The U.S.-Russian Relationship

Deputy Assistant Secretary Kramer: Don, thanks very much for the kind introduction. I am a baseball fan and I'm a happy baseball fan these days since my Red Sox won. I'm also a happy American football fan.

Moderator (RFE/RL): We even put that on the Russian service program today.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Kramer: That will be my best quote, I think, of the day. I'm also a happy football fan with my Patriots winning.

Many thanks to all of you for showing up. I will try to be brief in some opening thoughts because I think it will be more interesting to have a give and take. But let me start with the U.S.-Russian relationship and where we are.

Some of you have heard me say this before; it's a complicated relationship. It's a relationship that is defined by cooperation in areas of common interest, and those include working in the counter-proliferation area, in counter-terrorism; they include working together in the Middle East peace process and working on the threat of North Korea. Russia is one of the members of the six-party talks.

We have a number of areas where we work pretty well together. We have an American business community that is very bullish on Russia. In fact, Ian was just out in Russia a week or so ago and was at the U.S.-Russia Business Council event they had there and was struck by how bullish, in fact, the business community is.

That is to suggest that it's not all black and white as it's commonly portrayed in, not by RFE/RL, but by some in the Western press that everything is going to hell in the U.S.-Russian relationship, and we're back in the Cold War days. In fact, it is not.

But having said that, it's also very true that we have our differences with the Russians on a number of issues. And quite frankly, the list of differences has been growing of late. The differences include issues we are trying to work together with the Russians on to narrow the differences, find ways that we might be able to cooperate such as on missile defense where we have had a number of discussions with Russian officials on trying to reduce the differences we have, where we want to cooperate with Russia and take advantage of its offer to cooperate at the Gabala radar where we also are in discussions with the government of Azerbaijan. The radar site under construction at Armavir. We think that actually is a good thing for us to be cooperating with Russia in developing a missile defense against potential threats, in the Middle East and elsewhere, for that matter. But we also feel it's important that we continue our efforts with Poland and the Czech Republic. We view these systems as complementary, not as alternatives to each other.

There's also the issue, of course, of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe treaty where we have had discussions with the Russians on how to keep Russia from moving forward with its intent to suspend from a treaty that really has been the bedrock of European security since it was first signed and ratified and went into effect in 1992, and then with the adapted CFE version resulting from the 1999 Istanbul Summit. 1999 is, of course, important because along with attempts to adapt the CFE agreement came commitments by the Russian side to move forward with withdrawal from Georgia and Moldova. In that case, we've seen significant progress with base closings and withdrawal by Russian forces in Georgia. One issue outstanding, the Gudauta Base. But where we have not seen much progress is the case of Moldova since really the end of 2003 or early 2004.

There is the issue of post-START where, here again, we hope to narrow any differences we may have, but we want to move forward in trying to work together on reducing nuclear weapon stockpiles, and we are in discussions with the Russians on this issue too.

The issue of the intermediate range and short range nuclear forces, INF treaty came up in Moscow. When Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates were there the middle of October, and they went with the intent of having serious, in-depth discussions with their Russian counterparts on a whole range of security issues. And I think contrary to the media reports, not just Western, but media reports in general about those talks of the 2+2, I think the meetings actually went fairly well. They were constructive.

I think we did not have any breakthroughs, it's fair to say, in those discussions when Rice and Gates were there, but we did agree that the 2+2 would continue in roughly six months time, and we also agreed that it was important to maintain the various working groups we have on issues.

I mentioned INF. We, for example, contrary to reports of the media did not come away with a sense that Russia was threatening to withdraw from the INF treaty. On the contrary, what President Putin and others made clear was they hoped other countries would also adhere to the general principles of the treaty without opening up the treaty since the treaty actually doesn't have any provisions for new countries to join.

We have differences as well dealing with the neighborhood, the whole region. In particular, we have expressed concerns about Russia and Georgia in the relationship there, and the support that we see that has been provided through separatist regions in Georgia -- Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We have urged both sides and all sides frankly, to engage in confidence building measures to try to reduce tensions. There is, unfortunately, too great a risk for accidents or even provocations that lead to bigger problems in the Caucasus, so we have been stressing to both the Georgians and to the Russia to engage in a serious way to try to tamp down tensions there.

