The U.S. and India: An Emerging Entente?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting my colleague, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph, and me to discuss the recent visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Washington and to describe the implications of this historic visit for bringing the United States and India closer together in strategic partnership.

President Bush has made a fundamental judgment that our relations with India will be central to the future success of American foreign policy in South Asia and around the world. The President said that "after years of estrangement, India and the United States together surrendered to reality. They recognized an unavoidable fact -- they are destined to have a qualitatively different and better relationship than in the past." I believe this is a view many of you share.

Of course, our recent engagement with India, and with South Asia more broadly, was transformed by the events of 9/11. That terrible attack on the United States opened the door to a new relationship with Afghanistan and Pakistan, an engagement sustained by our commitment to building peaceful, prosperous democratic societies that no longer offer fertile ground to terrorists and their extreme ideologies.

Our desire to transform relations with India, however, was founded upon a strategic vision that transcends even today’s most pressing security concerns. India is a rising global power. Within the first quarter of this century, it is likely to be numbered among the world’s five largest economies. It will soon be the world’s most populous nation, and it has a demographic structure that bequeaths it a huge, skilled, and youthful workforce. It will continue to possess large and ever more sophisticated military forces that, just like our own, remain strongly committed to the principle of civilian control. And, above all else, India will thrive as a vibrant multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-lingual democracy characterized by individual freedom, rule of law, and a constitutional government that owes its power to free and fair elections. As the President phrased it succinctly, "This century will see democratic India’s arrival as a force in the world." And, as such, it is in our national interest to develop a strong, forward looking relationship with the world's largest democracy as the political and economic focus of the global system shifts inevitably eastward to Asia.

A strong democratic India is an important partner for the United States. We anticipate that India will play an increasingly important leadership role in 21^st century Asia, working with us to promote democracy, economic growth, stability and peace in that vital region. By cooperating with India now, we accelerate the arrival of the benefits that India’s rise brings to the region and the world. By fostering ever-closer bilateral ties, we also eliminate any possibility that our two nations might overlook their natural affinities and enter into another period of unproductive estrangement, as was so often the case in the past half century.

Today, for the first time since bilateral relations were established in 1947, the United States and India are bound together by a strong congruence of interests, values, and a large and successful Indian-American community. Consequently we find an especially receptive partner in New Delhi, one no longer bound by Cold War politics or dogma. The Indian Government has demonstrated its firm desire to enhance our bilateral relationship. The United States now has a window of opportunity to seize the initiative with India, to build bonds and habits of cooperation that will stand the test of time. It is incumbent upon us, therefore, to undertake ambitious actions that correct our mutual history with India of missed opportunities and advance our common interests in the century ahead. We seek to work with India to win the global War on Terrorism, prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, enhance peace and stability in Asia, protect trade routes and sea lines of communication, and advance the spread of democracy. India and the United States now find ourselves on the same side on all of these critical strategic objectives. Our challenge, then, is to translate our converging interests into shared goals and compatible strategies designed to achieve those aims. In this context, the wide range of initiatives agreed to by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh this July, including our agreement to promote civilian nuclear energy cooperation, represents a unique chance to build trust between the United States and India because of the resonance all these programs have for both countries.

Our efforts to advance this bold agenda did not begin this summer. During the President's first term, the United States and India reinvigorated an Economic Dialogue, restarted the Defense Policy Group, expanded joint military exercises, began the India-U.S. Global Issues Forum, launched the High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG), and set in motion other initiatives designed to foster bilateral cooperation on a number of key issues. Drawing on activities begun early in the first term, President Bush and then Prime Minister Vajpayee announced the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP): a major initiative to expand high technology, missile defense, space and civilian nuclear cooperation while strengthening our nonproliferation goals.

Prime Minister Singh's July 18 visit to Washington took the U.S.-India relationship to a new, higher plane. Not only did that visit provide an opportunity for President Bush and Prime Minister Singh to celebrate the achievements our new partnership has produced so far, it presented an opportunity for them to agree on a new framework for even closer cooperation in the years ahead. They recognized that the enhanced U.S.-India relationship can make an important contribution to global stability, democracy, prosperity, and peace.

Two of the major themes of the Prime Minister's visit to Washington were promoting democracy and fighting terrorism. As spelled out in the Joint Statement, the two leaders resolved to, "create an international environment that is conducive to democratic values, and to help strengthen democratic practices in societies seeking to become more open and pluralistic." They also resolved, "to combat terrorism relentlessly."

