UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER V. JAMES CONNORS KARO, ET AL. No. 83-850 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1983 The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States, petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in this case. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING In addition to the parties listed in the caption, Richard Miles Horton, William Robertson Harley, Michael Gaylord Steele and Evan Roth are respondents in this Court. Gene R. Rhodes was a party to the proceedings below but is not a respondent herein. TABLE OF CONTENTS Opinions below Jurisdiction Constitutional provision involved Statement Reasons for granting the petition Conclusion Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D Appendix E Appendix F OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the court of appeals (App. infra, 1a-15a) is reported at 710 F.2d 1433. The opinion of the district court (App. infra, 16a-22a) is not reported. JURISDICTION The judgment of the court of appeals (App. infra, 23a) was entered on June 20, 1983. A petition for rehearing was denied on August 26, 1983 (App. infra, 24a). On October 17, 1983, Justice White extended the time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including November 24, 1983. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED The Fourth Amendment provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether warrantless installation of a beeper inside a container of chemicals with the consent of the original owner violates the Fourth Amendment rights of a suspect in a drug manufacturing scheme to whom the container is subsequently transferred. 2. Whether the warrantless monitoring of signals from a beeper installed inside a container of chemicals that law enforcement authorities reasonably believe will be used to manufacture illegal drugs violates the Fourth Amendment when the monitoring occurs while the beeper is located within a home or other "private" area (such as a commercial storage locker). STATEMENT In an indictment filed in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, respondents and co-defendant Gene R. Rhodes were charged with conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846. Respondents Horton, Harley, Steele and Roth were also charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). In addition, the indictment charged respondent Karo with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute it and distribution of cocaine, both in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). 1. Prior to trial, respondents filed a joint motion to suppress evidence seized in a warrant-authorized search of a house in Taos, New Mexico. Respondents contended that the search warrant for the Taos residence was invalid because it was based on information derived from allegedly unlawful beeper surveillance. The evidence at the suppression hearing showed that on March 3, 1980, in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents conducted a judicially authorized search of a storage locker rented by Richard Logan and discovered laboratory equipment, glassware and chemicals used to manufacture amphetamines. Some of the boxes containing laboratory equipment and chemicals bore shipping labels addressed to Carl Muehlenweg of Graphic Photo Design in Albuquerque. H. Tr. 46-47, 167-169, 307. Approximately six weeks later, DEA agents executed search warrants at Graphic Photo Design, which turned out to be Muehlenweg's residence, and at T & M Research, where Muehlenweg worked. At those locations, the agents discovered invoices and statements reflecting that Muehlenweg had ordered and obtained laboratory glassware and chemicals that had been found in Logan's locker. H. Tr. 47-48, 165, 177. Shortly thereafter, Muehlenweg acknowledged to the DEA that Logan had ordered chemicals and laboratory glassware through him, and he agreed to become a DEA informant (H. Tr. 42-43, 126, 167-168, 308-309). /1/ Muehlenweg also apprised the agents that he had previously ordered ether for respondents Karo, Horton, and Harley for their use in the production of cocaine. In late August 1980, Muehlenweg told DEA Agent Richard Rottinger that he had ordered a 50-gallon shipment of ether for Karo, Horton, and Harley, which they planned to use to extract cocaine from clothing that had been imported into the United States. H. Tr. 124-130, 178, 191, 196, 257-258. Agent Rottinger confirmed that Muehlenweg had ordered and paid for ten five-gallon cans of ether from BWR Scientific, Inc., for delivery in September 1980 (H. Tr. 48-50, 143-146). Prior to the arrival of that shipment, the government obtained a court order authorizing the installation and monitoring of a beeper /2/ in one of the cans of ether that had been ordered by Muehlenweg. /3/ With Muehlenweg's permission, the DEA picked up the shipment from the common carrier, substituted a can containing a beeper for one of the cans in the shipment, repainted the cans so that they would all look alike, and then delivered them to Muehlenweg's residence. H. Tr. 48-54. On September 20, 1980, agents observed respondent Karo pick up the ether from Muehlenweg's house and, using visual and beeper surveillance, followed Karo as he transported the ether to his residence in Muehlenweg's automobile. Still under