Detailed Information on the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Assessment

The CTR program will meet regularly with recipient countries during Executive Reviews and Integrated Program Management Reviews to assess progress and develop binding agreements that tie long-term goals to annual plans for CTR activity.

The program will continue to establish cost boundaries and phased exit criteria so that CTR's resources are not irrevocably committed if a partner country is not cooperating sufficiently.

CTR will continue to advise Congress via the notification process of proposed resource realignments among recipient countries if it is determined that a recipient country cannot meet its commitments.

Increasing emphasis on systems engineering to provide for effective technical management of projects with appropriate controls and verification methods. Developed in-house training and a systems engineering toolkit to ensure consistent use of systems engineering.

Improved requirements definition process via proactive consultations with CTR Policy and the establishment of formal requirement verification reviews. Establishing measures to gage progress considering operational analysis of the assistance provided and project objectives which also includes a re-design of the Audit and Examination Program to focus on operational matters, including safety and sustainability.

Implemented a formal risk management program that provides guidance, processes, training and supporting tools to plan, identify, assess, handle, monitor and communicate cost, performance, and schedule risks for each individual project.

Measure: Cumulative aggregate number of missiles and launchers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, eliminatedi.e., the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

Explanation:The CTR Program's goal is to assist the former Soviet Union to eliminate 4,299 missiles and launchers that deliver nuclear weapons by December 31, 2012. Accomplishing this goal will destroy most of the Soviet legacy of the means to deliver nuclear weapons and prevent them from falling into the hands of states and groups seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This achievement serves the U.S. national security objectives of combating WMD and preventing WMD proliferation. It will also help Russia to meet its commitments under the Moscow Treaty by December 31, 2012.

Measure: Down-scoping

Explanation:The down-scoping of the CTR Program in 2003, requiring Russia to assume additional responsibilities in legacy programs, produces savings from the lesser expenditure of CTR dollars in these programs. The savings are re-directed to new areas and enable broadening the scope of threat reduction by the CTR Program. Thus, this portion of the efficiency measure tracks the aggregate annual savings from the following commitments assumed by Russia: re-grading ICBM silo elimination sites; elimination of a substantial portion of SS-25 road-mobile ICBM base infrastructure, including the foundations specialized garages from which missiles can be launched; operations and maintenance support at missile storage warehouses built with CTR assistance; elimination of the bows, sterns, and sails of nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines; support for emergency response equipment accompanying transportation of nuclear weapons; and the nuclear weapons safety and security personnel reliability program. Values are in millions of US dollars rounded to the nearest $10k and are adjusted for the projected future annual inflation rates provided in DTRA/CTI guidance.

Measure: Structured Program Management

Explanation:DTRA's managers of the CTR Program have implemented a more structured approach to day-to-day program management. It focuses on assessment and mitigation of cost, schedule, and performance risks throughout a project; improves communications between both internal and external USG stakeholders and foreign partners; and institutes periodic project evaluation and reporting to a higher reviewing authority. These management changes produce greater efficiency and the ability to identify savings in both direct and indirect costs. For instance, in 2006, CTR sought and obtained a special exemption from the DoD regulation that requires use of the US Transportation Command for transportation/shipping support. Instead, CTR has awarded a single direct contract for transportation and logistical support, increasing efficiency and effectiveness and saving approximately $1M over 7 years. Other examples of cost efficiencies include: elimination of travel and housing-related costs of temporary 90-day assignments of USG linguists to the U.S. Embassy locations by hiring foreign nationals; use of award fee contracts to encourage companies to seek more effective and efficient means of completing contractual requirements; contracting directly with Russian partners to eliminate liquid-fueled ICBMs and avoid paying overhead to the U.S. contractor; and objective-based negotiation strategies to reduce the cost of train shipments of weapons to storage facilities. These efforts result in significant savings that will be reinvested in higher priority requirements or new initiatives. The annual savings target represents 2% per year of the program funding.

Measure: Railcar procurement to transport nuclear weapons to secure storage and dismantlement facilities.

Explanation:All long distance movements of Russian nuclear weapons are done by rail. The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (MOD) requires 200 nuclear-weapons cargo railcars in order to meet their nuclear-weapons-elimination commitments. DoD performs periodic maintenance and service-life extensions on these railcars used to ship warheads to secure storage or dismantlement facilities. Service-life extensions on some railcars are no longer feasible, and new railcars are required to continue CTR-supported shipments at the current level (up to 48 per year). DoD will procure up to 100 replacement cargo railcars for each two current cars destroyed by MOD.

Measure: The number of Russian nuclear warhead storage sites with installed security upgrades.

Explanation:DoD, through the CTR Program, and its partner??the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Federation (RF) Ministry of Defense??have agreed that 24 nuclear-weapon storage sites of the RF will receive security upgrades by 2008. The Presidents of the U.S. and the RF reached agreement at the Bratislava Summit that all upgrades are to be completed by 2008. Completing each site upgrade is a significant step in achieving the nuclear safety and security objectives of the CTR Program and the objectives stated at the Bratislava Summit in February 2005. This, in turn, serves the U.S. national security goals of preventing proliferation and keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists.

Measure: The cumulative number of disease control monitoring stations built and equipped for biological agent detection and response.

Explanation:By 2012, the CTR Program's goal is to have 36 disease control monitoring stations built and equipped for detection of, and response after detection of biological agents, throughout the non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union, including Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan. The goals of building biological agent detection and response disease control monitoring stations are: prevent the theft, sale, diversion, and accidental or intentional release of pathogens; consolidate pathogen collections and work at safe and secure centralized facilities; strengthen the recipient country's detection and response networks for dangerous pathogens. Based on these goals, the completion of each monitoring station represents a major step in achieving the CTR Program's Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) objectives to reduce the risk of bioterrorism and prevent proliferation of biological weapons technology, expertise, and extremely dangerous pathogens. This serves the U.S. national security interest of preventing proliferation and keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: The Department of Defense's (DoD) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program has a clear program purpose and mission consistent with the U.S. National Security Strategy and the Global War on Terror. Created by legislation in 1991, the CTR Program helps states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) secure and eliminate their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and prevents proliferation of these weapons, weapons materials, and expertise. CTR projects lessen the threat posed by WMD, deactivate and destroy the weapons and their infrastructure, and assist scientists formerly engaged in producing these weapons transition to working on peaceful projects and become members of the international scientific community.

