INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, PETITIONER V. PITTSBURGH & LAKE
ERIE RAILROAD CO., ET AL.

   No. 88-217

   In The Supreme Court Of The United States

   October Term, 1988

   On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of
Appeals For The Third Circuit

   Brief For The United States As Amicus Curiae

                           TABLE OF CONTENTS

   Interest of the United States

   Statement

   Discussion

   Conclusion

                     INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

   Congress has provided that, except as otherwise authorized by law,
the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or
officer thereof is a party, or is interested, is reserved to officers
of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney
General.  28 U.S.C. 516, 519.  Congress has further provided that,
except as the Attorney General in a particular case otherwise directs,
the Attorney General and the Solicitor General shall conduct and argue
suits and appeals in this Court in which the United States is
interested.  28 U.S.C. 518.  The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC),
an "independent establishment of the United States Government" (49
U.S.C. 10301), contends that, notwithstanding those provisions, it is
entitled to intervene in this labor dispute between two private
parties and present its views, through its own lawyers, to this Court.
 The Solicitor General resectfully submits this brief amicus curiae to
advise the Court of the United States' position on that matter.  /1/

                               STATEMENT

   The ICC petitions for a writ of certiorari to review a court of
appeals' decision holding that the Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad
Company (P&LE) is obligated to bargain with its unions, in accordance
with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq.,
over the effects of P&LE's proposed sale of its rail lines to another
company.

   1.  P&LE is small railroad that owns and operates 182 miles of rail
line in western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio.  P&LE has experienced
financial difficulties and, on July 8, 1987, it entered into an
agreement to sell its rail lines to P&LE Railco, Inc. (Railco), a
newly formed company that intended to operate those lines with a
reduced contingent of employees.  Railco's acquisition of P&LE's rail
lines was subject, among other legal and practical conditions, to the
ICC's approval in accordance with the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA),
49 U.S.C. 10101 et seq.  /2/ See Pet. App. 23a-25a.

   When informed of the proposed sale, P&LE's unions requested the
railroad to serve notices under Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act, 45
U.S.C. 156, and commence collective bargaining with the unions over
its decision to discontinue its railroad business and the effects of
that decision on the unions' members.  P&LE responded that it had no
duty to bargain under the circumstances.  The Railway Labor
Executives' Association (RLEA), on behalf of P&LE's unions, then
brought an action in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania to enjoin the sale and force P&LE to bargain.
 On September 15, 1987, the unions commenced a general strike of the
P&LE.  See Pet. App. 25a, 27a.

   Shortly thereafter, on September 19, 1987, Railco filed a "notice
of exemption" with the ICC seeking exemption from the ICA approval
process under the ICC's "noncarrier" exemption regulations.  See Ex
Parte 392 (Sub. No. 1), Class Exemption for the Acquisition and
Operation of Rail Lines Under 49 U.S.C. 10901, 1 I.C.C.2d 810 (1985),
review denied mem. sub nom. Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. ICC, 817 F.2d
145 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  /3/ Under Ex Parte 392, an exemption becomes
effective and the transaction may be carried out seven days after the
filing of a notice by the acquiring entity unless a petition to revoke
the exemption has been filed and granted or the transaction is stayed
by the ICC. See ibid.; 49 C.F.R. Pt. 1150.  On September 25, 1987, the
ICC denied RLEA's request for a stay, and on October 2, 1987, RLEA
filed a petition to revoke Railco's exemption, which remains pending
before the agency.  See Pet. App 26a-27a.

   Meanwhile, P&LE requested the district court to enjoin the RLEA
general strike on the ground that the work stoppage was an illegal
attempt to interfere with the ICC's exclusive jurisdiction over
Railco's purchase of the rail line.  The court ultimately agreed and
issued an injunction.  Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Pittsburgh &
Lake Erie R.R., Civ. No. 87-1745 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 1987) findings of
fact and conclusions of law).  /4/ The RLEA appealed, and the court of
appeals summarily reversed the district court's decision.  Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 831 F.2d 1231
(3d Cir. 1987) (P&LE I).  The court held that Section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act deprived the district court of jurisdiction to
issue the injunction, rejecting P&LE's contention that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act must be accommodated to the ICA, and remanded the
case for a determination whether P&LE was obligated to comply with the
Railway Labor Act bargaining procedures.  P&LE has petitioned this
Court for a writ of certiorari to review that decision.  Pittsburgh &
Lake Erie R.R. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, petition for cert.
pending, No. 87-1589 (filed Mar. 24, 1988).

