RICHARD A. LYNG, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, APPELLANT V.
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL
IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, UAW, ET AL.

   No. 86-1471

   In the Supreme Court of the United States

   October Term, 1986

   On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia

   Jurisdictional Statement

                       PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

   In addition to those named in the caption, the parties are:  United
Mine Workers of America (UMWA);  Mary Berry;  Johnie B. Blake;  Barm
Combs;  Patricia Ann Combs;  Mark Dyer;  Geneva Dyer;  and a class of
persons composed of certain UAW and UMWA strikers and their
households.

         TABLE OF CONTENTS
   Parties to the proceeding
   Opinions below
   Jurisdiction
   Statutory provision involved
   Question presented
   Statement
   The question is substantial
   Conclusion
   Appendix A
   Appendix B
   Appendix C
   Appendix D
   Appendix E
   Appendix F
   Appendix G

                            OPINIONS BELOW

   The decision of the district court holding the relevant provision
of the Food Stamp Act unconstitutional is reported at 648 F. Supp.
1234 (App., infra, 1a-16a).  An earlier decision of the district court
(App., infra, 17a-47a) is reported at 648 F. Supp. 1241.  Subsequent
decisions and orders of the district court are not yet reported (App.,
infra, 48a-65a, 66a-70a, 71a-72a).

                             JURISDICTION

   The order of the district court declaring the statute
unconstitutional (App., infra, 71a-72a) was entered on November 14,
1986.  The order of the district court enjoining the Secretary from
enforcing the statute (App., infra, 48a-50a) was entered on December
22, 1986.  A notice of appeal to this Court (App., infra, 73a) was
filed on December 11, 1986, and an amended notice of appeal (App.,
infra, 74a) was filed on December 30, 1986.  On February 2, 1987, the
Chief Justice extended the time within which to docket this appeal to
and including March 12, 1987.  The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1252.

                     STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

   7 U.S.C. 2015(d)(3) provides:

         Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a household shall
      not participate in the food stamp program at any time that any
      member of such household, not exempt from the work registration
      requirements of paragraph (1) of this subsection, is on strike
      as defined in section 142(2) of title 29, because of a labor
      dispute (other than a lockout) as defined in section 152(9) of
      title 29:  Provided, That a household shall not lose its
      eligibility to participate in the food stamp program as a result
      of one of its members going on strike if the household was
      eligible for food stamps immediately prior to such strike,
      however, such household shall not receive an increased allotment
      as the result of a decrease in the income of the striking member
      or members of the household:  Provided further, That such
      ineligibility shall not apply to any household that does not
      contain a member on strike, if any of its members refuses to
      accept employment at a plant or site because of a strike or
      lockout.

                          QUESTION PRESENTED

   Section 6(d)(3) of the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. 2015(d)(3),
generally provides that a household shall not become eligible to
participate in the food stamp program at any time that a member of the
household is on strike.  The statute further provides that a household
already participating in the program shall not receive an increased
allotment of food stamps by reason of the loss of income occasioned
when a member of the household goes on strike.  The question presented
is whether this statute is unconstitutional as violative of the First
Amendment, the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection component of
the Fifth Amendment.

                               STATEMENT

   The Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 2011 et seq.,
established a public welfare program, funded by the Department of
Agriculture and administered by state agencies, that supplements the
food purchasing power of low-income households.  This suit was brought
by a number of potential food-stamp recipients and certain labor
unions against the Secretary of Agriculture (the Secretary),
challenging the constitutionality of Section 6(d)(3) of the Act, 7
U.S.C. 2015(d)(3).  That Section generally provides that a household
may not become eligible for food stamps -- of, if already eligible,
may not receive an increased allotment of food stamps -- by reason of
a decrease in household income occasioned by the fact that any member
of the household is on strike.

   The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held
that Section 2015(d)(3) is unconstitutional and enjoined its
enforcement.  The court held that the statute violates the First
Amendment rights of strikers to associate with their families and with
other union members.  The court also held that Section 2015(d)(3)
violates equal protection principles by creating a classification that
discriminates against striking employees.  The Secretary seeks direct
review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1252, of the district court's
unprecedented decision.

