Detailed Information on the
Secret Service: Domestic Protectees Assessment

Continue performing environmental scanning to ensure that protective doctrine and the program's countermeasures keep pace with emerging threats.

Provide program managers with program-level performance reports, including efficiency measures.

Continue to ensure that effectiveness, efficiency and return on investment are emphasized as key components of program evaluations.

Providing program managers with program-level performance reports, including efficiency measures.

Revising how program evaluations are conducted to ensure that efficiency is incorporated as a key component of evaluations.

Reviewing efficiency index to incorporate where possible variables (such as threat level) that may impact workload and other efficiency factors.

Performing environmental scanning to ensure that protective doctrine and the program's countermeasures keep pace with emerging threats.

Continuing to provide program managers with program-level performance reports, including efficiency measures.

Measure: Campaign Protection Efficiency Index

Explanation:This measure indicates whether the program used more or less resources (relative to the previous campaign period) to accomplish a comparable program outcome. This measure pertains only to the Campaign Protection program (excludes Domestic Protectees).

Measure: Protectee Travel Stops

Explanation:This output measure represents the level of travel by protectees, and is workload indicator used in internal management decision-making. A stop is considered a city or other definable subdivision visited by a protectee. As a rule, risk and the level of effort required to provide security increases dramatically when a protectee is traveling. Because the number of stops in a given year is completely driven by the protectees, the target given should be interpreted as an estimate.

Measure: Domestic Protectee Efficiency Index

Explanation:This measure indicates whether the program is using more or less resources in the measured fiscal year, compared to the four year average based period, to accomplish a comparable program outcome. This measure pertains only to the Domestic Protectees program (excludes Campaign Protection).

Measure: Percentage of National Special Security Events that were successfully completed

Explanation:This measure is a percentage of the total number of NSSEs completed in a Fiscal Year that were successful. A successfully completed NSSE is one where once the event has commenced, a security incident(s) inside the Secret Service-protected venue did not preclude the event's agenda from proceeding to its scheduled conclusion.

Measure: Percentage of time incident-free protection is provided to persons inside the White House Complex and Vice President's Residence

Explanation:This measure represents the percentage of persons (protectees, staff/employees, guests, and the public) who receive incident-free protection while inside the White House Complex or the Vice President's Residence. An incident is defined as someone who is assaulted or receives an injury from an attack with a prohibited weapon while inside the White House Complex or Vice President's Residence. The performance target is always 100%. Anything under 100% is unnacceptable.

Measure: Percentage of instances domestic protectees arrive and depart safely

Explanation:The security of protectees is the ultimate priority of the Secret Service. As a rule, risk and the level of effort required to provide security increase dramatically when a protectee is traveling. This measure represents the percentage of travel stops where the protectee arrives and departs safely. The performance target is always 100%. Anything under 100% is unnacceptable. Note that this measure is inclusive of the Secret Service's Domestic Protectees and Campaign Protection programs; put another way, the measure is inclusive of all Secret Service protectees except visiting foreign dignitaries.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: The Domestic Protectees (DP) program's primary purpose is to protect our Nation's leaders. To achieve this purpose, the program operates to ensure protectees' physical protection and to protect the buildings and grounds where our Nation's highest leaders reside and work (e.g., White House Complex, Vice President's Residence). In 1998 (pursuant to Presidential Decision Directive-62 [PDD-62]), the program's purpose expanded to include the design, coordination, and implementation of operational security plans for "National Special Security Events" (NSSEs). Unlike the protection of our Nation's leaders (which the program operates literally 365 days a year, 24 hours a day to achieve), the DP program designs, coordinates, and implements operational security plans for NSSEs on an "as needed" basis (pursuant to NSSE designation determinations by the Secretary of Homeland Security). There have been 21 NSSEs since 1998.

Evidence: 18 U.S.C. 3056; 3 U.S.C. 202; USSS mission statement; Various internal USSS policy directives; "National Special Security Events" (a secretservice.gov web page); List of NSSEs (1998-present)

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: The assassinations of Abraham Lincoln, James Garfield, William McKinley, and John F. Kennedy (and the attempted assassinations of other Presidents) clearly demonstrate the need for protecting our Nation's highest leader - the President of the United States. Protection of the Vice President (as first in the Presidential line of succession) is a logical extension of this need. The history of actual and attempted assassinations of candidates seeking the Presidency (e.g., Robert F. Kennedy - 1968) and former Presidents (e.g., George H.W. Bush - 1993) clearly demonstrates the need for protecting both. Terrorist and other criminal threats to a leader can be direct (assassinating, kidnapping, or otherwise harming a leader), or indirect (assassinating, kidnapping, or otherwise harming a leader's family member in the attempt to secure political or economic demands); commensurate with such risk, the program's protection also extends to family members of certain protectees. In addition to terrorist and criminal threats, protection also addresses medical incidents, emergency preparedness, and natural disasters. As threat circumstances have evolved and heightened, the number of the DP program's protectees has been enlarged by statute (18 U.S.C. 3056, as amended) and by Presidential directive over time. Leader protection remains a contemporary challenge, recently articulated in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Strategic Plan as follows: "We will protect our nation's leaders . . . from all threats, including terrorists and other criminals; natural, technological and man-made emergencies; and preventable accidents." The vulnerability of large, public, visible events to terrorist attack is a national security problem that resulted in President Clinton's issuance of PDD-62, which designated the Secret Service as the lead Federal agency for the design, coordination, and implementation of operational security plans for NSSEs. (18 U.S.C. 3056, as amended, codifies this role.) Security at NSSEs is crucial to national security in that these events, by definition, involve persons, institutions, and landmarks that are integral to the governance of the Nation, vital to national and/or global economic stability, or symbolically important to American citizens. An attack occurring at an NSSE could upset the democratic process, compromise the capacity of elected officials to perform their duties, and/or undermine confidence in national security - which may in turn have long-range impact on the credibility of the government and the well-being of the economy. Moreover, NSSEs are usually attended by large numbers of people and are well-covered by the media, making such events attractive targets for terrorists seeking to inflict mass casualties, create psychological damage, and disrupt civil order.

