Detailed Information on the
Space Launch Assessment

Continue monitoring milestones for schedule compliance to ensure programmatic adjustments can be made in a timely and efficient manner without disrupting planned satellite launches.

Ensure the satellite launch programs are flexible enough to respond to changing conditions, while maintaining the necessary capabilities described in National Space Transportation policy.

Combine launch, production, and engineering teams of Boeing and Lockheed Martin, forming the United Launch Alliance (ULA) Joint Venture. The single ULA workforce will benefit from a launch tempo, defined as the number of booster cores built in the assembly line and launched per year, that would be greater than could be expected for either of two competing workforces. Fostering increased launch reliability notwithstanding the declining demand for medium and heavy lift launches.

Evaluate common payload configuration (EELV Secondary Payload Adapter [ESPA]) for Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELV).

Determine feasibility to deploy the EELV Secondary Payload Adapter (ESPA) on all EELV launch vehicles. The ESPA will facilitate greater opportunity to fly scientific payloads in support of National Security Space efforts.

Measure: Demonstrated cost savings of 25% below 'heritage' systems.

Explanation:The EELV program office will need to conduct analysis demonstrating the projected cost savings of the EELV system over the 'heritage' launch systems for a similar manifest. This analysis should include comparisons of development, infrastructure, and vehicle purchase costs for the EELV and various systems 'heritage' systems.

Measure: ORS CDR

Explanation:Successful Completion of CDR. CDR is a critical review of the entire system that must be successfully passed before the program can go into final production/deployment. The review board at a CDR is made up of a team of government reviewers that critically looks at each area of the program to ensure that user requirements are being successfully met by the design and intended implementation of the system.

Measure: ORS Cost data/ EVMS within 10% of planned budget.

Explanation:Cost Performance measure. This data is reported by the contractor to the program office. This is the data that will flag a schedule overrun on a particular part of the program.

Measure: Range Safety Metrics are at 100% of stated goals.

Explanation:Statistical summary of system operational availability and other range safety figures of merit and their performance towards operational goals.

Measure: ORS Schedule data/ EVMS within 6 months of planned schedule.

Explanation:Schedule Performance Measure. This data is reported by the contractor to the program office. This is the data that will flag a schedule overrun on a particular part of the program. Displays a seven (7) month schedule overrun.

Measure: Complete allocation of DoD and IC requirements and funding responsibilities for EELV

Explanation:The Air Force and the Intelligence Community launch offices need to analyze, evaluate and finish the negotiations on the launch infrastructure and funding responsibilities.

Measure: Provide on-time Range Services at 100% of stated goals.

Explanation:Statistical summary of range service goals and their performance towards operational goals. For example, the number of times that a launch was scrubbed or delayed from its desired primary launch window due to a range instrumentation failure.

Measure: ORS Flight Demonstration on schedule as dictated by National Security policy.

Explanation:Successful completion of the ORS Flight demonstration by the date described in NSPD-40.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: The purpose is clear and well documented in Federal Law and National Policy. The purpose of the program is to fulfill the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) responsibilities articulated in the December, 2004 U.S. Space Transportation Policy. Under this policy, SECDEF is the launch agent for the national security sector and maintains the capability to develop, evolve, operate, and purchase services for those space transportation systems, infrastructure, and support launch activities necessary to meet national security requirements. The SECDEF has delegated program execution to the Air Force. The Air Force Space Launch Program (i.e., Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles, Medium Launch Vehicles, Ranges, Operationally Responsive Launch Demonstration, and Rocket Systems Launch Program) is the DoD instrument to meet Federal Law and National Space Policy requirements.

Evidence: U.S. Code Title 10, Subtitle D, Part I, Chapter 807, Section 8062, Policy; composition; aircraft authorization, March 18, 2004 National Space Transportation Policy, December 21, 2004 Commercial Space Launch Act U.S.C. Title 49, Subtitle IX, Chapter 701, Commercial Space Launch Activities, January 2, 2001 Programmatic Documentation: Mission Need Statement (MNS), Operational Requirements Document (ORD), Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), Program Management Directive (PMD), Concept of Operations (CONOPS), and Analysis of Alternatives (AoA).

