

Central Valley, California High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area

Fresno, Kern, Kings, Madera, Merced, Sacramento, San Joaquin, Stanislaus & Tulare Counties

Annual Report 2006



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2006 ANNUAL REPORT

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Central Valley California HIDTA (CVC HIDTA) region has 4.5 million residents. It is one of the nation's leading food producing regions. It is also a National Distribution Hub for illegal drugs supplying many of the drug markets in the United States. Law enforcement agencies have battled the influences and activities of drug cartels for decades yet this region retains its ignominious "leadership" as a drug producing region for both methamphetamine and massive amounts of marijuana. The immense profits reaped from illegal drug production in the CVC HIDTA region are estimated to be in the billions of dollars. Much of the drug proceeds are believed to be returned to Mexico to further enrich the drug barons who exercise command and control over California's drug trafficking organizations (DTO's).

The typical DTO in the CVC region is one that capitalizes on the relative close proximity to the Mexico-U.S. border and the ability to move drugs and illegal aliens across it with relative ease. In March 2005, the undocumented population of Mexican Aliens reportedly reached nearly 6 million with 24% of them living in the State of California.¹ The typical Mexican DTO is poly drug in nature and seizes the opportunity to manufacture methamphetamine in pastoral, rural farmlands and orchards. Its members are able to import, purchase and distribute heroin, cocaine, marijuana, chemicals and precursors from the many "underworld" contacts that exist in this region and in the neighboring drug distribution centers of Los Angeles, San Francisco and San Jose, California.

The Central Valley HIDTA region has been called the "Meth Capitol" of the United States for several years but the overall number of methamphetamine laboratories maintained its steady decline throughout 2006. Methamphetamine producing DTO's continued to operate superlabs in remote areas of the region producing more than 10 pounds of the drug in a single production cycle. There are limited instances of smuggled Pseudoephedrine and Ephedrine Hydrochloride occurring in the HIDTA region. These products are produced in Asia and go through importers in Canada and Mexico. The majority of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine come from domestic sources and were purchased as over-the-counter products or illegally sold from businesses. Laboratory dumpsites disclose most pseudoephedrine comes from the blister pack medications.

The leading explanation for the decline in methamphetamine laboratories has been that law enforcement and new regulatory laws in California have finally had an impact on the manufacturers. The coordination of efforts from the California Precursor Committee, the National Methamphetamine Chemicals Initiative, the California Multi-Jurisdictional Methamphetamine Enforcement Team (Cal-MMET) program and the HIDTAs has been successful. Many clandestine laboratories are believed have been displaced to other states and south into Mexico.

Federal border enforcement agencies continued to seize methamphetamine at the California-Mexico Ports of Entry. There is reason to believe that a significant methamphetamine manufacturing potential remains in the Central Valley HIDTA region to meet a portion of the regional demand for the drug. Reliable informants in the methamphetamine production “business” have offered intelligence information to members of the CVC HIDTA’s Fresno Methamphetamine Task Force that the “crooks” have gotten smarter. They are still producing nearly as much methamphetamine in the Central Valley HIDTA region.

Methamphetamine producers avoid discovery by going into the extremely rural agricultural areas, renting entire farms, operating the superlabs and burying the toxic waste on the property. Dumpsite discovery is therefore avoided, thereby leaving no telltale signs that a methamphetamine laboratory was been operating in the region. The toxic chemical dumpsites often prove this assertion. For example, in 2006 the Stanislaus, San Joaquin Methamphetamine Task Force investigated a report of chemicals dumped in unused well shafts on an extremely remote ranch. Access to the ranch property was down a long dusty road and approach was impossible without being seen by people on the property. Entrance to the fenced property was prohibited by a gate. The officers found that three old well shafts were full of solvent and other chemical containers indicating that a superlab producing over 10 pounds of methamphetamine in a single process may have been operating in that location for several years. In 2006, the HIDTA Stanislaus County task force reported nearly 80 dumpsites.

A newly developed methamphetamine production method lessens the time required to obtain the product and therefore lessen their opportunity for discovery by law enforcement. For example, the utilization of Hypophosphorous acid and alternate chemicals as well as newly developed “flameless” production methods have reduced the production time to 2 hours from the six to twelve hours previously required and simplified the methamphetamine production process. As these methods evolve within the criminal subculture, new methods to escape police detection also develop making the drug enforcement officer’s job more demanding.

More marijuana plants were harvested in California last year then in any previous year. No drug enforcement program is more arduous than the harvesting of outdoor grown marijuana from mountainous garden plots and huge marijuana plantations. The Sierra Mountain range borders the eastern side of the Central or San Joaquin Valley of California. This area has become the nation’s leading production center for outdoor grown marijuana. Mexican DTO’s dominate the region’s marijuana growing and have developed complex corporate approaches to their criminal endeavors.

Drug trafficking organizations are sophisticated and well organized. They have investors, comprehensive logistical support teams and a small “army” of temporary workers who hoe and cultivate the plantations located in remote, high altitude regions. DTO operational areas often span great distances and occasionally extend into adjoining states. Investigations have shown that DTO members drive from Central Valley locations to other California counties outside of the HIDTA area. Their vehicles have appeared at DTO member locations in other States as well. DTO’s react to law enforcement actions. They’ve changed operational practices as a result of

law enforcement pressures from HIDTA initiatives and programs. Their expansion to other locations for instance, has been confirmed through surveillances as our investigators have found related marijuana growing and methamphetamine activities in Shasta County, Tuolumne County and others in the State. Shasta County law enforcement harvested 237,000 marijuana plants in 2006, an all-time record harvest. Tuolumne County is considered a critical area for marijuana cultivation and methamphetamine production expansion due to Yosemite National Park being located within the County. The National Park is an essential component of an on-going public lands initiative led by the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of California. Analysis of available intelligence information by the Marijuana Fusion Center staff predicts a shift in marijuana cultivation patterns to the east and north of current growing areas.

Some in-state DTO's diversify their operations and sell large quantities of other drugs as well as manufacture methamphetamine. Most marijuana plantations on either public or private land are tended throughout the April-October growing season by armed guards and plot-tenders. Often these marijuana gardeners are illegal aliens who have been instructed to use violence to protect the valuable crops which have had as many as 80,000 plants in a single locale. Hikers, campers, hunters and others who enjoy the pristine wilderness areas of the National Parks and U.S. Forest Service lands are put at great risk.

