Roundtable With Traveling Press

QUESTION: Well, actually, can you say how long in this discussion you actually talked about the political horizon? What was the -- I mean, there were all these --

SECRETARY RICE: You mean you want me to give you an accounting of how we spent the time?

QUESTION: Well, no, but just -- no, I realize you don't want to go blow by blow by blow. We already heard this from [a senior State Department official].

SECRETARY RICE: Yes.

QUESTION: But I want to get a feel for -- because a large part of the lead-up to this meeting was we were going to finally talk after six years about a political horizon.

SECRETARY RICE: I would say we spent a substantial time on kind of the future. I don't want to -- I'm not going to, you know, try to account for how much time. I probably can't even remember exactly how much time. But we went through the agenda that I said that we would. We did have discussions on the -- you know, the current situation with the government. I would characterize those discussions as productive and candid, but rather formal really. You know, we were downstairs, table, rather formal discussions.

We did talk quite a long time about current agreements and how to make sure that those were being implemented. So first phase roadmap obligations but also some of the movement and access issues, ceasefire, the quadrilateral committee meeting to deal with ceasefire issues and also to deal with concerns that everybody has about smuggling in the Philadelphi strip.

So those parts of the discussion all took place downstairs. We kind of transitioned upstairs, continued to talk some about current obligations and then we talked some about the future. And --

QUESTION: Looking out over the Old City and --

SECRETARY RICE: Well, we started in the suite. We only looked out over the Old City for a little while.

QUESTION: Didn't it inspire you to talk about final status?

SECRETARY RICE: Prime Minister Olmert was Mayor of Jerusalem so, you know, he knows the city well and showed me where there were some actually apartments that he thought were occupied by Americans. So it was -- but it was a nice atmosphere and I think less formal, more comfortable, a little bit -- when you're sitting around a table that way, it can be very formal, and I just felt at some point that it was time to have a little bit less formal setting. So that's what we did.

QUESTION: You talked quite a bit about this being a complicated time --

SECRETARY RICE: Yeah.

QUESTION: Can you describe a little bit of how that complication (inaudible) back and forth and what you think the value of getting that (inaudible)?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, I think -- first of all, I think the real value here was that they sat down to talk with each other pretty early in this process, of when the government has not yet been formed but when the announcement of the formation of the government has been made. I, frankly, don't know how long it might have been before they would have talked with each other were it not for the coincidence of this meeting having been scheduled. And I think it's far better that they talked to each other about the formation of the government, about concerns about the formation of the government, about concerns given that the government appears that it will not -- you know, that there's nothing yet that suggests the government is going to meet the Quartet standards.

And the ability to do that face to face rather than, as you might imagine, through the press or through newspapers or whatever, I think was enormously valuable at this moment. Because the -- it isn't as if the -- it's true, the Hamas government didn't meet the Quartet principles either, but you move from a Hamas government to a national unity government in which there would -- prospectively there would be Fatah representation. The President helped to broker this and so the -- so President Abbas was able to talk again about how committed he was to the Quartet principles, how the Quartet principles are, in fact, his principles. He doesn't call them the Quartet principles; he says those are my principles because I think they're right.

That's a very good engagement to have at a time when there's a lot of uncertainty, where people are not quite -- don't quite know what this government is going to be but know that something has changed and something has happened. And I'm glad that they were able to talk about it face to face and not through the press.

QUESTION: Secretary Rice, were you able to get any assurance from Mr. Abbas that the Quartet principles which he says are his principles, that he's going to continue to work to get them to try in this new national unity government?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, look, I don't want to put words in his mouth. He recognizes the importance of the Quartet principles. I think he recognizes that there is much that can be done on the basis of the Quartet principles that cannot be done if you're not working on the basis of the Quartet principles. And so remember that there are three separate entities here: There's the Palestinian Legislative Council, which Hamas controls; there is the Palestinian Government, which has been a Hamas government which will now be a unity government; and then there's the Presidential Administration or the Palestinian Authority, which he heads. And he heads it with his own authority and his own legitimacy, having been elected to that position on the basis of principles that he went to the Palestinian people on when he was elected in 2005.

