Fact Sheet Bureau of African Affairs Washington, DC March 14, 2002 Zimbabwe: Initial Findings of U.S. Election Observer TeamBeginning on February 18, U.S. Embassy Harare, Zimbabwe, fielded an 18-member election observation team. The team traveled in pairs, covering as much of the country as possible in an effort to develop a complete picture of the political climate. Over this period, the observers confirmed many of the numerous reports from the last two years detailing government intimidation, violence, and electoral manipulation. Among the Embassy team findings:
The Government of Zimbabwe’s Pre-election Campaign:Setting the Table for a Flawed Election The groundwork for the flawed March 9/10 election was laid over the last two years, a period during which the Government of Zimbabwe developed and employed an aggressive strategy designed to cripple its political opposition. This strategy was marked by a collapse in the rule of law, serious human rights abuses, and the subversion of democratic institutions including the judiciary and independent media. At the same time, the Government of Zimbabwe pursued economic policies, including a violent and chaotic land redistribution program that resulted in Zimbabwe's downward economic spiral. Over this same period, the United States repeatedly urged the Mugabe government to address the international community’s concerns over the breakdown of the rule of law and assault on the nation’s democratic institutions. These concerns were reflected in the passage of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001, which was signed into law by President Bush in December 2001. In our efforts to convince the Government of Zimbabwe to reverse course, the United States frequently referred to election norms and standards promulgated in March 2001 by the Southern Africa Development Community Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF). The norms and standards are available at www.sadcpf.org, and set in stark relief the failings of the Government of Zimbabwe. The norms and standards state, for example: Any measures such as political violence, kidnapping, murder, threats and sanctions should be perpetually outlawed by SADC member states. (C Part 1, Section 2, ii) For nearly two years, the political environment in Zimbabwe has been marked by state-sponsored or tolerated political violence, including frequent, credible reports of torture, assault, abduction, threats, and murder. Over the last several months, the Government of Zimbabwe established training camps for youth militia in numerous locations around the country, using these camps to launch campaigns of violence and intimidation on the surrounding communities. Frequent reports suggest that opposition supporters were often taken to these camps and tortured. The sanctity of the freedom of association and expression should be protected and strictly adhered to. (C Part 1, Section 3, I) As the political opposition to the Mugabe government grew over the last two years, the government increasingly restricted the right of association, and repeatedly used force to break up nonviolent demonstrations by its critics. The government expanded its powers to limit freedom of association and expression through the Public Order and Security Bill of 2001, which authorized police to arrest anyone at a public meeting not in possession of adequate identification, and criminalized statements deemed abusive of the president or that undermined his authority. The law also broadened police authority to control and disperse public gatherings. Governments should take the emergence of private media as a healthy development in the institutionalization of the democratic process, the conduct of elections and should therefore refrain from taking decisions and actions that thwart the development of a strong private media. (C Part 2, Section 4, I) Over the past two years, the Government of Zimbabwe became increasingly intolerant of the independent press. The government arrested and prosecuted editors and journalists who contributed to printed stories critical of Government policies or security force operations. On at least two occasions, independent printing presses were damaged or destroyed by government supporters. In late 2001 the Government of Zimbabwe introduced the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Bill, which would broaden government control over media outlets and restrict unfavorable reporting. Opposition parties should be given equal opportunity and agreed upon time and space on the state owned media to put their announcements and broadcasts and advertisements. (C Part 2, Section 4, ii) The Government effectively controls all domestic radio and television broadcasting stations. Opposition parties do not have access to the radio or television for their announcements, broadcasts, or advertisements, and efforts to launch independent domestic radio stations have been blocked by the government. The government also effectively controls the bulk of the print media in the country, and similarly restricts access and monitors content. On repeated occasions, most recently in October 2001, the government has removed editorial staff at its newspapers for allegedly demonstrating sympathy for opposition views. The complete independence and impartiality of the Electoral Commission in dealing with all political parties should be reaffirmed in the constitution. (C Part 2, Section 5, I) Zimbabwe’s Electoral Supervisory Commission is composed of individuals either appointed by Robert Mugabe or by bodies controlled by him, and thus lacks the necessary independence to oversee a genuinely democratic electoral process. The Electoral Commission and all stakeholders in the electoral process should therefore be required by law and be empowered to ensure that political parties and candidates denounce violence in elections in order to ensure:
Clearly, the Government of Zimbabwe took no steps to ensure freedom of campaign. On the contrary, ZANU-PF youth militia, often with the support of police or army units, established roadblocks and "no-go" areas in order to restrict freedom of campaign. Government security forces do not act impartially, but as active agents of the ZANU-PF election machine. Zimbabwean police and/or army units routinely provide transportation and other logistical support to perpetrators of political violence and knowingly permit their activities. In addition, police and army units have been credibly accused of participating in political violence directed against the opposition. Not only did the Government of Zimbabwe not provide adequate security to MDC presidential candidate Morgan Tsvangirai, it supported or tolerated at least two assaults by ZANU-PF youth militia on the candidate’s motorcade. As previously noted, the Government of Zimbabwe routinely sponsors or tolerates the disruption of opposition activities. Opposition offices have been repeatedly raided by police and government supporters. Acceptance by the host government of election observers as a factor in fostering transparency, integrity and in institutionalizing the democratic process in the conduct of elections. (C Part 3, Section 14, vi) In the weeks before the election, the Government of Zimbabwe invited selected observer missions and excluded others from nations critical of the Mugabe regime. In addition, a U.S.-based election monitoring team from the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), was expelled by the government of Zimbabwe in September, shortly after initiating an election pre-assessment project. The European Union fared little better, receiving approval for an observation team from selected countries, only to impose restrictions on the team’s activities, forcing the EU to remove the team. In the days before the election, the Mugabe government expelled a 50-member South African non-governmental election observation team (South African National Non-Government Organization), without explanation. |