Arms Control and Nonproliferation Issues

Maureen Cormack, Press Attaché: Welcome to today’s press conference. We welcome Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Mr. John Bolton. Mr. Bolton, during his time here in Seoul, has met with Foreign Minister Ban Ki Moon and other members of the Foreign Ministry staff and will meet later today with Secretary General of the National Security Council, Mr. Lee Jong-seok and other Blue House staff members.

Under Secretary Bolton: Thank you very much. I just thought I’d say a few words briefly in opening and then be available for questions.

The discussions that we’ve had here in Seoul and will have by the end of the day obviously covered the DPRK weapons of mass destruction programs, the proliferation security initiative, the A.Q. Khan network, and a variety of other arms control and nonproliferation issues, including things like export control regimes. So, we’ve had a very broad-ranging discussion and exchanged views and discussed the way ahead in a number of these areas. So, with that, by way of introduction, I’d be happy to take your questions.

Question: Hi, Choi Jie Ho from JoongAng Daily. You said in the morning that the U.S. was not in a holding position until the presidential elections in November and that you seek progress now. Does this mean that the United States will seek substantial results before the November elections? Will the November elections be a watershed or will the negotiating positions continue even after the November elections?

Under Secretary Bolton: I don’t expect the November elections to be a watershed because I expect that we’re going to win and our policies are going to continue. What I was trying to do was address the point that Secretary Powell and others have addressed, that many observers of North Korea think that they are in a holding pattern and that they think that, depending on the outcome of our November election, they might get a better deal. I wanted to disabuse them of that thought.

The central issue here is when North Korea is prepared to make the strategic decision that the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction makes them less secure not more secure. The sooner they come to that decision, the sooner they can make progress. As soon as they do, we’re ready to go. That’s why I said in my speech, suggesting again as Dr. Rice had suggested, that Kim Jong-il call Colonel Qaddafi.

Question: I’m Andrew Ward, Financial Times. For several years the CIA publicly estimated that North Korea had one or two nuclear devices. Over the past two years, North Korea claims to have reprocessed enough fuel rods for a further five or six bombs. What is the latest U.S. estimate of North Korea’s nuclear capability? Is it accurate to say that North Korea is now a de facto nuclear power, rather than an aspirant nuclear power? Additionally, can I ask whether you’re comfortable with the idea of Kim Jong-il remaining in power after resolution of the nuclear dispute, or whether you would prefer a new leadership in Pyongyang?

Under Secretary Bolton: I don’t have any new estimates on the exact state of play of the North Korean nuclear weapons capability. Although I would say that I think it’s important that we not look at this through a soda straw.

The estimates that you referred to are based on the capability of plutonium-based nuclear weapons. That’s been a focus of people’s attention since the Agreed Framework. But, the failure of the Agreed Framework came not from the plutonium weapons program, but from our conclusion that the North Koreans were violating the Agreed Framework by seeking a second route to nuclear weapons through uranium enrichment. A program about which we don’t know as much as we’d like to, but which we are very much concerned is a substantial basis that could dramatically enhance North Korea’s capabilities.

I think one of the lessons of Libya is that a regime can make the strategic calculation that it wants to give up weapons of mass destruction and remain in power. Historically, countries have given up their nuclear weapons programs only at a time of regime change, as is the case with the elimination of the Apartheid regime in South Africa or the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the newly independent Ukraine returned its strategic weapons and missiles to the Russian Federation. So, it is possible for a government to give up the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and that is the result we seek with the DPRK.

The evidence that North Korea is prepared to make that strategic decision is lacking and it’s lacking, just merely as one example, by the fact they keep denying they even have a uranium enrichment program.

Question: Gordon Fairclough from the Wall Street Journal. There’s some debate going on within the government here about pursuing a return summit meeting between President Roh and Kim Jong-il of North Korea. Do you think that such a meeting would be productive or counterproductive in trying to achieve the U.S. goals of disarming North Korea?

Under Secretary Bolton: I’ll answer that question in two ways. The first way is to say that a decision on whether the South should have a summit with the North is a matter for the South to decide.

But the second part of the answer, really divorced from the first part, is that it’s worth considering whether all of our actions, all of us who are involved in the Six-Party Talks, are contributing to a cost-benefit analysis that leads the North Koreans to conclude that it’s in their interest to give up the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. That’s the issue. Are they being encouraged, or even pressured, in that direction? Or are they being encouraged to think that they could have the best of both worlds: pretending to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons in exchange for economic assistance, but actually trying to keep a clandestine program alive? What we want them to do is make the first calculation, not the second.