surveillance, Karo then returned the automobile to Muehlenweg's residence. App. infra, 4a; H. Tr. 58-59, 181-182, 275. By monitoring the beeper later that day, the agents ascertained that the ether had been transferred to respondent Horton's house. The ether's presence at that location was confirmed by a DEA agent who walked along the sidewalk and smelled the odor of ether emanating from Horton's residence. App. infra, 4a-5a; H. Tr. 59-60, 182-183. Subsequent monitoring of the beeper two days later, on September 22, 1980, revealed that the ether had been moved to the home of Horton's father. The following day, the agents traced the ether by means of the beeper to a commercial self-storage facility in Albuquerque. The beeper did not enable the agents to identify the particular locker that contained the chemical; however, the agents detected the odor of ether emanating from locker 143 and ascertained that respondents Horton and Harley had rented that locker. On October 8, 1980, the agents obtained an order authorizing installation of an entry tone alarm in that locker. During installation of the alarm on the following day, the agents saw the cans of ether inside the locker. The alarm malfunctioned, however, and the agents did not learn that the ether had been removed by respondent Horton until October 16, 1980, when they were so notified by the manager of the storage facility. App. infra, 5a; H. Tr. 60-61, 62-73, 182-184, 216-217. Three days later, on October 19, the agents picked up the beeper signal at another self-storage facility in Albuquerque. With the permission of the storage facility's manager, the agents installed a closed circuit video camera that was focused on the door of locker 15, which had been rented under an alias by respondents Horton and Harley. On December 31, 1980, agents monitoring the camera observed respondents Horton and Harley enter the locker, and on February 6, 1981, they observed co-defendant Rhodes and an unidentified woman remove the cans of ether and load them into Horton's pickup truck. By means of both visual and beeper surveillance, agents followed the truck to Rhodes' residence, where it was parked in the driveway. App. infra, 5a-6a; H. Tr. 82-85, 97-103, 155. Later that day, DEA agents followed the truck containing the ether to a residence in Taos, New Mexico rented by respondents Horton, Harley, and Steele. During their surveillance of the Taos residence, the agents monitored the beeper to determine its continued presence at the house. App. infra, 6a; H. Tr. 100-103, 111-112, 120, 135-138, 156-158. Relying on information obtained in the course of their investigation, including information derived through the use of the beeper regarding the various locations to which the ether had been transported, the agents secured a search warrant for the Taos residence. On February 10, 1981, the warrant was executed, cocaine and laboratory equipment were seized, and respondents Horton, Harley, Steele and Roth were arrested. App. infra, 6a. 2. The district court granted respondents' motion to suppress the evidence seized at the Taos residence (App. infra, 25a). The court concluded that the order authorizing the installation of the beeper was invalid because the government had made deliberate misrepresentations in the warrant application, and that the evidence in question was the fruit of the improperly authorized beeper surveillance (Tr. 331-334). Thereafter, the district court denied the government's motion to reconsider its suppression ruling, rejecting the argument that the installation and monitoring of the beeper did not require a warrant (App. infra, 16a-22a, 26a). 3. On appeal, the government did not challenge the district court's finding that the order authorizing the beeper was invalid (App. infra, 3a). /4/ Rather, the government contended that the Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant for the installation and monitoring of a beeper, that the defendants lacked "standing" to contest the use of the beeper, and that the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant for the Taos residence was not the fruit of the beeper surveillance. The court of appeals affirmed the suppression order except as to co-defendant Rhodes (App. infra, 1a-15a). /5/ At the outset, the court rejected the argument that the defendants could not have had any legitimate expectations of privacy in the can of ether because the ether was intended for use in the manufacture of contraband (id. at 3a-4a). The court then concluded (id. at 6a-9a) that Karo's Fourth Amendment rights were violated at the time he picked up the can of ether from Muehlenweg because the installation of the beeper in the can had not been authorized by a valid warrant. In so concluding, the court expressly refused to follow the holdings of other courts that have ruled that no warrant is required to install a beeper in a container with the consent of the owner (id. at 6a-7a). The court explained (id. at 7a-9a) (footnotes and citation omitted): Although the physical installation of the beeper in the can takes place before the new owner picks it up, we believe an intrusion occurs at the time the item comes into his possession. All individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy that objects coming into their rightful ownership do not have electronic