The Prime Minister's July visit coincided with the completion of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) initiative that was launched eighteen months earlier. But we do not see the completion of the NSSP, however noteworthy, as an end in itself. Instead, the President and Prime Minister underscored that the NSSP provides a basis for expanding bilateral activities and commerce in space, civil nuclear energy, and dual-use technology. Indeed, the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation initiative announced during the visit would not have been possible without the foundation laid by the completion of the NSSP.

Much of the public attention paid to the visit focused on the civil nuclear energy agreement, but I would also like to draw the Committee's attention to the other initiatives that were agreed to by the two leaders. These initiatives are important in their own right and demonstrate that there has been a real transformation in the U.S.-India relationship. Not only have our bilateral ties never been better, but our overall relationship has never been broader and deeper, as these initiatives show.

Economy: One of the driving forces in the U.S.-India relationship has been its expanding economic component. A highlight of the Prime Minister's visit was the announcement that the United States and India were launching a CEO Forum, comprising 20 chief executive officers from some of the biggest, most dynamic U.S. and Indian firms involved in transforming our bilateral economic relationship. These CEOs represent a cross-section of industrial sectors, particularly those that have a stake in improving the commercial climate between our two countries. This forum will serve as a channel to provide senior-level private sector input into discussions at the Economic Dialogue. Their input will help both countries make progress on key issues that will enhance economic growth and job creation and promote bilateral trade and investment.

We see the creation of the CEO Forum as part of a more general commitment to enhancing the U.S.-India Economic Dialogue. As the Indian economy grows and becomes increasingly interconnected with the world economy, our bilateral economic relationship has expanded beyond trade into new and increasingly complex areas that are having a profound impact on the economic outlook in the 21^st century.

To fully reflect this more complex relationship, the re-vitalized Economic Dialogue has four tracks: the Trade Policy Forum, the Financial and Economic Forum, the Environment Dialogue and the Commercial Dialogue. Each of these tracks is led by the respective U.S. agency and Indian ministry. In addition, the Economic Dialogue has two cross-cutting forums focused on biotechnology and information technology. Overall these forums aim to expand economic opportunities and to overcome longstanding issues that have prevented the development of a deep and dynamic economic relationship. As a corollary, the United States and India have both recognized the urgent need to modernize India's infrastructure as a prerequisite for the continued growth of the Indian economy. Continued progress in resolving outstanding issues and improving the investment climate will be important in attracting the private capital necessary to fund infrastructure investment. Sustaining high levels of economic growth is vital for India to meet its developmental goals and essential for providing the United States with more commercial opportunities.

Energy and the Environment: Another major initiative highlighted during the Prime Minister's visit was the U.S.-India Energy Dialogue, designed to promote increased trade and investment in the energy sector. This dialogue, led on our side by Secretary of Energy Bodman, will promote these goals through working groups that will deal with oil and natural gas, electric power, coal and clean coal technology, energy efficiency, new and renewable energy technologies, and civil nuclear energy. It is our hope that these efforts in their totality will not only produce the power that India needs, but help safeguard the environment by encouraging cleaner, more efficient, affordable, and diversified energy technologies.

Let me quickly mention several other important initiatives agreed to during the visit.

Democracy: Both leaders announced the start of the U.S.-India Global Democracy Initiative to help countries making the often difficult transition to democracy. The Initiative will draw on U.S. and Indian democratic traditions and institutions to provide assistance to help build democratic institutions and strengthen foundations of civil society. As part of this initiative, India and the U.S. agreed to provide contributions to the new U.N. Democracy Fund, charged with building democratic institutions around the world, which will be launched at the margins of the upcoming U.N. General Assembly.

HIV/AIDS: The President and Prime Minister also formed the U.S.-India HIV/AIDS partnership, an effort to encourage the private sector to undertake greater efforts in the prevention, care, and treatment of people living with HIV/AIDS.

Disaster Response: During the tsunami disaster that struck many countries in South and Southeast Asia, the U.S. and India joined with Japan and Australia to form a Core Group that cooperated closely to coordinate the initial international response. The two leaders believe that effort provided a basis for future India-U.S. cooperation on disaster assistance, not just in the Indian Ocean region, but beyond, so they have launched the U.S.-India Disaster Response Initiative. In this sense, we are extremely grateful for India’s quick commitment of $5 million for the American victims of Hurricane Katrina.

