UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER V. THOMAS J. HENSLEY No. 83-1330 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1983 The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States, petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in this case. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit TABLE OF CONTENTS Opinions below Jurisdiction Statement Reasons for granting the petition Conclusion Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D Appendix E OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, 1a-9a) is reported at 713 F.2d 220. The order of the district court (App., infra, 12a-15a) and the recommendation of the magistrate (App., infra, 16a-21a) are unreported. JURISDICTION The judgment of the court of appeals (App., infra, 10a) was entered on August 9, 1983. A petition for rehearing was denied on December 15, 1983 (App., infra, 11a). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether Terry stops (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)) may be made only when the police reasonably suspect that a crime is about to be committed or is ongoing at the moment of the stop, or whether such stops may also encompass situations in which the police reasonably suspect that the person to be stopped is wanted in connection with a crime already committed. 2. Whether a "wanted flyer" issued by one police department provides an officer of another department with reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a brief stop of the suspect while an effort is made to ascertain whether an arrest warrant has been issued for the suspect. STATEMENT Following a bench trial on stipulated facts in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, respondent was found guilty of being a convicted felon in possession of firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. App. 1202(a)(1). Respondent was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. The court of appeals reversed the conviction (App., infra, 1a-9a). 1. a. On December 4, 1981, two armed men robbed the Moon Tavern in St. Bernard, Ohio (10/4/82 Tr. 10-12). /1/ On December 10, 1981, Officer Kenneth Davis of the St. Bernard Police Department interviewed a woman by the name of Janie Hansford. After advising Hansford of her rights, Officer Davis obtained from her a detailed, handwritten statement in which she implicated herself in the robbery and identified respondent as the driver of the getaway car (id. at 11-13, 14, 16). Officer Davis had had prior contact with respondent and considered him to be armed and dangerous (id. at 19-20). On the basis of his knowledge of the robbery, Hansford's statement, and his prior knowledge of respondent, Officer Davis immediately issued the following communication for transmission to neighboring police departments (App., infra, 2a n.1): "Wanted for Investigation Only for Aggravated Robbery" Wanted for Investigation of Aggravated Robbery which occurred at the Moon Tavern, 631 Vine Street, St. Bernard, Ohio on December 4, 1981 at 6:19 a.m., is one Thomas James Hensley, M/W -- 1/18/44, CTL No. 21528, PICA #325, SS -- 295366974, SFF, 190 lbs. Subject LKA as of 12-7-81 was Drake Motel. If subject is located pick up and hold for St. Bernard Police. Use caution and consider subject armed and dangerous. b. The above-quoted communication was sent out by teletype on December 10, 1981, received by the Covington, Kentucky Police Department on that date, and read aloud at roll call each day at every change of shift from that date until December 16, 1981 (5/13/82 St. Tr. 16, 30, 33; 10/4/82 Tr. 9, 22-23). The teletype was never cancelled or withdrawn (id. at 9). Covington Police Officers Daniel Cope and David Rassche both had seen the teletype and had had it read to them (ibid.). Based on their experience as police officers, both were of the opinion that this type of "flyer" was reliable and usually was followed by an arrest warrant (5/13/82 St. Tr. 17, 33). Officer Cope testified that "(w)e had been advised from Cincinnati that a warrant was forthcoming" (9/28/82 Tr. 8). /2/ (Respondent was eventually charged with the robbery (10/4/82 Tr. 14)). The Covington officers knew respondent and knew where he occasionally stayed, but they had been unable to locate him prior to December 16, 1981 (5/13/82 St. Tr. 31; 9/28/82 Tr. 5, 13; 10/4/82 Tr. 8-9, 24-25). Officer Rassche knew that respondent was a convicted felon (5/13/82 St. Tr. 42). Based on prior police contact, the Covington officers also believed respondent to be armed and dangerous (9/28/82 Tr. 17). c. On December 16, 1981, a third Covington officer, Officer Terence Eger, came upon respondent and one Albert Green. The two were sitting in an automobile parked in the middle of the street (5/13/82 St. Tr. 43), but upon seeing Officer Eger they "took off" (9/21/82 Tr. 11). Officer Eger radioed Covington police headquarters; set forth below are the