So there are three entities here, and I think he wanted to make clear that the entity which he controls and on the basis of which he was elected is one that is going to act on the basis of the Quartet principles. So I know it's a complicated structure, but that is truly the structure of the Palestinian political leadership. And it is also the case that he is the Chairman of the PLO and that discussions, negotiations, whatever, work with Israel, is in the hands of the Chairman of the PLO.

Anne, you were trying to follow up, though. Let me --

QUESTION: I was just --

SECRETARY RICE: Yes, it's a different meeting that -- you were going to say it's a different meeting?

QUESTION: Yes, right. You're describing essentially the chief value of holding the meeting in -- of the -- the chief accomplishment of the meeting is that it happened at all.

SECRETARY RICE: I didn't say that.

QUESTION: Well, no, but I mean, that's --

SECRETARY RICE: It is an accomplishment that it happened because in this circumstance with a change in the circumstances, I think it is really valuable that they sat down face to face. I think it was helpful that I was there. I think it was useful that they could talk about what had changed, what had not changed, what commitments was Abu Mazen making on the basis of his principles. I think that was all extremely important to do.

We also achieved an opportunity for them to give their views of the political and diplomatic horizon. And that was also important. But clearly, there were people -- we thought, should we go ahead with this meeting under these circumstances when you had a Hamas government and Abu Mazen. There was a certain clarity to that. Now you have a national unity government that was brokered by Abu Mazen. What does that mean? And you could have -- I could have made the decision that, all right, that means that we'll just wait until this all sorts out.

But in discussing this with the President in particular, we thought, we decided, that it would be best to go ahead because, as I said, it's never uncomplicated here. But I think a real benefit of it that I realize even more having held the meeting is that face to face they got to talk about things in a pretty candid fashion that I think would have been harmful to the relationship if it had been done through the press or through subordinates or whatever. It was better for them to deal with these issues face to face. And it was -- they have a lot of respect for each other, and so it was never not cordial. I don't -- it was never hostile in any way. It was always cordial. It was always respectful. But there were important issues to get on the table, and they talked about them.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, you say -- you talk about this complicates the political horizon and both sides have said today that if you weren't there they didn't think at this point they would be able to talk about these issues. So given the complications of the unity government and (inaudible) said they were talking (inaudible) difficult issues candidly, are you worried that your role is going to become more of a referee on the idea of a unity government and whether Israel should accept it and how you deal with the Palestinians?

SECRETARY RICE: No, no.

QUESTION: Rather than looking at the endgame (inaudible) original (inaudible)?

SECRETARY RICE: Yeah. It's a good question, Elise, but no, I don't think there's any danger of that because we were able to kind of -- we were able to at a certain point set that aside. First of all, there isn't a government yet and we'll deal with it when there is. But we were also -- I think President Abbas knows very clearly where the United States stands also on the Quartet principles and I didn't -- I had repeated that to him yesterday. He had reassured me. He said, "I want to reaffirm right here" -- this is yesterday -- "that I am committed to these Quartet principles." I told him that I would communicate that to the President on his behalf. I have also done that.

And so it was -- we were able after the discussion of the current situation -- and a chance for President Abbas to describe what he was trying to accomplish with the unity government. You know, the fact that Palestinians were killing each other, that innocent children were dying in this and that he felt an obligation to stop the interfactional violence -- they had an opportunity to talk about that as well.

But we were then able to set that aside, then to move on to talk about some current agreements that need to be reinforced. I think everybody is very concerned, for instance, that the ceasefire be reinforced, that the Qassam rockets stop. We're very concerned that there be further movement at Karni and at Rafah, so we talked some about that. And then to have them talk about their views on the diplomatic and political horizon. So we were able to do all three. I didn't feel that I was refereeing anything, but I think that it would have been unlikely that they would have had that face-to-face discussion had it not been for the coincidence of this meeting --

QUESTION: Madame Secretary --

QUESTION: Madame Secretary --

SECRETARY RICE: Yes, go ahead.