   1. The Food Stamp program is a federally-funded, state-administered
effort to "permit low-income households to obtain a more nutritious
diet through normal channels of trade by increasing food purchasing
power." 7 U.S.C. 2011.  Households with aggregate income and financial
resources below specified national standards are eligible to
participate.  7 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 2014.  Participating households
receive coupons (food stamps) that can be used for food purchases at
retail stores.  7 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 2013.  Nearly 21 million
persons resided in households that received food stamps in 1984.  The
resulting federal outlay was in excess of $10 billion.  See Bureau of
the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United
States 1986, at 122 (106th ed.).

   In addition to establishing an income threshold, the Food Stamp Act
prescribes several eligibility requirements designed to ensure that
finite government funds are available to those who are most in need.
For example, Section 2015(d)(1) withholds food stamps from households
in which an otherwise qualified person refuses to register for
employment, refuses to provide information about his employment, or
refuses to accept employment at particular wages.  7 U.S.C. (& Supp.
III) 2015(d)(1)(i), (ii) and (iv).  Section 2015(d)(1)(iii) makes
ineligible for 90 days a household whose head voluntarily quits a job
without good cause.  And 7 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 2029 permits the
states to disqualify certain households whose members refuse to
participate in "workfare programs." See also 7 U.S.C. 2015(b)
(disqualification for engaging in fraud and misrepresentation about
food-stamp eligibility).

   Consistent with its policy of ensuring that limited federal funds
remain available to assist the neediest households, Congress amended
the Act in 1981 to prescribe new eligibility requirements for
households with members unemployed because of strikes.  Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), Pub. L. No. 97-35, Section 109, 95
Stat. 361.  This amendment is now codified at 7 U.S.C. 2015(d)(3).
/1/ It generally provides that "a household shall not participate in
the food stamp program at any time that any (otherwise-qualified)
member of such household * * * is on strike." A proviso states that a
household already eligible for food stamps shall not lose its
eligibility if one of its members goes on strike, but that "such
household shall not receive an increased allotment as the result of a
decrease in the income of (its) striking member or members."

   The 1981 amendment was designed to promote three distinct goals.
The first and foremost of these goals was a reduction in the cost of
the Food Stamp program.  Section 2015(d)(3), as amended, was part of a
package of across-the-board budget cuts whose purpose was to effect
"dramatic changes in Federal spending policy * * * necessary in order
to wage an effective battle against the high inflation and
unemployment which have plagued the national economy for many years."
S. Rep. 97-139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1981).  Indeed, the 1981
amendment to Section 2015(d)(3) was only one of many changes in the
Food Stamp Act enacted by OBRA in an effort to achieve significant
budgetary savings.  See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 97-35, Section 101(a), 95
Stat. 358, 7 U.S.C. 2012(i) (providing that parents and children who
live together shall comprise a single household for food stamp
purposes);  Pub. L. No. 97-35, Section 104(a), 95 Stat. 358, 7 U.S.C.
2014(c)(2) (establishing new gross income eligibility standard).  See
generally S. Rep. 97-139, supra, at 52-53, 55-57.  In deciding to
enact the 1981 amendment to Section 2015(d)(3), Congress determined
that over the three-year period from 1982 to 1984 the provision would
reduce the total cost of the Food Stamp program by approximately $165
million.  S. Rep. 97-139, supra, at 63.  See also id. at 119
(detailing administrative savings expected to result from the
amendment).

   Secondly, by significantly restricting the availability of food
stamps to households that included strikers, Congress sought to
promote "the underlying policy of trying receipt of food stamps to the
ability and willingness to work, as exemplified by provisions
requiring work registration, denying benefits to those voluntarily
quitting a job without good cause, and allowing the establishment of
workfare programs." S. Rep. 97-139, supra, at 62.  Unlike needy
persons without job opportunities, Congress determined that "(a)
person who leaves his job to go on strike has given up the income from
the job of his own volition." Ibid.  And Congress concluded that
"(u)nion strike funds should be responsible for providing support and
benefits to strikers during labor-management disputes." Ibid.

   Finally, Congress believed that the 1981 amendment would help
promote the appearance of governmental neutrality in labor disputes.
According to the Senate Report, providing food stamps to striking
workers could "be seen as encouragement to workers to 'wait out'
management, rather than compromise." S. Rep. 97-139, supra, at 62.
Congress was particularly concerned about strikes by public employees,
who under previous law might receive food stamps "even though the
strikes in which they (were) participating (were) illegal." Ibid.

