Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea

Thank you Co-Chairs for the opportunity to address the Informal Consultative Process on piracy and armed robbery at sea. We believe that governments acting regionally and through the International Maritime Organization (IMO) are to be commended for the scope and the breadth of the activity undertaken to combat violence against mariners and shipping.

Mr. Co-Chairs, in addition to the IMO activities, the International Maritime Bureau, as well as regional organizations and individual countries, are working to implement the spirit of these IMO instruments and other arrangements. In an effort to be of assistance we have prepared a background paper on many of these efforts. That paper, which includes a number of helpful websites, is located in the back of the room.

There appears to be a strong commitment to address piracy. This is evident in the activity within IMO and the range of actions enumerated in the Secretary-General's report. The UNGA LOS Resolution has called for these actions. Despite these best efforts, Mr. Co-Chairs, the problem persists and may be getting worse.

Much more must be done at the national, regional and global levels in order to suppress this modern threat to international peace and security, as described by the panel. In this connection we believe that it is imperative that Governments consider taking the actions identified in paragraphs 209-223 of the Secretary-General's report (A/56/58).

In our view there are three ways that this can be undertaken. First, national governments should consider establishing inter-ministerial bodies to draw up action plans for preventing such attacks as well as plans for steps to be taken in the event of an attack.

Second, surveillance efforts should be augmented.

Third, port security should be enhanced through better training in law enforcement and the ability to identify phantom ships.

On the matter of definitions, not all of these attacks on the high seas or in an EEZ can be classified as traditional acts of piracy, over which all States may exercise jurisdiction. When they occur in port or at anchorage they are more likely proscribed and should be punishable by local criminal law. When the acts endanger the safety of navigation and occur on board foreign flag ships while underway in the territorial sea, international straits or international waters, these acts are frequently not proscribed nor punishable by the criminal law of the coastal State.

The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, with its Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome 10 March 1988, was adopted under the IMO's auspices. These instruments can fill many of the jurisdictional gaps highlighted when the acts endanger the safety of international navigation and occur on board national or foreign flag ships while underway in the territorial sea, international straits or international waters. The Convention requires States parties to criminalize such acts under national law and to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of their perpetrators.

While the Convention has been in force since 1 March 1992, many States in whose waters these acts are occurring are not yet a party. We join the urgent call of others for affected States to adhere to the Rome Convention and its Protocol, and to implement its provisions. (See Paragraphs 217-222 of the Secretary-General's report). The ICP should endorse the UNGA's call for States that have not done so to consider adhering to the Rome Convention and its Protocol and to implement its provisions.

The elements of legislation necessary to implement the Rome Convention's obligations should be identified. This is the approach that was taken for the 1988 Vienna Drug Convention.

While we recognize the impending urgency of the calls for action the U.S. also acknowledges that developing countries cannot deal with this on their own. Paragraph 223 of the Secretary-General's report addresses technical assistance. Bilateral and multilateral assistance must begin to address these needs. We believe that this process, which is designed to facilitate coordination and cooperation among UN agencies to promote peaceful uses of the seas, can play a role in alerting donor agencies to this issue and raise awareness in the developing world that such requests should be given a priority by them. UNDP and other agencies must begin to appreciate the fact that developing countries need support in addressing two issues: enhancing enforcement capability and implementation of port security measures. Donor institutions should be encouraged to engage in a dialogue with developing countries to assess the needs identified to address piracy and report their findings to the Secretary-General.

Capacity can be increased in the developing world to suppress piracy and armed robbery at sea through increased force protection and enhancement of local maritime law enforcement efforts. An increased presence in these locations by cooperating navies and maritime law enforcement vessels may be needed to supplement these efforts. In that connection serious consideration should be given by states sharing borders in areas threatened by piracy to establish bilateral/regional cooperation arrangement as suggested in paragraph 214 of the Secretary-General's report.

As piracy and armed robbery at sea are just one aspect of international crime, including transnational organized crime, coordination with the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) could enhance regional training efforts. The FBI has expanded its cooperative programs with the police of up to 44 nations. This includes an important training component. In the past five years more than 3,000 international trainees were trained by the FBI in the U.S., and nearly 15,000 were trained in other countries. We have requested that the FBI and U.S. Coast Guard to provide representatives to serve on our delegation and they have graciously complied. Gary Swinkey and Eric Runnels are fully conversant about those training programs. Delegations interested in pursuing questions on training opportunities are encouraged to take advantage of their presence.

The combined efforts of the Department of State and U.S. federal law enforcement agencies led to the establishment in 1995 of the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, Hungary and more recently another facility in Bangkok, Thailand. In addition, preparations for the opening of another branch of the Academy in Botswana are underway. Consideration should be given to utilizing the Academy to provide specialized training on such issues as organized crime and the investigative process. In that connection we commend Scotland Yard for taking the lead in developing the IMO's Draft Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships.

More attention should be paid to vessel tracking in terms of current technology. Home port verification should also be studied. Article 110 of the Law of the Sea Convention provides a basis for boarding vessels flying questionable flags. Consideration should be given to increasing the onus on Flag States to make sure they do not register stolen vessels.

There are a number of ways to improve port security so that officials can prevent acts of armed robbery against ships at anchor or in port, to identify stolen vessels and to assist in the apprehension of the criminals. The experience of Brazil is instructive and we commend the Brazilian authorities on their success.

We would note the following:

Port personnel need training from the Captain of the Port to the dock workers. The most comprehensive training for Captains of the Port is at the World Maritime University, Malmo, Sweden. The two-year course offered at this institution is world-renowned. The U.S. Agency for International Development has advised that it can fund requests for attendance at this University by developing countries if the request is identified as a priority.

The Coast Guard is available to teach and instruct law enforcement tactics and port security measures and enhancements to member nations. This can serve to reduce and mitigate the piracy threat. Member nations may send their personnel to the United States for training or the Coast Guard can send international training detachments to member nations.

Information on other training opportunities should be identified and made available to developing countries. We know that efforts are being made to do this and in particular we commend the constructive efforts of the government of Japan.

Ports often have to deal with the phantom ship phenomenon. We understand that the IMO is expected to consider at its MSC June 2001 meeting a proposal from Hong Kong, China that the IMO Ship Identification Number be visibly welded on the stern of all vessels required to possess an IMO number. This could be of considerable help to port authorities.

Finally, Mr. Co-Chairs, we want to draw attention to the fact that we have prepared an additional background paper on the issue of vandalism to scientific equipment that we alluded to earlier in the week. It is in the back of the room.