pertinent portions of the radio transmission (9/21/ 82 Tr. 11-16): /3/ (Officer Eger): 606. Dispatcher: 606. (Officer Eger): Concerning a warrant on Tommie Hensley or Al Thomas. They just saw me at the 800 block of Madison and took off. (Officer Rassche): Car 12 to 606. There's supposed to be a robbery warrant out of Ohio. (Officer Eger): Repeat. (Officer Cope): There's possibly a robbery warrant out of Ohio for that subject. (Officer Eger): Which one, Thomas or Hensley? (Officer Cope): Hensley, Thomas Hensley. * * * * * Dispatcher: 606, can you identify the vehicle? (Officer Eger): White over white Cadillac El Dorado, I believe. * * * * * (Officer Rassche): They will probably go to Trevor Street or 806 Holman. * * * * * (Officer Rassche): Have you confirmed the warrant? Dispatcher: There's nothing local on either one. I need them stopped for information to run a NCIC check. (Officer Rassche): Okay. You might check with the detective bureau. They put a flyer on Hensley on roll call about a week ago or so in reference to a Cincinnati robbery one. Dispatcher: Okay. I'll see what I can find. (Detective Hanlon): Crime Bureau, Detective Hanlon speaking. Dispatcher: * * * On Tommie Hensley, do we have a robbery warrant out of Ohio on him? Det. Hanlon: I don't know whether they did or not, Ma'am. * * * * * Dispatcher: * * * I believe there was something put on roll call a while ago. Never mind. I will check it. Okay. * * * * * (Officer Cope): I have a white convertible Cadillac approaching 18th on Holman at this time. I will be checking to see the subjects, two subjects in front. * * * * * Dispatcher: This is the Covington Police Department. We had something -- reference to a Thomas Hensley on roll call about a week ago. I believe it was a robbery warrant from Cincinnati. Is there any way you can check on that without a date of birth on him? Female Voice: Where are you calling from? Dispatcher: Covington Police Department. Isn't this Cincinnati Records? Female Voice: Yes, it is. Let me transfer you to 3567. Hold on. * * * * * (Officer Cope): 121, I am at 15th and Holman at this time. Dispatcher: 10-4, 121 -- we have not confirmed the warrant as of yet. I have Cincinnati hunting for the warrant. Yes, ma'am. 10-4. This is Covington Police Department. About a week ago we had something reference a Tommie Hensley on roll call. We can't find it now. I believe there is a robbery warrant out of Cincinnati. Is there any way you can -- Female Voice: Well, I can't give you any information, but I can transfer you downstairs and -- Dispatcher: Never mind, never mind, thank you. By this time, Officer Cope had arrived at the vehicle's location. He stopped the vehicle and ordered respondent and Albert Green out of the car (9/28/82 Tr. 14). Officer Cope stopped the vehicle for the sole purpose of detaining respondent long enough to determine whether a warrant had been issued for his arrest (id. at 8-9). If there had been no warrant, Officer Cope would have let respondent go on his way (id. at 9). Officer Cope did not stop respondent's vehicle with any intent to search the vehicle, to arrest respondent, or to question him (ibid.; 5/13/82 St. Tr. 25). Officer Cope "felt that (his) life was in jeopardy at the time of the stop" (9/28/82 Tr. 15, 17), and he took no action until back-up units arrived. Officer Rassche was the first to reach the scene. As he was looking straight into respondent's car, the door of which was open, Officer Rassche saw a gun protruding from under the passenger seat (id. at 19, 24; 5/13/82 St. Tr. 28, 34-35). Because Albert Green had been sitting in the passenger seat, he was arrested for carrying a concealed weapon (id. at 35; 9/28/82 Tr. 23). /4/ "Immediately after finding (the first) gun," the officers searched a jacket lying between the two front seats and an open gym bag on the back seat "(f)or other weapons" (id. at 24; 5/13/82 St. Tr. 36). One hand gun was found wrapped inside the jacket, and another was found in the gym bag (id. at 20-21, 28-29). All three guns were loaded (id. at 20). The gym bag also contained hypodermic needles, several ski masks, a change of clothes, and a controlled substance (ibid.). Respondent, who owned the car and had been driving it, was then arrested for carrying two concealed weapons (id. at 35-36, 38). 2. Prior to trial, respondent moved to suppress all evidence arising out of the search of his vehicle. Adopting the recommendation of the magistrate (App., infra, 16a-21a), the district court denied respondent's suppression motion. The district court ruled (id. at 14a-15a): The St. Bernard Police were justified in issuing the teletype and Officer Cope was justified in stopping (respondent). Once stopped, the officers could ask the men to step out of the car. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977). Having observed a weapon in plain view, the officers were justified in seizing the weapon and in searching further for weapons that might be accessible to the two men. * * * The discovery of the weapons gave the officers probable cause to arrest (respondent). Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). 3. The court of appeals reversed, holding that respondent had been illegally arrested. The court held that the Covington police were not justified in making a Terry stop of respondent, reasoning that this Court has manifested a "clear intention to restrict investigative stops to settings involving the investigation of ongoing crimes" (App., infra, 8a-9a) and observing that "the government has not shown us any * * * 'exigent circumstances' that would have justified the Covington police in stopping (respondent)" (id. at 8a). The court of appeals summarized its holding as follows (id. at 9a): (W)e refuse to expand the Terry doctrine to encompass police attempts to round up people against whom arrest warrants may have been issued. This "arrest now, verify warrant later" policy that the government urges us to uphold simply stretches the constraints of the Fourth Amendment beyond all reasonable limits. In conclusion, we hold that the Fourth Amendment does not permit police officers in one department to seize a person simply because a neighboring police department has circulated a flyer reflecting the desire to question that individual about some criminal investigation that does not involve the arresting officers or their department. /5/ REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION The court of appeals' conclusion that the stop in this case violated respondent's Fourth Amendment rights apparently rested on two theories: first, that the officers had to have a basis to suspect respondent of being engaged in criminal activity at the time of the stop itself; and second, that the flyer issued by the St. Bernard Police Department did not provide Covington Officer Cope with "'specific and articulable facts' that would have justified the stop" (App., infra, 8a). The court was patently wrong on both counts, and its decision conflicts with numerous decisions of this Court and other courts of appeals. Moreover, the decision threatens to have serious and widespread practical consequences for effective law enforcement. As the cases cited at pages 13-14, infra, demonstrate, the practice of making investigative stops on the basis of "wanted" flyers is quite common, but the decision below would bring a halt to interdepartmental cooperation and require officers simply to turn their backs on suspected criminals. /6/ The court of appeals gave no reasoned justification for invalidating a long-standing and effective method of cooperation among police departments of different jurisdictions, and its error should be corrected. 1. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), this Court held that law enforcement officers may stop a person and briefly detain him for questioning upon reasonable suspicion that he is connected with criminal activity. See also, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). Apparently because Terry involved the "stop and frisk" of an individual who seemed about to commit a robbery, the court of appeals here concluded that investigative stops are permissible only in "settings involving the investigation of ongoing crimes * * *" (App., infra, 8a-9a). In thus elevating the factual circumstances in Terry to a prerequisite for an investigative stop, the court of appeals clearly erred. Terry's holding that investigative stops made on reasonable suspicion do not violate the Fourth Amendment rests on a balancing on the "limited intrusions on the personal security of those detained" against the "substantial law enforcement interests" advanced by permitting such brief detentions. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. at 699. See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209 (1979). Although the officer who observes an individual whom he reasonably suspects of having committed a past crime may not be in a position to prevent or halt ongoing criminal activity, he is certainly in a position to serve the "substantial law enforcement interest()" in apprehending criminals and bringing them to justice. Such an officer is no more required "to simply shrug his shoulders * * * and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape" (Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 145) than the officer who observes ongoing criminal activity. In either situation, "it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response" by briefly stopping the suspicious individual "in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information * * *." Id. at 145-146. /7/ Indeed, this Court's post-Terry decisions expressly state that law enforcement officers may make investigatory stops based on reasonable suspicion of past criminal activity. Thus, in Florida v. Royer, No. 80-2146 (Mar. 23, 1983), the Court