Detailed Information on the
Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Expertise Assessment

Review mechanisms to monitor the impact of the NWMDE program on scientist attitudes regarding potential proliferation of expertise. For example, the program could implement regular surveys to inform program management.

Review the feasibility of long-term tracking of participating scientist activities to demonstrate long-term program success.

Measure: Cost to Assist a WMD Institute to Reach Financial Self-Sufficiency (in thousands of dollars)

Explanation:The US program changed the focus of its project selection and the supplemental programs to focus on institutes' sustainability in 2003; decreases in lifetime aid to any one institute that is graduated should decline in the future with improved training, supplemental programs and project selection.

Measure: Number of Russian and other Eurasian proliferation-relevant institutes engaged in U.S.-funded civilian research projects

Explanation:Access, engage and redirect high-risk former weapons institutes and former weapons scientists worldwide away from WMD/missile programs through our Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise (NWMDE) programs

Measure: Number of institutes and/or scientists graduated into commercially sustainable ventures.

Explanation:Access, engage and redirect high-risk former weapons institutes and former weapons scientists worldwide away from WMD/missile programs through our Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise (NWMDE) programs

Measure: U.S. private sector funding of collaborative research as a percentage of USG regular project funding.

Explanation:Access, engage and redirect high-risk former weapons institutes and former weapons scientists worldwide away from WMD/missile programs through our Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise (NWMDE) programs

Measure: Number of BW production projects started at facilities for the purposes of commercialization and reconfiguration for peaceful uses -- Number of engaged former BW institutes in in drug and Vaccine development.

Explanation:Access, engage and redirect high-risk former weapons institutes and former weapons scientists worldwide away from WMD/missile programs through our Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise (NWMDE) programs

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: Program purpose is to redirect into peaceful, transparent, economically sustaining work scientists and technicans in the former Soviet Union and in other countries whose expertise could be used by WMD proliferant states or terrorists to harm U.S. interests. FREEDOM Support Act authorizes the establishment of science and technology centers to address the proliferation of WMD expertise. The Biotechnology, now Bio/Chem, Redirection program was included under that authority in 1997. Chapter 9 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 2000 moved the science centers program from FREEDOM Support Act to the Foreign Operations appropriations account for nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining and related programs (NADR). The FY 2000 provision lifted the restriction of funding to only NIS countries. The Bio Industry Initiaitive (BII) is authorized in the Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of FY 2002.

Evidence: a. Sec 503 of the FREEDOM Support Act (22 USC 5851 et seq). b. DoD-State memo of 1996 transferred the Science Center program authority from DOD to State. c. Chapter 9 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 2000 (22 USC 2349bb et seq) d. Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of FY 2002 (P.L. 107-117). BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers: WD. 01 - Bilateral Measures. NP Bureau Goal 9

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest or need?

Explanation: Thousands of scientists who were active in Soviet nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons research and development or in missile and other technologies with WMD applications remain active today. The economic circumstances of many of them, personally and with respect to work environment and opportunity, remain difficult if no longer dire. A 2003 survey of 602 Russian physicists, chemists and biologists, found 20% would consider accepting one-year employment in their professions in either Iraq, Iran, Syria or North Korea. Economic conditions at laboratories in other former Soviet republics are, broadly speaking, more difficult than in Russia. WMD technicians in Iraq and Libya now require alternatives and incentives to counter the purchase of their services by remaining proliferant states or terrorists. Reports indicate Iraqi WMD and missile scientists have been approached by Iran and possibly other countries; Libyan scientists similarly vulnerable.

Evidence: a. 2003 survey of Russian scientists' attitudes, conducted by Dr. D. Ball of Lawrence Livermore National Lab under contract to NP/PTR. Report not yet in the public domain. b. Sensitive reporting. BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers: WD. 01 - Bilateral Measures. NP Bureau Goal 9

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: NP/PTR is the sole manager of U.S. policy input to the two intergovernmental science centers. Bio/Chem Redirect and Bio Industry Initiative have research channels to institutes previously closed to collaborators outside the former USSR. Iraq scientist redirection being designed by NP/PTR-led team detailed to the Coalition Provisional Authority (eventually to American Embassy Baghdad). Libya program being designed jointly by UK officials and NP/PTR-led U.S. team. NSC Sub-PCC views activities across programs to ensure coordination and minimize duplication.