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: The program addresses a need for assured access to space, responsive space launch, reduced launch cost, and increased launch reliability in support of national security space goals.

Evidence: Programmatic Documentation: Mission Need Statement (MNS), Operational Requirements Document (ORD), Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), Program Management Directive (PMD), Concept of Operations (CONOPS), and Analysis of Alternatives (AoA).

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: According to national space transportation policy, the Secretary of Defense has a unique responsibility as the launch agent for the national security sector.). This program does not duplicate the civil space launch efforts conducted by NASA. Further, the Air Force launch program and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) collaborate closely to prevent duplication within the national security space launch arena. The program does not duplicate private sector efforts. Assuring access to space requires maintaining a viable space transportation industrial and technology base. A significant downturn in the market for commercial launch services has undermined, for the time being, the ability of industry to recoup its significant investment in current launch systems (e.g., Sea Launch and Integrated Launch Services) and effectively precludes industry from sustaining a robust industrial and technology base sufficient to meet all United States Government needs. The Air Force and DoD have interpreted the 'assured access to space' strategy as requiring two EELV launch vehicle contractors. It is not clear to OMB that this strategy is the best method to satisfy the 'assured access to space' requirements.

Evidence: U.S.C. Title 10, Subtitle D, Part I, Chapter 807, Section 8062, Policy; composition; aircraft authorization, March 18, 2004 National Space Transportation Policy, December 21, 2004 Commercial Space Launch Act U.S.C Title 49, Subtitle IX, Chapter 701, Commercial Space Launch Activities, January 2, 2001.

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: Currently the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) system and associated programs can meet user demands and launch to their manifests. However, there are continuing issues associated with both the launch industry and definition of underlying EELV requirements. The EELV program, when conceived, was to be leveraged on the commercial launch market projections for a large volume of launches. Since then the commercial market has collapsed resulting in a significantly lower launch rate than anticipated. This low launch rate has delayed the build-up in flight experience, reducing confidence in the system's reliability, and driving up the costs per launch. These cost pressures, low vehicle production rates, and low launch volumes are some of the factors influencing the industry consolidation: United Launch Alliance (ULA), a proposed joint venture between Boeing and Lockheed Martin. OMB is concerned that creation of ULA could, in the long term, be counter to many of the 'assured access' requirements postulated for 'assured access to space'. In addition, 'assured access' space launch requirements are not matched by an 'assured space capability' investment strategy, invalidating many 'assured access' benefits. This is a major shortfall in DoD and Air Force space strategy.

Evidence: National Security Space Acquisition Policy, Number 03-01, Dec 27, 2004 DoDI 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, May 12, 2003 (Recertified Nov 24, 2003 DoDI 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, May 12, 2003 Operational Requirements Document: Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, Sep 98.

Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?

Explanation: The program is effectively targeted so that resources reach the supporting space launch components, which results in capabilities and effects for the satellite programs and ultimately to the warfighter. Recent NSPD-40 guidance calls for sustaining and promoting a domestic space transportation industrial base, including launch systems, infrastructure, and workforce, necessary to meet ongoing United States Government national security and civil requirements.

Evidence: The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process enables DoD to allocate resources to the highest priority programs. The primary building block of this process is the Program Element (PE), which identifies specific beneficiaries for intended funding. DoD Budget materials; Program Budgets; COCOM Integrated Priority Lists (warfighter requirements).