Evidence: "Presidential Facts" (excerpt from The World Almanac and Book of Facts 2004), published by the World Almanac Education Group, Inc.; "U.S. Constitution: Twenty-Fifth Amendment" (from findlaw.com); "About Robert F. Kennedy" (from rfkmemorial.org); "A Case Not Closed" (Seymour Hersh, the New Yorker, 11/1/93), excerpt; Protection Development timeline; Various internal USSS policy directives; 18 U.S.C. 3056; "A Day in the Life of Homeland Security" (from DHS Strategic Plan); DHS Strategic Plan, Objective 3.4;"National Special Security Events" (a secretservice.gov web page); "National Special Security Events" (article from nyjt.com)

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: The DP program is neither redundant nor duplicative of any other Federal, state, local, or private protective effort. The Secret Service has the sole statutory responsibility for the protection of our Nation's highest leaders; no other program meets the protection needs of this population of individuals. While other law enforcement entities (Federal, state, local, and foreign) play critical roles in the overall security framework associated with protectees' travel (local, domestic, and foreign), the DP program clearly occupies the sole lead role in coordinating and organizing the large and complex, multi-jurisdictional security presence necessary to protect our Nation's leaders. Duplication and overlapping of effort are avoided by the program's design: the Secret Service's protective methodology delineates inner, middle, and outer rings of security. Partnering agencies' roles are determined on the basis of their respective jurisdictions (whether statutory or delegated). While other agencies do play various roles with respect to the security of NSSEs, Presidential directives delineate the Secret Service's role (the lead Federal agency responsible for the design, coordination, and implementation of operational security plans) from other Federal agencies' roles (i.e., crisis and consequence management, or "incident management"). The availability of state and local resources is a major factor in the NSSE designation process; in cases where an event is designated as an NSSE, the human and physical resources of the Federal Government augment, not supplant, state and local governments' human and physical assets. In summary, the DP program's role with respect to NSSEs is neither redundant nor duplicative of that of other agencies - Federal, state, or local.

Evidence: 18 U.S.C. 3056; USSS Strategic Plan, pages 6-7; Various internal USSS briefing slides; "National Special Security Events" (a secretservice.gov web page)

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: The Secret Service's responsibility to protect our Nation's leaders and to design, coordinate, and implement operational security plans for NSSEs is statutory; therefore, the DP program is "direct federal" and the Federal Government could not delegate associated responsibilities to state, local, or private entities through a "grant" or "regulatory" program design. The program's design (its heavy reliance on agents in the field to perform protective functions) is not only effective (see Section 4) but also efficient: field resources (ordinarily focused on the Secret Service's investigative programs that further DHS' strategic objective of economic security) are re-directed to DP program activities based on protectees' travel itineraries, NSSE venue locales, and variances in national and regional threat levels. This re-direction of resources occurs in two primary ways: (1) Permanent protectees, such as the President and the Vice President, have protective details of special agents assigned to them on a long-term basis; special agents assigned to Secret Service field offices provide critical manpower in the area of "post-standing" when these protectees travel. (2) Temporary protectees, such as Presidential candidates and their spouses, have protective details staffed with special agents on temporary assignment to the investigative rotation ("ROTA"). This "surge capacity" of the field to perform protective functions (with staffing levels dependent upon threat assessments), then to resume investigative functions, makes the DP program both largely unique and highly efficient. Absent the Secret Service's dual mission, two highly inefficient DP program structures would be conceivable: (a) locating large numbers of DP-dedicated personnel in field offices throughout the nation (which would be inefficient in terms of idle manhours between protectees' visits) or (b) making each protectee's detail self-sufficient in terms of post-standers (which would be cost-prohibitive in terms both additional staffing and travel expenses). Also lost would be the demonstrated value of a constant field agent presence in communities nationwide and worldwide - partnerships forged and maintained in the course of the field's investigative functions have proven invaluable with respect to bringing about the state and local law enforcement participation needed to support protective visits. The DP program routinely extends its impact by leveraging contributions from other parties. Protecting our Nation's leaders, as well as the design, coordination, and implementation of NSSE security designs, would be impossible absent the contributions of Federal, state, and local law enforcement and public safety partners, as well as the U.S. military. These partners perform critical functions in areas such as perimeter security, traffic enforcement, emergency preparedness, transportation, communications, airspace security, explosive ordnance disposal, etc. The leveraging of inter-agency contributions is particularly critical in campaign years, which are markedly travel intensive. In the 2004 campaign, for example, 2,300 agents of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement - at the request of the Secret Service - provided approximately 43,000 perimeter security manhours in support of candidate protection.

