No. 96-8596 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1996 HARRY PLYLER, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MICHAEL W. MOORE, DIRECTOR, SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL. ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION WALTER DELLINGER Acting Solicitor General FRANK W. HUNGER Assistant Attorney General BARBARA L. HERWIG ROBERT M. LOEB Attorneys Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 (202) 514 - 2217 ---------------------------------------- Page Break ---------------------------------------- QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether 18 U.S.C. 3626(b) (West Supp. 1996), as amended by Section 802 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104- 134, 110 Stat. 1321, 801-810 (April 26, 1996), violates separation-of-powers principles. 2. Whether Section 3626(b) violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment due process clause. 3. Whether Section 3626(b) deprives petitioners of property without due process of law. (I) ---------------------------------------- Page Break ---------------------------------------- IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1996 No. 96-8596 HARRY PLYLER, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MICHAEL W. MOORE, DIRECTOR, SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL. ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. A1-A14) is reported at 100 F.3d 365. The opinion of the district court (Pet. App. A15-A23) is unreported. JURISDICTION The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on November 14, 1996. The petition for rehearing was denied on January 10, 1997. Pet. App. 24. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254 (1). STATEMENT 1. In 1982, inmates in the South Carolina prison system (petitioners) filed suit against the South Carolina Department of Corrections (respondent), alleging that conditions of confinement violated the Eighth Amendment. Pet. App. A3. The parties agreed ---------------------------------------- Page Break ---------------------------------------- to the terms of a consent decree, and the district court approved the decree in 1986. Ibid. The decree contains provisions relating to overcrowding, health services, educational programs, vocational training, food service, and visitation. Ibid. In 1996, respondent moved to terminate the consent decree pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3626(b), as amended by Section 802 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 801-810 (April 26, 1996). Pet. App. A4. In the PLRA, Congress altered the standard for providing equitable relief in prison conditions cases: Under the PLRA, such relief "shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs." 18 U.S.C. 3626(a) (1) (A). Section 3626(b) provides for the immediate termination of relief that does not comply with that standard. It specifies that "[i]n any civil action with respect to prison conditions, a defendant or intervener shall be entitled to the immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right." 18 U.S.C. 3626(b)(2). Under Section 3626(b) (3), however, relief shall not be terminated "if the court makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current or ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn ---------------------------------------- Page Break ---------------------------------------- 3 and the least intrusive means to correct the violation." 18 U.S.C. 3626(b) (3). A party may seek termination under Section 3626(b) even if the relief "was originally granted or approved before * * * the date of the [PLRA's enactment]." Pub. L. No. 104-134, 802 (b) . The district court found that the decree in this case was entered without the findings required by Section 3626(b) (2) , and that there was no present basis for entering such findings. Pet. App. A17. The court therefore ordered the immediate termination of the decree. Id. at A22. The district court rejected petitioners' argument that the PLRA's termination provisions violate Article III. Pet. App. A18-A22a. Petitioners appealed, and the United States intervened in the court of appeals to defend the constitutionality of Section 3626(b). See Id. at A4 n.1. 3. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. A1-A14. The court held that Section 3626(b) does not violate the principle established in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995), that Congress may not interfere with the authority of federal courts to render dispositive legal judgments. Pet. App. A7 -A8. The court reasoned that "the consent decree at issue here was not a final judgment for separation-of-powers purposes, " because "[a] judgment providing for injunctive relief * * * remains subject to subsequent changes in the law." Id. at A10. The court also held that the PLRA does not mandate a rule of decision, in violation of the principle established in United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 126 (1871). Pet. App. A9-A10. The court ---------------------------------------- Page Break ---------------------------------------- 4 concluded that, by eliminating the authority of district courts to award relief greater than that required by the Constitution, the PLRA "amends the applicable law and does not dictate a rule of decision." Id. at A10. The court of appeals next held that Section 3626(b) does not violate the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause. Pet. App . A10-A11. While the court agreed with petitioners that the right of access to the courts includes a right to enforce a judgment, the court concluded that Section 3626(b) "does not burden this right; it merely limits the substantive relief to which the Inmates are entitled." Id. at All. Finally, the court of appeals held that Section 3626(b) does not deprive petitioners of property without due process of law. Pet. App. A12-A13. The court explained that "the Inmates had no property right in the continued enforcement of a decree granting prospective relief." Id. at A13. ARGUMENT Applying this Court's decisions, the court of appeals correctly held that Section 3626 is constitutional. That holding does not conflict with the decision of any other circuit. Indeed, the court below is the first court of appeals to address the constitutionality of Section 3626(b), and that issue is pending in five other circuits. The petition for a writ of certiorari should therefore be denied. 