07. Reduce the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)Since the end of the cold war, our strategic thinking has been transformed as the nature of the threat has profoundly changed. The proliferation and potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the missiles that carry them have replaced the Soviet Union as the greatest national security threat facing the United States, our friends, and allies. The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, provide dramatic proof of the changed environment. The United States has developed a comprehensive strategy to counter the WMD and missile threat. This approach includes active nonproliferation, diplomacy, arms control, counterproliferation, effective verification, counterterrorism, deterrence, homeland defense, and missile defenses.
Our achievements in FY ’01 had a major impact on keeping WMD and missiles out of the hands of rogue states, terrorists, and those harboring or supporting them. We have made real progress in impeding their access to materials, equipment, technology and expertise that would aid their WMD and missile aspirations. We spearheaded a number of successful interventions that halted transfers to countries of concern, and when necessary, invoked sanctions. Under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, for example, we imposed penalties on a Chinese entity for transferring to Iran technical assistance controlled in accordance with a multilateral regime, and on a North Korean entity for transferring equipment and technology controlled under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex to Iran.
The United States decided to revise our deterrence strategy to reflect the end of the cold war and to counter current threats. This will entail reducing U.S. strategic forces to the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs and our obligations to our allies, and to establish a more cooperative relationship with Russia.
In light of these decisions, we held consultations on the new strategic framework and missile defenses with our NATO and Pacific allies, other friends, Russia and China, and made clear that the United States will move beyond the ABM Treaty to test and deploy missile defenses. There was steady improvement in our dialog with Russia, although Russian agreement to U.S. missile defense efforts was not achieved.
Looking ahead, we expect further development of the new strategic framework with Russia and are helping develop the details of this framework. President Bush has announced that the number of operationally deployed U.S. strategic nuclear warheads will be reduced to between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next 10 years. President Putin has indicated Russia's intention to reduce the number of its strategic warheads by a similarly significant amount, and we are negotiating a legally binding agreement to codify these reductions. On missile defense, the U.S. gave its six-month notice of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, to take effect in June 2002, but continues to discuss cooperation with Russia on missile defense. Our nonproliferation relationship with Russia is more problematic, however. The Russia-Iran nuclear and missile cooperation remains a major challenge, which we will continue to address. Although Russia and Iran have discussed renewed sales of conventional weapons, Russia has not signed any new contracts.
Since the EP-3 incident, China has become more open to consultations due to progress in U.S.-Russian missile defense (MD) discussions, U.S. briefings regarding our MD policy, and our assurances that MD was not directed at China. This may have resulted in some restraint in China’s criticism, though the jury is still out. We engaged with China to promote full implementation of its November 2000 commitments not to assist other countries in any way to develop MTCR-class missiles and enact comprehensive missile-related export controls. We also imposed mandatory missile sanctions on Chinese and Pakistani entities for their involvement in the transfer of MTCR-controlled items from China to Pakistan.
Weapons-grade nuclear material is a priority nonproliferation issue. We signed an agreement to provide support to drain and process the sodium coolant from a fast breeder reactor in Kazakhstan and engineering work is underway. Three hundred metric tons of spent fuel containing three metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium were placed in canisters and secured under IAEA safeguards. We signed an agreement establishing a Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU) branch office in Tashkent, which will improve coordination between Kiev and former WMD institutes and scientists in Uzbekistan. We completed installation of radiation detection systems at eight sites in Russia.
Our goal of negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) was again thwarted by China, supported by Pakistan and Russia, which continued to block negotiations by linking them to negotiations on nuclear disarmament and outer space. We protected U.S. interests on outer space and nuclear disarmament by maintaining general support in the CD for a work program package that includes negotiation of an FMCT, but only discussion of outer space and nuclear disarmament. Moreover, we were successful in getting consensus on a UN General Assembly resolution calling for FMCT negotiations to begin, the first FMCT resolution since 1998. We will continue efforts to keep the pressure on those states that are blocking agreement to negotiate a Treaty.