   2.  The foregoing events led to the present dispute.  On remand,
the district court held that P&LE was obligated to bargain under the
Railway Labor Act concerning the effects of the proposed sale on its
employees.  Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie
R.R., Civ. No. 87-1745 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 1987) (memorandum opinion).
/5/ P&LE appealed, and the ICC, through its own lawyers, intervened in
the court of appeals in support of P&LE.  /6/ The court of appeals
affirmed the district court's decision (Pet. App. 14a-84a (P&LE II)),
specifically rejecting, among other arguments, the ICC's contention
that the RLEA's assertion that P&LE must bargain with its unions
constituted an impermissible "collateral attack" on the ICC's approval
of Railco's acquisition (id. at 50a-58a).  P&LE petitioned this Court
for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision.
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, No.
87-1888 (filed May 17, 1988).  The ICC, meanwhile, requested the
Solicitor General's assistance in preparing a petition for a writ of
certiorari.

   The Solicitor General concluded that the ICC lacked statutory
authority to intervene in the court of appeals and that the ICC
accordingly was not a proper part before this Court.  On June 14,
1988, the Solicitor General notified the Clerk of this Court that,
based on his determination that the ICC was not properly a party
respondent, the United States did not intend to file a response to
P&LE's May 17, 1988, petition.  /7/ On August 8, 1988, the ICC filed
the instant petition for a writ of certiorari, through its own
lawyers, with this Court.

                              DISCUSSION

   The United States suggests that the ICC lacked statutory authority
both to intervene in the court of appeals proceeding and to petition
this Court for a writ of certiorari.  The ICC's petition should
accordingly be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  /8/

   1.  Congress has given the Attorney General plenary authority over
all litigation involving the United States, its agencies, and officers
except "as otherwise authorized by law" (28 U.S.C. 516, 519).  /9/
Thus, unless Congress has given the ICC specific statutory authority
to intervene in a judicial action through its own attorneys, it must
rely on the Attorney General's representation of its interests in the
lower courts.  See United States v. Providence Journal Co., No. 87-65
(May 2, 1988), slip op. 11 n.9.

   The ICC contends (Pet. 10) that Congress has conferred independent
litigating authority on the agency in the present case pursuant to a
provision of the Urgent Deficiencies Act of 1913, which is codified,
as amended, at 28 U.S.C. 2323.  /10/ Section 2323, according to the
ICC, states (Pet. 10 (emphasis added by the ICC)):

         that the Commission may appear as a partty on its own motion
      and as of right, represented by its own counsel, in "any action
      involving a Commission order."

   The ICC has not given the Court an accurate rendition of the
statutory language.  Section 2323 actually states as follows:

         The Attorney General shall represent the Government in the
      actions specified in section 2321 of this title and in
      enforcement actions and actions to collect civil penalties under
      subtitle IV of title 49.

         The Interstate Commerce Commission, and any party or parties
      in interest to the proceeding before the Commission, in which an
      order or requirement is made, may appear as parties of their own
      motion and as of right, and be represented by their counsel, in
      any action involving the validity of such order or requirement
      or any part thereof, and the interest of such party.

                      * * * * *

   28 U.S.C. 2323 (emphasis added by the United States).  The language
of Section 2323, correctly rendered and read in context, allows the
ICC to intervene in judicial actions brought to review or enforce ICC
orders where the validity of the order is at issue.  The first
paragraph sets forth the Attorney General's authority to represent the
government in actions to review or enforce ICC orders, and the second
paragraph gives the ICC authority to intervene in those specific
actions.  In addition, the second paragraph makes clear that the ICC
can exercise its right to intervene only when the validity of the ICC
order being reviewed or enforced is drawn into question.  /11/