In many counties, law enforcement resources are scarce and the high costs of law enforcement are a continuing issue in each jurisdiction. Although the CVC HIDTA region is predominately rural and agricultural, the mid-sized cities and smaller towns have all the social problems of larger metropolitan areas. There are a high percentage of Latinos and minorities in the region providing the environment for the infiltration of Mexican dominated drug trafficking organizations. Violent gang activities have surfaced within the region and have often pitted one gang against the other in an explosion of gunfire and 2006 recorded a high level of gang violence. Outside the cities, ranchers, farmers, mountain hikers and urban dwellers are fearful of the violence that has developed as an adjunct to the drug trade.

This nation's drug abuse continues at very high levels and the Central Valley of California is a mirror-image of the rest of the nation. Drug treatment admissions from methamphetamine abuse in the nine CVC HIDTA have risen each year for the past five years.ⁱⁱ According to the National Institute of Drug Abuse, methamphetamine abuse "...several CEWG (Community Epidemiology Working Groups) areas report new populations of methamphetamine users, including Hispanics and young people..."

II. INTRODUCTION

The CVC HIDTA is pleased to summarize the exemplary work done by the men and women of the CVC HIDTA Initiatives during 2006. The reader will find that this Annual Report presents a summary of initiative activities during the last calendar year. The CVC HIDTA exists to implement the National Drug Control Strategy within this nine county region of Central California. It is structured similarly to many other HIDTAs and follows the policies and procedures proscribed in the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Program Policy and Budget Guidance and other applicable directives. The CVC HIDTA was designated in 1999 and has been funded for the past few years at \$2.5 million. The Office of National Drug Control Policy designated the Central Valley California region as a critical drug trafficking area adversely impacting the United States. This designation has withstood the test of time and remains one of the nation's most significant illegal drug producing regions.

The CVC HIDTA is one of 28 individual HIDTAs spread throughout the nation. It works cooperatively with all other HIDTAs. Because of the Central Valley's prominence as a drug producing region, numerous out-of-state HIDTA threat assessment documents refer to the CVC HIDTA region and California as the source of their drugs. The CVC HIDTA has fostered cooperative and effective working relationships with regional federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. Nearly 400 miles spans the northern and southern terminus of the CVC HIDTA area of responsibility. If Shasta County is certified as a HIDTA County during 2007, this area will expand significantly. The great distances are overcome through the close working relationships developed between the CVC HIDTA initiatives and regional law enforcement agencies. A detailed description of each initiative can be found in the CVC HIDTA 2006 Strategy.

CVC HIDTA law enforcement initiatives focus on investigating the most-significant DTOs operating in the region in a concentrated effort to lessen the drug supply. They particularly concentrate on those organizations involved with drug-related violent crime and presenting threats to their communities. HIDTA initiatives target DTOs that have the greatest adverse impact on the production and distribution of illicit substances in the region. There is a determined effort to counter drug production and distribution through the HIDTA's area of responsibility. New investigative methodologies and techniques developed by the initiatives exemplify their commitment to the law enforcement process and the rule of law. The cooperation between federal agencies having scarce personnel resources and state and local agencies facing the same personnel shortages is exemplary.

In 2006 the CVC HIDTA's Threat Assessment defined the nature of the drug problems facing the nine-county region. Most Executive Board members were acutely aware of the nature of the drug crimes in their jurisdictions prior to developing the CVC HIDTA's annual 2006 Strategy and crafting enforcement initiatives to meet those challenges. Quantifiable performance targets

were established as a means to document individual initiative performance and achievements towards attaining the Strategy objectives and CVC HIDTA mission.

The National Program Mission Statement provides the overarching guidance for each individual HIDTA program:

**National HIDTA Program
Mission Statement**

The mission of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program is to disrupt the market for illegal drugs in the United States by assisting federal, state, and local law enforcement entities participating in the HIDTA program to dismantle and disrupt drug trafficking organizations, with particular emphasis on drug trafficking regions that have harmful effects on other parts of the United States.

The CVC HIDTA Executive Director and Executive Board collaborated with participating law enforcement agencies and HIDTA staff to develop a Vision Statement for the future which clearly reflects what outcomes HIDTA initiatives seek to achieve.

**Central Valley California HIDTA
Vision Statement**

Our vision is to reduce drug availability in the region which will greatly improve the overall quality of life for the citizens of the Central Valley of California over the next five years. The vision will be achieved by commitment, professionalism and excellence in drug law enforcement. Through our adherence to the HIDTA program's mission, we will forge collaborative partnerships placing health, safety and welfare of the citizens first. Our efforts will sustain the beauty of this region and protect its rich environmental heritage for future generations to work and live.

CVC HIDTA success is measured in part by its ability to facilitate greater efficiency, effectiveness and cooperation among and between external participating agencies at the local, state and federal level. The collocation of participating law enforcement agencies facilitates and enhances resource sharing. This has become a key strategy to success for the HIDTA program. The increased information sharing and inter-agency cooperation fostered by the CVC HIDTA's design and strategy has forged the separate law initiatives into an effective and efficient counterdrug force. The CVC HIDTA Executive Director and Executive Board realizes that with clarity of mission and a dedication of combined resources, this region's law enforcement, intelligence and prosecution communities can make inroads into solving the immense public safety problems that confronts this region.

The CVC HIDTA mission statement succinctly states the program's intent and direction.

**Central Valley California HIDTA
Mission Statement:**

The mission of the Central Valley California HIDTA (CVC HIDTA) is to reduce the manufacture, trafficking, and distribution of all illicit narcotics and dangerous drugs by attacking and dismantling the large-scale and often violent organizations responsible through the implementation of cooperative and innovative strategies. The goals of the CVC HIDTA are to: reduce drug availability by disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations; to reduce the harmful consequences of drug trafficking and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the region's law enforcement organizations.

Reporting Period: This Annual Report covers the reporting period January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2006.

Budget Allocation: During 2006, ONDCP allocated a \$2,500,000 base budget for CVC HIDTA operations. The majority of CVC HIDTA funds are applied to investigative and intelligence initiatives with only about 10% of the funds applied to Administrative overhead expenses. This approach maximizes the impact of the enforcement and supporting intelligence initiatives and places recognition of their importance towards attaining the National HIDTA Mission. As noted in this Annual Report, the CVC HIDTA has documented significant success towards achieving its mission, and yet each law enforcement officer knows that this is a long-term struggle against the criminal influences of the region and the individual miseries created by drug addiction.

Geographic Area of Responsibility:

- Central Valley California HIDTA Counties: Kern, Kings, Tulare, Merced, Madera, Fresno, San Joaquin, Stanislaus and Sacramento.
- The Cities of Sacramento and Bakersfield define the northern and southern boundaries.
- One hour drive east of San Francisco metropolitan area.
- Two hours drive northeast of Los Angeles.
- Six hours drive from the U.S.-Mexico Border.
- Region produces 1/4th of the nation's food products.

