WITH HATFIELD AND BAKER

Interview #1

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RITCHIE: I see that you're a fellow New Yorker, and I wanted to ask you about where you grew up and what your family was doing.

GOLD: I grew up in Manhattan until I was ten years old and moved to South Florida. My grandfather was an immigrant from Czarist Russia. He had a great interest in politics and was a lifelong Democrat. At a time when I was very young, my father died, and he became a father figure and instilled in me an interest in politics that has remained with me all of my life. He had a picture book of presidents up through Harry Truman at that time. He would go over the pictures with me, so even though I couldn't read the names when I was maybe three or four years old, I could identify all the faces. I grew up on a diet of Roosevelt and Wilson.

RITCHIE: Was your grandfather involved in politics at all?

GOLD: He was a committed voter. There was one Republican that he assisted and that was [Jacob] Javits, who was the congressman at the time from that district. Javits went to the Senate in 1956. Prior to that he had been attorney general and then he had been a congressman from the Upper West Side district. So my grandfather was helpful to Javits. He would never have considered not voting in an election, but otherwise I don't think was especially politically active. There were things about the United States that he truly loved. He came here for reasons of religious freedom, and he treasured political freedom.

RITCHIE: So then you moved with your grandparents to South Florida?

GOLD: I moved with my parents to South Florida. I stayed there through high school and came to Washington when I was seventeen years old, which was the year of the [Lyndon] Johnson-[Barry] Goldwater election. I remember working in the Republican Club at American University at that time. All the other clubs were active in the District of Columbia for Goldwater. I thought that was sort of futile, and we worked in Maryland for [Charles] Mac Mathias, who was a House member then. His district at that time was Montgomery County all the way through the panhandle of Maryland. He overcame the complete deluge of votes against Goldwater in Maryland in 1964 and remained in the House. We helped him a little bit.

RITCHIE: What brought you from your grandfather's Democratic party to the Goldwater Republican party by '64?

GOLD: [Chuckles] Well, I was never a Goldwater supporter. I was a [Nelson] Rockefeller supporter in 1964. You know, people follow the parties of their parents. This is hardly profound, but when my mother remarried I was five years old. My stepfather was a Republican and to identify with him I followed in his footsteps. I often have thought that my grandfather would have approved of what I did in my career, but wished I had done it in the other party. But in any event, he would have approved of political activism.

RITCHIE: And how did you decide on American University?

GOLD: I heard about it, particularly in connection with the political science department there. They were strong in government and strong in international relations, which were two subjects that I had a great deal of interest in. I did not apply to a lot of places. I applied locally to the University of Miami. I applied to the University of Florida. And I applied to American University. The moment that I was accepted, the story was over because I knew that I would go there. I arrived in Washington on the seventeenth of September, 1964, having never been here before. I loved it at first sight and have loved it ever since.

RITCHIE: It had to be a very heady thing for somebody interested in government to come right to the center of it all.

GOLD: I was just beside myself, frankly, and getting involved in the 1964 election, and then helping out a little bit on the Hill as a volunteer, stuffing envelopes in congressional offices, I thought that was the best thing in the world. I did not come here with a plan to stay. If somebody had asked me what I would do after 1968, which was when I was going to graduate, I would have had no specific plans. But Uncle Sam had a plan, because the draft was alive and well and that dictated a lot of things. Because of the draft, I wound up staying a year in graduate school for a Master's in Public Administration before going into the service. Then once I had made that investment, I came back to American University, and finished the Master's degree. By that time, I was working on the Hill for Mark Hatfield, and

I went on to law school while working on his staff.

RITCHIE: Did you get drafted or did you join because the draft was looming?

GOLD: I was what they called a "draft induced volunteer." The draft was looming and there was no way to avoid that. At twenty-two years of age I was too old for the National Guard or the Reserves because they were getting younger people in them than I was. I had not done the specific planning and I certainly didn't have anybody pulling strings for me, so enlistment made sense in order to have a choice of what to do. My choice was language school. I went to the recruiter, who was at that time at the closed-down *Evening Star* building on Pennsylvania Avenue, because the paper had moved out, and the army had some space in there. They said, "Well, we teach thirty plus languages. You might be interested in this. Here's a menu." So I thought about it and I went back and I said, "I think I'll take Russian." They said, "We're out of that." "How about Mandarin Chinese?" "We're out of that." "Let's save time, what do you have?" It was at the very peak of the troop commitment in Vietnam in 1969. They said, "Well, we have Vietnamese. We have Cambodian, Lao, and Korean." I said, "Korean then."