QUESTION: Just so you know, I'm Steve Erlanger from the Times.

SECRETARY RICE: Yeah, I know you, Steve.

QUESTION: If Abu Mazen is so committed to the principles, which I believe personally he is, why do you think he's allowed his movement to go into a unity government which is very unlikely to meet these principles, and do you see him (inaudible) Fatah (inaudible) compromise (inaudible)? And do you see him going in to Mecca as a sign of weakness because, in fact, Fatah's force was hit badly in the intra-Palestinian fighting in Gaza against Hamas?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, I think, Steve, you would need to ask him why he felt the need to do this at this particular point in time. He clearly was concerned about the violence and I -- that obviously was very high on his -- in his concern. I think they're also concerned that the Hamas government, the government that was wholly Hamas, really wasn't able to govern the country and perhaps this coalition would be better able to govern the country.

Now, we have made very clear at every stage there's a question of international -- or rather I should say American -- support for a government rests on the Quartet principles. But I do think that the sense that the violence had to stop and the territories were becoming ungovernable under the Hamas government was very much on his mind. I mean, he said as much.

I continue to believe that those who believe in these principles and who have accepted them and who are acting on them should be supported. And this is a -- there's a process going on inside of the Palestinian political leadership. That's obvious. There is -- it's going to be, I suspect, a process of coming to terms with differences that are quite black and white and may be going to gray at some point.

But what we have to do as the international community is stay clear about what is required. And I think if we stay clear about what is required, that increases the chance that the entire Palestinian -- or at least the bulk of the Palestinian political leadership will end up in a place that the international community can deal with it. But I think that was (inaudible).

QUESTION: Madame Secretary --

QUESTION: Madame Secretary --

SECRETARY RICE: Yes, Charlie. Charlie.

QUESTION: Why didn't the other two come with you to make the statement, and were you disappointed they didn't?

SECRETARY RICE: No, we had decided well in advance that it was best that I just make the statement because this is a sensitive time. They obviously have a good relationship. I think you could see that in the way that they greeted each other. But because I really believe and I think they believe that confidentiality of these meetings is extremely important so that people can say whatever is on their mind, I just don't think it would have been useful to put them in a position in which they were having to deal with questions that I'm sure they will deal with over time, but it just -- it didn't seem like the right way to end this meeting. It seemed that it was best to just have a statement and let that be it. And I'm here to take your questions now.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, ultimately you're going to arrive back at the same problem, which is that Hamas is in the majority, and Hamas has made it clear that they're not willing or unable to bend on the Quartet principles. That being said, do you have some sort of an alternative or an override to deal with what seems to be an eventual obstacle?

SECRETARY RICE: I think that the roadmap and just about every other plan or guide to the establishment of a Palestinian state understands or assumes that if there's going to be a Palestinian state, it's going to have to be on the basis of what we've now called the Quartet principles. The Quartet principles, of course, are enshrined in the roadmap. You're going to have to -- if you're going to have to have -- if you're going to have a Palestinian state, if you're going to make the choice for a Palestinian state, you're going to be making a choice for a state that's going to live side by side in peace with Israel, that recognizes the right of the Israelis to exist, just as the Israelis will have to recognize the right of a Palestinian state to exist. You're going to have to have a renunciation of violence. You're going to have to have one authority over the -- over security forces, what Azu Mazen has called one authority and one gun. But that's also enshrined in the roadmap.

So if there is going to be a Palestinian state, it's going to be on that basis. Now, the sooner that the entire Palestinian political leadership accepts that, the better. But in the process of getting through the roadmap and going to the development of that Palestinian state, I think it is entirely possible to work with those who do accept that. And since I believe that the great majority of the Palestinian people ultimately accept those principles as well, I see nothing wrong with working through the roadmap, developing a sense of what the destination will be, and recognizing that it's only going to come into being on the basis of those principles.

