PHYLLIS A. ANDERSON, PETITIONER V. CITY OF BESSEMER CITY No. 83-1623 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1984 On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner TABLE OF CONTENTS Interest of the United States Statement Summary of argument Argument: I. The court of appeals misapplied the standard of review prescribed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) in reversing the district court's findings of fact in this case. II. The court of appeals erred in concluding that the fact that male selection committee members were married to women who had been employed dispelled inferences from other evidence in the record that those members were biased in favor of hiring a male for the position of Recreation Director Conclusion QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether the court of appeals misapplied the standard of review prescribed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) in reversing the district court's findings of fact in this case. 2. Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that the fact that male selection committee members were married to women who had been employed dispelled inferences from other evidence in the record that those members were biased in favor of hiring a male for the position of Recreation Director. INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 2000e et seq., prohibits, inter alia, discrimination on the basis of sex in employment. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Attorney General are responsible for the enforcement of federal employment discrimination statutes, including Title VII. Title VII is also enforced through private lawsuits, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5, which provide an important complement to federal enforcement efforts. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974). The federal government therefore has an interest in the development and even-handed application of proper standards to govern Title VII actions. In addition, since the government as an employer is subject to private suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 2000e-16, the decision in this case may affect the federal government as a Title VII defendant. STATEMENT 1. In early 1975, respondent, the City of Bessemer City, North Carolina, began the process of filling the position of Recreation Director for the City. The mayor appointed a selection committee consisting of four men and one woman. Leona "Auddie" Boone, the female member of the committee, was appointed chairperson by virtue of her position as a member of the City Council. Although the City did not establish any formal educational or experience requirements for the position, the members of the selection committee testified that they were seeking the person who had the best background to perform the duties of the position. The committee members also agreed informally that the Recreation Director should reside in the City. The position was advertised in the local newspaper and by word-of-mouth. Pet. App. 9a, 36a-37a; J.A. 68a-69a, 78a, 106a-108a, 109a, 116a-117a, 140a-141a, 144a-145a, 149a, 153a, 157a-160a, 164a, 165a-167a. Eight persons, including petitioner, applied for the position of Recreation Director. Petitioner was the only female applicant. After interviewing all the candidates, the selection committee concluded that three applicants -- Burt Broadway, Donald Kincaid, and petitioner -- were qualified for the position. All of the committee members agreed that Broadway, who was then Recreation Director of Cramerton, North Carolina, was the most qualified. However, Broadway indicated during his interview that he would not relocate to Bessemer City. The committee then voted 4-1 to offer the position to Kincaid. The four male committee members voted for Kincaid, while Boone, the female member, voted in favor of petitioner. Pet. App. 9a-11a, 13a-14a, 38a-39a; J.A. 107a-108a, 119a-120a, 132a-133a, 139a-141a, 144a, 147a, 153a, 157a, 163a-164a. Boone subsequently informed petitioner that she believed petitioner was more qualified for the position of Recreation Director than Kincaid and that Kincaid was hired because he was a man. Boone told petitioner that the selection committee did not consider all the qualifications of the candidates and that only petitioner had been asked by the committee about her ability to work at night. Pet. App. 14a-15a; J.A. 82a, 96a, 121a. 2. Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The Commission determined that there was reasonable cause to believe that respondent had failed to hire petitioner because of her sex and issued a notice of right to sue to petitioner. Pet. App. 15a; J.A. 63a, 64a-67a, 82a-83a. Petitioner then brought this suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, alleging that respondent had discriminated against her on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 2000e et seq. Following a bench trial, the district court concluded that respondent had violated Title VII by intentionally discriminating against petitioner because of her sex when it failed to hire her for the position of Recreation Director (Pet. App. 1a-32a). The district court enjoined respondent from discriminating on the basis of sex in employment and awarded petitioner $30,397 in back pay plus interest (id. at 33a-34a). The district court based its finding of intentional discrimination on three subsidiary findings of fact. First, the court found that only petitioner was seriously questioned by committee members about whether she knew the position of Recreation Director involved working at night and travel to meet with other recreation directors and about her husband's reaction to her application for the job (Pet. App. 12a-13a). Second, the court found that petitioner was better qualified