   Thus, the language on which the ICC relies does not authorize the
ICC's intervention in this case.  The present suit is neither a
proceeding to review an ICC order under Section 2321(a), an
enforcement action under Section 2321(b), nor an action under subtitle
IV of title 49 -- the three types of actions to which Section 2323
applies.  Moreover, it is a labor dispute between private parties that
involves, at most, a question of the consequences of an ICC
determination.  No question has been presented involving the validity
of an ICC order.  /12/

   The history of Section 2323 fully supports the statute's
self-evident meaning.  Prior to 1910, the ICA provided in relevant
part:

         If any carrier fails or neglects to obey any order of the
      Commission, other than for the payment of money, while the same
      is in effect, any party injured thereby, or the Commission in
      its own name, may apply to the circuit court * * * for an
      enforcement of such order.

   Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3591, Section 5, 34 Stat. 591.  In 1910,
Congress modified this provision to create a special "commerce court"
to review and enforce ICC orders.  Act of June 18, 1910 (Mann-Elkins
Act), ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539.  In response to President Taft's
suggestion, Congress additionally included a provision that ultimately
would become Section 2323.  Section 5 of the Mann-Elkins Act stated,
in language virtually identical to the present formulation of Section
2323, as follows (36 Stat. 543):

         That the Attorney-General shall have charge and control of
      the interests of the Government in all cases and proceedings in
      the commerce court * * *:  Provided, That the Interstate
      Commerce Commission and any party or parties in interest to the
      proceeding before the commission, in which an order or
      requirement is made, may appear as parties thereto of their own
      motion and as of right * * * in any suit wherein is involved the
      validity of such order or requirement or any part thereof * * *.

   President Taft had urged the passage of legislation restricting the
ICC's litigating authority for the following reasons:

         "Under the existing law, the Interstate Commerce Commission
      itself initiates and defends litigation in the courts for the
      enforcement, or in the defense, of its orders and decrees, and
      for this purpose it employs attorneys who, while subject to the
      control of the Attorney-General, act upon the initiative and
      under the instructions of the commission.  This blending of
      administrative, legislative, and judicial functions tends, in my
      opinion, to impair the efficiency of the commission by clothing
      it with partisan characteristics and robbing it of the impartial
      judicial attitude it should occupy in passing upon questions
      submitted to it.  In my opinion all litigation affecting the
      Government should be under the direct control of the Department
      of Justice;  and I therefore recommend that all proceedings
      affecting orders and decrees of the Interstate Commerce
      Commission be brought by or against the United States eo nomine,
      and be placed in charge of an Assistant Attorney General acting
      under the direction of the Attorney General."

   H.R. Rep. 923, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1910) (quoting President
Taft).  /13/ Thus, Section 5 was intended to limit the ICC's role in
conducting litigation by giving the Attorney General authority over
cases involving the review and enforcement of ICC orders that the ICC
had previously conducted exclusively through its own attorneys.  See
also H.R. Rep. 923, supra, at 8;  S. Rep. 355, 61st Cong., 2d Sess.
5-7 (1910).  Section 5 was subsequently included in the 1911
compilation of the judicial code.  See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231,
Section 212, 36 Stat. 1150.

   The Urgent Deficiencies Act (Act of Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32, 38 Stat.
219) abolished the commerce courts but retained the essence of Section
5 of the Mann-Elkins Act (36 Stat. 543), which was ultimately codified
as 28 U.S.C. 2323.  See ICC v. Southern Ry., 543 F.2d 534 (5th Cir.
1976), rehearing en banc denied, 551 F.2d 95 (1977).  Section 2323
remained essentially unchanged until 1975, when Congress substantially
revised the procedures governing judicial review of ICC orders.  See
Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-584, 88 Stat. 1917.  Congress
preserved the district court's jurisdiction to enforce ICC orders but
vested the courts of appeals with exclusive jurisdiction to review ICC
orders in accordance with the Hobbs Act (28 U.S.C. 2341 et seq.).  See
note 10, supra.  Those statutory revisions required a technical
revision of Section 2323 but resulted in no substantial change to the
provisions of that section relevant here.  See H.R. Rep. 93-1569, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 19-23 (1974) (indicating the relevant statutory
revisions).  /14/

   The legislative history thus demonstrates quite persuasively that
Section 2323 means what it says.  It permits the ICC to intervene in
agency review and enforcement proceedings in which the United States
is already a party, but it does not give the ICC independent
litigating authority in any other context.  The United States
accordingly submits that the ICC lacked statutory authority to
intervene in this action and it is therefore not a proper party
respondent in this case.

