Detailed Information on the
Customs and Border Protection: Border Security Inspections and Trade Facilitation Assessment

1. Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) - CBP is working with The State Department and the DHS to design and issue a WHTI-compliant border-crossing card to all Americans who require them. During FY 2008, CBP will be working aggressively to roll out WHTI to all major land border ports. CBP will award a contract for the WHTI radio frequency identification (RFID) card-reader infrastructure in December 2007. On January 31, 2008, the use of verbal declarations alone will be eliminated and all travelers will be required to present a government-issued identification. CBP will be issuing WHTI-compliant Trusted Traveler Program membership cards in the March-December 2008 timeframe. CBP is also working with The State Department and the Department of Homeland Security to develop alternative documents that meet WHTI requirements.

2. By the end of FY 2008, CBP will complete a total of 237 lanes at 28 crossing facilities in 13 major ports of entry.

3. Train and deploy an additional 15 CBP Agricultural Specialist Canine teams to major ports of entry by the end of FY 2008.

4. Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) - As mandated in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), the CBP Immigration Advisory Program is working to expand the number of partnership locations with foreign governments. Discussions are underway to make a three new IAP sites operational in FY 2008 at Hong Kong; Madrid, Spain; and Seoul, Korea.

5. Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) Advance Quick Query (AQQ) - Develop and implement the AQQ for screening international flights before takeoff. On February 19, 2008, it will be mandatory for all international carriers to transmit all flight manifest data at least 30 minutes prior to flight departure. CBP will work with carriers during FY 2008 to resolve the technical issues relating to implementation of real-time AQQ.

6. Interpol Stolen and Lost Travel Document database - CBP is working with Interpol to build the required APIS connectivity to screen all inbound passengers against the Interpol Stolen and Lost Travel Document database. Testing will take place in December 2007 and January 2008. National deployment to all ports is expected by April 2008.

8. Deploy non-intrusive imaging (NII) technology - CBP is continuing to expand the number of large-scale NII devices deployed at the ports of entry. CBP will be adding a total of 38 new units in FY 2008, bringing the total deployed by year-end to 230. CBP is planning to have 16 units in place by June 2008 and an additional 22 units in place by the end of FY 2008.

9. Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) - The Secure Freight Initiative is developing the International Container Security (ICS) program to deploy radiological and radio-graphical scanning capability using RPM and Non-Intrusive Imaging technologies in order to scan all cargo traffic destined for U.S. ports of entry. By the end of Q1 FY 2008, CBP will begin prototype operations at Qasim, PK; Puerto Cortes, HN; and Southampton, UK. CBP is also developing additional prototype ports at Salalah, Oman (operational by the end of January 2008); Hong Kong (end of Q1 FY 2008); Brani Terminal, Singapore (end of Q2 FY 2008); and Busan, Korea (end of Q2 FY 2008). SFI will be preparing a report to Congress in April 2008 providing an analysis of SFI test implementation at the prototype locations. Decisions regarding further expansion and the direction of the ICS program will be made subsequent to the issuance of this report. Since 2006, Field Operations has worked to implement the Secure Freight Initiative, in conjunction with the Department of Energy, to provide an operational and emergency response to mitigate the threat of cargo that may contain nuclear or radioactive material.

11. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) - In FY 2008 C-TPAT will continue working to establish minimum-security criteria for port authorities and new enrollment sectors as well as review existing criteria. C-TPAT will complete at least 3500 validations and/or revalidations for FY08. C-TPAT will maintain or improve on the target average CBP exam reduction ratio for member importers compared to non-member importers of 3.5 or less.

12. Admissibility Review Office - During FY 2007, CBP completed the establishment of the Admissibility Review Office (ARO), co-located at the National Targeting Center, to review travel documents and to determine the admissibility of foreign nationals attempting entry to the U.S. at the ports of entry. The ARO reviews and renders decisions on Visa Waiver Section 212(d)(3) requests. For FY 2008, the ARO will render admissibility decisions on at least 12,000 referred individuals.

BSTIF will continue to work with their program partners to achieve its annual performance goals.

BSTIF will strive to demonstrate improved efficiencies and cost effectiveness.

BSITF is continuing to improve its planning process and the performance measures assembled to assess program effectiveness. During 2006, The Office of Field Operations, CBP developed a five-year strategic plan for Securing America's Borders at the Ports of Entry (SABPOE). A new Division was established within CBP OFO to manage the SABPOE implementation process. A formal implementation plan and an expanded set of efficiency and outcome performance measures have been developed to further improve the tracking and evaluation of BSITF program performance and ongoing operational activity.

7. Deploy Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM) - CBP is deploying RPMs to all major ports of entry to detect and prevent nuclear or radiological attacks in the U.S., including all Southern Border land crossings, all major Northern Border land crossings, and the top 22 U.S. seaports by December 31, 2007. By January 2008, CBP will screen 100% of all Southern Border land truck cargo, 91 % of Northern Border land truck cargo, and 97% of major seaport containerized cargo.

10. Container Security Initiative (CSI) - CBP finalized expansion of the CSI program to the target 58 foreign ports at the end of FY 2007. For FY 2008, The Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) is working, in conjunction with the Container Security Initiative (CSI), to implement nuclear and radiological screening of all U.S. bound cargo at three prototype foreign ports, as required by the Safe Port Act. CSI will also conduct evaluations at all CSI ports to refine automated data processes, infrastructure renewals, and maintain 100% screening of all targeted high-risk U.S.-bound containerized cargo at the 58 CSI locations. By the end of FY 2008, at least 86% of the worldwide U.S. destined containers will be processed through CSI ports. Also by the end of FY 2008, CSI personnel will collaborate with foreign customs officials to resolve at least 19,000 targeted cargo examinations.

Measure: Number of fraudulent documents intercepted

Explanation:Legitimate travel is facilitated by maintaining security and integrity in official travel documents as determined by the number of intercepted, fraudulent documents in air, land, and sea environments, including, but not limited to, passports, border cross

Measure: Number of decisions made on Visa Waiver Section 212(d)(3) requests.

