FRANK LIPAROTA, PETITIONER V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA No. 84-5108 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1984 On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Brief for the United States TABLE OF CONTENTS Opinion below Jurisdiction Statute involved Statement Summary of argument Argument: Proof that a defendant knew he was acting illegally is not required under 7 U.S.C. 2024(b) A. The language, structure, and legislative history of Section 2024(b) indicate that the government need not prove the defendant knew his conduct was illegal B. Interpreting Section 2024(b) to require proof of knowing illegality would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Act C. The omission of a knowledge of illegality requirement from Section 2024(b) is consistent with the role played by penal regulatory statutes Conclusion OPINION BELOW The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at 735 F.2d 1044. JURISDICTION The judgment of the court of appeals (J.A. 45) was entered on June 4, 1984. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on July 23, 1984, and was granted on October 29, 1984 (J.A. 46). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). STATUTE INVOLVED 7 U.S.C. 2024(b) and (c) provide: (b) Unauthorized use, transfer, acquisition, alteration, or possession of coupons or authorization cards; restitution by convicted individuals (1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2) of this subsection, whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or authorization cards in any manner not authorized by this chapter or the regulations issued pursuant to this chapter shall, if such coupons or authorization cards are of a value of $100 or more, be guilty of a felony and shall, upon the first conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, and, upon the second and any subsequent conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned for not less than six months nor more than five years and may also be fined not more than $10,000 or, if such coupons or authorization cards are of a value of less than $100, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon the first conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both, and upon the second and any subsequent conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned for not more than one year and may also be fined not more than $1,000. In addition to such penalities, any person convicted of a felony or misdemeanor violation under this subsection may be suspended by the court from participation in the food stamp program for an additional period of up to eighteen months consecutive to that period of suspension mandated by section 2015(b)(1) of this title. (2) In the case of any individual convicted of an offense under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the court may permit such individual to perform work approved by the court for the purpose of providing restitution for losses incurred by the United States and the State agency as a result of the offense for which such individual was convicted. If the court permits such individual to perform such work and such individual agrees thereto, the court shall withhold the imposition of the sentence on the condition that such individual perform the assigned work. Upon successful completion of the assigned work the court may suspend each sentence. (c) Presentation for payment or redemption of coupons that have been illegally received, transferred, or used Whoever presents, or causes to be presented, coupons for payment or redemption of the value of $100 or more, knowing the same to have been received, transferred, or used in any manner in violation of the provisions of this chapter or the regulations issued pursuant to this chapter, shall be guilty of a felony and, upon the first conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, and, upon the second and any subsequent conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned for not less than one year nor more than five years and may also be fined not more than $10,000, or, if such coupons are of a value of less than $100, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon the first conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both, and, upon the second and any subsequent conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned for not more than one year and may also be fined not more than $1,000. In addition to such penalties, any person convicted of a felony or misdemeanor violation under this subsection may be suspended by the court from participation in the food stamp program for an additional period of up to eighteen months consecutive to that period of suspension mandated by section 2015(b) (1) of this title. QUESTION PRESENTED Whether in a prosecution under 7 U.S.C. 2024(b) the government must prove that the defendant knew that his actions were not authorized by law. STATEMENT Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, petitioner was convicted of three counts of acquiring food stamps in a manner not authorized by law, in violation of 7 U.S.C. 2024(b) (Pet. App. 1). He was sentenced to three hours' imprisonment, the sentence to be considered served (Pet. App. 3). 1. The Food Stamp Act of 1977 (the Act), Tit. XIII, 7 U.S.C. 2011-2029, is a federal program designed to "alleviate * * * hunger and malnutrition" by "permit(ing) low-income households to obtain a more nutritious diet through normal channels of trade" (7 U.S.C. 2011). To this end, food stamp coupons are issued through the mail or over the counter by a participating state agency (see 7 C.F.R. 274.1, 274.3) to eligible low income households. 7 U.S.C. 2013(a), 2014, 2015. The value of the coupons allocated to each household is calculated to permit the recipients to obtain a low-cost, nutritious diet. 7 U.S.C. 2017, 2012(o). The coupons -- which are not transferable -- may be used by the recipients only to purchase certain types of food for home consumption (7 U.S.C. 2013(a), 2012(g)) from approved food stores. 7 U.S.C. 2018. Participating grovers, in turn, may redeem the coupons for cash. 7 U.S.C. 2019. Coupons ultimately are redeemed for full face value by the United States. 7 U.S.C. 2013(a). Both recipients and food stores may be disqualified from participation in the food stamp program for failure to comply with a variety of the Act's requirements. 7 U.S.C. 2015, 2021. The Act also contains criminal penalty provisions. 7 U.S.C. 2024(b)(1) provides that "whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or authorization cards in any manner not authorized by this chapter or the regulations issued pursuant to this chapter" commits a criminal act; /1/ that act is a misdemeanor if the value of the coupons involved is less than $100, and a felony if it exceeds $100. In either case, individuals convicted under Section 2024(b)(1) may be given an opportunity to "perform work approved by the court for the purpose of providing restitution for losses incurred * * * as a result of the offense for which such individual was convicted." In such a case, the sentence may be suspended. 