Evidence: Complementary programs: DoE/IPP focuses on market-ready technologies, with mandatory private U.S. financial involvement. Collaborative research with former Soviet institutes by experts at the USDA Agricultrual Research Service, DHHS Public Health Service or Centers for Disease Control, and Environmental Protection Agency is by law coordinated, prioritized, and to a large extent funded by our DOS Bio/Chem Redirection program. NSC Sub-PCC oversees activities in Iraq. STATE is the mission leader for Libya activity. BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: WD. 01 - Bilateral Measures. NP Bureau Goal 9

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: NP/PTR reviews program design regularly and modifies as necessary to meet its objectives. 2004 GAO study detected no deficiencies in our engagement programs.

Evidence: GAO study "Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs Follow Legal Authority, But Some Activities Need Reassessment" BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: WD. 01 - Bilateral Measures. NP Bureau Goal 9

Is the program effectively targeted, so that resources will reach intended beneficiaries and/or otherwise address the program's purpose directly?

Explanation: Determinations on project funding rest on direct person-to-person contact, open source, and intelligence information confirming the WMD-relevance of researchers' expertise.

Evidence: Science Centers' published guidelines on categorization of WMD expertise, referenced in all grant proposals. BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: WD. 01 - Bilateral Measures. NP Bureau Goal 9

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: Long-term performance measures of redirecting scientists into sustainable activity serves two meaningful purposes, moving scientists and institues (1) away from weapons work and (2) toward transparent revenues from non-USG sources. ISTC collection of voluntary data from grant-receiving institutes indicates growing diversity of funding sources.

Evidence: ISTC Insititute Sustainability Survey (not in the public domain). BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers: Targets data entered into BPP/PART Interface. BPP Goal Paper WP.01, Bureau Goal 9

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: The program has ambitious but realistic targets, taking into account the complex and evolving environment in which we operate. Soviet weapons science lived off state funding in the absence of market forces or much relationship between productivity and income. While Russia and other successor states grapple with their political, legal and social transition away from Communism, their scientists still lack communication with Western counterparts or appreciation for legal and commercial structures in which their work must find application for them to prosper. Changing the culture and skills of former WMD institutes so that several each year no longer require our aid remains an ambitious target.

Evidence: BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers: Targets data entered into BPP/PART Interface. BPP Goal Paper WP.01, Bureau Goal 9

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: Our BPP sets annual progress goals for: institutes "graduated" from reliance on our aid; previously inaccessible institutes opened to Western collaboration and made "transparent"; the ratio of research funding from the US private sector to project funding by our program; and, launch of new biotech enterprises reformed under our Bio Industry Initiative.

Evidence: BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers: Targets data entered into BPP/PART Interface. BPP Goal Paper WP.01, Bureau Goal 9

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: BPP identifies annual progress targets against: -- baseline for institute graduation in FY03, when we collected financial data on which to justify graduation of institutes from conventional project funding; -- baseline at inception of program for Bio-Chem Redirection program to access institutes previously closed to non-Soviet/non-Russian personnel; -- 2002 baseline for Bio Industry Initiative to spur reconstitution of "closed" bioweapons production facilities. Program-internal baselines also vary by country, depending on when engagement began. The targets are ambitious but realistic.

Evidence: BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers: Targets data entered into BPP/PART Interface. BPP Goal Paper WP.01, Bureau Goal 9

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: The nonproliferation goals and related terms of funding are explicit for all grantee institutes. The science centers' nonproliferation mission is defined in two intergovernmental agreements and endorsed mutually by the United States, European Union, Canada, Japan, other funding states, host states Russian and Ukraine, and other recipient states. Each grant results in a detailed project agreement and work plan by which the science centers phase the release of funds. Bio-Chem Redirection and Bio Industry Initiative projects run through the science centers.