We've been concerned about a general zero-sum approach that we think has been prevalent in Russian thinking towards its neighbors where efforts by countries such as Ukraine or Moldova to improve their relationship with the West is viewed as, by definition, counter to Russian interest. We, on the other hand, tend to think that Ukraine and Moldova and other countries in the region can develop stronger, better relations with the West while simultaneously maintaining good healthy relations with Russia. In fact, it is the view of the United States that bad relations between these countries and Russia is not in U.S. interest. It is in everyone's interest, not just U.S. interest but everyone's interest, for these countries to maintain good, strong relations with Russia.

These countries, however, are new independent states. Not so new any more, but they're sovereign states that have the right to deepen ties with Euro-Atlantic institutions and no country should have a veto over those countries' aspirations.

We have been concerned about tensions between Russia and the Baltic states, most recently, of course, the situation with Estonia back in the spring.

So the relationship Russia has with its neighbors has, in fact, been a source of some disagreement and tension, and we have tried to work in tamping down those differences.

We have expressed some concern about the use of energy for political or economic pressure on some of the neighbors. The cutoff of gas to Ukraine in 2006, the cutoff of oil to Belarus in 2007. Our hope is not to see any repeat of that either in those countries or any other countries along Russia's borders.

It is in everyone's interest for Russia to be a key energy provider and a reliable energy provider for all of Europe, given Europe's dependence on Russia for much of its oil and gas. But we also hope to see avoidance of any tactics or efforts to use energy to apply pressure on countries.

We also hope to see greater investment in Russia's energy sector so that Russia is able to not only maintain its current production levels but possibly increase it to meet both rising domestic consumption needs but also domestic consumption needs in Europe, too.

A final area I would mention is the concerns we have about the domestic situation in Russia. Most recently, of course, the efforts to narrow and confine the ODIHR mission that we have been trying to send to Russia to observe the upcoming Duma elections on December 2^nd, but more than that we have been concerned, and Secretary Rice, President Bush have spoken about this, the over-centralization of power. I always look back to the removal of election of governors back in 2004 following Beslan, which I think was a step that removes accountability for the population with government officials.

It's important, I think, that people, NGOs, opposition groups, be allowed to gather, to protest, to speak out, but I think we have seen some growing pressure on journalists, on NGOs, on opposition types with rallies and protests being disruptive. Deaths of, murder of journalists, which is a terribly unfortunate thing. And the Politskaya, Klebnikov and other cases still remain unsolved, though some people have been detained in some of those cases. We have continued to press for the proper resolution of those cases so that the people responsible are brought to justice.

So there are differences. I've spelled some of them out. But there are areas where we work well together.

I think we are looking at a Russia, understandably, that will be more focused on its elections, upcoming elections; that will be more focused on the issue of succession; and I think that means a Russia that will be a little more distracted by its domestic and internal developments, its political developments, perhaps a little focused on its foreign policy, though that remains to be seen.

With Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates having been in Moscow in the middle of October, we have tried to demonstrate our willingness, our interest, our seriousness in trying to engage with our Russian counterparts so that we can continue to make progress in the areas where we work well together. And that will continue to be the focus of U.S. efforts and U.S. diplomacy that we will continue to try to tap into and even enhance the areas of cooperation on counter-terrorism and non-proliferation, on the business climate while also avoiding a tendency to sweep differences under the rug. I think we are able to, to use the expression, walk and chew gum at the same time, and that is to say continue to try to deepen areas of cooperation while also dealing with and recognizing that there are going to be areas of disagreement. On a number of these issues we may wind up having to agree to disagree. But if we can manage those differences in a way that doesn't adversely affect the areas where we have good relations, I think that's all for the better.

With that I will stop there and be happy to take any questions.

Moderator (RFE/RL): We'll go back and forth, Prague to Washington. Please identify yourselves when you ask the questions, and I will use the authority of the chair to ask the first one, David, which is to ask about what you mentioned in passing which is to say the succession and its effect on bilateral relations. In my conversations in the past few years, a third Putin term seemed to be a red line for some people in the administration, which is to say he should obey the constitutional stricture against another term, and if he didn't there might be some adverse consequences for the relationship. Can you give me your thoughts on that issue?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Kramer: We have for a considerable period of time stressed the importance of a democratic transfer of power in Russia. President Putin has repeatedly said that he is not interested in office and staying on for a third term. He doesn't want to amend the constitution in that respect.