7 U.S.C. 2024(b)(2). Section 2024(b)'s companion provision, 7 U.S.C. 2024(c), addresses the redemption of food stamp coupons by grocers. It provides that "(w)hoever presents, or causes to be presented, coupons for payment or redemption * * * knowing the same to have been received, transferred, or used in any manner in violation of the provisions of this chapter or the regulations issued pursuant to this chapter, shall be guilty" of a criminal act. 2. The evidence at trial showed that petitioner and his brother owned a restaurant that was not authorized to participate in the food stamp program (Pet. App. 2). /2/ In March 1982, an agent of the Department of Agriculture received a tip that she might be able to sell food stamps at the restrurant (Pet. App. 2). She therefore visited the restaurant and approached petitioner, offering to sell him $195 worth of food stamp coupons. Petitioner agreed to purchase the coupons for $150, and petitioner's brother paid the agent that sum in exchange for the coupons. A similar transaction, involving petitioner's purchase for $350 of food stamp coupons having a face value of $500, was completed one week later. Pet. App. 2. Petitioner subsequently purchased another $500 set of stamps for $300 (ibid.); at that time, he offered to "hustle" food stamp coupons for the agent (J.A. 19). Petitioner was indicted on three counts of violating 7 U.S.C. 2024(b). /3/ When the case was submitted the trial judge instructed the jury that "the word 'knowingly' is used in these instructions (to) mean() that the Defendant realized what he was doing and was aware of the nature of his conduct, and did not act through ignorance, mistake, or accident" (J.A. 33). The judge then charged that the government bore the burden of proving that "the defendant knowingly and wilfully acquired food stamps" (4/6/83 Tr. 251). But the judge rejected petitioner's request that he give an instruction on "specific intent" (see J.A. 34), thus declining to charge the jury that petitioner could be convicted only if he knowingly violated the law. On appeal, petitioner contended that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on "specific intent." The court of appeals disagreed, ruling that "Section 2024(b) clearly states that only a finding of general intent is necessary to sustain a conviction" (Pet. App. 5). /4/ The court arrived at its holding by comparing the placement of the word "knowingly" in Section 2024(b) ("whoever knowingly * * * uses * * * coupons * * * in any manner not authorized by this chapter") with the placement of the word "knowing" in 7 U.S.C. 2024(c) ("(w)hoever presents * * * coupons for payment or redemption * * * knowing the same to have been received * * * in violation of the provisions of this chapter"). In the latter provision, the court of appeals noted, "knowing" precedes and therefore plainly modifies the requirement that the coupons be used "in violation of" law. In Section 2024(b), in contrast, "knowingly" precedes the verbs "uses, transfers, acquires, alters or possesses." Given this difference between the provisions, the court of appeals reasoned that Congress must not have intended that the word "knowingly" in Section 2024(b) apply to the requirement that the stamps be transferred or acquired "in a manner not authorized by this chapter." The court therefore concluded that, "(i)n view of the fact that Congress knew precisely how to create a specific intent offense, and did so in the provision immediately following the section at issue here * * * section 2024(b) cannot be characterized as ambiguous. It must be held that Congress intended to require only proof of general intent." Pet. App. 6. /5/ SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT A. The language, structure and legislative history of Section 2024(b) make it plain that knowing violation of the law is not an element of the offense created by the statute. The provision does not in terms make knowledge of illegality a prerequisite for conviction: it uses the word "knowingly" to condition a series of verbs, which have as their object the terms "coupons" and "authorization cards." The verbs are then again conditioned by the phrase "in any manner not authorized by (law)." As the Court held last year in construing a virtually identical statute, "(t)he most natural reading" of a provision in this form does not apply the "knowingly" to the "in any manner" phrase. United States v. Yermian, No. 83-346 (June 27, 1984), slip op. 6 n.6. So construed, the term "knowingly" saves the statute from imposing strict liability by insuring that the defendant was aware of the nature of his actions, while at the same time making it unnecessary for the government to prove the defendant's familiarity with all of the provisions of the Act and its implementing regulations. This reading of Section 2024(b) draws added support from the structure of the statute. In Section 24(b)'s companion provision, 7 U.S.C. 2024(c), Congress provided that "(w)hoever presents * * * knowing the same to have been received * * * in any manner in violation of the provisions of this chapter" commits a criminal act. In contrast to Section 2024(b), Section 2024(c) explicitly makes liability hinge on knowledge of illegality. Given Congress's creation of such an offense in the provision immediately following the one at issue here, the sharply contrasting placement of "knowingly" in Section 2024(b) must be seen as intentional. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981). This difference between the two provisions is a sensible one: as it is written, Section 2024(c) spares grocers (the persons who present coupons for redemption) from being held strictly liable under the criminal provisions of the Act for the fraud of their customers, or held liable under a respondeant superior theory for the misbehavior of their employees. In contrast, only a wrongdoer himself can perform the acts at which Section 2024(b) is directed. The legislative history confirms that Congress intentionally chose to give Sections 2024(b) and (c) differing structures. Congress repeatedly summarized the two provisions in one sentence, thus emphasizing their differences. H.R. Rep. 1228, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1964); S. Rep. 1124, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1964); H.R. Rep. 95-464, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 376 (1977). Indeed, the House Report pointedly omitted any mention of knowing illegality in describing Section 2024(b), explaining that the provision reaches "any unauthorized use" of food stamps; in contrast, it added that "under (Section 2024(c)) * * * the same penalties are prescribed for whoever presents * * * food stamps (for payment or redemption) knowing that they have been" used illegally. H.R. Rep. 95-464, supra, at 376 (emphasis added). B. The legislative purpose also suggests that knowing illegality is not an element of a Section 2024(b) offense. The Act and the regulations issued under it erect an extraordinarily detailed system of controls designed to permit the use of food stamps only by those in need, and only for purposes relating to the improvement of nutrition. Thus, the Act creates stringent eligibility requirements, provides for the allocation only of enough coupons to support a "minimum cost adequate diet" (H.R. Rep. 95-464, supra, at 8), closely controls program administration, and makes use of unusually strict penalties. These provisions demonstrate that the program is designed to allocate with some precision the necessary number of coupons -- and only that number -- to those in need of nutritional assistance. Almost by definition, then, any diversion of coupons will detract from the nutritional aid available to needy households. In these circumstances, the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Section 2024(b) is sensitive to the congressional interest in preserving the integrity of the program, while recognizing that the eveils against which the provision is aimed inlcude not only fraudulent or culpable conduct but also any actions that might chip away at the efficacy of "the most effective social program in aid of the poor today." H.R. Rep. 97-106, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1981). C. The Seventh Circuit's decision also is consistent with the role played by penal regulatory statutes. It is true, of course, that common law crimes generally were directed at inherently blameworthy conduct, and therefore were read to punish only persons with an "evil-meaning mind." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952). But this Court consistently has recognized the legitimace of "public welfare offenses" in which "penalties serve as an effective means of regulation." United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-281 (1943). In considering these types of provisions -- which are aimed at preventing regulatory injury rather than at punishing blameworthy conduct, and which generally operate in areas where regulation should be anticipated -- a culpability or scienter requirement has no useful application. Section 2024(b) plainly shares the signficant characteristics of these provisions. It is not derived from a common law offense. It is aimed at actions that, whatever their blameworthiness, will both injure the treasury and detract from the effectiveness of a significant federal program. And the existence of criminal penalties under the Act should not take anyone by surprise: the detailed restrictions placed upon the use of coupons certainly suggests that they should not be trafficked in lightly; program administrators make extraordinary efforts to educate participants about the Act's requirements; and most members of the public surely are aware that the aim of the program is "to furnish resources to the poor to enable them to survive" (H.R. Rep. 96-788, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980)), rather than to create a novel form of legal tender that can be traded at will. ARGUMENT PROOF THAT A DEFENDANT KNEW HE WAS ACTING ILLEGALLY IS NOT REQUIRED UNDER 7 U.S.C. 2024(b) The court of appeals in this case held that familiarity with the provisions of the Act and its implementing regulations is not an element of the offense defined by 7 U.S.C. 2024(b); it therefore upheld petitioner's conviction despite his argument that he was unaware that he had acquired food stamp coupons in a "manner not authorized" by law. This conclusion was correct. Section 2024(b) does not in terms make knowing violation of the law a prerequisite to conviction, and the statute's structure and legislative history confirm that Congress acted intentionally in omitting such a requirement from the provision. Indeed, Section 2024(b) is written -- as are many similar statutes in analogous areas -- to most efficaciously safeguard the integrity of a public welfare program. In these circumstances, the decision below simply heeded this court's admonition that "courts obviously must follow Congress' intent as to the required level of mental culpability for any particular offense." United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 406 (1980). A. The Language, Structure, And Legislative History Of Section 2024(b) Indicate That The Government Need Not Prove The Defendant Knew His Conduct Was Illegal 1. There is no doubt that a defendant may be convicted under Section 2024(b) only if the government is able to establish that he used, transferred, acquired, altered or possessed food stamp coupons or authorization cards in a manner that is not authorized by law. The government also must prove that the defendant "knowingly" committed these acts -- that is, that he knew that the documents he handled were federal food stamp coupons or authorization cards as the objects of those verbs. Finally, each of the verbs is again modified by the requirement that the action described be taken "in a manner not authorzed by (law)." Thus, the "in any manner" element of the offense "appears in a phrase separate from the prohibited conduct modified by the term() 'knowingly * * *.'" United States v. Yermian, No. 83-346 (June 27, 1984), slip op. 6. Because "'the question of the kind of culpability required (must) * * * be faced separately with respect to each material element of the crime" (Bailey, 444 U.S. at 406, quoting Model Penal Code Section 2.02 comment 123 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955)), there is no reason to suppose that "knowingly" was used to condition the "in any manner" phrase as well as the terms describing the prohibited activity. "Any natural reading" (Yermian, slip op. 6) of the statute must therefore associate "knowingly" only with the latter words. Indeed, the Court reached an identical conclusion last term while addressing a statute that is phrased identically to Section 2024(b). In Yermian, the Court considered the meaning of the 1934, predecessor to 18 U.S.C. 1001 (Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 587, 48 Stat. 996 et seq.), which provided that "whoever shall knowingly and willfully . . . make . . . any false or fraudulent statements * * * in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States" commits a crime. The Court noted that the "in any matter" phrase -- which directly parallels Section 2024(b)'s "in any manner" term -- "appeared as a separate pharase at the end of the description of the prohibited conduct * * *." Yermian, slip op. 6 n.6. The Court therefore had little difficulty concluding from "(t)he structure of the statutory language" that "(t)he most natural reading of this version of the statute * * * establishes that 'knowingly and willfully' applies only to the making of false or fraudulent statements" and not to the "in any matter" element of the offense. Yermian, slip op. 6 n. 6. /6/ Nothing in the language of Section 2024(b) suggests that the Court should reach a different result here. /7/ Despite petitioner's assertions to the contrary (Br. 8), the Seventh Circuit's reading of the term "knowingly" leaves it with a significant role to paly in the statute. It prevents Section 2024(b) from imposing "strict or absolute liability," by insuring that the defendant was aware of the nature both of his actions and of the coupons that he acquired or used. United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 560 (1971). See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 612 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). This restricts liability to those persons who knowingly engaged in activities that Congress sought to condemn, while giving persons who have contact with food stamps an opportunity to discover and conform their conduct to the law's requirements. /8/ Cf. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 n.15 (1971). Indeed, it is petitioner's approach to Section 2024 (b) that fails to recognize the full import of the statutory language. He would require the government to prove that a defendant knew that his actions were "not authorized by (7 U.S.C. 2011-2029) or the regulations issued pursuant to (7 U.S.C. 2011-2029)." As the statute is written, such a requirement presumably would force the government to establish beyond a reasonable doubt a defendant's familiarity with the provisions of the Act and its implementing regulations. Given the likelihood of self-serving testimony (see, e.g., J.A. 30), petitioner's reading would in many instances make it impossible to prosecute individuals who are not participants in the food stamp program -- even those who, like petitioner, have engaged in acts that any reasonable person must realize to be of suspect propriety -- because the government will be unable to prove that the defendant knew that no statutory or regulatory provision authorized his actions. /9/ In short, nothing in the statutory language invites the Court to give the statute anything other than its most straightforward reading. Had Congress wished to make knowledge of illegality an element of the Section 2024(b) offense, it easily could have done so. It might, for example, have drafted the statute to begin with the words "whoever, with intent to defraud the United States"; or it might have provided that "whoever uses, transfers, acquires, alters or possesses coupons in a manner that he knows not to be authorized by law" commits an offense. Indeed, Congress regularly uses just these formulations when making the legality of the acquisition or possession of a certain type of property turn on either culpable intent or knowledge of the property's legal status. /10/ And when Congress has wanted to make ignorance of the existence of a statute or regulation a defense to a charge of violating the provision, it has not hesitated to do so explicitly. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 79z-3, 80a-48. Its failure to make use of either of these drafting devices here is a powerful indication that knowledge of illegality is not an element of the Section 2024(b) offense. 2. While the statutory text thus supports the Seventh Circuit's conclusion, the court of appeals' holding draws strength from more than the bare language of Section 2024(b); this is not a case where the court simply "point(ed) to the (assertedly) ambiguous phrases and proclaim(ed) them clear." Yermian, slip op. 3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Instead, the court properly concluded that the meaning of the statute can be illuminated by an examination of the provision's companion, 7 U.S.C. 2024(c). In that provision, Congress made use of the formula discussed above, providing that "(w)hoever presents * * * coupons for payment or redemption * * * knowing the same to have been received * * * in any manner in violation of the provisions of this chapter" commits a criminal act. /11/ In contrast to Section 2024(b), Section 2024(c) explicitly makes liability hinge on knowledge of illegality. In using this statutory structure, Congress "demonstrated that it knew how to provide (that knowledge of illegality was required for conviction) when it wished to do so elsewhere in the very 'legislation cited.'" Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 162 (1981), quoting Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 389 (1943). "Under traditional principles of statutory construction," the difference between Sections 2024(b) and (c) accordingly must be seen as intentional. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981). See Lawrence County v. Lead Deadwood School District, No. 83-240 (Jan. 9, 1985), slip op. 10; United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 208 (1982). As a result, the court of appeals correctly reasoned that "section 2024(b) cannot be characterized as ambiguous" (Pet. App. 6). Congress's decision to give the two provisions differing structures was a sensible one. Unless Section 2024(c) requires proof that the defendant knew the coupons at issue to have been used or obtained imporperly, a grocer who attempts to redeem coupons might not only be strictly liable for the fraud of his customer, but also criminally liable under a respondeat superior theory for the misbehavior of his employees. Cf. Wolf v. United States, 662 F.2d 676, 677-678 (10th Cir. 1981) (store may be disqualified administratively under 7 U.S.C. 2021 on a respondeat superior theory); J.C.B. Super Markets, Inc. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1119, 1121-1122 (2d Cir. 1976) (same). In contrast, only a wrongdoer himself can perform the acts at which Section 2024(b) is directed -- that is, using, transferring, acquiring, possessing or altering food stamp coupons in an unauthorized way. And petitioner is incorrect in suggesting (Br. 9-10) that this statutory structure makes it easier to convict nonparticipants in the food stamp program than grocers who presumably are familiar with the requirements of the Act, since grocers -- as well as all other participants in the program -- may be prosecuted under Section 2024(b) for improper acquisition or use of food stamp coupons. See e.g., United States v. Cash, 486 F.2d 295, 296 (5th Cir. 1973). 3. Finally, the legislative history of the provision confirms that Congress intentionally placed the "knowingly" in Section 2024(b) so that it would not condition the "in any manner not authorized by (law)" phase. When the predecessors to Section 2024(b) and (c) were first enacted (in a form identical in all relevant respects to the current versions) as part of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. (1964 ed.) 2023(b) and (c), Congress emphasized the differing structures of the two subsections by describing them in one sentence: "(t)his section makes it a violation of Federal law to knowingly use, transfer, acquire, or possess coupons in any manner not authorized by this act or to present, or cause to be presented, such coupons for redemption knowing them to have been received, transferred or used in any manner in violation of the provisions of the act." H.R. Rep. 1228, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1964). See S. Rep. 1124, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1964). At the time, Congress also observed that the criminal provisions generally imposed penalties "for misuse of coupons." H.R. Rep. 1228, supra, at 14. The legislative history of the 1977 Act is more explicit. /12/ Again, Congress highlighted the structure of the provision by describing Section 2024(b) and (c) in one sentence. H.R. Rep. 95-464, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 376 (1977). The House Report then omitted any mention of knowing illegality in explaining that "(a)ny unauthorized use, transfer, acquisition, alteration, or possession of food stamps * * * by any individual * * * may be prosecuted under the provisions of" Section 2024(b). "Moreover," the Report then continued, "under (section 2024(c)) * * * the same penalties are prescribed for whoever presents or causes to be presented food stamps (for payment or redemption) knowing that they have been received, transferred or used in any manner violating the provisions of the Act or regulations implementing the Act." H.R. Rep. 95-464, supra, at 376 (emphasis added). This legislative history, which demonstrates both that the difference between Sections 2024(b) and 2024(c) was plainly visible to Congress and that Congress was fully aware of the scope of the former provision, is entirely ignored by petitioner. In short, the statutory text and legislative history "unambiguously dispense() with an actual knowledge requirement." Yermian, slip op. 6 n.7. /13/ In these circumstances, neither the rule of lenity nor any of the other canons of construction urged upon the Court by petitioner (see Br. 15-24) "'require(s) magnified emphasis upon a single ambiguous word in order to give it a meaning contradictory to the fair import of the whole remaining language.'" Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 303 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting), quoting United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1948). See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981). Similarly, "(p)rinciples derived from common law as well as percepts suggested by the American Law Institute must bow" to the clear congressional intent. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 406. B. Interpreting Section 2024(b) To Require Proof Of Knowing Illegality Would Be Inconsistent With The Purposes Of The Act The Food Stamp Act of 1977 was intended "(t)o allevaite * * * hunger and malnutrition" to "permit(ing) low-income households to obtain a more nutritious diet." 7 U.S.C. 2011. See H.R. Rep. 97-106, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 50-52, 443 (1981); H.R. Rep. 96-788, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1980); H.R. Rep. 1228, supra, at 5, 12; S. Rep. 1124, supra, at 1. To guarantee that this purpose is fulfilled to the fullest extent possible, the Act and the regulations issued under it by the Department of Agriculture erect an extraordinarily detailed system of restrictions and controls designed to permit the use of food stamp coupons only by those in need, and only for purposes relating to the improvement of nutrition. These restrictions are augmented by a series of administrative and criminal penalty provisions, of which Section 2024(b) is a part. Viewed in this context, Section 2024(b) must be seen as accomplishing more than the punishment of acts that are "culpable" in themselves, or the prevention fraud against the federal treasury; in addition, the Section is one of a long list of provisions that serve to discourage any diversion of coupons from use for the beneficial purposes intended by the food stamp program. In this setting, the omission of a knowing illegality