Developments in Burma

Mr. Chairman:

I wish to thank you for the opportunity to testify once again on Burma. By way of noting a division of labor, my remarks will not go into detail on our programmatic efforts to support democracy in Burma as that topic has been covered by Assistant Secretary Craner.

The past year has seen considerable change in Burma, much of it tragically wrong-headed and sad, especially as progress toward to democracy is concerned. Following the totally unjustifiable violent attack on Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade on May 30, the SPDC detained a number of NLD supporters. Over the succeeding months, the SPDC has released most of these people, but they are not really free. Aung San Suu Kyi and three other members of the National League for Democracy Central Executive Committee remain under house arrest. The NLD offices remain shuttered and party members are not allowed to organize. There has been no compensation offered to the victims of the May 30, attack nor has there been a public investigation into the incident. However, the representatives of the democratic opposition remain prepared for their role in the reconciliation process. They are not bowed by the restrictions they face, nor are they dismayed by the SPDC’s continued intransigence. Internally, on the democracy front, the situation inside Burma has yet to return to even the admittedly low, but hopeful status it had achieved prior to May 30. International access across the board, whether to members of government or to the opposition has been difficult. The SPDC has not cooperated with UN Special Rapporteur Pinheiro in his efforts to organize an international investigation of the incident.

Last fall Prime Minister Khin Nyunt announced a “road map” for the future. To be successful, such a process must involve the various parties, both democratic political opposition and ethnic groups, and it must have a timeframe that is both realistic and concrete. We understand that democracy will not be achieved overnight in Burma. But we will persevere and support those who want freedom. To quote Secretary Powell’s remarks three weeks ago, “Let me now tell all true Burmese patriots that we are with you still…Burma’s day of democracy will come.”

International attention to Burma has several focal points. The United States has been engaged in multilateral fora such as the General Assembly, the UN Commission on Human Rights, the International Labor Organization, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. We also have an active dialogue with the European Union and individual states in Europe and Asia to maintain pressure and urge the SPDC toward an inclusive, political dialogue that will lead to democracy. The international community is in substantial agreement on desired outcomes in Burma, but sharply divided on the use of tactics and strategy. At the “Bangkok process” that was inaugurated in mid-December 2003, diplomats from 12 nations, including China, Japan, India, Indonesia, and several European Union members addressed their concerns to the SPDC and to encourage reform. Burma’s Foreign Minister, Win Aung, heard a chorus of calls for Aung San Suu Kyi’s release and her inclusion in the national reconciliation process. The United States was not invited to participate in the December meeting, nor did we request to do so. We will follow the Bangkok process, continue to work with those who want to see democracy take root in Burma, and the Prime Minister’s road map closely, but thus far, we have seen no concrete progress.

Mr. Chairman, I am aware of the Committee’s interest in the impact of sanctions that the United States imposed on Burma last year. I am also mindful that the executive branch will have to report formally to the Congress in April on this topic. Two weeks ago, Secretary Powell told the House Appropriations Committee, “I have seen no improvement in the situation… We will not shrink back from the strong position we have taken… and we will continue to apply pressure.” For the moment, the immediate impact of our economic sanctions that include an import ban, asset seizure and a ban on financial services, has centered on the Burmese economy. The Treasury Department reports that it has blocked $13.3 million worth of transactions. Of that amount, $1.7 million has been subsequently licensed by the U.S. By July 30, 2003, U.S. banks maintaining correspondent accounts with Burmese banks had blocked the balances in those accounts, an amount that exceeds $320,000.

In response to the financial services ban Burma’s banks have shifted from U.S. dollar to Euro-denominated letters of credit and remittances. Many traders have turned to unofficial channels to conduct dollar transactions. International trade financing has since rebounded, such financing has not reached pre-sanctions levels. In addition to the economic sanctions, since July 28, 2003, seven applicants for visas have been turned down because of their connections with the SPDC or closely related enterprises. Because the provisions of the visa ban are widely known, there are undoubtedly many others who have dissuaded from applying.