Evidence: The enabling legislation is the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (title II of Public Law 102-228; 22 U.S.C. 2551), commonly known as "the Nunn-Lugar Act", and its successor law, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 (title XII of Public Law 103-160; 22 U.S.C. 5951 note). Twenty-five other laws restating the CTR Program's mission to prevent proliferation have been passed since 1992, including provisions in National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 1997-2005. Through them, Congress has fine-tuned the CTR Program's mission.

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: Yes, the United States is threatened by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the possibility that WMD technology may fall into the hands of rogue states and terrorists hostile to the United States. An important U.S. national security policy goal is to reduce these threats. To do so, the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program assists former Soviet Union (FSU) and other designated states to secure, dismantle, and destroy WMD, its infrastructure, and its knowledge base. These projects are done on-site, in the recipient country, with their cooperation and resources, so the threats do not reach the United States. For example, in Russia, the CTR Program increases the security around nuclear warheads by designing and installing fencing, security systems, alarms, inventory controls, and other technologies. The threat of chemical weapons proliferation is reduced by destroying former production facilities, securing chemical weapons in arsenals, and constructing destruction facilities for Russia and Albania. The threat from bio-terrorism is reduced by consolidating especially dangerous pathogens, improving security for the remaining pathogens, providing modern diagnostics to rapidly identify disease outbreaks and report them to the USG, motivating scientists formerly engaged in biological warfare work to map the locations where dangerous diseases are located and how they are transmitted, and destroying former BW facilities. The CTR Program supports the dismantlement of strategic weapons' delivery systems and infrastructure to immediately improve the security of the United States. It assists countries of Central Asia and Ukraine to bolster their borders by improving their capability to detect and interdict WMD smuggling, reducing the threat of WMD thousands of miles from the U.S. border. This work creates a layered defense so the threat of proliferation is addressed first at the source, e.g., the warhead at the storage bunker; next by improving recipient countries' security networks; and then with assistance to enhance the border security detection and interdiction system in Central Asia and Ukraine.

Evidence: "The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991" (Section 211) (Public Law 102-228) and subsequent National Defense Authorization Acts articulate the continuing problem and national interest in threat reduction, preventing proliferation, and waging the Global War on Terror by keeping WMD out of the hands of terrorists and rogue states. The two most recent and important National Security/WMD documents of 2006 directly link CTR back to the President's National Security Strategy. "The National Security Strategy of March 2006" lists Combating WMD as one of the nation's eight goals. "The National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction", published in February 2006, lists Threat Reduction as one of the eight mission areas for success. Thus, CTR is linked by documents issued by the President and the Congress to addressing the problem of WMD and the Nation's national security. Other official documents also describe the U.S. national security purposes served by the CTR Program. These include the "National Security Presidential Directive on the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction", December 2002; the "National Security Presidential Directive on Biodefense for the 21st Century", April 2004; and the "Presidential Directive on Domestic Nuclear Detection", April 2005.

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: The CTR Program is not redundant, nor does it duplicate other efforts. In the former Soviet Union and designated countries, the Department of Defense (DoD) is authorized by law and directed by the interagency of the Executive Branch to secure and eliminate strategic delivery systems (bombers, submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles) and their infrastructure; secure and eliminate chemical weapons and their production/research facilities; consolidate, secure, or eliminate especially dangerous pathogens and remove excess bio facilities and improve the safety and security of remaining facilities. The DoD's CTR Program works in some areas which the Department of Energy (DoE), the Department of State (DoS), and other USG agencies also work, and these areas are closely coordinated by the National Security Council (NSC) to avoid duplication. In nuclear warhead security, DoD provides security for warheads while they are in transit and at certain Ministry of Defense storage facilities. The DoE provides security for the Russian Navy and Strategic Rocket Forces facilities and some additional Ministry of Defense Facilities, as agreed to by DoD; and these Departments share information to avoid duplication. Both DoD and DoE, along with the Departments of State, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture work to reduce the risk of bioterrorism and prevent the proliferation of biological weapons technology, expertise, and extremely dangerous pathogens. All sponsored research projects have a distinct area of expertise and interest tailored to their departments and are coordinated before award. In border security programs, non-DoD agencies target official ports of entry while the CTR Program works on the open seas and the land areas between ports of entry. Foreign countries also contribute to the threat reduction efforts. Other members of the world community concentrate on elimination of non-strategic nuclear powered submarines, often called general purpose submarines, while the CTR Program supports elimination of strategic submarines, which carry ballistic missiles. Other countries also contribute to chemical weapons elimination and bio security, and these programs are closely coordinated with CTR. The CTR Program obtains maximum leverage through this coordination, both to ensure there is no redundancy and to obtain synergy through the combined efforts.

Evidence: U.S. agencies coordinate assistance programs directly through Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs), NSC staff guidelines, and NSC and Interagency meeting decisions on such common projects as Security Upgrades at Russia's Nuclear Weapons Storage Sites and International Border Security. For example, DoD's CTR Program and DoE's Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program are upgrading security at Russia's nuclear weapons storage sites, but have divided responsibility for the particular sites to ensure no duplication of effort. Similarly, DoD's CTR Program, DoE's Second Line of Defense Program, and DoS's Export Control and Related Border Security Program all provide assistance to enhance border security. In the few countries that two or more of these programs assist, the U.S. agencies either develop projects on different sections of the border or provide different but complementary capabilities at the same ports of entry. DoD also coordinates with other international contributors on monetary commitments to projects such as the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility in Russia.