element from Section 2024(b) is far from anomalous. To the contrary, the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the provision is entirely consistent with the statutory aims. 1. Food stamps may be issued only to individuals "whose incomes and other financial resources * * * are determined to be a substantial limiting factor in permitting them to obtain a more nutritious diet." 7 U.S.C. 2014(a). See 7 U.S.C. 2016(a). Eligibility therefore is limited to families below or near the poverty line (see 7 U.S.C. 2014(c)), and both the Act and its implementing regulations establish elaborate income (see 7 U.S.C. 2014(d)-(j); 7 C.F.R. 273.1(b), 273.7-273.9), reporting (see 7 U.S.C. 2015(c); 7 C.F.R. 273.12), and work (see 7 U.S.C. 2015(d), (e)) requirements for recipients. See generally H.R. Rep. 97-106, supra, at 50-51; H.R. Rep. 1228, supra, at 2-3; S. Rep. 1124, supra, at 10-11. Similarly, the number of coupons allocated to each household is carefully calculated to permit the recipients to obtain "a minimum cost adequate diet." H.R. Rep. 95-464, supra, at 8. See 7 U,S.C. 2017; H.R. Rep. 97-106, supra, at 41; S. Rep. 1124, supra, at 1, 9, 11-12, 14-15. These coupons may be used to purchase only certain types of food for home consumption: tobacco products, alcoholic beverages, medicinal items, vitamins and mineral supplements, animal foods, nonfood groceries and food preparation equipment may not be purchased. See 7 U.S.C. 2012(g); H.R. Rep. 95-464, supra, at 324-325. The administration of the program also is strictly controlled. Among many other requirements (see generally 7 C.F.R. Pts. 274-275), recipients may obtain coupons only by mail (see 7 C.F.R. 274.3) or by presenting an identification card; in some areas, a photo identification card is required. 7 C.F.R. 273.10 (g)(3)(ii). The social security number of each member of a recipient household must be provided to the administering agency. 7 C.F.R. 273.6. To prevent even the possibility of fraud or manipulation, as a general matter the same state employee cannot both certify a recipient household as eligible to participate in the program and issue coupons to that household. 7 C.F.R. 272.4(c). Strict requirements relating to the processing and verification of applications, issuance of coupons, administration of the program, and reporting are imposed on participating state agencies. See 7 C.F.R. 272.1-272.2, 273.2, 274.1, 275.1-275.23. Reporting requirements also are mandated for the entities that issue coupons and for participating food stores. 7 U.S.C. 2016(d), 2018(c). Indeed, only certain stores are eligible even to apply to participate in the food stamp program (7 U.S.C. 2018(a)), and those that apply may be approved only after an examination of, among other things, their "business integrity and reputation." 7 U.S.C. 2018(a)(3); 7 C.F.R. 278.1(b)(3). Completing the controls that forestall the diversion of coupons from their intended use are a set of unusually strict penalty provisions. States are expressly made strictly liable to the Secretary for virtually all losses that occur during the acceptance, storage and issuance of coupons. 7 U.S.C. 2016(f); see 7 C.F.R. 274.3, 274.8, 276.2(b), 278.5. It is a criminal offense -- for which any entity issuing coupons, or any of its officers, employees or agents, may be held strictly liable -- for a coupon issuer to fail to provide its required monthly reports to the Department of Agriculture, or otherwise fail to comply with the requirements of 7 C.F.R. Pt. 274. 7 C.F.R. 271.5(d)(1). /14/ Provision is made for the administrative recovery of overpayments made to recipients who benefitted either from inadvertent error or from an intentional violation of the program's requirements (7 C.F.R. 273.18(a)); individuals who intentionally violate program rules also may be disqualified from participation in the program (7 U.S.C. 2015; 7 C.F.R. 273.16), /15/ as may stores that fail to comply with applicable requirements. 7 U.S.C. 2021; 7 C.F.R. 278.6. 2. These provisions demonstrate that the food stamp program makes an attempt to allocate with some precision the necessary number of coupons -- and only that number -- to those in need of nutritional assistance. Almost by definition, then, any diversion of coupons will detract from the nutritional aid available to, or taken advantage of by, needy households. The drafters of the Act plainly recognized this, explaining that criminal penalties were provided even for seemingly trivial misuses of coupons -- "for someone using some of the stamps for a haircut or a shave or gasoline or whatever." Food Stamp Act of 1964: Hearings on H.R. 10222 Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1964) (colloquy between Sen. Talmadge and Secretary Freeman). Given this background, it is hardly surprising that, as the statutory and regulatory provisions outlined above also make clear, preserving the integrity of the program was a central congressional concern, doing so is necessary if the Act's beneficial purposes are to be achieved. And preventing the diversion of coupons from their intended use is crucial to the program for another reason as well: the perception that food stamps, for whatever reason, often are devoted to a purpose other than the improvement of nutrition will be fatal to the public confidence that is essential for the success of the Act. See H.R. Rep. 97-106, supra, at 53; H.R. Rep. 96-788, supra, at 12-13. In these circumstances, it is evident that "the program's worthy purpose can easily be thwarted by fraud or even a level of a much lesser degree of noncompliance, and that punitive sanctions are necessary for enforcement." Badwan v. United States, 541 F.2d 1388, 1390 (10th Cir. 1976). Interpretation of the Act's provisions therefore must be sensitive to the drafters' intention that "applicants and recipients alike constantly * * * be aware that Congress does not and will not tolerate" avoidance of the Act's requirements. H.R. Rep. 97-106, supra, at 52; see H.R. Rep. 96-788, supra, at 13. The decision below fosters such an awareness (cf. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 n.15 (1971)) and protects the integrity of the program. Equally as important, it recognizes -- as petitioner's proposed reading does not -- that the evil against which Section 2024(b) is aimed is not so much culpable or fraudulent conduct as actions of any sort that chip away at the efficacy of "the most effective social program in aid of the poor in operation today." H.R. Rep. 97-106, supra, at 52. See generally United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-281 (1943). /16/ C. The Omission Of A Knowledge Of Illegality Requirement From Section 2024(b) Is Consistent With The Role Played By Penal Regulatory Statutes Although the language, structure and purposes of the statute suggest that knowledge of illegality is not an element of a Section 2024(b) offense, petitioner urges the Court to apply a "presumption" to find such an element and therefore forestall the imposition of "strict liability" (Br. 20). This suggestion misapprehends the nature of Section 2024(b) and misstates the role played by culpability and knowledge requirements in criminal law. In fact, the decision below is entirely consistent with this Court's rulings on the place of the mental element in regulatory offenses. 1. It is true, as Justice Jackson wrote for the Court in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952), that at common law "(c)rime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand." Yet the Court in Morissette was forced to reconcile this notion with two other undeniably valid concepts: "the ancient maxim that 'ignorance of the law is no excuse'" (Freed, 401 U.S. at 612 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment)), and the doctrine that mens rea need not be found "where the emphasis of the statute is evidently upon achievement of some social betterment rather than the punishment of the crimes, as in cases of mala in se." United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922). The Court's answer to the problem posed by these competing principles was its conclusion that crimes "taken over from common law" generally should be read to punish only those "blameworthy in mind." Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252. See id. at 263. At the same time, however, the Court recognized and endorsed the existence of a category of "'public welfare offenses'" (id. at 255) with no common law analogue that "depend on no mental element but consist only of forbidden acts or omissions" (id. at 252-253). Such crimes, the Court explained, "may be regarded as offenses against (the state's) authority, for their occurrence impairs the efficiency of controls deemed essential to the social order as presently constituted." Id. at 256. See id.at 259-260. See generally United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978); United States v. Fernandez, 497 F.2d 730, 744 (Hufstedler, J., concurring). Thus, as petitioner grudgingly concedes (Br. 23), this Court and the lower courts, both before and after Morissette, repeatedly have upheld examples of the "now familiar type of legislation whereby penalties serve as effective means of regulation." Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280-281. These include statutes that, like Section 2924(b), simply dispense with a knowledge of illegality element, as well as true strict liability statutes that provide criminal penalties for engaging in certain types of conduct even though the actor is unaware of the nature of his actions. Generally speaking, the omission of a culpability element has been found appropriate when the provision at issue was a "statute of prohibition rather than of punishment" (Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960) (Blackmun, J.)), aimed not so much at penalizing blameworthy conduct as at preventing regulatory injury. And such enactments have been deemed fair because they tend to operate in areas either where regulation should be anticipated (see International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 564-565; Freed, 401 U.S. at 607) or where "(t)he accused * * * is in a position to prevent (the violation) with no more care than society might reasonably expect." Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256. In these circumstances, a culpability or scienter requirement -- which traditionally has served to distinguish blameworthy from innocent conduct -- has no useful application. With these principles in mind, the courts have found that lawmakers appropriately dispensed with a "culpability element" in a wide range of enactments. Among them are revenue provisions, see Balint, 258 U.S. at 252-253 (interpreting the Narcotic Act of 1914, ch. 1, Section 2, 38 Stat. 786); /17/ provisions involving the prescription (United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 288 (1922) (interpreting the Narcotic Act of 1914, ch. 1, Section 2, 38 Stat. 786)) and transportation (Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278, interpreting 21 U.S.C. 331(a)) of drugs; provisions prohibiting re-entry onto a military reservation (Holdridge, 282 F.2d at 310 (Blackmun, J.) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. 1382)); provisions involving the shooting of migratory birds (United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1984) (interpreting 16 U.S.C. 703 and 50 C.F.R. 20.1)); provisions involving the grazing of livestock on federal land (United States v. Larson, 746 F.2d 455, 456 (8th Cir. 1984) (interpreting 16 U.S.C. 551 and 36 C.F.R. 261.7)); provisions involving the cutting of timber in a national (United States v. Wilson, 438 F.2d 525, 525-526 (9th Cir. 1971), interpreting 16 U.S.C. 551 and 36 C.F.R. 261.6(a)) or state (Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 62 (1910)) forest; provisions involving the transportatin of corrosive materials (International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 563-565, interpreting 18 U.S.C. 834(a)); provisions involving the registration or making of firearms (Freed, 401 U.S. at 607; Sipes v. United States, 321 F.2d 174, 179 (8th Cir. 1963) (Blackmun, J.) (interpreting 26 U.S.C. 5821 and 5861)); and provisions involving the possession of a gun by a person with a prior felony conviction (United States v. Horton, 503 F.2d 810, 813 (7th Cir. 1974), interpreting 18 U.S.C. App. 1202(a)(1)). /18/ Section 2024(b) shares the significant characteristics of these regulatory provisions. It is not, of course, derived from a common law offense. The actions at which it is aimed, whatever their inherent "blameworthiness," will both injure the treasury and detract from the effectiveness of a significant federal program. And the existence of criminal penalties under the Act should not take anyone by surprise: the extraordinary restrictions, outlined above, placed on the manner in which coupons may be obtained and used certainly suggests that they should not be distributed or trafficked in lightly. Indeed, congress and the Department of Agriculture have taken pains to ensure that everyone with a legitimate reason to come into contact with the program is aware of the restrictions on the use of coupons. Thus, state administrators must explain the Act's requirements to all recipients (7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(2); 7 C.F.R. 272.5(b)(2)), participating food stores repeatedly are made familiar with those requirements (see J.A. 7-8), and stores must even "display a sign providing information on how persons may report abuses they have observed in the operation of the food stamp program." 7 U.S.C. 2018(e). In these circumstances, "the standard (of behavior) imposed is * * * reasonable and adherence thereto properly expected of a person." Holdridge, 282 F.2d at 310 (Blackmun, J.). In short, there is nothing extraordinary about Congress's decision to omit a knowledge of illegality element from Section 2024(b), and no "presumption" operating in favor of its creation. /19/ To the contrary, the application of a presumption excusing those who are ignorant of the law would run squarely counter to the traditional approach to the notion of scienter. /20/ Although petitioner repeatedly asserts otherwise (Br. 9, 18, 20-30), Section 2024(b) does not create a strict liability offense; it imposes liability only on those who are aware of the nature of their acts. Cf. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 286 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Under the usual approach to the interpretation of criminal statutes, such a state of mind is enough to support conviction. Courts generally have not insisted upon the creation as an additional prerequisite to conviction of a requirement that the defendant realize that the particular transaction in which he engaged was unauthorized: "(i)f the ancient maxim that 'ignorance of the law is no excuse' has any residual validity, it indicates that the normal intent requirement -- means rea -- of the criminal law does not require knowledge that an act is illegal, wrong, or blameworthy." Freed, 401 U.S. at 612 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). See Shevlin-Carpenter, 218 U.S. at 62 & n.1. 