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 You are in: Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs > Bureau of Public Affairs > Bureau of Public Affairs: Electronic Information and Publications Office > Middle East Digest > 2008 > January - April 

Middle East Digest: January 24, 2008

Bureau of Public Affairs
January 24, 2008

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The Middle East Digest provides text and audio from the Daily Press Briefing. For the full briefings, please visit
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/

From the Daily Briefing of January 24, 2008:

MR. CASEY:All right. Well, good afternoon, everybody. I don’t have anything to start you off with, so let’s see what you may have as questions today.

QUESTION: On Gaza?

MR. CASEY: More on Gaza. Well, I don’t think I have a lot more than what we talked about this morning. But just to make sure we have at least something more than a two-minute briefing, I’ll go through what we do have again.

We’ve been in contact with the Egyptian Government, both David Welch with the Egyptian Ambassador here in Washington as well as Frank Ricciardone, our Ambassador to Egypt. He has spoken with a number of Egyptian officials, including, as I understand it, President Mubarak.

We share the concerns of the Egyptians about this situation. Certainly, we all want to make sure that the border is properly controlled and secured. The Egyptians are working towards that end. And certainly, we hope that they will be able to do so in the next few days.

We understand and also appreciate the fact that Hamas is trying to take advantage of this incident to use it not only to let individual Gazans try and purchase consumer goods on the other side of the border but potentially to smuggle in arms and other materials to support their fighters. And that is something that we and the Egyptians are concerned about.

We’re certainly going to continue to work on this issue and discuss it with the Egyptians as well as with the Israelis and the Palestinian Authority Government. I think it’s important to all of us that there be an appropriately secured international border there between Gaza and Egypt.

QUESTION: Are you satisfied --

MR. CASEY: Yes. Oh sorry, keep going.

QUESTION: Are you satisfied with the Egyptian response that they’re doing their best to control that, or is there any political element in what they’re doing?

MR. CASEY: Well, again, we understand that this is not the easiest situation for them to deal with, know they’re making efforts to do this. I’d leave it to them to talk about sort of the specifics of how they’re moving forward. Certainly, we want to see this dealt with as soon as possible. It’s in Egypt’s interest to do so. It’s in ours. It’s in everyone’s.

Yeah.

QUESTION: Yeah, just following on from that, Tom, when people like Under Secretary Burns say that the Egyptians need to do as much as they can to secure the border as soon as possible, what concrete help can the U.S. provide to help Egyptians achieve that goal, given the limits of manpower that they have and other points that they – and treaty obligations that they highlight? And could you perhaps spell out a little bit for us, sir, how worried you are about some kind of increase in violence in Gaza should this (inaudible) to go on for much longer with the smuggling in arms that you fear?

MR. CASEY: Well, we’ve all talked about some of the concerns about the tunnels and the smuggling of material across the border. As you know, there were elements of the Army Corps of Engineers out in Egypt fairly recently for discussions and consultations with Egyptian officials about that. We understand that this is not the easiest situation for them to deal with, but it’s something that they recognize that they do have to respond to. And that’s something that we’re prepared to assist them with as they might see fit.

But this is – you know, we are confident that the Egyptians are capable of handling their own sovereign responsibilities along the border. But certainly, again, it is a difficult issue. We want to continue to work with them on it. If they have specific kinds of help, we’re prepared to consider those requests. I’m not aware that they’ve asked for anything specific beyond what’s already been discussed previously.

QUESTION: But you’re not suggesting anything yourself, you’re awaiting requests from them; is that right in terms of --

MR. CASEY: Well, again – yeah, again, look, this is an issue that there’s a great deal of discussion on, both in terms of general security along the border as well as in response to this specific incident. But it’s, from our perspective, up to the Egyptians to determine how they would like to proceed. They’re a sovereign nation and this is their border with Gaza and ultimately it’s their responsibility. Certainly, if they want to have any suggestions from us, I’m sure we’ll be happy to put some ideas forward. But I think that they’re capable of understanding what their needs are.

MR. CASEY: Let’s let Samir get in here.

QUESTION: Tom, do you have any comment on the conference hosted by Syria yesterday for all the rejectionist Palestinian groups that called for – they opposed the negotiations with Israel and insisted that liberation must go before (inaudible) states?

MR. CASEY: Well, unfortunately, Samir, it shows yet again that despite many comments made by the Syrian regime, there certainly is still an effort underway to continue their support for some of these Palestinian rejectionist groups. And that’s unfortunate. We very much were appreciative of the fact that the Syrians came to the Annapolis conference and did so in what we hoped would be a spirit of support for the will of the Palestinian people to live in peace with Israel and to have a two-state solution. It’s unfortunate to see them hosting these kinds of events which really aren’t anything more than a grouping of individuals who basically stand opposed to what we believe to be the overwhelming wishes of the Palestinian people as well as the Israelis.

