Detailed Information on the
Precision Weapons Programs Assessment

Continuing to resolve JASSM test issues so that the program can return to its full-rate production plan.

Continuing to find production and management efficiencies in all three programs to achieve lower Procurement Average Unit Costs on an annual basis.

Measure: Attainment of JSOW Block III Initial Operating Capability

Explanation:The key component of the Block III capability is the successful addition of a Moving Target Indicator to the JSOW missile. This addition will provide Combatant Commanders an added capability for hitting ground targets from a standoff distance, thus avoiding putting pilots and aircraft in harm's way.

Measure: Number of Units Procured

Explanation:Number of each weapons system (JSOW, JASSM, and SDB) produced each year.

Measure: Planned program cost ($ millions)

Explanation:The total planned cost in a fiscal year to procurement the planned quantity of each missile.

Measure: Total quantity of missiles produced through FY 2011

Explanation:These quantities represent the sum of the total number of missiles procured annually in each program from FY2007 through FY2011. Since these quantities are the sum of annual targets, this long-term cumulative purchase quantity goal will be affected in annual targets are not met. This measure directly supports the program's purpose of providing Combatant Commanders with a robust inventory of precision air-to-ground munitions with which to destroy ground targets from a standoff distance.

Measure: Total program cost through FY2011 to produce targeted quantities

Explanation:These figures represent the cumulative cost of the annual purchases for each program from FY2007 through FY2011, and support the long-term program goal of providing Combatant Commanders with a robust inventory of air-to-ground munitions within cost.

Measure: Procurement Average Unit Cost for entire purchase through FY2011

Explanation:

Measure: Procurement Average Unit Costs

Explanation:Precision Munition programs measure efficiencies by the extent to which they achieve unit cost targets. Lower-than-anticipated unit costs reflect the achievement of efficiencies in program management and/or execution. Precision munitions programs have succeeded in achieving efficiencies in certain years, and not met targets in other years. In certain cases, targets are not achieved either due to congressional reductions resulting in lower volume purchases (which result in increased unit costs), or new contracts that include terms and prices that differ from the ones on which the targets were originally based.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: The purpose of the the Department of Defense's Air-to Ground Precision Munitions program is to meet the Combatant Commanders' (COCOM) mission needs for engaging and destroying enemy ground targets at a "standoff" distance -- from beyond the range of air defenses -- during a military operation. The program meets this need by developing and procuring a planned number of munitions at or below projected costs. Each precision munition provides specific capabilities to satisfy this need, and the entire program provides Combatant Commanders with a menu of options with which to fulfill their missions. While the entire "program" consists of a number of different weapon systems, this evaluation will focus on three major systems currently or soon-to-be in production: The Joint Stand-off Weapon (JSOW); Small Diameter Bomb (SDB); and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM).

Evidence: Evidence: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), "Conventional Engagement Capability Roadmap, Version 0" (OSD CECR) defines the purpose of DoD's Air-to-Ground munitions program.

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: DoD's arsenal of precision air-to-ground standoff weapons addresses the need for the ability to suppress enemy air defenses and destroy ground targets from beyond the range of area defenses, thereby greatly reducing both cost and risk to pilots and aircraft.

Evidence: The various requirements documents generated by the JCIDS process and validated and approved by the JROC document the mission needs and capability gaps to be met by the above precision guided weapons. The CERC also identifies these needs and gaps.

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: Each weapon in this program is specifically designed to to engage and defeat land targets while being fired from a DoD fixed-wing, rotary-wing, or unmanned aerial asset. There are no substitutes among other Federal, state, local or private efforts for these capabilities or missions. Moreover, each precision munition has requirements and capabilities documents that describe the mission need and capability gap that the weapon is designed to meet. These documents aim to ensure that duplicative programs are not sustained within the Department of Defense.

Evidence: Operational Requirements Docuements, Joint Capabilities Documents, and the OSD CECR all detail the unique mission that the Air-to-Ground munitions program fulfills.

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: DoD's precision munitions program is well-designed and well-executed, and the program offices for each weapon system have the tools necessary to achieve results in a timely, efficient manner. The program roadmap lays out an achievable design that is free of major flaws.