2. Petitioner also is incorrect in suggesting that the Seventh Circuit's decision will make criminals of a substantial number of innocent and unsuspecting individuals. In fact, the vast majority of those who come into contact with food stamp coupons -- recipients and food stores that participate in the program -- have had the Act's requirements explained to them in detail (see page 32, supra), and therefore are (or should be) familiar with the ways in which coupons may be used. Even under petitioner's reading of the statute, all of these persons may be convicted under Section 2024(b) if they engage in unauthorized food stamp transactions. /21/ Petitioner's concerns (Br. 28) about snaring unsuspecting nonparticipants are similarly overstated. /22/ There is little doubt that most persons realize that the aim of the food stamp program is "to furnish resources to the poor to enable them to survive," (H.R. Rep. 96-788, supra, at 13; see H.R. Rep. 97-106, supra, at 52-53), and therefore understand that coupons are not to be traded for private purposes. This understanding may be confirmed by a visit to any food store that posts signs warning against food stamp abuse (see page 32, supra), as well as by the stamps themselves: all coupons are marked "non-transferable," and $50 dollar coupon booklets carry the warning that "'(p)ersons using illegally obtained food stamps may be found guilty of a felony.'" J.A. 23 (citation omitted). In this context, individuals such as petiitoner, who are offered large quantities of food stamps at a substantial discount, surely can be expected to appreciate the impropriety of the proposed transaction. At the same time, however, the Seventh Circuit's reading of Section 2024(b) makes it more difficult for those who engage in such dubious activities to escape conviction by claiming that they were unfamiliar with all of the requirements of the Act and its regulations. This is not to say, of course, that no circumstances can be imagined in which the application of Section 2024(b) would lead to "an unduly harsh result." Yermian, slip op. 11. See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284. But this is true of virtually every statute. /23/ The Court therefore has recognzied that the proper answer to this problem involves reliance on "the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries" to forestall improvident or needless prosecutions. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285. In contrast, the Court has not taken the course, urged by petitioner, of giving the statutory language an unreasonable reading to avoid the possibility that the statute might be applied in an unreasonable manner. See Yermian, slip op. 11. CONCLUSION The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed. Respectfully submitted. REX E. LEE Solicitor General STEPHEN S. TROTT Assistant Attorney General LOUIS F. CLAIBORNE Deputy Solicitor General CHARLES A. ROTHFELD Assistant to the Solicitor General FRANCIS J. MARTIN Attorney FEBRUARY 1985 /1/ Authorization cards, which are issued by participating state agencies to eligible households, show the allotment of coupons that the household is entitled to receive. 7 U.S.C. 2012(b);7 C.F.R. 271.2. /2/ In unusual circumstances, restaurants may participate in the program by contracting with administering state agencies to provide meals to the elderly (see J.A. 6-7). Petitioner's restaurant had not done so. /3/ Petitioner's brother, who was named in the first two counts of the indictment (J.A. 2-3), pleaded guilty. Pet. 3. /4/ Petitioner did not argue before the court of appeals that Section 2024(b) is a specific intent crime; he instead contended that the trial judge should have given a specific intent instruction because the indictment alleged that petitioner acted "willfully" (Pet. App. 5). The court of appeals rejected this contention (Pet. App. 6-7). It was the government that brought to the court's attention decisions by other courts of appeals that found a specific intent requirement in Section 2024(b) (see note 5, infra), leading to the Seventh Circuit's analysis of the provision. /5/ The court of appeals therefore rejected holdings by the Eighth and Tenth Circuits to the effect that "section 2024(b) requires a finding of specific intent" (Pet. App. 5). See United States v. Marvin, 687 F.2d 1221 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1081 (1983); United States v. O'Brien, 686 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1982). See also United States v. Pollard, 724 F.2d 1438, 1438-1439 (6th Cir. 1984). The opinion below was circulated to the full Seventh Circuit; only one judge favored rehearing en banc to resolve the apparent conflict with the decisions of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits (Pet. App. 1 n.*). /6/ Yermian is far from unique: both this Court and the courts of appeals consistently have given a similar reading to similarly worded statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 687 (1975) (under its "natural reading," 18 U.S.C. 371 -- which makes it a crime to "conspire * * * to commit any offense against the United States" -- does not require the government to prove that the defendant was aware that he was conspiring to commit a federal crime); United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971) (18 U.S.C. 834(a)) (repealed 1979), which subjects "whoever knowingly violates any (Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)) regulation" to criminal penalties, does not require knowledge of the applicable ICC regulation); United States v. Bankston, 603 F.2d 528, 532 (5th Cir. 1979) (construing 18 U.S.C. 1201); United States v. Napier, 518 F.2d 316, 319 (4th Cir. 1975) (same); United States v. Howey, 427 F.2d 1017, 1018 (9th Cir. 1970) (construing 18 U.S.C. 641). Ct. Note 13, infra. /7/ While petitioner correctly notes (Br. 23) that the "in any matter" phrase addressed in Yermian involved a jurisdictional element of the offense, the Court ultimately based its holding not on that factor but on congressional intent as "ma(de) clear" in the "statutory language." Yermian, slip op.5. See id. at 6 & n.6. /8/ Petitioner plainly is incorrect in asserting (Br. 8) that Congress has not used the word "knowingly" to indicate that the defendant must be aware of the nature of his actions. See generally Freed, 401 U.S. at 612-616 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). This is, of course, the very meaning given the word in the Model Penal Code, upon which petitioner relies extensively. Section 2.02(2)(b)(i) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). /9/ Petitioner denies that his contention would require the government to prove "knowledge of complex regulations" (Br. 15). But it is difficult to see how the prosecution could establish "that a defendant knew his acquisition of food stamps was in a manner not authorized by law" (Br. 15) without proving that the defendant was familiar with the provisions setting forth the authorized methods for acquiring and using coupons. /10/ For statutes involving the placement of "knowing," see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 331, 485, 494, 498, 500, 641, 659, 2113(c), 2312, 2313, 2314. For references to fraudulent intent, see e.g., 18 U.S.C. 472, 477, 478, 479, 480, 483, 500. /11/ While conviction under Section 2024(c) requires proof of the defendant's knowledge that the coupons at issue had been used in a manner not authorized by law, that requirement -- in contrast to the parallel one proposed by petitioner for Section 2024(b) -- will not serve as an insuperable obstacle to prosecution. The Department goes to great lengths to ensure that grocers (who are the persons that present coupons for redemption) are familiar with the requirements of the Act. See page 32, supra; J.A. 7-9. Demonstrating their knowledge of program requirements in prosecutions under Section2024(c) therefore should not present undue difficulties. /12/ In 1977 Congress significantly revised the food stamp program that had been created in 1964. It therefore superseded the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. (1964 ed.) 2011 et seq., with the 1977 Act. See Section 1303 of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, 91 Stat. 979. /13/ The cases cited by petitioner in support of his proposed construction (Br. 11-14) do not detract from this conclusion: none involved the combination of statutory language, structure and legislative history that give Section 2024(b) its clarity. /14/ Coupon issuers are subjected to greater penalties for knowingly providing false information in the required reports. 