Explanation:Legitmate travel is facilitated for travelers from Visa Waiver countries with reciprocal agreements with the US, by waiving grounds of inadmissibility to allow entry. The number of waiver decisions as tracked by the Admissibility Review Office.

Measure: Number of investigative cases initiated due to CSI intelligence

Explanation:This measure tracks the number of investigative cases opened either in the US or at a foreign location due to intelligence gathered by CSI staff at foreign port locations.

Measure: Level of trainee satisfaction reported in follow up survey after CBP Officer training supporting "One Face at the Border" Initiative.

Explanation:CBP's corporate, centrally-managed approach to training and education ensures that CBP training programs are responsive to the direction of CBP leadership and to the rapidly-changing environment in the field. Measure evaluates the level of trainee satisfaction.

Measure: Percent of worldwide U.S. destined containers processed through Container Security Initiative (CSI) ports.

Explanation:This measure is the percent of worldwide U.S.-destined containers (and their respective bills of lading) processed through CSI ports as a deterrence action to detect and prevent weapons of mass effect and other potentially harmful materials from leaving foreign ports headed to U.S. ports. Note: Processed may include any of the following: 1) U.S.-destined cargo manifest/bills of lading data reviewed using the Automated Targeting System (ATS), 2) further research conducted, 3) collaboration with host country and intelligence representatives, and 4) examination of the container.

Measure: Border vehicle passengers in compliance with Agricultural Quarantine Regulations (% compliant).

Explanation:The measure shows CBP's success at maintaining a high level of security in the land border environment by measuring the degree of compliance with U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) agricultural quarantine regulations and other mandatory agricultural product restrictions. CBP randomly samples border vehicle passengers for compliance with all USDA laws, rules, and regulations using USDA guidance on sampling procedures.

Measure: Number of foreign cargo examinations resolved in cooperation with the Container Security Initiative.

Explanation:This measure provides an indicator of the benefit of locating CBP Officers at foreign locations that are cooperating with CBP under the Container Security Initiative (CSI). It provides the number of container examinations processed or mitigated by foreign Customs officials that were identified by CBP CSI as higher-risk and accepted as meeting CBP examination standards and requirements. These examinations would otherwise have taken place at US ports of entry. It is an indication of the number of higher-risk cargo shipments identified and examined prior to embarkation from foreign ports to US destinations.

Measure: Advance Passenger Information (APIS) data sufficiency rate (%)

Explanation:Accurate transmittal of advance passenger information data for law enforcement queries facilitates decision making and targeting capabilities to identify high risk passengers prior to arrival. Carrier compliance rates were substantially below the target. New APIS reporting requirements went into effect in FY 2006 that greatly increased the number of reportable data elements from 5 to over 20, including manually-provided data elements for home address, placing greater responsibility for accuracy at the embarkation point. All data elements on the passenger data record must be transmitted correctly in order for the record to be counted as a valid record. Carriers are having difficulty ensuring that legible and valid information is provided for advanced transmission in the manually prepared data fields. APIS Carrier Account Managers are working with the carriers to improve data collection procedures and input forms in order to improve the APIS rate.

Measure: Average cost savings from centralized NTC operations.

Explanation:The measure shows the cost/time savings that result from the centralized operations at the NTC. Quicker response times compared to each individual port calling different agencies and doing research. Eliminates the need for specialized personnel at each port of entry. Ports can concentrate on continuous inspection operations while the NTC does all necessary research. Targets and actuals are expressed in the following format: #of activity logs processed/$ in POE cost savings.

Measure: Percent of sea containers screened for contraband and concealed people.

Explanation:The measure shows the progress towards increasing security by measuring the percent of sea containers arriving at seaports that were screened for contraband and concealed people using Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) technology. NII technology consists of x-ray imaging and electro-magnetic imaging equipment that is very effective at inspecting trucks, containers, and packages for shapes, density, and hidden cargo. It is very effective at identifying weapons, narcotics, smuggled humans, and concealed cargo. NII equipment is not effective at identifying radioactive or weapons-grade materials. NII equipment and radiation portal monitor (RPM) equipment use very different technologies that accomplish distinctly different things. They complement each other and work together to fully screen cargo.

Measure: International air passengers compliant with agricultural quarantine regulations (%)

Explanation:The measure shows CBP's success at maintaining a high level of security in the international air environment by measuring the degree of compliance rate with agricultural quarantine regulations and other mandatory agricultural product restrictions. The Goal was originally set at 95% compliance by USDA but raised to the current level of 97%. The goal has been set at a level that is high by historical standards and will be a challenge to CBP to continue to meet. CBP has shown significant success in achieving compliance over historical rates, however the goal for compliance of air passengers (97%) for FY 2006 was not met. Although we have maintained a high rate of compliance, we will continue to set higher goals for achievement. Keeping unwanted agricultural products from entering our borders helps improve the safety of our nation. Currently, a lack of fully trained Agricultural Specialists is the root cause of us not achieving even higher levels of compliance. Analysis indicates that higher rates of interceptions occurred during shifts when Agriculture Specialists were available. Fully staffing high-risk air environments with trained CBP Agriculture Specialists will increase the Quarantine Material Interceptions (QMIs), which will improve compliance. CBP should maintain its current mix of programs while continuing its emphasis on filling Agricultural Specialist vacancies, with a priority given to higher-risk environments, and providing additional specialized training to CBP Officers.

Measure: Land border passengers compliant with laws, rules, and regulations (%).

