

2006 Annual Report



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Puerto Rico and the U. S. Virgin Islands HIDTA

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The PR/USVI High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area¹ (PR/USVI HIDTA) continues to experience violent crime in its communities associated with Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) and their related criminal activities. The National HIDTA program philosophy, tailored to each jurisdiction's needs, is an excellent methodology to develop a strategic plan involving federal and non-federal law enforcement agencies guided by its Executive Board (EB) using a balanced mix of resources. This strategic plan, hereinafter referred to as the Strategy, specifically addresses the Threat across both jurisdictional boundaries of Puerto Rico (PR) and U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI). To its credit, this approach has worked extremely well for both jurisdictions over the last ten years. It has made it easier to eradicate the boundaries between two jurisdictions which are separated by 14 miles of water.

This Report serves to highlight the efficiency and effectiveness of the operations within the HIDTA in a uniform and measurable manner.

- Effectiveness in dismantling DTOs and Money Laundering Organization (MLOs) requires the development of a cohesive and seamless approach that spans two jurisdictions separated by water. With this as a goal, there are 19 federal and non-federal collaborating law enforcement organizations with 20 agencies comprising the EB.
- Regional law enforcement Initiatives continue to pursue DTOs and MLOs, using all the capabilities of the Investigative Support Center (ISC) to make significant progress in identifying, investigating and dismantling or disrupting the most complex, threatening, as well as violent, drug traffickers, money launderers, drug related weapons traffickers, drug dealers and violent criminals, including fugitives.
- The HIDTA increasingly addresses large, complex DTOs and MLOs. Its goal is to disrupt/dismantle organizations that are known to cause significant damage in the region through their illegal activities. It is recognized that results take longer when targeting these larger and more sophisticated DTOs/MLOs; however, the benefits are well known. A review of the statistical information provided in this Annual Report reveals success in this area. It is noted that of the 152 DTOs/MLOs investigations, 93 carried over from 2005 and 59 were newly opened. Of these, 59 were international, 17 were multi-state, and 76 were local. Forty-two were worked on as Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) designated cases, nine as Regional Priority Organization Targets (RPOTs) and one as a Consolidated Priority Organizational Target (CPOT).
- The main goal of every HIDTA is to disrupt and dismantle DTOs and MLOs. Toward this end, 152 DTOs/MLOs were worked and, of these, 41 were targeted. At year's end, 16 were disrupted and 14 dismantled. This allowed for a high success rate of 73%.
- Following the money trail is critical. To this end five MLOs were identified

¹ For the purpose of this document, note that the reference to HIDTA should be construed as meaning the PR/USVI HIDTA except where otherwise noted.

and/or targeted during CY 2006. Two were dismantled/disrupted for a 40% rate of success.

- Following the money trail is critical. To this end five MLOs were identified and/or targeted during CY 2006. Two were dismantled/disrupted for a 40% success rate
- The sale of illicit drugs is widely recognized as highly profitable. It is this HIDTA'S goal to target those profits. For 2006, the drugs seized were valued at the wholesale level at \$76.8 million, or a Return on Investment (ROI) of \$11.58 for every dollar invested; a cost-effective use of resources. This HIDTA achieved a combined drug and seized assets ROI \$12.18 versus a law enforcement budget of \$6.6 million.
- Drug assets seized during CY 2006 were valued at about \$4 million and impacted DTOS and MLOs by reducing their access to vital resources. Not only were their assets seized, but this event served as a very visible reminder to the general public about the consequences of a criminal lifestyle.
- This HIDTA continues to experience violent crime that is believed to be associated with DTOs/MLOs and their related criminal activities. Drug abuse remains the primary social problem in the area which has contributed to a high murder rate. During CY2006, the region experienced a high crime rate: 775 murders, 178 rapes, 5,550 robberies, 3,542 aggravated assaults, 18,449 burglaries, 29,007 property thefts and 9,237 auto thefts. However, overall, there was a reduction of 6% of part one crimes in the region. It is critical to note that experts deem that approximately 80% of part I crimes may be attributable to illegal drugs. This has resulted in a ratio of 1,622 part I crimes for every 100,000 citizens.
- In an environment where every dollar counts, intelligence driven investigations are of paramount important and the desired mode of operation. The goal is to have each investigation supported by the ISC. In 2006, 69 analytical support requests were handled by the ISC in support of 107 investigations targeted or 64%. All initiatives used the ISC for case and subject deconfliction. This resulted in higher levels of officer safety and a more cost effective and productive targeting of MLOs/DTOs.
- This report serves to highlight the efficiency and effectiveness of the operations within the HIDTA in a uniform and measurable manner. In 2006, the EB continued centralized efforts in addressing the two National HIDTA goals. The first consists of disrupting the illegal drug market by dismantling or disrupting DTOs/MLOs. This clear directive serves to narrow the focus and unity of purpose used by all HIDTA initiatives in maximizing their effectiveness.
- In its continuing and aggressive mission to disrupt and dismantle DTOs/MLOs, the successful HIDTA collaborative approach is used and intelligence/resource sharing is pivotal, clearly resulting in success, a brief example is provided:

Operation Watusi, an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) led Money Laundering Initiative, resulted in the disruption and dismantling of DTOs and MLOs that produced seizures of over \$1.26

million in cash and \$569,800 in bank accounts. This case is a stellar example of the HIDTA philosophy in that its success emanated from a collaborative approach that included intelligence sharing among multiple federal and non-federal law enforcement agencies, including the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the DEA-ICE Special Operations Unit (SOU), the British Virgin Islands (BVI), the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRPD), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), as well as Dutch Law Enforcement and Colombian authorities.

Targeted was a drug trafficking network involving three organizations headed by sources of supply. These organizations operated throughout Venezuela, the Eastern Caribbean and the U.S. and were responsible for the importation of frequent multi-hundred kilograms (kgs.) drug shipments from Colombia to Puerto Rico (PR).

To date, a total of 35 individuals have been arrested, which included a worldwide simultaneous takedown in October 2006 that occurred in Colombia, the Dominican Republic, St. Maarten, BVI and the Netherlands. Seizures include 1,952 kgs of cocaine, 6 motor vessels, \$569,893.50 from various bank accounts and over \$1.26 million in cash. It is expected that over 40 un-indicted co-conspirators will be identified through defendants now willing to cooperate for a second round of multiple indictments.