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: Each of the specific programs, which comprise the "Space Launch Programs" have performance parameters intended to measure success of the programs (e.g., mass to orbit, reliability, standardization, infrastructure, payload interfaces, cost, timeliness, responsiveness). In addition, the Air Force was directed, through the Secretary of Defense, to provide reliable and affordable access to space. This includes providing assured access to space (EELV ORD, Sep 98, Para 1.2.1), responsive space launch (ORS (demonstration program), MNS, Dec 01, Para 2.1.4), reduced launch cost (EELV 25% cost savings goal over heritage launch systems and $5M to $10M per launch for ORS), and increased launch reliability (EELV ORD, Sep 98, Para 4.1 and ORS MNS, Dec 01, Para 2.1.4.4) in support of national security space goals. Performance rating methods like validated Key Performance Parameters and the Selected Acquisition Reports are used to analyze and report the program's status and performance. NSPD-40 states: "The fundamental goal of this policy is to ensure the capability to access and use space in support of national and homeland security, civil, scientific, and economic interests." 'Assured access' is a requirement for critical national security, homeland security, and civil missions and is defined as a sufficiently robust, responsive, and resilient capability to allow continued space operations, consistent with risk management and affordability." The particular system requirements associated with fulfilling the 'assured access' terminology is not clear. The Air Force has settled on having two systems as a solution; however, the independence of the systems and the associated requirements associated with 'assured capability' are not defined in either the DoD investment strategy or the individual program/systems requirements.

Evidence: DoDD 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, 12 May 03, Certified Current 24 Nov03 National Security Space Acquisition Policy Number 03-01, 27 Dec 04 ORS Mission Need Statement, 20 Dec 01 Operational Requirements Document: Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, Sep 98 Enabling Assured Access Study, 15 Jan 05 (The Moorman Study) National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-40, 21 Dec 04 National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004, H.R. 1588.

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: Although the DOD space launch program has systems that are fully developed and providing services that support the community, there are some programs that are still in development. The Space Lift Range System (SLRS) "Range Standardization and Automation" (RSA) Phase IIA is on schedule for a 2008 completion. This effort completes modernization of communication and control/display segments. The SLRS contract is planned to complete Instrumentation Modernization in 2010. EELV provides assured access to space with medium and heavy lift vehicles. The Delta II Program schedule is to flyout GPS IIR missions by 4th Qtr/FY07 and complete contract closeout and facilities shutdown or Disposition by 4thQtr/FY08. Finally, one of the most ambitious programs is the newly started ORS Technical Demonstration program. Its goals include rapid, low cost access to space, payload configuration flexibility, and tactical mission responsiveness to COCOM commanders. The goals for ORS are $5M to $10M per launch and systems that must be ready to launch within hours of call-up, and to conduct military operations within hours of reaching orbit. These goals and capabilities are the foundation for future specific program measures. Output goals serve as a reasonable surrogate for many outcomes in the launch programs.

Evidence: Program Research and Development Announcement (PRDA) #TD-05-01 Program Management Directive (PMD) 2138(49)/PE#35119F for MLV, 25 Jul 02 ORS MNS, Dec 01, Para 2.1.4.1 Falcon Statement of Objectives (SOO) Sec Def Memorandum: Support of Service Development Flight Test Requirements, Aug 72 Det 12 Strategic Plan, 26 July 04 Published Program schedules and goals in OSD and Congressional Staffer briefs.

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: The programs included in the DOD national space launch program all use the following methods and procedures to analyze and measure the program's achievements. DOD Directive 5000.1, National Security Space Acquisition Policy Number 03-01, 27 Dec 04 DoDI 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, DoDD 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Version 1.0, 17 Oct 04, and Defense Acquisition Guidebook. In addition, the programs participate in many reviews to all levels of management in the DOD and Congress.

Evidence: : DoDD 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, 12 May 03, Certified Current 24 Nov03 DoDI 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 12 May 03 National Security Space Acquisition Policy Number 03-01, 27 Dec 04 Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Version 1.0, 17 Oct 04 Defense Acquisition Guidebook url: "http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document".

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: The purpose of the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) is to document the program's approved baseline by reporting top-level program drivers and risk areas associated with schedule, performance, and cost thresholds and objectives. It is established to enhance program stability and provide a critical reference point for measuring and reporting the status of program implementation. APB is required for each milestone review for each acquisition program, without regard to acquisition category (ACAT).