Explanation:This measure is the Compliance Rate of land border vehicle passengers with all of the laws, rules, and regulations that CBP enforces at the Ports of Entry, with the exception of agricultural laws and regulations. It is also referred to as the land Compex rate. It results from a statistical sampling technique that is outcome/result driven. It is an outcome measure because it estimates the threat approaching the port of entry and the effectiveness of officer targeting toward that threat. The measure is valid because it encompasses enforcement actions taken at a port of entry and a statistically valid random sampling of passengers who are considered low risk and would not otherwise be examined. These data are used to determine the actual percentage of passengers who are compliant with all of the laws, rules, regulations, and agreements enforced by CBP.

Measure: Percent of active commissioned canine teams with 100% detection rate results in testing of the Canine Enforcement Team.

Explanation:The Canine Enforcement Program conducts twice-yearly testing of the Canine Enforcement Teams to maintain an operating standard of full detection. To meet both new and existing threats, the CBP canine program has trained and deployed canine teams in a broad array of specialized detection capabilities. Any team exhibiting a weakness in detection capability for an area in which it has been trained must undergo additional training in order to bring it to a level of full detection.

Measure: C-TPAT member compliance rate (%)

Explanation:The measure shows the progress towards increasing compliance rate for C-TPAT members with established C-TPAT security guidelines. In FY 2006, CBP has increased the number of validations performed. Over fifty percent of all C-TPAT members have been validated by CBP. A high compliance rate indicates that a majority of C-TPAT members are committed to maintaining supply chain security standards and have the required level of supply chain security measures in place.

Measure: Average level of supervisor satisfaction reported in followup survey after CBP Officer training supporting "One Face at the Border" initiative.

Explanation:CBP's corporate, centrally-managed approach to training and education ensures that CBP training programs are responsive to the direction of CBP leadership and to the rapidly-changing environment in the field. Measure evaluates the average level of supervisor satisfaction with the delivered product in post-training surveys.

Measure: Percent of truck and rail containers screened for contraband and concealed people.

Explanation:The measure shows the progress towards increasing security by measuring the percent of truck and rail containers that were screened for contraband and concealed people using Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) technology. NII technology consists of x-ray imaging and electro-magnetic imaging equipment that is very effective at inspecting trucks, containers, and packages for shapes, density, and hidden cargo. It is very effective at identifying weapons, narcotics, smuggled humans, and concealed cargo. NII equipment is not effective at identifying radioactive or weapons-grade materials. NII equipment and radiation portal monitor (RPM) equipment use very different technologies that accomplish distinctly different things. They complement each other and work together to fully screen cargo.

Measure: Compliance with electronic submission of advanced cargo information by mode of shipment. (# of penalties written for non-compliance)

Explanation:Operational requirements for submitting and collecting advanced information used to identify high-risk shipments is now mandatory on all shipments entering and leaving the U.S. The rule addresses the threat to the safety and security of the United States posed by containerized shipments.

Measure: Air passengers compliant with laws, rules, and regulations (%).

Explanation:This measure is the Compliance Rate of international air passengers with all of the laws, rules, and regulations that CBP enforces at the Ports of Entry, with the exception of agriculture laws and regulations. It is also referred to as the air Compex rate. It results from a statistical sampling technique that is outcome/result driven. It is an outcome measure because it estimates the threat approaching the port of entry and the effectiveness of officer targeting toward that threat. The measure is valid because it encompasses enforcement actions taken at a port of entry and a statistically valid random sampling of passengers who are considered low risk and would not otherwise be examined. These data are used to determine the actual percentage of travelers who are compliant with all of the laws, rules, regulations, and agreements enforced by CBP.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the guardian of America's borders. Our mission is to safeguard the homeland at and beyond our borders, balancing protection of our Nations' economic security through identifying threats to our security from terrorists and the instruments of terror while facilitating lawful international trade and travel. Border Security Inspections and Trade Facilitation at POEs (BSITF) encompasses a multi-layered system of people and technology to target, screen, and interdict international cargo and travelers that pose a potential risk to the nation's security and the health and safety of its citizens or do not comply with trade and travel rules and regulations, while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel.

Evidence: The Program, for purposes of the PART, includes the entire budget line item for BSITF. This includes the following organizational entities and all of their sub-programs: Office of Field Operations (OFO), Office of International Affairs (INA), Office of Rulings and Regulation (OR&R), Office of Strategic Trade (OST), Office of Training and Development (OTD), and several other headquarters and management offices. CBP's multi-layered system of people and technology includes core Customs and Border Protection programs such as: Inspection, Trade and Travel Facilitation, which handles Interdiction and Security; Passenger Operations, Targeting and Analysis, and Canine Enforcement; Trade Compliance and Facilitation; Harbor Maintenance Fees (in OF); the Container Security Initiative (CSI) (in INA); the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)(in OFO); Inspection Technology (one of the programs included in last year's PART)(in OFO); Other International Programs (in INA); the National Targeting Center (in OFO); Automated Targeting System (in OFO); Training at the POEs; Headquarters Management and Administration (in OR&R, OST, OC, Finance); and Other Technologies.

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: " The United States has 5,000 miles of border with Canada and 1,900 miles of border with Mexico to protect. On a typical day, CBP processes 1.1 million passengers and pedestrians, including 724,192 aliens; 64,432 truck rail and sea containers; 2,639 aircraft; 365,079 vehicles; and 75,734 merchant entries coming into the United States. CBP's role is the single agency charged with securing the U.S. borders against the entry of terrorists and their weapons, and enforcing trade, immigration and other laws while facilitating the entry of legitimate travel and trade. CBP's mandate requires investment in and implementation of innovative technologies and strategies to help the agency sift through the huge volume of passengers and cargo entering or bound for this country and determine where to focus the agency's efforts in order to protect the American public from terrorists and terrorist acts. In recent years, the zone of security has expanded outward and strengthened by targeting, risk management, using advanced technologies, and fostering partnerships."