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: Yes, the program is free of major flaws that would limit its effectiveness or efficiency because it is designed to be flexible. In order to achieve maximum effectiveness and greatest efficiency, the CTR Program requires cooperation on common objectives from partner countries receiving assistance. The CTR Program's ability to be flexible in its program management and acquisition strategy enables it to target its efforts on the most cooperative partner countries. Thus, if a country is not cooperative in developing or implementing a CTR threat reduction project, the law permits the CTR Program to shift its resources to another country or to another CTR program after notification to Congress. Also, the Implementing Agreements with partner countries, required before a project can begin or enter a new stage, are written with an "up to" cost limit so that CTR's resources are not irrevocably committed if a recipient country is not cooperating fully. Each phase of a project has exit criteria, many of which are tied to the recipient's cooperation. If the exit criteria are not met, CTR can terminate a project. Similarly, all projects' acquisition strategies take into account the possibility that the recipient's objectives or level of cooperation may change. The flexibility permitted by this approach means that, while CTR's near-term projects may change, the long-term goal and outcome of keeping the U.S. safe from WMD is not affected if resources must be directed to another country or project.

Evidence: The Secretary of Defense has used congressional authority to reprogram, or shift, over $500 million dollars between its programs and projects since 1994. Since 1994, when new fiscal year funds become available to the CTR Program, amendments to implementing agreements that increase program cost limits have been renegotiated with the recipient states every year before additional resources are committed, and, in several cases (e.g., Kazakhstan in 2004), the CTR Program withdrew funding because of lack of cooperation.

Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?

Explanation: Yes, the program's design is effectively targeted. The CTR Program is structured around broad threat reduction programs and then further organized into specific projects, e.g., chemical weapons elimination in Albania and the elimination of chemical weapons production facilities in Russia. Each program and its component projects satisfy one or more purposes of the CTR Program's threat reduction mandate. Similarly, each program and project is governed by an Implementing Agreement, which specifies conditions for expenditure of CTR funds, negotiated with the partner recipient states; in those states, specific agencies are designated to receive DoD managed assistance from the program and must permit USG verification that the assistance is used for the intended purposes. In addition, each year, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) stakeholders review the previous year's strategic implementation guidance and issue new guidance for activities during the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP). The new guidance re-directs near-term efforts and guides out-year planning to ensure resources directly address the program's purpose and reduce the threat of WMD and its proliferation.

Evidence: The NDAA for FY 2001 Section 1308 (Public Law 106-398) requires the Secretary of Defense to submit an annual report to Congress on CTR activities, including a report on whether funds are used efficiently and effectively. The annual report to Congress is reviewed concurrently with the annual strategic implementation guidance, and the two are linked. The annual report contains a five-year plan specifying the amount and purpose of funds and other U.S. resources to be provided by the DoD managed projects of the CTR Program. This report directly links the use of CTR Program resources to the established program objectives. Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits of the annual reports, example GAO 05-780R.

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: Yes, the CTR Program has a limited number of specific long term performance measures that focus on outcomes and reflect the purpose of the program to reduce the threat of WMD proliferation from legacy weapons in states of the former Soviet Union (FSU). The measures are designed to track progress over the life of the program but sufficiently flexible to enable the program to reflect changes in USG policy and international commitments or respond to a Presidential initiative or directive. For example, one performance measure tracks progress of installing security upgrades at Russian nuclear weapon storage sites. Originally designed to measure progress through 2012, it has been modified to reflect the acceleration of the eight remaining sites requiring upgraded security with program completion by the end of 2008 as agreed to by Presidents Bush and Putin during the Bratislava Summit of 2005.

Evidence: As stated annually in the Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress, the CTR Program's performance goals are: (1) dismantle FSU WMD and associated infrastructure; (2) consolidate and secure FSU WMD and related technology and materials; (3) increase transparency and encourage higher standards of conduct in handling FSU WMD, and (4) support defense and military cooperation with the objective of preventing proliferation. From these stated goals, the CTR Program has established long-term measures. GAO audits of the CTR Annual Reports, for example, GAO 05-780R.

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: The CTR Program has ambitious targets to be achieved by 2012 that reflect the performance goals itemized in annual reports to Congress. These targets include assisting states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) by 2012 to: deactivate nuclear warheads and eliminate the missiles and launchers that were their means of delivery; ship trainloads of nuclear weapons to central storage and/or dismantlement sites and upgrade the security at nuclear weapons storage sites; design and construct a chemical weapons destruction facility; and build and equip biological agent detection and response disease control monitoring stations.

Evidence: Per the Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2007, by 2012 the CTR Program will assist the FSU states to: deactivate 9,029 nuclear warheads and eliminate 4,446 missiles and launchers that were delivery mechanisms; complete 620 nuclear weapons train shipments and security upgrades at 24 nuclear weapons storage sites; complete construction of a Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF) in Russia to eliminate more than 5,449 metric tons of Russia's chemical weapons stockpile; and complete the building and equipping of more than 36 biological agent detection and response disease control monitoring stations.

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: The CTR Program has specific annual performance measures that demonstrate progress towards assisting states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) to: eliminate missiles and launchers; complete nuclear weapons train shipments and security upgrades at nuclear weapons storage sites; complete construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia; build and equip biological agent detection and response disease control monitoring stations; and install portal monitors at land and maritime ports of entry.

Evidence: The Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2007 and other CTR documents substantiating this report delineate specific annual performance goals for the CTR Program. These other documents include the CTR Drawdown Schedule, the CTR Scorecard, acquisition management baselines, and Joint Requirements and Implementation Plans agreed to by DoD and Executive Agent organizations in recipient states. These documents state that, by 2007, the CTR Program will assist FSU states to: deactivate 7,347 nuclear warheads and eliminate 3,513 missiles and launchers that were their means of delivery; complete 380 nuclear weapons train shipments and security upgrades at 16 nuclear weapons storage sites; continue construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility, which is currently 42 percent complete, and support transfer of responsibility for it to Russia in FY 2009; complete the building and equipping of 22 biological agent detection and response disease control monitoring stations; and install portal monitors at 17 ports of entry in Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan.