Evidence: Program Acquisition Program Baselines Ref: 10 USC 2435 Published tables of EOM and EOY execution goals Execution data published in OSD and Congressional Staffer briefing

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: The Air Force and its partners have worked in partnership through out the development of the EELV and have committed to working through issues that will come up in the course of the program. However, some NASA activities may impact the DOD National Space Launch community; (the NASA Exploration Vision) and the Joint Venture proposed by the two EELV Contractors. Currently under analysis is NASA's choice for the launch vehicle(s) that will support NSPD-31, The Exploration Vision for NASA. The proposed Joint Venture for space launch between the two EELV contractors, Boeing and Lockheed Martin, named United Launch Alliance, could possibly affect the EELV program if approved. The Medium Launch Vehicle III Program schedule is to flyout GPS IIR missions by 4th Qtr/FY07 and complete Contract Closeout and Facilities Shutdown or Disposition by 4thQtr/FY08. Space X, Lockheed Martin, Microcosm, and Air Launch are in the final down select competition for an Operationally Responsive Launch Demonstration. Finally, the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office have been working in conjunction to create an integrated launch infrastructure that would support both DoD and Intelligence Community launch requirements.

Evidence: National Security Space Acquisition Policy Number 03-01, Para 4d, 27 Dec 04 OMB Circular A-11, Part 7 and ANSI/EIA-748 (2002 version) Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 15

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: The DOD National Space Launch programs use the following tools to conduct periodic analyses and support program improvements: Capabilities Review & Risk Assessment, Independent Program Assessment, Independent Cost Estimate (ICE), Life Cycle Cost Estimate, and OSD Budget Analysts to review and assess programs. In addition, Congressional Armed Services and Appropriation Committee Staffers review and assess programs' content, progress and relevance on an annual basis, prior to authorizing and appropriating funds. The GAO also conducts annual budget and program assessments. In addition, the FY2005 Defense Authorization Act section 912 requires the Secretary of Defense to Conduct an comprehensive review of national security space launch. This analysis is currently in progress.

Evidence: Capabilities Review & Risk Assessment (CRRA) Independent Program Assessment (IPA) Team Report Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) A Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) Nunn-McCurdy Study of Alternatives for the EELV Program, Jan 2004 Congressional Armed Services and Appropriation Committee Staffers reviews GAO-05-301, March 2005 GAO-04-778R Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, June 2004 GAO/NSIAD-98-151 Expendable Launch Vehicle, June 1998.

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: The space launch programs have Program Elements in the Defense Budget and are supported with detailed programs data in the required Congressional budget documentation. In addition, the budget is matched to program milestones in Air Force Space Command's Program Objective Memorandum (POM) inputs. For example, launch service budgets are explicitly tied to specific launches required to fly specific satellites.

Evidence: Integrated Budget Documentation and Execution System for acquisition programs. FY06 POM submission

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: The programs included in DOD National Security Launch use the following tools to address and correct strategic planning deficiencies. They include Modernization Planning documents like the Mission Area Plans (MAP) and Functional Area Plans (FAP), Capabilities Review & Risk Assessment (CRRA), and Evolutionary acquisition techniques like the "spiral development plan". An example of correcting a strategic planning deficiency is the EELV acquisition strategy restructuring due to the commercial market collapse and its impact on the space launch program. However, there are two strategic issues that have not been addressed in planning or execution of the DOD investment strategy for future programs. First is the definition of measurable requirements associated with the 'assured access to space' concept. Specific validated goals have not been defined for 'assured access' that would allow OMB to judge success or failure. And second, the 'assured access requirements' are flowed into the future DOD program investment strategy in an uneven manner. While the EELV program is currently interpreting the 'assured access' concept as supporting two families of rockets (Atlas V and Delta IV), this strategy is not completely failsafe, since both systems use a near-common upper stage engine and some common sub-components. Additionally, 'assured access' space launch requirements are not always matched by an 'assured space capability' investment strategy (e.g. spare EELV components, fully funded dual integration of payloads or spare satellites), reducing the full affect of 'assured access'. All national security spacecraft are required to design to the EELV Standard Interface Specification, enabling integration onto either EELV rocket system. While not all spacecraft programs fund dual integration, in several cases, dual integration is being accomplished by virtue of procuring launch services on both EELV systems.