Question: (Paul Eckert, Reuters) I attended your speech this morning at Yonsei University and you were quite forceful about the need to end the denial of the HEU program. I’m wondering if there’s not a way that the United States could make evidence public from the various channels that you’ve obtained it from, obviously with security in mind to protect sources, that would just remove the question in the public. I ask this because recently a Chinese senior official openly raised doubts about the U.S. case with HEU.

Under Secretary Bolton: I think that, in fact, we have talked a good deal about some of the conclusions that we have drawn about what the uranium enrichment program looks like. In fact, I think one of the significant aspects is that in 2002 all of the elements of our intelligence community, all of the elements, concluded that the North Koreans were pursuing a production-scope procurement program in the uranium enrichment area. That’s been further confirmed in the public arena by the confessions of A.Q. Khan. Now, the A.Q. Khan network has been a focus of ours for several years now. Even though parts of it have been exposed publicly, we continue looking into what else we can find out about what Khan is up to, what Khan had been up to and what the product of his efforts had been, which is a limiting factor on what we can say publicly.

Now, a number of people have said, “Why don’t you make this information public? Why don’t you describe it more? Why don’t you brief the North Koreans on what you know?” As if they didn’t know what they know about their own program. The fact of the matter is that revealing some of this information, in and of itself, would tell the North Koreans a substantial amount and would aid in their concealment and denial and deception activities. So, it’s a dilemma that we have and that we always have with classified information, as to how to make it effective. The easiest thing to do in the short term would always be to make it public, but that may mean that in the longer term there’s a lot less you can learn. So, that’s just a continuing policy dilemma that we face.

Question: Judy Choi, I represent Washington Post and ABC News in Seoul. There’s been growing concern in South Korea that the U.S.-South Korea alliance is falling apart. One of the reasons being pointed out is the fact that President Roh’s government appears to have been leaning towards North Korea, away from the U.S. What is your opinion on that and why?

Under Secretary Bolton: I don’t think it’s accurate to say that the alliance is falling apart. I mean we are, as we speak, in the process of seeing the deployment of additional Republic of Korea troops to Iraq. You know, that’s that famous unilateral action that the United States has undertaken with 30 other countries, which is now being substantially augmented despite the tragic loss of life of a Korean citizen. I think it is a courageous judgment by the government here to participate with us in this very important effort in Iraq. I think it’s a sign, a tangible sign, not rhetorical, not something the chattering classes talk about, but a tangible sign of the strength of the alliance.

I think there have been discussions about the tactical approaches to take with respect to North Korea and I have no doubt whatever that a fundamental tenet of North Korea’s strategy is to try to divide the United States from South Korea, to divide the United States from Japan, divide the United States from the other participants in the Six-Party Talks. That’s something we’re determined to prevent happening, and I think it’s exemplified by the extent and nature of the consultations that we have on a bilateral basis with the Republic of Korea, trilaterally with the Japanese, and with the other parties in the Six-Party Talks, where all of us except the North Koreans believe that the only acceptable outcome is the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Question: I am Kim Jeung-an from Dong-A Ilbo. I have two questions. The first is, instead of using the word HEU, you seem to use the term uranium enrichment. So, is there a difference between the two words? My second question is, when you mention the WMD of North Korea, do you also mean not only the nuclear weapons, but also long-range missiles?

Under Secretary Bolton: Yes, to both. Uranium enrichment is the capacity to take natural uranium, which has the isotope U235 present roughly in the range of seven-tenths of one percent of total uranium in a given sample. Uranium enrichment can take that level of the U235 isotope to all the way up to nearly 100 percent. Low-enriched uranium, which is about 10 percent U235, is called reactor-grade uranium. It can be used for civil nuclear power purposes. U235 concentrations of 90 percent and above are weapons grade. That’s what is used in the formulation of uranium-based nuclear weapons. The enrichment activity that’s going on is exactly the same when you take uranium from 0.7 percent to 10 percent to 90 percent. If, using uranium centrifuges or any other enrichment technique, if you can take it from 0.7 percent up to reactor grade, you can take it up to weapons grade. In fact, under enrichment of the kind we’re talking about, the total amount of energy required to enrich from natural levels of concentration of U235 to reactor grade is two-thirds of the total energy involved to take it up to weapons grade. In other words, the total amount of energy consumed to go from 0.7 percent of U235 to 90 percent of U235 is divided. By the time it takes you to get to 10 percent, you’ve used two-thirds of the total energy required to get you from 0.7 to 90 percent. So a capacity to enrich uranium, even if it’s arguably only for reactor-grade uranium enrichment, can give you a weapons-grade potential as well.