Science and Technology: In conjunction with the Prime Minister's visit, the U.S. and India agreed to sign a Science and Technology Framework Agreement. It will build on the U.S.-India High-Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG), to provide for joint research and training, and the establishment of public-private partnerships.

Space Cooperation: The two leaders also looked forward to increasing cooperation in space. To that end, the recently created U.S.-India Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation will build closer ties in space exploration, satellite navigation and launch.

Agricultural Alliance: President Bush and Prime Minister Singh also agreed to launch a U.S.-India Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture, something that will focus on promoting teaching, research, service and commercial linkages between our two countries, and especially our training institutions and universities.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I hope I have made it clear that much was accomplished during the Prime Minister's July visit, and we have much to look forward to in the coming months and years. I know that President Bush very much looks forward to his trip to India -- currently planned for early 2006 -- and the opportunity to strengthen further our partnership.

My colleague, Under Secretary Joseph, will discuss in detail the major U.S.-India initiative on civil nuclear energy cooperation, but I would like to make a few comments before closing, to put it in context.

This is a major Presidential initiative, one that seeks to bring about full civil nuclear energy cooperation between the United States and India. I had the privilege of negotiating this agreement with India on behalf of the President and the Secretary of State. I believe it is a good and sound agreement that will have the effect of progressively integrating India into the global nonproliferation order.

We sought this agreement because India’s nuclear weapons program and its status outside the nonproliferation regime has proven to be a longstanding stumbling block to enhanced U.S.-India relations, as well as a problem for the global nonproliferation regimes. The initiative for civil nuclear cooperation announced by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh in July is intended to deepen the bilateral partnership, address India’s energy needs, and advance international nonproliferation norms and practices.

Mr. Chairman, many do not realize that India is one of the few developing countries that possesses full competency over all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, and is in fact pursuing a variety of advanced nuclear technologies, yet it remains—as it has since 1967—outside the global regime. Although India has demonstrated a strong commitment to protecting fissile materials and nuclear technology more generally, it is in both Indian and American interests that New Delhi’s isolation be brought to an end and that India be made part of a stable global nonproliferation order. The agreement between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh does this in a fair and equitable way. It contemplates both countries taking serious steps toward achieving the goal of strengthening the international nonproliferation regime, while also meeting India’s very real energy needs in a way that contributes to a clean global environment.

For our part, we are committed to working with the Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies, working with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, and consulting with our partners on Indian participation in the fusion energy International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) consortium and the Generation IV International Forum, the work of which relates to advanced nuclear energy systems. As you are aware, we already have begun briefing members and staff about this initiative. Our presence here with you today demonstrates our continuing interest in working with the Congress to see this process through. We are here not simply to explain this initiative, but because we welcome your ideas and counsel. I am sure we will have many more discussions on this important initiative.

This civil nuclear initiative is part of a transformation of the U.S.-Indian relationship that President Bush believes will strongly serve U.S. interests in furthering global stability, democracy, prosperity and peace. As a result of our civil nuclear cooperation with India, U.S. companies will be able to enter India’s lucrative and growing energy market, potentially providing jobs for thousands of Americans. And finally, all states have a vested interest in strengthening the international nonproliferation regime. We gain in this respect, as do our international partners.

We want to move ahead on this initiative expeditiously. We believe this initiative will help bring India into the international nonproliferation mainstream, and open the door to a cleaner and more secure energy future. In the process, it also makes the United States an essential partner as India assumes its rising position in the community of nations. It will help India's economy gain access to the energy it requires to meet its goal of growing at 8% and beyond over the long term, while reducing competition in global energy markets. The environmental benefit of nuclear power in India would be significant and help to curb global warming. Coal accounts for 51% of India’s energy consumption. Nuclear energy offers a clean alternative, because it does not emit carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases.

Mr. Chairman, the President and Secretary of State consider this initiative as one of the Administration’s top foreign policy and legislative priorities for this year. I would like to take this opportunity to outline how we would like to proceed, with the consent and advice of the Congress, to achieve success. First, I will begin meeting with the Indian foreign political advisor next week on the margins of the UN General Assembly. I plan to follow up with him regularly through the course of this process to ensure that our governments are in lock-step as we move forward.