II. INTRODUCTION

The PR/USVI HIDTA is pleased to present this Annual Report to document its most significant activities and achievements that occurred in CY2006. To fully appreciate the achievements, it is important to understand how each HIDTA is structured, and why it exists. The Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), designates regions with critical drug trafficking problems adversely impacting the United States, as High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs). Thus, the national HIDTA program is comprised of 28 individual HIDTAs spread throughout the country uniquely situated to counteract this illicit activity. HIDTAs play a significant role in addressing real world drug and drug-related problems, and offer real world solutions. The PR/USVI HIDTA is similar in this regard and has developed or encouraged the development of working relationships with over 26 federal and non-federal law enforcement agencies in joint pursuit of disrupting and dismantling DTOs and MLOs.

Law enforcement initiatives are clear on their prioritization of dismantling and/or disrupting DTOs and MLOs. Of particular importance are those that most substantially endanger the communities of the region by the violent and destructive manner in which they conduct their illegal activities.

The PR/USVI HIDTA's EB's strong leadership and commitment to success have played a decisive role in the achieving of performance measures for these reporting periods. The EB's leadership strategy was guided by establishing specific goals and objectives in support of the National Drug Control Strategy to focus the investigative efforts of the Initiatives and enhance their productivity. The PR/USVI HIDTA's EB composition solidifies the partnership among federal and non-federal agencies by enhancing participation and ensuring equality among all participants. The resulting balanced Strategy of intelligence,

interdiction, investigative/enforcement and support initiatives has served as a force multiplier to enable the disrupting and dismantling of drug trafficking, money laundering and their related crime organizations.

The overall HIDTA mission is embodied by the National Program Mission Statement:

National HIDTA Program Mission Statement

The mission of the HIDTA Program is to disrupt the market for illegal drugs in the United States by assisting federal, state, and local law enforcement entities participating in the HIDTA program to dismantle and disrupt DTOs with particular emphasis on drug trafficking regions that have harmful effects on other parts of the United States.

The PR/USVI HIDTA EB during 2006 focused on the vision, mission, goals and objectives that personify the efforts undertaken by the law enforcement entities comprising its initiatives. To that end, this information is shared with you.

PR/USVI HIDTA Mission Statement

In support of the National Drug Control Policy, the PR/USVI HIDTA participating agencies create intelligence driven task forces comprised of federal, state and local law enforcement agents which are aimed at eliminating or reducing drugs trafficking and its associated criminal consequences within the domestic environment.

PR/USVI HIDTA Vision Statement

HIDTA will continue to develop and operate a major intelligence driven joint investigation system, using the latest technology and with full participation by all local, state and federal agencies. This seamless integration of land, sea and air resources will continue to be dedicated to dismantling and disrupting major DTOs operating in the Caribbean Basin (i.e., RPOTS/CPOTS) and their related criminal activities, with a specific focus in the area of money laundering. This system will continue to be manned by a highly trained and effective law enforcement work force.

Reporting Period: This Annual Report covers the reporting period January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2006.

Budget Allocation: The HIDTA has a budget of \$9,084,494. The HIDTA strives

to reduce administrative costs to allow maximum budgetary allocations to be used for operational activities. Periodic evaluation of service contracts occurs to seek to reduce costs even further. Effective property management redirects surplus items into initiatives that need them and particular attention is paid in the trade-in of obsolete equipment against the cost of the new to further increase our cost effectiveness; a practice that obtained commendations from the auditors. Obsolete equipment is auctioned and the proceeds are reinvested in the program.

Geographic Area of Responsibility: The HIDTA covers two separate island jurisdictions: PR and the USVI. This area is a primary arrival and transit zone of drugs originating from many foreign countries through hundreds of miles of ocean which further complicates interdiction operations. The jurisdictions are separated by 14 miles, or 12 nautical miles, as measured by their nearest populated islands (St. Thomas and Culebra). Each jurisdiction is comprised of larger inhabited islands and smaller islets and cays. While the uninhabited islets and cays are frequently used by the general population for recreational enjoyment, they are also used by the criminal element as drug stashing points. Specifically, the inhabited islands are:


Puerto Rico: Puerto Rico and Culebra, Mona and Vieques.

Virgin Islands: St. Croix, St. John, St. Thomas and Water Island.

Within the HIDTA, the areas where drug related criminal activity is most noted are the San Juan Metro Area (Bayamon, Carolina, Guaynabo, Caguas, Toa Baja, as well as San Juan) and the cities of Mayaguez, Fajardo and Ponce. In the USVI, the islands of St. Croix and St. Thomas are those with the higher rates of drug related criminal activity, primarily in or around the densely populated public housing communities.

PUERTO RICO/U. S. VIRGIN ISLANDS HIDTA AREA

CY2006 INITIATIVES - AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY



The jurisdictions in the HIDTA are ripe for the transshipment of drugs into CONUS, as well as its related criminal activities, due to substantial coastlines,

not just of the seven populated islands, but also as previously mentioned the hundreds of small cays and islets. This is also contributed to by the area's low per capita income. Other impacting factors include the high volume of shipping containers, the transient nature of tourism based economies and the significant number of cruise ships that daily traverse the ports of PR and the USVI, which all contribute to making it attractive for use as a smuggling route. This has to be placed within the backdrop of high part one crime rates associated with the drug trade, accountable for over 80% of crime, particularly murder. It is critical to note that the PR/USVI HIDTA was designated a High Intensity Financial Crimes Area (HIFCA) due to its frequent use as a conduit for money laundering.

III. NATIONAL HIDTA GOALS

HIDTAs nationally have adopted two specific goals to be achieved in meeting the drug challenge. These two national goals guide all HIDTA initiatives and activities throughout the United States. The PR/USVI HIDTA is proud to present these national HIDTA program goals, plus concise summaries of its Threat Assessment for Budget Year 2006 and resultant Strategy in the following sections. The PR/USVI HIDTA has fashioned an individual strategy to meet local drug threats according to its individual needs, in conjunction with the national objectives:

- | |
|--|
| <p>Goal 1: Disrupt the market for illegal drugs by dismantling or disrupting drug trafficking and/or money laundering organizations; and</p> <p>Goal 2: Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of HIDTA initiatives.</p> |
|--|

The EB, in addition to supporting the National HIDTA goals, developed region specific objectives and subsequently required each Initiative to operate within that framework. Initiatives are required to annually appear before the Board and demonstrate their progress in achieving the below goals and objectives. Performance Management Process (PMP) Core Tables are used as the standard briefing model.

A) **Goal 1: Reduce drug availability by eliminating/disrupting drug trafficking or MLOs.**

- 1) **Objectives Intelligence:**
 - i) Develop and expand on intelligence trends and patterns used by traffickers, money launderers, violent gangs and terrorist groups operating within or affecting PR/USVI.
 - ii) Identify weaknesses that are within commercial carrier systems and the U.S. Postal System that are used by organizations trafficking weapons and drugs.