Evidence: 18 U.S.C. 3056; Various internal USSS workload statistics, briefing slides, and reports; List of USSS field offices

Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?

Explanation: The DP program targets and provides protection only to individuals designated by statute or Presidential directive. The program does not provide protection to other government officials, or to any other unintended beneficiaries. For purposes of larger detail staffing (i.e., Presidential Protective Division [PPD] and Vice Presidential Protective Division [VPD]), manpower is largely independent of the occupant of the office; it is based on the shift structure and attendant supervisory controls necessary to protect these leaders. For purposes of smaller detail staffing (e.g., former Presidents, Presidential candidates), the Office of Protective Operations (OPO) targets limited resources taking a variety of considerations into account for each protectee (e.g., number and location of residences and offices, nature and frequency of travel, threat assessments). To meet program purposes, limited and specific resources are targeted commensurate with risk. For purposes of individual travel stops, the conduct of "advances" drives the targeting of program resources (for all protectees). An Advance Team surveys the site to be visited, identifies site vulnerabilities, determines the security arrangements necessary to counter those vulnerabilities, and plans and implements corresponding security arrangements. The Advance Team's determinations as to the nature, scope, and complexity of the local threat environment inform program management's targeting and deployment of appropriate resources (e.g., manpower, equipment, specialized tactical units) in protective operations. The program uses a steering committee structure to achieve the design and coordination of operational security plans for NSSEs. An NSSE steering committee structure is, in effect, a larger and longer version of an advance associated with a protectee's travel stop. The steering committee ensures that available state and local resources are augmented rather than supplanted by the Federal security presence at the NSSE.

Evidence: Various internal USSS policy directives and organizational charts

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: The DP program's long-term performance measures are (1) the percentage of instances domestic protectees arrive and depart safely, (2) the percentage of time incident-free protection is provided to persons inside the White House Complex and Vice President's Residence (NEW MEASURE), and (3) the percentage of National Special Security Events that were successfully completed (NEW MEASURE). (See Measures Tab for a definition and description of all three measures). All three measures explicitly support the program's purpose (articulated in Response #1.1); all three measures are outcome measures.

Evidence: Fiscal Year 2006 Congressional Budget Justification; Description of Future Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP) system; FYHSP database excerpts; Performance Based Budget Highlights by Program

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: The nature of the protective mission demands that targets for the DP program's long-term performance measures be the complete safety of domestic protectees (100% instances of domestic protectees' safe arrival and departure); 100% safety of persons inside the White House Complex and the Vice President's Residence (zero assaults or injuries from attack with a prohibited weapon inside these facilities); and the successful completion of 100% of commenced NSSEs (zero events precluded from proceeding to their scheduled conclusion by a security incident inside the Secret Service-protected venue). Anything short of 100% targets for each of the program's three long-term outcome measures is unsatisfactory. The targets not only promote, but demand, continual program improvement, as follows: with the increasingly sophisticated evolvement of the threat environment, securing protected persons, facilities, and events consistent with 100% target levels requires continual improvement, particularly regarding optimal resource allocation (e.g., manpower, systems, assets). Clear baseline data (see Measures Tab) exist for all long-term outcome measures.

Evidence: FYHSP database excerpts; Fiscal Year 2006 Congressional Budget Justification; Performance Based Budget Highlights by Program

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: The DP program's long-term goals are to ensure the physical protection of domestic protectees and to prevent terrorism directed toward domestic protectees, protected facilities, and citizens and visitors at NSSEs. The DP program's annual performance measures, which demonstrate progress towards achieving these goals are (1) the percentage of instances domestic protectees arrive and depart safely, (2) the percentage of time incident-free protection is provided to persons inside the White House Complex and Vice President's Residence (NEW MEASURE) and (3) the percentage of NSSEs that were successfully completed (NEW MEASURE). The DP program's long-term and annual outcome measures are identical (targets are 100% for and across all timeframes) because the ongoing, complete safety of protectees and the successful completion of all protected events are synonymous with the program's mission; interim targets below 100% that build incrementally towards 100% would be unacceptable to the program, the Secret Service, the Federal Government, and the taxpayer. The program also has an output measure (Travel Stops) that demonstrates progress toward long-term goals. In addition, the program has an efficiency measure indicating whether the program is using more or less resources in the current year, versus the four year average based period, to accomplish a comparable program outcome. (The Evidence Section discusses the efficiency measure in greater detail).