Evidence: "In cooperation with 23 foreign Customs administrations, CBP facilitates trade at 36 Container Security Initiative (CSI) ports ensuring U.S. destined maritime cargo is fully scrutinized, promoting international standards, and increasing the security of the international supply chain. CBP has forged partnerships with the private sector through the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), working with manufacturers, brokers, importers and carriers to secure the supply chain for goods entering this country from the factory floor to the point of delivery, helping prevent terrorists from exploiting weakness in the international supply chain. At the POEs, radiation detection technology and non-intrusive detection technology screen, detect, and interdict persons and goods entering this country that pose a risk to the general population. Specially trained canine detection teams prevent explosives and dangerous chemicals from entering the country. Airlines and sea carriers are mandated to provide passengers and cargo information on (24 hours prior to arrival or loading a container) allowing identification of terrorist threats before arrival in a U.S. port."

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: CBP was created within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to unite all border agencies charged with the management, control, and protection of our Nation's borders at and between the official ports of entry. CBP is trusted with keeping terrorists and terrorist weapons out of the country while enforcing hundreds of U.S. laws. No other government agency or private sector organization has responsibility for protecting and securing Nation's borders, both at designated Ports of Entry and between the Ports. CBP is the only agency that permits the entry of travelers or goods into the country. CBP coordinates closely with other federal, state and local agencies whose activities touch areas of CBP responsibility. The multi-layered strategies that CBP employs in its BSITF program are not duplicative, but carefully designed to be self-reinforcing. CBP employs a multi-layered approach to target and screen arriving people and cargo, because no single method will ever completely shield the United States from the terrorist threat.

Evidence: "About 90% of the world's manufactured trade is transported in cargo containers. Almost half of trade coming into the US (by value) arrives by containers onboard ships. CSI is the only entity capable of screening containers that pose a risk for terrorism before the containers are even loaded. CBP officers deployed to foreign ports, work with host nation counterparts building intelligence from both nations. CBP's National Targeting Center identifies high-risk travelers and trade and coordinates information sharing across government agencies and disciplines. Other government agency representatives are physically located within the NTC and have access to CBP's Automated Targeting System (ATS). Another example, the Automated Export System (AES), shared with the Census Bureau is the only system, public or private, that collects statistical information on exports."

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: For each of the BSITF programs included in this analysis, the programs and their implementation are free of major flaws that impede their effectiveness. No major flaws have been pointed out by GAO reviews. CBP also has a formal program in place that tracks recommendations made as a result of external audits and CBP's efforts to implement necessary changes in response to these reviews.

Evidence: Both regularly scheduled and random reviews are part of all programs. These reviews evaluate specific system processes and identify major and minor flaws and provide direction to make the appropriate corrections to improve the program or make the necessary adjustments.

Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?

Explanation: BSITF targets resources directly to address the program's purpose which increases the overall efficacy of Inspection programs. Targeting resources facilitate CBP Officers' efforts, allowing them to maximize their time and focus. BSITF operates at 20 Field Operations offices; 317 ports of entry (including air, land, sea); 14 preclearance stations in Canada and the Caribbean - for a total of 326 official manned and unmanned ports (these ports are electronically monitored at all times); at 36 foreign ports in 23 foreign administrations; immigration policy and programs; and Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) at all ports of entry in order to protect the health of U.S. plant and animal resources. National security concerns are addressed by identifying possible high-risk passengers attempting to enter or leave the U.S., while at the same time facilitating the flow of law-abiding travelers through the clearance process.

Evidence: "CBP stratifies its workload into high risk or unknown risk, (a small percent of workload), and low risk, (the majority of workload). Enforcement resources target high-risk groups and facilitate low risk traffic. Trusted traveler programs (SENTRI, NEXUS, FAST) use risk management principles, identifying low risk people and conveyances. Prospective enrollees (frequent travelers or businesses that transit cargo near the borders) are screened to identify high-risk people or businesses. Rules used in targeting systems analyze data to identify risk indicators for cargo and persons transiting US borders. Movement of people is matched with terrorism watch lists of known or suspected terrorists to identify high-risk travelers. Anomalies in movement of commercial goods or conveyances, are risk scored with an established decision point that identifies when to inspect or exercise greater scrutiny. BSITF's strategic approach targets Priority Trade Issues: textiles and wearing apparel; agricultural products; anti-dumping/counter-vailing duty; and intellectual property rights. Resources focus on high risk/low compliance areas."

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: Eleven long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes are included in the PART analysis and in the Department's Future Years Homeland Security Plan (FYHSP). Additional measures are currently under development for inclusion in the FY 2006 FYHSP. These measures reflect the purpose of the program and provide insights into the success of the diverse range of sub-programs in BSITF. Long-term measures are employed to examine such outcomes as: expanding the nation's zone of security outward; compliance with trade, agriculture, and passenger regulations; and the improvement of targeting systems which identify high-risk travelers and cargo while facilitating lawful trade and travelers.

Evidence: "Measure 37, the "Facilitate The Movement Of Legitimate Trade And People" shows how CBP facilitates legitimate trade and people. Border wait times posted on the internet provide public notice so commercial entities and private citizens can make informed decisions and choose the most beneficial crossing. CBP's agricultural inspections program monitors for significant agricultural threats, encourages compliance with regulations, and educates the public and importers concerning agricultural quarantine regulations. The programs' efficacy in achieving compliance with agricultural quarantine regulations is tracked by measures of outreach program performance (See measures 1-2). CSI uses technology and international partnerships targeting high-risk shipments. Long-term measures evaluate the mitigation of exams as a result of the shared intelligence and relationships with partner customs agencies. (See measures 25-29). Additionally, many of the programs under BSITF have completed or are currently completing OMB 300 Cost Benefit analyses which have long-term measures reflected as part of the analysis. (A list of programs that completed OMB 300s is attached.)"

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: As the agency has integrated its programs, new anti-terrorist responsibilities targets for sub-programs under BSITF have focused on the complexities in rolling out new programs and integrating the multitude of programs that were established into CBP when DHS was created. Now, two years since the agency was created, CBP is setting ambitious targets and timeframes for our long-term measures. These include multiple-year goals for rolling-out programs, integration of programs, and specific levels of outcome to be reached. For some measures (such as 1,2) the goal is constant at a high level; set as a measure to maintain.

