Interview With Stefan Kornelius, Süddeutsche Zeitung

QUESTION: Since you’re leaving office, I’d love to get your take on the state of the world and the state of the U.S. as it is presenting itself in the world, first. So you’ve changed over the past years, coming to a change in administrations, what is [inaudible]?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: We have tried very hard over these last three years to rebuild our relations with Germany and with Europe. We suffered, of course, in 2002 and 2003, when we had a major transatlantic disagreement between Germany and the United States, between France and the United States. We have worked very hard to overcome that, and I think we’ve rebuilt the relationship of trust with Germany. We have very close relations with the German government. We have great respect for Chancellor Merkel, for [Foreign Minister] Frank-Walter Steinmeier, and work well with both of them.

Similarly, I think the U.S.-European relationship is in much better shape in 2008 than it was in 2004 because we are partners again in Afghanistan. We are working together in Iraq. Not so much militarily, but in the political and economic support for the Iraqi government.

And we see on the horizon these great global challenges like climate change, terrorism, drug cartels, crime cartels, trafficking, where we must work together, we must combine forces to be successful.

So I am rather optimistic about the political and strategic relations between Europe and the United States. I think we’ve overcome arguably the most significant crisis since the Second World War in transatlantic relationships, the Iraq War, in 2002 and 2003. We’ve overcome that and there’s a sense of trust and of good working relations that the next administration can build on.

QUESTION: The rupture in 2002 and 2003, was that avoidable? Was it a product of the changing landscape after the Cold War?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: It happened. It doesn’t serve much good for someone like me to go back and say who was responsible and who was not. We were both responsible. So we were then both responsible in 2005 and 2006 to resurrect the relationship, which we did, beginning with President Bush’s trip to Mainz and to Brussels in February 2005. A historic trip in a way.

When I look at all the issues in front of us, and [in front of] Europe -- the status of Kosovo which needs to be decided in the next month or two; relations with a difficult and more aggressive Russia; missile defense and CFE; and then the global challenges beyond Europe, in the Middle East, in South Asia and East Asia -- I think Europe and America are beginning to develop a common strategic view on most of these problems, which is essential if we’re going to be effective transatlantic partners.

QUESTION: What could be done to actually build on that strategic common view within the next administration? [Inaudible]. The frameworks are there, the issues are there, but there seems to be a lot of things out of sync still.

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: I think it’s quite understandable why Europeans would be preoccupied with the construction and evolution of the EU, the European Union. It’s a historic enterprise. It’s positive for Europeans and the world. So I quite understand that.

At the same time I have a strong sense that Europe needs to develop a stronger role in the world and a more ambitious sense of Europe’s contributions beyond Europe. In other words, a better defined global strategy.

The EU and NATO are both institutions that are operating well beyond Europe. Sometimes I think that Europe is so preoccupied by the internal construction of the EU and of European problems that it isn’t sufficiently ambitious and articulate in engineering an aggressive, ambitious global strategy. We, the United States, want Europe to play that role. We want Europe to be active in the Middle East where our vital interests are engaged. We want Europe to be more active in Afghanistan and more willing to contribute a greater number of troops, for example, in Afghanistan.

We need Europe to be a factor in the strategic situation in East Asia for the next generation, and to be present in trying to bring growth and prosperity as well as security.

So I think a more ambitious global role for Europe is in order. The United States certainly sees itself as a global power, and Europeans might begin to think of themselves as a global power as well, in a way that would parallel the interests that the U.S. and Europe have in common.

QUESTION: U.S. policy is naturally preoccupied with the Middle East, with the hot conflict in Iraq, with the rise of Asia. Is Europe still strategically important?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: Happily for both of us, Europe is no longer the place where America’s vital interests are in danger. That was the case from 1917, when we entered the First World War, until 1999, when we entered the Kosovo conflict. But because Europe is now peaceful, united and stable, we now can work together differently.

The Middle East is now a place, South Asia is another place, where America’s vital national interests are in peril, in danger. So Europe remains vitally important to the United States in a different way. It is our natural partner. The greatest collection of American allies in the world are in Europe, the members of the NATO alliance. We count on Europe to be with us in confronting the challenges, positive and negative, that we face inside the Middle East, South Asia, East Asia. I think that’s what’s changed, and that’s a fundamental change in American foreign policy and it ought to be seen as a fundamental challenge and change for Europe’s foreign policy as well.