QUESTION: Am I to interpret -- I don't know the rules here, if I can get in all my questions.

SECRETARY RICE: Sure.

QUESTION: Am I to interpret from that that you can simply keep the aid blockade in place and, for lack of a better phrase, starve the Hamas government out?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, until there is a government, I'm not going to comment on what we will or will not do because I really want to see what this is going to be. We know what the letter of designations look like, but we don't know how it's going to be put into practice. We don't know anything really about that. It's a very sparse data -- you know, there's very sparse data at this point about this government.

So I don't want to get into speculating about what we'll do. But in terms of the creation of the Palestinian state, it's obvious it has to be on the basis of the Quartet principles. In terms of who we will support, particularly with American financial support of any kind, with the exception of humanitarian support which we are giving directly to the Palestinian people through nongovernmental organizations and through the UN that -- we've always said humanitarian support has no -- we have no political criteria for humanitarian support. And that continues to be the case here, as in everywhere else.

But we'll -- when we see a government, we can determine what we're going to do about it.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary --

QUESTION: Madame Secretary --

SECRETARY RICE: Oh, wait a minute. You had a question, Helene, so --

QUESTION: Who didn't?

SECRETARY RICE: That's the only rule, that you don't get a second question until --

QUESTION: She had a feeling question.

SECRETARY RICE: Yeah. (Laughter.) How did I feel looking at the city of Jerusalem? No. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: The Israelis were saying that they were looking at this as a confidence-building measure -- this particular meeting. Do you see this meeting as having built up some confidence between them and that it's going to lead to be able to look at more -- the final status issues?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, I certainly think that it was -- it had a confidence-building outcome because, again, this is a period of considerable uncertainty and I'm not sure when they would have sat down to try to come to terms with some of those uncertainties, to try to get answers to each others' questions. And this meeting was scheduled well before the formation of the national unity government, but frankly I'm really glad it was scheduled. I'm not also certain that after the formation of the -- or the designation letter that I would have been able to schedule it. So sometimes things come together in a good way and I'm very glad that it did because I do think it had a sense of building confidence.

I think as we talk about the -- you know, their views of the diplomatic and political horizon, or as that -- when that goes -- if they do it together or if and when I do it again, I think we have to recognize that it is important to take things step by step. Glenn asked last night, you know, why -- when he looks back to see why some of the efforts to get a Palestinian state have not succeeded, and a lot of people have tried and maybe I'm only going to be the last in a long list of people who have tried, but I think one of the lessons is that if you haven't had a chance to prepare the ground, if you haven't had a chance to have informal discussions about difficult issues, if you press people into saying -- answering questions to which they can only give a no answer, you've got a problem. And I do think that one of the goals of diplomacy has to be not to force an answer when you know that the answer is going to be no, but rather to work and continue and build confidence until you can begin to say yes about some things.

QUESTION: Do you have an idea when the next bilateral will be or trilateral will be?

SECRETARY RICE: I think they will try to meet. They've said soon. And I don't have a schedule, but I know that they were -- they will try -- I think the quadrilateral will try to meet quite soon because there's a lot of concern about the Philadelphi corridor. And I'll come back at some point.

But you know, it's important also that there be a bilateral channel and that that bilateral channel be preserved. They really don't need me showing up every time they want to meet. I think that would be a mistake, too. And so I'll just kind of assess and see when it might be helpful for me to come back.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary --

SECRETARY RICE: Yes.

QUESTION: The Palestinians say that today and in the past President Abbas was offered assurances that Gilat Shalit will be freed before the national unity government is formed, and I'm wondering if you have that expectation as well.