Evidence: "CSI uses proxy measures to gauge its results. The goal by 2010 is to process 86% of all containers destined for the U.S. prior to lading at overseas ports. (See Measures 29-33) Long Term measures for the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program show the level of member validations. Member validations strengthen our nation's security by verifying the member's supply chain. C-TPAT certified members are selected for validation based on risk factors. Each validation increases security by verification of the supply chain and by freeing future time to focus on carriers of higher threat. (See Measure 9) The Trade Act of 2002 mandates submission of advanced cargo information electronically to identify high-risk shipments on all shipments entering and leaving the U.S. The measure of compliance by mode is based on the number of penalties written for carriers in non-compliance for situations where advanced information was not provided prior to cargo arrival or departure. In the vessel environment, penalties written between October 1, 2004 and March 31, 2005 resulted in a 99% compliance rate (See Measure 24)."

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: BSITF has 25 annual performance measures that support the BSITF long-term performance goals and is in the process of expanding these goals. Annual goals are used to illustrate an increased emphasis on systematic analysis, threat assessment, risk prioritization, and impact measures. These long term goals include: Preventing Terrorism at the POEs, Balancing Legitimate Trade and Travel with Security, Protecting America and Its Citizens, and Modernizing and Managing.

Evidence: "For example, the Training at POEs measure, "Ensuring that CBP Officers are properly trained to combat terrorism," evaluates the efficacy of training provided by both the trainees and by their supervisors. (See measures 30 and 31) CSI works to achieve permanency in its selection of overseas personnel. A steady stream of applicants for fully 'benefited' overseas positions ensures program continuity and staff consistency. (See measures 25-29) Annual targets supporting the long-term C-TPAT measures are shown in Measures 10-12. A primary long-term goal is validation of 2,600 certified importers by the end of 2006, a significant jump from 2004 made possible by an increase in resources and based on full Supply Chain Specialist staffing levels (See measures 9). The anti-terrorism mission is enhancing the capabilities of our detector canines to detect and apprehend concealed humans or potential terrorists in conveyances. All dogs must detect 100% of all decoys, a standard that is met by no other entity in government or the private sector. (See measure 38)" "Preventing Terrorism at the POEs" (See measures 5, 10, 13, 14, 15, 20, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 36, 37, 38); Balancing Legitimate Trade and Travel with Security" (See measures 5, 6, 14, 15, 18,19, 20, 21); "Protecting America and Its Citizens" (See measures 5, 14, 15, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 36, 37, 38); and "Modernizing and Managing" (See measures 5, 10, 13, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 30, 31, 32, 36).

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: Many of the sub-programs in the BSITF have completed extensive evaluations for the OMB 300. As part of these program evaluations, baseline measures and targets and milestones for the programs' annual measures have been developed. Additionally, new performance measures are currently underway and are identified in the Future Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP) which cover all programs in the BSITF (See measures tab).

Evidence: The Automated Targeting System (ATS) is an aggressive, sophisticated targeting tool that enhances CBP's ability to identify imports that pose a high risk of containing narcotics or other contraband. Shipments are evaluated and scored through the use of over 300 weighted rules derived from targeting methods used by experienced CBP personnel. The higher the score, the more the shipment warrants attention. This system is used in U.S. ports and in CSI ports worldwide. Annual targets in ATS show the cost savings of using Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) equipment compared to the costs required to conduct a physical container examination. (See measure 13)

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: "The C-TPAT program is an incentive based public-private partnership where members of the trade community commit to strengthen their supply chain security, and in exchange, CBP offers the benefits of fewer cargo inspections and expedited cargo processing. Validations are a crucial step in this program, and both the industry members and CBP work jointly towards meeting the long- term validation goals. All participants, such as the contractors working on C-TPAT, and all of the contractors working with OIT on the National Targeting Center (NTC), are committed to the goals of the program. Non-compliance with the terms of the contract or agreement is cause for removal from the program - a strong motivator for supporting the program. In the case of other government partners, their own goals usually dovetail with CBP's and are supportive of the goals of both organizations. "

Evidence: "External organizations have representatives co-located in the NTC, including U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), ICE, Federal Air Marshals (FAM), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Border Patrol (OBP), and FBI. Work is coordinated with NTC targeters and examiners daily. Other U.S. agencies include FDA for joint enforcement efforts with CBP, the Department of Agriculture (AG), ICE, the Bureau of Export Administration (BEA), the FBI, the TSA, and USCG. CBP, Seizures & Penalties Division currently oversees the National Seized Property Contract, which supports CBP, ICE, USSS, IRS, ATF, USCG and FDA. All parties are involved in technical and award fee meetings with the contractor. Agencies participate in contractor over-sights to ensure performance is according to the SOW. Contractors may also identify efficient methods to meet goals such as timeliness of disposition or identify alternative ways to control costs. CSI and the Department of Energy are discussing sharing responsibilities including rapid analysis of cargo that may contain nuclear or other radioactive material, operational and emergency response efforts to mitigate the threat from nuclear or radiological cargo."

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: BSITF utilizes various means to evaluate programs, ensure quality control, and determine the effectiveness of the program to the agency's overall mission. There are 31 Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits and 33 DHS Inspector General audits in various stages of the process, including a full financial statements review. Audits are not generally scheduled on a specific plan, but are targeted as part of the budget process and addressed before problems arise. The types of recommendations from GAO typically have included the need for strategic plans, human capital plans, and for performance measures. GAO reviews have been completed for CSI, C-TPAT, Radiation Detection Equipment, NII, Interior Checkpoints, ACE, and Ag Terrorism. In response to the recommendations, strategic plans and human capital plans have been developed (or are in the process of development), for all of these programs (and were submitted to OMB with the draft PART). As part of CBP's general internal controls program, other evaluations are conducted by the Office of Policy and Planning and the Office of Internal Affairs.