recently observed that Terry stands for the principle that "certain seizures are justifiable under the Fourth Amendment if there is articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime" (slip op. 6 (emphasis added)). /8/ Likewise, in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. at 699 n.9, the Court characterized its decision in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), as holding that the statute there at issue, requiring individuals to identify themselves, was unconstitutional as applied "because the police did not have any reasonable suspicion that the petitioner had committed or was committing a crime" (emphasis added). Perhaps the Court's clearest statement that investigative stops may be based on reasonable suspicion of past criminal activity came in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981). There, after stating that "(a) ninvestigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity," the Court added that "(o)f course, an officer may stop and question a person if there are reasonable grounds to believe that person is wanted for past criminal conduct." Id. at 417 & n.2. See also Kolender v. Lawson, No. 81-1320 (May 2, 1983), slip op. 2 (Brennan, J., concurring). /9/ The court of appeals' totally unprecedented limitation on Terry stops thus requires correction by this Court. 2. The court of appeals also erred in concluding that the stop of respondent's vehicle was unlawful because the wanted flyer failed to provide Officer Cope with sufficient facts upon which to make his own determination of reasonable suspicion. The flyer stated that respondent was "Wanted for Investigation Only for Aggravated Robbery" and supplied details concerning respondent's identity (see page 3, supra). This information by itself -- regardless of Officer Cope's knowledge of the facts giving rise to the flyer -- fully justified the "intermediate response" of stopping respondent's vehicle and briefly detaining him in order to determine if a warrant for his arrest had been issued. /10/ The conclusion of the court below that the flyer was insufficient to justify the stop is at odds with numerous court of appeals decisions holding that an officer may make an investigative stop -- or, where appropriate, an arrest -- in reliance on a police wanted bulletin or radio lookout, and that he may do so even though he has no personal knowledge of the facts warranting such action. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 652 F.2d 244, 248-249 n.3 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1057 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 536 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Mungo v. LaVallee, 522 F.2d 211, 214 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1977); United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 400-401 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975); United States v. Stevens, 509 F.2d 683, 687 & n.6(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 989 (1975); United States v. Hernandez, 486 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 959 (1974); /11/ United States v. Impson, 482 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1009 (1973); United States v. Maryland, 479 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir. 1973); Daniels v. United States, 393 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Smith v. United States, 386 F.2d 532, 533 (9th Cir. 1967). See also United States v. Roper, supra (upholding action of officer who, having seen bond company's flyer describing defendant and his vehicle and stating that defendant was wanted for federal bail jumping, stopped defendant's car for purpose of determining if a probation violation warrant for defendant's arrest had been issued); 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure Section 9.2, at 36-37 (1978), quoted with approval in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. at 700-701 n.12. In general, these cases stand for the proposition that an officer who receives a police bulletin has "the same right" to make a stop or an arrest as the officer who issued the bulletin. United States v. Jackson, 652 F.2d at 249 n.3. As the Fifth Circuit stated in United States v. Impson, 482 F.2d at 199, an "officer can act on the basis of information of which he has no personal knowledge which has been relayed to him by police transmission facilities," but if the bulletin "is the sole cause for the detention * * * then the government has the burden of showing that the information on which the action was based itself had a reasonable foundation" (emphasis in original). See also United States v. Robinson, 536 F.2d at 1299-1300; United States v. Stevens, 509 F.2d at 687 n.6 ("(a) police officer is entitled to view information supplied via police radio as a trustworthy basis for his actions"); Daniels v. United States, 393 F.2d at 361. Cf. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971) ("Certainly police officers called upon to aid other officers in executing arrest warrants are entitled to assume that the officers requesting aid offered the magistrate the information requisite to support an independent judicial assessment of probable cause."). The practical basis for these decisions is clear: effective law enforcement would be impossible if police officers could not act on directions and information transmitted from one officer to another. As the court of appeals observed in United States v. Robinson, 536 F.2d at 1299, "officers, who must often act swiftly, cannot be expected to cross-examine their fellow officers about the foundation for the transmitted information." And, at the same time as it facilitates effective law enforcement, the rule fully protects the Fourth Amendment rights of those detained or arrested by requiring that the police officer initiating the chain of communication have sufficient knowledge to constitute reasonable suspicion or probable cause. /12/ Moreover, the rule is as applicable to communications between different police departments or law enforcement agencies as it is to communications within a single department. See, e.g., United States v. Impson, supra; United States v. Maryland, supra; Smith v. United States, supra. See also United States v. Roper, supra. Given the ease with which criminal offenders may move quickly among various police jurisdictions, officers in one jurisdiction must be able to respond swiftly to wanted bulletins from other jurisdictions without making time-consuming personal determinations as to the existence of reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The alternatives are a national police force or a requirement that officers turn their backs on suspected offenders simply because they lack personal knowledge of the facts leading to the issuance of a wanted bulletin. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment justifies either result. CONCLUSION The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. Because the governing legal principles appear to be well established, the Court may wish to consider summary reversal. Respectfully submitted. REX E. LEE Solicitor General STEPHEN S. TROTT Assistant Attorney General ANDREW L. FREY Deputy Solicitor General KATHRYN A. OBERLY Assistant to the Solicitor General JOEL M. GERSHOWITZ Attorney FEBRUARY 1984 /1/ "Tr." refers to the transcript of the hearing on respondent's motion to suppress. The suppression hearing was initially held before a magistrate on September 21, 1982. Further hearings were held before the district court on September 28 and October 4, 1982. The transcript of each hearing is separately paginated. In addition, a suppression hearing was held on May 13, 1982, in the case of Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Thomas Hensley, No. 82-CR-5 (Kenton Co. Cir. Ct.). That hearing followed the Commonwealth's initiation of charges against respondent for possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, in violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. Section 527.040 (Supp. 1982). Those charges were dismissed after the state court granted respondent's motion to suppress. (The record does not clearly reveal the basis for the state court's decision. At the suppression hearing itself, the state court indicated its intention to rule for the prosecution (5/13/ 82 St. Tr. 61-62).) The transcript of the state court suppression hearing (hereinafter cited as St. Tr.) was made a part of the record of the federal proceedings (see App., infra, 16a; 9/21/82 Tr. 3). /2/ St. Bernard, Ohio, is a suburb of Cincinnati, as is Covington, Kentucky. Throughout the record in this case, Cincinnati and St. Bernard appear to have been referenced interchangeably. /3/ In the transmission, Albert Green is erroneously referred to as Albert Thomas. The transmission includes Officer Eger's communications with the Covington dispatcher, car-to-car communications among Officers Eger, Rassche, and Cope, and the Covington dispatcher's communications with the Cincinnati Police Department. /4/ After respondent admitted owning all of the guns discovered in the car, the United States moved to dismiss the indictment against Green, and the district court granted the motion. /5/ The court also refused to apply the "collective knowledge" doctrine in this case, holding that even if the St. Bernard Police Department had probable cause to arrest respondent, that knowledge could not be imputed to the Covington police because the two departments were not working directly together on the investigation (App., infra, 4a-5a). We do not seek review of this aspect of the court of appeals' decision. /6/ The decision below already has produced adverse practical consequences. We are advised by the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Kentucky that the police departments of