Four more states became parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, for a total of 144. We undertake continual diplomatic efforts to gain additional adherents. We actively pursued our compliance concerns with those 16 nations that we have been unable to certify as compliant to date. The most positive development from the ongoing bilateral discussions has been that Russia offered site visits as a means to resolve our concerns. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is facing a management crisis and a severe budget crunch. Our efforts ensured that a credible inspection regime was maintained. Russian chemical weapon stockpile destruction finally began during FY ’01, but Russia needs significant financial support, and we are working to galvanize the international community to provide such support.
The Bureau of Verification and Compliance began implementing its congressional mandate to provide an independent voice concerning U.S. verification and compliance policy. In this regard, we sought to ensure that verification and transparency issues are a central element of arms control and nonproliferation approaches as they are being formulated and negotiated. State also monitored compliance with all existing arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament agreements and commitments; and coordinated the development of technology in support of verification and compliance.
The administration concluded its policy reviews on North Korea and South Asia, taking a more comprehensive approach to the security of the Korean Peninsula and waiving sanctions on India and Pakistan, in part to enhance the prospects for dialog and progress on nonproliferation. Regarding North Korea, we continued to pursue an acceleration of its compliance with nuclear safeguards, and explored ways to verify a missile ban and enhance transparency related to its missile activities. We expect a decision on the review of U.S. nonproliferation assistance to Russia soon.
Other Significant Accomplishments:
START I reductions were completed as required by December 5, 2001, with assistance from the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. All strategic offensive arms in Ukraine were eliminated by October 30, 2001. The INF Treaty inspection regime was completed successfully on May 31, 2001.
A GAO report on the Department of State's oversight of the Science Center Program, dated May 2001, found no significant deficiencies in oversight and management of the Program.
At the 2001 Plenary, the Australia Group (AG) agreed to a number of U.S. proposals aimed at enabling the regime to better combat chemical and biological proliferation and terrorism. AG export control lists were further refined to plug loopholes that proliferators could exploit to acquire CBW production equipment. At the 2001 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Plenary Meeting in Ottawa, MTCR Partners held a special meeting to foster greater cooperation in stopping and impeding specific shipments of missile proliferation concern. The Partners also continued their work on the draft International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missiles Proliferation (ICOC), which is intended to be a widely subscribed and voluntary multilateral mechanism for combating missile proliferation. The Ottawa Talks resulted in an augmented draft ICOC text and agreement to move forward with its universalization.
The United States continues to work to ensure a viable International Monitoring System (IMS) to monitor the international moratorium on nuclear testing. We achieved our goal of expanding the IMS, adding 10 stations during this reporting period, and will continue our efforts.
National Interest |
National Security |
Performance Goal # |
WD-01 |
Strategic Goal |
Reduce the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). |
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Outcome Desired |
Proliferators do not develop, acquire, produce, or deploy WMD or missile delivery systems. |
Performance Goal |
Prevent proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery to other countries or terrorists. Where proliferation has occurred, contain or reverse it. |
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Performance Indicator |
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FY ’01 Target |
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Russian entities provide nuclear and missile technology assistance to Iran and nuclear fuel to India. China announces it will not assist other countries, in any way, to develop ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons. China announces it will improve its export control system. North Korea negotiates on ending its missile exports.
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Goal was achieved: Both internal factors (policy review) and external factors (EP–3 incident in the South China Sea) increased complexity of challenge.
U.S. objected to Russian assistance to Iran's and India’s WMD and ballistic missile programs. Partial success in halting elements of Russian assistance to Iran, and efforts to achieve cooperation are ongoing.
U.S. engaged with China on failure to implement November 2000 commitments and implemented sanctions to that effect. China seriously implementing its 1997 nuclear commitments. North Korea not a supplier of nuclear-related technology but continues to seek buyers for missile exports.
After the creation of a new office last year, there was a marked increase in both meeting export control standards and in reported successes in interdicting WMD and related components.