   2. Appellees are two labor unions and several individual union
members.  On October 29, 1984, they filed this action in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the
constitutionality of Section 2015(d)(3) and seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief.  On September 30, 1985, the district court denied
the Secretary's motion to dismiss the complaint (App., infra,
17a-47a).  The parties thereafter conducted discovery and filed
cross-motions for summary judgment.

   On November 14, 1986, the court granted appellees' motion for
summary judgment and issued a declaratory judgment (App., infra,
1a-16a).  The district court acknowledged (id. at 10a) that Section
2015(d)(3) "is, in one sense, rationally related to legitimate
legislative objectives -- requiring a person able to work to do so in
order to receive food stamps and promoting government neutrality in
strikes." Nevertheless, identifying five deficiencies in the statute,
the court held it unconstitutional.

   First, the court found that the statute "interferes or threatens to
interfere with the First Amendment right of the individual plaintiffs
to associate with their families, with their union, and with fellow
union members, as well as the reciprocal First Amendment right of each
union plaintiff to its members' association with the union." App.,
infra, 11a (citations omitted).  Second, relying on this Court's
decisions in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977),
and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the court determined that
"(t)he statute as administered interferes with strikers' right to
express themselves about union matters free of coercion by the
government." App., infra, 11a.  Third, the court stated that strikers
as a group have historically "been subject to discrimination," possess
"obvious and distinguishing characteristics," and have "frequently
been in the stance of an unpopular political minority." Id. at 12a.
The court accordingly suggested that strikers should be considered a
suspect or quasi-suspect class for equal-protection purposes.  Fourth,
the court discerned in the statute (id. at 13a) "significant and
discriminatory differences between the treatment accorded a striker
who stops work in concert with others and an individual who quits a
job." As a result, the court stated that one of the rationales
advanced by Congress for Section 2015(d)(3) -- the desire to tie the
receipt of food stamps to the willingness to work -- was "seriously
weakened" (App., infra, 13a).

   Finally, in an analysis that the court termed "critical to (its)
appraisal of rationality," the court stated that Section 2015(d)(3)
"impermissibly strikes at the striker through his family." App.,
infra, 13a.  In the district court's view, "(n)either administrative
convenience nor the desirability of maintaining government neutrality
in labor disputes justifies the denial of food stamps to innocent
members of a striker's household if this legislative purpose could be
achieved by more narrowly tailored measures." The court surmised that
"(a)djusting the food stamp allotment to exclude the striker would be
neither difficult nor intrusive." Id. at 14a.  It accordingly held
that the statute, "when considered in light of its impact on the
constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and on innocent members of the
families of the individual plaintiffs, is not sufficiently tailored to
the objectives stated by its defenders to pass constitutional muster."
Id. at 15a.  The court issued an order granting a declaratory judgment
consistent with this decision (id. at 71a-72a).

   On December 22, 1986, the district court granted appellees interim
injunctive relief (App., infra, 48a-50a).  In relevant part, the court
enjoined the Secretary (id. at 48a-49a) "pending further orders of
this Court or the Supreme Court, from enforcing the provisions of 7
U.S.C. Section 2015(d)(3) and its implementing regulations to
disqualify class members from participation in the Food Stamp program
when they are determined by a state or local Food Stamp agency to meet
the other eligibility requirements of the Food Stamp Act." /2/

                      THE QUESTION IS SUBSTANTIAL

   The district court has held unconstitutional a carefully considered
provision of the Food Stamp Act, whose evident purpose is to allocate
finite resources to those most in need of government assistance.
Applying a loose amalgam of heightened and rational-basis scrutiny,
the district court held that Section 2015(d)(3) impinges on
fundamental rights of free speech and association, burdens a suspect
class, and irrationally discriminates against striking workers.  The
court's analysis if flawed at every turn.  It ignores settled equal
protection principles and improperly second-guesses the complex
choices made by Congress when it amended the Food Stamp Act.  The
result cannot be reconciled with this Court's decisions and reflects a
marked lack of deference to "the duly enacted and carefully considered
decision of a coequal and representative branch of our Government."
Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, No. 84-571 (June 28,
1985), slip op. 13.  The question presented is therefore substantial.
Indeed, because the principles governing the constitutionality of this
sort of legislation have been settled by recent decisions of this
Court, the Court may wish to consider summary reversal.