Kenton County, Boone County, Covington, Erlanger, and Florence (all located in Kentucky) have ceased making investigative stops on the basis of other departments' "wanted" flyers as a result of the decision below; in the past, these police departments each made an average of four or five such stops each month. Presumably, other police departments within the Sixth Circuit have responded in similar fashion. /7/ On the other side of the balance, the intrusion undertaken by the Covington police could not have been more limited. Officer Cope testified that he intended to detain respondent only long enough to determine whether there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest; had there been none (and had independent probable cause to arrest respondent not developed through the discovery of the guns), respondent would have been released (see page 7, supra). Depending perhaps upon the amount of the time required for the St. Bernard police to reach Covington, it may well be that the Covington police would have needed probable cause to take the action requested in the flyer of detaining respondent until the St. Bernard police could assume custody of him. Cf. Dunaway v. New York, supra. But it is undisputed on the record in this case that the Covington police did not intend to take the action requested in the flyer. Rather, as the radio transmission indicates (see pages 4-6, supra), the Covington police immediately sought to verify the existence of a warrant. Although it became unnecessary to continue those efforts when the police observed the first gun in plain view in respondent's vehicle, it is clear that the court of appeals completely mischaracterized this case as an "arrest now, verify warrant later" situation (App., infra, 9a). In reality, the facts show that this is a "stop now, try to verify warrant immediately" case. /8/ The court of appeals relied exclusively on Florida v. Royer, supra, for its conclusion that the stop in this case was impermissible under Terry and its progeny (see App., infra, 6a-7a). But the Court in Royer held only that what had commenced as a reasonable investigative detention later escalated into "a more serious intrustion on (Royer's) personal liberty than is allowable on mere suspicion of criminal activity" (slip. op. 10-11). That escalation occurred only after Royer had been taken to "a police interrogation room, where the police, unsatisfied with previous explanations, sought to confirm their suspicions" (id. at 11). Clearly, the stop in the instant case never escalated to the level found objectionable in Royer. /9/ In addition to this Court's decisions, several court of appeals decisions likewise indicate -- explicitly or implicitly -- that the Terry doctrine applies when an officer has reasonable suspicion of past criminal activity. See, e.g., United States v. Roper, 702 F.2d 984, 989 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Mobley, 699 F.2d 172 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, No. 82-6441 (Apr. 25, 1983); United States v. Burnette, 698 F.2d 1038, 1047 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, No. 82-6532 (May 16, 1983); United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1268 n.8 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, No. 82-6305 (May 2, 1983); United States v. Streifel, 665 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Seni, 662 F.2d 277, 283 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982). /10/ Because the flyer was six days old, it was reasonable to anticipate that the information regarding respondent's participation in the robbery had ripened into probable cause. By the same token, the flyer was hardly so old that it should have been discarded as stale. /11/ The court below attempted to distinguish Hernandez on the basis that "the officer knew that the vehicle he stopped was thought to contain illegal aliens," and that "(h)is intrusion on the suspect's privacy was limited to the specific purpose of verifying or dispelling (the suspicion)" (App., infra, 8a). But here Officer Cope likewise knew that the vehicle he stopped contained a suspected robber, and his intrusion was limited to the specific purpose of determining whether a warrant for his arrest had been issued. At the time of the stop in Hernandez, the officer had no more information than Officer Cope did when he stopped respondent. /12/ In the instant case, there is no question that the St. Bernard police officer who issued the wanted flyer had ample reason to suspect respondent of the robbery based on Janie Hansford's "detailed handwritten statement" (App., infra, 2a). Indeed, the district court "concluded that Janie Hansford's statement actually provided the St. Bernard police with a sufficient basis for probable cause * * *" to arrest respondent (id. at 4a), a conclusion the court of appeals did not disturb. APPENDIX APPENDIX MATERIAL IS NOT AVAILABLE ON JURIS.