Evidence: The OSD CECR details the program's goals and means for measuring and achieving theses goals. This roadmap and the program's performance to date, as evidenced in acquisition reports and independent reviews, show no major flaws that might limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency.

Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?

Explanation: The Air-to-Ground Precision Munitions program has a track record of using resources requested by the President and appropriated by Congress to provide the intended beneficiaries -- US combat forces -- with a set of effective and highly sought-after capabilities. Resources are allocated in the the Planning, Programming and Budget Execution process and then targeted to each program within the framework of the Department of Defense Acquisition System. Precision-guided weapons are currently in high demand by operational commanders in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

Evidence: The President's Budget and Selected Acquisition Reports (SARS) for each program indicate that the program design is effectively targeted so that budgeted resources are allocated by each individual program office such that desired precision munition capabilities reach airmen in the field.

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: The Department of Defense's goal is to produce a total of XXX precision munitions at a cost of $xxxxxx through fiscal year (FY) 2013 [Insert PB08 figures when available]. Each specific program that is part of the Department's precision munitions program also has production and cost targets through FY 2013. Progress towards achieving the cumulative targets through FY2013 measures the success of the program in fulfilling its purpose of providing commanders with an inventory of precision munitions from which to choose. Since the purpose of the program is to provide an inventory of munitions for combatant commanders, measures of program success are better labeled "output" than "outcome". This program produces an output which then will be used by commanders to achieve an outcome sought by policymakers.

Evidence: Documents include: Acquisition Program Baselines, SARs, the FY2008 President's Budget, and the OSD CECR.

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: As of the FY2007 President's Budget, the three main precision munitions programs had the following production targets through FY2011: SDB: 12,941 weapons and 2,000 carriages; JSOW: 3,214 weapons; JASSM: 1,917 weapons. In addition, Increment I of the SDB program is on an aggressive schedule allowing for only 18 months from entry into Systems Development and Demonstration to entry into Low Rate Initial Production. The JSOW Block III program seeks to deliver a moving target capability in 2010. These are considered quite aggressive measures for a defense acquisition program.

Evidence: FY2007 President's Budget, program plans and schedules, and OSD CECR.

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: The President's Budget contains annual production and cost targets for each weapon and associated components that are measures of how well the program is achieving its purpose of providing an inventory of precision munitions for combat commanders. The success of each system can be measured by the extent to which planned quantities of weapons are produced on-time and at or below planned costs. The production targets for FY2008 in the FY2007 President's Budget are the production of 272 JASSMs for $233.8 million, 421 JSOWs for $131.6 million, and 1,395 SDBs for $96.2 million. Since the purpose of the program is to provide an inventory of munitions for combatant commanders, measures of program success are better labeled "output" than "outcome". This program produces an output which then will be used by commanders to achieve an outcome sought by policymakers.

Evidence: Annual President's Budget submissions, Acquisition Program Baselines, SARs, and Milestone Entrance/Exit Criteria.

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: Each system in the precision munitions program has an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) that provides threshold and objective targets for cost, schedule, and performance. Annual budget submissions also include ambitious production and cost targets that ultimately determine whether the program is staying on schedule and within budget. The current plan calls for the production of well over 1,000 air-to-ground munitions annually.

Evidence: An analysis of the Program and President's Budget documentation provides details on programs' progress based on previous estimates of costs, contract award dates, and delivery schedules. Acquisition Program Baselines (APBs) provide threshold and objective targets for cost, schedule and performance.

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: The overall strong performance of the precision munitions program in meeting annual production and cost targets demonstrates that prime contractors and sub-contractors are fully committed to the program. In particular, the JSOW program earned the Department of Defense's FY2005 David Packard Excellence in Acquisition Award and the FY2004 DoD Value Engineering Award for significant unit cost savings achieved largely due to contractor re-investment. In addition, Lockheed Martin has responded to recent JASSM test failures by undertaking a number of actions to improve sub-contractor performance and product testing.

Evidence: Past and recent President's Budgets and SARs for each weapon indicate that the precision munitions program has been successful in meeting production and cost targets. Contracts for each weapon list the obligations of sub and prime contractors to achieving program goals.