India will assume the same responsibilities and practices as other countries with advanced nuclear programs. We expect India to take clear steps in the coming months to fulfill its part of the agreement. India has agreed to:

• Identify and separate civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs and file a declaration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding its civilian facilities;
• Place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards;
• Sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities;
• Continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing;
• Work with the U.S. for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT) to halt production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;
• Refrain from the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and support efforts to limit their spread; and
• Secure nuclear and missile materials and technologies through comprehensive export control legislation and adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

The United States has reciprocally promised that the Administration will:

• Seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies;
• Work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India; and
• Consult with partners on India’s participation in the fusion energy ITER consortium and the Generation IV International Forum, the work of which relates to advanced nuclear energy systems.

We believe that the Government of India understands this completely and we expect them to begin taking concrete steps in the weeks ahead, and plan to reach agreement with India on a joint implementation schedule. The Administration has identified a number of options for modifying and/or waiving provisions of existing law to allow for full civil nuclear cooperation with India, and we look forward to working with the Congress as we review these options and consider the best way forward.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me say that this is a good deal for the United States. It meets our national security interests because it aligns a 21^st century power with the U.S. in democracy promotion, nonproliferation efforts, and global energy security. For many years we have talked about the potential of U.S.-India relations. The Prime Minister's visit showed that both countries are turning that potential into reality. The United States recognizes India as an emerging world power in the 21st century, with an important role of promoting global stability, democracy and prosperity. We welcome India as a full partner in the international community. Our dialogue with India aims to do just that. We look forward to working closely with the Congress as we strengthen this vital relationship. We would be grateful for your support.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to take questions.

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UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Chairman Hyde, Congressman Lantos, distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor for me to appear before you today to discuss the President’s policy toward India with respect to civil nuclear cooperation. I look forward to working with you over the months ahead to bring this important objective to a timely and successful outcome.

Toward U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation
As Under Secretary Burns testified, we believe that it is in our national security interest to establish a broad strategic partnership with India that encourages India’s emergence as a positive force on the world scene. In the context of this partnership, and as part of the much larger agenda that has just been described, we reached a landmark agreement with India to work toward full cooperation in the civil application of nuclear energy while strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

India believes, and our Administration agrees, that it needs nuclear power to sustain dynamic economic growth and address its growing energy requirements in an affordable and environmentally-responsible manner. Our intent -- in the context of the July 18 Joint Statement by the President and Prime Minister -- is to provide India access to the technology it needs to build a safe, modern and efficient infrastructure that will provide clean, peaceful nuclear energy, one of the few proven sources of emissions-free energy that can provide the energy needed for a modern economy.

At the same time, India has agreed to take on key nonproliferation commitments that will bring it for the first time into the mainstream of the international nuclear nonproliferation community. This is a major positive move for India. While more can and will be done, India’s implementation of its agreed commitments will, on balance, enhance our global nonproliferation efforts, and we believe the international nuclear nonproliferation regime will emerge stronger as a result.

Nonproliferation Gains
Through the Joint Statement, India has publicly agreed to a number of important steps to prevent proliferation. It will now:

• Identify and separate civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs and file a declaration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding its civilian facilities;
• Place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards;
• Sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities;
• Continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing;
• Work with the U.S. for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT) to halt production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;
• Refrain from the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and support efforts to limit their spread; and
• Secure nuclear and missile materials and technologies through comprehensive export control legislation and adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Indian officials have long indicated that India wants to aid international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, missile, chemical, and biological weapons. The Joint Statement makes explicit the specific actions it will undertake. These actions will bring India much closer to international nonproliferation norms and practices.

India’s commitment to separate its civil and military facilities and place its civil facilities and activities under IAEA safeguards demonstrates its willingness to assume the responsibilities that other nations with civil nuclear energy programs have assumed. It will also help protect against diversion of nuclear material and technologies either to India’s weapons program or to the weapons programs of other countries.

By adopting an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, India will commit to reporting to the IAEA on exports of all Trigger List items. This will help the IAEA track potential proliferation elsewhere.

By committing to adopt strong and effective export controls, including adherence to NSG and MTCR Guidelines, India will help ensure that its companies do not transfer sensitive weapons of mass destruction- (WMD) and missile-related technologies to countries of concern.

India has also agreed to work with the United States toward the conclusion of a multilateral FMCT and to maintain its nuclear testing moratorium.

