Human Rights, Civil Society, and Democratic Governance in Russia: Current Situation and Prospects for the Future

Chairman Brownback, Co-Chairman Smith, Members of the Commission, this is my first appearance before you, and I would like to mark this occasion by commending all of you for the pioneering role the Commission has played in promoting respect for human rights and democratic principles throughout the Helsinki signatory states.

I welcome this opportunity to share with you some of my impressions about the Russian Federation’s new NGO legislation, the trajectory of democracy and civil society there, and the way forward.

Russia is a pivotal player on the world stage and the United States values its strong relationship with Russia. Together, we have already achieved much, and there are many more opportunities for us to work in partnership for peace and prosperity and against common threats. As President Bush said at the Bratislava summit last year, it is in our interest "that Russia be a strong and viable partner with the United States …but that we understand that in the 21^st century, strong countries are built by developing strong democracies." We want Russian democracy to succeed and we will do all we can to support the work of those who are committed to making democracy’s promise a reality for all the citizens of Russia.

The experience of nations worldwide has shown that a flourishing civil society–especially the activism of NGOs–is essential to reaching democratic goals. The Bush Administration shares the concerns of this Commission that civil society in Russia is under increasing pressure. Recent months have seen raids on NGO offices, registration problems, visa problems for foreign NGOs, and intimidation of NGO leaders and staff. These measures have disrupted the work of key NGOs and have had a chilling effect on Russian civil society.

As part of our larger diplomatic efforts to deliver a clear message to the Russian Government about our deepening concerns for NGOs, Secretary Rice asked me to go to Moscow, which I did from January 17-19. I met with Russian and U.S.-based NGO representatives, Duma committee chairpersons, officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Chair of the Presidential Human Rights Council, and representatives of independent media.

Upon landing in Moscow, I was greeted with the news that the official Russian newspaper had published that very morning the long awaited NGO law, which President Putin had quietly signed on January 10.

Although some of the more problematic elements were removed in the legislative process, in part due to concerns expressed by the U.S., European allies, and Russian and foreign NGOs, key problems remain. The new law has the potential to cripple the vital work of many NGOs and retard Russia’s democratic development. Key provisions of the legislation are vague. For example, the law does not define what activity would constitute a "threat to Russian sovereignty" or "extremist activity." The law also imposes potentially burdensome reporting requirements on all NGOs’ financial and programmatic activities, allowing broad oversight by Russian officials.

The authorities have broad discretion to implement the law. NGOs’ financial records, as well as current and planned programs, would be subject to examination. The authorities could request multiple reports or attend any NGO event to verify that an organization’s activities comply with the purposes stated in its founding documents. Officials could order an NGO to cease funding a program, to cease funding an individual, or to shut down completely. While we are told punitive measures would be subject to court approval, this could entail a lengthy and expensive litigation that could cripple an NGO.

We have already registered our concerns at the OSCE Permanent Council when Ambassador Finley on January 26 said that the law does not appear to meet OSCE commitments in the Copenhagen and Moscow Documents.

The law will go into effect in April. Implementing regulations are now being drafted. We will press for clarifications and input from Russian civil society. We will follow its implementation closely and raise our concerns about its consequences. We also will keep an eye out for any similar legislation pertaining to foundations, endowments and charitable organizations. Already, there are ominous signs of things to come:

• As justification for the new law, President Putin and other officials cited the "spy rock" case, following the January 22 airing of the program "Spies" on state-owned Russian television and subsequent allegations by the FSB that British spies have been funding Russian NGOs.
• On January 24, the Duma passed a resolution denouncing the spying incident and called upon the Committee on Security to direct the FSB to report on political parties and organizations that receive foreign funding. The Duma also called upon numerous government agencies to report on the legality of NGOs using funds received from the United Kingdom.
• On January 27, the Ministry of Justice announced that it is seeking to revoke the registration of the Russian Human Rights Research Center–an umbrella organization that brings together prominent NGOs, including the Moscow Helsinki Group, the Union of Soldiers’ Mothers and the Independent Psychiatric Association of Russia–for allegedly failing to provide required documentation about its activities in recent years.
• In a January 31 press conference, President Putin acknowledged that society needs NGOs to monitor the activities of the state and power structures and pledged support for their activities, but added that their financing must be transparent and efforts to control them by "foreign puppeteers" would not be tolerated.
• On February 1, 16 demonstrators were detained at an unsanctioned rally in front of the FSB building on Lubyanka Square protesting the recent FSB allegations against NGOs.
• And on February 3, Stanislav Dmitrievsky, the Executive Director of the Russian Chechen Friendship Society received a 2-year suspended sentence and 4 years of probation for inciting ethnic hatred for publishing statements by Chechen separatist leaders. This conviction follows a series of repressive actions in recent months against the Russian Chechen Friendship Society.

These and other developments suggest that the Russian Government has a deep mistrust of civil society, and especially of organizations that receive foreign funding and are engaged in politically sensitive activities like human rights monitoring.