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: In accordance with "The Defense Acquisition System" (DoD Directive 5000.1) as supplemented by "Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Major Programs" (DTRA Instruction 5000.01), virtually all CTR projects have acquisition management baselines established before significant resources are committed. Baselines and outcome targets are determined by assessing DoD's requirements for the outcome of a project and the recipient's ability to absorb the assistance to be provided by the CTR Program. Projects are restructured and re-baselined or cancelled if sufficient progress is not made in achieving the objectives or if other factors, such as the level of cooperation of the recipient, change.

Evidence: The Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress and other CTR documents substantiating this report??such as the CTR Drawdown Schedule, acquisition management baselines, and Joint Requirements and Implementation Plans agreed to by DoD and the Executive Agent in countries receiving assistance??establish baselines and ambitious targets for the CTR Program. These documents state that during 2007 the CTR Program will: deactivate 397 warheads and eliminate 174 missiles and launchers that deliver nuclear weapons; complete security upgrades for at least 4 nuclear weapons storage sites; complete 61% of the construction of the Russian chemical weapons destruction facility between April 2006 and the end of FY 2007 in order to complete the facility by the end of FY 2007; build and equip 13 biological agent detection and response disease control monitoring stations; and install communication nodes at 6 border points of entry.

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program uses various mechanisms to ensure commitment and progress toward the goals. First, its authorizing law requires that, to continue receiving assistance, the President certify annually that recipient countries are making progress towards key criteria. If not, the President must certify that continued funding is in the national security interest of the U.S. The U.S. addresses these legislatively mandated issues with recipients each year; issues that can not be resolved by DoD are elevated to the Ambassadorial level or higher. Second, before assistance is extended, a diplomatic agreement captures the potential recipient's commitment to the overarching purpose of the CTR Program in a country-to-country "Umbrella Agreement", which lasts multiple years. Every year, each recipient is required to sign an amended implementing agreement before the U.S. obligates new funds. The amendment to the implementing agreement constitutes an annual recommitment to the principles of the Umbrella Agreement. Third, the U.S. and recipient countries meet regularly in Executive Reviews to assess progress and initial other documents that tie the long-term goals, objectives, and plans to annual plans for CTR's activities in that country. Within the U.S. Government, Interagency partners like the Department of State (DoS) commit to and work toward CTR goals by negotiating the Umbrella Agreements, without which CTR could not undertake its cooperative programs, on behalf of the CTR Program. Similarly, the Department of Energy commits to and fosters CTR goals by aligning its cooperative programs with those of the CTR Program in order to get maximum synergistic results. Finally, the recipient partners measure and report on their commitment to and progress in achieving the long-term goals in the Executive Reviews; the Interagency also measures and reports progress through such documents as the "Mission Performance Plan" published by the DoS.

Evidence: The annual certification has been executed by the President or his designee since the CTR program was initiated. Currently, there are seven Umbrella Agreements. There have been 38 CTR implementing agreements or memoranda of understanding. As of May 2006, four counties have conducted Executive Reviews and Executive Reviews are planned for the remaining two countries by the end of 2006. All recipient countries have negotiated planning documents with the U.S. on the reciprocal responsibilities for program implementation to agree on the near- and long-term commitments of each side for a project.

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: The Government Accountability Office (GAO) routinely conducts independent evaluations of the CTR Program. Since 2001, the GAO has performed fourteen separate reviews focusing wholly or partially on CTR Program activities. GAO has reviewed the Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress and management and internal controls of the CTR Program.

Evidence: There have been 14 GAO reports since 2001. GAO Reports: GAO-06-692, GAO-05-780R, GAO-05-329, GAO-05-157, GAO-04-930R, GAO-04-361, GAO-03-1008R, GAO-03-6270R, GAO-03-482, GAO-03-526T, GAO-03-341R, GAO-02-426, GAO-01-694, GAO-01-582.

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: At the beginning of each budget cycle, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy issues Policy Direction for the CTR Program. Using that policy direction, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs promulgates the Strategic Implementation Guidance that establishes performance goals for the CTR Program. These two documents are the basis for developing resource requirements throughout DoD's Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System. The long-term performance goals are addressed in both the President's Budget Submission and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress. The Annual Report states the summary budgeted amount by project level under each objective. The budget exhibit (OP-5) submits performance criteria for the required fiscal years.

Evidence: The Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit of the FY 2006 Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress stated, "We analyzed the 2006 report to determine whether (1) the 5-year plan addresses legislative requirements and presents accurate information ??. We found that the 5-year plan addressed the legislative requirements by setting forth funding information for the term of the plan and stating the purpose of those funds." GAO 05-780R, pps. 1 and 2, July 1, 2005.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: Over the past three years, specific actions have corrected strategic planning deficiencies. GAO Report-05-0329, "DOD Has Improved Its Management and Internal Controls but Challenges Remain," June 2005, concluded that "new leadership made important improvements to the program's internal controls in the areas of organizational structure, risk assessments, performance measures, program reviews, and communication". Central to this improvement, the CTR Strategic Implementation Guidance (SIG) process, initiated at the beginning of 2005, identifies resource requirements out to FY 2013 using Integrated Process Teams to ensure that all program stakeholders participate. The SIG process identifies the relative priorities of different programs or projects and the desired funding levels for priority projects. Current planning specifies that CTR's efforts and dollars spent in Russia will be reduced over time to accommodate development and growth of new CTR programs in non-Russian FSU countries to reflect U.S. national security policy and operational objectives in the Global War on Terror and preventing WMD proliferation. Also, CTR management has mandated that all projects are planned and executed consistently with the recipient's capacity to absorb the assistance received, enhancing the effectiveness of the CTR Program. New internal strategic planning processes encourage forward thinking about potential projects so new projects can be funneled into the normal planning and budgeting process as original projects are completed.

Evidence: The SIG directs a CTR planning process for projects with lifecycles consistent with DoD's policy goals and available funding. Consistent, disciplined processes apply DoD and DTRA regulations and ensure rigor in both planning and acquisition. CTR's strategic planning now encompasses issues of program management, risk assessment, performance measures, routine program reviews, and regular communication with stakeholders. Memorandum, Strategic Implementation Guidance Process for FY 2008-2013, dated 21 December 2005; Memorandum, Policy Direction for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Strategic Implementation Guidance for Fiscal Years (FY) 2008-2013, dated 19 December 2006; GAO Report-05-329, June 2005 (in accordance with Section 3611 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2004); Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2006; and Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2007.