Dan.

QUESTION: Can I ask you about --

MR. CASEY: Okay, Nina. (Laughter.) Then we’ll go back to Dan. That’s okay, go ahead.

MR. CASEY: Let’s let Dan – I think Dan had – let him get one thing in here first and then we’ll let him get in.

QUESTION: Yes, just – Joe Biden just gave a press conference when he said – on terms of the possible agreement with Iraq this year. He said nobody knows what the Administration is proposing and he said he had no idea whether they were proposing a long-term security arrangement which would require congressional approval or a short-term status of forces agreement, which wouldn’t – and which he considered would be nonbinding. He said he had written to the Secretary and received no response or clarification on this. Can you help him on what is such a major feature of Administration foreign policy?

MR. CASEY: I will try not to personally think that I need to offer assistance to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee who, after all, does have oversight authority for the Department of State. But let me see if I can talk to you a little bit about the specifics of plans for a status of forces agreement with Iraq and some other things.

First of all, as I think we all know, the presence of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq has, until now and through the end of this coming year, been governed under Chapter 7 UN Security Council resolutions. The Iraqis have told us and told the United Nations that once the current resolution expires at the end of the year, they would like to move towards a more normalized relationship with the United States and with other countries that may continue to have a troop presence in Iraq. And to do that, what we are looking at is the kind of vehicle that we use for relations between U.S. military forces and more than a hundred countries throughout the world, which is a status of forces agreement.

But let’s be clear about what those are. Those agreements basically outline the terms under which U.S. forces legally operate in the country. It includes things like, you know, whether they respond to the Uniform Military Code of Justice or whether they come under local government or local court authorities. It includes the kinds of arrangements that allow for duty-free transshipment of materials for troops and those kinds of things. It’s a very basic agreement that, in many ways, is similar to the kinds of structures that we have in place in Iraq under the current Chapter 7 resolution. And in many ways, I think it represents a real change in the terms of the situation in Iraq. It’s an opportunity for us to move away from a UN mandate and towards a more normal bilateral relationship between our countries, which I think would be welcomed by many individuals.

In fact, there’s been legislation passed by Congress specifically asking us to negotiate a status of forces agreement to follow on measures to this UN mandate. And that’s also important for the U.S. military as well and – well, you can talk to some of my colleagues over at the Pentagon. Certainly, we want to make sure that any place in the world that U.S. troops are deployed, that there is a clear legal mandate and understanding of the environment they operate in. And that’s why we have these kinds of status of forces agreements all over the world.

Now there has been some comments that I’ve seen from other quarters that express concern that this agreement would somehow be establishing bases or in some way trying to limit options of policymakers now or in the future and that’s certainly not the case. What this arrangement does is make sure that whether it is this President or any of his successors that they have the full range of policy options available to them. Certainly there’ll always be the decision of the Commander-in-Chief and U.S. military leaders over what level of forces to have and what military operations will be.

I do think it’s pretty reasonable to assume, if you look at the history of what has gone on and look at statements made by representatives of both major political parties in this country that most likely options in Iraq will include some desire to be able to fight al-Qaida to provide training for Iraqi forces or do other kinds of activities there that respond to U.S. policy needs.

And so I think if you look at what is envisioned, and remember these are negotiations that have not even begun yet, certainly what we are trying to do is normalize and regularize a relationship between the United States and Iraq so that we are in a position to be able to carry out whatever operations are chosen to be engaged in by the U.S. and Iraqi Government cooperatively.

QUESTION: So just to clarify --

MR. CASEY: Sorry.

QUESTION: Sorry. Just to follow -- to just clarify, as a Status of Forces Agreement, it would not require congressional approval, nor would it in any sense lock in U.S. forces in Iraq and into the medium and long term.

MR. CASEY: Well, again, it’s a agreement that establishes the basis for having troops there. It is not a specific commitment of forces in terms of numbers or operations. Those are obviously things that are determined by the military commanders and ultimately by the President.

Yeah.

QUESTION: That was my question, so it’s not expected that it would have provisions of how many forces, how many U.S. forces or how long that it would stay in the country. It’s not expected that those things would be in this agreement.

MR. CASEY: No. I mean, it’s a basic framework agreement for normalizing the relationship. It’s not something that establishes force levels either minimum or maximum or determines specific operations. And I think, you know, you can look at the kinds of agreements that we have with other countries around the world, including longstanding allies in Europe and Asia. And obviously over time, while the Status of Forces Agreements have remained fairly consistent, the missions, the numbers of troops, the kinds of troops have changed and adjusted in accordance to the needs of policymakers in this country as well as in the host country. So there is no anticipation that this is somehow going to forever lock in stone a particular level of troops or a particular set of activities – activities or goals. Again, it’s a legal framework.