· United States. and Ukraine signed an Export Control Agreement resolving taxation and customs issues that had impeded our assistance efforts.
· Uzbekistan customs officials intercepted radioactive materials at their border with the aid of U.S. equipment.
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Access of states of concern to WMD and missile equipment and technology impeded through diplomacy, export control assistance, and interdictions |
· Slovakia stopped arms cargo destined for Angola.
· Slovenian customs seized four containers of military weapons en route to Yugoslavia.
· Interagency visit addressed training and equipment needs to enable Turkey to commence prevention/interdiction of WMD and related components.
· Cyprus has strengthened its transshipment enforcement program resulting in several detentions of suspect transshipment cargo.
· However, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been unable to get needed laws enacted by their Parliaments.
· Malta has failed to implement customs control of its free port, despite EU admission requirements.
The indicator, an outcome measure, remains valid, but some performance targets were too ambitious. The Department coordinates closely with National Security Council, Commerce, Customs, Department of Defense, and the Intelligence Community |
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Source: record of international meetings, intelligence reports, assessment of progress against U.S. Government-developed standards of effective controls, reports on the outcome of export control assistance projects/demarches
Storage: Department of State/NP |
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Indicator |
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FY ’01 Target |
FY ’01 Actual |
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Conformity to international nonproliferation norms of behavior. |
South Asia: Continued unilateral nuclear testing moratoriums, restraints in nuclear and missile programs, and stronger export controls. Experts cooperate with India to improve export control regulations and mechanisms.
Middle East: UNSCR 1284 establishes UNMOVIC to verify Iraqi compliance with its UN WMD and missile requirements.
East Asia: DPRK resumes missile talks with U.S. DPRK moratorium on missile flight-testing and freeze at Agreed Framework nuclear facilities continues. Spent fuel canned under IAEA safeguards. Unconstrained DPRK missile exports and noncompliance with the NPT. |
Successful:
South Asia: Continued nuclear testing moratoria, better export controls, restraints in missile testing, and weapons deployment.
Middle East: Complete the development and implementation of reformed Iraq Oil-for-Food (OFF) program and targeted controls. Strong international support for refined controls, especially P-3. Iraq and Iran are generally denied access to technologies needed for their nuclear weapons programs. Experts engage with countries in the region on ways to strengthen export controls.
East Asia: U.S. Government review and development of North Korea policy. U.S. Government re-engages with North Korea with concurrence of ROK and Japan. DPRK complies with Agreed Framework and missile flight-test moratorium.
Minimally Effective:
South Asia: Expert cooperation on export controls. Dialog on the importance of nuclear and missile restraint.
Middle East: Reformed OFF program and targeted controls not fully implemented. Tehran continues WMD development using own technologies and help received.
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Goal was partially achieved: We were successful in South and East Asia, but only partially successful in the Middle East.
South Asia: Nuclear test moratoria continue. India partially cooperating to address U.S. onward proliferation concerns. Pakistan further tightened its export controls, but proliferation risks continue. Ballistic missile and nuclear programs continue unrestrained. Nuclear sanctions waived by United States against both countries, with aim of broad nonproliferation discussions (early 2002 with both countries).
Middle East: UN inspection organizations for Iraq remain ready to resume inspections, but Iraq has continued to reject UNSC Resolution 1284. UNSC commits to pass Goods Review List (GRL) in May 2002.
Delay caused by Russia, despite strong P-3 support. Iran received first major components of Bushehr reactor from Russia; all other nuclear suppliers continued to refrain from cooperation with Iran. U.S. secured the political commitment of the UAE, a key transit/transshipment state, to take concrete steps to adhere to nonproliferation regimes, and to cooperate in establishing a modern export control/border security (EXBS) system.