QUESTION: Especially in Germany, foreign policy doesn’t seem to grasp these tectonic changes and hasn’t developed a global strategic sense. What’s your advice? How to develop such an attitude?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: I think maybe for a long time many Europeans saw themselves as regional countries without perhaps a global perspective. That’s changing.

We see that the EU now has a strategic relationship with India. We see that the EU has taken very seriously its future relationship with China. We see a greater EU focus on Africa with the call for the EU force in Chad, with what Europe is trying to do to help the United Nations and the United States in Sudan, in Darfur.

So I think it’s correct and it is essential because the greatest change in American foreign policy has been this shift in our vital attention to the Middle East and South and East Asia, and we do need Europe as a partner in those parts of the world.

QUESTION: A lot of this operating goes through the common institutions we share starting with the UN. [Inaudible] Do you see a need for reviving the UN?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: I do. I think in a globalized world where the challenges cannot be met successfully without multilateral attention, we need to rebuild the great multilateral institutions starting with the United Nations.

We have a clearly defined policy to help the United Nations be successful, to make the necessary reforms in peacekeeping and budget so that the United Nations can be more vital and effective. And we see that the United Nations performs duties that no nation state can perform alone. The great crisis in peacekeeping in Africa can only lend itself to resolution by the United Nations in places line Congo or Somalia in the future or Sudan now. We understand that the United Nations has a singularly important role in the world and we ought to support it.

I do think that most Americans understand and embrace the fact that a policy of disdain for the United Nations does not make sense and a policy of trying to make the United Nations work better does make sense for American interests. So I think we can share that with Europe. We share a belief that the United Nations needs to be strengthened in every way for the future.

QUESTION: The hardware institution you go through is NATO which is definitely in a huge crisis. We’re ahead the summit and NATO’s future is, according to its Secretary General, being decided in Afghanistan. What’s your assessment on the state of the alliance?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: I’m a former Ambassador to NATO so I have some perspective on this. My perspective is that NATO is not in crisis. That NATO has done extraordinarily well to adapt itself and transform itself from a Cold War institution into a more modern, 21^st Century institution. NATO has done very well in the Balkans. Our engagement in Bosnia and Kosovo over the last decade were singularly important and effective in stopping two wars and in keeping the peace.

NATO is now in Afghanistan. That is a true test of the alliance. It is our first ground operation in 59 years. Whether or not we can be successful will be a function of the commitment we make to the effort. Here we thank the European allies who have contributed troops, but we do believe that Europe needs to do more. We believe that more troops are needed, and certainly those troops in those areas -- in the south, Helmand, Oruzgan, and Kandahar provinces; in the east, where the great majority of the fighting is taking place. The fact that some allies have chosen to stay out of that fight or have imposed caveats, restrictions, on the deployment of their troops, is objectionable, and it’s not in the spirit of an alliance that prides itself on all for one and one for all.

QUESTION: Which ones?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: I’m talking about a number of the allies, but certainly Spain and Italy, France and Germany, the major West European continental allies. The countries with the largest forces. Certainly we need those countries to take their share of the responsibility in the south and east in the coming years so we would ask them to do better at that.

QUESTION: The biggest part of the burden in Afghanistan has been carried by not only the U.S., but also the Netherlands and Canadians. Have the issues associated with Afghanistan fractured the alliance?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: I don’t believe they divide the alliance, but I believe the alliance is facing an existential issue, and that issue is: will all of us group together to be successful in Afghanistan or will just some of us be on the forward lines where the fighting is the most intense and the challenge is greatest in the south and east. And we respectfully ask the major West European powers to consider this. It’s terribly important.

Look at the sacrifice that Canada has made. I think nearly 75 deaths now and the highest casualty rates by far of any country in the alliance. What the Netherlands has done, what the United Kingdom has done. What my country, the United States, is doing with a decision by the President and Secretary Gates to add more than 3,000 troops to our contingent, bringing our total close to 30,000 troops.