- 2) **Objectives Interdiction:**
 - i) Target organizations that smuggle, sell, stash, or distribute illegal drugs and firearms engaged in other violent crimes.
 - ii) Target trafficking organizations smuggling drugs from South America through the Caribbean basin to PR/USVI with a focus on RPOTS and CPOTS.
 - 3) **Objectives Money Laundering:**
 - i) Identify money laundering trends and techniques used to facilitate the movement of illegal and illicit proceeds.
 - ii) Disrupt and dismantle MLOs or systems by conducting investigations and undercover operations.
 - iii) Attack and seize illegally obtained proceeds and assets of DTOs (e.g. RPOTS/CPOTS).
- B) **Goal 2: Improve efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement organizations and their efforts within HIDTA.**
- 1) **Objectives Intelligence:**
 - i) Identify smuggling, trafficking and money laundering activities that could adversely affect the soundness of public institutions in PR/USVI.
 - ii) Improve intelligence sharing among HIDTA initiatives.
 - iii) Increase ISC use and effectiveness through participation and sharing of information by all HIDTA agencies.
 - iv) Explore, identify and acquire new technology and innovative techniques that enhance the mission of HIDTA.
 - v) Increase information building and sharing with all reliable U.S. intelligence sources.
 - vi) Ensure that any pertinent databases/information systems be shared with the ISC to facilitate the dissemination to all agency representatives assigned to the ISC in support to each HIDTA initiative investigations.
 - 2) **Objectives Interdiction:**
 - i) Maintain a robust, professional interagency maritime interdiction force around/between PR and the USVI.
 - ii) Enhance the maritime air cargo information sharing to increase the intelligence collection and analyze responses for successful interdiction.
 - 3) **Objectives Money Laundering:**
 - i) Provide training to state, local and federal and non federal law enforcement officers participating in HIDTA

IV. Summary of Threat Assessment for Budget Year 2008

The PR/USVI HIDTA prides itself on maximizing and strategically using HIDTA funding to achieve results. In 2006, this was assisted by the development of a strong Threat Assessment which only occurred after a major and intense collaborative effort by multiple federal and non federal law enforcement agencies in the ISC. This Threat Assessment serves as the basis from which the strategic plan evolves. The reader is referred to The PR/USVI HIDTA Threat Assessment

for Budget Year 2008 for details on the threats identified.

This HIDTA continues to face an extraordinary challenge, although national estimates suggest that the amount of illicit drugs detected has declined in recent years, officials recognize that the actual amount is probably higher than what is detected. This may be attributed, partly, to the reduction of counter drug assets in the region and the substantial quantities of illegal drugs entering the region via commercial and private maritime vessels, which is exceedingly difficult to detect/interdict. It is believed that some Colombian DTOs may be encouraged to smuggle greater amounts of illegal drugs through the Caribbean region, due to the pressure exercised by law enforcement officials along the Southwest Border, in part because of anti-illegal immigration efforts, and the fighting among Mexican cartels for control of the border. Nonetheless, the drug trade remains a significant threat to PR and the USVI.


Maritime Threat: Continues to be the preferred method for cocaine, heroin and marijuana trafficking with cocaine trafficking representing the greatest threat. Venezuela (VZ) continues to surface as a main transshipment country. The principal cocaine trafficking route throughout the eastern area of PR is either from Colombia or VZ to Sint Maarten/St. Martin, Netherlands Antilles (NA) where the cocaine shipments are broken down into smaller shipments prior to being smuggled to the USVI and then to PR.



Port of San Juan
Source: ICE

Ports and Cruise Ships: The Port of San Juan receives about 30,000 containers on a monthly basis, but only three to five percent of these are inspected. The Ponce Port of the Americas became fully operational in 2006, receiving marine

cargo and facilitating its transshipment/export to the Caribbean, South America, Central America, the U.S. and Europe and will possibly represent another opportunity for maritime drug smuggling. Cruise ships, ferryboats, and noncommercial vessels are frequently used to transport drugs into the region. A study entitled "Economic Contribution of Cruise Tourism to the Caribbean Economy", showed that St. Thomas, USVI, is the third busiest cruise port in the Caribbean. San Juan is the fourth busiest in the western hemisphere for US domestic offshore traffic. These facts represent a greater threat/venue for drug trafficking in the region. The largest drug smuggling threat from cruise ships visiting the USVI come from crew members, with Puerto Ricans being the most heavily involved. The Caribbean Express, which transports passengers and cargo from the Dominican Republic (DR) to PR, poses a greater drug movement threat to the region. In 2006, there was an increase in the



St. Thomas Cruise Ship Port

hemisphere for US domestic offshore traffic. These facts represent a greater threat/venue for drug trafficking in the region. The largest drug smuggling threat from cruise ships visiting the USVI come from crew members, with Puerto Ricans being the most heavily involved. The Caribbean Express, which transports passengers and cargo from the Dominican Republic (DR) to PR, poses a greater drug movement threat to the region. In 2006, there was an increase in the

number of Puerto Rican drug traffickers coming to the USVI, particularly St. Thomas, to buy drugs to smuggle back to PR.

Distribution: Dominican and Puerto Ricans are the main distributors of powdered cocaine and crack cocaine in housing projects throughout PR. Heroin is distributed to the cells in the San Juan area primarily by Puerto Rican and Dominican criminal groups. Independent dealers are the primary wholesale and retail distributors of the marijuana in PR, which is typically sold in small plastic bags. In the USVI, local criminal groups and independent dealers distribute marijuana personally during transactions on the streets.

Money Laundering: Statistics indicated that the total value of money transfers through wire services increased 66% from \$126.8 million in 1996 to \$369.4 million in 2006 and gross sales of money orders increased 60% from \$419.1 million to \$1 billion during the same period. San Juan ranked tenth, nationally, amongst cities reporting high numbers of SARs. HIFCA reports that leaders of high profile money laundering organizations are usually located in Central or South American countries with cells and contacts operating in PR, the USVI and the DR.

Prevalent Drugs: Cocaine and crack cocaine are prevalent, as well as Heroin in PR and to a lesser extent on St. Croix. Marijuana is the most widely available and frequently abused illicit drug in the region. There has been some MDMA reported and abuse of prescription drugs. Hydroponics cultivation of marijuana has become popular among marijuana growers in St. Croix, USVI.

V. HIDTA Strategy Summary

The reader is referred to *The PR/USVI HIDTA 2006 Strategy* for details on the PR/USVI HIDTA initiatives. This summary is presented for your convenience.