Evidence: Performance Based Budget Highlights by Program; FYHSP database excerpts; Fiscal Year 2006 Congressional Budget Justification; Discussion of Efficiency Measures

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: The Secret Service collects and maintains historical protective data (baselines). The ambitious annual target for all three of the DP program's annual outcome measures (see Response #2.3) is 100%. The ambitious annual target for the program's efficiency measure is 1. The Measures Tab includes both a baseline and ambitious targets for each of the program's annual outcome measures (including new measures), and its efficiency measure. The Measures Tab includes baseline and target data for the program's output measure (Travel Stops); however, because the number of stops in a given year is protectee-driven, the target should be interpreted as an estimate of the number of stops that will occur (as opposed to a target of the number of stops to which the program aspires).

Evidence: Fiscal Year 2006 Congressional Budget Justification; Performance Based Budget Highlights by Program; FYHSP database excerpts

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: The program routinely works in partnership with numerous Federal, military, state, local, and international partners to ensure the protection of domestic protectees and NSSEs. Through Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), Letters of Agreement (LOAs), and other written and verbal agreements, partners provide an array of support (e.g., post-standers, emergency response, air patrols, airlift for Presidential and Vice Presidential travel, communications, geographic expertise), the effect of which is to contribute to the physical protection of domestic protectees. The Secret Service communicates schedule and performance expectations to partners in "Police Meetings" that precede a protectee's arrival in any jurisdiction. Given the level of state and local law enforcement resources needed to secure a protectee stop, the program outcome of consistently safe protectee arrivals and departures evidences our partners' ongoing contributions to program goals. From the perspective of outputs, partner contributions transparently link to program activities as follows: "Final Survey Reports" for every protectee stop list quantities of contributing partner personnel by both agency and type (K-9, highway patrol, etc.). PDD-62 requires Federal agencies to provide to the Secret Service any asset requested in support of NSSEs. Accordingly, the DP program relies on Federal and military partners' contributions to the design, coordination, and implementation of operational security plans for NSSEs. State, local, and private (e.g., Republican and Democratic National Committees) partners also make critical contributions to event security.

Evidence: Letter from FBI Director Mueller; Position Description for Assistant Director of Protective Operations (excerpt); Various Memoranda of Understanding; Various internal USSS policy directives, electronic messages, briefing slides, and security reports

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: Independent statisticians and analysts in the Secret Service's Quantitative Studies and Statistical Systems Branch use the Secret Service's Workload Statistical and Reporting System to provide DP managers with routine (at least monthly) reports containing performance indicators. The Branch uses the Statistical Analysis System tool to extrapolate data from the Service's operational systems and analyze the data for trends, projections, and other types of analyses of importance to program management. This process ensures that the Secret Service systematically obtains and uses performance feedback in order to evaluate and improve the DP program. The regularity of the data's dissemination is such that program effectiveness, in terms of achieving its measurable outcomes, is evaluated on a systematized and routine basis. Historically, other independent evaluations have "filled the gaps," answering questions that reflect broader management considerations not easily found in the DP program's performance data. For instance: (A) The Secret Service's Analytical Support Branch (ASB) conducts evaluations concerning process improvement, organizational restructuring, and the like. Examples of ASB evaluations addressing the DP program are its studies of (i) the appropriate level of administrative staffing levels for PPD, (ii) the respective roles of Washington area 24-hour communications centers, and (iii) the prospect of the merger of the Major Events and Dignitary Protective divisions. ASB is organizationally independent of the DP program. (B) An interagency working group (including Treasury, OMB) conducted a review to support program improvements by identifying the causes of increased attrition among new special agents and to study issues related to agents' diminished quality-of-life. (Note that the DP program's budget funds approximately half of the Secret Service's special agent FTE). A similar interagency working group conducted a comparable staffing review of the Uniformed Division. (Note that the DP program's budget funds the majority of the Uniformed Division.) (C) The White House Security Review, conducted by the Department of the Treasury, was a comprehensive independent evaluation pertaining to program effectiveness with regards to the security of the President of the United States and White House Complex. (D) Federal, state, and local law enforcement partners participate in interagency, pre-event "Table Top" exercises that evaluate the DP program's operational security plans for dimensions (e.g., command and control, response times) critical to a program outcome measure - successful completion of NSSEs. The G-8 Summit, Republican National Convention, and Democratic National Convention were NSSEs subject to interagency "Table Top" evaluation in 2004.

Evidence: Re-weighting explanation and performance system graphics; Management and Organization Division functional responsibility statement; Management and Organization Division organization chart; USSS intranet page - Quantitative Studies and Statistical Systems; USSS intranet page - Analytical Support Branch; Executive summaries of various internal USSS studies; Documentation of interagency working group studies; Excerpts of the Public Report of the White House Security Review; Various internal USSS workload statistics, organization charts, and exercise descriptions