The Central Valley California HIDTA region; contains a unique blending of geography and cultures. It is nearly 400 miles in length and extends from the top



of the Sierra Mountains to the west and abuts the Coastal Counties. Agriculture and food production is the predominate industry. Orchards, farms and ranches dominate the landscape. The 2000 Census lists Fresno as the largest city with nearly ½ million residents and Sacramento, Modesto and Bakersfield follow.

III. National HIDTA Goals

HIDTAs have adopted two specific goals that define the challenge of mission attainment. These two goals guide all HIDTA initiatives and activities throughout the United States. The CVC HIDTA is proud to present these national HIDTA program goals, plus concise summaries of its Threat Assessment for Budget Year 2006 and resultant Strategy in the following sections. The CVC HIDTA has fashioned its strategy to meet local drug threats currently existing. The national goals are the local goals for the same objective is obtained.

<p style="text-align: center;">NATIONAL HIDTA GOALS</p> <p>Goal 1: Disrupt the market for illegal drugs by dismantling or disrupting drug trafficking and/or money laundering organizations; and</p> <p>Goal 2: Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of HIDTA initiatives.</p>

The above goals represent an aiming point for CVC HIDTA initiatives. They also provide the foundation upon which performance planning and outcome measurement are based. As the CVC HIDTA develops budget submissions, each CVC HIDTA initiative must present programmatic and fiscal justifications that are based on the regional Threat Assessment. They must articulate how the initiative’s funding request directly addresses the threat then set realistic performance measures. Each initiative must eventually provide specific information on how the funding has allowed the CVC HIDTA to meet its desired outcomes. CVC HIDTA initiatives are developed within clear national guidelines governing all HIDTA activities and expenditures.

The CVC HIDTA Executive Board is significantly involved in all aspects of the Central Valley California HIDTA, and reviews the Intelligence, Investigation, Interdiction, and initiative activities. The Board provides a forum to discuss and evaluate important trends in regional drug trafficking. It exchanges information on which drugs are being distributed throughout the region, and the DTOs that are responsible. The Board also addresses important administrative issues in its oversight capacity. The Board has established an Intelligence Subcommittee that supports CVC HIDTA initiatives and its participating agencies on a wide variety of intelligence issues. These include training, computer technology and other matters. CVC HIDTA success is measured by results, and each initiative is fully accountable for its success or failure in meeting its objectives.

IV. Summary of Threat Assessment for Budget Year 2006

Mexican led DTO's were the dominant force in the production of both marijuana and methamphetamine, the leading drugs of abuse for the region. The DTO's are responsible for the manufacture, importing and exporting of methamphetamine and the importation and distribution of other drug types including heroin, cocaine and marijuana.

Central Valley methamphetamine "superlabs" still are producing methamphetamine. A "superlab" is one that manufactures over 10 pounds of methamphetamine in one 24 hour production cycle. Central Valley HIDTA Counties recorded half (50%) or six of all twelve (12) superlabs reported in California during 2006. The HIDTA's nine counties accounted for nearly one half of the total superlabs (13) found in the nation last year.

Marijuana cultivation on public lands: Mexican DTO's are often polydrug operations thus maximizing year-round income. They have seemingly perfected the "art" of creating large-scale marijuana cultivation plots on public lands in the CV HIDTA region and throughout California. In 2006, violence in the marijuana growing forest regions continued as an ever-present threat for all who approach an operating grow site.

Harmful Consequences: Methamphetamine addiction is the greatest regional abuse issue. Marijuana use is widespread. Methamphetamine treatment program admissions are rising according to the latest available data. Heroin admissions are declining. Crack or rock cocaine remain in demand in all locations particularly in the larger cities where street level crack sales are often conducted by gang members. During 2006, HIDTA task force members reported rescuing 80 Drug Endangered Children from dangerous environments, nearly twice that of the preceding year.

V. HIDTA Strategy Summary

The 2006 Strategy was based on the identified drug threat. The HIDTA Executive Board's strategy relied on the existing law enforcement initiatives already in place. Intelligence led investigations are the keystone of HIDTA activities. Additional task forces or non-enforcement entities contribute service and knowledge that heightens the overall success of the CVC HIDTA program.

In the CVC HIDTA, collaborating with the California National Guard's demand reduction outreach program has proven to be very successful and a value-added activity. All initiatives are encouraged to have a public outreach and education component.

A regional intelligence center in Fresno serves area initiatives. Decentralized intelligence analysts are placed in each remote initiative for on-site tactical intelligence support.

The CVC HIDTA funded 8 core initiatives in CY 2006. Four (4) Supplemental Funded initiatives were also undertaken. One (1) unfunded National Guard led demand reduction initiative participated in the CVC HIDTA region.

VI. HIDTA Performance Measures

Performance measures introduce a new capability to quantify and track HIDTA targets and monitor HIDTA results. With application of the new PMP, the CVC HIDTA Annual Report now functions as a report card; a barometer of HIDTA efficiency and effectiveness; a source for comparison with previous year efforts; and most importantly, a beacon for future action. The following series of tables and charts present specific outputs and efficiency measures organized in CVC HIDTA Goal order. These measurable results reflect a continuing increase in efficiency and effectiveness at lower programmatic costs.

Goal 1: Disrupt the market for illegal drugs by dismantling or disrupting drug trafficking and/or money laundering organizations; and

Performance Measures for Goal 1

Table 1 – DTOs and MLOs Disrupted or Dismantled for 2006

Table 1: Percentage of Expected DTOs and MLOs Disrupted or Dismantled by Scope for Year 2006, at Central Valley California HIDTA [ALL DTOs; MLOs included]								
Scope	#DTOs & MLOs Identified	# DTOs & MLOs to be Disrupted or Dismantled	# DTOs & MLOs Disrupted	% Disrupted	# DTOs & MLOs Dismantled	% Dismantled	Total Disrupted or Dismantled	Total % Disrupted or Dismantled
International	19	6	5	83%	4	67%	9	150%
Multi-state	16	32	1	3%	6	19%	7	22%
Local	55	25	13	52%	19	76%	32	128%
Total	90	63	19	30%	29	46%	48	76%

CVC HIDTA CY2006 field operations began with several very significant DTO investigations carried over from the previous year. The size, sophistication and diversified nature of the DTO's operations required considerable manpower to be dedicated to surveillances and other investigative activities. Investigators traveled across the country pursuing investigative leads and collaborating with investigators in those jurisdictions. Although there may be fewer organizations reported as disrupted or dismantled, the statistics belies the scope and importance of those investigations.