After I signed up for Korean, they said, "We have an opening in Spanish." "Where will that send me?" "Panama or Puerto Rico." I said, "You have a deal." So Spanish it was. It was actually one of those hinge moments of life, because *if* I had gotten Russian I would have had a whole different life. If I had gotten Russian, I would have taken a Ph.D. in Soviet studies and had a different career entirely. The course for Romance languages was twenty-four weeks, six hours a day, five days a week. For non-Romance languages it was forty-seven weeks. You can learn a lot in forty-seven weeks if that's all you're doing. It was a fabulous program even for Spanish. I would have thirsted to get into the Russian program because I had a great personal interest in this, being of Russian background. So as it turned out, law and politics became my vocation and Russia became my avocation, as opposed to the opposite.

RITCHIE: So where did you wind up spending your two years or three years in the army?

GOLD: Three years. Well, it was a year in the States being in basic training and the language school, and at Fort Sam Houston for medic training. And then I went on to Panama for a year and a half. The army was at that point Reducing In Force by early 1972 and they offered me six months out early, and I took it. So I resumed the Master's degree in the early spring of '72 as opposed to the fall. I finished it by the spring semester of '73 and started law school in the fall of '73, and by that time I was already working up here.

RITCHIE: Could you use the GI Bill when you came back?

GOLD: That's what I did, yes. I saved myself from student loans, and my parents from bills, because the GI Bill paid about 75 or 80 percent of the costs of graduate school and law school. If I had gone to a state school it would have paid it all, but I went to American University, so I just made up the difference from a salary from Mark Hatfield. For the most part, the GI Bill was what got me through.

RITCHIE: It paid for my Ph.D., too.

GOLD: It's a fantastic thing, really.

RITCHIE: So before you had gone in the army you had gotten your Master's in Public Administration.

GOLD: I got half a Master's before—it was eighteen hours before, and eighteen hours after.

RITCHIE: What led you into the Public Administration program?

GOLD: The draft. I did not think that there was time to finish law school. There were no deferments anyway at that point for that kind of training. And no deferments for anything else that I would have considered. I wasn't sure that once I got out of the army I would necessarily be able to go back to that school for the length of time necessary to go to law school. I knew several of the professors who were in that Public Administration program, knew them from undergraduate work, liked them, thought the work was pretty interesting. Again, wasn't sure what I was going to do from a career standpoint but imagined that at that point I'd stay in government, so I just took that program. It was not a bad thing to do at the time, although it has not proven of much value, really.

RITCHIE: One nice thing about being taken out of school and thrown into the military for a period of time is that you actually have a chance to think ahead as to what you want to do with your career. When you came out of the army, did you have a better sense of what your objectives were?

GOLD: Much. It was a great maturing mechanism. I had many friends in school who were a year behind me, so that year that I stayed prior to going into the service was almost like a fifth year of undergraduate school. I had a part-time job on the Hill, very minor, and I was doing graduate work, but basically what I was doing was waiting for the army. Coming out, it was a whole different world. First of all, the experience in the army itself was a great education. I had come from a middle-class background, and never really spent much time around blue-collar people. I didn't want to be an officer because OCS [Officers Candidate School] was a ticket to Vietnam. Of course, once you're in, you're in, and they can send you any place, but within reason I thought, "I'll go in this way and learn something and put my time and then they can do with me as they wish."

So I remained enlisted for the entire time I was in the service. I wound up doing a lot of work for people who were less educated than I was. That was a very enlightening and rewarding experience. You have to understand the psychology of some of these folks who could resent college kids. They were, after all, careerists in the military. These college kids didn't want to be there in the first place, were punching the clock and getting out, and everybody understood that. There were, I think, people who were careerists who wondered about whether or not these college students held them in much respect for what they were doing. It teaches you a little bit of humility, working for people who in the end could have been working for me if I had been an officer, and who I would probably not meet again in the passage through life. If I had had a choice I wouldn't have gone into the military at all, but when I think about that experience of just working with blue-collar people with high school degrees, the experience of the Spanish language, the experience of learning something about the Panama Canal before it became an issue that was central in the late '70s, and the benefits of the GI Bill, all in all I think it was a very good thing that happened to me.