devices attached to them, devices that would give law enforcement agents the opportunity to monitor the location of the objects at all times and in every place that the objects are taken, including inside private residences and other areas where the right to be free from warrantless government intrusion is unquestioned. * * * The installation of a beeper on an item of personal property gives the government the capability of tracing every movement of the object on which the beeper is placed. * * * We believe that individuals have a reasonable and legitimate expectation that the government will not engage in such activity without the protections afforded by resort to the judicial process. * * * Thus, regardless of the consent obtained when the beeper is physically installed, an infringement of the new owner's Fourth Amendment rights begins at the time the object comes into his control. The consent of the owner to have a beeper installed cannot suffice to continue the installation once the item belongs to someone else any more than the consent of a previous owner of a suitcase could suffice to permit the police to periodically open and search the suitcase after it comes under the ownership of another. The court also held that the monitoring of the beeper without a valid warrant violated the Fourth Amendment (App. infra, 9a-11a). It sought to distinguish this Court's decision in United States V. Knotts, No. 81-1802 (Mar. 2, 1983), on the following grounds: that here the beeper was monitored while the can was inside private premises and storage lockers, whereas in Knotts the beeper was never monitored inside a residence; that, unlike in Knotts, the monitoring here gave the agents information they could not have discovered even by constant visual surveillance; that the surveillance in Knotts lasted only a short time, whereas here is covered a five-month period; and that here, unlike in Knotts, the officers lost track of the can for substantial periods of time and much of the tracing of the ether to new locations was possible only by use of the beeper. App. infra, 9a-10a. Relying on United States V. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 113 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978), and United States V. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 940 (6th Cir. 1980), while expressly rejecting the contrary ruling in United States V. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854, 861 (9th Cir. 1980), the court concluded (App. infra, 10a) that "the warrantless use of a beeper to monitor the location of noncontraband withdrawn from public view inside private residences or similarly protected places is an unconstitutional search or seizure." /6/ REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION Last Term, in United States V. Knotts, No. 81-1802 (Mar. 2, 1983), this Court held that the use of a beeper by law enforcement officers to trace a can of chemicals from its place of purchase to the defendant's residence did not violate the defendant's legitimate expectations of privacy and thus did not constitute a "search" or "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This case presents two important and recurring Fourth Amendment questions relating to beeper surveillance that the Court did not specifically resolve in Knotts. The first question is whether, as the court of appeals held, the mere installation of a beeper in a container with the consent of the original owner amounts to a search or seizure that, unless authorized by a valid warrant, infringes the new owner's Fourth Amendment rights at the time the container comes into his possession. The second question is whether the warrantless monitoring of a beeper's signals violates the Fourth Amendment whenever, at the time of monitoring, the container in which the beeper has been installed is situated inside a home or other "private" area. The holdings of the court of appeals on both of these questions are in direct conflict with the decisions of other courts of appeals. Accordingly, review by this Court is warranted to resolve the conflicts on these important questions of Fourth Amendment law. 1. Cases involving the permissibility of beeper use ordinarily raise two distinct issues, one relating to the installation of the beeper in a package or conveyance, the other relating to the monitoring of signals transmitted by the beeper. Although the Court in Knotts recognized this distinction, it did not pass on the installation issue because Knotts did not challenge the warrantless installation of the beeper in his case. The Court noted, however, that several courts of appeals have approved warrantless installations. Knotts, slip op. 3 n.*, citing United States V. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854, 860 (9th Cir. 1980); United States V. Lewis, 621 F.2d 1382, 1388 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 935 (1981); United States V. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979); United States V. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978); United States V. Cheshire, 569 F.2d 887, 889 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978); United States V. Curtis, 562 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978); United States V. Abel, 548 F.2d 591, 592 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 956 (1977); United States V. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976). See also United States V. Knotts, 662 F.2d 515, 517 n.2 (8th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, No. 81-1802 (Mar. 2, 1983); United States V. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 943 (6th Cir. 1980); United States V. Devorce, 526 F. Supp. 191, 199-200 (D. Conn. 1981), aff'd sub nom. United States V. Lombardo, 697 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1982) (table), cert. denied, No. 82-5459 (Mar. 7, 1983). Indeed, in this case, the court of appeals expressly acknowledged (App. infra, 6a-7a) that other courts have upheld the warrantless installation of a beeper inside a container with the consent of the original owner. This clear conflict requires resolution by this Court. We believe the holding of the court of appeals is plainly incorrect. As is evident from its own analysis of the installation issue (App. infra, 7a-9a), the intrusion, if any, into legitimate expectations of privacy occasioned by beeper surveillance occurs when a beeper is monitored to ascertain the location of the container in which it has been installed. No search or seizure of any sort occurs when the beeper is placed inside the container with the consent of the original owner or when the container is transferred to the suspect purchaser. Unless the beeper is activated and its signals monitored, the beeper tells nothing about the whereabouts of the container. Thus, the court's analogy to a previous owner of a suitcase consenting to subsequent searches of the suitcase (id. at 8a-9a) is totally inapposite. Although the owner of a container generally has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of the container, a beeper does not disclose the container's contents, which are already known to the agents when they install the beeper with the original owner's consent. Instead, the beeper discloses only the present location of the container. As the Court held in Knotts, however, there is no legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to this information, at least where the container's location could have been ascertained by visual surveillance of the suspect's vehicle while it travelled over public roads. Here, respondent Karo certainly had no greater privacy interest in the location of the container than did the defendant in Knotts. There, the beeper was used to ascertain the arrival of a can of chemicals on the defendant's premises. Because this same information could have been obtained through constant visual surveillance, the Court concluded that the use of the beeper did not implicate Fourth Amendment concerns. In this case, insofar as respondent Karo is concerned, the beeper revealed only that Karo transported the container of ether in Muehlenweg's automobile from Muehlenweg's residence to his own home. As was the case in Knotts, this same information could have been obtained by direct visual surveillance. Moreover, as the court of appeals conceded (App. infra, 13a), Karo could not establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the locations at which the beeper was monitored after it left his house, including the Taos residence where the warrant-authorized search uncovered an illicit drug manufacturing laboratory. The court nevertheless concluded that Karo could move to suppress the evidence seized from that residence by virtue of his challenge to the installation of the beeper (id. at 14a; see also id. at 6a n.1). Under the ruling below, therefore, even where a defendant's legitimate expectations of privacy are not infringed by beeper monitoring, the defendant may still object to the use of the beeper by challenging its installation. The effect of the court of appeals' decision is to limit Knotts to cases in which the defendant's lawyer fails to object to insertion of the beeper. 2. The court of appeals' ruling on the monitoring issue also warrants review. To begin with, the question whether the Fourth Amendment is violated by the warrantless monitoring of a beeper while it is located inside private premises is one on which the courts of appeals are sharply divided. The holding of the court of appeals that a warrant is required in these circumstances is in accord with the decisions of the First and Sixth Circuits, but conflicts with decisions of the Ninth Circuit. In United States V. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978), the court acknowledged that "the limited data transmitted by a beeper (is) far less revealing than the conversation recorded in Katz" and "the level of intrusion * * * less severe." 562 F.2d at 113. The court nevertheless concluded that when the defendants took inside their house a box of chemicals which, unbeknownst to them, contained a beeper, "they had every right to expect that their activities inside the house which they sought to preserve as private would be free from warrantless intrusion by the Government." Ibid. Relying on Moore, the Sixth Circuit, in United States V. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 944 (1980), concluded that "(b)eeper surveillance of non-contraband personal property in private areas trenches upon legitimate expectations of privacy and constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment." Although the agents in Bailey had obtained a warrant authorizing the use of the beeper, the court held that the warrant was invalid because it contained no provision limiting the duration of the surveillance. Id. at 945-946. Accordingly, it suppressed evidence obtained as a result of the beeper surveillance. The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, has consistently held that the Fourth Amendment permits the warrantless monitoring of a beeper attached to a container that has been taken inside private premises. See United States V. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1318-1322 (1982), cert. denied, No. 81-6922 (Mar. 7, 1983); United States V. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854, 860-861 (1980); United States V. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 211 (1978). In Dubrofsky, for example, the court upheld the warrantless monitoring of a beeper transmitting from inside a package after it had been taken into a residence, reasoning that a device that continually broadcasts "here I am" constitutes only a "slight" intrusion and "is not an impermissible search." 581 F.2d at 211. The court explained (ibid.) (footnote omitted): Transmitting the package's location is merely an aid to what can be accomplished by visual surveillance. Permissible techniques of surveillance include more than the five senses of officers and their unaided physical abilities. Binoculars, dogs that track and sniff out contraband, searchlights, fluorescent powders, automobiles and airplanes, burglar alarms, radar devices, and bait money contribute to surveillance without violation of the Fourth Amendment in the usual case. On the other hand, wiretaps, breaking and entering, and many other searches and seizures fall on the other side of the line. The issue before us is whether the mere presence of the beeper, it having been attached without violating the Fourth Amendment, sufficiently resembles a wiretap to require the "antecedent justification" that a warrant would provide. We hold that it does not. Moreover, although the instant case may be factually distinguishable from Knotts, the decision below seems to us inconsistent with the principle underlying Knotts. Under the teaching of Knotts, the use of a beeper to monitor the movement of a container from one location to another does not disclose information as to which there is a legitimate expectation of privacy, even though each location may itself be private premises, because the actual movement-- which is all that the beeper reveals-- takes place over public roads. Similarly, the information revealed by the beeper-- that it has arrived at a particular location-- is the same regardless whether it is broadcasting its signals from a position inside the premises (as here) or outside the premises (as in Knotts). The beeper tells nothing about the interior of the premises into which it has been taken other than the fact that it is there. Because, under Knotts, respondents had no legitimate privacy expectations with respect to the arrival of the container at any particular locations, it is immaterial that the beeper was actually situated inside private residences or storage lockers at the time its signals were monitored. Even if the monitoring of a beeper in circumstances such as those present here may be deemed a search or seizure within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment, the court of appeals erred in imposing a warrant requirement. /7/ In determining the reasonableness of law enforcement actions in particular contexts, "the Court has weighed the public interest against the Fourth Amendment interest of the individual." United States V. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976). There can be little doubt that the governmental interest served by the beeper surveillance in this case was substantial, if not compelling. See United States V. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561-562 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring). As this case illustrates, a beeper is an extremely useful investigative tool in uncovering illegal drug manufacturing operations. By the same token, a beeper is capable of conveying only strictly limited information and poses little threat of revealing to government agents any lawful private activity. See United States V. Place, No. 81-1617 (June 20, 1983), slip op. 10-11. Because the substantial societal concern with drug enforcement outweighs the limited intrusion, if any, on privacy interests resulting from beeper surveillance, use of a beeper to locate a source of illegal drugs is fully justified on the basis of reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. If reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify use of a beeper, it follows that a warrant (which may only be issued on probable cause) is not required under the Fourth Amendment. But even if probable cause is required (and probable cause was clearly present here), the monitoring of a beeper should not require a warrant. We note that, as a practical matter, by imposing a warrant requirement whenever a beeper is taken into a private area, the court of appeals has made it necessary for agents to obtain a warrant in every investigation in which a beeper is used, since they will not know in advance whether the beeper will be inside a private area