Table 2 - Percentage of DTOs and MLOs Disrupted or Dismantled by Scope, 2006

Table 2: Percentage of Under Investigation DTOs and MLOs Disrupted or Dismantled by Scope for Year 2006, at Central Valley California HIDTA [ALL DTOs; MLOs included]								
Scope	#DTOs & MLOs Identified	# DTOs & MLOs Under Investigation	# DTOs & MLOs Disrupted	% Disrupted	# DTOs & MLOs Dismantled	% Dismantled	Total Disrupted or Dismantled	Total % Disrupted or Dismantled
International	19	15	5	33%	4	27%	9	60%
Multi-state	16	12	1	8%	6	50%	7	58%
Local	55	46	13	28%	19	41%	32	70%
Total	90	73	19	26%	29	40%	48	66%

CVC HIDTA Initiatives worked throughout 2006 on intelligence driven investigations of major trafficking organizations. The investigation of local organizations naturally dominates investigative efforts as the sources of information and technical capabilities allow the initiatives to proceed within their normal range of operations.

Table 3 - Percentage of Money Laundering Organizations Disrupted or Dismantled by Scope, 2006

Although several 2006 investigations had money laundering components, HIDTA initiatives did not report any organizations that engaged primarily in money laundering activities during the year.

Table 3: Percentage of Expected Money Laundering Organizations Disrupted or Dismantled by Scope for Year 2006, at Central Valley California HIDTA								
Scope	# MLOs Identified	# MLOs to be Disrupted or Dismantled	# MLOs Disrupted	% Disrupted	# MLOs Dismantled	% Dismantled	Total Disrupted or Dismantled	Total % Disrupted or Dismantled
International	0	0	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Multi-state	0	0	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Local	0	0	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Total	0	0	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%

Table 4 - Operational Scope of All DTO Cases Initiated for 2006

Table 4: CPOT, RPOT, and OCDEF Cases (by Operational Scope) Initiated in 2006, at Central Valley California HIDTA			
Scope	# CPOT Cases	# RPOT Cases	# OCDEF Cases
International	0	0	4
Multi-state	0	1	4
Local	0	0	5
Total	0	1	13

Drug trafficking organizations in the Central Valley HIDTA region are no different than the organized crime organizations historically identified as the “Mafia.” Although most are of a different ethnicity, they are as well organized, as ruthless, as well financed and managed as the Italian Mafia organizations of previous decades. The CVC HIDTA region DTO’s are comprised mostly of Mexican individuals. Many associated with marijuana production come from the State of Michoacán in Mexico. They are very tight knit and difficult to penetrate by undercover operatives. The fear of assault or death from DTO members minimizes the number of confidential informants that are recruited into the highest level of international DTO’s.

Table 4a – All Active CPOT, RPOT, and OCDEF Cases (by Operational Scope) for 2006

Table 4a: All Active CPOT, RPOT, and OCDEF Cases (by Operational Scope) in 2006, at Central Valley California HIDTA			
Scope	# CPOT Cases	# RPOT Cases	# OCDEF Cases
International	0	0	5
Multi-state	0	2	5
Local	0	0	7
Total	0	2	17

We have noted that the DTO's are efficient at the production of their illegal drugs. The U.S.-Mexico border does not appear to be a serious impediment either and escaping law enforcement detection is paramount. They now practice business diversification and are vertically integrated from raw material acquisition to product distribution. Police surveillance units frequently note that the DTO's practice counter-surveillance techniques. Their farms, ranches or compounds have been seen to have armed guards on occasion. The sophistication and intent of the Central Valley criminal organizations has caused them to be a potent force to be dealt with by law enforcement.

Collaboration with other agencies is a necessity and utilization of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force is an important element for successful HIDTA investigations. Long term investigations must often be undertaken in order to gather sufficient evidence for arrest and prosecution. Costly and protracted electronic surveillance methods must be employed in order to dismantle an organization.

The Central Valley of California is an under-recognized production and transshipment locale for drug markets around the country. Their methamphetamine, marijuana, cocaine and heroin are delivered to virtually every major metropolitan area in the country. The significance of California as a drug source is reflected in the Threat Assessments of other HIDTAs. Most of them clearly reference that the source of their drug supply is in California. Highway interdiction and Pipeline stops in Northwest, Midwest and Eastern states disclose that drugs are outbound from California and bulk cash seizures are traveling west towards the state.

Tables 1 through 4a reflect the impact CVC HIDTA initiatives had on DTOs, not only within the HIDTA region itself, but also on a national and international level as well. Throughout the year, CVC HIDTA initiatives identify the most significant DTO's operating in the region.

These tables demonstrate the CVC HIDTA's commitment to regional safety and reducing retail drug supplies by targeting local DTOs. Targeting local DTO's is an important component of the HIDTA strategy as Mexico based organizations are often their source of supply. Local organizations are the "retail" distributors of the Mexico-produced drugs. Proving the exact nature of that supply source isn't always possible. Attacking the wholesalers who supply street level traffickers in conjunction with investigating larger DTO targets has a ripple effect in the drug supply chain. Arresting street dealers, even though the drug quantity seized may be small, impacts the ability of international and multi-state DTOs to get their drugs into the hands of drug users, thus helping in the overall disruption of this "black market industry." By making it more difficult and time consuming for drug buyers to "score" a local connection it disrupts the drug markets. If local agencies and task forces adopt a two pronged drug enforcement strategy that consists of attacking both the supply and demand, it is harder for street level dealers to sell their drugs and for buyers to obtain the substances. The ultimate result is market disruption as the DTO's are not able to move the volume of drugs that they want.