than Kincaid to perform the broad range of duties required of a Recreation Director and that the subjective decisionmaking process allowed committee members to make a selection for their own reasons (id. at 15a-19a). Finally, the district court found that the male selection committee members were biased toward selecting a male for the position of Recreation Director, particularly someone versed in the traditionally male-dominated sports. The court inferred bias from evidence that (1) only petitioner was seriously questioned about after-hours work and her spouse's reaction to the job; (2) one male committee member solicited applications from qualified men but not from two women whom he considered qualified; /1/ (3) another male committee member testified that it would be "real hard" for "a lady" to be the Recreation Director and that he thought his wife should be at home at night (J.A. 158a, 161a); (4) the male committee members testified that Kincaid was more qualified than petitioner because he had a college degree in health and physical education, although Broadway (the committee's first choice for the job) had no college degree; (5) two of the male committee members emphasized the importance of organizing traditionally male-dominated sports leagues and did not mention the other activities for which the Recreation Director would be responsible; and (6) there was no substantial difference in the overall recreational programs presented by petitioner and Kincaid during their interviews. Pet. App. 21a-23a. 3. The court of appeals reversed (Pet. App. 35a-65a). It held that certain of the district court's subsidiary findings of fact, as well as its ultimate finding of intentional discrimination, were clearly erroneous. The court of appeals weighed the education and experience of petitioner and Kincaid and concluded that, while petitioner was qualified for the position of Recreation Director, "Kincaid's overall training was superior to (petitioner's) training and experience for the demand(s) of this job" (id. at 54a (footnote omitted)). The court of appeals also held that there was no evidence to support the district court's findings that only petitioner was questioned about after-hours work, travel, and her husband's reaction to the job. Although it acknowledged that there was conflicting testimony on this point, the court of appeals found that Kincaid had been questioned in a similar manner. Pet. App. 56a-59a. Following its conclusion that the district court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous with respect to petitioner's and Kincaid's qualifications and the questions posed to the two applicants, the court of appeals held that the remaining evidence relied on by the district court was insufficient to support its finding that the male committee members were biased toward selecting a male as Recreation Director. Pet. App. 60a-62a. The court of appeals noted that the district court had inferred bias from the facts that one of the male committee members had failed to solicit applications for the position from two admittedly qualified females and that another male committee member testified that he believed it would be "real hard" for a woman to serve as Recreation Director. The court of appeals concluded that any inferences of bias from this evidence were dispelled by the fact that all of the male committee members were married to women who had worked and were accustomed to being away from home during evening hours. Id. at 61a n.5. The court of appeals also rejected the district court's emphasis on the fact that the hiring decision had been made on the basis of subjective, unarticulated criteria, since "(t)he use of subjective criteria to hire employees is not * * * illegal per se" (id. at 61a). The court of appeals concluded by asserting that its close scrutiny of the record in this case was justified by the manner in which the district court prepared its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court of appeals expressed its disapproval of the district court's practice of itself preparing a memorandum decision and then requesting that the prevailing party submit more detailed proposed findings and conclusions, followed by an opportunity for response by the opposing party. The court of appeals referred to earlier decisions, in which it had stated that a district court should request proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law from both parties before it reaches a judgment and should accept whatever it deems appropriate from each submission. Pet. App. 63a-65a. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT I.A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) provides that "(f)indings of fact shall not be set aside (on appeal) unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." Under the "clearly erroneous" standard an appellate court should not weigh the evidence de novo and supplant the district court's determinations with its own. The "clearly erroneous" standard applies to appellate review of the district court's finding of discriminatory intent in this case. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982). In our view, the court of appeals misapplied the Rule 52(a) standard of review in this case. In reversing the district court's finding of discriminatory intent, the court of appeals appears to have engaged in a de novo review of the evidence. In the course of doing so, the court of appeals disregarded significant evidence that supports the district court's findings and second-guessed the credibility determinations of the district court in connection with conflicting testimony. B. The court of appeals misapplied the "clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52(a) in reversing the district court's finding that petitioner was better qualified to perform the duties of Recreation Director than Donald Kincaid, who was hired for the position. The court of appeals disregarded record evidence of petitioner's relevant work experience and skills; in addition, it made no reference to Kincaid's lack of experience in certain areas. It was the district court's responsibility to weigh all the evidence; and its finding that petitioner was more qualified than Kincaid was amply supported by the record. The court of appeals erred in conducting a de novo review of the evidence on this question. C. The court of appeals also misapplied Rule 52(a) when it reversed the district court's finding that petitioner was the only applicant who was seriously questioned by the selection committee about after-hours work, travel, and her spouse's reaction to her application for the position of Recreation Director. There was conflicting testimony about what questions had been asked of the various applicants. The district court, after considering the credibility of the witnesses, resolved the conflicts in favor of petitioner. The district court, unlike the court of appeals, heard the testimony of the witnesses about the questioning of applicants and was able to evaluate it in light of factors such as demeanor and tone of voice. The court of appeals' failure to give due regard to the district court's credibility determinations on this subject is clearly contrary to the command of Rule 52(a). II. The court of appeals erred in concluding that inferences of bias from record evidence were dispelled by the fact that the male selection committee members were married to women who had been employed and were accustomed to being away from home in the evenings. There was significant evidence that the male committee members were biased in favor of selecting a male as Recreation Director. For example, one male committee member acknowledged that he had solicited applications from qualified men, but not from qualified women, while another testified that he believed it would be "real hard" for a "lady" to serve as Recreation Director and that he would not want his wife to hold the job. The inference of bias the district court drew from this and other evidence in the record is not rebutted by the mere fact that the wives of the male committee members had been employed. As this Court recognized in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499-500 (1977) an individual's personal circumstances will not necessarily prevent him from harboring discriminatory intent in other contexts. The court of appeals therefore erred in relying on the personal circumstances of the male committee members as the basis for rejecting the district court's finding that those members were biased in favor of selecting a male as Recreation Director. ARGUMENT I. THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED THE STANDARD OF REVIEW PRESCRIBED BY FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) IN REVERSING THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT IN THIS CASE A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) provides that "(f)indings of fact shall not be set aside (on appeal) unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." A finding of fact is "clearly erroneous" when the reviewing court, on the basis of all the evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that an error has been made. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). It is well settled, however, that an appellate court should not consider and weigh evidence de novo and supplant the district court's judgment with its own. Inwood Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. at 856; Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969). "The mere fact that on the same evidence the appellate court might have reached a different result does not justify it in setting the findings aside. It may regard a finding as clearly erroneous only if the finding is without adequate evidentiary support or induced by an erroneous view of the law." 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Section 2585, at 732-734 (1971) (footnotes omitted). See also United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 495-496 (1950). This case turns on the question whether respondent, through its selection committee, acted with discriminatory intent when it hired a male applicant, rather than petitioner, for the position of Recreation Director. In Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982), this Court held that the existence of discriminatory intent is an issue of fact to be determined by the trial court. "Thus, a court of appeals may only reverse a district court's finding on discriminatory intent if it concludes that the finding is clearly erroneous under Rule 52(a)." 456 U.S. at 290. Here the district court found as a matter of fact that respondent had acted with discriminatory intent when it failed to hire petitioner. The court of appeals correctly recognized (Pet. App. 55a-56a, 59a) that it should apply the "clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52(a) in reviewing the district court's findings of fact. But in our view the court of appeals misapplied the Rule 52(a) standard by engaging in a de novo review of the record and making an independent determination of whether respondent acted with discriminatory intent. /2/ In the course of its review, the court of appeals disregarded much of the record evidence that supports the district court's findings; moreover, the court of appeals gave insufficient deference to the credibility determinations made by the district court, in contravention of the express command of Rule 52(a). B. The district court found expressly that petitioner was better qualified to perform the "broad range of duties required of a Recreation Director" (Pet. App. 