increasing the Effectiveness of Correctional
Programming Through the Risk Principle:
Identifying Offenders for Residential
Placement, Criminology and Public
Policy 4 (2) (2005): 263-290. |
[6] |
Rhine, E.E., T.L. Mawhorr, and E.C. Parks,
Implementation: The Bane of Effective
Correctional Programs, Criminology and
Public Policy 5 (2) (2006): 347-358. |
[7] |
Marlowe, D.B., When
What Works Never Did: Dodging the
Scarlet M in Correctional Rehabilitation,
Criminology and Public Policy 5 (2) (2006): 342. |
[8] |
Ibid. |
[9] |
For an overview, see the Council of State
Governments Web site at www.csgeast.org/pdfs/justicereinvest/BuildingBridges.pdf
or www.csgeast.org/pdfs/justicereinvest/BuildingBridgesReportUpdate.pdf. |