I think recent developments have, not surprisingly, raised the prospect that in one way or another President Putin will try to maintain some degree of control over the situation. We will be following this, obviously, with great interest. I think to be honest it is premature to speculate on what the various scenarios might be, but certainly Secretary Rice and others have been on the record saying that we take President Putin at his word when he says he doesn't want to stay for a third term and that's what we expect to see. That's what I think is in the best interest of the country, that everyone abide by the constitution and the expectation that we will see a transfer of power.

How that's done, the details of all that are up to the Russians. It's up to them to decide how they want to do this. But we will be following with great interest the elections of both the Duma and the presidential, and some of us are back to tea leaf reading days to try to figure out what's really going on.

Question: [RFE/RL]. Secretary Kramer, when you gave examples of the energy cutoffs that have raised concerns for the United States, you mentioned Ukraine and Belarus but there was also an oil cutoff to the previously Lithuanian owned oil refinery at Mažeikiai in the spring of 2006 with the excuse that the pipeline had broken and couldn't be repaired.

The Poles now own that oil refinery. It still does not get any oil through the pipeline. Any comment on that?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Kramer: I appreciate that you raise that. That is another example where I think serious questions can be asked and eyebrows raised, frankly, about the inability to fix that pipeline. I will say in contrast in January 2006 there was a break in a pipeline to Georgia which got repaired under rather adverse conditions, both climate and the geography, fairly quickly. It is quite striking that the Lithuanian situation has not been rectified after more than a year has gone by. I think the Lithuanians, frankly, have adjusted to the change in status and don't necessarily expect that the pipeline will be back up and running that Mažeikiai-Nafta will be running smoothly, the way it used to. Perhaps that's for the good. I think in some respects too much time has passed to expect that that situation will change, which I think is unfortunate. But it is another good example to raise, and I appreciate that.

Question: [RFE/RL]. My question will be about Iran. How will you evaluate the Russian position on Iran? I know that during the [inaudible] it was [inaudible] of Russian position. What is your evaluation now, how you see the Russian position toward Iran?

And a second question is concerning Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Do we have some concern about possible creation of military bloc with the members of this organization?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Kramer: Thank you. On Iran, we and Russia agree on the overarching objective which is we need to keep Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability. We and Russia have worked well together in passing two resolutions through the UN Security Council, December of last year and March of this year. And efforts continue on a third resolution, which we would like to see brought up before the UN Security Council this month or next month depending on some other developments involving the IAEA and EU head Solana.

We have had some differences, I think, over tactics which is not surprising, between Russia and the United States over how to deal with Iran through the UN Security Council process. We have had differences even with China. It isn't just Russia. We've also noted that the completion of the Bushehr nuclear reactor has been stalled, and we think actually that probably is a good thing. Whatever the reasons may be.

I think it is important that Iran be sent a message that it is not business as usual, and I think the lack of completion of the Bushehr nuclear reactor is a good example of that.

There will continue to be intensive discussions involving Russia, involving the other members on Iran over the next few weeks. We'll see how efforts go on another resolution. But as I say, I think it is important to note, even though there may be some tactical differences, that on the strategic objective Russia and the United States agree, which is that Iran should not become a nuclear weapon state.

On the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the summit in 2005 certainly got our attention. That was when there was an effort with a receptive President Karimov in Uzbekistan to kick the United States out of Uzbekistan. We also have noted that President Ahmadinejad has attended recent summits as an observer, not as a full participant. But I will say to you and perhaps at the risk of sounding naïve, of all the things that keep me up at night SCO is not one of them. I don't see a reason, at least so far, to worry too much about this organization. I think that in a way perhaps it's an organization where some countries keep an eye on each other.

Question: [RFE/RL). Recently Central Editorial Commission of Russia, (inaudible)a diminished number of OSCE observers for elections to Duma. What is your vision on the repercussions of this move?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Kramer: This is an issue where Under Secretary for Political Affairs Nick Burns, when he was in Vienna on Thursday I think of last week, met with ODIHR Chairman Strohal and also with OSCE Secretary General de Brichambaut and expressed real concern about the efforts to restrict and confine the ability of ODIHR to do its job. There was a plan or a letter sent not just by Russia but some other countries in the region that tried to bring together some countries that are interested in narrowing the efforts of ODIHR, and we think that is an unfortunate development. We think it's unfortunate also that ODIHR has not been able to send long-term observers to Russia. That opportunity has already been missed. So what we're looking at now, most likely, is trying to get observers in as soon as possible, if they can get visas. So far we don't have assurances that they will. So that ODIHR could run as good and capable an observation mission as possible.