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reviewed each major weapon in the precision munitions program since 2005. In addition, precision weapons programs experience several forums for independent evaluations within the DoD as they move through the Defense Acquisition Life Cycle. At different points in the life cycle, the programs are reviewed by the OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG), the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD AT&L), and Overarching Integrated Product Teams (OIPTs) comprising executives from across the Department.

Evidence: GAO-06-391 - Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs, GAO-05-301 - Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs, OSD(CAIG) Independent Cost Estimates, Technology Readiness Assessments, Beyond Low-Rate Initial Production Reports, OIPT reports.

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: Annual President's Budget submissions for each weapon system in the program directly tie resources requested to planned production and cost levels over the 5-year Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). Budget requests describe each system's plan and provide rationale for both annual and long-term production quantities and funding requested. Each program's submission reports the full costs of procurement, including production and support costs, contractor incentives, tech support, training, and program office support costs.

Evidence: Past and present President's Budget justifications detail annual and long-term quantity and funding requests. These cost and production targets are the key annual and long-term measures for how well the program is fulfilling its purpose of supplying warfighters with standoff precision weapons that can destroy enemy targets from beyond the range of air defenses.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: DoD's precision munition program is well-planned and well-executed. Program managers continue to apply lessons learned from current combat operations to improve weapon capabilities within budgeted costs and schedules.

Evidence: The Conventional Engagement Capabilities Roadmap provides a plan for precision munitions programs, lists goals, and addresses actions that are being taken to achieve these goals. The various systems continue to be developed and procured largely on schedule and within cost.

Has the agency/program conducted a recent, meaningful, credible analysis of alternatives that includes trade-offs between cost, schedule, risk, and performance goals, and used the results to guide the resulting activity?

Explanation: Program offices have conducted analyses of alternatives for each of the systems that comprise the precision munitions program. These analyses have been used to evaluate weapon cost effectiveness and risk both at the outset of system development and later in the production cycle. In particular, the JSOW program office used a Cost as Independent Variable (CAIV) analysis to look at the question of whether JSOW was the best choice for the Department of Defense in light of the new security environment. The results of this analysis were used to guide production decisions on the newest JSOW variant, known as the JSOW-C.

Evidence: JSOW Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) dated April 1995; CAIV study plan and implementation briefings by the Cost Performance IPT March - October 1998; Single Acquisition Management Plan for JSOW Unitary MS-III December 2004; SDB I Miniature Munitions Capability AoA dated October 2000; JASSM Analysis of Alternatives.

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: DoD regularly reviews performance information for the precision munitions program and, based on the information, makes budget and program decisions. The Department regularly collects appropriate data as required to assess and improve program performance in meeting all Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) objectives and thresholds and reports on that performance as required by DoD 5000 regulations. Cost accounting data is collected for smaller contracts, while Earned Value Management is exercised on the larger contracts.

Evidence: President's Budget submissions, SARs, APBs annual OSD Program Budget Decisions, and periodic Acquisition Decision memoranda all consist of performance information used to manage and improve program performance. The SDB and JASSM program offices submit monthly acquisition reports in the System Metric and Reporting Tool (SMART) that identify progress in meeting cost, schedule, and performance parameters.

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: Program Managers are held accountable for program performance in annual performance reviews and Earned Value Management data that is used to measure program performance. Contractors' adherence to cost, schedule and performance objectives is reported to acquisition executives via Program Deviation Reports (PDRs, and to defense and congressional leadership via Defense Acquisition Executive Summaries (DAES) and Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs). In addition, contractor performance in meeting contract requirements for cost, schedule, quality, subcontract management, engineering and production performance is measured and reported annually through Formal Contractor Performance Assessment Reports (CPARs). The CPAR reports are used by DoD/other Government program's as a weighted factor in assessing the contractor's past performance for consideration during formal competitive contract source selection evaluations. To date, contractor performance has been strong in the precision munitions program.

Evidence: Defense Acqusition Executive Summaries, SARs, JASSM Acquisition Program Baseline signed 14 July 04; SDB Increment I Acquisition Baseline signed 20 April 05; JSOW Acquisition Program Baseline signed 20 December 04. In addition, this program uses a mix of firm fixed priced contracts, which provide incentive for contractors to perform by placing all risk for cost/schedule overruns on the contractor, and cost plus incentive contracts, which reward the contractor for meeting program targets.