   1. Equal protection principles generally require that legislation
accord like treatment to similarly situated individuals.  See, e.g.,
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., No. 84-468 (July 1,
1985), slip op. 6;  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).  But the
precept of equal protection does not preclude legislators from making
rational distinctions.  "A legislature must have substantial latitude
to establish classifications that roughly approximate the nature of
the problem perceived, that accommodate competing concerns both public
and private, and that account for limitations on the practical ability
of the (government) to remedy every ill." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at
216.  Particularly in cases involving social welfare programs -- where
Congress must "make many distinctions among classes of beneficiaries
while making allocations from a finite fund" (Bowen v. Owens, No.
84-1905 (May 19, 1986), slip op. 5) -- the judiciary must give broad
deference to the choices of Congress, "the appropriate representative
body through which the public makes democratic choices among
alternative solutions to social and economic problems." Schweiker v.
Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981).  A legislative choice is subjected
to heightened scrutiny only if it "employs a classification that is
inherently invidious or that impinges on fundamental rights." Ibid.

   These principles confirm that Congress acted well within it powers
in amending Section 2015(d)(3).  Faced with an overwhelming budget
deficit and with ever-increasing demands on federal resources,
Congress decided to "concentrate limited funds where the need (was)
likely to be greatest." Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 296 (1979);
accord, Bowen v. Owens, slip op. 8.  Congress concluded, quite
reasonably, that households whose members are on strike have greater
access to the means of self-support than households whose members are
entirely without employment opportunities.  In addition, Congress
chose not to discourage striking employees from reaching reasonable
accommodations with their employers;  it therefore declined to
provide, in the form of food stamps, the practical equivalent of
strike benefits that it believed could ordinarily be paid from union
funds.

   In sum, the 1981 amendment to Section 2015(d)(3) addressed an array
of legitimate governmental interests and did so in a way that cannot
be described as "patently arbitrary or irrational." United States
Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177 (1980).  The
statute thus easily meets the traditional "rational basis" test
applied to public welfare programs.  See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S.
749, 772 (1975);  Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. at 230;  Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979);  Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603,
611 (1960).  Every other court that has considered the
constitutionality of Section 2015(d)(3) has held it valid on that
basis.  See Ledesma v. Block, No. G82-94 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 26, 1985),
appeal pending, No. 85-1730 (6th Cir.);  United Steelworkers v. Block,
578 F. Supp. 1417, 1421-1424 (D.S.D. 1982) (alternative holding).

   2. The district court acknowledged (App., infra, 10a) that Section
2015(d)(3) is "rationally related to legitimate legislative objectives
-- requiring a person able to work to do so in order to receive food
stamps and promoting government neutrality in strikes." /3/ The case
should have ended upon that conclusion.  Instead, the district court
embarked upon a rudderless voyage into heightened scrutiny.  In so
doing, the court relied, indiscriminately, upon cases involving
suspect classifications, gender discrimination, fundamental rights,
and "rational basis" analysis.  This jumble of loosely connected
precedent cannot support the application of heightened scrutiny to the
legislative classification effected by Section 2015(d)(3).

   a. The court held, first, that "(t)he disputed limitation on food
stamps for strikers interferes or threatens to interfere with the
First Amendment right of the individual plaintiffs to associate with
their families, with their union, and with fellow union members"
(App., infra, 11a (citations omitted)).  This Court rejected a nearly
identical contention in Lyng v. Castillo, No. 85-250 (June 27, 1986).
That case involved a challenge to a provision of the Food Stamp Act
that generally treated parents, children, and siblings who live
together as a single "household" for purposes of determining need and
eligibility for benefits.  Applying heightened scrutiny, the district
court had concluded that this provision infringed the rights of family
members to associate with one another.  In reversing, this Court
upheld the statutory classification because it did not "'directly and
substantially' interfere with family living arrangements and thereby
burden a fundamental right" (slip op. 3 (citation omitted)).  In
particular, the Court observed, the provision defining "household" did
not "order or prevent any group of persons from dining together" (id.
at 4).  And the Court found it "exceedingly unlikely that close
relatives would choose to live apart simply to increase their
allotment of food stamps" (ibid.).