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: The Secret Service organizes its budget into six program areas, including Domestic Protectees. Each program area represents a specific amount within the Secret Service's base budget, linked to the performance measures present in each of the program areas. The Secret Service aligns each program budget request with the appropriate departmental strategic goal, bureau strategic goal, bureau strategic objective, program performance goal, and program performance measure. The FY 2006 Budget request for the DP program reflects the Secret Service's estimate of what the program needs in the budget year to accomplish its goal of 100% of instances of domestic protectees arriving and departing safely. With regard to funding, policy, and legislative changes, the FY 2006 budget request reflects the DP program's unfunded requirements for enhanced protective technologies, portable x-ray equipment, and planning for the upgrade of security around the White House; these initiatives address program goals directly and represent a $6.8 million funding change in the aggregate. Finally, the Secret Service's budget request reflects the full cost of the DP program, inclusive of indirect or "overhead" costs (e.g., retirement, training, technical security support, human resources, procurement support, finance and accounting) needed to attain program results. The FY 2006 Budget contains no request for Campaign Protection funding; campaign funding is a cyclical, not annual, requirement. PDD-62 (dated May, 1998) required Administration officials to submit an implementation plan (including needed funding changes) to the President within 120 days of the PDD's effective date. Seven years have passed since the issuance of PDD-62, however, the Administration has still not developed a comprehensive funding mechanism for NSSEs. As a result, NSSE security costs have been funded in an ad hoc manner (from a mix of the Counterterrorism Fund [the Department of the Treasury's then the Department of Homeland Security's], base appropriations [Domestic Protectees Program] and/or reprogrammed base appropriations, and emergency supplemental appropriations). Regardless of the funding source, resources used by the Secret Service for NSSEs do not exceed the amount needed to attain the program's goal of the successful completion of NSSE(s). These costs are driven by threat assessments and presented transparently by object class.

Evidence: Discussion of budget methodology; Various internal USSS workload statistics; President's Management Agenda self-assessment (Budget Performance Integration initiative); FHYSP database excerpts; Fiscal Year 2006 Congressional Budget Justification

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: The DP program has both specific, ambitious long-term performance goals and annual performance goals demonstrating progress toward them (see Response #2.1 through 2.3). In the Future Years Homeland Security Program, the Secret Service plans strategically for "outyear" issues such as Presidential campaign cycles and the addition of former Presidents' protective divisions. The program's primary resource (its manpower) is targeted strategically (see Response #1.5), however, the ever-evolving protective environment is such that even the most thorough of strategic planning cannot address the threats encountered operationally in program execution. Manpower needs expand and contract based on threat levels, tactical intelligence, protectee travel destinations, etc. A permanent staff within the Secret Service, the "Manpower and Operations Staff," temporarily assigns manpower to and from protective divisions and the field; this staff - by design - ensures on literally a daily basis that the DP program's resources are allocated to address contingencies that strategic planning cannot forecast.

Evidence: Various internal USSS policy directives; FYHSP database excerpts

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: The Secret Service systematically collects a wide range of performance information for all of its core programs, including the DP program. Automated systems that are integrated into normal business processes collect information that includes the inputs (e.g., manhours) and outputs (e.g., quantity of protectees' "stops") that support outcomes (e.g., protectees' safe arrivals and departures, incident-free protection to persons in the White House and Vice President's Residence, completed NSSEs). Data dating back decades exist for baselining purposes. Independent statisticians and analysts in the Secret Service's Quantitative Studies and Statistical Systems Branch apply quality control techniques to confirm data validity, and compile for program managers statistical reports that assist them in managing the performance of protective operations. Input data (manpower, overtime, hours out-of-district, etc.) are a key factor in program managers' allocation of resources (to ensure that manpower fatigue does not compromise program outcomes). Performance information is also useful in program managers' semi-annual office evaluations. Following each protectee travel stop, the Lead Advance Agent prepares a "Final Survey Report" for the Director of the Secret Service. This report contains information concerning the operational security arrangements associated with the visit; for example, the report documents vulnerabilities that were identified and unusual developments that occurred. The report also documents, by agency, program partner (Federal, state, local, and military) participation. The program stores Final Survey Reports on a shared drive where, as a matter of routine business practice, Lead Advance Agents' management of an advance (in 100% of instances) includes accessing and reviewing any historical Final Survey Reports pertaining to the visited jurisdiction. The creation, storage, and accessing of Final Survey Reports enhances DP program performance by providing the program with an "institutional memory" of critical information such as tactical and technical resources utilized, vulnerabilities, unusual developments, and the type and number of locally-available partner personnel. The program prepares a formal "After Action Report" following every NSSE. The bulk of an After Action Report consists of detailed "Event Observations and Recommendations" regarding every aspect of event security (e.g., assets used, command and control, manpower operations, credentialing, communications). By virtue of "Lessons Learned" pertaining to management actions and resource allocation, After Action Reports constitute a critical management tool for improving program performance in subsequent NSSEs.