Evidence: "KPMG, LLP, was contracted by the DHS OIG to perform the FY05 DHS Financial Statements Audit. As part of DHS, CBP will receive a stand-alone, Balance Sheet only audit. CBP will receive a separate audit opinion on our Balance Sheet. CBP's audit is projected to be completed by November 7, 2005. Financial Statement audits are conducted annually. CBP anticipates a full scope stand-alone audit of all its financial statements in FY 2006. The DHS Financial Accountability Act (Pub. L. No. 108-330) places new internal control reporting and audit requirements on DHS. The internal control provisions of the DHS Financial Accountability Act require the Secretary of DHS to include in the Fiscal Year (FY) 05 performance and Accountability Report (PAR) an assertion of the internal controls that apply to financial reporting and in the FY 06 PAR and thereafter, an audit opinion on the Department's internal controls that apply to financial reporting. CBP will be assessing its internal control over financial reporting in order to support the Secretary's assertion in FY 05 and the audit in FY 06."

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: "Annual budget justifications use performance measure results to justify the budget request. Dollar amounts for each program and sub-program are published in CBP's annual budget requests. In addition, each program and sub-program have identified long-term performance goals that are described in the budget requests. CBP's budget requests also convey to congressional appropriators what will be accomplished with new funds requested. Additionally, CBP is strengthening the link between program performance measures and results and resource allocation requests. Program budget materials clearly describe program operations, goals, and measures in a series of documents beginning with strategic assessments, and continuing through resource allocation plans, OMB exhibits, and congressional justifications. Semi-annual Integrated Planning Conferences are being implemented to integrate agency-wide planning and budgetary issues along with the integration of the CBP Strategic Plan and the 2005-2010 Commissioner's priorities. CBP's planning, programming, budgeting, and execution model is attached. "

Evidence: The FY 2006 Congressional Submission established a link between requests for WMD Technology, C-TPAT, Targeting Systems, and the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP). The budget request asserts WMD Technology will increase the number of truck and rail containers examined using NII, and the IAP request will increase the number of suspect travelers identified and denied boarding for entry into the US. Reqests are evaluated for funding level. Costly projects receive plans identifying costs by fiscal year to aid long-term planning. Pilot projects allow lower cost evaluation before major material acquisitions are made. With additional funding, staffing to address the anti-terrorist mission could be deployed. At seaports, additional staff could maximize the benefits of RPMs. IAP Officers are needed at 10 additional foreign airports, with up to 50 more sites requested by Congress. Additional funding could expand capital investments to augment seaport and container security and expand existing programs (NEXUS/SENTRI, FAST, C-TPAT, NII) and technologies (e.g., ATS, License Plate Readers) that help manage risk.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: BSITF has taken several concrete steps to improve strategic planning processes. We have a number of strategic plans in place and others that are being developed: CSI (plan in draft), C-TPAT (plan final), Keeping Terrorist Weapons Out Strategy (plan nearly final), along with the overall CBP Strategic Plan. Both C-TPAT and CSI are integrated with the PPBS (Performance Based Budgeting System) process. All major organizational units are creating individual programmatic plans that link to the CBP Strategic Plan and to the budget cycle.

Evidence: In January 2005, the sub-programs were required to develop strategic goals and provide detailed implementation schedules for the specific means and strategies they would use to reach those goals. These implementation plans include a schedule, a list of actions to be accomplished, and a summary of actions to be taken in the next quarter. An on-going quarterly status report tracks programs' progress in meeting the implementation schedule. (Copies of noted strategic plans and a timetable of estimated completion dates for the remainder were provided.)

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: All of the sub-programs in BSITF collect information on their performance including internal and external partners where appropriate. Processes to use the information to manage the sub-programs and improve performance are currently being constructed at a high level instead of the historical method of being done at the program level. Additionally, as part of DHS's Future Years Homeland Security Plan (FYHSP), CBP is developing a complete set of measures including outcome, output, and efficiency measures against which progress in meeting annual goals is measured. These measures are used in CBP's budget justification documents, and have also provided the sub-programs with valuable insights into their own performance.

Evidence: "Directors of Field Offices (DFO) regularly meet with the Assistant Commissioner (AC) to provide a quarterly report which includes findings, action workload, performance measures, quarterly results, evaluated levels of resource allocation, on-going funding, and staffing commitments. The number of foreign mitigated examinations by category as a proxy measure for CSI gauges the outcome of increased information sharing and collaboration by collocating CSI customs personnel at foreign ports. The baseline from FY2004 data is 2,416 and the goal for FY2005 is to reach 10,000 and track by categories. (See Measure 26) Border Unification collects monthly statistics on training modules. Updates are provided to DFOs and their Field Training Coordinators. On a quarterly basis, beginning in January 2005, report cards of each port's performance is provided. The DFOs need to show monthy progress using these reports to track activity. These reports present progress to Congress, outside interested parties, and the press. "

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: Through its Strategic Plans, CBP strives to maintain the focus created by the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), improving program efficiency and effectiveness, maintaining a results-oriented focus, clearly describing the goals and objectives of programs, and developing a means of measuring progress and as a budget allocation tool. Developing an integrated planning methodology that is supported by meaningful performance measures is a primary focus towards demonstrating CBP's business results.

Evidence: "Within the Automated Targeting System program, all production-system projects are subject to a rigorous vetting and control process based on Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) and Configuration Management (CM) methodologies as well as CBP's Investment Management Process (IMP). The SDLC monitors schedule, cost and performance, and the IMP monitors budget. All CBP managers and program partners associated with these projects are held to these strict accountability standards. CBP, Seizures & Penalties Division, currently oversees the National Seized Property Contract (current contractor EG&G), which supports CBP, but also ICE, USSS, IRS, ATF, USCG and FDA. All participants are actively involved in Technical Meetings and Award Fee meetings with the Contractor. In addition, each agency participates in quarterly oversights of the Contractor to ensure they are performing according to the statement of work. Deviations from the statement of work or late performance by the Contractor are documented and utilized in the quarterly evaluation of the contractor resulting in the reduction of funds from the award pool. "

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner and spent for the intended purpose?