Table 5 - Drugs Removed from the Marketplace, 2006

Table 5: Drugs Removed from the Marketplace for Year 2006, at Central Valley California HIDTA		
Drugs Seized (kg or D.U.)	Amount Seized (kg or D.U.)	Wholesale Value
Heroin kg	4.440	\$96,938
Cocaine HCL kg	72.800	\$1,158,757
Crack cocaine kg	0.200	\$3,300
Marijuana kg	0	\$0
Marijuana plants and grows	0	\$0
Methamphetamine kg	127.700	\$1,685,640
Methamphetamine ice kg	168.378	\$3,673,502
Ecstasy(MDMA)(D.U.s)	1,100.000	\$18,700
Hashish	0.600	\$10,560
Marijuana (indoor)	6,337.869	\$55,773,247
Marijuana (outdoor)	863,725.624	\$7,600,785,491
Marijuana, Commercial Grade	2,125.874	\$3,507,692
Marijuana, Sinsemilla high-grade	2,124.717	\$18,697,509
Meth Precursor: Iodine	190.000	\$48,640
Meth Precursor: Pseudoephedrine	85026.600	\$368,420,257
Total Wholesale Value		\$8,053,880,236

There are massive amounts of drugs in the Central Valley HIDTA region during any given year. The region is both a manufacturing and warehousing region for illicit drugs and a waypoint to other states in the nation. Most major DTO's assume the likelihood that a portion of their drugs will be seized by law enforcement. These are generally considered to be "acceptable losses" but are to be avoided whenever possible. During CY 2006, the CVC HIDTA had a significant impact on the region's drug trade through its drug seizures. HIDTA initiatives submit an annual drug price list showing the market price of each drug type in their respective territory. These are averaged for the entire area and a median value is reported for PMP purposes. Since HIDTA initiatives investigate the higher-level of drug organizations, they are considered to operate at the "wholesale" level and their price lists reflect that focus. Table 5 lists the wholesale values of the respective drugs seized, thus giving a depiction of the drugs in circulation and

economic impact of removing these drugs from the marketplace. In this fashion, achieving the CVC HIDTA goals is more clearly shown in terms of real dollar outcomes.

Table 6 - Return on Investment (ROI) for Drugs Removed from the Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives, 2006

Central Valley California HIDTA Table 6: Return on Investment (ROI) for Drugs Removed from the Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives by Year					
Year	Budget	Baseline Drug Wholesale Value	Expected Drug ROI	Drug Wholesale Value Removed From Market	Actual Drug ROI
2004	\$2,259,166	\$22,259,166	\$10.00	\$1,198,261,165	\$530.39
2005	\$4,991,842	\$22,259,166	\$2.00	\$465,842,213	\$93.32
2006	\$4,693,022	\$22,259,166	\$300.00	\$8,053,880,236	\$1,716.13

Table 7 - Return on Investment (ROI) for Assets Removed from the Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives, 2006

Central Valley California HIDTA Table 7: Return on Investment (ROI) for Assets Removed from the Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives by Year							
Year	Budget	Baseline Value of Drug Assets	Expected Asset ROI	Value of Drug Assets Removed from Market			Actual Asset ROI
				Cash	Other Assets	Total	
2004	\$2,259,166	\$4,518,332	\$2.00	\$0	\$4,512,475	\$4,512,475	\$1.99
2005	\$4,991,842	\$4,518,332	\$2.00	\$1,440,801	\$5,598,894	\$7,039,695	\$1.41
2006	\$4,693,022	\$4,518,332	\$2.00	\$6,984,105	\$3,589,255	\$10,573,360	\$2.25

CVC HIDTA initiatives had a return on investment of \$2.25 for every dollar invested in asset seizures. Although seizing and forfeiting assets obtained from drug sales is an important component of task force operations, it is not a primary direction of enforcement operations. Asset seizures vary greatly from year to year and the variables do not lend themselves to easily project that a given amount will be seized annually. It is well-recognized that the costs to participating law enforcement agencies are quite high and exceed that which HIDTA provides. These costs

include such expenses as officer salaries, police overhead and so forth. Table 7 does not factor in such outside expenses when calculating ROI, but is focused directly on what HIDTA spends.

Table 8 - Total Return on Investment (ROI) for Drugs and Assets Removed from the Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives, 2006

Central Valley California HIDTA Table 8: Total Return on Investment (ROI) for Drugs and Assets Removed from the Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives by Year					
Year	Budget	Drugs and Assets Baseline	Expected Total ROI	Drugs and Assets Removed from Market	Actual Total ROI
2004	\$2,259,166	\$26,777,498	\$12.00	\$1,202,773,640	\$532.39
2005	\$4,991,842	\$26,777,498	\$4.00	\$472,881,908	\$94.73
2006	\$4,693,022	\$26,777,498	\$302.00	\$8,064,453,596	\$1,718.39

A criminal enterprise is somewhat similar to a business corporation. Corporate survival and profit making are key issues to staying in business. A DTO is no different in that has its structure and vulnerabilities. A criminal organization may be disrupted or dismantled much like a business can. One of the effective techniques for disassembling a DTO is reducing its drug assets and consequently its ability to pay its “stockholders” and survive. In the case of a drug trafficking criminal organization, seizing its drug assets is an effective and efficient methodology for damaging the DTO’s ability to continue in a highly competitive marketplace.

Tables 6, 7 and 8 demonstrate the efficiency of the CVC HIDTA initiatives and their identification and targeting of the region’s most-significant drug trafficking organizations. Utilizing intelligence directed investigations presents opportunities for success and the realization of larger returns than less sophisticated investigative methods. The drug and asset seizures serve as testimony as to the success of long-term investigations.

Tables 6 and 7 reflect the immense amount of marijuana and other drugs seized in the CVC HIDTA region. HIDTA funded initiatives harvested record levels of marijuana during 2006 driving the seizure values and ROI to unprecedented levels. The volume of drugs seized in 2006 may not be repeated in subsequent years however the potential remains.

Table 9 – Value of Clandestine Methamphetamine Laboratories Dismantled by Size for Year 2006

Table 9: Value of Clandestine Methamphetamine Laboratories Dismantled by Size for Year 2006, at Central Valley California HIDTA			
Meth Cost Per Ounce		\$542.00	
Lab Size	ID/Targeted	Dismantled	Value of Labs Dismantled
A. Less than 2 Oz	4	15	\$16,260.00
B. 2 - 8 Oz	15	7	\$18,970.00
C. 9 - 31 Oz	15	4	\$43,360.00
D. 32 - 159 Oz	17	8	\$416,256.00
E. 10 - 20 Lbs	10	9	\$1,170,720.00
F. Over 20 Lbs	8	3	\$520,320.00
Total	69	46	\$2,185,886.00

Methamphetamine production continued throughout 2006 although at a lesser past than in previous years. The chart leads the reader to believe these were one-time “clanlab” events counted herein but that is incorrect. Methamphetamine laboratories can operate for months or years before discovery. Evidence gathered by law enforcement initiatives now proves the movement of large superlabs into remote regions. Mexico based trafficking organizations are the preeminent poly-drug traffickers in the United States. They excel at hiding their superlabs in extremely rural and remote locations escaping detection and intervention. The Mexican organizations have sources of supply for chemicals, precursors and solvents needed to produce methamphetamine in clandestine laboratories throughout the region. Superlabs remain numerous and the region has been a leader for several years in methamphetamine laboratories capable of producing over 20 pounds in a single production cycle.