All right, now I’ll try this again. U235 isotope occurring naturally, 0.7 percent; ten percent U235 isotope, reactor-grade quality; ninety percent U235 isotope, weapons grade. The total amount of energy to go from 0.7 to 90, we’ll say is “X,” it takes two-thirds of that energy to go from 0.7 to 10 percent and one-third of that energy to go from 10 percent to 90 percent. That’s why, if somebody says, “I’m just enriching to reactor grade, I’m not a problem,” they’re deceiving you.

Now, the reason I’m beating this into the ground is because it underlines why we want the elimination of North Korea’s uranium enrichment capability.

Now, your second question was on missiles. Do you want to give me that again please?

Question: We’re just wondering whether or not the WMD program, does it include long-range missile programs, not just nuclear?

Under Secretary Bolton: Certainly from the perspective of the United States, and we’ve said this repeatedly, we need not just the elimination of the nuclear program in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner, but also the elimination of the chemical weapons program, the biological weapons program, and the missile program as well. That’s not directly involved at the moment in the Six-Party Talks, but those are all issues, along with the disposition of conventional forces on the Peninsula and the human rights record in North Korea, which we have repeatedly said have to be addressed.

Question: Jeremy Kirk with Pacific Stars and Stripes. During your talk this morning, you said that as a result of Libya giving up its WMD programs that the hotels in Tripoli were full of Western businessmen starting business there. Can you give us some idea if American businessmen would be interested in investing in North Korea and what industries those might be in?

Under Secretary Bolton: The answer is, no I don’t and if I did I’d be guilty of a conflict of interest of some kind or another. The issue is, the point about Libya is that particularly United States sanctions, but other’s, the EU’s, sanctions had left Libya very substantially isolated economically for a long period of time with a very negative impact on the standard of living of the Libyan people. That is even more true in the case of North Korea. The decision that Libya made is that in order to get out of this international isolation, as a general proposition, not on a quid pro quo basis, but as a general proposition, it had to give up its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and, again from our perspective, its support for terrorism. Making that strategic decision makes a lot of other things possible. I think the same is true for North Korea, not simply because of potential involvement with the United States, but because of what might happen in South Korea, Japan, and other countries as well.

Question: Hi, I’m Lee Sang Min from Mirae Hankook Shinmun. Now, exchanges between North and South Korea have been accelerating. For example, South Koreans are increasingly investing in the Kaesong Industrial Complex. So, I believe that such accelerated exchanges go against the U.S. policy to not provide any economic assistance or support or engage in any economic actions before North Korea gives up its nuclear program. So, what is your view on this, sir?

Under Secretary Bolton: I think we have said for quite some time that those sorts of decisions are fundamentally for each country to make. There’s no doubt, no ambiguity, on what our position would be. I think in each case you should ask yourself if this kind of activity is more or less likely to induce Kim Jong-il and the North Korean regime to make the strategic calculation that they’re better off abandoning the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.

Question: I’m Lee Sung-chul from SBS. Recently, Secretary of State Colin Powell held bilateral talks with Baek Nam-sun, Foreign Minister from North Korea, and also Dr. Rice met with President Roh Moo-hyun, and now you have made your visit to Seoul. Each time, what came up was that North Korea should learn from Libya. So, is this a coordinated policy for North Korea within the State Department?

Under Secretary Bolton: I’m going to take my time answering this question. It is the case that we have tried to use the example of Libya to show that it is possible for a government to make the strategic decision that it is better off abandoning the search for weapons of mass destruction than continuing to pursue them. We think this is important to show that one can give up weapons of mass destruction in a context where the regime that makes that decision stays in power. Also, that if a decision is made at that kind of strategic level to abandon the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, that it is possible to have a fundamentally changed relationship with the United States, because indeed that country has made a fundamental change. So, the example for Iran or North Korea is underlined by what Libya actually did.