So we need greater burden sharing. We need the larger West European allies to consider their responsibilities. And that is an existential question for the alliance. I believe that NATO will succeed. I believe we will meet these challenges. But we have to make the hard decisions to find success.

QUESTION: Your government has decided to increase your troops in Afghanistan, to add more combat troops to the south. Is that for a limited time? And when do you want to have them replaced?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: I can’t speak to the specifics of the deployment schedule. That’s the job of the Department of Defense. But I can tell you that it’s a serious decision by us. It’s meant to augment the current forces. It’s meant to allow us to be successful. We’re very proud this decision has been taken.

I think the United States has put its best foot forward in Afghanistan. Our troops have done a first rate job in the east and we’re trying very much to help the other allies that are deployed in the south.

The alliance faces this question of effectiveness of our counterinsurgency strategy, of dealing with the counternarcotics challenge which is of course at a critical state, and to try to unite what we’re doing in the military operations with what we must do to provide humanitarian and economic support. If there’s one weakness that is very glaring in the international presence in Afghanistan right now, it is the relative weakness of the UN effort. The military effort is so well structured and well defined; we don’t find that singular purpose and clarity, strategic clarity on the economic side.

So we’ve been advocating the appointment of a senior level European who could do for the economic/humanitarian effort what our NATO military commanders have done so well on the military side. We need to see a greater integration of the military and civilian efforts. That is essential for an effective counterinsurgency strategy.

QUESTION: The Afghan government rejected the proposal that Paddy Ashdown take this job.

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: It’s a shame. Paddy Ashdown is a unique person. He has proven himself to be one of the most effective international civil servants in the world today. He would have done a spectacular job in Afghanistan. So with the decision that he would withdraw his candidacy, we now need to look for a similar person who would have a very strong mandate and terms of reference to have the kind of power and flexibility to make the international civilian effort as effective as the military effort.

QUESTION: That has to be a European person?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: It could be anyone. It could be an Asian, it could be a European. We had thought that since the great majority of countries that are putting money into Afghanistan are Europeans as well as the United States that it might be effective to have a European. Obviously this is not our decision, it’s the decision of Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary General. We just want a competent, powerful person in that job so we can help the Afghan government to be more successful.

QUESTION: Do we need to reconsider the strategy for Afghanistan? [Inaudible] It’s a big country, it’s a very splintered country, and the state-building seems to be working at a very slow pace.

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: We’re very grateful to the European countries, including Germany, which have contributed troops. I do think all of us understand and recognize the fact that we need to be more skillful in counterinsurgency. There are some critical assets that are in short supply like helicopters, and that we need to work very hard to give NATO, our men and women in NATO the tools to succeed. That’s the focus of our efforts right now.

QUESTION: This government will change, I guess it’s time to reconsider --

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: Our government?

QUESTION: Your government.

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: In a year. That’s a long time.

QUESTION: -- time to reconsider the international engagement in Iraq. Anything on the wish list? How that burden can --

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: From an American perspective we have a major commitment in Iraq, and we want obviously to be successful over the long term. Therefore we very much appreciate the efforts of those countries who continue to contribute troops. We want countries to be active politically to support the Iraqi government, and we want countries to do what they can to help economically, to stimulate trade and investment in Iraq. This, we believe, is in the self interest of the European countries, to see a stable, peaceful, successful Iraq in the future.

I think we are at a point where we’ve put behind us in the transatlantic relationship the bitter debate that we had in 2002 and 2003 over the issue of whether or not there should be a military intervention in Iraq. That debate took place five years ago.

The debate now is how can all of us, especially now, how can all of us work more effectively together to give the proper level of support to the Iraqis so that they can be successful. That’s a very different question. I think the gradual improvement in U.S.-European relations can be traced to the fact that we have found a way to discuss Iraq that is not divisive, so that it plays on the strengths of both Europe and the U.S.