Table 10 - Clandestine Laboratory Activities for Year 2006

Table 10: HIDTA Clandestine Laboratory Activities for Year Central Valley California HIDTA, in 2006				
	Baseline	# Projected	# Identified	% Identified
Laboratory Dump Sites Seized	63	39	98	251%
Chemical/Glassware Equipment Seizures	5	12	19	158%
Children Affected	0	42	80	190%

The Central Valley HIDTA region has been the “Meth Capitol” of the United States for several years. DTOs import pseudoephedrine and ephedrine from Canada and Mexico as well as purchased it from domestic sources. In the last three years, there has been a recorded decline in the number of methamphetamine “superlabs” in the region, law enforcement has only speculated on the cause for the declines. The leading explanation has been that the immense concerted law enforcement and community pressures in California that developed over the past 20 years of dealing with the methamphetamine lab problems have finally shown to be effective. The coordination of efforts from the California Precursor Committee, the National Methamphetamine Chemicals Initiative, the California Multi-Jurisdictional Methamphetamine Enforcement Team (Cal-MMET) program and the HIDTAs have proven their worth. To a limited extent, clandestine laboratories may have been displaced to other states and back into Mexico however CVC HIDTA initiatives continue in their enforcement efforts against the many laboratory operators in the region.

Table 10 shows that CVC HIDTA actually worked more laboratory cases than initially estimated. The removal of nearly millions of dollars worth of methamphetamine through laboratory investigations has had little impact on the region’s supply. We believe this supports the contention of abundant meth supplies in the HIDTA area. The increase in reported dumpsites, chemical and glassware seizures are proof that methamphetamine laboratories continue to be operated covertly in the region. Methamphetamine manufacturers came to realize that police officers were studying their dumpsites in detail and processing the evidence as a crime scene. Often fingerprints and identifying items found intermingled in the dumpsite led to criminal prosecutions. Also, clusters of dumpsite patterns are analyzed to determine the

estimated production volume and duration of production of related methamphetamine laboratories. The analysis of dumpsites and their materials has led to focusing investigative efforts to within a few miles radius of the dumpsites. On occasion the laboratories were located by conducting a search of the surrounding area which was often rural and sparsely populated. Now the methamphetamine manufacturers are burying their toxic dumpsite material in the ground using tractors and bulldozers rather than risking discovery by the police. The adverse environmental impact of this practice is clear. The CVC HIDTA initiatives have been successful with identifying and dismantling operational laboratories, as indicated in Table 10.

Table 10a - Fugitives Targeted and Apprehended for 2006

HIDTA Fugitives Targeted and Apprehended by Year at Central Valley California HIDTA (Joint Fugitive Task Force only)						
Year	# Identified	# To Be Apprehended	% To Be Apprehended of Identified	# Apprehended	# Related To Drug Charges	Apprehended % of To Be Apprehended
2006	994	750	75%	994	864	132%
2008	950	850	89%	0	0	0%

Table 10a presents information pertaining to the specialized enforcement group entitled the Joint Fugitive Task Force. Not all HIDTAs have such an initiative that works to apprehend drug related fugitives. Its operations are based on HIDTA National Goal #1 of Disrupting and Dismantling Drug Trafficking Organizations through locating and arresting drug fugitives. The data presented herein reflects the number of drug fugitives targeted and apprehended by the CVC HIDTA initiative during the calendar year. These performance figures illustrate the difficulty of locating individuals who are fugitives hiding from the law and often fleeing from the region. At the same time, the data provides insight as to the effectiveness of the HIDTA initiative. A HIDTA intelligence analyst is assigned to the U.S. Marshal's office to help in the research of investigative targets. Members of this U.S. Marshal's Service initiative find over 8 out of 10 fugitives that they go after.

Goal 2:
 Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of HIDTA initiatives.

Performance Measures for Goal 2

Table 11 –Training Efficiency by Type of Training for Year 2006

Table 11: HIDTA Training Efficiency by Type of Training for Year 2006, at Central Valley California HIDTA											
Type of Training	# Students Expected for Training		# Students Actually Trained		# Training Hours Actually Provided		Total Training Cost		Training Cost Per Hour		
	2004	2006	2004	2006	2004	2006	2004	2006	2004	2006	% Change 2004-2006
Analytical/Computer	3	40	70	33	0	241	\$0	\$13,590	\$0.00	\$56.39	0%
Investigative/Interdiction	10	660	500	441	0	3,656	\$0	\$22,918	\$0.00	\$6.27	0%
Managment/Administrative	1	4	6	5	0	228	\$0	\$11,627	\$0.00	\$51.00	0%
Advance Clan Lab Investigation	0	40	0	38	0	1,104	\$0	\$39,332	\$0.00	\$35.63	0%
Advanced Clan Lab Training & Recertification	0	40	0	38	0	104	\$0	\$38,332	\$0.00	\$368.58	0%
Total	14	784	576	555	0	5,333	\$0	\$125,799	\$0.00	\$23.58	0%

Training is essential in improving the safety, efficiency and effectiveness of CVC HIDTA initiative operations. Training that focuses on providing the lawfully mandated clandestine laboratory investigation skills (OSHA Hazardous Materials Technician, etc.) is the primary training type for HIDTA initiatives. Most initiatives maintain standing “clan’lab” teams on constant stand-by duty in preparation of a laboratory callout. The CVC HIDTA provided training to 555 students in 2006. The training was designed to improve their analytical skills, bolster their investigative knowledge and develop their managerial abilities. This training, which cost CVC HIDTA was near \$23.58 per classroom hour. This amount reflects the technical sophistication of this year’s training programs such as those required for highway enforcement. Naturally, this training was provided free of charge to CVC HIDTA assigned investigators. These training courses would not have been available without CVC HIDTA support, funding and the utilization of no-cost guest instructors provided by a variety of training vendors.

Table 12 follows and depicts one of the critical aspects of drug law enforcement activities in the Central Valley California HIDTA region. Investigators and intelligence analysts have used the event and case deconfliction system provided through the Los Angeles Clearinghouse (LA HIDTA) and the Western States Information Network for many years. Its intent is to provide increased officer safety by coordinating investigative activities and avoiding one

undercover drug investigator from “selling” purported drugs to another undercover officer “buyer.” This traditional “sting” type of operation concludes in an arrest situation and critical event deconfliction is designed to preclude the “buyer” officer from believing that he/she is the subject of an armed robbery. Coordinating investigations and ensuring no duplicative investigative efforts over a wide-region is the intent of “case or subject” deconfliction. Both event and case/subject deconfliction are done through the same system throughout California.