26a) than Donald Kincaid, the applicant who was hired. In making that finding, the district court considered the backgrounds of petitioner and Kincaid and the testimony of the committee members that they were looking for the person with the best background to perform the duties of the position, which included development of a well rounded recreational program for all ages and both sexes (see J.A. 108a, 160a, 164a; and see id. at 56a, 70a-71a). There is substantial evidence in the record to support the district court's finding that petitioner was better qualified for the position of Recreation Director than Kincaid. Petitioner was a college graduate with a B.S. degree in elementary education. She had also earned an associate degree and had taken additional courses in guidance, logic, government, history, and decoupage, as well as a course in public speaking. Petitioner had more than 20 years of work experience. She had been a substitute teacher in the public schools for ten years and had taught a third grade class during 1973-1974. Petitioner had taken courses in supervising physical education activities, had taught her own physical education classes, had herself played softball, basketball, and soccer, and had a basic knowledge of all sports. In addition, she had taught art and music to her students. During 1956 and 1957 petitioner had worked in the recreation department of Broughton Hospital, where she directed ball games, dances, and crafts for patients and supervised some employees in connection with these activities. She had also worked as a receptionist/bookkeeper and as a sales clerk in a department store. Petitioner had gained experience in public speaking in the course of her work in civic activities, and she had some experience with budgeting, planning activities, and recruiting people to work on projects. Pet. App. 16a-18a; J.A. 58a-60a, 86a-91a, 92a-93a, 98a-99a, 100a, 103a-104a. Kincaid had earned his B.S. degree in health and physical education approximately ten months before he applied for the position of Recreation Director. During college he had completed student teaching. After graduation, Kincaid had worked in the finance department of a credit bureau and had sold insurance for two months. He had played various sports during high school and college and had helped organize little league basketball games in Bessemer City. Pet. App. 18a-19a; J.A. 62a. The court of appeals concluded, contrary to the district court's finding, that Kincaid was better qualified for the position of Recreation Director (Pet. App. 49a-54a). Although the City had not formally articulated requirements for the position, the court of appeals found, on the basis of the selection committee's initial decision that Burt Broadway was the best qualified applicant, that the committee members were particularly concerned about athletics. /3/ The court of appeals concluded that Kincaid was better qualified for the position because he had more formal training and life experiences in athletics than petitioner. The court made no reference to petitioner's experience, and Kincaid's lack of experience, in other areas, such as arts and crafts, music, and dance. The court of appeals correctly noted (id. at 53a-54a) that petitioner's experience in supervision, budgeting, and recreation was limited in various respects, but it made no reference to the fact that Kincaid had no experience at all in these areas. The court of appeals also disregarded the testimony of committee chairperson Boone that petitioner was the best all-around candidate for the job. /4/ It is clear from this summary that the court of appeals engaged in a de novo review of the evidence relating to the relative qualifications of the candidates. In doing so, the court of appeals ignored considerable evidence that supports the district court's finding that petitioner was more qualified for the position of Recreation Director than Kincaid. In addition, the court of appeals appears to have substituted its judgment for that of the district court, particularly in evaluating the evidence of what qualifications a Recreation Director was expected to possess. The court of appeals was correct in concluding that some parts of the record support respondent's claim that it chose Kincaid because of his qualifications for the position. However, there was also substantial evidence to support petitioner's version of the facts. It was the district court's responsibility to weigh all the evidence and to reach a finding concerning the relative qualifications of the applicants. The court of appeals' de novo review of the evidence exceeds the narrow scope of the "clearly erroneous" standard prescribed by Rule 52(a). C. The district court found that only petitioner was questioned seriously by the selection committee about after-hours work, travel, and her spouse's reaction to her application for the job (Pet. App. 12a-13a). The testimony in the record includes varying accounts of the questions that were addressed to petitioner and the other applicants. There is some evidence (see J.A. 121a, 146a) that during Kincaid's interview Boone had remarked "and your new bride won't mind." The district court stated expressly (id. at 12a-13a) that it had "carefully considered the conflicting testimony * * * and * * * the credibility of the different witnesses" in concluding that only petitioner was asked serious questions about night work or her spouse's reaction to her application for the job and that Boone's remark to Kincaid was meant to be facetious and the result of her annoyance that only petitioner was asked such questions. Although it acknowledged that there was conflicting testimony on the subject, the court of appeals nevertheless concluded that there was no record support for the district court's characterization of Boone's remark and that petitioner and Kincaid in fact had been asked substantially similar questions (id. at 56a-59a). Rule 52(a) requires that an appellate court give due regard to the credibility determinations of the trial court. An appellate court "must be especially reluctant to set aside a finding based on the trial judge's evaluation of conflicting oral testimony, and will do so only under most unusual circumstances." 