   2.  The ICC also asserts (Pet. 9) that, if the agency were a proper
party below, there would be no obstacle to the ICC petitioning this
Court for a writ of certiorari.  The United States disagrees.

   Section 518(a) of Title 28 gives the Attorney General and the
Solicitor General exclusive power to represent the interests of the
United States and its agencies in the Supreme Court, whether or not
Congress has given an agency authority to litigate in the lower
courts.  Section 518(a) provides that the Attorney General and the
Solicitor General shall conduct and argue all suits and appeals in the
Supreme Court, "(e)xcept when the Attorney General in a particular
case directs otherwise." On occasion, the Attorney General (or the
Solicitor General, pursuant to the delegation of authority contained
at 28 C.F.R. 0.20) has exercised that authority to permit an agency to
file a brief in the Supreme Court in its own name, rather than having
the Solicitor General represent it.  But the existence of the
discretionary authority to allow exceptions simply underscores the
firmness of the otherwise applicable rule.  See United States v.
Providence Journal Co., No. 87-65 (May 2, 1988).

   Congress has created a limited statutory exception to this rule in
the case of Hobbs Act proceedings to review agency orders, where it
has provided that "(t)he United States, the agency, or an aggrieved
party may file a petition for a writ of certiorari" (28 U.S.C. 2350).
But Section 2350's statutory authorization is strictly circumscribed
by that section's carefully drawn terms.  Section 2350 permits a
petition only from:  (1) an interlocutory order of the court of
appeals granting or denying an injunction of an agency order;  or (2)
a final judgment of the court of appeals on review of the agency
order.  /15/ The ICC (or for that matter the United States or an
aggrieved party) may not file a petition to review a court of appeals
decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2350 except from one of these two types
of orders.  The court of appeals' decision in this case obviously did
not arise in a Hobbs Act proceeding, since it does not involve the
review of an ICC order.  Thus, Section 2350 has no relevance here.

   The ICC argues, without statutory support, for a broader
interpretation of its litigation authority, relying (Pet. 11) on a
letter from Solicitor General Bork to Senator Quentin Burdick
describing the consequences of subjecting the ICC to the Hobbs Act
review process (H.R. Rep. 93-1569, supra, at 13-14).  The ICC suggests
that the Solicitor General confirmed the agency's authority to seek
review in "actions involving its orders" including actions arising
outside the Hobbs Act (Pet. 11).  The ICC creates that impression,
however, only by truncating the Solicitor General's statement (ibid.).
 The Solicitor General stated (H.R. Rep. 93-1569, supra, at 14
(emphasis added)):

         The Interstate Commerce Commission would continue to have the
      same authority to represent itself independent(ly) in the
      Supreme Court under S. 663 that it now has under the Urgent
      Deficiencies Act.  Under the bill it will have the authority
      itself to file petitions for write of certiorari, to oppose such
      petitions when filed against it, and to take any other action *
      * * in any cases before the Supreme Court in which both it and
      the United States are parties.

   The Solicitor General's specific reference to cases "in which both
(the ICC) and the United States are parties" demonstrates that his
description of the ICC's litigation authority pertained only to
actions for judicial review of ICC orders under the Hobbs Act.  The
ICC's reliance (Pet. 10-11) on various law review articles (e.g.,
Stern, "Inconsistency" in Government Litigation, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 759
(1951)), is similarly misplaced.  Those articles address, at most, the
ICC's authority to participate in Supreme Court review of the agency's
orders.