By committing not to export enrichment and reprocessing technology to states that do not already have them, India will help us achieve the goals laid out by President Bush in February 2004, designed to prevent the further spread of such proliferation sensitive nuclear equipment and technology. This will help close what is widely recognized as the most significant loophole in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty regime -- a loophole that has been cynically manipulated by countries such as North Korea and Iran that have pursued the capability to produce fissile material under the guise of peaceful energy but for purposes of developing nuclear weapons.

Each of these activities will help to strengthen the global regime. Together, they constitute a dramatic change in moving India into closer conformity with international nonproliferation standards and practices.

As befits a major, responsible nation, we hope that India will also take additional actions beyond those outlined in the July 18 Joint Statement in support of nonproliferation in the months and years ahead, and we look forward to working with the Indian Government and the international community to further strengthen nonproliferation efforts globally. Through our ongoing nonproliferation dialogue we have already discussed with India such steps as cooperating with us at the IAEA, endorsing the Proliferation Security Initiative Statement of Principles, and harmonizing its control lists with those of the Australia Group and Wassenaar Arrangement.

U.S. Commitments Under the Joint Statement
On a reciprocal basis with India’s commitments, the United States has agreed to work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India. In this context, President Bush told Prime Minister Singh that he would:

• Seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies;
• Work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India; and
• Consult with partners on India’s participation in the fusion energy International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) consortium and the Generation IV International Forum, the work of which relates to advanced nuclear energy systems.

To implement effectively the steps agreed in the Joint Statement, we will need the active support of Congress and that of our international partners. We expect -- and have told the Indian government -- that India’s follow-through on its commitments will allow for our collective action. We believe that the Government of India understands this completely and we expect them to begin taking concrete steps in the weeks ahead.

International Responses to Date
Mr. Chairman, many of our international partners have recognized the need to treat India differently and some have indicated their outright support. The United Kingdom, for instance, welcomed the initiative and noted its pleasure at India’s willingness to take these steps as outlined in the Joint Statement. The Director General of the IAEA has also expressed his support, welcoming India’s decision to place its civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and to sign and implement the Additional Protocol as "concrete and practical steps toward the universal application of IAEA safeguards." Others have told us that they look forward to normalizing their relations with India in the energy and nonproliferation communities.

Some have understandably questioned how this complex initiative comports with the NPT and our efforts to combat proliferation. Others have asked why a cap on India’s production of fissile material for weapons was not part of the deal.

Let me clarify. The United States does not and will not support India’s nuclear weapons program. Our initiative with India in no way recognizes India as an NPT nuclear weapon state and we will not seek to renegotiate the NPT. We remain cognizant of and will fully uphold all of our obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. We remain committed to universal NPT adherence.

But we also recognize that India is a special case and see a clear need to come to terms with it. India never became a party to the NPT. In fact, India was very hostile toward the Treaty for many years. With its decision to take the steps announced in the Joint Statement, India will now take on new nonproliferation responsibilities that will strengthen global nonproliferation efforts and serve the fundamental purpose of the NPT.

India has informed us that it has no intention of becoming a party to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state at this time. Despite this, it is important to seize this opportunity to assist India in becoming a more constructive partner in our global nonproliferation efforts. Indian commitments to be undertaken in the context of the Joint Statement will align this critical state more closely with the global nonproliferation regime than at any time previously. India has said it wants to be a partner and is willing to take important steps to this end. We should encourage such steps in this case by offering tangible benefits in return.

We remain committed to achieving an Indian cessation of fissile material production for weapons, and we have strongly encouraged a move in this direction. However, achieving the physical separation of civilian and military infrastructure would be a significant step forward. And we jointly agreed to work toward the completion of an effective Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty, even as the United States stands willing to explore other intermediate options that also might serve this objective.

As India completes those nonproliferation actions that it has agreed to undertake in the Joint Statement, I am convinced that the nonproliferation regime will emerge stronger as a result. Separately, we will continue to encourage additional steps, such as India’s acceptance of a fissile material production moratorium or cap, but we will not insist on it for the purposes of the civil nuclear cooperation initiative announced by the President and Prime Minister. Even absent such a cap, the initiative represents a substantial net gain for nonproliferation. It is a win for our strategic relationship, a win for energy security, and a win for nonproliferation.