Explanation: The program has a highly structured process for obligating funds in a timely manner and ensuring that funds are spent on the intended purpose. A high-level agency review of funding for new initiatives increases the likelihood that funds are expended for the Congressionally intended purpose. Once spending plans are approved at the agency level, funds for initiatives are allocated. This allocation process is distinct from the initial budget plans the program receives, which fund on-going programs. Rigorous monitoring of initiative fund expenditures is performed monthly throughout the congressionally prescribed timeframe. Surplus funds identified through this process are promptly reallocated to other uses within the program.

Evidence: This structured approach to financial management and budget execution has worked well for the BSITF program. The program target to lapse annually appropriated funds is .5%. In FY 2000-FY 2003, the program never lapsed more than .24% (FY 2002) of its funds. Due to the fact that FY 2004 was a transition year for the governmental reorganization that resulted in the creation of CBP, FY2004 is not used as a valid comparison point for achieving our financial management objectives related to lapsed funding.

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: As part of the DHS Investment review process and the OMB 300 process, which the majority of all programs in BSITF have completed, competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, and appropriate incentives are measured and cost effectiveness is evaluated.

Evidence: "The Canine Enforcement Program (CEP) is establishing a DHS-wide program for strategic sourcing and supply-chain management in procuring untrained dogs for detection work while enhancing cooperative working relationships with other DHS agencies. The CEP is working closely with DHS where there are 14 cross-functional commodity councils creating sourcing strategies for goods and services acquired. The CBP Officer position consolidates the knowledge and skills of the inspections workforce, carrying out traditional missions, including interdicting illegal drugs and other contraband, enforcing trade and immigration laws, apprehending those attempting to enter the U.S. illegally, and protecting US agricultural interests from harmful pests and diseases. By integrating all Inspectors into the new position, BSITF maximizes focus on the priority mission of preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the US. NII identified "technical obsolescence"" as a risk responded by using tried and tested Commercial Off-The-Shelf technologies used in the past while keeping abreast of new and emerging technologies and constantly evaluating their suitability to support CBP."

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: CBP maintains a vital, yet diverse group of programs for which close collaboration with other agencies is critical to a successful mission. BSITF is responsible for implementing and enforcing rules and regulations for a myriad of other federal agencies, including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Food and Drug Administration, State, and Treasury. These agencies and personnel meet systems security requirements; have positively adjudicated background checks, and a "need-to-know" concerning the information.

Evidence: "CSI has bi-lateral partnerships with 23 foreign administrations and is expanding. The World Customs Organization, the European Union, and the G8 support CSI expansion and adopted resolutions implementing CSI security measures throughout the world. In textiles, BSITF works as an advisor for enforcement issues with other agencies that set textile policy. It is a participant in textile negotiations, working closely with the US Trade Representative and the Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements and developing anti-circumvention language in free trade agreements. In canine enforcement, CBP has a successful relationship with other Federal and state police agencies serving as a point of contact with explosive experts of the FBI, TSA, and the Virginia State Police to develop the explosive detection program. The explosive canine program capitalizes on strengths to deploy canine resources. National Targeting and Security (NTS) ensures targeting systems are integrated into operations. NTS coordinates with other government agencies such as the FDA and the USDA to establish rules for its ATS that address bio-terrorism and agro-terrorism threats. "

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: "Reference: see the CBP Performance and Annual Report which contains last year's financial statements, material weaknesses and repairable conditions. All the financial management practices of the program are directed at: ?? Distributing available resources to functional activities of the program in a manner that will achieve the maximum accomplishment of agency program objectives with a minimum expenditure of funds, and within legal and administrative limitations. ?? Controlling the allotment, commitment, obligation and expenditure of funds within the limits permitted by anti-deficiency legislation and supplementing regulations and identifying responsibility for violations of such legislation and regulations. ?? Identifying and correcting out-of-line operating situations and/or conditions; and ?? Achieving the purposes and objectives for which the budget is approved."

Evidence: "The program's budget personnel perform monthly analyses throughout the fiscal year and review them with senior managers to determine whether budget plans have sufficient funds to meet the objectives of the program. The program's managers are alerted to situations where spending is not in line with available funds. In addition, surplus funds are reallocated to more effective uses, especially in cases where those funds will address some of the program's unmet needs and further its overall objectives. As an example, the program redirected $11 M to the purchase of over 25 Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) and funded the site survey preparation for those RPMs, and funding an additional 100 Radiation Isotope Identifiers Devices (RIIDs). Rigorous oversight of the programs spending has also resulted in high usage rates for funding provided to the program. During FY 2000 - FY 2003, the program never lapsed more that .24% of its funding. The lapse target for the program is .5% of its funds. The program avoids overspending available funds through controls built into the financial system, which identify obligations in excess of funds allocated and do not process such transactions. "

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: The Inspector General is responsible for conducting and supervising audits, investigations, and inspections relating to the programs and operations of the Department. The OIG is to examine, evaluate and, where necessary, critique these operations and activities, recommending ways for the Department to carry out its responsibilities in the most effective, efficient, and economical manner possible. All programs within OFO are subject to audit, either internal or external. Management responds to any deficiencies discovered during these audits by instituting controls to resolve the issue.