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner, spent for the intended purpose and accurately reported?

Explanation: Funds requested by the President and appropriated by Congress are obligated in a timely manner, spent for the intended purpose, and accurately reported. Precision weapons programs continually measure performance plans and forecasts of obligations and expenditures against goals set by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. JSOW, SDB and JASSM consistently meet performance metrics in this area. Precision munitions systems' strong track records of meeting production targets indicates that funds are being obligated for intended purposes.

Evidence: Obligation data provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Comptroller, GAO Assessments of Selected Major Weapons Programs, monthly financial reports for program managers, Air Force SMART reports.

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: Each precision weapon system program seeks to achieve efficiency by lowering weapon unit costs. These unit cost efficiencies are measured and achieved for precision munitions using cost models, contractual incentives to promote capital re-investment by contractors, Earned Value Management, and competition for contracts. Each weapon system program office employs a mix of these procedures to measure and achieve increased unit cost efficiencies in program execution. For FY2008, unit cost targets for JSOW, JASSM, and SDB are $313,000, $860,000, and $69,000, respectively.

Evidence: Joint Common Cost Model, the Navy's Long Term Pricing Agreement (LTPA) for JSOW, Earned Value Management for SDB Increment I.

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: The multiple weapon systems programs that constitute DoD's precision munitions program collaborate in a number of forums. The Navy and Air Force align their respective air-to-ground weapons programs within the same program office and have established a Joint Networked Weapons Collaborative (JNWC) Team. In addition, representatives from the program offices actively participate in the Department's Land Attack Weapons Capability Area Review Integrated Product Team (IPT), which seeks to promote "jointness" between Services, and helped author the Department's Conventional Engagement Capability Roadmap (Version 0).

Evidence: Program organization charts, CERC. Examples of JNWC collaboration include: (1) Obtaining National Security Agency (NSA) participation in solving common encryption engine/key handling management issues for all four weapons programs; (2) writing of Capabilities Development Document (CDD), Capabilities Production Document (CPD), (3) developing joint Key Performance Parameters (KPPs), (4) sharing information on Data Link hardware options (Link-16/UHF/Beyond Line Of Sight) for JSOW Block III, Harpoon Block III, JASSM and SDB II to promote commonality.

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: DoD's financial management system is being improved, but slowly. No audit reports showing that precision munitions programs are free of internal control or other financial management weaknesses have been provided.

Evidence: There are no reports that specifically cite DoD rotary wing aircraft programs for material financial weaknesses; however, none of the audits specifically looked at that aspect of the programs. Numerous audits document DoD's financial management weaknesses. Because of the magnitude of the problem, DoD is unlikely to obtain an unqualified opinion for some time.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: In response to multiple JASSM test failures, the Air Force and the contractor have increased testing, oversight over suppliers, and production product verification activities. In addition to these changes, the contractor has modified its change control board procedures in accordance with the Air Force's guidance to ensure more rigorous review of engineering changes prior to their introduction into production and to enable greater Air Force insight into any substantial changes made in production hardware or processes.

Evidence: JASSM test failures have decreased in the latest round of testing. The program's overall strong management is evidenced by each system's strong reviews in SARs and DAES reports, and by the multiple acquisition awards these systems have won.

Is the program managed by maintaining clearly defined deliverables, capability/performance characteristics, and appropriate, credible cost and schedule goals?

Explanation: Precision munition program deliverables, capability/performance characteristics, and appropriate, credible cost and schedule goals are clearly defined in each weapon's Acquisition Program Baseline document, President's Budget justification documents, and Key Performance Parameter documents. The overall performance of the program in meeting cost and schedule goals is quite strong, indicating that these goals have been and continue to be credible.

Evidence: Acquistion Program Baselines, President's Budget submissions, Key Performance Parameters, GAO reports.