SECRETARY RICE: I'm not going to talk about what the President talked about in the meeting, but obviously he has said publicly that he wants to see Galit Shalit released, and I hope that he will be released soon. And it is one thing that could, I think, help a lot with the atmosphere because whoever is holding him is causing a great deal of problems. So I think redoubling the efforts to do that would be a very good thing.

QUESTION: Do you have an expectation that that will happen?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, I -- let's just hope it comes. I have no doubt that if Abu Mazen can bring it about tomorrow, he would bring it about tomorrow. So we'll all work and see if it can be brought about.

QUESTION: Did Abbas -- I'm sorry.

SECRETARY RICE: Janine didn't have a question?

QUESTION: I yield.

SECRETARY RICE: You yield. Okay. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Has Abbas asked you since you've been here to lift the aid boycott?

SECRETARY RICE: He knows and I've repeated, you know, that our position is that we're going to wait and see what this government is.

QUESTION: So he hasn't really asked you that? I just -- I mean, has he not made a case that, look, I've really tried hard here --

SECRETARY RICE: He is -- he accepts the American position -- and I think it's the position internationally, it's not just the American position -- that we are in a wait-and-see mode but that our decisions are going to be based on the Quartet principles. And I think he understands that.

QUESTION: So he didn't necessarily have to ask you? He just knew what --

SECRETARY RICE: Glenn, you know that I don't talk about diplomatically what people have and have not asked of me. But he is -- he accepts that the U.S. position is one of waiting and I think he understands also that that will be -- that that is the Quartet position.

QUESTION: Janine.

SECRETARY RICE: Yes. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: I'm having trouble phrasing my question. But King Abdullah of Jordan, for example, expressed the fatigue of the Arab world with what you just described, a step-by-step approach that's incremental. They want the big deal. And there was a sense over the last couple weeks and months that you were going to do a big -- you were going to do this. And I'm wondering, having been to your meeting with King Abdullah of Jordan and what you expect the Arab reaction to be to the statement which, at the most, is saying we're going to implement stage one of the roadmap.

SECRETARY RICE: No, Janine, I think I said that one of the things we talked about was implementing phase one of the roadmap. I did not say that this meeting was about implementing phase one of the roadmap. Did you hear me say that? No. I said that we talked about the current situation, which we needed to do and had to do. You could not have walked into that room and said, all right, let's talk about your views of the political and diplomatic horizon, let's forget that a national unity government has been -- that there's a plan. You couldn't have done that. So we talked about the current situation.

Then we talked about agreements that needed to be met, because I am very concerned about movement and access issues and problems like Karni and it's a good opportunity to raise those issues. We're all concerned about the Qassams that continue to come out. We're all concerned about Gilad Shalit and getting that. And so we talked about some current issues. In that group of current issues -- current, let me say, extant agreements, we talked about the first phase of the roadmap, and really for not a terribly long time how to get that phase moving.

I would hope that what people would refer back to is that I've said that I think getting a vision before the Palestinian people of what their state -- you know, how to get to their state and even what it might be is extremely important and we ought to do that as quickly as we can.

But I'm also aware that I can decide that I ought to do that in two months and it won't happen because there is work to be done that is going to -- will take some time. As I said the other day, let's not have people run and somebody fall down. So it's not a lack of commitment to the completion of the roadmap, and the completion of the roadmap in as accelerated a fashion as we possibly can.

It's also important that we've broken through the idea that the sequence of the roadmap, which is extremely important -- sequence is important and it makes sense -- but the sequence of the roadmap doesn't preclude talking about the destination. And for a while, we were stuck in the notion that you couldn't talk about the destination until you've fulfilled all the phases of the roadmap. And I think that was the frustration in the international community broadly and also in the Arab world, and so I think we've broken through that. But it's -- you know, it's one meeting and I think --

QUESTION: Just to clarify, I wasn't (inaudible) what you accomplished here by bringing them together, by talking about movement and access and first stage (inaudible) these are things that you did. I'm just talking about the Arab world expectations of you and whether or not they're too high after this agreement.