Evidence: DoDD 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, 12 May 03, Certified Current 24 Nov03 DoDI 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 12 May 03 National Security Space Acquisition Policy Number 03-01, 27 Dec 04 National Security Presidential Decision (NSPD)-40, 21 Dec 04 Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Version 1.0, 17 Oct 04 Defense Acquisition Guidebook url: http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document

Has the agency/program conducted a recent, meaningful, credible analysis of alternatives that includes trade-offs between cost, schedule, risk, and performance goals, and used the results to guide the resulting activity?

Explanation: Space launch programs have commissioned analyses to examine alternatives. The EELV program used a study of alternatives provided in the 1994 Space Launch Modernization Plan (a.k.a. Moorman Study) and the Moorman Study 2005 update to guide its launch program. Additionally, a Study of Alternatives was conducted in Jan 2004 as part of the Nunn-McCurdy EELV recertification. The SLRS program is planning an AoA for the Global Launch and Test Range System and conducted in house studies that led to selection of Open System Architecture for Radar System Upgrades. Finally, the Air Force Space Command conducted the Operationally Responsive Spacelift (ORS) AoA, which analyzed the need for the capability to responsively put payloads in and through space, maneuver, and provide on-orbit support.

Evidence: Space Launch Modernization Plan, May 1994 Nunn-McCurdy Study of Alternatives for the EELV Program, Jan 2004 Space Launch Modernization Plan Update (15 Jan 05), Enabling Assured Space Access Study ROSA Study, National Academy of Sciences Study dated 2000 (SLRS) Published MLV Program schedules and goals in OSD and Congressional Staffer briefs. ORS AoA approved by the Air Force Requirements for Operational Capabilities Council (AFROCC) on 15 Jul 04. Published RSLP Program schedules and goals in OSD and Congressional Staffer briefs.

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: The system program director, program manager, program executive offices, and component acquisition executive conduct regular reviews of performance. This information is used at the biennial DoD Space Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) review to advise the DoD Space Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) of potential program deviations against APB and KPPs, etc. In addition, each System Program Office (SPO) conducts routine technical performance reviews with contractors, has insight into contractor cost data under the terms of the applicable contracts, and receives financial data and earned value management (cost and schedule) data from prime contractors on a regular basis. For developing programs, current state-of-the-art system development data are shared with research labs to benchmark industry results.

Evidence: USAF submits its Selective Acquisition Reports (SARs), Unit Cost Reports (UCRs), integrated product team documents, Earned Value Management Reports, and Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) reports via AF processes to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Staff. National Security Space Acquisition Policy Number 03-01, 27 Dec 04 Defense Acquisition Guidebook url: "http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document" The Defense Acquisition Guidebook for DAES, SAR, and UCR procedures.

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: The Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) and Program Manager (PM) make decisions, lead the execution of their programs, and are accountable for results. (DoDD 5000.1, 12 May 03 Para E1.1.2). The Program Executive Officer (PEO) or Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) and the DoD Space MDA provide the SPD/PM with the resources and guidance necessary to accomplish these goals. For example, the EELV contractors experienced large cost growth due to a collapse in the commercial market and were not compensated for the erroneous business plans. In addition, the program uses award fees and incentives to hold the program accountable.

Evidence: The DoD acquisition, financial communities, and operational users maintain continuous and effective communications with each other by using Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). Teaming among warfighters, users, developers, acquirers, technologists, testers, budgeters, and sustainers begins during capability needs definition. The acquisition execution chain is ultimately accountable for a program's success or failure. The SPD/PM, as the leader of the Government-Contractor team for a program, is accountable and has the authority to accomplish the program's objectives and meet the user's needs. National Security Space Acquisition Policy Number 03-01, 27 Dec 04 DoDD 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, 12 May 03, Certified Current 24 Nov03 NSSAP 03-01, 27 Dec 04, Para 4.b.