East Asia: North Korea continued to comply with Agreed Framework and missile flight-test moratorium. State helped shape policy review on North Korea, completed in June, and informed North Korea. United States seeks serious discussions on range of issues: improved implementation of Agreed Framework relating to North Korea’s nuclear activities; verifiable constraints on North Korea’s missile program and a ban on missile exports; and a less threatening conventional military posture. North Korea has yet to agree to U.S. proposal for comprehensive talks. Engaged Governments of Malaysia, Singapore, and others as interagency EXBS teams performed initial needs assessments. South Korea turned down a nuclear export to Pakistan. Hong Kong continued to maintain its exemplary export control regime.
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Verification |
Storage: Department of State/NP, IO |
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Performance Indicator |
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FY ’01 Target |
FY ’01 Actual |
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Progress toward implementing fissile material projects - Plutonium disposition; Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility; Physical security |
U.S.-Russian bilateral agreement on plutonium disposition completed. G-8 Okinawa Summit called for development of financial and multilateral framework by July 2001. Joint U.S.-Russia construction of fissile material facility at Mayak underway to provide long-term storage for dismantled nuclear weapons. Negotiations underway on transparency and additional assistance for upstream processing of plutonium.
Resolution of issues associated with delivery of the improved physical security upgrades for key nuclear weapons storage sites |
Successful: Agreed plan to finance and structure cooperation for plutonium disposition in Russia with robust funding commitments from other states. Russian warhead dismantlement continues. Transparency negotiations progress. Physical security upgrades resume.
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Goal was partially achieved:
· Plutonium disposition suspended due to administration review of nonproliferation assistance to Russia and more cost-effective options.
· Mayak FMSF was nearly completed, with talks on transparency — a major obstacle -still in progress.
· Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA): Implementation of reactor shutdown also suspended due to administration review. Transparency arrangements resolved and monitoring mission scheduled.
· Physical Security upgrades progressing.
· The indicator, an activity measure, remains valid. Performance targets are appropriate.
· The Department consults closely with National Security Council, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, and the Intelligence Community.
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Verification |
Source: Intelligence reports, State Department cables
Storage: Department of State/NP |
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FY ’00 Baseline |
FY ’01 Target |
FY ’01 Actual |
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Successful: New programs in commercialization, training, industry partnering as well as expansion into former missile and chemical weapons institutes.
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Goal was partially achieved: Implementation progress made, while transition to self-sustainability needs further development. Under Science Centers, up to 40,000 scientists and several new high-interest institutes now engaged. Redirection activities and budgets expanded, Increases achieved in the number of private industry partners, industry financing of science center projects. Centers are engaged in studying program effectiveness.
The indicator, an activity measure, remains valid. Performance targets are appropriate. The Department consults closely with NSC, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Commerce, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and the Intelligence Community. |
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Source: Internet, diplomatic and programmatic direct contacts, press, intelligence reports, official statements, and Department of State cables
Storage: Department of State/NP |
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Countries |
Worldwide |
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Complementary U.S. Government Activities (Non-Department of State) |
Department of Energy Nuclear Cities Initiative; Department of Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction; IC monitoring programs |
| Lead Agency |
Department of State/NP |
| Partners |
Regional bureaus, INR, PM, VC, IO, intelligence community, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Customs, Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, NSC, Health and Human Services, Department of Agriculture, Office of Management and Budget, Australia Group, MTCR, Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, UNSC, IAEA, Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), Congress, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies, European Union members, G-8 members, ISTC, STCU, CTBTO, private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and academia |
National Interest |
National Security |
Performance Goal # |
WD-02 |
Strategic Goal |
Reduce the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). |
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Outcome Desired |
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The strategic threat of weapons of mass destruction to the United States is minimized. |
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Performance Goal |
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· Further reductions in strategic offensive arms, nuclear weapons stockpiles, and infrastructures in ways that reinforce stability.
· Reduce U.S. uncertainty about such weapons in other countries.