Evidence: Based on the repeat finding on several recent Financial Statement Audits that "drawback controls need to be strengthened," a new stratified drawback sampling methodology was developed. The new methodology removes the possibility that a drawback specialist may judgmentally reduce the import entries that require review on a drawback claim. Once the new methodology, developed by a CBP statistician, is put in practice and tested, the weakness is expected to be resolved. In April 2005, the Financial Statement Audit contractor KPMG was briefed on the new process. Also, in April 2005, all of the Drawback Chiefs and Drawback Specialists were trained on the new sampling methodology. In July 2005, all Drawback Centers will begin to process drawback claims utilizing the new methodology, which should result in elimination of the repeat Financial Statement Audit finding. Management is also working to simplify the drawback process. As proposed, drawback simplification will provide increased internal controls and will eliminate the drawback process from the Financial Statement Audit findings.

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: BSITF's mission is to prevent terrorists from entering the country while facilitating legitimate trade and travel. Success in meeting the long-term performance goals is illustrated by a number of the measures included in this reveiw.

Evidence: " Automated Targeting System (ATS) - goal was to expand to all transportation modes. Implementation occurred for sea-going cargo on August 19, 2002; for northern-border truck cargo on February 13, 2003; for southern-border truck cargo on August 13, 2003; for northern-border rail on May 17, 2004; and for southern-border rail on September 29, 2004. The final remaining mode, air cargo, will be implemented in FY 2005. ?? Border Unification's long-term goals include having all cross-training modules (for all inspection functions) in place by December 2005. As an example, a major cross-training course is "Unified Immigration Processing Air". Delivery will begin in the field during the summer of 2005. At least four related courses will be developed and delivered in tandem with this course. As a result, there will be almost 2,000 more staff available in CBP's primary passport control area, facilitating the traveling public and performing functions in the line of defense for our anti-terrorism mission (See measure 36)." See measures 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 16, 17, 24, 26, 29, 33, and 35. Of the nine long-term performance goals with established baselines, all targets were fully met.

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: CBP has a set of measures that includes 14 annual outcome measures, four annual output measures, and eight annual efficiency measures, against which progress in meeting annual goals is measured. These measures are used in CBP's budget justification documents, and have also provided the sub-programs valuable insights into their own performance.

Evidence: "Several measures highlight CBP's success at achieving their annual performance goals: ?? The CEP formulated and established a 3-year program to achieve their aspiration to train narcotic/concealed human detection canines starting FY 2005. These canines will detect potential terrorists attempting to come across the border concealed in conveyances while maintaining their traditional mission of narcotic interdiction. A total of 308 new narcotic/concealed human detection teams are to be trained (FY 05- 98; FY06 - 105; FY07 - 105) in support of CBP's mission. The Canine Program is on track to complete their first year's objective and overall goal (see measure 37). ?? The CSI program has been effective in achieving results. Agreements with 23 foreign administrations to open CSI ports have been signed. Thirty-six ports have been opened. The GAO has conducted evaluations and examinations of different aspects of the Container Security Initiative beginning 3 months after the program started. Since the evaluations, CSI implemented changes to be more effective and achieve and measure results. (See Measures 25-29) "

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: The BSITF uses 12 efficiency measures to monitor sub-programs efficacy and cost advantages of implementation. Several newer sub-programs yield significant cost savings when compared to previous methods for achieving the same results (see measures 13 and 35).

Evidence: "Of the three major trusted traveler programs FAST is more efficient and effective. CBP's OIT staff built FAST; NEXUS & SENTRI were built and maintained by a contractor. The lane and enrollment equipment: lane cost for FAST is $55,000; for NEXUS/SENTRI $210,000. A FAST enrollment center $75,000; $380,000 for NEXUS/SENTRI. Maintenance cost under FAST for lanes and enrollment centers are $980,000 per year based on actual expenditures for 94 lanes and 16 enrollment centers; NEXUS/SENTRI annual maintenience costs are $130,000 per lane and $250,000 per enrollment center. One NII exam using large-scale imaging equipment takes 5 minutes. A container screened by RPM can be completed as the conveyance transits an RPM at 5 mph. An identical manual container exam would take 3 officers an avg of 2 hours to complete. Since FY 2003, there has been an increase in the percentage truck and rail traffic examined using NII equipment (approx. 12% of all arrivals). FY 04 NII exams were approx. 24%. We expect NII exams to be approx. 33% of all arrivals in FY05. (associated cost savings in measure 12)"

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: CBP is charged with the management, control, and protection of our Nation's borders at and between the official POEs and with keeping terrorists and terrorist weapons out of the country while enforcing hundreds of U.S. laws. In only two years since CBP was formed, BSITF has moved aggressively to integrate inspection functions from legacy agencies, dramatically expanded intelligence and targeting capabilities and outreach to other governments and agencies, extended our zone of security beyond our physical borders, and substantially improved the use of technology to detect contraband and WMD/Es.

Evidence: Other CBP programs such as legacy INS, CG, and Customs are providing protection at the POEs, but no other program is responsible for all inspection functions at the POEs. BSITF is the federal component responsible for providing inspection functions of all trade and travelers entering and exiting the U.S. TSA, ICE, and USCG have similar functions, but BSITF's responsibilities for inspection are unique. CBP has many partnerships with other law enforcement entities at all levels of government in addition to our federal partners mentioned above; CBP also maintains ties with state and local agencies to leverage our strengths and our capabilities in meeting the agency's mission in the operating environment.

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: In the past two years both GAO and the DHS-IG have conducted numerous audits of the various sub-programs in the BSITF. Comments have confirmed that the majority of all programs that have been audited are performing at an acceptable level of effectiveness and that they are achieving results. In fact, 44% of GAO and IG audits in 2003 and 65% of all audits in 2004 were issued to CBP without any recommendations.

Evidence: "Included in the programs that have been audited since the inception of CBP are: CSI, Trade Capacity Building, Stolen Passports, C-TPAT, SENTRI, Visa Waver Program, Combating Terrorism, and Management Challenges among the 66 audits from the beginning of CBP in March 2003 through 2004. Of those audits where recommendations were presented, the recommendations have been resolved and the audit is closed in 79% of 2003 audits (with only 3 of 15 recommendations still open) and 64% of all recommendations from 2004 audits (35 of 55 recommendations are closed). "