Has the agency/program conducted a recent, meaningful, credible analysis of alternatives that includes trade-offs between cost, schedule, risk, and performance goals, and used the results to guide the resulting activity?

Explanation: Because it follows DoD's principles and processes and DTRA Instruction found in "Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Major Programs" (DTRA Instruction 5000.01), the CTR Program employs disciplined analyses that ensure a project's operational effectiveness, suitability, and accurate life-cycle cost estimates. Analyses of Alternatives (AoA) are an important element of CTR's acquisition process. AoAs, along with "best practice" concepts such as Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) and risk management, ensure best value to the government. CAIV and risk management enable program and project managers to identify and make trade-offs between the costs, schedule, and performance results of CTR's projects. In addition, regularly conducted independent reviews provide objective analysis of whether a project is accomplishing its objectives.

Evidence: DTRA 5000.01 requires an AoA for senior-level reviews for all applicable programs. AoA results are presented to the reviewing authority during an Acquisition Strategy Review, a Milestone Decision Review, and at periodic Program Reviews. CTR's risk management program enables managers to identify, assess, and design mitigations for each project's risks and make decisions that balance cost, schedule, and performance throughout all stages of the project. The review of the Non-Russia Collaborative Biological Research Program, completed in 2005, exemplifies the independent reviews commissioned by the CTR Program. It was established to assess the effectiveness of the program in meeting the obligation of engaging scientists formerly engaged in biological weapons research and included experts from the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), Department of State (DoS), Department of Homeland Security (DHHS), U.S. Coast Guard, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, University of Maryland, and Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: Data on the performance of all CTR programs and projects is regularly collected and analyzed. Major sources of data are contractors' Weekly, Monthly, and Cost Performance Reports; Site Reports; Safety Reports; Task Order Status Reports; Weekly Construction Reports; Schedule Analysis Reports; reports from contractors' offices; project management trip reports; and weekly teleconferences. Program Managers regularly receive detailed reports on the status of programs and their components. Project personnel meet at least weekly and communicate daily to discuss the status of the components they manage. Each piece of a project is measured against a set of Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) for the expected cost, schedule, and performance objectives. A project's compliance with the KPPs is tracked on an IT database and reviewed frequently. When necessary, the KPPs are adjusted after management approval. KPPs are the basis for development and maintenance of the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB).

Evidence: "Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Major Programs" (DTRA Instruction 5000.01) requires a senior manager, the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), to review and approve a project's acquisition strategy, resource allocation, and program plans. Each Program Manager (PM) is responsible for day-to-day management and technical decisions consistent with the MDA's overarching guidance and direction. Each PM schedules and conducts timely reviews. The PM is required to "...[r]eport to the designated MDA for the planning and management of cost, schedule, and performance for these programs." DTRA Instruction 5000.01 states the requirements for an APB: "The APB contains the thresholds and objectives for the most important cost, schedule, and performance parameters of the program. It is signed by the PM and approved by the MDA. The APB establishes a contract between the MDA and the PM for measuring and reporting program status, and it serves as a measure of accountability for the PM."

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: Implementation of all CTR programs and projects complies with "Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Major Programs" (DTRA Instruction 5000.01), issued November 15, 2004. It reiterates two DoD regulations, "The Defense Acquisition System" (DoD Directive 5000.1) and "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System" (DoD Instruction 5000.2), and makes them applicable to DTRA's programs. The regulations specify management's responsibilities and accountability for achieving cost, schedule, and performance standards. Each performance standard has two components: the "objective" is the actual performance goal, and the "threshold" is the minimum performance goal that must be met to continue the project, unless the highest reviewing authority approves their revision. Performance measures, developed by the Program Manager (PM) in concert with all program stakeholders, are approved by the reviewing authority, the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). Diplomatic agreements, called Umbrella Agreements and Implementing Agreements, establish recipient states' responsibilities and accountability. Contracts bind vendors or contractors who provide the products and services to complete a project. Further, in accord with DoD's new performance management policy, Federal managers are required to link performance to the organization's mission and the program's goals and objectives. Thus, performance appraisals for CTR Program staff, including Senior Executive Services (SES) and managers, are linked to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's (DTRA) mission, goals, and outcomes, effectively differentiating between various levels of an employee's performance, and provide for consequences based on performance.

Evidence: Each project's MDA approves the project's cost, schedule, and performance standards. The performance standards are documented in an Approved Program Baseline (APB), which establishes a contract between the MDA and the PM for continually measuring and reporting the project's status and is the measure of PM's accountability to achieve the cost, schedule, and performance measures. DoD also uses a List of Critical Activities and On-Site Managers, for projects above specified dollar values, when dealing with recipient countries to help it achieve its performance goals. For example, Section 1305 of the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2004 states that if a non-U.S. participant fails to complete a critical activity, the On-site Manager can suspend U.S. participation in the project. DoD maximizes competition and incentive-based contract strategies, including award-fee contracts. DoD also considers the contractors' performance in cost control, quality, customer satisfaction, and compliance with laws and regulations on past or current contracts when awarding new contracts. These evaluations are inputs for the Contractor Performance Assessment Rating System or CPARS system. DTRA has implemented the DoD's National Security Personnel System (Spiral 1.1) that links performance appraisal plans to agency mission, goals, and outcomes. Performance measures for all CTR Program personnel have been established and linked to the DTRA strategic plan.

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner, spent for the intended purpose and accurately reported?