· Develop and implement effective diplomatic strategies to permit U.S. development, testing, and deployment of missile defenses; to achieve support of friends, allies, and other concerned countries and international organizations; and to establish a more sound relationship with Russia. |
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FY ’99 Baseline |
FY ’00 Actual |
FY ’01 Target |
FY ’01 Actual |
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Strategic Arms Reductions |
Reductions under START I continue; START II not ratified. |
Russian START I reductions from over 10,000 deployed warheads at signature down to 6,000-ahead of schedule; START II and associated agreements ratified by Russia but not yet entered into force. |
Successful: reduction of strategic weapons under START I on pace to finish before Treaty deadline in CY ’01; U.S. Government decisions made on deterrence strategy, force reductions and role of arms control.
Minimally Effective: START I reductions continue, but at slower pace. |
Goal was achieved:
· The START I reductions were completed as required on December 5, 2001, with assistance from the U.S. CTR program. All strategic offensive arms in Ukraine were eliminated by October 30. Also, the INF Treaty inspection regime was completed successfully on May 31, 2001.
· The number of former Soviet strategic warheads accountable under START I reduce during FY ’01 from 6,860 to 5,988. In addition, the United States Government decided to revise our deterrence strategy to better reflect the end of the cold war and counter current threats, to reduce U.S. strategic forces to the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs and our obligations to our allies, and to establish a more cooperative relationship with Russia. Discussions with Russia on this new strategic framework made significant progress during FY ’01.
· In the future, we expect further development of the new strategic framework with Russia, as well as further reductions in strategic arms.
The indicator, an outcome measure, remains valid. Performance targets are appropriate. The Department of State consults closely with National Security Council, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, and the Intelligence Community. |
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Verification |
Source: negotiating records, data exchanges, intelligence, Mission reporting
Storage: Department of State/AC, JCIC |
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FY ’99 Baseline |
FY ’00 Actual |
FY ’01 Target |
FY ’01 Actual |
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Missile Defense |
ABM Treaty in effect. |
United States decides not to deploy a limited
National missile defense at this time. |
Successful: U.S. Government makes decisions on deterrence strategy and missile defense; consultations with allies and others on development of missile defense, leading to a consensus.
Minimally Effective: same as "successful," but without, "leading to full consensus" |
Goal was partially achieved:
· While Russian agreement to U.S. missile defense efforts has not been achieved, during FY ’01 there was a steady improvement in the dialog between Russia and the United States. Russian rhetoric lost its negative focus on dire consequences of ABMT withdrawal.
· Presidents Bush and Putin agreed to continue consultations on establishing a new strategic relationship based on mutual interests and cooperation, rather than mutual vulnerability. The U.S.-Russian relationship is much broader than the ABM Treaty and our mutual efforts to build a new relationship will continue independent of the future of the Treaty.
· The United States initiated a series of consultations on missile defenses and the new strategic framework with our NATO allies, Asian allies, friends, and China.
The indicator, an activity measure, remains valid. Performance targets are appropriate. The Department of State consults closely with National Security Council, Department of Defense, and the Intelligence Community. |
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Verification |
Source: Internal U.S. Government documents, Mission reporting
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Countries |
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Lead Agency |
Department of State/AC |
National Interest |
National Security |
Performance Goal # |
WD-03 |
Strategic Goal |
Reduce the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). |
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Outcome Desired |
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Negotiation and implementation of multilateral agreements that formalize nonproliferation and arms control commitments and make existing regimes more effective. |
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Performance Goal |
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FY ’00 Baseline |
FY ’01 Target |
FY ’01 Actual |
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Activity: Strengthen NPT and IAEA |
2000 NPT Review Conference consensus reflects widespread support for Treaty.
IAEA is working on strengthening safeguards;
accepted by 54 states, 9 of which implement them, strengthened safeguards.
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Successful: Strong international consensus to preserve and strengthen the NPT; no withdrawals threatened; United States provides more financial support to improve IAEA safeguards and fund key new responsibilities; more states sign or ratify the safeguards protocol.