Key Challenges and Uncertainties
Ø Civil/Military split – We have indicated that the separation of civil and military facilities must be credible and defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint to us and to our international friends and partners. India has not yet indicated how it intends to proceed on this score, but we will engage with India over the weeks and months ahead to develop a mutually acceptable approach to this key commitment. To strengthen the international nonproliferation regime and to meet our own expectations, the civil/military split must be comprehensive enough to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime and to provide strong assurances to supplier states and the IAEA that materials and equipment provided as part of civil cooperation will not be diverted to the military sphere. Obviously, the number of facilities and activities that India places under IAEA safeguards, and the speed with which it does so, will directly affect the degree to which we will be able to build support for full civil nuclear cooperation with India in Congress and in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Ø NSG Strategy – In the coming weeks we intend to outline to NSG partners a number of approaches that will permit NSG countries to engage in civil nuclear cooperation with India without undermining the effectiveness of the this regime. We will engage at senior and expert levels, with the goal of securing agreement to permit the provision of NSG Trigger List items to India once it has taken the steps outlined in the Joint Statement.

Ø Other states – We view India as an exceptional case, and see civil nuclear cooperation as a mechanism to deepen further India’s commitment to international nonproliferation. Some have asked whether it might be possible to extend such cooperation to Israel and Pakistan – the only two other states that did not join the NPT. India, Israel, and Pakistan are each unique and require different approaches. Neither Pakistan nor Israel has a civil nuclear energy program that approximates that of India. The United States has no plans to seek full civil nuclear cooperation with Israel or Pakistan.

Legislative Strategy
The President promised that the Administration would seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies. We recognize that the pace and scope of expanded civil nuclear cooperation requires close consultations between the Executive and Legislative Branches, and we seek your active support. In our own ongoing review, we have identified a number of options for modifying and/or waiving provisions of the Atomic Energy Act that currently prohibit the United States from engaging in such cooperation with India. We are reviewing these options, and the Administration looks forward to working with Congress as we consider the best way forward in the legal area. We welcome your suggestions and advice as we embark on this effort.

Conclusion
In conclusion, I would note that from the outset of his first term, the President established non- and counterproliferation as top national security priorities. He put in place the first comprehensive strategy at the national level for combating this preeminent threat to our security, and he embarked on changing how we as a nation, and how the international community more broadly, design and expand our collective efforts to defeat this complex and dangerous challenge.

Recognizing that traditional nonproliferation measures were essential but they were no longer sufficient, the President put in place new concepts and new capabilities for countering WMD proliferation by hostile states and terrorists.

• He increased our national resources to prevent proliferation through Nunn-Lugar type nonproliferation assistance programs and, through the G8 Global Partnership, successfully enlarged the contributions from other countries to this essential task.
• He launched the Proliferation Security Initiative to disrupt the trade in proliferation-related materials. This initiative has achieved the support of over sixty other countries who are working together to share information and develop operational capabilities to interdict shipments at sea, in the air, and on land.
• He initiated the effort resulting in the unanimous adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 that requires all states to enact legislation criminalizing proliferation activities under their jurisdiction, as well as requiring effective export controls and the protection of sensitive materials and technologies on their territories.

These efforts in effective multilateralism, coupled with the strengthening of our own counterproliferation capabilities, have produced concrete successes such as the unraveling of the A.Q. Khan network and the decision by Libya to abandon its nuclear, chemical and long range missile programs.

These efforts also demonstrate the need to be creative and adjust our approaches to take into account the conditions that exist, so that we can achieve our nonproliferation objectives. We must recognize that there is today no viable cookie-cutter approach to nonproliferation; we need tailored approaches that solve real-world problems.

The President’s initiative with India deepens an emerging strategic partnership between the United States and India, while calling for concrete steps by India that further U.S. nonproliferation goals. The agreement to work toward full civil nuclear cooperation is tailored to India’s clear and growing energy needs, but is also a pragmatic and effective response to a long-standing proliferation problem. To the extent it is successfully implemented, it will become a significant nonproliferation success over the months and years ahead.

We have begun consultations with our international partners; conducted a number of introductory discussions with you, your colleagues, and your staff; and look forward to working further with you on the steps necessary to fully realize civil nuclear cooperation with India. We recognize that the pace of this effort and our ability to build NSG consensus relies on the timely implementation of Indian steps. The President and Prime Minister have agreed that they will review progress when the President visits India in early 2006.

Thank you.