This is not a hypothetical situation. This is a real world example of how changed behavior on the part of the rogue state seeking weapons of mass destruction can result in changed behavior by others.

Question: Andrew Salmon, Washington Times. Mr. Bolton, you just said that it’s very desirable for North Korea to follow the Libyan model, but presumably if you want a Libyan outcome, you require some sort of Libyan-style process. Now, please correct me if I’m wrong on this, because I haven’t looked into this deeply, but the Libyan process was something along the lines of Mr. Qaddafi looked at Mr. Hussein about to be invaded, decided he didn’t want that, contacted the British and through a process of quiet, back-door-type negotiations, the British and the Libyans established trust, the Americans came on board and the process moved forward. With North Korea, the negotiation process is the Six-Party Talks. The Six-Party Talks, to me at least, have singly failed to achieve any trust between the North Koreans and the Americans. So, my question is, is there any kind of Libyan-style process going to take place to achieve a Libyan-style outcome? Secondly, if such a process is to take place, who would play the British-style role? Would it be South Korea, which obviously has the most at stake here? Would it be Japan, which is perhaps about to establish diplomatic relations with Korea? Or, would it even be Britain, which is not involved in the Six-Party Talks, but does have the relationship with the U.S. and has a diplomatic relationship in Pyongyang and, furthermore, has the Libyan experience under its belt? Thank you very much.

Under Secretary Bolton: Let me describe how Libya actually worked and that may answer the question. You certainly started off right, because the Libyans approached the British within a few weeks before the onset of hostilities against Iraq, convinced that now was the time to get serious. So, that part is correct.

But, the response from the British and the United States was, we’re not going any further here until you, Libya, open up all of your weapons programs and allow us to inspect them. The initial Libyan reaction was, yeah, sure, that’s fine; we’ll get to that. But, time went by and time went by and no inspectors went in, until early October of last year; discussions had begun in March. In early October of last year, through the activities of the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Germans, the Italians, the British and the Americans worked together to interdict a shipment of uranium centrifuge equipment from the A.Q. Khan network bound for Tripoli. That shipment was diverted to Italy and, within a few weeks, the Libyans, who had undoubtedly concluded that if we knew that much about their nuclear program there was no telling how much else we knew, within a few weeks of that, the Libyans had agreed to inspections and teams of American and British intelligence experts were in Libya reviewing all of the Libyan programs in two separate trips for a period of up to three weeks.

But, even then, it was not at all clear when the Libyans would agree to the kind of dismantlement and removal of their program that we required. Until, that is, the capture of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Within six days after the capture of Saddam Hussein, Libya had agreed to what we had asked for.

So, the trust that was developed was the trust that was created by the impending invasion of Iraq, the hard work of British and American intelligence personnel in Libya with Libya’s consent examining all of their WMD programs, as a result of the interdiction of the BBC China, and the capture of Saddam Hussein. And that’s why Libya’s nuclear weapons program now lives in Oakridge, Tennessee.

Question: I’m Yeo Hong Kyu from MBC. During the third Six-Party Talks, North Korea said that if the United States agreed to participate in energy supply or aid, then it is willing to show a flexible attitude toward other demands it had made, such as taking it off the list of terrorist-supporting countries. So, is there a possibility that the United States could review this proposal, or is there no possibility at all?

Under Secretary Bolton: What we’re really waiting for is North Korea’s reaction to our proposal. But, essentially, whether it’s discussions they may have, proposals that have been made by other participants in the Six-Party Talks, or the proposal that we made at the third round, the real issue is when North Korea is going to make the strategic decision to renounce the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. That’s what the Libyans did and that’s what’s made the difference in that case. This is not a matter of a little bit here and a little bit there. We need to know that they are truly committed to giving up nuclear weapons in this case and not doing what they did in the case of the Agreed Framework, which is freeze one program and start another one.

Question: Maeng Joo Seok, CBS News. North Korean Ambassador Mr. Han just mentioned that they are not interested in the Libyan lesson, which means they earn time. As time passes, they might be able to complete their nuclear weapons program. When would be the line enough to give certain warning? I mean, is the sky the limit?