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Goal was achieved:
· NPT remains strong with widespread support, and review process for 2005 NPT Review Conference began smoothly. No state threatened to withdraw. North Korea remained a party and took limited steps to improve cooperation with IAEA. U.S. provided strong support for IAEA safeguards and essential new IAEA programs (e.g., information and imagery analysis) and integrated safeguards. Key equipment needs, e.g., in surveillance areas, were met. Over $50 million in funds for safeguards equipment make important contributions to IAEA safeguards effectiveness. Seven additional states signed protocols and 13 additional protocols were brought into force.
· IAEA responded quickly to September 11 terrorist attacks to review relevant IAEA activities with a view to strengthening them and provided initial views to Board of Governors.
The indicator, an outcome measure, remains valid. Performance targets are appropriate. The Department of State consults closely with the National Security Council, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Intelligence Community. |
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Verification |
Storage: Department of State/NP, IAEA
Validation: data is complete, accurate, and timely |
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FY ’00 Baseline |
FY ’01 Target |
FY ’01 Actual |
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Strengthen CWC |
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Successful: At least 5 new states’ parties, including at least one state of proliferation concern; United States fully implements industry and other obligations.
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Goal was partially achieved:
· Yemen, Zambia, the UAE, and the Dominican Republic became states parties during the reporting period. There are now 144 parties. We will persist in this effort.
· The United States is fully implementing its industry obligations. All declarations have been made. In the reporting period, the first full year of inspections, 16 inspections of U.S. industry facilities were conducted. We worked closely with the Commerce Department in ensuring smooth implementation of these inspections. Some problems occurred, but we either resolved them or continue to make progress on resolution, and will improve implementation with experience.
· We invested much time and effort in attempting to improve financial and administrative management of the OPCW, where budget problems are preventing the Organization from executing its full responsibilities. Because of our efforts, the OPCW maintained sufficient level of activity to ensure credible implementation of the CWC.
· We continue our engagement with the Russians on their declarations and destruction plans. Although some destruction was done in FY ’01, Russia will not meet the deadlines for chemical weapons destruction and has requested extensions. We will continue to press them to make this a higher priority, but they also need significant international assistance, which we will continue to press for.
The indicator, an activity measure, remains valid. Performance targets may need to be changed to reflect maturity in CWC membership numbers. The Department consults closely with National Security Council, Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Intelligence Community. |
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Verification |
Source: negotiating reports, implementation reports, ratifications
Validation: data is complete, accurate, and timely. |
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FY ’00 Baseline |
FY ’01 Target |
FY ’01 Actual |
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Successful: Expansion of international nuclear test monitoring system. A committee is established with an acceptable negotiating mandate on FMCT.
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Goal was partially achieved, with full success in the International Monitoring System (IMS) sub goal.
· We met the goal of IMS expansion, as 10 additional stations were certified in FY ’01.
· With regard to FMCT, we protected U.S. interests, although we were not able to establish at the Conference on Disarmament a committee with an acceptable mandate.
· China, supported by Pakistan and Russia, continued to block FMCT negotiations by linking them to negotiations on nuclear disarmament and outer space, pointing to U.S. actions on missile defense as highlighting the need for negotiations on outer space.
· However, there continues to be general support, apart from China, Pakistan, and Russia, for a work program package that includes negotiation of FMCT but only discussion of outer space arms control and nuclear disarmament.
· We will continue to work to establish a committee to negotiate FMCT, since it would help achieve our nonproliferation objectives.
The indicator, an outcome measure, remains valid. Performance targets are appropriate.
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Verification |
Source: negotiating reports, implementation reports
Storage: Department of State/AC, CTBTO, CD
Validation: data is complete, accurate, and timely |
Countries |
Worldwide, with focus on Russia, China, India, and Pakistan |
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Complementary U.S. Government Activities (Non-Department of State) |
Department of Energy assists in supporting our work on new and recent multilateral treaty implementation. The Departments of Defense and Commerce are heavily engaged in ensuring U.S. implementation of the CWC. NRC, Department of Energy, Department of Defense cooperate in improving IAEA safeguards and implementing safeguards in the United States. |
National Interest |
National Security |
Performance Goal # |
WD-04 |
Strategic Goal |
Reduce the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). |
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Outcome Desired |
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Effective verification of compliance with arms control and nonproliferation treaties, agreements, and commitments. |
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Performance Goal |
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Develop effective verification regimes and verify compliance with arms control and nonproliferation treaties, agreements, and commitments. |
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FY ’00 Baseline |
FY ’01 Target |
FY ’01 Actual |
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Effective verification measures for new treaties |
No mandate for FMCT, major BWC issues unresolved, START III and ABM/NMD provisions under development. |
Final phase of BWC negotiations begin; negotiations begin for enhanced verification measures for START III and ABM. |
Goal was partially achieved.