   The Court's analysis in Castillo squarely disposes of appellees'
First Amendment "associational" claim.  By limiting the availability
of food stamps to households that include strikers, Congress did not
"directly and substantially interfere" with family members' ability to
associate with each other.  Nor did Congress directly interfere with
union members' ability to associate with their union.  See Florida
AFL-CIO v. Florida Dep't of Labor & Employment Security, 676 F.2d 513,
516 (11th Cir. 1982) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to state
statute that withheld unemployment compensation from workers who quit
their job upon expiration of labor contracts).  And there is no more
reason here than in Castillo to believe that families "will choose to
live apart," or that workers will resign from their union, in order to
acquire food stamps.  /4/

   b. The district court also concluded that Section 2015(d)(3)
abridges union members' First Amendment freedom of expression (App.,
infra, 11a-12a).  The court reasoned (id. at 11a) that in order to
qualify for food stamps, striking workers may find it necessary to
"pressure their union to reach a settlement." Relying on this Court's
decisions in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977),
and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the district court held
that in this manner Section 2015(d)(3) "interferes with strikers'
right to express themselves about union matters free of coercion by
the government" (App., infra, 11a).

   The district court's analysis ignores the fact that Section
2015(d)(3) does not prohibit union members from expressing their
views.  It simply refuses to fund the decision to strike.  This Court
has made it clear that while the Constitution "protect(s) against
unwarranted government interference with freedom of choice in the
context of certain personal decisions, it does not confer an
entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the
advantages of that freedom." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-318
(1980).  "A refusal to fund protected activity, without more, cannot
be equated with the imposition of a 'penalty' on that activity." Id.
at 317 n.19.  "It is one thing to say that a State may not prohibit
(an activity) and quite another to say that such (activity) must * * *
receive state aid." Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973).
Accord, e.g., Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461
U.S. 540, 545-546 (1983);  Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977);  Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 94-95 (1976);  Cammarano v. United States, 358
U.S. 498 (1959).  Cf. Baker v. General Motors Corp., No. 85-117 (July
2, 1986), slip op. 16 (federal statutory right to authorize a strike
does not preclude States from refusing to provide unemployment
compensation to those employees whose unemployment results from a
strike to which they have contributed funds).

   In this essential respect Section 2015(d)(3) is distinguishable
from the statute involved in the Abood case.  The statute there
required public employees to contribute funds to employee unions, even
though the unions used the funds to promote political objectives
unrelated to their collective-bargaining responsibilities.  The Court
held the statute unconstitutional, observing that the law required
public employees to support "an ideological cause (they) may oppose"
(431 U.S. at 235).  The statute challenged in Abood thus violated the
principle "at the heart of the First Amendment * * * that in a free
society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience
rather than coerced by the State" (id. at 234-235).  Section
2015(d)(3), by contrast, does not require citizens to spend their
money on political causes in which they do not believe.  It simply
withholds government funds from a class of households that Congress
reasonably concluded have relatively less need of government
assistance.

   The Sherbert decision is equally inapposite.  The Court there
upheld a Free Exercise challenge to a state denial of unemployment
compensation benefits to a Sabbatarian who refused to work on
Saturdays.  See also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, No. 85-993
(Feb. 25, 1987).  But the Court has never extended the reasoning in
Sherbert beyond the unique context "of a constitutionally imposed
'governmental obligation of neutrality' originating in the
Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of the First Amendment."
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474-475 n.8 (refusing to extend the holding
in Sherbert to a claim that a state statute was unconstitutional
because it denied funding for abortions).  Compare Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. at 317 n.19 (refusing to extend Sherbert to a claim that a
federal statute was unconstitutional because it withheld Medicaid
funding for abortions) with Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707,
717-718 (1981) (applying Sherbert to a state denial of unemployment
compensation to a worker who quit his job for religious reasons).

   c. The district court next held (App., infra, 12a-13a) that labor
unions in general, and striking workers in particular, warrant special
constitutional protection in that they have historically been "subject
to discrimination" and possess "obvious and distinguishing
characteristics." This Court has twice rejected that precise claim.
In City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 426
U.S. 283 (1976), the Court sustained, under a rational-basis analysis,
a city's refusal to withhold union dues from the paychecks of city
firefighters.  The Court specifically rejected the contention that
"respondents' status as union members * * * is such as to entitle them
to special treatment under the Equal Protection Clause" (id. at 286).
Similarly, in Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S.
471 (1977), the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a state
statute that denied unemployment benefits to persons whose
unemployment resulted from a labor dispute.  The Court upheld the
statute under a rational-basis standard, expressly finding (431 U.S.
at 489) that "(t)he statute does not involve any discernible
fundamental interest or affect with particularity any protected
class." Accord, Russo v. Kirby, 453 F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir. 1971)
(rejecting First Amendment and equal protection challenges to state
law denying welfare benefits to strikers);  Francis v. Davidson, 340
F. Supp. 351, 362-363 (D. Md.) (three-judge court), aff'd mem., 409
U.S. 904 (1972) (rejecting equal protection challenge to state
regulation denying AFDC benefits to families of striking workers).