The Strategy co-locates all law enforcement personnel which serve to foster the sharing of intelligence and investigational resources. This is orchestrated through directives from the twenty heads of federal and non-federal law enforcement agencies that serve on the EB. This collocation also serves to provide a united front in addressing illegal drug activities in a seamless marine and land based system encompassing two separate jurisdictions. The Strategy has determined the need for an increase in intelligence presence in the USVI and in CY2006 planning was initiated to establish an ISC satellite office at St. Thomas and it is expected to become a reality in late 2007. As a vital part of The 2008 Strategy, focus is placed on developing a stronger response to maritime interdiction through potentially merging a HIDTA, High Seas Narcotic Trafficking Investigative Initiative, and a non-HIDTA one, Caribbean Corridor, into a larger more unified approach to targeting maritime interdiction.

The law enforcement initiatives focus on DTO's, money laundering groups, violent drug offenders and firearms trafficking groups and the training of law enforcement personnel assigned to HIDTA initiatives to increase their effectiveness. All initiatives provide data and receive information from the ISC that develops and expands on trends that promote Goal 1's intent to disrupt and dismantle DTOs / MLOs, as well as event and case deconfliction, enhanced officer safety and minimizing duplication in case investigation and prosecution. The PR/USVI HIDTA has institutionalized the Performance Management Process (PMP) by exercising a great degree of oversight over the DTO/MLO reports and its

associated statistical data. With support from three Initiatives: the ISC and the Management and Coordination Support (MCS).

Investigative initiatives continue to make significant progress in identifying, investigating and dismantling or disrupting the area's most dangerous and prolific DTOs and MLOs, drug dealers, money launderers, drug related weapons traffickers and violent criminals. Through its performance measures and data tracking systems such as the automated DTO/MLO database, the PR/USVI HIDTA provides real-time tracking of all DTOs/MLOs identified and targeted region-wide by HIDTA task forces.

The PR/USVI HIDTA will fund 14 initiatives in CY 2008 distributed as follows:

- Two maritime Interdiction Initiatives
- One investigative & maritime interdiction initiative
- Eight investigative initiatives
- One intelligence initiative
- Two support initiatives (Management & Coordination and Training)

In 2008, it is projected that there will be 159 federal (148 full-time/ nine part-time) and a total of 829 full-time non-federal, plus eight part-time law enforcement officers and agents co-locating and collaborating in HIDTA Initiatives. A detailed listing can be found in Appendix C. They represent over 22 federal and non-federal law enforcement agencies in joint pursuit of disrupting and dismantling DTOs. This is an increase in personnel over the current operational level as evidenced by the CY2006 participants enumerated below.

VI. HIDTA Performance Measures

PR/USVI HIDTA as part of an effort to measure initiative's achievements working within and toward the established goals and objectives commenced using the Performance Management Process (PMP) measures which provide a new capability to quantify and track HIDTA targets and monitor HIDTA results. The use in this year and subsequent years of the PMP will ensure that measurable results can be easily identified in a uniform manner at a National level. Furthermore, they will establish a base year against which achievements in future years can be placed in context. The PR/USVI HIDTA continues to achieve ambitious and high performance results.

A. Performance Measures for PMP Goal 1:

Disrupt the market for illegal drugs by dismantling or disrupting drugs trafficking and /or MLOs.

Core TABLE 1

Table 1: Percentage of Expected DTOs and MLOs Disrupted or Dismantled by Scope for Year 2006, at Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands HIDTA [ALL DTOs; MLOs included]

Scope	#DTOs & MLOs Identified	# DTOs & MLOs to be Disrupted or Dismantled	# DTOs & MLOs Disrupted	% Disrupted	# DTOs & MLOs Dismantled	% Dismantled	Total Disrupted or Dismantled	Total % Disrupted or Dismantled
International	59	18	7	39%	4	22%	11	61%
Multi-state	17	5	1	20%	2	40%	3	60%
Local	76	18	8	44%	8	44%	16	89%
Total	152	41	16	39%	14	34%	30	73%

SOURCE: Performance Management Process Database CY 2006.

NOTE: DTO refers to drug trafficking and MLOs to money laundering organizations. International refers to DTOs activities conducted between individuals trafficking drugs from different countries. Multi-state organization refers to conspiracy schemes using interstate/US territories localities to trafficking illegal drugs. Local refers to DTOs conspiracies within the same state or US territory.

REMARKS: This table presents a total investigation load of 152 cases. PR/USVI HIDTA initiatives carried 93 DTOs/MLOs investigations from 2005. During 2006, the initiatives identified 59 additional DTOs/MLOs. By the end of calendar year 2006, the PR/USVI HIDTA disrupted 16 and dismantled 14 for a total of 30 DTOs/MLOs out of the 41 targeted to be disrupted or dismantled. In short, out of the targeted in the reporting period, **73%** (30) were disrupted or dismantled, a notable achievement.

Core TABLE 2

Table 2: Percentage of Under Investigation DTOs and MLOs Disrupted or Dismantled by Scope for Year 2006, at Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands HIDTA [ALL DTOs; MLOs included]

Scope	#DTOs & MLOs Identified	# DTOs & MLOs Under Investigation	# DTOs & MLOs Disrupted	% Disrupted	# DTOs & MLOs Dismantled	% Dismantled	Total Disrupted or Dismantled	Total % Disrupted or Dismantled
International	59	57	7	12%	4	7%	11	19%
Multi-state	17	16	1	6%	2	12%	3	19%
Local	76	76	8	11%	8	11%	16	21%
Total	152	149	16	11%	14	9%	30	20%

SOURCE: Performance Management Process Database CY 2006.

REMARKS: This table represents the complete inventory of the DTOs/MLOs disrupted or dismantled by their operational scope from all of the organizations under investigation. In 2006, both the local as well as the international arenas were substantially impacted by disruptions and dismantling, which given the nature of their organizations was of benefit

not just to the region alone, but the entire Nation. Major improvement was noted in the area of targeted local DTOs/MLOS where a 20% success rate was attained.

Of the 152 DTOs/MLOs identified, 59 operated internationally. Initiatives targeted 18 of these major DTOs/MLOs organizations, disrupting 7 and dismantling 4. Of the 5 targeted Multi-State DTOs/MLOs, 1 was disrupted and 2 were dismantled. Out of the 18 targeted local DTOs/MLOs, 8 were dismantled and 8 were disrupted. These results reflect the commitment of the PR/ USVI HIDTA to dismantle or disrupt 73% of the targeted DTOs/MLOs or 20% of the total DTOs/MLOs under investigation within the area of operations.

Core TABLE 3

Table 3: Percentage of Money Laundering Organizations Disrupted or Dismantled by Scope for Year 2006, at Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands HIDTA									
Scope	# MLOs Identified	# MLOs to be Disrupted or Dismantled	# MLOs Disrupted	% Disrupted	# MLOs Dismantled	% Dismantled	Total Disrupted or Dismantled	Total % Disrupted or Dismantled	
International	3	2	1	50%	0	0%	1	50%	
Multi-state	0	0	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	
Local	2	3	1	33%	0	0%	1	33%	
Total	5	5	2	40%	0	0%	2	40%	

SOURCE: HIDTA Performance Management Process Database CY 2006.