President Putin has stated that the NGO law is "aimed at preventing the intrusion of foreign states into Russia’s internal political life and to create favorable and transparent conditions for the financing of non-governmental organizations." Several government officials and lawmakers asserted to me that the NGO law is necessary in order to clamp down on terrorist activity and money laundering. But what came through from further discussion was their deep suspicion that Western states had manipulated election outcomes in Ukraine, Georgia and elsewhere by funding NGO activity there, and that they see our promotion of democracy as part of a zero-sum game of geopolitical influence. I emphasized that they were fundamentally mistaken about what happened in Ukraine and Georgia, that our NGO funding and activities there were transparent and fully in keeping with OSCE and other international standards and practices. Our assistance is designed to help ensure that elections are free and fair, not to pick winners and losers.

President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov also have claimed that the new NGO law is similar to U.S. and other Western regulations regarding civil society. In my exchanges with Russian officials, I stressed that is incorrect. U.S. NGO laws are geared toward providing tax exempt status to non-profit groups, not regulating their activities. I also told Russian officials that NGO activities have become part and parcel of international politics. NGOs can support governments, they can criticize governments, but they should never be treated as enemies of governments.

To be sure, states have the right and the responsibility to protect their citizens, but the peaceful exercise of internationally recognized freedoms of association, assembly and expression through NGO activities constitutes no security threat. Governments have the obligation to defend–not to violate–fundamental rights even if they do not agree with what NGOs are saying and doing. Laws should protect citizens from harm, not prevent legitimate voices from being heard. Indeed, where differing views can be aired, the influence of extremists tends to be reduced. And law enforcement already has tools to respond to organizations that espouse or facilitate terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, whenever NGOs are under siege, democracy is undermined. The new NGO legislation is just one element of a broader pattern of restricting the space for independent views, consistent with the apparent aim of President Putin to concentrate power in the Kremlin and direct "democracy" from the top down.

The Kremlin has created a Presidential Council for Human Rights, chaired by Ella Pamfilova, where concerns about the law and civil society can be voiced. In parallel, it also established a Public Chamber through which officially sanctioned civil society groups can channel advice to the President. Both the Council and the Chamber publicly raised concerns about the NGO law, worked to soften the text during the drafting process in the Duma, and are seeking to address problems in the drafting of implementing regulations. It is an open question whether either body can serve as an effective check on determined efforts by the Government to restrict civil society and control the political process.

The Government also fosters semi-governmental NGOs. It has already allocated $18 million to support government approved NGOs in Russia and neighboring states. Independent NGOs expressed concerns that this government funding, while not in itself bad, may increase the competition from "government-approved" NGOs and reduce private funding, thereby disadvantaging already weak independent voices.

The Kremlin has employed legislative means to weaken prospects for the development of a viable opposition and reduce the likelihood of competitive, democratic and transparent Duma elections in 2007 and presidential elections in 2008. These measures have been accompanied by moves to consolidate executive branch control and strengthen Kremlin supporters.

In 2004, the Putin Administration proposed and the Duma approved abolishing direct elections of governors in favor of presidential nomination, subject to approval for 5-year terms by regional legislatures. Regional legislatures that fail to support the President’s choice are ultimately subject to dissolution. Thus far, no candidate recommended by the Kremlin–mostly incumbents–has been rejected by a legislature. This system in the current Russian context–where checks and balances are weak at best–limits government accountability to voters while further concentrating power in the executive branch.

Electoral and political party law amendments passed in the last 2 years and billed as intended to strengthen nationwide political parties in the longer term could nonetheless reduce the ability of opposition parties to compete in future elections. These amendments could favor the pro-Kremlin United Russia Party, while at the same time decreasing transparency in the electoral process by banning Russian non-partisan groups from observing Duma elections. The amendments place burdensome registration requirements on political parties, including provisions requiring more members in more regions in order to register in national elections.

These broader trends of limiting the space for critics of the Kremlin in political parties have been accompanied by continuing attacks on political rivals and those associated with them. For example, many Russians consider to be politically motivated the conviction and imprisonment of prominent businessman and outspoken Kremlin critic Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the detention and fraud charges against lawyer Svetlana Bakhmina, who worked for the Yukos oil company, the fraud charges against former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, and the harassment of chess champion turned political activist Garri Kasparov. Let me be clear, our concern in these and other cases is not whether this or that oligarch wins or loses power over another, but whether the Russian Government is selectively enforcing the law as a political weapon.

Other cases involving critics of the Kremlin also raise fears about the political nature of charges brought against them. Human rights organizations have called for the release of Mikhail Trepashkin, Valentin Danilov, Platon Lebedev, Zara Murtazaliyeva, and others who they believe were detained or imprisoned for criticizing the Kremlin or raising issues that are neuralgic to the government. We share their concerns about the lack of due process and a fair trial in these cases. We see them as symptomatic of larger deficiencies that remain in Russia with regard to the rule of law, respect for human rights and the independence of the judiciary. A Freedom House report found that President Putin has "increased the role of the federal security service in governing Russia and arbitrarily wielded the power of state institutions, such as the courts, tax inspectors, and the police for political ends."