SECRETARY RICE: Well, no. What I said that I would do is we would also talk about the political horizon. And we did. I mean, we had the -- you know, their views of the diplomatic and political horizon.

I hope that the Arab states also understand that they have a role to play in this. You know, this isn't just what the United States can talk about with the Israelis and the Palestinians. How about some of the ideas that were there in the Arab initiative? Why can't we get some of that going, too? I don't want others to stand on the sideline and say, you know, the United States needs to deliver the completion of the roadmap. Everybody's got obligations. And one thing that I'll be talking to the Arabs about is what can you to do make this happen.

QUESTION: Normalize?

SECRETARY RICE: Eventually. Eventually. But there are a lot of things short of that that would be helpful. And so given the -- you know, the complicated circumstances, I think it was the right discussion to have today. But I don't want to leave you with the impression -- and if I did, it's my fault -- but I don't want to leave you with the impression that we only talked about the current circumstances and only talked about the extant commitments or agreements. We also did have a chance to discuss their views of this diplomatic horizon.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary.

SECRETARY RICE: Yes.

QUESTION: I'm trying to clarify something in my own mind because you've said several times now that I really want to see what this national unity government looks like. We know what the Mecca agreement says, but it sounds like you're continuing to hold out hope that this national unity government might possibly move further than the Mecca agreement. Do you -- I mean, do you honestly -- are you (inaudible) that -- are you expecting Abu Mazen to push --

SECRETARY RICE: Look, I think until there is a government, you don't pass on the government. As I said, I haven't seen anything yet that suggests that it's going to be a government that is -- that respects the Quartet principles, but let's see. I assume, too, that people have been hearing that the international community continues to hold to the Quartet principles.

But I just don't see any point, really, in making decisions in the absence -- in the abstract. We'll make decisions when there's something concretely to make decisions about.

QUESTION: Can I follow on that? But I mean, once this government is formed and you have a better picture, I mean, how long are you going to give it before you go back to the idea of trying to boost up Abu Mazen? There was some concern that, you know, your support for Abu Mazen, the beefing up his security forces, was creating a lot of the tensions between Hamas and Fatah, and when he called for those elections that was what started the bloodshed and the kind of emergence of him and to take more power was what started the bloodshed that led to them forming a government in an effort to get the blockade lifted, and it kind of creates this cycle.

So I mean, are you going to go back to your original plan of boosting up of -- the strengthening the office of the president, or do you have to consider some of the things that the Russians and the Germans have suggested that you do, and that's engage Hamas in an effort to influence their position, not wait for them to change their position?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, first of all, let's just remember that Hamas is a terrorist organization and I actually think that the Russians don't list Hamas as a terrorist organization but the EU does. And so you know, that's something that we can't just push aside. It's an organization that is a terrorist organization. And so we can't engage a terrorist organization.

But, Elise, I think that we're not in a position to talk about what the strategy is going to be until we've made a decision on what we're going to do. And again, I just don't see why in advance, in the abstract, we would want to do that. I don't see anything wrong with working with the part of the Palestinian leadership that is committed to the Quartet principles, and I think we'll continue to do that.

QUESTION: How long are you going to -- I mean, at what point do you say, all right, I don't picture -- I don't see anything that (inaudible)? I mean, are you waiting for some kind of platform of the government? Are you going to give them six months? I mean, what is your benchmark for them following the Quartet principles?

SECRETARY RICE: I don't know how this is going to unfold, so I really can't answer the question. I think we just have to see how it unfolds.

QUESTION: You're going to see the Quartet on Wednesday.

SECRETARY RICE: Wednesday.

QUESTION: What's the role that you see for them in this process from this point on?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, I'm sure we will have a discussion also about the current situation and -- but we talked a lot about the need -- it's like the answer to Janine's question about the Arabs. I think the international community has a lot that it can bring to the table in terms of helping to build a Palestinian capacity. The Europeans are very involved. The EU is very involved in the movement and access agreement that I negotiated back in '05. They are the ones who are at Rafah. I suspect that there are more -- there will be more opportunities of that kind as this all progresses.