REMARKS: This table represents the complete inventory of the 5 MLOs targeted for disruption or dismantling in PR/USVI HIDTA as classified by their operational scope. An excellent disruption and/or dismantling success rate of 40% is noted. In 2006, the international and local categories received the major impact resulting from investigations producing 2 organizations disrupted/dismantled during the year. These organizations will no longer constitute part of the underground banking system or be used to launder drug trafficking proceeds.

Core TABLE 4

Table 4: CPOT, RPOT, and OCDETF Cases (by Operational Scope) Initiated in 2006, at Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands HIDTA			
Scope	# CPOT Cases	# RPOT Cases	# OCDETF Cases
International	1	2	9
Multi-state	0	0	2
Local	0	0	3
Total	1	2	14

SOURCE: HIDTA Performance Management Process Database CY 2006.

Core TABLE 4A**Table 4a: All Active CPOT, RPOT, and OCDETF Cases (by Operational Scope) in 2006, at Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands HIDTA**

Scope	# CPOT Cases	# RPOT Cases	# OCDETF Cases
International	1	7	29
Multi-state	0	1	5
Local	0	1	8
Total	1	9	42

REMARKS: Table 4 and 4A represents the complete inventory of the cases initiated/handled in 2006 that became very important for law enforcement and prosecution. Thus, it is a remarkable achievement that of the 149 opened HIDTA investigations the task forces converted 14 into OCDETF investigation cases, 9 into RPOT cases and 1 into a CPOT case. A total of 42 HIDTA initiated investigations are currently open as OCDETF cases; 9 as RPOTs and 1 as CPOT in accordance with the PMP database.

Tables 1-4 clearly reflect the nature of the PR/USVI HIDTA's enforcement efforts and demonstrate its efficiency and effectiveness in achieving its targeted outcomes. In nearly every instance, the PR/USVI HIDTA achieved or exceeded its targets in excellent levels of performance.

Core TABLE 5**Table 5: Drugs Removed from the Marketplace for Year 2006, at Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands HIDTA**

Drugs Seized (kg or D.U.)	Amount Seized (kg or D.U.)	Wholesale Value
Heroin kg	142.416	\$9,982,580
Cocaine HCL kg	3,757.084	\$63,870,428
Crack cocaine kg	108.185	\$2,271,885
Marijuana kg	143.551	\$631,624
Marijuana plants and grows	0	\$0
Methamphetamine kg	0	\$0
Methamphetamine ice kg	0	\$0
Ecstasy(MDMA)(D.U.s)	0	\$0
Other	0	\$0
Total Wholesale Value		\$76,756,517

SOURCES: Performance Management Process (PMP) Database CY2006;
"Special Issue: National Illicit Drug Prices, February 2007 - National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), Product No. 2007-L0424-002.

REMARKS: Table 5 lists the drugs seized during this reporting period as presented by Task Force Supervisors to the Executive Board and End of the Year Report. Cocaine, crack cocaine, heroin, and marijuana are the main drugs trafficked in the region. There have been some seizures of MDMA by HIDTA task forces although PR and USVI area is not known as major MDMA transshipment location."

The total value of the seized drugs exceeded \$76.7 million at wholesale prices. The seizure of large amounts of drugs, along with its proceeds, serves to substantially cripple DTO/MLO operations. During CY 2006, the PR/USVI HIDTA through such drug seizures had a significant impact on the region's drug trade. Table 5 lists the respective drugs seized, thus giving an accurate view of the economic impact of removing these drugs from the marketplace. The data demonstrates achievement of goals in terms of real dollar outcomes. Despite these achievements and the dollars they reflect, the most critical success can never be measured, that of reducing the availability of drugs in the region's communities and thereby contributing to a better quality of life and the reduction of crime rates within impacted communities.

Core TABLE 6

Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands HIDTA Table 6: Return on Investment (ROI) for Drugs Removed from the Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives by Year					
Year	Budget	Baseline Drug Wholesale Value	Expected Drug ROI	Drug Wholesale Value Removed From Market	Actual Drug ROI
2004	\$6,566,297	\$120,000,000	\$18.00	\$284,487,240	\$43.32
2005	\$7,238,972	\$120,000,000	\$23.00	\$210,755,197	\$29.11
2006	\$6,624,215	\$120,000,000	\$22.00	\$76,756,517	\$11.58

SOURCE: Performance Management Process Database CY2006. "Special Issue: National Illicit Drug Prices, February 2007 - National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), Product No. 2007-L0424-002.

REMARKS: The drug wholesale baseline was established at \$120 million or an expected return on the investment (ROI) of \$22. For 2006, the drugs seized were valued at the wholesale level of \$76.7 millions, or a ROI of \$11.6 for every dollar invested in the investigative and interdiction efforts. This achievement is considered notable despite the restrictions imposed by a constrained budget. As to the future of the HIDTA Program, the morale was always high, and TFOs put forth their best effort to accomplish the mission. It should be noted that seizures were significantly less than in 2005 mainly due to a change in trend and patterns and reduced intelligence support to the marine interdiction resources to cover the requirements in the Threat Assessment.

Core TABLE 7

Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands HIDTA Table 7: Return on Investment (ROI) for Assets Removed from the Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives by Year							
Year	Budget	Baseline Value of Drug Assets	Expected Asset ROI	Value of Drug Assets Removed from Market			Actual Asset ROI
				Cash	Other Assets	Total	
2004	\$6,566,297	\$12,766,667	\$2.00	\$0	\$31,405,505	\$31,405,505	\$4.78
2005	\$7,238,972	\$12,766,667	\$3.00	\$6,642,091	\$606,128	\$7,248,219	\$1.00
2006	\$6,624,215	\$12,766,667	\$4.00	\$2,118,718	\$1,840,411	\$3,959,129	\$0.59

SOURCE: Performance Management Process (PMP) Database CY2006.

REMARKS: The seizure of close to \$4 million in drug assets during CY2006 significantly reduced the availability of resources at the disposal of DTOs and MLOs. These seized investments in real property, including luxury homes, vehicles and boats, businesses, not only served to hurt DTOs/MLOs king-pin players, but also is a clear message to others on the consequences of criminal lifestyles. This is an ROI of \$0.59 for every \$1.00 of funding invested. Law enforcement agencies provided additional dollars that cover officers' salaries, administrative overhead and related expenses that are not included in Table Seven.