It's, I think, regrettable that the numbers have been significantly reduced. If 70 observers are sent by ODIHR that would be a quarter of the number that was sent for the 2003 Duma elections. Our view is that ODIHR is the organization that should be setting the numbers and the conditions and all of that, not individual countries. We're all members of the OSCE. We do understand the importance of consensus on these issues. But election observation is important. We do it in the United States. We've had OSCE observers in the United States to observe our elections and we think it's important for all member states to be willing to accept OSCE observers, and we hope that the situation can get worked out as soon as possible so that ODIHR can do its job in a proper fashion.

Question: [RFE/RL]. It is a follow-up, because it's not only that Russia limited the mission of observers in Russia, Russia also has made a suggestion of limit the observers' rights to strictly technical issues without political monitoring. This will be discussed at the ministerial meeting late at the end of this month. We all understand that this will not pass because of the consensus in OSCE, but it kind of forms the front of the countries there for whom it would be a moral kind of -- Russia is trying to demoralize this organization and give additional incentives to countries like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. How are you going to counter-balance it?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Kramer: I think we'll have to let ODIHR take the lead in deciding how it's going to respond to this, but I think the United States will be ready to stand with whatever decisions Mr. Strohal makes.

By the ministerial everything will have been decided. Either the ODIHR mission will be in place and operating to the best of its ability or there will have been a decision made not to go. I think the jury is still out on that, on which is the best approach. That's something that Mr. Strohal will have to decide, and we'll support him whatever decision he makes. Under Secretary Burns made that clear.

Your question gets at a deeper point, which is that there are efforts to limit the ability not only of ODIHR but the OSCE in general to do its job and our feeling in Washington is that ODIHR and OSCE should be allowed to do their job without any restrictions, without any limits. As long as they do their job properly, we don't see what the problem is.

In the specific case of the upcoming Duma election, there doesn't seem to be a great deal of suspense connected with the Duma election so I'm not quite sure what the problem is with allowing an ODIHR observation team in to do its job. I hope that these issues can get sorted out. I hope the team will be allowed in without conditions. I hope other countries will also understand that it's important to allow ODIHR observation missions into countries without conditions so that they can do their job without any prejudice.

Ukraine had an ODIHR observation mission for its recent Rada elections, and it issued a preliminary statement of conclusions the day after the elections which is the normal practice for ODIHR. I think it would be a very unfortunate development if ODIHR were not allowed by the host country to issue a preliminary statement the day after an election as is done in every other case in the past.

So this is an issue where I think it's important for the member states, for OSCE members to speak out and state clearly that it's important for all countries that ODIHR be allowed to do its job without any restriction.

Question: [RFE/RL]. I have a bunch of questions. [Laughter].

You said in your initial remarks that Russia very often misrepresents the intentions of a country like Ukraine to have good relations with Western countries, and they take that as somewhat of a threat. We've seen Ukraine go through a variety of revolutions, post-revolutions, various convulsions in an attempt to find its proper road in life, so to speak. I'd like to hear your assessment in this post-electorate stage that Ukraine is in yet again embroiled in making a new coalition, how do you see it developing? Do you feel that it's sort of let-down the revolutionary Orange days?

The second question is about energy. We all know that energy is a big political issue, even though everybody always says that it shouldn't be politicized. Ukraine is beholden to Russia for its energy to a very large extent, and earlier this year the Ukrainian president talked about Ukraine having a closed energy circle. There are voices that are calling for more nuclear reactors to be built in Ukraine. There are also voices that are against that. What is the U.S. view on Ukraine having a closed energy circle, being able to enrich its own uranium?

The third question is very Russia-related, even though it also has repercussions in Ukraine. The nationalist march that we saw in Russia over the weekend had an echo in the Crimean Peninsula. Some 2,000 people walked out and said that they were going to form little military units to fight for the defense of Russian causes in Ukraine.

Thank you.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Kramer: Thank you.

Our interest in Ukraine is in getting a government formed as soon as possible so that we can get back down to the regular bilateral business that we need to engage in. The election that we saw September 30^th was democratic; it was relatively free and fair. ODIHR gave it a passing grade for the most part. Not everything was perfect. There were questions about the voter list. There were questions about the border guards trying to keep some people from voting, but for the most part the election passed another test, which often I think is taken for granted. This is the third election really Ukraine's had in a row that passed the test, and I think that's a major accomplishment and Ukraine deserves credit for that. All the political leaders deserve credit for that, for abiding by the rule.