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner and spent for the intended purpose?

Explanation: The financial management system ensures that obligations and expenditures do not exceed the amount appropriated, apportioned, reapportioned, allocated and allotted (Anti-Deficiency Act 31 U.S.C.). Obligations are recorded immediately. SPOs employ OSD obligation goals to obligate funds in a timely manner and as intended. DoD obligation and expenditure goal, for FY05 were met by all space launch programs. These track end-of-month O&E over time as percentages of total budget authority available for the program to spend. Data are measured against monthly goals and program forecasts to indicate program execution health and offer an indication of program progress. Poor program execution relative to goals can indicate schedule slips, slow billings, or excess funds. End-of month goals for O&E vary by appropriation and year. RDT&E is judged by expenditures while procurement is judged mainly by obligations.

Evidence: The fund control procedures prevent untimely liquidation of obligations, unmatched expenditures, and undistributed disbursements, including fiscal year end "Section 1311 Statement of Certification" by a senior accounting official to ensure the validity of all obligations and unobligated balances. Administrative funds control ensures that funds are used economically, efficiently, and only for properly authorized purposes. DoD Financial Management Regulation, Volume 1, Chapter 3, Key Accounting Requirement # 7 Web Site www.dod.mil/comptroller/fmr/01/01_03.pdf Published Program schedules and goals in OSD and Congressional Staffer briefs.

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: Under the original EELV strategy, the Air Force relied on the market to achieve cost effectiveness and efficiencies - there was a continuous competition for launch services between two prime providers. The current EELV strategy will rely on award fees and other success incentives, coupled with a government review of contractor cost and pricing data to achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness. While, the EELV systems will be less costly that the Heritage systems, it is far mare costly that previously planned. This has required DoD to add funding to the EELV program for each of the last three budget cycles. In addition, the program has not yet incorporated clear measures of cost effectiveness for EELV or launch range infrastructure. Other elements of the program also have procedures in place (such as competitive down selects) to achieve incentives, but have not developed transparent measures of the associated efficiency The MLV program uses contract Base Fee and Award Fee incentives and Mission Success Incentives for successful launches, with String Incentives for multiple successful launches of the Delta II (Contract Extension # F04701-93-C-0004/P00201).

Evidence: Competition provides major incentives to industry and Government organizations to innovate, reduce cost, and increase quality. All of the DoD Components acquire systems, subsystems, equipment, supplies, and services in accordance with the statutory requirements for competition. If competition is not available, PMs consider alternatives that will yield the benefits of competition. (DoDD 5000.1, Para E1.1.3) Contract Extension # F04701-93-C-0004/P00201, CLINs 051 - 092, 13 Sep 02 New Acquisition Strategy infrastructure allocations briefing of 26 Mar 02, Investment Budget Review (IBR) reports/briefings for EELV and MLV Program Research and Development Announcement (PRDA) #TD-05-01.

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: Range system program office collaborates and coordinates with EELV, MLV, ICBM, and ORS System Program Offices (SPO) at Los Angeles Air Force Base (LAAFB) on a routine basis. Examples of coordination include adjustments to range programs to support EELV launches and implementation of GPS tracking involving ranges and launch vehicles, with future launch requirements, capabilities, and integration being coordinated with satellite program offices. Examples of Rocket Systems Launch Program's (RSLP) collaborative efforts with related Federal programs include the MoA with MDA for targets and countermeasures. In addition, the AF collaborates with NASA, NRO, and other agencies.

Evidence: DoDI 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 12 May 03National Security Space Acquisition Policy Number 03-01, 27 Dec 04 RSLP/MDA Targets and Countermeasures MOA, 04 NASA/USAF ELV Launch Services MOA, Feb 23, 94 EELV Acquisition Program Baseline (APB), 26 Jul 04.