Core TABLE 8

Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands HIDTA Table 8: Total Return on Investment (ROI) for Drugs and Assets Removed from the Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives by Year					
Year	Budget	Drugs and Assets Baseline	Expected Total ROI	Drugs and Assets Removed from Market	Actual Total ROI
2004	\$6,566,297	\$132,766,667	\$20.00	\$315,892,745	\$48.10
2005	\$7,238,972	\$132,766,667	\$26.00	\$218,003,416	\$30.11
2006	\$6,624,215	\$132,766,667	\$26.00	\$80,715,647	\$12.18

SOURCE: PMP Database & Matrix. "Special Issue: National Illicit Drug Prices, February 2007 - National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), Product No. 2007-L0424-002.

***NOTE:** Law Enforcement includes prosecution, intelligence, and enforcement initiatives. The budget column should be the same in tables 6-8.

REMARKS: Major disruptions occur in DTO operations when large amounts of drugs are seized by law enforcement. The larger the seizure of drugs, the bigger the impact achieved over the potential profits of the DTOs. A review of tables 6, 7 and 8 demonstrate the efficiency in the PR/USVI HIDTA in achieving its goal of diminishing illegal drugs, profits and assets on DTOs hands. Tables 6 - 7 show the results achieved, through an investment of 6.6 million which resulted in the permanent removal of \$76.7 million in illicit drugs and \$3.96

million in drug profits from the marketplace. This is a remarkable figure and reflects very good rate of ROI as evidenced by the \$12 derived from each HIDTA dollar expended in law enforcement investigative, interdiction and intelligence initiatives. This ROI compares favorably to a profitable private sector business.

Core TABLE 9

Prosecution Outputs and Outcomes by Year at Puerto Rico (US Virgin Islands) HIDTA					
Year	Investigations Baseline	Investigations Projected	Investigations Handled	% Handled	
2004	0	0	0	0%	
2005	0	16	50	312%	

SOURCE: HIDTA Budget, Performance Management Process Database & Matrix CY 2006.

REMARKS: This table was not completed for CY 2004 as there was no such initiative in the PR/USVI HIDTA. However, prosecution support of cases should be mentioned. In PR and the USVI, the USAO regularly attends the monthly task force commanders meetings and provides support and guidance to expedite investigative and interdiction efforts with case development, evidence collection and organization, pre-trial preparation, asset seizures and case presentation.

Core TABLE 10

REMARKS: This table was not completed as clandestine laboratories are not known to operate in the PR/USVI HIDTA region.

B. Performance Measures for PMP Goal 2

Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of HIDTA initiatives

Core TABLE 11

Table 11: HIDTA Training Efficiency by Type of Training for Year 2006, at All HIDTAs												
Type of Training	# Students Expected for Training		# Students Actually Trained		# Training Hours Actually Provided		Total Training Cost		Training Cost Per Hour			% Change 2004-2006
	2004	2006	2004	2006	2004	2006	2004	2006	2004	2006		
Analytical/Computer	120	120	120	8	111	32	\$18,350	\$0	\$165.32	\$0.00		-100%
Investigative/Interdiction	870	870	870	593	752	23,235	\$323,934	\$54,731	\$430.76	\$2.36		-99%
Management/Administrative	30	20	20	467	41	4,083	\$1,845	\$2,000	\$45.00	\$0.49		-99%
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	\$0	\$0	0	0		0%
Total	1,020	1,010	1,010	1,068	904	27,350	\$344,129	\$56,731	\$380.67	\$2.07		-99%

SOURCE: HIDTA On-Line Training Tracking System (HOTT), HIDTA

Performance Management Process Database CY 2006.

REMARKS: Training is pivotal to improving the efficiency and the effectiveness of law enforcement personnel and their operations. In 2006, training was provided to 1,068 students for a total of 27,350 classroom-student hours. This training was provided almost free of charge to assigned personnel and participating agency staff. These training courses would not have been provided / available without PR/USVI HIDTA support and funding and without participating agencies support. With a cost of \$2.07 per training hour our training strategy is a success.

During CY 2006, the Training Initiative was operated by one part-time coordinator. Training funds for travel were allocated to the operational task forces at a modest rate. This occurred primarily due to the development of a more cost-effective approach to training that would focus on securing/coordinating free or reduced costs trainings. The goal was to focus training strictly on Task Force Officers (TFOs) assigned to HIDTA Initiatives and thus reduce the reliance on limited HIDTA funds and free them for use in vital operational areas.

Core TABLE 12

Table 12: Percentage of Event and Case Deconflicts Submitted for Year at Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands HIDTA

Year	Baseline # Deconflicts Submitted	# Deconfliction Submissions Expected	# Event Deconflicts Submitted	# Case/Subject Deconflicts Submitted	Total Deconflicts Submitted	% Deconflicts Submitted
2004	5118	4,050	1,007	4,111	5,118	126%
2005	5118	5,255	588	4,300	4,888	93%
2006	5118	5,427	525	3,600	4,125	76%
2007	5118	666	0	0	0	0%

SOURCE: HIDTA Performance Management Process database for CY 2006.

REMARKS: A major law enforcement concern has been the paramount need to devise ways in which officer safety will not be placed in jeopardy. A critical aspect is the need for an effective deconfliction center that can ensure that law enforcement agents are not simultaneously conducting conflicting operations in the same place and time because of lack of communications, this causing injuries or death from "friendly fire." Therefore, one of the core reasons for each HIDTA to have an ISC is to have a site that can serve as a coordinating body to prevent the potential conflicts/encounters that may result in injury or death to law enforcement personnel.

Of the 11 initiatives eligible to use the deconfliction services, 100% took advantage of this valuable tool. This service promotes officer safety, helps to coordinate the investigative aspect of their work and serves to ensure resources conservation.

Core TABLE 13**Table 13: Percentage of Cases Provided Analytical Support for Year at Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands HIDTA**

Year	Baseline # Cases Receiving Analytical Support	# Cases Expected for Analytical Support	# Cases Provided Analytical Support	% Expected Cases Supported
2004	105	133	133	100%
2005	105	96	105	109%
2006	105	107	69	64%
2007	105	94	0	0%

SOURCE: HIDTA Performance Management Process database for CY 2006.

REMARKS: Law enforcement initiatives, while aggressively pursuing incarceration of the DTO leaders and dismantlement their operations, require support from those trained in intelligence analysis. In an environment where every dollar counts, intelligence driven investigations is of paramount importance and the desired mode of operation. The goal is to have every investigation supported by the ISC with analytical processes to maximize the success of each investigation. ISC support is rendered based on initiative requests. Table 13 depicts that 69 analytical support requests were handled by the ISC in support of 107 investigations targeted or 64% of the requested investigation support.