There has, it seems I think, been an endless election process underway in Ukraine. I don't think that's letting down the people who were out in Maidan representing the Orange Revolution. I think it's expected that there would be some ebbs and flows in Ukraine's development. The Ukrainian economy continues to do fairly well despite the fact that government and political leaders seem a little preoccupied with election campaigning. So the country has not collapsed amidst all these efforts to have elections and to form new governments, but I think it would serve everyone's interest best if the Rada would convene quickly, if they could agree on a government, whatever the government is. As long as the government reflects democratic will of the Ukrainian people. That's the most important thing.

We've heard various rumors about what kinds of government. That's up to the Ukrainians to decide. It's not for U.S. officials sitting in Washington to dictate by any means.

In terms of energy, energy I think is one of the biggest challenges Ukraine faces, getting greater control over its energy security. Our emphasis has been on transparency, diversification, and elimination of middle men. We were intrigued by recent comments made by Gazprom Chairman Dmitri Medvedev when he talked about removing RosUkrEnergo from the energy equation between Russia and Ukraine. We think actually that would be a positive development. Certain political figures in Ukraine have also talked about removing RosUkrEnergo from the equation. The challenge, of course, might be that prices would go up significantly, but I think it's also important to point out that there are costs, maybe hidden costs, when a company like RosUkrEnergo is allowed to exist and even thrive in Ukraine, and I think that's something Ukrainian leaders need to look at very seriously.

Nuclear energy, another possibility. So we would want to work closely and consult closely with Ukrainians, and I know Europeans would want to do the same on that.

In terms of the nationalist marches echoed in Crimea, certainly the situation in Crimea I know has taken up considerable time of the Ukrainian political leadership. I think none of us wants to see a situation where Crimea becomes a hotbed of instability or tension. I don't think it's at that point. These groups do have a right to protest as long as they're peaceful about it so I think it's an issue that will require the continued attention of the Ukrainian government and will require the continued attention of outside observers, too.

Question: [RFE/RL]. In the early days of George Bush's first administration Secretary Rice said that Nagorno Karabakh can become one of the areas where the United States and Russia can cooperate. How did Russia meet your expectation? Do you think that Russia is cooperating, is a constructive partner in Nagorno Karabakh talks?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Kramer: I'll try to keep my answers brief to these questions to the extent I can. This one I can answer briefly, and I appreciate the question.

My colleague Deputy Assistant Secretary Matt Bryza is the main point of contact for the Minsk Group process. He tells me, and I have the same impression, that Russia and the United States and France actually work very well together in this process. I'm glad you did raise the question because even though the situation with Russia's neighbors can sometimes be a challenge, this is an example where actually we've worked well together and have cooperated well together. It doesn't mean we solved the problem, but I don't think that's for lack of good cooperation between Moscow, Washington, and Paris.

Question: [RFE/RL]. Secretary you said that you are talking to Russians about Gabala radar station. First this idea sounded very crazy idea that Putin put this offer, but now it looks like it is more and more talks on this issue.

Is there a real opportunity for the cooperation on this area, or you believe you're just going to continue to keep talking without any results?

And if I may ask just one more brief question. Talking on the baseball technology. If you have three strikes you're out. There are seven journalists in Azerbaijan right now and it looks like country is still getting the homerun without any problems. Dan Fried in Baku raised this issue with Azeri authorities but there is no results. Is it because you are not talking very seriously on this issue with Azeri officials or they don't take you seriously any more because they know this issue is not an issue of priority for the United States?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Kramer: Azerbaijan is not a country I have responsibility for but I don't have much to add to what Dan said when he was there. We certainly raise the issue of journalists, freedom of the press, in all of our discussions with officials from Azerbaijan. So I confess I don't have much more to add than what Dan has said in Baku.

In terms of the Gabala radar, we are very serious about working with Russia at Gabala. We're also very serious to make sure that officials in Azerbaijan are included since it is, after all, on their territory. We had a team visit in September which was unprecedented, led by General O'Reilly from the Missile Defense Agency. We were stuck by the capabilities of the system. But the system is rather different than what we have in mind for Poland and the Czech Republic.

Gabala would be able to provide surveillance and early warning. It would not be able to guide intercept missiles to hit an incoming missile and that's what we have in mind for Poland and the Czech Republic. That's why we feel these radars are complementary, not substitute. But we're very serious about it, and we hope we can continue to explore ways that we can work together with Russia, with Azerbaijan, and with other countries in the region.