Explanation: By the end of FY 2006, the CTR Program's obligation rate will far exceed the goals of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for all fiscal years. In accord with Section 1205 of the FY 1996 U.S. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that requires a Prior Notice to Congress of the obligation of funds, in all cases, CTR's funds are spent for the intended purpose and accurately reported. DoD has provided 68 reports on the proposed obligation of funds since the start of the CTR Program. Audits and Examinations, too, account for the assistance provided and ensure CTR funds are used for the intended purposes. Umbrella and Implementing Agreements give the U.S. the right to examine the use of any material, training, or service provided through CTR assistance. Over the past five fiscal years, five audits have been performed to validate the intended use of funds. Other methods to ensure funds are used for their intended purposes include application of U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), appropriate DoD regulations, and disciplined acquisition procedures in contracting; frequent, direct observations of CTR assistance in recipient states, including by On-site Managers and site visits by Program Managers, technical teams, and oversight by personnel of CTR's Logistics Support contractor and other U.S. contractors working on-site; monitoring of non-proliferation assistance provided through other Government agencies; use of best business practices; and Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)/Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) audits and surveys.

Evidence: Effective with the FY1998 appropriation, CTR funding was made available for obligation for a 3-year period and as a result, the program carried some significant unobligated balances at year end. The CTR Program's management, however, has reduced the year-end unobligated balance by over 300 percent in the past two fiscal years. The average unobligated balance for all available appropriations was $560.4 million between FY 1999 and FY 2003. The unobligated balance for all available appropriations at the end of FY 2004 was $236.4 million and $132.2 million at the end of FY 2005. The projected unobligated balance of all available appropriations for the end of FY 2006 is $53.6 million. Audits and Examinations and other methods to ensure CTR Program funds are used as intended are described each year in DoD's Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress.

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: Yes, DoD has procedures to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution. In 2003, DoD thoroughly analyzed the CTR Program and, as a matter of policy, purposefully revised and down-scoped previous commitments of assistance. This required Russia to accept responsibility for specific tasks, which DoD previously had agreed to support, in a number of CTR projects. Requiring enhanced financial responsibility by Russia not only minimized the cost to the U.S. of these projects, it also increased the cooperation required. Down-scoping enabled DoD to expand its efforts to prevent proliferation of WMD through shifting funds to new components of non-proliferation policy in the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Proliferation Prevention Initiative, the Biological Threat Reduction Program, and for elimination of chemical weapons. In addition, in 2005, CTR's managers revamped their program management approach. It became a more structured process, one that focuses on the assessment and mitigation of cost, schedule, and performance risks throughout a project; improves communication between both internal and external USG stakeholders and foreign partners; and requires periodic project evaluation and reporting to a higher level of review by a designated Milestone Decision Authority. These management changes produced savings in both direct and indirect costs, savings that can be re-invested in higher priority requirements or new initiatives.

Evidence: Russia now has the responsibility for: permitting and construction of missile propellant open burn facilities, re-grading ICBM silo-elimination sites; elimination of a substantial portion of SS-25 road-mobile ICBM base infrastructure, including the foundations of garages for mobile ICBMs, from which missiles can be launched; operations and maintenance support at missile storage warehouses built with CTR assistance; elimination of bows, sterns, and sails of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines; and support for emergency response equipment for nuclear weapons transportation. Reinvestment of savings generated by more rigorous management include: use of a single direct contract for transportation and logistical support; hiring of foreign nationals which eliminates housing and travel-related costs for those on temporary 90-day assignments; and direct contracts with Russian partners, eliminating the overhead paid to U.S. contractors, to dismantle ICBM components.

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: Yes, the program collaborates and coordinates effectively with related programs. Although the focus of the majority of the CTR programs is performed only by DoD, the Department of Energy (DoE) and the Department of State (DoS) are pursuing related programs in some areas. Work in these areas is closely coordinated by the National Security Council to avoid duplication. In nuclear warhead security, the DoD provides security for warheads while they are in transit and at certain Ministry of Defense storage facilities. The DoE provides security for the Russian Navy and Strategic Rocket Forces facilities and some additional Ministry of Defense facilities, as agreed to by DoD and coordinated through the National Security Council staff. Both DoD and DoE regularly share information in this project to avoid duplication. Both DoD and DoE work in the biological research world as it relates to non-proliferation in the former Soviet Union, along with the Departments of State, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture. These efforts are coordinated through the State Department. All agency-sponsored research projects in this area require a distinct area of expertise and are coordinated ahead of time. DoS funds the Export Control and Related Border Security Program, which seeks to improve former Soviet Union states' export control capabilities to prevent proliferation of WMD and WMD components, technology, and delivery systems. Other U.S. agencies, including DoE, the Department of Commerce, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Service, and the U.S. Cost Guard, help implement the Export Control and Related Border Security Program. Other border security programs are divided so that other agencies concentrate on the official ports of entry while CTR works on the open seas and the land areas between ports of entry. CTR coordinates these efforts through interagency contacts and through Combatant Commanders. Foreign countries also contribute to the threat reduction efforts, and these efforts are closely coordinated to maximize efficiency. The United States, United Kingdom, and Canada work collaboratively to assist Russia in the construction of the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility. All four parties meet twice a year as a coordinating group. In addition, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States meet twice a year to collaborate on Biosecurity and Biosafety projects in the former Soviet Union. Finally, the Strategic Arms Elimination Program has coordinated efforts with Norway and Japan on the issue of Russian Strategic Submarine Elimination.

Evidence: The following examples demonstrate how DoD collaborates and coordinates with related programs. Coordination occurs at National Security Council and Interagency meetings, such as the sub-Proliferation Strategy Policy Coordination Committee on International Border Security, and at Interagency Working Group Meetings and the nuclear weapons security working group. Integrated Process Team (IPT) meetings, where CTR Program projects' work is leveraged with that of other agencies, occur throughout the project. In these IPTs, stakeholders from appropriate agencies participate actively. For example, the CTR Program's Weapons of Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI) assists non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union to strengthen their borders against the proliferation of WMD. Several other U.S. agencies' programs support the same objective. To avoid conflict and maximize synergy, representatives of other programs, including those from other DoD offices, the U.S. Coast Guard, DoE, and DoS, and from other countries attend working and, in some cases, decision meetings. When necessary, Memorandums of Understanding and/or Memorandums of Agreements are formalized between U.S. agencies to define their reciprocal roles and responsibilities and ensure that the U.S. projects complement rather than duplicate each other. Lastly, CTR participates in the Global Partnership Process, a venue to collaborate and coordinate with other countries on threat reduction activities. The Government Accountability Office's periodic investigations assess whether the CTR Program collaborates with other programs. Various DoD Inspector General teams also perform similar inquires. Finally, CTR Program plans and results are formally reported to Congress annually, providing another mechanism to assess effective collaboration.