7 C.F.R. 2715.5(d)(2). /15/ Nothing that Section 2015(b) provides for administrative disqualification from the program only for intentional violations, the Tenth Circuit concluded that a knowing illegality element should be read into Sectin 2024(b) to keep that provision from reaching a broader range of conduct than does Section2015(b). United States v. O'Brien, 686 F.2d 850, 853 & n.9 (10th Cir. 1982). But this analysis ignores the differing language, purposes and legislative history of the provisions. As originally enacted in 1977, the language of Section 2015(b) differed dramatically from that used by Congress in that same year to provide for criminal penalties in Section 2024(b). Section 2015(b) provided that a person would be ineligible to participate in the food stamp program for a stated period for having "fraudulently" used coupons, or for having used them in a "fraudulent" manner. Section 1301, 91 Stat. 964. The legislative history confirms that the provision was aimed at individuals who "fraudulently, i.e. knowingly and with deceitful intent," used coupons. H.R. Rep. 95-464, supra, at 154. In contrast, of course, Section 2024(b) makes no mention of fraud, and its legislative history indicates that it reaches "any unauthorized use" of coupons. H.R. Rep. 95-464, supra, at 376. This simultaneous use of different language cannot be seen as accidental. See, e.g., Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 162 (1981); Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981). That Congress used different standards in the two provisions is hardly surprising: Section2015(b) is concerned principally with sanctions imposed on a large scale by state administrative agencies, rather than with criminal penalties meted out by the federal courts. See H.R. Rep. 95-464, supra, at 155; H.R. Rep. 96-788, supra, at 114-115. Section 2015(b) was put in its present form in 1981, when the existing administrative penalties for fraud were "extended" to misrepresentation. S. Rep. 97-139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1981). The statue was then seen to be directed against "fraud and misrepresentation" (id. at 66), as well as against violations of state laws relating to food stamps (id. at 65). Again, the emphasis was on state enforcement (see ibid.). And, again, the language used differs significantly from that found in Section 2024(b): Section 2015(b) now disqualifies persons who have "intentionally (A) made a false or misleading statement * * *, or (B) committed any act that constitutes a violation of this chapter, the regulations issued thereunder, or any State statute, for the purpose of" using coupons. 7 U.S.C. 2015(b)(1). In contrast, Congress at no time has indicated that it intended to narrow the focus of Section 2024(b) to conform the reach of that provision to the reach of Section 2015(b). In these circumstances, the Tenth Circuit erred in striving to read as identical statutes that plainly are quite different. Indeed, even under the Tenth Circuit's (and petitioner's reading of Section 2024(b), that provision will reach more conduct than does Section 2015(b), for the word "knowingly" is broader than are the terms "intentionally" and "purpose(ly)." For example, a food stamp recipient who is given a coupon as a gift has acquired it in a manner that he knows not to be authorized by law, and therefore is (even under petitioner's reading) subject to prosecution under Section 2024(b). It is hardly clear, however, that he has "intentionally * * * committed any act * * * for the purpose of acquiring" coupons. /16/ Petitioner is incorrect in suggesting that United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), indicated that Section 2024(b) is concerned only with "fraud" (Br. 7-8). In the course of holding that Section 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. (1976 ed.) 2012(e), was not necessary to combat fraud, the Court in Moreno noted that the predecessor to Section 2024(b) "impose(d) strict criminal penalties upon any individual who obtains or uses food stamps fraudulently." 413 U.S. at 536. But the Court never suggested -- and had no occasion to address the question whether -- the provision also reached nonfraudulent activity. /17/ The Narcotic Act was characterized by the Court as "a taxing act, with the incidental purpose of minimizing the spread of addiction." 258 U.S. at 253. The Court therefore based its holding in part on the observation that "in the collection of taxes the importance to the public of their collection leads the legislature to impose on the taxpayer the burden of finding out the facts upon which his liability to pay depends, and meeting it at the peril of punishment." Id. at 252. /18/ This Court has found the omission of a culpability element permissible while interpreting statues that made provision for felony as well as misdemeanor and petty offense convictions. See, e.g., Section 9, 38 Stat. 789 (at issue in Balint and Behrman); Shevlin-Carpenter, 218 U.S. at 62 n.1; 26 U.S.C. 5871 (at issue in Freed). In any event, to the extent that the severity of the punishment bears on the degree of culpability required for conviction (see Holdridge, 282 F.2d at 310 (Blackmun, J.)), it is worth noting that transactions involving stamps worth less than $100 -- which presumably includes most trivial and "nonculpable" offenses -- are punishable only as misdemeanors. And the sentence for any Section 2024(b) conviction may be suspended in favor of a court-approved work program. This suggests that criminal intent "may properly be omitted as an element of the offense." Holdridge, 282 F.2d at 310 (Blackmun, J.). /19/ As the Court noted in Morissette, "Congressional silence as to mental elements in an Act merely adopting into federal statutory law a concept of crime already * * * well defined in common law * * * may warrant quite contrary inferences than the same silence in creating an offense new to general law, for whose definition the courts have no guidance except the Act." 342 U.S. at 262. /20/ "In general, two closely related but distinguishable notions are involved in the idea of mens rea. One is that conduct is criminal only if the actor is aware of the facts making it so. For example, it may be criminal under certain circumstances to possess narcotics. The question arises, does the actor know that the substance that he possesses is a narcotic? If he claims that he does not, will he be allowed to introduce evidence to that effect? If he may not, we have what is commonly described as an offense of strict liability, i.e., one dispensing with mens rea. The other and rather more difficult notion includes what is sometimes referred to as awareness of wrongdoing. For example, does the possessor of narcotics know there is a legal norm that renders his possession criminal? It is hornbook law that the first of these two notions is usually a limitation on criminality, that the second is not." Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 107, 108. /21/ Thus, most of the violations committed by retail outlets -- pointed to by petitioner as an example of the kind of broad liability that might be created by the Seventh Circuit's ruling (Br. 24) -- may be prosecuted under his own reading of the statute. /22/ Petitioner also is incorrect in asserting (Br. 27) that there is little need for the government to aim its enforcement activities at nonparticipants, for anyone may turn a profit by buying and selling discounted coupons. See H.R. Rep. 96-788, supra, at 115. /23/ It certainly is true of Section 2024(b) as read by petitioner. An example of how this is so is provided by the testimony in this case. A food stamp recipient might order a meal in a restaurant such as petitioner's and, while leaving, drop a food stamp coupon on the counter as payment. See J.A. 26. If the proprietor took possession of the coupon, knowing that he had not been authorized to participate in the food stamp program, he would be subject to prosecution -- despite the "nonblameworthiness" of his conduct.