Mr. Chairman, our sanctions represent a clear and powerful expression of American dismay at the developments in Burma last year. Sanctions are a key component of our policy in bringing democracy to Burma and have been a key source of support for the morale of many democracy activists. We have reason to believe that these sanctions also have the endorsement of the NLD. No other country has taken like measures. In our diplomatic efforts, however, we have continued to raise the question of sanctions similar to ours or targeted approaches to dealing with Burma at all levels in many countries. We have found that many in the international community have a different view on how best to achieve our shared goals in Burma.

Unrelated to the May 30 events, the international Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering prompted governments to consider measures against Burma. The United States also imposed measures in conjunction with the USA PATRIOT Act that essentially duplicated steps we had taken previously. Subsequent to the steps taken by the international Financial Action Task Force, the SPDC initiated an investigation into two named financial institutions and published money laundering legislation. The FATF will continue its dialogue with the SPDC on this global issue.

Mr. Chairman, in the case of Burma, I think it is also useful to address issues of human rights, specifically minority rights. Democracy without firm assurances of minority rights will ring hollow to those who fear domination by the majority. The history of the relations between ethnic Burmans and other ethnic groups of the last five decades, let alone the colonial and pre-colonial period is too complex to do justice in brief testimony. Suffice to say, following the post-independence uprising of the Communist Party of Burma, many ethnic groups joined the hostilities in an effort to secure sovereignty or autonomy as well as protection of minority rights. At one point, Rangoon’s writ did not extend much beyond the outskirts of the capital itself. Much was lost in the decades of fighting that followed, and the indirect consequences of the combat spilled over into Thailand and even reached the United States as some minority groups yielded to the temptation of the narcotics trade. Yet during the past decade, there has been a real increase in tentative understandings between Rangoon and some ethnic groups. We do not take a position on the specific content of the various cease-fire accords, but we do note that these accords have had some durability and associated with them has been a diminution of violence in some areas. Ethnic groups have complained that benefits from resource development that once accrued to them now accrue to the central authorities.

Most notable among the recent developments in relations between Rangoon and the ethnic groups are the discussions now underway between the SPDC and representatives of the Karen National Union. A temporary cease-fire is in place and meetings have been held with a focus on demarcation of territory and the return of internally displaced persons. The first visit by General Bo Mya to Rangoon in January was dramatic. We doubt that he would have gone to Rangoon unless he thought that there was some real chance of success. However, there have been reports that the discussions have stalled and it may take time for the parties to reach an agreement. Future historians will have to judge whether his trip represents a historic turning point on the path to national reconciliation or a sentimental journey by an aging leader. If a permanent agreement is reached, it would represent an end to over 50 years of conflict. There are also indications that other groups, including the Karenni National Progressive Party, are reportedly interested in talks with the government. Needless to say, we support the peaceful resolution of these conflicts.

All of us share a sense of frustration at the opportunities lost in 2003. But there is much to be said for persistence and some glimmers that suggest Burma may be open to new departures. For example, Amnesty International was able to visit Burma for the first time ever in February 2003 without specific conditions attached to their visas and to use their own interpreter. Despite issuing a report that was rather candid, Amnesty International was able to make a second 17-day visit in December. I would also note that the International Committee of the Red Cross has been able to continue its presence and operations in Burma.

Humanitarian concerns loom increasingly large in Burma and on its borders, fueled by inept economic policies over the years, diversion of scarce resources from the health and education sectors, human rights abuses and armed conflicts. More than a third of Burmese children under age five are malnourished according to UNICEF. The school system is under-funded and universities are no longer the respected institutions of the past. Given the nature of the Burmese government, we are limited in what we will do to provide assistance in this area. However, the Administration is providing $1,000,000 of assistance directly to international NGOs to combat HIV/AIDS in Burma. On Burma’s borders and beyond, between one to two million persons have sought a better life. One hundred and sixty thousand of these Burmese citizens are living in camps along the Thai-Burma and Bangladesh-Burma borders. The U.S. provides significant humanitarian assistance to this population. Beyond that, the Congress has appropriated $13 million dollars for FY-04 that will be disbursed in large part to the population on the Thai-Burma border and to the groups that support this population and the cause of democracy.