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: Bi-Weekly Business meetings review the execution status of the CTR Program. Both the planned obligation of funds and the Contracting Work Plan are reviewed. Financial management items covered at these meetings include the current projection for obligation of funds against the baseline for obligations established at the beginning of the fiscal year, the status of obligations and disbursements against goals set by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the status of available funds at the Sub-Activity Group Level of the CTR Program, and a review of unliquidated obligations. Other financial management practices include incremental funding of contracts, DTRA quarterly reviews of CTR programs, and OSD/OMB mid-year reviews. Further, on a weekly basis, CTR program/project managers review expenditure data and coordinate with the Defense Finance and Accounting Service and Defense Contract Management Agency to ensure payments are made properly for the intended purpose, thereby minimizing erroneous payments. Defense Treat Reduction Agency (DTRA) financial management systems (Centralized Accounting and Financial Resource Management System) meets all statutory requirements, records accurate and timely financial information, and supports day-to-day business decisions.

Evidence: The CTR Program has reduced its unobligated balance by approximately $400 million in the past two fiscal years, and the CTR Program's obligation rates will exceed goals set by the Office of the Secretary of Defense by 35% for FY 2006 funds. Over $500 million has been renotified to Congress and obligated for higher priority requirements within the CTR Program, as authorized by the NDAAs. Furthermore, the DoD has made achieving a department-wide "clean audit" of its financial statement a top priority. A "clean audit" reflects employment of superior management and keen oversight of financial statements and associated business operations. While the appropriation for the CTR Program is just one of many recorded in DTRA's financial system, DTRA continues to demonstrate business management success and fiscal responsibility, receiving four "clean audit" opinions of its financial statements. DTRA is committed to continued financial and managerial excellence.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: Yes, the CTR program has taken meaningful steps to address management deficiencies. For example, management deficiencies were identified in 2002 after Russia declared it did not need the $100M Heptyl (i.e., rocket fuel) Conversion Plant constructed with CTR Program funds. The CTR Program had worked very closely with Russia to build the facility according to their stated needs. In 2003, Russia notified the US that the facility was no longer needed because the heptyl would be used for commercial space launch purposes. To minimize any similar waste of program funds, CTR management implemented several new processes to ensure the recipient country's commitment to CTR projects and objectives. The new processes include: joint semi-annual Executive Reviews of a country's projects by senior USG officials and officials of a country that receives assistance; negotiation and signature of Implementing Agreements codifying the partners' commitments; and negotiation and initialing of Joint Requirements and Implementation Plans that document working-level agreement on program-wide relationships and objectives and on project-specific requirements, budgets, schedules, assumptions, and mutual responsibilities. The CTR Program's managers also have implemented procedures to capture, update, and share lessons learned during project implementation and completion, enabling more effective project implementation, execution, and control. Further, in accord with the new Risk Management Plan, managers now assess and balance risks with project requirements and measure achievement of cost, schedule, and performance objectives throughout a project. "Best practice" management techniques such as Earned Value Management Systems reporting and analysis, Acquisition Program Baselines, Program Plans, Milestone Decision Reviews, requirements-definition, spiral and incremental acquisition approaches, performance-based services contracting, Integrated Process Teams, and System Design Review processes are now standard procedure. Realizing that management improvement requires more than reforming processes, OSD and DTRA improved the oversight monitoring of Quarterly Program Management Reviews (QPMRs). At each QPMR, senior managers review selected programs' progress in maintaining improved management. Subordinate reviews, all established formally, review in detail matters that cannot be reviewed at QPMRs.

Evidence: "Cooperative Threat Reduction: DoD has Improved Its Management and Internal Controls, but Challenges Remain", a report of the Government Accountability Office, GAO-05-329, dated June 2005, provides independent evidence that CTR improved previously identified management and internal control deficiencies. Additionally, "Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Major Programs" (DTRA Instruction 5000.01) documents the management control process used to implement all of the CTR Program's projects. Further, the management processes for the pre-qualified, established group of CTR Integrating Contractors (CTRIC) are documented in the CTRIC Business Process Guide.

Is the program managed by maintaining clearly defined deliverables, capability/performance characteristics, and appropriate, credible cost and schedule goals?

Explanation: All CTR Program projects have a designated Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), and all projects establish Key Performance Parameters (KPP) for cost, schedule, and technical performance. Program and project managers are responsible to an MDA for the achievement of goals articulated by the KPPs. Formal briefs and reports to the MDA are required regularly and in response to emerging issues. Although required only for programs designated as DTRA Major Programs, in practice these disciplines are required of all CTR projects. The CTR program also uses several computer-based monitoring systems to assist management. One IT tool is a database that tracks the status of compliance with KPPs; another tracks the receipt of deliverable data required of contractors.

Evidence: DoD increased management visibility and oversight by implementing the KPP Tracking Tool. Each program's key cost, schedule, and performance parameters are readily available for management review via the CTR Web Portal. The tool automatically generates and distributes warning notices when key performance parameters are at risk of not being met. The CTR Risk Management database, a component of the comprehensive Risk Management Plan, is also available via the CTR Web Portal. This database allows management to view the compendium of CTR program risks and ascertain the status of all risks and the mitigation strategies designed to reduce or control risk. A tracking tool for the Contract Deliverable Requirements List is under development to enable DoD to ensure that it is receiving its products and services in a timely manner. In accordance with DTRA regulations, all CTR programs are subject to an ongoing review process to monitor program cost, schedule, and performance.