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, Section 2586, at 737 (footnotes omitted). See also, e.g., Graver Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275 (1949); Davis v. Murphy, 587 F.2d 362, 364 (7th Cir. 1978). Here there are no unusual circumstances that would warrant setting aside the district court's finding of fact. It is true that two of the male committee members testified in a manner that supported respondent's claim that petitioner was not singled out for special questioning. See J.A. 145a-146a, 151a, 157a-158a. However, that testimony was neither specific nor entirely consistent. Kincaid himself testified that he commented about night work during his interview, but he declined to agree that he had been questioned on that subject by any committee member. See J.A. 129a. Boone testified that the questions about night work and reactions of spouses were not asked of anyone but petitioner and characterized her own statement to Kincaid as a comment rather than a question (J.A. 108a, 120a-121a). The district court, unlike the court of appeals, was present during Boone's testimony about her statement during Kincaid's interview and may have interpreted her tone of voice or mannerisms as indicating that she had not asked him a serious question. /5/ Cf. United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326, 339 (1952) (quoting Boyd v. Boyd, 252 N.Y. 422, 429, 169 N.E. 632, 634 (1930)). It was the district court's responsibility to resolve the conflicting testimony concerning the questions addressed to petitioner and Kincaid. Under Rule 52(a), the court of appeals should not have second-guessed that resolution. /6/ II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE FACT THAT MALE SELECTION COMMITTEE MEMBERS WERE MARRIED TO WOMEN WHO HAD BEEN EMPLOYED DISPELLED INFERENCES FROM OTHER EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THAT THOSE MEMBERS WERE BIASED IN FAVOR OF HIRING A MALE FOR THE POSITION OF RECREATION DIRECTOR After finding clearly erroneous the district court's findings that petitioner was better qualified than Kincaid for the position of Recreation Director and that only petitioner was seriously questioned about night work, travel, and her spouse's reaction to the job, the court of appeals held (Pet. App. 60a-62a) that the remaining evidence relied on by the district court was insufficient to support its finding that the male selection committee members were biased in favor of selecting a male for the job. The court of appeals noted that there was evidence that one male committee member solicited applications from qualified males but not from qualified females and that another male committee member had testified that he preferred Kincaid over petitioner for the job in part because it would be "real hard" for a woman to serve as Recreation Director (see J.A. 158a, 161a). /7/ The court of appeals concluded, however, that this direct evidence of discimination was "inadequate to support a finding of bias, and is dispelled by other portions of the record" (Pet. App. 61a n.5). /8/ The court stated (ibid.): For example, there is nothing to show the male committee members had a bias against working women. All four testified that their wives had worked and were accustomed to being away from home during evening hours. The wife of one committee member had worked a night shift for ten years and the wife of another had performed night work() as a Registered Nurse. The court of appeals disregarded certain record evidence in its description of the personal circumstances of the male committee members. /9/ But, at all events, the court of appeals relied on a presumption that is flawed -- i.e., the presumption that a man married to a woman who is employed will not discriminate against women seeking employment. This Court held in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499-500 (1977), that evidence that the majority of county jury commissioners were Mexican Americans was insufficient to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination against Mexican Americans in the grand jury selection process. The Court noted that "(b)ecause of the many facets of human motivation, it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will not discriminate against other members of their group." Id. at 499. Likewise, in this case it cannot be assumed that the personal circumstances of the male committee members would prevent them from harboring any discriminatory intent in other contexts. The court of appeals therefore erred in concluding that the district court was required to find that the clear and direct evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of the male committee members was rebutted by the fact that their wives had been employed. CONCLUSION The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed. Respectfully submitted. REX E. LEE Solicitor General LAWRENCE G. WALLACE Deputy Solicitor General CAROLYN F. CORWIN Assistant to the Solicitor General JOHNNY J. BUTLER General Counsel (Acting) PHILIP B. SKLOVER Associate General Counsel VINCENT BLACKWOOD Assistant General Counsel IRENE HILL Attorney Equal Employment Opportunity Commission AUGUST 1984 /1/ That committee member testified that he believed the two women would not have been interested in the position of Recreation Director because it paid less than what he assumed they already were earning in their teaching positions. See J.A. 148a-149a. /2/ An appellate court's recitation of the correct standard of review is not decisive of the question whether the court actually followed that standard. Instead, it is necessary to examine the opinion and the entire record in order to determine whether the appellate court improperly engaged in an independent review of the record. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. at 290-291. /3/ We note, however, that while all four male committee members testified that Broadway was their first choice for Recreation Director, none referred to his experience with athletics as the reason for preferring him. See J.A. 140a-141a, 144a, 147a-148a, 153a, 154a-155a, 157a, 159a, 163a-164a, 165a, 170a. In his resume Broadway noted specifically that he was "capable of organizing programs tailored to Bessemer City not only in athletics but other programs, also" (id. at 73a). /4/ As petitioner notes (Pet. 19-21), the court of appeals quoted only a part of the transcript of Boone's testimony when it suggested (Pet. App. 54a-55a n.4) that Boone acknowledged that petitioner was not more qualified than Kincaid in particular respects. A reading of the entire line of questioning (J.A. 109a, 117a) suggests not that Boone believed Kincaid was as qualified as, or more qualified than, petitioner in each specific area mentioned, but that Boone was resisting the attempt of the cross-examiner to get her to modify her expressed judgment that petitioner was the best all-around candidate. /5/ The district court referred specifically to the fact that it had heard live testimony concerning the questions asked of the applicants. See Pet. App. 13a. The court of appeals stated that since night work and travel were part of the duties of the Recreation Director, "any question on these subjects to any of the candidates were (sic) certainly job-related" (Pet. App. 59a). But an inference of discrimination may be created when job-related questions are not addressed to all candidates, especially when the questions reflect an assumption that family responsibilities might interfere with a female applicant's ability to perform a job. See, e.g., Coble v. Hot Springs School District No. 6, 682 F.2d 721, 724, 726-727 (8th Cir. 1982); Weiner v. County of Oakland, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 380 (E.D. Mich. 1976). /6/ The court of appeals stated (Pet. App. 63a-65a) that its close scrutiny of the record in this case was justified by the manner in which the district court prepared its opinion. See page 6, supra. We do not believe such actions by a district court would warrant a court of appeals' undertaking to make de novo factual determinations in disregard of the deference a court of appeals should give to findings of fact and credibility determinations under Rule 52(a). Cf. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 (1964); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 184-185 (1944). In any event, in the circumstances of this case it is evident that the findings and conclusions of the district court were the product of its own independent judgment. The district court initially issued a memorandum of decision that described in some detail the evidence on which it had relied. See Pet. App. 1a-5a. That memorandum included the findings that petitioner was better qualified than Kincaid and that only petitioner was asked questions "which implied substantial doubt that a woman ought to have a job which required night work and which suggested that a woman ought to be at home instead of working" (Pet. App. 4a). Thus, the district court both decided the ultimate issues in the case and made the critical findings of subsidiary facts before it requested submission of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Following unsuccessful efforts at settlement, petitioner's counsel filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and respondent's submitted a detailed response. See J.A. 11a-33a, 36a-47a. The findings and conclusions ultimately issued by the district court differ in a number of respects from petitioner's proposals, apparently as a result of the district court's own rewording and its incorporation of comments submitted by respondent. E.g., compare J.A. 13a with Pet. App. 11a; compare J.A. 13a-14a with Pet. App. 12a-13a; compare J.A. 17a-19a with Pet. App. 16a-19a; compare J.A. 22a-24a with Pet. App. 21a-23a. And contrast J.A. 17a (Paragraph 16(a)) with J.A. 40a and Pet. App. 16a, 18a; contrast J.A. 17a (Paragraph 16(b)) with J.A. 45a and Pet. App. 17a, 18a-19a. /7/ The court of appeals failed to mention certain other evidence relied on by the district court in support of its finding that the male committee members were biased in favor of choosing a male for the job. See pages 4-5, supra. /8/ This Court need not decide whether this evidence, standing alone, would have been adequate to support the district court's ultimate finding of discrimination, since, as we have shown in point I, supra, the court of appeals erred in setting aside additional factual findings on which the district court's ultimate finding was premised. See also note 7, supra. /9/ For example, the court of appeals did not mention the testimony of one of the male committee members, expressly relied on by the district court (Pet. App. 21a), that he believed that his "wife should be at home at night" (J.A. 161a). The same committee member acknowledged that he would not have wanted his wife to have the position of Recreation Director (ibid.). The court of appeals also failed to note that only one committee member's wife was working at the time of trial, while two of the other committee members' wives had not worked for a number of years (id. at 146a-147a, 153a-154a, 159a, 167a).