1. a. Petitioners contend (Pet. 4 - 9) that Section 3626(b) violates the separation-of-powers principles set forth in Plaut v. ---------------------------------------- Page Break ---------------------------------------- 5 Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995). That contention is without merit. In Plaut, the Court held that Congress may not require federal courts to reopen final judgments dismissing claims for monetary relief. 115 S. Ct. at 1453. Plaut did not suggest, however, that Congress was precluded from directing federal courts to modify prospective relief to the extent that such relief fails to conform to new legal standards. To the contrary, the Court reaffirmed its earlier decision in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1955), which it characterized as upholding Congress's power to "alter[ ] the prospective effect of injunctions entered by Article III courts." Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1459. The critical difference is that, while a final judgment on a claim for monetary relief represents " the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy," id. at 1457, an injunction is always subject to modification or termination in light of a "significant change either in factual conditions or in law." Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992). Thus, under Plaut, there is a constitutional distinction between legislation that requires courts to reopen final judgments on claims for monetary relief and legislation that requires courts to modify prospective relief in accordance with a change in the applicable law: The former is unconstitutional; the latter is not. As the court of appeals concluded (Pet. App. 8-9), Section 3626(b) falls on the constitutional side of that line. Section ---------------------------------------- Page Break ---------------------------------------- 6 3626(b) applies only to "prospective relief." 18 U.S.C. 3626(b). And Section 3626(b) requires a court to vacate such prospective relief only when the relief does not conform to Congress's new legal standard for awarding equitable relief in prison conditions cases, i.e., when it "extends * * * further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right." 18 U.S.C. 3626(b) (2) and (3). Section 3626(b) is therefore fully consistent with the separation-of-powers principles set forth in Plaut. b. Petitioners also err in contending (Pet. 9-10) that the PLRA unconstitutionally prescribes a rule of decision within the meaning of United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). As explained by the Court in Plaut, legislation does not prescribe a rule of decision within the meaning of Klein when it "amends applicable law." Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1452. That is the situation here. Prior to the enactment of the PLRA, a court could enter injunctive relief in a consent decree that extended further than necessary to remedy unconstitutional prison conditions. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389. "In enacting the PLRA, Congress has deprived district courts of this authority, and in so doing has unquestionably amended the law applicable to this case." Pet. App. A10. Because the PLRA sets out a new legal standard for the judiciary to apply and does not prescribe a rule of decision without a change in the applicable law, Klein is inapposite here. c. Petitioners next contend (Pet. 10-12) that Section 3626(b) violates equal protection principles, because it interferes with the fundamental right of inmates to challenge the constitutionality ---------------------------------------- Page Break ---------------------------------------- 7 of their conditions of confinement. But as the court of appeals concluded (Pet. App. All), the PLRA does not interfere with that right. Under the PLRA, inmates remain free to seek relief from unconstitutional prison conditions, 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(l), and to enforce decrees providing such relief, 18 U.S.C. 3626(b) (2) and (3), so long as the relief extends no further than necessary to remedy the constitutional violations. The PLRA therefore does not interfere with the right of inmates to seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights. d. Petitioners finally contend (Pet. 12-13) that Section 3626 deprives them of property without due process of law. Injunctive relief, however, is always subject to modification or termination, and that principle is fully applicable to consent decrees. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 378. Thus , as the court of appeals concluded (Pet. App. A12-A14), injunctive relief provided in consent decrees cannot be viewed as vested "property" protected by the Due Process Clause. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 273-274 (1994) (plaintiffs do not have a vested right in an injunctive decree). 2. The court below is the first court of appeals to address the constitutionality of Section 3626(b). There is therefore no conflict in the circuits on that issue. Challenges to the constitutionality of Section 3626(b) on the same grounds raised by petitioners are currently pending in five other circuits. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, No. 96-7957 (2d Cir.) (argued November 15, 1996); Gavin v. Ray, No. 96-3634 (8th Cir.) (argued May 21, 1997); Gates v. Rowland, No. 96-16537 (9th Cir.) (fully briefed, but not ---------------------------------------- Page Break ---------------------------------------- 8 yet argued); Hadix v. Johnson, Nos. 96-2463, 2582 (6th Cir.) (expedited and fully briefed) ; Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rufo, Nos. 97-1261, 1262, 1263, 1334 (1st Cir.) (appellants' brief filed). There is no reason at this time for the Court to preempt further appellate consideration of the constitutionality of Section 3626(b) . CONCLUSION The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. Respectfully submitted. WALTER DELLINGER Acting Solicitor General FRANK W. HUNGER Assistant Attorney General BARBARA L. HERWIG ROBERT M. LOEB Attorneys JUNE 1997