Moderator: We have a question about Belarus.

Question: [RFE/RL []. You visited Minsk a couple of times and as far as we hear you even had one-to-one meetings with representatives of Lukashenko. Three years ago the Belarus Democracy Act was passed and signed and reauthorized. How would you comment on its implementation and results and effect on the official Minsk?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Kramer: I was last there in April, and I did meet with Natalia Petkevich, the Deputy Head of Presidential Administration at her request, not mine. I thought actually the opportunity was a good one. I conveyed to her in clearest terms possible how we could improve relations between Belarus and the United States and the main step and the main obstacle has been release of all political prisoners. And it isn't just two or three, although we welcome release of two or three political prisoners. It's all of them. We've given them a list so that they know whom we're talking about so that there's no ambiguity.

I regret that we have not seen the release of the political prisoners and on the contrary, I would say we've seen the regime step up the pressure on opposition forces on NGO activists.

We have decided in light of that, since my visit in April, to impose additional sanctions on Belarus, which we do with great regret. I'd rather be describing to you how we're improving relations between Washington and Minsk, instead I'm forced to describe the additional pressure that we're trying to apply on the regime. We significantly expanded the visa ban list and over the next week or so you can expect to hear an additional step that we'll be taking, I'm not going to get into details now but stay tuned on that because there will be more coming.

We also want to engage more with opposition forces and civil society. We want to continue to support those who are trying to promote democracy in Belarus so that they don't feel that they're left alone. This dual approach, pressuring the regime because they leave us no choice and supporting the forces that are fighting for democracy, that has been our policy, will continue to be our policy, and I do hope and expect that it will pay off. We have to be patient.

The Lukashenko regime is under unprecedented pressure from all sides, from the U.S., from the EU, and ironically from Russia with higher energy prices. We'll have to see once the energy price goes up early next year what the effect and impact is on the regime, how it can absorb that.

Moderator: We have about four minutes left, David. Can you give us an update on the Kosovo situation, prospects for Kosovo? And a question from the Ukrainian Service again on Georgia-Ukraine.

Question: [RFE/RL]. I would like to ask you in the political uncertainty that we witness now in Ukraine and Georgia, can it diminish the U.S. commitment to democracy in the region? And if no, in what form will it continue?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Kramer: Sorry, I missed the first part of the question. Would what?

Question: Political uncertainty in Georgia and Ukraine. Can it diminish the U.S. commitment to democracy in the region? And if not, in what forms will it continue?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Kramer: On the contrary, as I stressed in answering the question earlier about Ukraine, we've seen three good elections in Ukraine in a row. That's a significant accomplishment in itself. We are seeing a political process play out in Ukraine. Is it frustrating at times? Sure, it is. If it's frustrating for me I can only imagine how it is for people in Kiev. But it's been peaceful, it's been democratic, it's been constitutional, and I think Ukrainian political figures deserve credit for abiding by those norms.

I think freedom of the press is better than it's ever been in Ukraine. I think it's growing. I think Ukraine deserves credit for its democratic development. Now we just need to see a government stay in place for a long enough period of time where we can really get down to some business, finalizing Ukraine's accession to WTO, making sure that the democratic gains over the past couple of years are irreversible.

In the case of Georgia, it's a positive thing to have opposition who feel they can go out and protest. I think that's not something that we would view as a setback.

I think popularity in governments comes and goes. One should not view the turnout of opponents of the current government in Tbilisi to be seen as a setback for democracy. They were allowed to protest, they were allowed to say whatever they wanted to say, and I think that is the reflection that democracy is taking root in Georgia. Does it mean all problems are solved there? Absolutely not. There's a long way to go. But I think it is encouraging to see people able to turn out on the streets, do so peacefully, and to be able to say what they want to say.

In terms of Kosovo, we're still working through the Troika process, as you know, which has a deadline to report to the Secretary General on December 10^th, and we'll have to see what the report says come the 10^th. But we're taking the Troika process very seriously, while at the same time I think we're under no illusions that there might be some magical solution that emerges from this process.

I think getting too much beyond the December 10^th deadline at this point would be a little too speculative, but suffice it to say that our support for the Ahtasarri Plan remains firmly in place, and we hope that this Troika process will lead to a way that is able to address the Kosovar interest in creating their status.

Moderator: We're out of time but on time. Thank you David. Thank you Martins, thank you Ian. It's good to see you. See you soon.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Kramer: Thanks very much to everybody out there in Prague.