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: Since the long-term production and cost targets for the precision munitions program are a sum of the annual targets, the program's success at achieving long-term goals is a function of how well each system meets its annual goals. To date, JSOW, JASSM, and SDB have met their goals to a large extent. Each program has consistently met or come close to meeting its planned annual production quantities, while in certain cases production targets have not been met due to congressional reductions. In SDB's first year of production, 2005, the program actually exceeded its planned purchase by 41 bombs at a lower cost than planned. In the case of JASSM, recent multiple test failures in the program caused a large reduction in funding for the program in fiscal year 2006 that could impact long-term performance goals if these technical problems are not resolved.

Evidence: GAO reviews, SARs, and DAES reports for each weapon system reflect the program's solid achievement of long-term cost and production objectives; Conference Report 109-359 accompanying P.L. 109-148 (FY2006 Defense Appropriations Act) notes the JASSM concerns that led to Congress' reduction of funding for the program in FY2006.

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: Overall, the precision munitions program has succeeded in meeting its annual production and cost targets. The JSOW program consistently meets its annual performance goals, with 100% on-time delivery ratings of planned production quantities for the past 2 years. In addition, the program performed better than the objective values on the majority of Key Performance Parameters. The SDB program has met all threshold performance, schedule and cost requirements in the Acquisition Program Baseline. The JASSM program has met price objectives through 4 production lots, and all delivery requirements have been met. However, JASSM has had multiple flight test failures. Although the program is making progress in resolving these issues, the failures caused the program to be funded only to the amount needed to sustain minimum production in FY2006 -- 225 fewer missiles than were programmed in the FY2006 budget request.

Evidence: The February 2006 SARs provide the latest annual assessment of performance against established objectives and thresholds for each program. The FY2006 and FY2007 President's Budgets document the annual production and cost targets for each system and the reduced FY2006 JASSM purchase. Conference Report 109-359 accompanying the FY2006 Defense Appropriations Act details Congress' reduction of the FY2006 JASSM purchase due to test failures.

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: Both JSOW and SDB have demonstrated improved efficiencies and cost effectiveness each year by reducing munition unit costs. JSOW unit costs for FY2006 were reduced by 28% compared to the FY2006 estimate in the FY2005 President's Budget, largely due to contractor capital re-investment and cost reduction measures. However, JASSM unit costs increased from $721,000 to $774,000, and may increase more in FY2006 due to the smaller quantity of JASSMs to be produced in this fiscal year.

Evidence: February 2006 Selected Acquisition Reports for each program.

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: Compared to other DoD programs that provide critical capabilities to troops in the field, the precision munitions program has a very strong track record of meeting production and cost targets, achieving cost efficiencies, and providing a large inventory of munitions that are in high demand from operational commanders. Specifically, the JSOW program has received multiple awards within the DoD acquisition community for its achievement, and the JASSM program received DoD's excellence in acquisition award in 2002. Individually and collectively, these programs compare very favorably with other DoD acquisition programs.

Evidence: In 2005, the JSOW program was selected to receive the David Packard Award for Excellence in Acquisition award for implementing an innovative, best-practices acquisition strategy that saved the Navy $133M over five years and an estimated additional $421M over the life of the program while maintaining the same or better performance. The JASSM program received this award in 2002. Additionally, the JSOW program was awarded the DoD FY 2004 Value Engineering Award for cost reduction, the Raytheon CEO Six Sigma Award for Lean Initiatives; and was 1st Runner Up for the Naval Air Systems Command Commander's Award.

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: GAO reviews of the systems comprising the precision munitions program are generally very positive, and indicate that these systems are, for the most part, effective and achieving results. JSOW and SDB are both on cost and on schedule, and achieving significant decreases in unit costs. GAO does note that JASSM's test failures have slowed the program a bit. Although JASSM has experienced small growth in average unit costs, however, it still compares well in this regard with the majority of DoD acquisition programs.

Evidence: GAO-05-301 and GAO-06-391, Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.

Were program goals achieved within budgeted costs and established schedules?

Explanation: The precision munitions program has achieved almost all of its program goals within budgeted costs and established schedules. The various acquisition awards that individual programs have won within DoD are evidence of the program's overall success in meeting its cost and schedule targets and providing a critical capability to combatant commanders. Although JASSM has experienced small growth in average unit costs, it still compares well in this regard with the majority of DoD acquisition programs.

Evidence: Selected Acquistion Reports, Presdent's Budet submissions, GAO reports.