Evidence: Various internal USSS workload statistics, security report templates, and policy directives

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: In October 2004, the Secret Service replaced its Senior Executive Service (SES) Performance Appraisal System with the Departmentally-standardized DHS SES Performance Appraisal System. This system supports the DHS-wide SES pay-for-performance system, now in effect. Within the DP program, this system is used to rate the performance of the Assistant Director of Protective Operations, the Deputy Assistant Directors of Protective Operations, the Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) of PPD, the SAIC of VPD, and the SAIC of the Dignitary Protective Division. The corresponding DHS appraisal form requires the rating official to state the extent to which each of these SES personnel "Achieves results by setting long-term and short-term objectives that are realistic and measurable, and contribute to the success of the Department's strategic plan, annual work plans, and/or key government-wide objectives. Work plans must include measures that balance the achievement of organizational objectives with customer satisfaction, and other stakeholder/employee perspectives." Performance standards in this section are tailored directly to the program that the individual SES manages; for DP program managers, such elements and measures focus on DHS' goal of "Protection" and DHS' objective to "Secure the physical safety of the President, Vice President, visiting world leaders and other protectees." The Secret Service communicates schedule and performance expectations and standards to partners in "Police Meetings" that precede a protectee's arrival in any jurisdiction. Given the level of staffing needed to secure a protectee stop, the program outcome of consistently safe protectee arrivals and departures evidences our partners' ongoing contributions to program goals.

Evidence: DHS Senior Executive Service performance appraisal; Position Description for Assistant Director of Protective Operations; Various internal USSS policy directives

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner and spent for the intended purpose?

Explanation: A portion of the DP program's budget falls into those categories that the Secret Service's Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and his Budget Staff centrally manage (this primarily includes, but is not limited to, personnel compensation, travel, and rent). The CFO also allocates a portion of the program's funding to the Office of Protective Operations (OPO). (OPO manages the following Secret Service programs: Domestic Protectees, Campaign Protection, and Foreign Protectees and Foreign Missions). The CFO's office ensures that all centrally-managed funds are obligated and outlayed in a timely manner (using the Department of Agriculture's National Finance Center as the Secret Service's pay agent, executing rental obligations in accordance with the General Services Administration Schedule, etc.) Each year, the Assistant Director for Protective Operations prepares a prioritized spending plan based on his constituent divisions' (PPD, VPD, former Presidents' protective divisions, etc.) competing requirements for funds. The Secret Service's CFO reviews the spending plan and provides OPO with annual funding to cover expense areas for which the office is responsible. The CFO's Budget Staff uses "status of funds" reports to ensure that OPO divisions' actual expenditures are timely obligations for purposes consistent with the approved spending plan and that very limited unobligated funds remain at the end of the year. OPO budget and finance specialists, in turn, monitor sub-allocations to the divisions (PPD, VPD, etc.) for which OPO is operationally and financially responsible. The DP program's budget funds compensation for all OPO personnel, excluding manhours devoted to foreign dignitary protection, whose parent program (Foreign Protectees and Foreign Missions) is a distinct Secret Service budget line item that was separately PART'ed. Also importantly, where agent and technical personnel in the field or in (non-OPO) headquarters divisions (e.g., Technical Security Division) dedicate a portion of their work-year to protective operations (e.g., post-standing, advances, NSSE security), the DP program's budget funds the corresponding portion of their compensation; this is accomplished using a "manhours" system that captures by activity the manhours of agent and technical personnel (e.g., Presidential protection, former president protection, candidate protection, and major events). Capturing these manhours associated with the DP program results in greater accuracy as to the program's full-cost to the Secret Service and the taxpayer.

Evidence: Obligation rates spreadsheets - FY 2004; Budget breakout - FY 2003 and FY 2004; Various internal USSS financial coding

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: The program has an efficiency measure indicating whether the program is using more or less resources in the current year, versus the four year average based period, to accomplish a comparable program outcome. (The Evidence Section discusses the efficiency measure in greater detail). The efficiency measure and its baseline and targets appear in the Measures Tab. The DP program has systemic procedures that result in efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution. Eleven examples follow, and the Evidence Binder discusses each: (1) The program practices systematic cost containment in the area of protective travel. (2) To the extent possible, the program transports personnel on cargo aircraft carrying Secret Service armored vehicles. (3) When former Presidents and their spouses travel on private aircraft, special agents travel with the protectee on a space-available basis, at no cost to the program. (4) Destructive testing of armored vehicles at the end of their useful life is a cost effective means of identifying needed future design improvements. (5) Various local law enforcement agencies provide cost-free range time to former Presidents' protective divisions. (6) In the late 1990s, the Secret Service reorganized the Uniformed Division (UD) to streamline the functional area chain of command pertaining to Presidential, Vice Presidential, and dignitary protection. (7) Canines are a cost effective and efficient means that support the pursuit of program goals. (8) Various local law enforcement and military agencies make training opportunities available to former Presidents' protective divisions at no cost to the program. (9) The Combined Operations Logistics Database (COLD) is an efficient, enterprise-wide IT solution supporting protective operations. (10) The program contracts with Johns Hopkins University for physician support in the event of certain protectees' travel to countries with substandard medical facilities. (11) Specialized tactical assets originally devoted to PPD have become increasingly utilized by other protective divisions on an as-needed, threat-based basis. To address this need, OPO is in the process of streamlining the associated chain of command by reorganizing Special Programs from a branch of PPD to a division of OPO.