Under Secretary Bolton: I think that’s why Vice President Cheney said in his recent trip to the Far East that “time was not on our side.” This is why we want to do all that we can through peaceful, diplomatic means to be sure that North Korea concludes it has to make a strategic decision to give up the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction in order to break out of the isolation that it finds itself in. That’s why Dr. Rice said some months ago, when asked how long the talks would go on, “As long as they’re productive.” Now, we’ve put something out on the table. We want a response from North Korea. If they’re serious, there’s a way to proceed. That’s why we’ve tried to elaborate the Libya model. It’s not hypothetical. It’s all right there and the benefits to Libya have already started to accrue. The Libyan announcement was made on December 19. Their program was essentially dismantled and moved out a few months later. We have already undertaken the steps that we indicated in return for the Libyans, such as lifting sanctions that were imposed because of WMD activities and the like. So, as I say, this is not hypothetical. That’s why we really think the next action should come from North Korea.

Question: I am from Yonhap. The last time during the ARF meetings, Baek Nam-sun, Foreign Minister of North Korea, said that North Korea does not have an HEU program. Since the U.S. has said that North Korea does possess such a program, it should come with the evidence and then the two countries can look into the evidence together. In other words, he had proposed a method used for the Kumchangni facilities. So, does the U.S. have any intention to accept such a proposal made by Mr. Baek?

Under Secretary Bolton: The issue with respect to the uranium enrichment program is something that North Korea doesn’t need any help with. They don’t need to know what our information about their program is. Presumably they know what their program is. This is a sign of an effort to gain information about what we know to aid in their concealment activities as much as anything else.

If they really want to come to a conclusion that they will give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons, they should just declare it. They should declare everything and, under any kind of agreement that we’ve ever made in the arms control field, a baseline declaration of what the North Koreans have will be a fundamental part of this agreement. So, we’re going to have it sooner or later anyway if there is to be a deal.

The unwillingness to be transparent on their part leads to the question of just whether there’s a serious determination on their part to come to agreement. So, they don’t need our information to find out where their program is.

Question: I’m Kwun Min Cheol from CBS. Now, the Kaesong Industrial Complex is being developed by North and South Korea and they’re actively engaging in these activities. So, it is expected that at the end of this year the consumers living in Seoul will be able to buy the products made in the Kaesong Industrial Complex. But, because of its export control regime, there are some products made within the Kaesong Industrial Complex that cannot be sold in South Korea, for example Pentium computers. So, the South Korean government has said that it will take on measures that North Korea does not use the Industrial Complex to its advantage for ill purposes. Do you, in your own view, believe that such products will be able to be sold in Seoul by the end of this year?

Under Secretary Bolton: I have to tell you honestly that I don’t know the answer to that question, because I’m not familiar with the specific circumstances that you’re asking about. It does raise an interesting question that I will try to investigate when I get back to Washington, as to what exactly the implications to that might be. I hate to confess that I can’t answer a question, but that’s a fact and I’ll just check into it further.

Question: (inaudible) from Korean Broadcasting System. Do you think that China will take a role for stopping the North Korean nuclear move for their nation’s benefit? Did China actually deliver this message to the U.S.?

Under Secretary Bolton: I think China has some important national interests here that have motivated it to take the role that it has in the Six-Party Talks. First, it cannot be in China’s interest to have a nuclear North Korea. That would lead to instability in Northeast Asia, the possibility of other states seeking nuclear weapons, and a discouragement to say the least to the prospects for a stable enough region that would encourage substantial outside investment, in China and in other countries. I think that there are good reasons to understand why the Chinese have taken the position they have in the Six-Party Talks.

On the other hand, North Korea’s dependence on economic support from China also gives China enormous leverage, which could be a very important factor in North Korea making the correct strategic decision to give up its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Question: I’m Wang Seon Taek from YTN. I attended your lecture this morning and I’m here today. Listening to your remarks, I can see that you have toned down a bit on your remarks towards North Korea and Kim Jong-il compared to a year ago. So, is this a result of a changed view of the U.S. administration on North Korea? Or, is there another reason, sir?

Under Secretary Bolton: I have to say, I liked the earlier question that said that Secretary Powell and Dr. Rice and I had all said the same thing. I liked that question better. I thought you all were reporters, not psychiatrists (laughter). I don’t know whether I’m toned down or not, but I think the administration’s policy remains consistent, and that is that we want North Korea to give up the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.

Also, it’s not very interesting to give the same speech twice. Thank you very much.