Evidence: Intergovernmental agreements creating the ISTC and STCU establish the nonproliferation mission, affirmed by every member state and ratified by their legislatures. Public statements of nonproliferation policy on www.state.gov, istc.ru and stcu.int. BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: BPP Goal Paper WP.01, Bureau Goal 9

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: At least 15% of currently-funded projects each year undergo independent audit by the Defense Contract & Audit Agency. ISTC and STCU internal financial procedures also subject to audit by major international accounting firms. NP/PTR staff is advised on program effectiveness throughout the year and in an annual off-site program review by U.S. science advsiers whose own work is WMD-relevant.

Evidence: a. NP/PTR rider to DOS IG umbrella contract with DCAA for overseas financial audit services. b. Survey of 602 Russian scientists conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory/Univ. of Wisconsin addressed impact of ISTC programs on WMD scientists; future round will survey BW scientists. BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: BPP Goal Paper WP.01, Bureau Goal 9

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: BPPs tie resource requests to all annual and long-term performance goals. Bio-Chem Redirection program funds implementing agencies (USDA, DHHS, EPA) that submit annual program plans and quarterly progress reports, which NP/PTR uses to calibrate future budget requests with performance.

Evidence: Congressional Budget Justitification documents submitted to RM. BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: BPP Goal Paper WP.01, Bureau Goal 9

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: Program purpose was initially to secure in place scientists and technicans in the former Soviet Union with WMD expertise. A decade later with improved economic circumstances reducing scientists' inclination to work abroad in a "rogue" nation, our strategy has shifted to meet heightened aspirations by helping institutes sustain themselves in the international market of technical research capabilities. NP/PTR conducts strategic program reviews at regular intervals.

Evidence: Reorganization of ISTC and STCU management structure, driven primarily by USG, to emphasize programmatic approach to funding research and capabiltiiers at institutes. BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: BPP Goal Paper WP.01, Bureau Goal 9

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: In 2003 NP/PTR commissioned Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to survey Russian scientists attitudes towards (a) working in rogue nations and (b) the impact of ISTC programs and project support for the well-being of Russian science. In the same year, at NP/PTR initiative, the Science Centers conducted their own surveys of institutes' economic strength.

Evidence: a. 2003 survey of Russian scientists' attitudes, conducted by Dr. D. Ball of Lawrence Livermore National Lab under contract to NP/PTR. Report not yet in the public domain. b. ISTC Insititute Sustainability Survey (not in the public domain). c. 2002 ISTC-commissioned study by IC3 Institute (Univ. of Texas) assessing ISTC commercialization support. BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: WD.01 - Bilateral Measures Bureau Goal 9

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: NP/PTR's Bio-Chem Redirection program provides NADR appropriated funds to USG agencies with technical expertise to collaborate on science in former Soviet Union. Those partner agencies are integrated into our program management, participate in frequent program meetings and weekly conference calls, and are accountable to NP/PTR for conducting research we authorize. They supply formal quarterly reports and more frequent issue-by-issue information on project performance and cost schedules.

Evidence: BCR-funded agencies' quarterly progress reports on their program activities (not in the public domain). BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: WD.01 - Bilateral Measures Bureau Goal 9

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner and spent for the intended purpose?

Explanation: Allotments have generally come from OMB/State RM in March following annual appropriation from Congress. The bulk of allotment is obligated immediately. Funds transferred to the science centers meet U.S. assessment for administrative budget or are held on account for phased payment to scientists according to multi-year work plans. Bio/Chem Redirect funds transferred to implementing agencies (USDA, DHHS, EPA) are in turn transferred to the science centers for release in conformance with work plans.

Evidence: STATE EUR/ACE Annual Report on Assistance to Eurasia documents that PTR programs regularly obligate all funds within the appropirations FY. BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: WD.01 - Bilateral Measures Bureau Goal 9

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: Science Centers' professional staff monitors project execution, conformance with work plans and timetables, and production of quarterly and final reports. Audits of ongoing and completed projects feature financial analysis by DCAA and technical assessment by independent scientists engaged by NP/PTR. PTR's management of FSU WMD expertise redirection programs has been scrutinized several times by GAO. However, the program does not have efficiency measures that demonstrate increasing program efficiency and effectiveness.