FMCT: The 2001 Conference on Disarmament was unable to reach agreement on an agenda. Stay the course (see discussion under WMD Goal 3).
BWC: Goal changed.
· Strategy being changed.
· Package of alternatives to BWC Protocol under development.
START III and ABM/NMD: Goal Changed.
· Strategy being changed. Reasons for the change include internal and external factors — a new administration, emerging threats, and a new strategic framework developing between the United States and Russia.
· The administration's position on reducing strategic offensive arms does not include START III or necessarily any new treaty; on defenses the administration has stated it will need to move beyond the ABM Treaty.
· Instead of the target activity, discussions took place between the United States and Russia on strategic arms reduction and missile defense in the context of a developing new strategic framework based on trust, openness, and cooperation, rather than the adversarial relationship of the cold war.
· In FY ’02, stakeholders can expect progress on reducing the threat of WMD and an updated strategy, performance indicator, and target to reflect a new strategic framework.
The Department of State consults closely with National Security Council, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, and the Intelligence Community. |
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Performance Indicator (cont’d) |
FY ’01 Actual |
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Compliance with existing treaties |
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· During the sessions and intersession, the Parties resolved issues pertaining to the Treaty-mandated expiration of the inspection regime. The inspection regime came to a successful conclusion on May 31, 2001. The Treaty remains in effect for unlimited duration.
· The original concept of the Technical Analysis Group (TAG) as part of the U.S. National Authority for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty evolved to encompass all relevant nuclear testing treaties and agreements.
· The TAG has been replaced by the Nuclear Verification Information System. In 2001, the Department of State committed $350,000 to a contract with the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to develop both requirements for nuclear test verification and software to access the relevant information from other government agencies and nongovernmental organizations.
· A System Vision document, evolved from the TAG Concept of Operations, has been drafted and submitted to the Office of Nuclear Affairs. The Office is now in the process of vetting its requirements with the Departments of Defense, Energy and the intelligence community through a Coordinating Committee sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration.
CTBT Verification Regime/VMTF:
· The interagency Nuclear Testing Verification and Monitoring Task Force (VMTF) developed U.S. verification policies and technical perspectives as needed that were deployed during meetings of the multinational CTBT Organization’s Preparatory Commission and its subsidiary bodies.
· In FY ’01, the decisions of the Preparatory Commission and the sequential establishment of the CTBT verification regime were consistent with U.S. verification policies and technical perspectives and were supported by the United States.
· However, after a review of U.S. concerns regarding nuclear testing, the United States announced at the August meeting of the Preparatory Commission that would no longer participate in establishing the entire CTBT verification regime. Henceforth, the United States will continue to participate in and fund only those activities directed at establishing and supporting the International Monitoring System (IMS), and, only to the extent required for the support of the IMS, the International Data Center and the Global Communications Infrastructure.
· It is expected that approximately 23 stations of the IMS will be certified by the end of CY ’01. As of October 31, data from 30 IMS stations were included in the International Data Center operations.
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FY ’01 Target |
FY ’01 Actual |
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Goal was achieved.
CRITICAL COLLECTION SENSORS:
· During FY ’01 critical collection sensors were funded and provided information for treaty verification. Pushed to fund future collection systems to ensure that there will be no gaps in coverage.
V FUND:
· Pushed for a budget allocation, including reprogramming efforts, to support the Verification Assets Fund (V Fund), but internal Department priority was given to other programs. Stay the course; try again in FY ’02.