Core TABLE 14**Table 14: Percentage of HIDTA Initiative Cases Referred to Other HIDTAs and Other Agencies for Year at Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands HIDTA**

Year	Total HIDTA Initiative Cases	# Initiative Cases Expected for Referral	# HIDTA Initiative Cases Referred to Other HIDTAs	# HIDTA Initiative Cases Referred to Other Agencies	Total Initiative Cases Referred	% Expected Initiative Cases Referred
2004	133	16	17	0	17	106%
2005	55	20	3	0	3	15%
2006	29	48	2	3	5	10%
2007	3	3	0	0	0	0%

SOURCE: HIDTA Performance Management Process database for CY 2006.

REMARKS: Law enforcement initiatives, while aggressively pursuing incarceration of the DTO leaders and dismantlement their operations, require support from those trained in intelligence analysis. In an environment where every dollar counts, intelligence driven investigations is of paramount importance and the desired mode of operation. The goal is to have every investigation supported by the ISC with analytical processes to maximize the

success of each investigation. ISC support is rendered based on initiative requests.

Table 14 depicts those initiative cases referred to other HIDTAs or agencies. Ten percent (5) from 48 initiative cases were referred out of the HIDTA for further action.

TABLE 15 – Threat Specific

HIDTA Fugitives Targeted and Apprehended by Year at Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands HIDTA						
Year	# Identified	# To Be Apprehended	% To Be Apprehended of Identified	# Apprehended	# Related To Drug Charges	Apprehended % of To Be Apprehended
2004	320	320	100%	309	0	96%
2005	893	640	71%	471	218	73%
2006	755	300	39%	560	224	186%
2007	893	400	44%	0	0	0%

SOURCE: Performance Management Process database for CY 2006.

REMARKS: Table 15 highlights a 186% success rate of the apprehension of fugitives that have a drug felony / HIDTA nexus. Communities within PR and USVI are made safer by their apprehension of targeted fugitives.

VII. Other Achievements

In 2006, PR/USVI HIDTA initiated a thorough transformation process to address the latest threat challenges, budgetary constraints and the technology developments now available to the law enforcement community. This transformation will continue in the revamping of the HIDTA structure and its way of doing business in the region. This HIDTA is in a unique location and situation representing the third frontier of the U.S. main effort against the drug trafficking establishment and as such, the initiatives have been refocused. An overall revamping of the ISC and the HIDTA Initiative structures is been initiated be the Executive Board to increase dynamism and strategic reach. Additionally, three Initiatives have finished their relocation process in improved sites: Money Laundering, Ponce Major Organization Investigations and Fajardo Major Organization Investigations. During 2006, HIDTA operations greatly contributed to the overall regional reduction of 762 crimes against people and 2,527 crimes against property as compared to CY2005.

PR/USVI CRIME STATISTICS

SOURCE: PRPD and VIPD	2006	2005	CHANGE	%	CRIMES/ 100,000
TOTAL OFFENSES HIDTA	66,510	69,799	-3,289	-5%	1,622
VIOLENT CRIMES	10,045	10,807	-762	-7%	245
MURDERS & HOMICIDES	775	815	-40	-5%	19
RAPEs	178	252	-74	-29%	4
ROBBERIES	5,550	5,816	-266	-5%	135
AGGRAVATED ASSAULTS	3,542	3,924	-382	-10%	86
PROPERTY CRIMES	56,465	58,992	-2,527	-4%	1,377
BURGLARIES	18,449	19,104	-655	-3%	450
LARCENY - THEFT	29,007	30,136	-1,129	-4%	707
VEHICLE - THEFT	9,237	9,654	-417	-4%	225
ARSON - USVI ONLY	72	98	-26	-27%	2

VIII. Conclusions

The two jurisdictions of PR and the USVI, located at a mid-point juncture between the CONUS and the source countries can be summarized as follows:

- Continues to be attractive as a key avenue of approach for illicit drugs in transit to the CONUS market;
- Major drugs trafficked remain cocaine, crack cocaine, heroin, and on a lesser scale marijuana;
- There is a minimum trend to include some European MDMA;
- Marijuana, mainly from Jamaica, Mexico and Northern California, is the most widely abused drug among adolescents and young adults.

Cocaine traffickers are predominantly Colombian, Dominican and Puerto Rican. Dominican and Puerto Rican organizations are the primary wholesale and retail distributors of the drug. The region is heavily used for drug related money laundering, resulting in federal designation as a HIFCA.

The EB's strong leadership and commitment to success have played a decisive role in achieving performance measures during the reporting period. The EB's leadership strategy was to establish specific goals and objectives in support of the National Strategy and that guided and focused the investigative efforts of the Initiatives and enhanced their productivity.

The EB has focused on reduction of drug availability by eliminating / disrupting DTOs/MLOs through the use of intelligence driven investigations, reducing the harmful consequences of drug trafficking by addressing public corruption and violence in the community and, finally, improving efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement organizations and their efforts within HIDTA implementing a strong training program and dedicating resources to the curtailment of money laundering.

This is our second year of an effort to measure initiatives performance working within and toward the established goals and objectives, commenced using the PMP measures. The PR/USVI HIDTA is pleased to highlight its remarkable achievements in 2006 toward the reduction of DTOs and MLOs, particularly those that are international in nature. The PR/USVI HIDTA continues to annually achieve remarkable results and such are achieved not only in measurable form, but also in an efficient and effective manner.

The average cost per investigation with favorable results (dismantle/disrupt), including arrests, has been computed at \$221,000. An insignificant amount expended when measured against the well being of the communities served and the lives that were saved because of disrupting or dismantling these DTOs/MLOs. Of particular importance was the ROI of drugs and assets seized at \$12 for 2006, while the drugs seized were valued at the wholesale level at \$76.7 million, or an ROI of \$11.58 for every dollar invested. This high performance occurred despite the restrictions imposed by austere budgetary times.

To close, the successes of the PR/USVI HIDTA are measurable, tangible and exceeded expectations. Focus will continue to be on maritime interdiction based on hard intelligence, investigations of DTOs/MLOs, money laundering and the

use of intelligence driven investigations.