Evidence: a. Science Center financial regulations b. Science Center procurement regulations c. Science Center travel regulations d. NP/PTR rider to State Department (IG) umbrella contract with DCAA for auditing services. e. GAO reports: GAO-01-582 "Weapons of Mass Destruction: State Department Oversight of Science Centers Program" GAO-01-694 "Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Adequate Oversight of Assistance, but Procedural Limitations Remain" GAO-01-429 "Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Efforts to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia's Nuclear Cities Face Challenges" GAO-02-180T "Nuclear Nonproliferation: Coordination of U.S. Programs Designed to Reduce the Threat Posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction" GAO-02-226T "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing U.S. Policy Tools for Combating Proliferation" BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: WD.01 - Bilateral Measures Bureau Goal 9

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: DoD, DoE and other STATE offices participate in NP/PTR's nonproliferation policy review of projects proposed for funding through the Science Centers, including those destined to be funded by Parties other than the U.S. Bio-Chem Redirection hosts frequent interagency meetings to coordinate the activities of implementing agencies it funds as well the complementary activities of DoD and DoE. Intergovernmental coordination through the science centers and parallel G-8 Global Partnership channels permits NP/PTR programs to leverage U.S. nonproliferation spending with activities of other nations. Iraq and Libya activities are coordinatied under an NSC sub-PCC.

Evidence: a. NSC terms of reference for Nonproliferation Interagency Roundtable b. Science Centers Interagency Policy Review Group c. NSC G-8 sub-PCC d. NSC sub-PCC on Iraq/Libya WMD Redirection BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: WD.01 - Bilateral Measures Bureau Goal 9

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: Extensive auditing of ongoing projects and science centers operations over 10 years has identified NO irregularities.

Evidence: Officers in NP/PTR are trained and certified as Contracting Officer Representatives. BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: WD.01 - Bilateral Measures Bureau Goal 9

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: During FY03 recruited a full-time, direct-hire financial resources specialist to improve budget preparation, record-keeping and planning.

Evidence: BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: WD.01 - Bilateral Measures Bureau Goal 9

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: Program was instrumental in retaining in the former Soviet Union the enormous community of WMD scientists whose world literally collapsed around them in the early 1990s. Original program goal was to cope with that emergency situation. Shift now is towards the sustainability of their employment. Ongoing progress toward long-term goal is demonstrated in the annual number of institutes we can document to be no longer in financial need of our aid because the U.S. has helped them attract other peaceful, transparent revenue sources. The long-term goal of institution sustainability is an accurate measure of program success. However, more work needs to be done to track and demonstrate that scientists engaged in the program remain in peaceful enterprises.

Evidence: BPPs of previous years BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: WD.01 - Bilateral Measures Bureau Goal 9

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: Program goals have been met but track number of institutions engaged as an output goal.

Evidence: BPPs of previous years BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: WD.01 - Bilateral Measures Bureau Goal 9

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: The program has developed new efficiency measures that have not yet been demonstrated. The US program changed the focus of its project selection and the supplemental programs to focus on institutes' sustainability in 2003; decreases in lifetime aid to any one institute that is graduated should decline in the future with improved training, supplemental programs and project selection..

Evidence: BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: WD.01 - Bilateral Measures Bureau Goal 9

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation:  

Evidence:  

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: The ISTC (larger of the two science centers) performed biennial evaluations of its program management, the results of which were presented to the USG and other governming board members. In 2002 an independent firm affiliated with a US university evaluated the ISTC's effectiveness in promoting economic self-sustainability of recipient institutes. NP/PTR management of its expertise redirection mission has been scrutinized in two specific GAO reports and a 2003-4 GAO study of NADR nonproliferation programs generally.

Evidence: a. IC# (U.Tx.) study of ISTC commercialization support. b. GAO-01-582 State Department Oversight of Science Centers Program. c. GAO/NSIAD-00-138 Effort to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers Benefits, Poses Risks. BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: WD.01 - Bilateral Measures Bureau Goal 9