OTIS R. BOWEN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, APPELLANT V. VERNITA BALDWIN, ET AL. No. 86-1140 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1986 On Appeal From the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia Jurisdictional Statement PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING In addition to those named in the caption, the parties are: James G. Ledbetter, Commissioner, Georgia Department of Human Resources; and Wilnetta Baldwin, Lapheitta Baldwin and Schlonda Baldwin, and all others similarly situated. TABLE OF CONTENTS Parties to the proceeding Opinion below Jurisdiction Constitutional and statutory provisions involved Question presented Statement: A. Statutory and regulatory framework B. Proceedings in this case The question is substantial Conclusion Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C OPINION BELOW The opinion of the district court holding the relevant provisions of the Social Security Act unconstitutional (App., infra, 1a-34a) is reported at 647 F. Supp. 623. JURISDICTION The judgment of the district court (App., infra, 35a-36a) was entered on October 17, 1986. A notice of appeal to this Court was filed on November 12, 1986 (App., infra, 37a-38a). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1252. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides in pertinent part: (N)or shall any person be * * * deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. Section 402(a)(38) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 602(a)(38), provides in pertinent part: A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must -- * * * * * provide that in making the determination under paragraph (7) with respect to a dependent child and applying paragraph (8), the State agency shall (except as otherwise provided in this part) include -- (A) any parent of such child, and (B) any brother or sister of such child, if such brother or sister meets the conditions described in clauses (1) and (2) of section 606(a) of this title, if such parent, brother, or sister is living in the same home as the dependent child, and any income of or available for such parent, brother, or sister shall be included in making such determination and applying such paragraph with respect to the family (notwithstanding section 405(j) of this title, in the case of benefits provided under subchapter II of this chapter) * * *. QUESTION PRESENTED Whether Section 402(a)(38) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 602(a)(38), which provides that all parents, brothers and sisters who live together shall constitute a single filing unit for purposes of the Aid To Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program, is unconstitutional as violative of the Takings Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. STATEMENT A. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK The statutory and regulatory framework is set forth in our jurisdictional statements in Bowen v. Gilliard, prob. jur. noted, No. 86-509 (Dec. 8, 1986), and Bowen v. Lesko, No. 86-744 (filed Nov. 5, 1986). /1/ B. PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASE 1. Appellees are a class of mothers and children who comprise families that receive benefits under the Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program. The children fall into two groups. The first group consists of "needy children" on whose behalf the AFDC benefits are paid. The second group consists of siblings who receive child support from a non-custodial parent. For the sake of convenience, we will use the term "appellees" to refer to the appellee-mothers exclusively. Appellees filed this state-wide class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against the Secretary and state officials responsible for administering the AFDC program in Georgia. The complaint challenged the Secretary's regulations implementing the DEFRA filing-unit provision contained in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA), Pub. L. No. 98-369, Section 2640, 98 Stat. 1145; 42 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 602(a)(38), and the state's conforming administrative practice. Complaint at 10-11. In the alternative, appellees challenged the constitionality of the statute itself. Id. at 10-14. Appellees sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit defendants from requiring that children who receive child-support payments apply for AFDC benefits and assign those child-support payments to the state as a condition of AFDC eligibility under 42 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 602(a)(26)(A). Appellees also sought to enjoin defendants from counting child-support income in calculating a family unit's AFDC benefits. See Complaint at 14-15. 2. On October 17, 1986, after granting appellees' request for class certification, the district court issued an opinion granting appellees' motion for summary judgment, declaring Section 602(a)(38) unconstitutional and granting appellees a permanent injunction (App., infra, 1a-34a). The court first rejected appellees' statutory construction arguments, holding that Section 602(a)(38) did indeed authorize the actions of which they complained. App., infra, 6a-12a. The court concluded that "(c)onsideration of the legislative history leads inexorably to the conclusion that Congress intended that children receiving child support who are co-resident siblings of AFDC recipient children be included in the AFDC family filing unit and that the child support income be included in the determination of the AFDC family unit's eligibility" (id. at 9a (citations omitted)). The court then proceeded to hold that the DEFRA filing-unit provision "effects a taking without just compensation and abridges plaintiff child support recipients' substantive due process rights" (App., infra, 33a). Addressing first the takings claim, the court found that child-support payments constitute a "protected property interest" and that the challenged statute had reduced the value of that property interest because "child support payments over and above the $50 disregarded are paid to the AFDC family unit in satisfaction of a portion of the payment standard for the family" (id. at 14a). The court concluded that the statutory scheme thereby forced con-resident siblings who receive child support "to use their property for the benefit of others," namely the siblings with whom they reside (id. at 18a-19a). "If the taking clause means anything," the court continued, "it means that the government cannot force child support recipients 'to bear public burdens which in all fairness should be borne by the public as a whole'" (id. at 19a (citation omitted)). The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the "intangible" benefits of membership in the AFDC family unit, such as eligibility for Medicaid benefits, constituted just compensation to the child-support recipient for any contribution he might be though to have made to the other members of his family (ibid.). The court also held that the DEFRA filing-unit provision violates a fundamental liberty interest of child-support recipients, viz., "the interest of the child in the support and nurture of his or her parent" (App., infra, 28a). Stating that "these child support recipients have been coerced into being wards of the state" by the family filing-unit rule (id. at 29a), the court held that the constitutionality of the statute must be assessed under a standard of "rigorous" and "heightened" scrutiny (ibid.). The court found that Section 602(a)(38) caused children to lose "two essential attributes of parenthood" -- "nurturing and guidance" from their non-custodial parent and "self-esteem and dignity which accompanies being supported by one's own family" (App., infra, 29a-30a). Finally, the court found that Congress's amendment of the statute in 1984 was "not narrowly tailored to accomplish the deficit reduction goals" (id. at 30a). A more narrowly drawn statute, the court suggested, would count only child-support income that is used to meet the child's pro rata share of family expenses, and would afford children the options of deciding whether to join the AFDC filing unit and whether to assign their income to the state (id. at 30a-31a). /2/ THE QUESTION IS SUBSTANTIAL The question here is subsumed within the question presented in Bowen v. Gilliard, No. 86-509, and Kirk v. Gilliard, No. 86-564, in which this Court noted probable jurisdiction on December 8, 1986. /3/ Accordingly, the Court should hold this case pending the disposition of those cases, which have been consolidated for argument. CONCLUSION This case should be disposed of in light of this Court's disposition of Bowen v. Gilliard, No. 86-509, and Kirk v. Gilliard, No. 86-564. Respectfully submitted. CHARLES FRIED Solicitor General RICHARD K. WILLARD Assistant Attorney General ALBERT G. LAUBER, JR. Deputy Solicitor General JERROLD J. GANZFRIED Assistant to the Solicitor General WILLIAM KANTER CARLENE V. MCINTYRE Attorneys JANUARY 1987 /1/ We are sending copies of our jurisdictional statements in Nos. 86-509 and 86-744 to counsel in this case. /2/ The court rejected appellees' claims that the family filing-unit amendment violated the Tenth Amendment, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Equal Protection component of the Due Process Clause and the Contract Clause (App., infra, 2a-26a, 31a-32a). /3/ The same question is also before this Court in Bowen v. Lesko, No. 86-744 (filed Nov. 5, 1986), and Reivitz v. Lesko, No. 86-415 (filed Sept. 12, 1986). APPENDIX