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: The CTR Program has demonstrated progress in achieving long-term performance goals in several areas, including elimination of missiles and launchers, security upgrades at nuclear weapon storage sites, and building and equipping disease control monitoring stations for biological agent detection and response. The CTR Program signs agreements with potential recipient countries, develops an acquisition strategy, and competitively selects among a group of pre-qualified contractors to perform the work on-site in recipient countries. A variety of reports and continued oversight visits ensure the work is performed and according to standards. In addition, because it requires cooperation from the recipient country, the CTR Program designs flexibility into its acquisition and program management strategies so it can target more cooperative countries: If one recipient is not supporting achievement of a project's goals, the CTR Program can shift its resources to another country, program, or threat reduction project. Thus, the CTR Program's near-term goals can be shifted to reflect the changing realities of foreign cooperation without impacting its ability to achieve its goals over a five-year period.

Evidence: Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2007, Figure 1, p. 3. See METRICS section.

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: The CTR Program's baselines and annual targets reflect requirements that must be fulfilled by states receiving assistance--for example, weapons must be turned over in order to be dismantled. There may be both increases and decreases in what these states provide, and schedule slippages and accelerations occur. To minimize these changes' impact on its annual performance goals, the CTR Program utilizes Executive Reviews (ER) and the Joint Requirements and Implementation Plan (JRIP) process to establish joint dialogue between U.S. and its counterparts for tracking, evaluating, and documenting program objectives, status, results, and outcomes and performance goals. Internally, CTR adheres to standard DoD acquisition processes that require identifying key performance parameters (KPPs) or goals to be achieved by a certain date and within a certain budget. Progress toward achieving the KPPs is reviewed formally each quarter so that, at year's end, annual progress can be measured. These measurements, as well as any changes in what is provided by DoD's partners in the former Soviet Union (FSU), are explained in each Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to the Congress. Thus, the CTR Program uses two approaches to achieve its annual performance goals: It works with its FSU partners to encourage them to provide as much as possible of what is required to achieve the annual performance goals and objectives that have been jointly developed. And it adheres to the DoD acquisition processes which entail regular measurement of progress and enable identification, in advance, of any potential obstacles to achieving annual performance goals.

Evidence: "Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Major Programs" (DTRA Instruction 5000.01), the CTR Program's Key Performance Parameters (KPP) Tracker database, quarterly Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) reports, Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress FY 2007; GAO Report-05-329, June 2005 (in accordance with Section 3611 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2004). The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) also has a strategic planning process to establish and measure the achievement of annual goals.

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: The CTR Program has demonstrated improved cost effectiveness through using DoD's procedure to review, as a matter of policy, previous commitments as measured against achievement of program goals. The review, performed in 2003, led to down-scoping of some previous DoD commitments and their assumption by Russia and Ukraine. DoD's new policy structure enabled it to shift funds to target emerging non-proliferation objectives in preventing WMD proliferation across the borders of the non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union and reducing the threat from proliferation of biological and chemical weapons.

Evidence: Some examples of conscious policy shifts to transfer responsibilities to Russia which also resulted in cost avoidances are permitting and construction of missile solid propellant open burn facilities, re-grading ICBM silo elimination sites; elimination of portions of SS-25 road-mobile ICBM bases' infrastructure; operation and maintenance support of missile storage warehouses; and elimination of bows, sterns, and sails of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. This means that DoD spending in Russia has been declining, while spending on securing dangerous pathogens and to prevent proliferation across borders in the non-Russian FSU states has increased.

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: Yes, the work of the CTR Program, still the largest and the first to work in cooperative security and dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction with a former foe, has achieved similar or better results compared to other programs with similar purpose and goals. Its budget has not exploded. It maintains schedules for achieving long-term goals and on individual projects through a variety of management tools. The CTR Program, since its inception, has supported deactivation of over 7,000 warheads and destruction of over 2,000 strategic missiles, 150 strategic bombers, and nearly 1,000 launchers in the former Soviet Union.

Evidence: The countries where CTR projects are located have been unable, financially or technically, to implement these projects on the established timetable without DoD assistance through the CTR Program. Other agencies with similar program areas have been unable to conduct large-scale comprehensive projects similar to those of the CTR Program in the states of the former Soviet Union. For example, the CTR Program is completing the largest threat reduction construction project in Russia. The CTR Program also has eliminated all heavy bombers and nuclear air-to-surface missiles from Ukraine.

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: Yes, such independent evaluations show that the CTR Program is effective and achieving results. For example, a report of the Government Accountability Office (GAO), released July 9, 2004, titled "FY 2005 Annual Report on the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program", examined the full scope of the CTR Program's report to Congress on all of its activities for one complete fiscal year. In reporting the examination's results, GAO stated that it had "examined the source documents that supported the data in the published report and found that the published data were generally well supported". Additionally, a report issued in June 2005, titled "DOD Has Improved Its Management and Internal Controls but Challenges Remain", stated that "new leadership made important improvements to the program's internal controls in the areas of organizational structure, risk assessments, performance measures, program reviews, and communication."

Evidence: GAO Reports: GAO-05-780R, GAO-05-329, GAO-04-930R, GAO-03-1008R, GAO-03-6270R, GAO-03-526T, GAO-03-341R

Were program goals achieved within budgeted costs and established schedules?

Explanation: Yes, to a large extent the CTR Program's goals were achieved within budgeted costs and established schedules despite the inherent risk that a recipient of its assistance may not always cooperate fully. The CTR Program has developed an IT database tool, called the "Key Performance Parameter (KPP) Tracker, to monitor this progress. As of May 2006, 235 key cost, schedule, and performance goals for 21 major CTR projects were recorded in the KPP Tracker, and 87% of them have been achieved or are on track to be met. Some completed projects, such as the Strategic Bomber and Air-to-Surface Missile Elimination Project, achieved all cost, schedule, and performance goals. The CTR Program's new Risk Management Program also enables managers to ensure projects achieve their goals within budget and on schedule by identifying risks to cost and timely performance and facilitating the developing of mitigation strategies for these risks.

Evidence: See the Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2007. It itemizes the CTR Program's accomplishments through FY 2005. The report identifies program and project goals, what was done to meet these goals during FY 2005 and the cumulative accomplishments since the beginning of the CTR Program, and target goals for the next year and through 2012. This data shows that projects are on schedule, stay within cost, and achieve performance objectives.