NPAC TWG:
· The Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group (NPAC TWG) continued to foster the development of key research and development activities that may contribute to verifying arms control and nonproliferation agreements. The NPAC TWG Report will be issued in the spring of 2002.
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Goal was partially achieved.
· NRRC agreement with Ukraine signed.
· Working toward signing agreement with DOC link to CWC Network on hold. DOC reassessing its need for a link to the CWC Network.
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Countries |
Worldwide |
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Complementary U.S. Government Activities |
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Lead Agency |
Department of State/VC |
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Partners |
T, AC, NP, PM, INR, EUR, IRM, L, INR, OSD, Joint Staff, National Security Council, Department of Energy, Department of Commerce |
National Interest |
National Security |
Performance Goal # |
WD-05 |
Strategic Goal |
Reduce the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). |
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Outcome Desired |
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Strengthen international nuclear safety and nuclear energy cooperation regimes; pursue international nuclear cooperation policies that reduce risks of proliferation and protect the global environment from nuclear accidents and improperly managed nuclear waste from Soviet-era facilities. |
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Performance Goal |
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Ensure nuclear cooperation serves safety, environmental, and nonproliferation goals. |
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FY ’01 Target |
FY ’01 Actual |
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Successful: Chernobyl closure implemented. Donors provide funding for the sarcophagus and support for energy reform. Ignalina I prepares for closure. Russia continues to work with the G–7 on specific safety initiatives in Russia and the other New Independent States. Bulgaria prepares for closure of units 1 and 2 of its Kozloduy Plant.
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Goal was achieved. Chernobyl was shutdown on December 15, 2000. Donors providing funding for the sarcophagus and support for energy reform through European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Working with the EBRD and the G-7, we secured a Ukrainian decision on a design concept for the Chernobyl shelter. Ignalina is preparing for closure in 2005 and Bulgaria signed an International Decommissioning Fund Agreement with the EBRD requiring early closure of Kozloduy 1 and 2. The United States negotiated a policy change in the G-7 that supports our efforts to help avoid a nuclear accident in Russia while pressing for closure of unsafe reactors. The G-7 agreed to continue to provide expert safety advice to Russia as its high-risk reactors enter life extension and is considering conditions under which Russia may become a member of the G-7 Nuclear Safety Working Group. We have made substantial progress in negotiating a Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in Russia (MNEPR) agreement with Russia and EU.
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FY ’01 Target |
FY ’01 Actual |
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The United States has nuclear cooperation agreements with the IAEA, the EU, 24 other countries, and Taiwan.
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Successful: China agrees to U.S. proposals for retransfer consents; peaceful nuclear cooperation proceeds smoothly. GIF proceeds as a viable forum for reactor cooperation. No security problems arise with U.S.-origin nuclear material or they are resolved quickly. Other cooperation programs proceed normally.
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Goal was partially achieved: U.S.-China discussions on retransfer consents made substantial progress in allaying PRC concern that its domestic technology could be captured by U.S. controls; level of detail in talks extended horizon for completion, with fully successful outcome still foreseen for FY ’02. GIF successfully drafted and approved its charter and embarked on its program as an international forum for discussion of innovative reactor designs. No significant issues arose regarding the security of U.S.-origin nuclear materials. United States continued as a reliable and predictable partner in peaceful nuclear cooperation with other countries, with cooperative programs proceeding smoothly.
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Verification |
Source: U.S. Mission reporting
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Countries |
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Complementary U.S. Government Activities (Non-Department of State) |
Department of Energy International Nuclear Safety Program and Nuclear Regulatory Commission international programs (funded by the Department of State and the Agency for International Development) |
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Lead Agency |
Department of State/NP |
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Partners |
Regional bureaus (EUR, EAP, SA, WHA), IO, VC, INR, OVP, NSC, Department of Energy, Agency for International Development, U.S. Treasury Department, and the Environmental Protection Agency |
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