   Insisting, nevertheless, on some form of heightened scrutiny, the
district court noted (App., infra, 13a) that "labor unions and
strikers have been the beneficiaries of extensive legislation designed
to ameliorate historic discrimination against them." But the court
drew exactly the wrong inference from this fact.  Far from showing
that heightened judicial solicitude is merited, a group's achievement
of significant legislative success "belies a continuing antipathy or
prejudice and a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight by the
judiciary." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., slip op.
9.  There is thus no basis whatever for the district court's
suggestion that strikers are a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class.
/5/

   d. Finally, the court held (App., infra, 13a) that because Section
2015(d)(3) "cuts off food stamps not only from a striker but also from
the entire household, including the striker's spouse and children,"
the statute must be "narrowly tailored" in order to survive
constitutional scrutiny.  The court's holding mischaracterizes the
structure and purpose of the statute, as well as the practicalities of
its administration.  More fundamentally, the court's underlying
premise -- that legislative lines must be narrowly drawn when they
have an impact on the welfare of family members -- cannot be squared
with traditional equal protection principles.

   To begin with, the district court paid insufficient attention to
the fact that Congress chose to award food stamps to households, not
to individual family members.  The Act routinely provides that a
household will lose its eligibility if one of its members performs, or
fails to perform, certain acts.  Thus, if any household member who is
fit to work fails to register for work, or refuses to accept certain
jobs, the entire household is disqualified from participation in the
food stamp program.  The same result follows if the head of a
household refuses to participate in an approved "workfare" plan.  In
each of these situations, the "onus" of the statute may be said to
fall, in the district court's words (App., infra, 13a), "as heavily on
the innocent members of the family as it does on" the person who
refuses to accept employment.  But the district court did not suggest,
and it could not credibly be suggested, that these provisions are
therefore unconstitutional for want of being "narrowly tailored."

   There is no logical basis for reaching a different result where, as
here, a household's disqualification results from a member's refusal
to accept employment by virtue of a strike.  Section 2015(d)(3) can no
more be said to "Punish" a family for the conduct of a member who goes
on strike than the provisions just described can be said to "punish" a
family for the conduct of a member who refuses to work on other
grounds.  In positing a distinction between the two situations, the
district court again hypothesized (App., infra, 13a) that strikers
occupy a privileged constitutional status.  But that hypothesis, as we
have already explained, is erroneous.

   The district court's further observation that "(a)djusting the food
stamp allotment to exclude the striker would be neither difficult nor
intrusive" (App., infra, 14a) is not only incorrect as a practical
matter /6/ but, more fundamentally, ignores basic equal protection
principles.  Legislative classifications need only be narrowly drawn
when they impinge on fundamental interests or burden suspect classes.
Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 425 (1981);  San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973).  In the absence
of a basis for heightened scrutiny, "a classification is not deficient
simply because the State could have selected another means of
achieving the desired ends." Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 969
(1982).  It is true that the eligibility requirement erected by
Section 2015(d)(3), like the rest of the Act's eligibility
requirements, may have an effect upon "innocent members of the family"
(App., infra, 13a).  But that is a feature of most social welfare
legislation.  It is the function of such legislation to "allocat(e)
limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential
recipients." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 487.  Inevitably,
classification will be drawn that, in one respect or another, may be
said to disadvantage certain needy persons.  But this Court has never
found unconstitutional an otherwise rational statute that allocates
social welfare benefits simply because the prescribed allocation has
such disadvantageous effects.  /7/

   3. The Food Stamp Act establishes a national program to supplement
the nutritional needs of large numbers of American households.  Over
$10 billion in food stamp benefits were distributed in 1984, to
households comprising nearly 21 million persons.  In 1981, when it
amended Section 2015(d)(3), Congress sought to sustain that national
effort, by conserving limited federal resources and channeling those
funds to households in greatest need of financial assistance.  The
district court's invalidation of Section 2015(d)(3) impairs that
effort.  And in so doing, its decision raises important questions
about the appropriate measure of deference to legislative judgment.