Assuming that these groups reach understandings with Rangoon, we expect that there will be considerable interest in repatriation to Burma. In that connection, we are encouraged that the SPDC has reached an understanding with the UNHCR to begin operations in Burma in areas where internally displaced persons are suffering. We applaud efforts that bring greater transparency and assistance to these IDPs and think it important, indeed imperative, that any repatriation of persons under the protection of the UNHCR take place with the full participation of organizations such as the UNHCR itself and the International Organization for Migration. We also hope that measures will be put in place to prevent the inadvertent return to Burma of persons entitled to refugee status. In this connection, I would like to underscore the support and cooperation that we have received from Thailand over the decades.

The issue of expatriate Burmese in Thailand is complicated. Clearly, some are refugees as that term is understood in international law, including those who are temporarily fleeing fighting and human rights abuses. These individuals could be receptive to returning to their homes as soon as conditions are safe. Others are economic migrants. Distinguishing between these various populations is a task for the UNHCR and the Royal Thai Government. The UN High Commission for Refugees and the RTG have conducted discussions on status determination and criteria and procedures. I understand that UNHCR has resumed status determination activity. Moreover, the RTG has allowed us to undertake resettlement for the Burmese refugee population that have been provided letters of concern by UNHCR. This population, sometimes known as the urban Burmese refugees, numbers nearly 4,000. We have already begun interviews and movements to the U.S. are scheduled to begin in May.

Finally, a comment on Burma-North Korea relations, a subject that has attracted considerable press interest. Burma and North Korea do have a military and trade relationship. Of particular concern, we also have reason to believe that the D.P.R.K. has offered surface-to-surface missiles. We have raised this issue of possible missile transfers with senior Burmese officials and registered our concerns in unambiguous language. Although Burmese officials have indicated that they have not accepted offers of such weapons systems, we will continue to monitor the situation and will deal with it vigorously and rapidly. Similarly, while we know that the Burmese remain interested in acquiring a nuclear research reactor, we believe that news reports of construction activities are not well founded. We also note that some press reports have suggested that Burma has provided heroin as compensation for transfers of military or nuclear technology or equipment. Available evidence simply does not support such a conclusion.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask your indulgence to address one point not on the agenda of today’s session but relevant to the concerns of all of us: the fate of Hmong, also known as “remote people” who have remained in the jungles of Laos in resistance to the LPDR. We have frequently urged the Lao Government to resolve this issue in a humanitarian manner. We hope that all concerned understand clearly that the United States does not support or encourage insurgent activity against the LPDR. The question has taken on greater urgency in just the past month. Starting in late February, there have been a number of reports that several hundred remote Hmong have emerged from mountain areas and requested resettlement assistance from the Lao Government in Luang Phrabang and Xieng Khoung provinces. It would be premature to say why these people have decided to seek assistance at this time. We have not seen credible reports that the Lao government has used violent force against such people after they emerged from the jungle. We understand that the Lao Government has an amnesty program for groups to come out of the forest peacefully and resettle. However, there are few details available about this program and whether it has sufficient resources to deal with this sudden influx of people.

Consequently, we have offered to provide basic humanitarian assistance items through international organizations or nongovernmental organizations that are acceptable to the LPDR in an effort to help ease the burden of resettling this population in Laos. Unfortunately, the Lao government has not yet responded positively to our offer, but we are prepared to assist. This is a signal opportunity to resolve one of the lasting legacies of the Indochina War and we hope the Lao Government will take it.