at the time its signals are monitored. But requiring a warrant simply because a beeper may be monitored while it is inside a private area ignores the lack of substantial privacy concerns implicated by beeper surveillance. The marginal benefits of antecedent judicial control of the limited intrusions affected by beepers are outweighed by the significant costs that would be entailed by a warrant requirement. /8/ In short, the decision below needlessly hampers the ability of law enforcement authorities to employ an extremely effective device in uncovering illegal drug operations. CONCLUSION The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. Respectfully submitted. REX E. LEE Solicitor General STEPHEN S. TROTT Assistant Attorney General ANDREW L. FREY Deputy Solicitor General ELLIOTT SCHULDER Assistant to the Solicitor General VINCENT L. GAMBALE Attorney NOVEMBER 1983 /1/ A few weeks later, after being tipped off by Muehlenweg, agents observed Logan pick up chemicals and equipment from Muehlenweg, but Logan shot and killed himself when the agents moved in to arrest him (H. Tr. 91, 125-126, 169, 309-310). /2/ "A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver." United States V. Knotts, No. 81-1802 (Mar. 2, 1983), slip op. 1. /3/ The affidavit in support of the application for the beeper authorization order falsely indicated that Muehlenweg was a target of the DEA investigation relating to the ether shipment, and did not state that he was cooperating with the DEA as a confidential informant. According to the testimony of the prosecutor involved, the affidavit was drafted in that manner in order to preserve Muehlenweg's usefulness as a confidential informant and to protect his safety in the event the targets of the investigation obtained copies of the warrant applications. H. Tr. 232-236, 254. The prosecutor was concerned that the targets might ultimately obtain the applications if the district court adopted target notification procedures analogous to those contained in the federal wiretap statute, 18 U.S.C. 2518(8)(d) (H. Tr. 237-238). The prosecutor and Agent Rottinger testified, however, that at the time the application was made, the prosecutor orally advised the issuing judge that Muehlenweg was actually cooperating in the investigation, and that he explained to the judge that that information had been omitted from the warrant application to preserve Muehlenweg's confidential informant status (H. Tr. 208-209, 237, 246). /4/ Because the inaccuracies in the written warrant application were not designed to mislead the magistrate, the true facts were revealed to the magistrate prior to issuance of the beeper warrant, and the variation between the written statement and the oral disclosure could not have affected the finding of probable cause, we believe the district court erred in invalidating the beeper warrant. That issue, not having been preserved on appeal, is not presented here. /5/ The court held that Rhodes, who transported the ether from Albuquerque to Taos, failed to establish that his legitimate expectations of privacy had been violated by the beeper surveillance or the search of the Taos residence. App. infra, 14a-15a. /6/ Rejecting the argument that the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant for the Taos residence was not the fruit of any illegal beeper surveillance, the court of appeals found a direct link between the beeper monitoring and the information that the ether was at the Taos residence (App. infra, 11a-12a). The court noted (id. at 14a n.6) that, even though there were breaks in the monitoring between the initial delivery of the ether to Karo and the tracking of the ether to Taos, there was no break between the monitoring of the beeper while it was in the second storage locker and its transfer to the Taos residence. In addition, the court rejected the argument that respondent Roth (who was a visitor at the Taos residence and had stayed there for several days prior to the search) and Karo (who had no connection with that residence, but whose rights allegedly were infringed by the installation of the beeper) lacked "standing" to seek suppression of the evidence (App. infra, 13a-14a). We do not here raise the fruits and "standing" issues, except insofar as a favorable resolution of the first question presented would establish that there was no violation of respondent Karo's Fourth Amendment rights. /7/ We have set forth these arguments at length in our brief in Knotts, copies which we are sending to counsel for respondents. /8/ Certain technical requirements associated with warrants are difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy in connection with the use of beepers. For instance, the violation of privacy that is supposed to exist in this case is the "search" of the private premises in which the beeper-laden container is located, yet it is plainly impossible to specify in the warrant application the place to be searched (that is precisely what the beeper monitoring itself discloses). Additionally, because long delays between the procurement of the chemicals and the illicit manufacturing operation are common modus operandi of offenders like respondents, beeper warrants are not amenable to temporal limitation like other warrants. But see United States V. Bailey, 628 F.2d at 945-946. Appendix Omitted