                              CONCLUSION

   Probable jurisdiction should be noted.  The Court may wish to
consider summary reversal.

   Respectfully submitted.

   CHARLES FRIED

      Solicitor General

   RICHARD K. WILLARD

      Assistant Attorney General

   ALBERT G. LAUBER, JR.

      Deputy Solicitor General

   LAWRENCE S. ROBBINS

      Assistant to the Solicitor General

   WILLIAM KANTER

   JOHN S. KOPPEL

      Attorneys

   MARCH 1987

   /1/ the 1981 amendment was originally codified at 7 U.S.C. (Supp. V
1981) 2015(d)(4).  Section 2015(d)(4) was redesignated as Section
2015(d)(3) by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-253, Section 190(b), 96 Stat. 787.

   /2/ On the same day, the district court also granted class
certification (App., infra, 66a-70a) and ordered the union appellees
to furnish a bond in an amount sufficient to cover the Secretary's
costs of food stamps provided under the injunction pending appeal (id.
at 50a).

   /3/ The district court at one point suggested that Congress's
effort to justify Section 2015(d)(3) as an effort to tie receipt of
food stamps to recipients' willingness to work was "seriously
weakened" by what the court perceived to be "significant and
discriminatory differences between the treatment accorded a striker
who stops work in concert with others and an individual who quits a
job" (App., infra, 13a;  see id. at 44a-47a).  This reasoning is
flawed.  To begin with, the distinctions that the statute draws
between strikers and quitters (compare 7 U.S.C. (& Supp. III)
2015(d)(1)(iii) with 7 U.S.C. 2015(d)(3)) do not, as the district
court suggested, uniformly disfavor strikers.  For example, a striker
who returns to his job is immediately eligible for food stamps;  the
quitter who finds a new job must still wait out a 90-day period of
ineligibility.  To the extent that the statute does disfavor strikers,
Congress could reasonably conclude that strikers, who have a job
waiting for them whenever they choose to return to it, are better off
than quitters, who have no certain prospect of employment whatsoever.
In any event, "(i)f the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it
does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is
not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in
some inequality.'" Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)
(citation omitted).  "(T)he drawing of lines that create distinctions
is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one.  Perfection
in making the necessary classifications is neither possible nor
necessary." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
314 (1976).

   /4/ In fact, Section 2015(d)(3) imposes even fewer pressures on
households to separate than did the statutory provision upheld in
Castillo.  Here, the eligibility limitation applies only as long as
the household member remains on strike.  In Castillo, by contrast, the
definition of "household" imposed a permanent limitation on the
availability of food stamps to households made up of close relatives.

   /5/ For the same reason, the district court's reliance (App.,
infra, 12a-13a) on Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973), is misplaced.  In Moreno the Court held unconstitutional a
1971 definition of "household" that effectively denied food stamps to
households that shared their income with one or more unrelated
persons.  The Court observed that the statute had been enacted out of
animus against "hippies" and held that such "a bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest." 413 U.S. at 534 (emphasis in the
original).  The district court here, by contrast, acknowledged that
Section 2015(d)(3) is "rationally related to legitimate legislative
objectives." App., infra, 10a.  And as we have explained above,
strikers are not a politically unpopular or otherwise "suspect" class.

   /6/ Congress expressly found that the elimination of benefits to
striking workers would reduce administrative costs.  As the Senate
report put it (S. Rep. 97-139, supra, at 119), "(b)ecause (strikers')
tenure in the program is temporary, their elimination will reduce the
administrative expense of initiating and then terminating (usually
within several months) eligibility."

   /7/ The district court predicated its "narrow tailoring"
requirement on this Court's decision in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982), but that case simply will not bear such an expansive
rendering.  The Court in Plyler held unconstitutional a Texas statute
that withheld funds for the education of children who were not legally
admitted into the United States.  In doing so, however, the Court made
clear (457 U.S. at 221) that education is not "merely some
governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social
welfare legislation." To the contrary, the Court noted (id. at 223)
that the denial of an education -- unlike the denial of routine
welfare benefits -- "imposes a lifetime hardship" and a "stigma of
illiteracy (that) will mark (the children) for the rest of their
lives." Only by ignoring the explicit rationale of the Court in Plyler
could the district court find support for its reasoning here.

   APPENDIX