I think that given that we're going to need a security concept eventually that makes it possible for Palestinians and Israelis to be secure, what role can the EU and the international community play in that. So I think there's a lot. This is going to have to be an international team effort to support the emergence of a Palestinian state. And so I think starting those discussions will be very important.

But I also want the Quartet to play a political role, to be supportive of efforts to build toward a political horizon and the fulfillment of the roadmap. And so I plan to sit and strategize with them about how we do that.

QUESTION: What do you envision as the next step for the Israelis and the Palestinians in face-to-face meetings that don't include you? Do they go back to the usual sort of haggling over incremental confidence-building measures such as the movement, a handful of roadblocks or the release of Palestinian prisoners and things like that? Or do they carry on with this notion of looking down the road for a political horizon; that is, do they start tackling the big issues? What do you think is the next -- is the next -- what the next meeting would look like for them?

SECRETARY RICE: You know, I can't write their agenda. I do think they've got quite a bit of work to do in terms of things on the ground. But I wouldn't underestimate, for instance, what real implementation of the agreement on movement and access could mean for the Palestinian people and therefore for preparations for the political horizon. The agreement on movement and access is not, of course, just about what checkpoints get moved in the West Bank, but it's about whether or not the Palestinian economy can function in a way that Palestinian products get to market.

Now, our Ambassador has told me that we're finally at Karni getting the kind of throughput that the Palestinians are actually able to get their agricultural products out in time so that they don't sit by the road and spoil. So if you were to have -- and I would encourage them to do this -- that rather than trying to make incremental progress on movement and access, to really try to make big progress on movement and access. I think you're talking about something that has real political ramifications in that way.

So I hope it will not be kind of incremental and, you know, a checkpoint here, a checkpoint there, but really trying to push as fast as hard as they can on some of these agreements.

Whether or not they'll choose to continue to explore the -- or share views about the political and diplomatic horizon I can't say, but I hope they will.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary.

SECRETARY RICE: Yes.

QUESTION: One question. You talked about the Mecca understanding, the Mecca agreement, in the context of the need to end the surge in Palestinian violence (inaudible) died. But isn't it true that we were giving money, weapons, bullets to one of these sides, to Fatah, that was engaged in this fighting? Do we, too, bear some share of responsibility for that violence?

SECRETARY RICE: I don't think the international effort -- and it was -- it is an international effort that is envisioned in the roadmap -- to professionalize the security forces of the Palestinian Authority is to blame for intrafactional fighting. I think it's actually quite the other way around. I mean, part of the problem has been that you've got multiple militias, really, not a professional security force that is one authority and one gun.

And so the effort that we've been making is really to -- is to put together a plan. I think if you looked at what Keith Dayton was doing and what he's doing with his Canadian counterparts and the European Union and so forth, it is really to build a professional army -- or professional security force, professional police force and security force, that will be responsive to a clear authority, which is the presidency.

And look, I do think it's fair to note that the situation in terms of security forces coming after Oslo and for the last ten years has been one in which you've had militias loyal to individuals, and then Hamas had a pretty disciplined militia but loyal to Hamas. So that's part of the problem of kind of lawlessness in the territories.

And the best way to protect the Palestinian people, let alone to carry out roadmap obligations in terms of security for Israel, the best way to protect the Palestinian people is to have a security force that is accountable, that is professional, that is well trained, that can stop terrorists from launching Qassam rockets from the Gaza.

I mean, I think one of the disappointments after the withdrawal, the Israeli disengagement from Gaza, is that there was not a force loyal to the political authorities that could actually control Gaza, could bring Gaza into security. So that's how I see it. And I don't think that you can blame that professionalization effort for what is really regrettable violence.

Thank you.

QUESTION: Thank you very much.

SECRETARY RICE: Thanks very much.

2007/T3-10