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: DoD's financial management weaknesses are well-documented. While DoD continues to make efforts to improve them, the Department has yet to obtain an unqualified audit opinion. The Air Force does not have audit reports demonstrating that its EELV and space launch programs are free from internal weaknesses. Moreover, DoD's plan to obtain a department-wide unqualified audit opinion has continued to slip from its planned milestones, which warrants a "no" for this question.

Evidence: None of the reports or audits specifically cite the EELV or space launch programs for material financial weaknesses, however none of the audits specifically examined that aspect of the program. Numerous audits document DoD's financial management weaknesses. Because of the magnitude of its problems, DoD is unlikely to obtain an unqualified opinion for some time.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: While there are no significant management deficiencies in the launch program, the Space Launch program has improved its management practices to include: more aggressive monitoring of program execution; increased focus on systems engineering processes; improved use of performance metrics; enhanced interaction with the operational community to facilitate product acceptance and turnover. The EELV contract has transitioned from the FAR-12 (commercial) to FAR-15 (cost-based contracting), and the new dual contract strategy (infrastructure and launch services). The transition was made to mitigate the commercial market downturn impact on the launch service providers.

Evidence: DoDI 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 12 May 03 DoDD 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, 12 May 03, Certified Current 24 Nov03 National Security Space Acquisition Policy #03-01, 27 Dec 04, Para 5.3.5 The Defense Acquisition Guidebook for DAES, SAR, and UCR procedures.

Is the program managed by maintaining clearly defined deliverables, capability/performance characteristics, and appropriate, credible cost and schedule goals?

Explanation: Statements of work and contracts clearly articulate the required deliverables; performance parameters, period of performance, and cost estimates. Currently the only contracted EELV deliverable is the actual launch service itself which must meet clearly defined requirements for performance and schedule with costs determined under firm-fixed-price agreements. Contracted deliverables may change in "Buy 3", the next major EELV contract award. The Medium Launch Vehicle (MLV) contract provides a launch capability (infrastructure, hardware, manpower, and operations) for precise orbital insertion of GPS satellites into the GPS constellation. Space Launch goals include rapid, low cost access to space, payload configuration flexibility, and tactical mission responsiveness to combatant commands (COCOM) commanders. However, in the new contract structure the infrastructure costs are separated from the procurement of the EELV rockets. The Air Force and the Intelligence Community still need to come to a consensus on the allocation of infrastructure funding each is responsible for.

Evidence: Systems engineering yields a program WBS. The PM prepares the WBS in accordance with the WBS guidance in MIL-HDBK-881. The WBS provides the framework for program and technical planning, cost estimating, resource allocation, performance measurement, technical assessment, and status reporting. (DoD 5000.2-R, Para C5.3.1) DoD 5000.2-R, Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPS) And Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS) Acquisition Programs, 5 Apr 02 MIL HDBK 881 - Work Breakdown Structure, 2 Jan 98.

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: Since the Space Launch 1999 Broad Area Review (BAR), the Space Launch Programs have provided an integrated launch capability that has launched 40 consecutive successful space launch missions (100% success rate) to place national security assets into orbit or to demonstrate lift capabilities at or under budget. In addition, range modernization is keeping pace with increasing launch and test support demands associated with the transition to EELV as the primary AF launch vehicle. The original long-term cost goals have not been met due to the collapsed EELV commercial market and sharp increases in EELV costs. EELV has nominally met performance goals following restructure of the acquisition strategy due to the commercial market collapse and its impact on the space launch program. However, much work still needs to be accomplished with respect to the definition of requirements and development of investment strategy associated with the term 'assured access'.

Evidence: Space Launch programs continue to meet programmatic Key Performance Parameters (reliability, availability, cost, schedule, and performance), providing assured access to space, responsive space launch, reduced launch cost, and increased launch reliability in support of national security space goals and the national security space mission. Launch vehicles, test vehicles, and space ranges integration are achieving the goals of the national space launch mission.