Evidence: Discussion of program efficiencies and effectiveness

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: On a daily basis, the program relies upon the contributions of partner agencies (Federal, state, local, and military) to ensure a safe and secure environment for domestic protectees. This is particularly characteristic of protectee travel; the program sends an Advance Team to the jurisdiction to be visited, and the Team networks to accomplish its objective of securing the protectee in that jurisdiction. Partner contributions directly affect the program's allocation of manpower and other assets; this is "business as usual" for the Secret Service - the Secret Service alone is not staffed at levels that would enable it to ensure protectees' safety without the contributions of partners. The program also relies on partners in its design, coordination, and implementation of operational security plans for NSSEs. In this role, for example, the program formed the "2005 Presidential Inaugural Law Enforcement and Public Safety Steering Committee," composed of the Secret Service, FBI, FEMA, Department of Defense, Capitol Police, Park Police, Metropolitan Police Department, Transit Police, and D.C. Emergency Management Agency. The Committee and its 20 subcommittees affected program management, setting policy and procedure relative to all events that could conceivably occur during the NSSE. On Inauguration Day, Federal, state, local, and military agencies contributed over 16,000 law enforcement and public safety personnel to implement the NSSE security design. The Secret Service designs, coordinates, and implements operational security plans for NSSEs in accordance with the parameters of the DHS-administered National Response Plan (NRP). The NRP constitutes a cooperative "national" (i.e., Federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector) approach to domestic incident management. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) establishes common standards and procedures, and a unified command for use in the event of the implementation of the National Response Plan.

Evidence: Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976; Various internal USSS briefing slides, security reports, policy directives, and workload statistics; DHS web page - National Response Plan; FEMA web page - National Incident Management System

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: The Secret Service issues an annual statement to DHS that "certifies" - through internally-conducted independent and alternative control reviews - that its financial systems and procedures are in compliance with the Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) and the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA). These actions review management controls to ensure, among other things, that Secret Service divisions (including protective divisions) allocate resources effectively, avoid fraud and mismanagement, and prevent improper payments. Also, the annual DHS financial statement audit (for which DHS has contracted with KPMG) verifies that payments are properly made, financial information is accurate and timely, and financial statements are clean and without material weaknesses. In the Department-wide audit, KPMG did issue a "Notice of Finding and Recommendation" regarding the Secret Service. While this Notice of Finding and Recommendation was "material," the finding was wholly unrelated to the DP program. In the area of centrally-managed funds associated with the DP program, the Secret Service has strong financial controls for recording, processing, and/or reporting. For example, the Secret Service (a) manages personnel compensation within its Full Time Equivalent ceiling through the use of its Position Identification Number System and (b) utilizes an agency-wide gasoline tracking database system. In the area of funds allocated to the program (principally training and equipment funds), OPO exercises additional financial management controls; for example, a formal system of "Training Requests" ensures that training expenditures are reviewed by OPO. In turn, the office of the CFO monitors OPO's financial management; for example, a formal system of "Procurement Requests" ensures that goods and services costing in excess of $2,500 are reviewed by OPO, as well as by the office of the CFO. This chain of reviews ensures that expenditures support the program's goals and approved spending plans.

Evidence: FY 2004 Statement of Reasonable Assurance of Achievement of Management Control Objectives; Management Representations for the FY 2004 Consolidated Financial Statements; DHS Performance and Accountability Report FY 2004 - excerpt; Sample gasoline report; SSF 182 Request for Training; SSF 2041 Procurement Request

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: Protective elements undergo a thorough inspection every three years to assess management performance and to recommend courses of action to address any deficiencies identified. (Inspectors are senior ranking criminal investigators independent of program offices' chain of command). 12 protective divisions falling under the DP program were each inspected on 64 items, for a total of 768 inspected items. Taking into account the most recent inspection for each protective division, the inspections identified only two (2) management deficiencies ("recommendations") among the 768 items - a diminutive recommendation rate of only ?? of 1%. To address the two recommendations, program managers provided additional supervision and oversight to the coordinators of the relevant Secret Service policy in the two divisions. Secret Service-wide, the FMFIA and FFMIA reviews annually ensure that efforts are made to address any weaknesses in management control systems. In the area of protection, these reviews identified no material weaknesses in FY 2004. Also, through the Office of Inspection and the Management and Organization Division, a structured process exists to monitor and respond to open Inspector General and Government Accountability Office audit findings. Among the DHS Inspector General's audits of the Secret Service to date, one falls under the purview of the DP program; the Secret Service concurred with the audit's recommendations, has reported back to the DHS Inspector General on the status of their implementation, and continues to address them in DP program management. Within the DP program, a system exists for identifying, recording, and correcting management deficiencies and other impediments to performance that exist at the program level; following every protectee trip, the Lead Advance Agent prepares a mandatory "Final Survey Report." Deficiencies noted are reviewed by the agent's chain of command in order to improve future program performance both in the aggregate, and as it pertains to operational security for particular protectees and/or particular visited jurisdictions.