   Finally, the ICC's policy argument (Pet. 13-17) that its
independence would be threatened in the absence of a broad grant of
independent litigation authority is untenable.  First, the ICC retains
full authority under the present statutory regime to defend the
validity of its orders as intervenor in Hobbs Act proceedings.
Second, there is no basis for believing that Justice Department
representation of the agency's interests in other matters will
substantially infringe upon the agency's performance of its assigned
duties.  And third, the question of the ICC's litigation authority, as
well as the scope of the agency's independence itself, are (within
constitutional limitations) statutory questions committed to the
judgment of Congress.

                              CONCLUSION

   The petition for a writ of certiorari should be dismissed.

   Respectfully submitted,

                                      CHARLES FRIED

                                      Solicitor General

                                      THOMAS W. MERRILL

                                      Deputy Solicitor General

                                      JEFFREY P. MINEAR

                                      Assistant to the Solicitor
                                      General

   SEPTEMBER 1988

                               FOOTNOTES

   /1/ On June 30, 1988, the Court entered an order inviting the
Solicitor General to express the views of the United States with
respect to two petitions for a writ of certiorari (Pittsburgh & Lake
Erie R.R. v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, No. 87-1589, and
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, No.
87-1888) filed by one of the private parties in this case.  The
Solicitor General will file a brief in response to that invitation
addressing in detail the merits of the issues raised in those
petitions.

   /2/ The ICA establishes a national transportation policy to promote
efficient, competitive carriage of goods and persons (49 U.S.C. 10101,
10101a) and creates the ICC to implement that policy (49 U.S.C. 10301
et seq.).  The ICA grants the ICC broad jurisdiction over various
forms of transportation, including rail carriage (49 U.S.C. 10501),
and gives the ICC power to exempt carriers from ICA regulation (49
U.S.C. 10505).  The ICA specifically regulates, inter alia, the
construction and operation (49 U.S.C. 10901) or abandonment (49 U.S.C.
10903) of rail lines and the combination (including consolidation,
merger and acquisition of control) of rail carriers (49 U.S.C. 11341
et seq.).

   /3/ The ICA generally provides that a party may acquire a rail line
only if the party first obtains ICC approval.  See 49 U.S.C. 10901.
However, the ICC is empowered to exempt a person, class of persons, or
transaction from the Section 10901 approval process if it finds that
ICC oversight is "not necessary to carry out" the national rail
transportation policy and is "not needed to protect shippers from the
abuse of market power" (49 U.S.C. 10505(a)).  In 1985, the ICC
established a blanket exemption for Section 10901 acquisitions by
"non-carriers" (i.e., new entrants into the railroad business), the
so-called Ex Parte 392 exemption.  See 1 I.C.C. 2d 810.

   /4/ The district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law
are reproduced in P&LE's March 24, 1988, petition for a writ of
certiorari.  See Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n, No. 87-1589, Pet. App. B1-B10.

   /5/ The district court's memorandum opinion is reproduced in P&LE's
May 17, 1988, petition for a writ of certiorari.  See Pittsburgh &
Lake Erie R.R. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, No. 87-1888, Pet.
App. 71a-85a.

   /6/ We have reproduced the ICC's motion to intervene and the
court's order granting that motion in the Addendum, infra, 1a-8a.

   /7/ We have reproduced that letter in the Addendum, infra, 9a-11a.

   /8/ We have suggested a similar result, in a somewhat different
procedural setting, in ICC v. State of Texas, No. 87-1938.  In that
case, the ICC also petitioned for a writ of certiorari without
statutory authorization and without the Solicitor General's consent.

   /9/ Section 516 provides:

         Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of
      litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer
      thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing evidence
      therefor, is reserved to the officers of the Department of
      Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General.

   Section 519 provides:

         Except as otherwise authorized by law, the Attorney General
      shall supervise all litigation to which the United States, an
      agency, or officer thereof is a party, and shall direct all
      United States attorneys, assistant United States attorneys, and
      special attorneys appointed under section 543 of this title in
      the discharge of their respective duties.