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: The Air Force contends that EELV has surpassed its savings goal of 25% by achieving a 50.4% savings for launch services while maintaining a 100% launch success rate. OMB believes that the achieved savings of 50.4% is based on a 2002 study and the number has not been reevaluated due to the contract and other program changes, further data has been requested. With regards to the 100% launch success rate, OMB agrees that the Atlas V and Delta IV systems have not suffered a launch failure to date. However, EELV has two System Interface Specification (SIS) issues. Shock vibration exceeds specifications during the five meter payload fairing separation on the Delta IV. A vibration absorption solution is currently being tested. The Atlas V has a system contamination issue when the linear shaped charge initiates the first and second stage separation of the core. Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for the redesign is expected first quarter of CY07. EELV has a Milestone III schedule breach (slipping 6 months). Currently the SPO is preparing the Program Deficiency Report (PDR) describing the issues and proposing solutions.

Evidence: Reliability, maintainability, and availability (RMA) data maintained by Space Wings Launch schedules Milestone schedules as briefed to and approved by AFSPC/CC Spring Program Reviews Investment Budget Reviews Nunn-McCurdy Study of Alternatives for the EELV Program, Jan 2004.

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: Each budget year Space Launch acquisition programs follow the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PBBE) process, which are designed to rigorously examine the previous and current years cost, performance, and schedule and adjust program baselines to ensure the efficient and effective use of resources. The Air Force and OSD review and assess cost efficiencies at least four times each the fiscal year to ensure budget execution maximizes cost efficiencies. However, during the last three budget cycles, DoD has added funds to EELV to address cost growth due to the failed contractor commercial launch business plans.

Evidence: Even though a significant downturn in the market for commercial launch services affected EELV Acquisition Program Baseline (APB), resulting in a Nunn McCurdy violation (declared Dec 03/certified Apr 04), the program continues to exceed its cost savings goal of 25% with a Air Force estimate of 50.4% cost savings efficiency. Annual Budget Documents (R-Docs and P-Docs) Spring Program Reviews Investment Budget Reviews Nunn-McCurdy Study of Alternatives for the EELV Program, Jan 2004 Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) Selected Acquisition Report (SAR)

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: DoD Space Launch, by policy definition, is the only National Security Space Launch provider for the federal government. Both 'heritage' and EELV are more cost efficient than the NASA STS program. Average cost per flight for the STS is $685M (sources Pielke 1994, Gehman 2003, 2004 Economic report of the President), whereas Titan cost per flight is $300M-$350M (depending on configuration), and EELV cost per booster is expected to cost $67M - $144M (recurring costs that do not include fixed costs).

Evidence: National Security Space Acquisition Policy Number 03-01, 27 Dec 04

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: Programmatic evaluations initiated by independent agencies including the Spring Program Review, Investment Budget Review, and OSD Budget Reviews, have shown the program to be effective in achieving the stated goals for cost, schedule, and performance. However, the EELV program continues to face cost pressures driven by low demand and launch rates. These challenges led to a Nunn-McCurdy cost breach; the program was re-certified by the Secretary of Defense, and has been the focus of several external reviews.

Evidence: Spring Program Review Investment Budget Review OSD Budget Reviews - Omnibus cost efficiencies Nunn-McCurdy cost analysis GAO reports (TBD)

Were program goals achieved within budgeted costs and established schedules?

Explanation: Each budget year Space Launch acquisition programs follow the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PBBE) process, which are designed to rigorously examine the previous years cost, performance, and schedule and adjust program baselines to ensure the efficient and effective use of resources. Each of the programs examined here has achieved cost savings, improved performance, and met program schedules and milestones. Exceptions include technical or operational payload issues, which slipped launch schedules in favor of mission assurance/success objectives, a prudent strategy given the "one chance" nature of the space launch, the high value of spacecraft, and launch systems.

Evidence: Annual Budget Documents Spring Program Reviews Investment Budget Reviews Nunn-McCurdy Study of Alternatives for the EELV Program, Jan 2004