Evidence: List of recently-inspected protective divisions; FY 2004 Statement of Reasonable Assurance of Achievement of Management Control Objectives; Management Representations for the FY 2004 Consolidated Financial Statements; Management and Organization Division functional responsibility statement; Various internal USSS inspection information, audit documentation, and policy directives

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: The Secret Service instituted its "percentage of instances protectees arrive and depart safely" measure pursuant to the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993; since that time, the DP program has continued to achieve its long-term performance goal with respect to this measure. The "percentage of time incident-free protection is provided to persons inside the White House Complex and Vice President's Residence" and the "percentage of NSSEs that were successfully completed" are new measures. Using historical data, the Secret Service has established baselines for these new measures; baseline data indicate that the DP program also continues to achieve its long-term performance goals for its new measures. In summary, the DP program continues to achieve its long-term performance goals relative to protected persons, facilities, and events.

Evidence: Performance Based Budget Highlights by Program; FYHSP database excerpts

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: The DP program met all annual performance targets evaluated in Response #2.4. In FY 2002, 2003, and 2004, protectees arrived and departed safely in 100% of instances, persons inside the White House and Vice President's residence received incident-free protection 100% of the time, and 100% of NSSEs that commenced were successfully completed.

Evidence: FYHSP database excerpts; Performance Based Budget Highlights by Program

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: Efficiency in the DP program is measured by an index that compares the measured fiscal year to a four year averaged base period in terms of time (manhours). In FY 2004, the DP index was .97 in comparison to the previous four year averaged period. The .97 index, on a scale where 1.0 represents the same allotment of resources as in the previous period, indicates a .03 reduction in the use of resources. Coupled with the program's sustained ability to accomplish both its annual and long-term goals, the .03 reduction in resource use signifies efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the program: The program achieved a 3% increase in efficiency, without compromising effectiveness. Also noteworthy is that the program demonstrated this greater efficiency in an environment of increased threat. In the Campaign budget, the index was 1.5, reflecting (relative to the previous campaign period) a significant increase in the volume of resources required to ensure the physical safety of Presidential candidates. For instance, UD assumed a much greater role in the 2004 campaign than in past campaigns; UD magnetometer support was critical to campaign stop security. Use of additional technologies (e.g., magnetometers) to achieve campaign security requires deploying the additional technical and human resources associated with those technologies. The need to apply unprecedented resources to campaign protection reflected exigent (and therefore mitigating) circumstances - an increased threat environment made it necessary to apply more manhours to the security of campaign stops. World events (e.g., elevated threat level [designated by DHS]; a terror attack preceding and perceived to have impacted Spanish elections; threat assessments regarding candidates and spouses) made it necessary to devote a greater amount of time (manhours) to campaign security in order to meet the goal of ensuring protectees' safety, as well as the successful completion of the Republican and Democratic National Conventions, which were NSSEs.

Evidence: Discussion of Efficiency Measures; FYHSP database excerpts; Performance Based Budget Highlights by Program

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: According to a 1995 independent evaluation by the Department of the Treasury, "Secret Service is recognized as, and is, the most effective protective security organization in the world. Many of its protective methods are viewed as innovative, and through its high level of professionalism, the Secret Service has established the standard against which all other protective organizations measure themselves." That other agencies look to the Secret Service (not vice-versa) for expertise in the area of physical protection evidences that the Treasury Department's 1995 finding remains factual. In 2004 for example, the Secret Service provided "small detail training" to a mix of eight Federal agencies, military organizations, and local police departments.

Evidence: Excerpts of the Public Report of the White House Security Review; List of external agencies trained

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: Independent statisticians and analysts in the Secret Service's Quantitative Studies and Statistical Systems Branch use the Workload Statistical and Reporting System to provide DP managers with routine (at least monthly) reports containing performance indicators. These data alone demonstrate that the DP program is effective and achieving the results discussed in Response #4.1 and 4.2. While not needed to demonstrate the DP program's effectiveness in achieving results, other, ad hoc independent evaluations have resulted in program improvements. For example: (A) With respect to the Analytical Support Branch evaluations referenced in Response #2.6, the DP program implemented the evaluations' recommendations (i.e., right-sizing of Presidential Protective Division administrative staffing, consolidation of Washington area 24-hour communications centers, merger of the Major Events and Dignitary Protective Divisions to achieve operational economies of scale). (B) With respect to the aforementioned interagency working group studies of special agent and uniformed officer staffing, the Secret Service increased special agent staffing to the level recommended by the working group, and will - by the end of FY 2005 - have increased uniformed officer staffing to the recommended level. (C) The Treasury-conducted White House Security Review clearly articulated the DP program's high level of effectiveness ("The United States Secret Service is recognized as, and is, the most effective protective security organization in the world.") In the "Department of the Treasury Public Report of the White House Security Review," the independent evaluators also articulated recommendations for the enhancement of protective operations; the DP program implemented these recommendations. (D) Other independent evaluations (aforementioned Table Top exercises) enhanced subsequent program performance at NSSEs by identifying and rectifying potential security weaknesses on a pre-event basis.

Evidence: Re-weighting explanation and performance system graphics; Accession statistics; Excerpts of and response to the Public Report of the White House Security Review; Various internal USSS workload statistics, study results, and exercises information