QUESTION: And --

MR. CASEY: Yeah. And – and what did I leave out?

QUESTION: And the next president, what’s their relationship to this agreement? They can tear it up, they can keep it, they can --

MR. CASEY: Well, look, the – again, the Status of Forces Agreements allows you to have a legal basis for operating in the country. The decisions that will be made by future presidents of this country, as well as let’s us – please, and I keep on trying to emphasize, future prime ministers and presidents of Iraq, since this is not a one-way street here, are obviously going to be up to their discretion.

We all want to see a time when Iraq is fully capable of handling its own security needs without the presence of any foreign forces and that’s the goal we’re all working towards. I do think, though, and when you listen to things that current candidates out there are saying, I think it’s pretty reasonable to assume, though, that there will be some kinds of U.S. military presence or operations beyond the end of the current UN mandate and that there will be a need as we work not only with Iraq, but with other countries over time to do things like respond to and fight al-Qaida wherever they may be.

We also have, I think, an enduring commitment to try and help the Iraqis achieve that kind of sustainability and that kind of ability to control their own security and that probably means some kind of ongoing role in terms of training and helping to support Iraq’s security forces. So this is certainly not an effort to tie anyone’s hands. This is very much an effort to provide current and future policymakers with a full range of options available to them.

QUESTION: So Tom --

MR. CASEY: Yeah, David.

QUESTION: You’re saying that SOFA agreements notwithstanding, the Bush Administration doesn’t intend to – in any way, to commit U.S. forces to Iraq after it leaves office?

MR. CASEY: Well, again, look, we believe that we need to have a long-term relationship with Iraq, a relationship that involves our diplomats, that involves economic reform, and that, for some time, will involve a military relationship. But how that relationship evolves, the specifics of it, how many diplomats will we have in our embassy, how many troops will we have on the ground, these are all the kinds of decisions that get made by policymakers here in Washington with the input from those in the field.

We believe that it’s important that we lay the groundwork now to be able to have that kind of sustainable relationship because it’s important that whoever is president next has a full range of options available and knows that U.S. forces that are there, for however long they are there, have a solid, legal basis and have a solid basis that’s acceptable not only to us and the broader international community, but the Iraqis as well because again, this is a cooperative effort and a cooperative arrangement.

And I do think one of the things that’s been missed in some of the comments that have been made about this over time is that this is actually a positive change and a positive move forward to be moving away from a mandated international community Chapter 7 resolution as a basis for troop presence to something that is much more similar to, in fact, is very much the model that we use for regular bilateral military relations between the United States and most other countries in the world.

QUESTION: So the Bush Administration doesn’t intend to foreclose any options of a -- that a future administration might have vis-à-vis Iraq.

MR. CASEY: Look, if anybody is worried that this agreement somehow ties the hands of future policymakers, it’s just simply not true.

Yeah.

QUESTION: Was there any reference to a permanent base or bases in the agreement?

MR. CASEY: No, we’re not seeking permanent bases in Iraq and that’s been a clear matter of policy for sometime. So no, the agreement is not a basing agreement.

QUESTION: But if it requires – I mean, the Iraqis require or made reference to it, how would the U.S. respond?

MR. CASEY: Well, again, you have to separate – separate out two issues here. One is the foundation and the legal basis on which our troops would operate in whatever term they are there. The second are the tactical decisions and arrangements as to how you proceed. But again, those are the decisions that are made by U.S. commanders on the ground working with their Iraqi counterparts, and ultimately blessed by policymakers. But there’s no intent on the part of the U.S. to establish permanent bases in Iraq whether that’s through this agreement or any other kind of agreement.

Yeah, Dan.

QUESTION: Just to follow up –

MR. CASEY: Just to follow up, okay.

QUESTION: When the President compared, as he did on his recent trip to the Middle East, this agreement to the understanding that the U.S. has with Kuwait, that’s just in terms of the modalities of day-to-day operations not to any kind of long-term presence. I just wanted to make sure that that gloss on the President’s comments was correct.

MR. CASEY: Well, I’d – you know, I’ll leave it to the White House to give you a – try and give you an interpretation of his comments. As I recall hearing them, it was again trying to establish this context that I’m talking about. It’s regularizing and normalizing our relations – our military relations with Iraq just as we have regular or normalized relations with Kuwait and many other countries not only in the Middle East but in Asia and Europe.


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