QUESTION: The biggest political test in the region is linked to our dealing with Iran and its influence. Last week the P-5 plus Germany met. The resolution which now is on the table doesn’t really provide for more pressure or that much more pressure as was publicly hoped for in the first steps. Is the resolution already in the making for [inaudible]?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: We have a very tight working relationship with Britain, France and Germany, and with Russia and China. We’ve been successful with the Perm-5 countries and Germany working together for over three years in passing two sanctions resolutions in the UN against Iran. In Berlin two weeks ago we agreed on the elements of a third sanctions resolution. That is being debated in New York now and will hopefully pass in the month of February. So we’ve been able to keep the pressure on Iran. We’ve been able to speak with a united international voice. All of us believe that Iran should not become a nuclear power. It should not try to develop a nuclear capability. And all of us believe and have agreed that Iran should suspend its enrichment and processing activities at its plant in Natanz. These are the united demands of the international community.

What we would rather do is negotiate with Iran, and the P-5 has been clear on that, but Iran has rebuffed repeated offers by us to sit down and negotiate on nuclear issues. If it cannot negotiate, and if they proceed in accelerating their research efforts at Natanz as Dr. Al-Baradei has indicated -- that they are accelerating those efforts -- then we’ll have no choice, no alternative but to sanction.

After the UN sanctions resolution is passed in February we would hope that the European Union would then pass a much stronger sanctions resolution, and we hope that the financial sanctions that Europe and the United States have been engaged in for the last year or so would continue so that the Iranians would understand that they are not going to be able to proceed without pressure and that it’s a much better choice for them to choose to negotiate.

QUESTION: As the Europeans can increase the pressure by adding additional sanctions, will it destroy the group of six?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: No. The EU would be free to operate, to have its own policy against Iran just as Russia and China have their policy. Russia and China both sell arms to Iran. We object to that. We Americans and Europeans. China has become a leading trade partner with Iran. We object to that. So Russia and China would have no grounds to object to additional American or European measures designed to pursue our own policies towards Iran.

QUESTION: What kind of sanctions do you see?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: That’s up to the European Union, but we know that the European Union has been debating them, and we know that most European countries prefer to wait for a third resolution before the EU takes its position. But the combination of these two can be very effective.

Another challenge would be to approach the other leading trade partners of Iran, including Japan and South Korea, to convince them to take similar sanctions measures against Iran.

QUESTION: [Inaudible]. Shortly after the NIE report, China signed its biggest energy cooperation deal with Iran. How do you avoid this sort of game of…?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: I understand what you’re saying. We all need to appeal to China not to have a business as usual attitude with the Iranians. Many of us, including my own country, have subordinated our commercial gains in order to choose the path of sanctions because we know strategically it’s far more important to stop the Iranian nuclear program than it is to have our companies find success in Iranian markets.

We cut off trade with Iran nearly 30 years ago. Our companies have paid the price. So it is time for some of that burden to be shared. We would like the export credits made available by European governments, the billions of euro, to be further reduced. And we certainly think the Chinese should consider diminishing their economic relations with Iran. We think China and Russia need to stop selling arms to Iran, for that matter.

QUESTION: Russia’s provision of nuclear fuel and finishing Bushehr, it that helpful?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: Is it helpful? We have said that we understand the Russian project in Bushehr. That it fits very neatly with the P-5 view, which is that we would offer to help Iran to construct a civil, peaceful nuclear industry. But we will do nothing, of course, to support the development of their indigenous nuclear capacities beyond that.

So we have favored President Putin’s original proposal which is the core of the P-5 proposal. The Perm 5 countries would be willing to help construct nuclear reactors, to ship the fuel in, take the spent fuel out. But we’re not willing in any way, and of course will oppose, any effort by Iran to master the fuel cycle, including the enrichment process. That’s been the central point of the P-5 proposal since June of 2006.

QUESTION: Is the West’s approach to the whole region in terms of its nuclear energy policy coherent and thought-through given that the French government is trying to sell nuclear power plants in the region [inaudible] creating a demand for enrichment without having an international fuel supplying program working? Is that something which is coordinated?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: I think the IAEA provides the central coordinating role for the international community on questions of this nature, of peaceful nuclear power. And the effort in Iran, of course, has been buttressed by the IAEA and the UN Security Council. Both institutions have spoken very clearly. No country with the possible exception of Belarus and Syria is willing to support an advanced nuclear industry in Iran. The trust is not there. Countries worry that Iran is seeking a nuclear capability that could become military in the future and we obviously are doing everything we can diplomatically to oppose this.