In recent years, the Kremlin also has acted to limit critical voices in the media. The Government has decreased the diversity of Russian broadcast media, particularly television, the main source of news for the majority of Russians. All independent nation-wide television stations have been taken over either by the state or state-friendly companies. State-controlled television continues to offer little critical coverage of the Kremlin or dissenting views. In 2005, groups controlled by or allied with the Kremlin bought the majority of shares of REN-TV, the last independent national TV station. Government pressure at various levels has continued to weaken freedom of expression and media independence. For example, independent journalist Nikolay Goshko was sentenced to 5 years of hard labor in 2005 for libel of the governor and deputy governor of Smolensk. Although the sentence was reduced on appeal and he was released, in this environment self-censorship of journalists and editors remains a serious problem.

With respect to religious freedom, the FSB has continued to depict some members of minority religious groups as security threats and tools of foreign governments seeking to undermine Russian society and culture. President Putin and other senior leaders have spoken out against religious intolerance, but with spotty responses. Recent years have seen attacks on Baptist and Pentecostal churches, leaders, and citizens; anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim and anti-Caucasian rhetoric in the public space; and desecrations of cemeteries, mosques and synagogues. Authorities did respond swiftly to identify and charge with a hate crime the perpetrator of a violent attack on worshippers at a Chabad synagogue in Moscow on January 11. Under the new NGO law, religious groups that have canonical ties or receive foreign funding, as most non-Russian-Orthdox faiths do, may be subject to review, taxation and special considerations regarding registration.

No testimony on human rights conditions in Russia should fail to mention the situation in and around Chechnya. The United States has never questioned the territorial integrity of Russia. We also consistently condemn acts of terrorism, for which there is no justification. That said, both federal forces and their Chechen government allies have generally acted with impunity. Pro-Moscow Chechen paramilitaries at times appear to act independently of the Russian command structure, and there has been no indication that the federal authorities make any effective effort to rein them in. There has been very little meaningful accountability for egregious abuses, which include extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, and torture. Government forces continue to harass individuals seeking accountability and in some cases those who appealed to the European Court of Human Rights have been harassed or abducted. Despite significant concerns about the November parliamentary elections in Chechnya and the absence of independent observers, we are hopeful that these elections represent a step toward a lasting political settlement. Anti-government forces also continue to commit terrorist bombings and serious human rights abuses in the North Caucasus. The past year has seen the continued spread of violence and abuses throughout the region, where there is an overall climate of lawlessness and corruption.

The Way Forward
Though the current trajectory is discouraging, President Bush and Secretary Rice remain firmly committed to supporting Russia’s democratic development and those working for greater personal and political freedoms in Russia. We will keep these issues on our agenda with Russia. We will speak honestly about our concerns with Russian officials. We do this as a friend of Russia. At the end of the day, the Russian government will have to choose how it wants to be perceived by the international community. Do they want the story coming out of the G-8 to be: "Putin demonstrates leadership in addressing global economic, health, and energy issues"? Or will the story be: "Putin presides over G-8 while democracy declines in Russia"?

With Congress’s help, we will continue robust and open support for programs to foster civil society and democratic governance in Russia. In coming years, our assistance to encourage free, fair, transparent, and competitive elections will be vitally important. And we will continue to work with our allies and other democracies around the world to send a strong message that we expect Russia to fulfill commitmentson human rights and democratic freedoms.

Specifically, we will monitor the implementation of the NGO law closely and raise with the Russian Government our concerns and those of NGOs about its enforcement. I have directed my bureau to create a focal point where NGOs can register their concerns about their treatment, not only in Russia but in other countries across the globe where we are seeing disturbing efforts to restrict NGO activities.

One final observation: Assistant Secretary Fried and I share a common history. We worked together in the State Department during the dark days of Solidarity’s repression. We also worked together later on when the darkness began to lift in the Gorbachev years leading to the end of the Cold War. As discouraging as the current trends may seem, the Russia of today is not the Soviet Union. The space for individual freedoms is immeasurably larger today than anyone could have imagined in Soviet days. On many fronts, as Assistant Secretary Fried will note in his testimony, we work in partnership with Russia, and partners who respect one another speak frankly to one another when they disagree. The path to democracy is seldom linear. We must not write off democracy in Russia, least of all the NGOs working despite setbacks to realize democracy’s promise.

My DRL team and I look forward to working closely with you and your expert Commission staff. We welcome and value your ideas and insights. I cannot overestimate the significance of Congressional attention to Russia’s democratic development. Russians took note of the joint resolution on the NGO law, some favorably, some critically. Please continue to engage your counterparts in the Duma and Federation Council about the law and its implementation, and on the importance of civil society organizations to the success of democracies.

Once again, Mr. Chairman, I thank the Commission for its far-reaching contributions to the cause of human rights and democracy.