Our motto, "*COMMITTED TO EXCELLENCE*", is one that guides our efforts. We are proud of our achievements and since our inception have won four National ONDCP awards for outstanding performance, including the one for "Outstanding HIDTA of the Year". *This has occurred solely because of the tremendous successes we have experienced against drug traffickers that just would not have occurred if HIDTA did not exist.*

IX. Appendices

- A. Organizational Chart of the HIDTA.
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APPENDIX A**Participating Agencies (Personnel) and Organization CY 2006****PR/USVI HIDTA ORGANIZATION CY 2006****LEGEND:**

- MOI:** Major Organization Investigations
FURA: Fuerzas Unidas de Rapida Accion (PR Police Department Air and Marine Law Enforcement)

Enforcement/Investigative
Enforcement/Interdiction
Support and Management
Intelligence

Chair
ROSA EMILIA RODRIGUEZ, ESQ.
United States Attorney
District of Puerto Rico

Vice Chair
RAMON ORTEGA, CPA
Deputy Superintendent
Puerto Rico Police Department

MEMBERS

Non-Federal

COL BENJAMIN GUZMAN
The Adjutant General (*Interim*)
PR National Guard

KERRY DRUE, ESQ.
Attorney General
VI Department of Justice

ELTON LEWIS
Police Commissioner
VI Police Department

JUAN C. MENDEZ, CPA
Secretary
PR Department of Treasury (Hacienda)

MIGUEL PEREIRA, ESQ.
Secretary
PR Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation

BG EDDY L. CHARLES
The Adjutant General
Virgin Islands National Guard

LT. EDWIN ROSADO
Commissioner
Bayamon Municipal Police

ROBERTO SANCHEZ-RAMOS, ESQ.
Secretary of Justice
PR Department of Justice

JOSE LOZADA MEDINA, ESQ.
Director
Special Investigations Bureau

Federal

ANTHONY JENKINS, ESQ.
United States Attorney
District of the Virgin Islands

MANUEL OYOLA
Special Agent in Charge
Immigration and Customs Enforcement

JEROME HARRIS
Special Agent in Charge
Drug Enforcement Administration
Caribbean Division

BRIAN WIMPLING
Special Agent in Charge
Internal Revenue Service

MARCIAL O. FELIX
Resident Agent in Charge
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

CAPTAIN JAMES E. TUNSTALL
Commander
U.S.C.G. Sector San Juan

MARCELINO BORGES
Director, Field Operations
Customs & Border Protection

HERMAN J. WIRSHING
United States Marshal
U. S. Marshals Service

LUIS FRATICELLI
Special Agent in Charge
Federal Bureau of Investigations

APPENDIX C**Participating Agencies (Personnel) and Organization CY 2006**

Federal	Full-time	Part-time	Total
• Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms	10		10
• Federal Bureau of Investigation	24	1	25
• Drug Enforcement Administration	39	6	45
• Immigration & Customs Enforcement	26	2	28
• U. S. Postal Inspection Services	1	1	2
• U.S. Marshal Service	10		10
• U.S. Coast Guard	24		24
• U.S. Coast Guard Investigation Services	10		10
• Bureau of Prisons	1		1
• Internal Revenue Service/CID	7		7
Non-Federal	Full-time	Part-time	Total
• PR Police Department	82		82
• FURA (Unified Forces for Rapid Action - PRPD) ²	672		672
• USVI Police Department	14		14
• PR National Guard	14		14
• Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation - PR	4		4
• U.S. Virgin Islands National Guard	4		4
• Department of Hacienda (IRS-PR)	6		6
• Special Investigation Bureau (NIE)	25		25
• Municipal Police & Contractors	25		25
	998	10	1,008

LEGEND:

MOI: Major Organization Investigations **FURA:** Fuerzas Unidas de Rapida Accion (PR Police Department Air and Marine Law Enforcement)

² P.R. Air and Marine Unit

APPENDIX D

STRUCTURE: This structure was implemented during CY 2005 and kept during 2006. EB funded a number of Task Forces to synchronize operations in accordance with the developed goals and objectives with 14 initiatives as indicated below:

Initiative	Type	Lead Agency	Mission
Investigative Support Center	Intelligence	FBI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Investigative and strategic drug intelligence • Enables a more effective and efficient utilization of drug investigative resources • Develops strategic intelligence • Ensures subject and case deconfliction
Air and Marine Interdiction Program (FURA)	Enforcement/Interdiction	PRPD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ground, air and marine drug law enforcement interdiction up to 12 miles deep within the coastline of PR.
Blue Lightning Strike Force	Enforcement/Interdiction	VIPD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ground and marine drug law enforcement interdiction up to three miles deep within the coastline of USVI.
High Seas Narcotics Trafficking Operations	Enforcement/Interdiction	USCG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Targets drug and migrant trafficking organizations through 24 hour interdictions at sea. • Disrupts transit and arrival zones outside territorial waters specifically in the PR/USVI area of responsibility • Assists other agencies in the regional marine intelligence trafficking, interdicting illegal drugs smuggling organizations.
Fajardo Major Organization Investigations	Enforcement/Investigative	DEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducts long range complex investigations • Dismantles sophisticated DTOs operating in the East coast of PR to include offshore municipalities of Vieques and Culebra islands
Money Laundering Initiative	Enforcement/Investigative	ICE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducts regional complex investigations and interdiction of sophisticated drug MLOs to prevent the exporting of illegally obtained proceeds to international bank accounts
Ponce Major Organization Investigations	Enforcement/Investigative	DEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducts long range complex investigations • Dismantles sophisticated DTOs operating in the southwest region of PR.
Safe Neighborhoods	Enforcement/Investigative	ATF & NIE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identifies, targets, investigates and prosecutes DTOs operating in PR and the USVI. • Targets violent narco-trafficking organizations responsible for drug related violent crime in PR and the USVI.
San Juan Major Organization Investigations	Enforcement/Investigative	DEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducts long range complex investigations • Dismantle sophisticated DTOs operating in the northwestern region of PR.
PR Fugitives Task Force	Enforcement/Investigative	USMS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disrupts narcotics smuggling, distribution, money laundering and street gang drug related activities throughout PR, by identifying, locating and apprehending HIDTA related fugitives within PR and CONUS.
St. Croix Major Organization Investigation	Enforcement/Investigative	DEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducts long range complex investigations • Dismantles sophisticated DTOs operating in St. Croix, USVI.
St. Thomas Major Organization Investigations	Enforcement/Investigative	DEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducts long range complex investigations • Dismantles sophisticated DTOs operating in St. Thomas, USVI.



STRUCTURE: This structure was implemented during CY 2005 and kept during 2006. EB funded a number of Task Forces to synchronize operations in accordance with the developed goals and objectives with 14 initiatives as indicated below:

Initiative	Type	Lead Agency	Mission
HIDTA Training Initiative	Training Support	PRPD & HIDTA Mgt.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhances the quality of drug related investigations • Improves the performance and effectiveness of law enforcement agencies • Increases the safety of law enforcement officers in PR and USVI.
Management and Coordination Support	Management/Coordination	HIDTA Mgt.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Management and organizational guidance • Finance, logistics, operations and administrative support • Coordinating of translation services and training to all initiatives in PR and USVI. Islands.