We do think there is time for a diplomatic solution and we’re very much focused on diplomacy and we hope that diplomacy can work.

QUESTION: Again, the French effort to help the spread of nuclear power in the region, is that something which is helpful?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: We’ve been working well with France on the question of Iran and we obviously work with France in the context of the IAEA to make sure that any civil nuclear cooperation conforms to the rules and regulations of the IAEA. I’ll give you an example, and it has to do with South Asia.

The United States and France have both supported the development of an agreement, a safeguards agreement by the IAEA and India, that would then lead to a decision by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to allow trade in civil nuclear fuel and nuclear reactors with India. I would say our two countries that have led this. Certainly my own country, the U.S., negotiated a very ambitious, very complex civil nuclear agreement with India. France has been supportive of that. President Sarkozy was just in India on January 26^th. So I think we’re working with the French on the question of India.

QUESTION: Can you give me an assessment on how you see Russia emerging, Russia’s more aggressive stance in the world? What is your view of Russia?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: We need to maintain a balanced view of Russia. On one hand Russia has been an important partner in counterterrorism globally, and a very important power on counter-proliferation, if you look at the 6-Party cooperation the U.S. has had with Russia on the question of North Korea and on the question of Iran in the P-5 context.

On the other hand we’ve certainly been disturbed to see the sometimes hostile and aggressive rhetoric from the Russian leadership. In fact it started with the Wehrkunde Conference in February of 2007. You have not seen the United States respond in kind because we don’t engage in this type of rhetorical histrionics. I think a more calm and objective discourse, public discourse, is really what’s needed in the U.S.-Russian relationship.

There are aspects of Russian policy with which we very much disagree. The centralization of power in the Kremlin. The fact that the political system is being run in such a way that one sometimes has to wonder about how decisions are made, who’s included in decisions or excluded from decisions or even excluded from elections. And of course we do not want to see a continuation of the type of aggressive Russian tactics in dealing with neighbors like Georgia or Moldova or the Baltic countries. We’ve seen examples of aggressive rhetoric and behavior in all three in the past year.

So we have a balanced view. On some issues we work well with Russia. On others we don’t. We have to be clear to say so when we do not agree with Russia, and we need to create, and I would urge the Russians to create, a more calm and objective public discourse free of the kind of threats and exaggerations that have often characterized Russian public statements about the U.S.

QUESTION: One concrete area of conflict is Kosovo…

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: We’ve had a major disagreement with the Russians on Kosovo. Russia left Kosovo. It hasn’t been part of the peacekeeping forces for many years. It hasn’t been centrally involved in Kosovo as the Europeans and Americans have been. We’re the ones who stayed after 1999. Our troops are still there. Our money has gone to support the UN effort and to support the creation of civil society there.

So I’ve felt very strongly that while Russia obviously has a right to say what it thinks, the countries that have the most to do with Kosovo should have a large share of helping decide international policy.

I think it’s clear the Russians tried to obstruct and delay a process that would lead toward the final status of Kosovo. They have not been successful in that regard. You will soon see, I think, a concerted effort to reach that final status and will soon hear the Kosovars defining their own future, and when that happens there will be very strong support from the international community.

So I don’t think Russian policy has been successful over the last year. They’ve succeeded in slowing things down. But we have a very clear view of what must happen and we’ve been a consistent and constant supporter of the Kosovar people, both Albanians and Serbs, since the NATO intervention in 1999.

QUESTION: What makes you so sure that recognizing Kosovo as a state will make the region more stable?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: We have always felt that failing to decide a final status of Kosovo would be a great risk and could lead to tension and conflict. Deciding the status of Kosovo is the best way to ensure a more stable Kosovo in the future and also a more stable Balkans region. That’s a quite important role that Europe and the United States share.

We invested quite a lot in the Balkans in the 1990s. NATO intervened in Bosnia in the autumn of 1995 and in the spring of 1999, Kosovo. Our troops have made a tremendous effort. We’ve kept the peace in both places. Our goal is to see the Balkans become peaceful and democratic, and the countries in the Balkans eventually become members of NATO and the EU. Deciding the status of Kosovo, the final status, is a very important part of that objective.