   /10/ Prior to 1975, ICC orders were subject to enforcement and
review under the Urgent Deficiencies Act of 1913, ch. 32, 38 Stat.
219.  See 28 U.S.C. (1970 ed.) 1336, 2321-2325.  That Act empowered
the district courts to enforce and review ICC orders and further
provided that an action to enjoin an ICC order had to be heard before
a three-judge panel and could be appealed directly to this Court (28
U.S.C. (1970 ed.) 2325).  In 1975, Congress substantially revised
those provisions, preserving the district courts' jurisdiction to
enforce ICC orders, eliminating judicial review by three-judge
district courts, and vesting the courts of appeals with exclusive
jurisdiction to review ICC orders in accordance with the
Administrative Orders Review Act, 28 U.S.C. 2341 et seq., which is
more commonly known as the Hobbs Act.  See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub.
L. No. 93-584, 88 Stat. 1917.  See also H.R. Rep 93-1569, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 19-23 (1974) (indicating the relevant statutory revisions).
The Hobbs Act procedures also control judicial review of certain final
orders of the Federal Communications Commission, and certain rules,
regulations, and orders of the Secretary of Transportation and the
Federal Maritime Commission (28 U.S.C. (& Supp. IV) 2342).

   /11/ The structure and context of Section 2323 indicate beyond
doubt that the section's several paragraphs, which are not even
demarcated as separate subsections, were intended to be read together
and understood to cover the same universe of court proceedings.  This
textually evident construction of Section 2323 is supported by
Sections 2321 and 2322, the provisions which, along with Section 2323,
constitute chapter 157 of Title 28, entitled "Interstate Commerce
Commission Orders;  Enforcement and Review." Section 2321 describes
the types of judicial procedures available to review or enforce ICC
orders:  actions by private parties to enjoin or suspend an order are
to be brought in the court of appeals, in accordance with chapter 158,
the Hobbs Act (28 U.S.C. 2321(a));  actions to enforce ICC orders
other than for the payment of money or the collection of fines, are to
be brought in district court "as provided in this chapter" (28 U.S.C.
2321(b)).  Section 2322 provides that all actions specified in Section
2321 shall be brought "by or against the United States." Reading all
three provisions of chapter 157 together confirms that the second
paragraph of Section 2323 was intended to give the ICC authority to
intervene only in actions to review or enforce ICC orders.

   /12/ The ICC argues that the RLEA's action constitutes a
"collateral attack" on its exemption order in this case.  However,
that characterization fails to satisfy Section 2323's quite specific
statutory preconditions for ICC intervention.  Neither P&LE nor the
RLEA has sought judicial review of the ICC order pursuant to the Hobbs
Act, nor have they questioned the validity of that order in the
proceedings below.  Indeed, the court of appeals rejected the ICC's
argument that the RLEA's suit constituted a collateral attack on the
agency order.  Pet. App. 50a-58a.

   /13/ The House bill, as reported, provided that "the Attorney
General shall have charge and control of the interests of the
Government" but gave the ICC no opportunity to participate in the
court proceedings.  See H.R. Rep. 923, supra, at 21-22.  The
provisions permitting ICC intervention were added in the course of the
legislative debate.  See 45 Cong. Rec. 7575-7576 (1910).

   /14/ The ICC mistakenly relies (Pet. 10-13) on the 1974 House
Report to support its proposition that the ICC has broad authority to
intervene in any case that affects its interests.  The legislation at
issue there was concerned solely with direct judicial review of ICC
orders, and the legislators' discussion of the ICC's power to
intervene arose in that context.  See, e.g., H.R. Rep. 93-1569, supra,
at 8 (discussing the ICC's request for authority "to defend its
actions at all levels of judicial review independent of the discretion
of the Attorney General") (emphasis added).  The House report
(including the portions the ICC extensively cites (Pet. 12-13))
confirms Congress's intention that the Attorney General would have
general responsibility for representing the ICC's interests in actions
to review ICC orders and that the ICC would have authority to
intervene solely to defend the validity of its orders in those
proceedings.  See H.R. Rep. 93-1569, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, 15-18
(1974).

   /15/ Section 2350(a) specifically provides:

   An order granting or denying an interlocutory injunction under
section 2349(b) of this title and a final judgment of the court of
appeals in a proceeding to review under this chapter are subject to
review by the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari as provided by
section 1254(1) of this title.  * * * The United States, the agency,
or an aggrieved party may file a petition for a writ of certiorari.

   APPENDIX