Table 12 - Percentage of Event and Case Deconflictions Submitted for Year, 2006

Table 12: Percentage of Event and Case Deconflictions Submitted for Year at Central Valley California HIDTA						
Year	Baseline # Deconflictions Submitted	# Deconfliction Submissions Expected	# Event Deconflictions Submitted	# Case/Subject Deconflictions Submitted	Total Deconflictions Submitted	% Deconflictions Submitted
2004	5000	13,000	4,500	25,000	29,500	227%
2005	5000	39,084	418	40,781	41,199	105%
2006	5000	46,500	953	60,390	61,343	132%
2007	5000	35,000	0	0	0	0%
2008	5000	25,950	0	0	0	0%

Table 13 - Percentage of Cases Provided Analytical Support for 2006

Table 13: Percentage of Cases Provided Analytical Support for Year at Central Valley California HIDTA				
Year	Baseline # Cases Receiving Analytical Support	# Cases Expected for Analytical Support	# Cases Provided Analytical Support	% Expected Cases Supported
2004	455	110	567	515%
2005	455	1290	709	54%
2006	455	1315	1575	119%
2007	455	735	0	0%
2008	455	1470	0	0%

The CVC HIDTA Investigative Support Center staff and its decentralized intelligence analyst positions were relied upon for their specialized services throughout the year. Table 13 depicts the case-support activity by the analysts. It shows that this labor-intensive activity has been readily accepted by investigators as being critical to intelligence led policing efforts. The demand for intelligence support to investigations increases yearly as the value of such an effort is demonstrated to case investigators. The intelligence analyst resources and time are finite however and are readily achieving a maximum-output capacity. HIDTA analysts supported 29 wiretaps and 186 pen registers during 2006.

CVC HIDTA initiatives were busy and opened over 1,500 investigations during 2006. Each year the number of spin-off cases may fluctuate considerably however doing so ensures that investigative targets are pursued if they move outside of the region. All agencies strive whenever possible to refer investigations to other agencies and to other HDTAs for appropriate follow-up.

Table 14 – Percentage of HIDTA Initiative Cases Referred to Other HDTAs and Other Agencies for 2006

Table 14: Percentage of HIDTA Initiative Cases Referred to Other HDTAs and Other Agencies for Year at Central Valley California HIDTA						
Year	Total HIDTA Initiative Cases	# Initiative Cases Expected for Referral	# HIDTA Initiative Cases Referred to Other HDTAs	# HIDTA Initiative Cases Referred to Other Agencies	Total Initiative Cases Referred	% Expected Initiative Cases Referred
2004	525	24	24	0	24	100%
2005	1650	37	20	12	32	86%
2006	1698	40	23	35	58	145%
2007	0	53	0	0	0	0%
2008	0	63	0	0	0	0%

Table 14 depicts the regional focus of investigative work. CVC HIDTA initiatives interact with other agencies and refer cases when appropriate. These activities are essential to the CVC HIDTA and improving efficiency and effectiveness through information sharing and coordinated intelligence collection and dissemination. CVC HIDTA investigators referred 58 cases either to other HIDTA regions or other agencies for additional scrutiny and investigative action.

VII. Conclusions

The growing of marijuana outdoors was clearly responsible for driving this HIDTA's 2006 PMP measurements upwards at an amazing rate. This subject needs to be briefly examined as to its nature and the resultant long term impact on HIDTA operations and funding. The surge of marijuana production in the HIDTA region was unexpected. It coincided with the decrease in methamphetamine laboratory investigations two years ago. Law enforcement agencies responded in a collaborative manner but rely upon federal funding to support operations and provide partial reimbursement.



California led the nation in 2006 for the production of outdoor grown marijuana. Eradicating tree-sized marijuana is shown in the photo on the left. Almost 80% of the nearly 3 million marijuana plants were grown on Federal public lands in the state. The terrain and climate together with a seemingly limitless number of alien Mexican workers provide the well-financed DTOs with an opportunity to reap profits in the billions of dollars. The three West Coast states have interconnected DTO's with well-coordinated interstate production efforts.

Finding marijuana gardens isn't easy. For example, spotting high mountain marijuana gardens requires trained aerial spotters looking from helicopters. Aerial surveillance is an expensive endeavor but the only reasonable approach to cover millions of acres of land. Once marijuana plots are found, then operational plans are constructed as to how to best dismantle the grow site. Often these marijuana plantations include thousands of marijuana plants growing in a vast number of individual plots, generally fed by a single water supply. General trends are that the plants are grown between 1,500 and 5,000 feet elevations. The sites are generally within a mile or two of the nearest trail head, up steep mountainous trails and all supplies must be carried in on backpacks. Eradication teams are often inserted via helicopter cables as pictured above right.



The DTO's often recruit a small "army" of illegal aliens to prepare the grow sites in approximately March to April after the snows recede and weather permits establishing a base camp. Potential growing locations are scouted out during the winter months and DTO advance party surveyors have been reported operating as early as February. Once the irrigation systems have been installed and the ground prepared and planted, Mexican aliens are left in charge of the plot with specific instructions to tend the plants and safeguard the crops. Many grow site workers are issued firearms creating a hazard for hikers, campers, hunters and general day users of the forests.

If a grower is able to successfully harvest the crops, profits are high. Marijuana producing organizations plant seeds that produce high-quality Sensimilla buds which are sometimes sold as “BC Bud,” an imported variety that commands a higher price. The general appearance of the California produced marijuana bud denotes its high-quality and desirability to the marijuana abuser. These bring an average price of \$8,000 per kilogram in the region. Because of their value, armed guards are present in nearly all marijuana gardens. This presents a safety hazard to law enforcement whenever they attempt to harvest the growing crops and calls for dynamic strategies and sometimes initiative mission modifications.

The Central Valley California HIDTA Executive Board’s 2006 Strategy set forth its goals. The Performance Management Process database chronicles the results of this totality of work last year. The data illuminates the extent and complexity of this region’s drug trafficking and how both National and Central Valley HIDTA goals are on target for mission attainment. Clear evidence of successful strategy enactment and initiative productivity is present throughout this report. One must conclude the inescapable fact that with each arrest and drug seizure, drug availability is somehow reduced. The criminals that comprise the identified DTOs are being prosecuted and the organizations are disrupted or dismantled (Goal 1). These accomplishments are done with relative efficiency, effectiveness but sometimes at a high cost. Long-term investigations of multi-state and international DTOs are time consuming and complex. Engaging in these investigations is often done at the expense of other cases and reaching estimated annual goals may not be possible.