QUESTION: When will that have to be done? Do you have a date when you will decide on final status?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: That’s up to the people of Kosovo and their government. They will make that decision.

QUESTION: But you…

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: They will make that decision. And when they do make that decision I think they’ll find very strong support from the United States and Europe and many of the Muslim countries. It’s important for us to all act for peace and stability in Kosovo.

QUESTION: One of the rising actors in the world is China and it’s definitely one the U.S. is paying more attention to recently. Are you taking a more cooperative approach with China, a more open approach? What’s the way to deal with this type of emerging power?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: I think there’s been an extraordinarily rapid development of the U.S.-Chinese relationship over the last five to ten years. We work more frequently together on global political issues than we ever did in any decade going back to 1949. So in the 6-Party talks, China and the United States have been two partners that I think can be satisfied with the success we’ve had.

On Iran, China and the United States talk almost daily about our interaction on Iran and the need to pressure Iran.

We would hope the Chinese could do more to encourage the Burmese government to be more open to a UN mediation role and we hope China could do more to convince the Sudanese government to allow a fully robust UN peacekeeping force into Darfur.

So we have a very intensive engagement with China right now, and it’s engaging, not containing. To engage China, to work with China. And we have some profound differences with China over religious rights, over human rights, over intellectual property rights. We have a trade imbalance which is quite worrisome. So it’s a complex relationship, but it’s one that is essential to maintain peace and stability in East Asia.

QUESTION: Is there a test for determining if China is a responsible international player?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: I think the idea that one would ask China to consider itself to be a stakeholder in the international system, and to sometimes agree to subordinate its own commercial interests for the greater global good is a very sound framework for how we engage China. And we believe that China as a rising power in the world has an obligation to take a leading role in the resolution of conflicts around the world.

We’re seeing a more activist China in that regard. Sometimes we see a China, as in the case of North Korea, which is willing to go to great lengths to achieve a strong agreement like the one that we have achieved on North Korea, and sometimes we see a more halting, ambivalent China as we certainly see in Sudan and Burma. We’d like to see a trend towards a more decisive global engagement on the part of China, but I do think we’ve made progress in the U.S.-China relationship and I think that we’ve found a way to work constructively with China over the last several years.

QUESTION: A final question. You will soon leave office. You’ve gone through all the phases of the past decades of American foreign policy -- a bipolar world, Cold War times, a unipolar world, American pragmatism and all the issues we’re talking about. Where is American headed?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: I think you will see in the future, I am confident you will see a strong, purposeful United States as the leading actor on the global stage. We have enormous resources in our country. We have a strong spirit that America needs to be engaged in the world as a partner and an ally. So I think you’ll see an America that is willing to provide the kind of political, economic and military leadership that the world clearly requires. But also an America that wants to rebuild the United Nations, an America that’s very interested in reforming and transforming NATO, that wants a close partnership with the EU, and wants to work with the regional organizations that are so important to global peace these days -- ASEAN in Southeast Asia, the African Union, the Organization of American States in our hemisphere, just to name a few. I think that most Americans understand that we need to resist the twin negative impulses in our history of either isolationism or unilateralism and that there needs to be purposeful American engagement in the world. I think that’s what you’ve seen over the last few years from our administration, an attempt to be a good partner. I think you’ll continue to see that after our elections in 2008, no matter who wins the Oval Office.

QUESTION: Thank you.

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: Can I take one more second? Just to say that we have an important opportunity to engage India, and that we in the United States see India as one of our most important global strategic partners, and that we are now working with India in way that is profoundly different and better than we ever have before. If you’re looking for a positive trend it’s the development that the two largest democracies in the world are becoming global partners and that’s good for the world and good for global stability.

QUESTION: Germany supports [inaudible] for training in India.

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: This U.S.-India civil nuclear deal is unquestionably in the best interest of the world community and we hope to have strong European support in the Nuclear Suppliers Group when that question comes before it.

QUESTION: Thank you very much.