The CVC HIDTA has created a pathway for success in future law enforcement undertakings through its neutrality and collaboration building. The HIDTA program brought divergent law enforcement agencies together and forged a unified force to address the serious drug trafficking issues facing the San Joaquin and Sacramento Valley areas of Central California. Since the CVC HIDTA began in 1999 there has been a steady and positive increase in the number of participant agencies, number of queries and data elements shared through the HIDTA information sharing system. Intelligence support to investigations became more prominent in 2006. The construction and operation of the Central Valley HIDTA Intelligence Fusion Center continued during 2006. This system is co-staffed with a California National Guard analyst and operates with funding from the National Marijuana Initiative. They receive and disseminate all-source intelligence information on marijuana growing organizations. Fusion Center staff works with the intelligence analysts throughout California, Oregon, Washington and elsewhere to share information and enhance the investigative process.

Law enforcement initiatives operating in the Central Valley California region continued to make significant progress in identifying, investigating and dismantling the most dangerous and prolific drug traffickers operating in the region during 2006. As the tables and charts presented throughout this report clearly attest, CVC HIDTA initiatives continue to support HIDTA Goal 1 objectives.

The challenges remain in every region as drug supplies are abundant. HIDTA initiative drug seizures, coupled with drug asset seizures have put a major crimp in DTO activities yet much

needs to be done as the demand for drugs continues at a high rate throughout the region. The CVC HIDTA has demonstrated efficient and effective methodologies to achieve the results presented herein.

For several years the CVC HIDTA has been developing and improving initiative operations and expertise through its training program. The CVC HIDTA Executive Director has worked with regional agencies to develop alternate programs that address the various nuances of the drug threat in this region. New programs such as Domestic Highway Enforcement, violent gang intervention and others continued into 2006. CVC HIDTA leadership stressed that the initiatives need to continue with the emphasis on education of their members, developing the essential skills and honing the tradecraft of drug enforcement.

The first component of the CVC HIDTA strategy for the preceding year was to develop goals and objectives that each initiative could embrace, with measurable outputs and outcomes that would form the basis for a reasonable means of self assessment and evaluation. The national HIDTA goals provided the roadmap. The CVC HIDTA Executive Board carefully considered the nature of their activities and provided the vision and mission. Based on many years of direct experience in the field, initiative supervisors, agency managers, and CVC HIDTA staff developed the measurable outputs and outcomes. Through training and constant reinforcement of the goals and objectives, each initiative began its 2006 program with enthusiasm and ended the year successfully.

There is still a great deal of work left to do. The presence of internationally-connected drug trafficking organizations, the continuing unacceptably high levels of methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine and marijuana addiction plague the CVC HIDTA region. Drug-related crime in the Cities, Counties and Towns of the nine CVC HIDTA counties continues. By bringing together criminal justice professionals and adhering to the CVC HIDTA Strategy, the current initiatives as well as other innovative and effective solutions will be applied to the region's drug threats. The Central Valley California HIDTA will continue to lead the region's drug enforcement effort.

VIII. Appendices

- A. Table of Organization for the HIDTA.
 - B. Table listing composition of Executive Board showing local, state and federal affiliation.
 - C. List of participating agencies.
 - D. List of Counties participating in the HIDTA
-

APPENDIX A - See Attached

APPENDIX B

CENTRAL VALLEY CALIFORNIA HIDTA EXECUTIVE BOARD MEMBERS

FEDERAL AGENCY MEMBERS:

1. Antonio C. Amador, United States Marshal, (2007 Chairman)
2. Javier Pena, Special Agent in Charge, Drug Enforcement Administration
3. Charles H. Demore, Special Agent in Charge, Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
4. McGregor Scott, United States Attorney, Eastern District of California
5. Roger Wirth, Special Agent in Charge, Internal Revenue Service
6. Drew Parenti, Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation
7. Steve Martin, Special Agent in Charge, Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
8. Scott Hinson, Special Agent in Charge, National Park Service
9. Timothy Swan, Colonel, National Guard Program
10. Troy Bolen, Special Agent in Charge, Bureau of Land Management

STATE AND LOCAL AGENCY MEMBERS

11. John McGinness, Sheriff, Sacramento Sheriffs Department
12. Elizabeth Egan, District Attorney, Fresno County
13. Jerry Dyer, Chief, Fresno Police Department
14. Rick Oules, Director, California Department of Justice
15. Margaret Mims, Sheriff, Fresno Sheriffs Department
16. Adam Christianson, Sheriff, Stanislaus County Sheriffs Department
17. Donny Youngblood, Sheriff, Kern County Sheriffs Department
18. Bill Wittman, Sheriff, Tulare County Sheriffs Department
19. Mark Pazin, Sheriff, Merced County Sheriffs Department
20. Bill Rector, Chief of Police, Bakersfield Police Department

APPENDIX C

PARTICIPATING AGENCIES:

Federal

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
Bureau of Land Management
Drug Enforcement Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, DHS
Internal Revenue Service
National Guard Bureau
Office of the Inspector General
United States Attorney for the Eastern District of California
US Marshal Service

State Agencies

Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement
CA Department of Corrections
CA National Guard
CA Youth Authority
California Highway Patrol

Local Agencies

Bakersfield Police Department
Delano Police Department
Fresno County Sheriffs Department
Fresno Police Department
Fresno County Child Protective Services
Kern County Sheriffs Department
Kings County Sheriffs Department
Madera County Sheriffs Department
Merced County Sheriffs Department
Modesto Police Department
Sacramento County Probation Department
Sacramento County Sheriff's Department
Stanislaus County District Attorney
Stanislaus County Probation Department

Stanislaus County Sheriffs Department
Tulare County Sheriffs Department
Yolo County District Attorney

APPENDIX D

LIST OF COUNTIES CENTRAL TO THE HIDTA REGION

Northern Region

Sacramento County

San Joaquin County

Stanislaus County

Central Region

Madera County

Merced County

Fresno County

Southern Region

Kern County

Tulare County

Kings County

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X. Endnotes - Sources of essential information referenced in this report.

ⁱ Estimates of the Size and Characteristics of the Undocumented Population, Pew Hispanic Center, March 21,2006

ⁱⁱ CVC HIDTA Commissioned study on Methamphetamine Admission Trends, 2006

Appendix A: 2006 CVCA HIDTA Organization Chart