Beyond all that, it was also a demarcation, because beforehand I was, in practical terms, a fifth-year undergraduate and when I got finished with it I was a serious graduate student. That was reflected in grades, and attitude. This was just a clear demarcation, closing down, if you will, youth and coming into adulthood.

RITCHIE: And coming back after three years, I'm sure there was a motivation to make up for lost time as well!

GOLD: Well, that's 100 percent so. I gave some thought to not completing the Master's, but then I thought: I've got enough invested in this, I'll go ahead and finish that. I remember my attitude the day before I was going to start law school, and that attitude was: I've got to get done with this before I'm thirty years old, because I'm behind now. I'm behind my peers. Partly because of the time spent in grad school, partly because of the time spent in the army, I was five years behind my peers. So I worked full-time, because I supported myself, and I went to school full-time at the same time. I graduated from law school in two and a half years. I took fifteen hours a semester for five semesters, six hours one summer, three hours another, that was eighty-four hours, and I was twenty-eight years old when I graduated. I just felt like I needed to get on with life, that the law school was a necessary step to take but I didn't want to linger with it and I certainly didn't want to spend four years with it as a night student. I had a very understanding boss, Hatfield, who allowed me to work around classes.

RITCHIE: When you were in law school did you have a particular focus on the law or area of interest?

GOLD: I was very interested in constitutional law more than anything else. But I knew pretty well that I was going to stick around the legislative process at that point, because I loved Congress and because of the age factor. Twenty-eight to thirty years old is obviously not old, but what I did not want to do then was to ignore whatever experience I had working on the Hill. By the time I passed the bar, I had three or four years in with Hatfield and I didn't want to go start off as a junior associate at some law office writing wills and doing estates and all that. I have no problem with other people who want to do that. That can be interesting work, and it's useful to people, but I didn't want to start there. So, given the time invested in graduate school, and law school, and working on the Hill, the obvious thing for me to do was just to stay here. That really decided what my legal career was going to be like, because it meant that I would work in and around legislation then for all the years afterwards, which was not only an easy choice for me but it was the right choice.

When I was in law school, because of the schedule that I kept I could not take advantage of some of things that full-time students might. For example, you have to go through a moot court exercise as part of graduating. At the time I did it, they said, “Well, maybe you want to be on the moot court team.” I had no time. I’d go to class in the morning and come to Hatfield’s office. Or I’d go to Hatfield’s office and go to class at night. There was no time to spare. Those were eighty-hour weeks every week. I could barely make sure to get all the studying done, I couldn’t do any extracurricular things that might have introduced me into other areas of the law.

If I have a regret on this early part of the story, it’s that I don’t know what it would have been like to take that Ph.D. in Soviet studies, but I had to make a choice. It’s not that one choice was necessarily better than the other, it’s just a different choice. So, do I regret not going into more traditional areas of law practice? No, I don’t, because I love legislation. The only thing that would compare with it from my perspective would have been to do the Ph.D.

RITCHIE: Of course, ironically, the collapse of the Soviet Union devalued the Soviet studies program for a while.

GOLD: In a way, sure. But certainly this notion of taking a Ph.D. in Soviet studies, learning the Russian language, being intimately involved through the end of the Cold War, an even in the post-Cold War development, would have been something great. Probably, I would have wound up teaching. But in any event, it’s not that I regret or lament it. It’s that I’ve thought often about what would have happened had I taken that path. I try to fill it in. I’ve been to Russia many times, taught over there—American political science, enjoyed that, and would be thrilled to have a chance to teach some more over there.

RITCHIE: You mentioned that you had already done a couple of part-time jobs on Capitol Hill before you went to work for Senator Hatfield. Can you tell me the types of things you were doing, and how you got started up here?

GOLD: The word for the labor was menial. [Laughs] I worked for two members during my college years. One was William M. McCulloch, who was the ranking Republican on the House Judiciary Committee, from Lima, Ohio. Mr. McCulloch was a skinflint in terms of paying his staff. He would get the watchdog of the treasury award from the Chamber of Commerce for all the money he turned back in every year, but he also made tremendous use of the frank, staying in touch with the movers and shakers in his district. What I did for

Mr. McCulloch was the mail, in part, making sure that those movers and shakers got copies of marked *Congressional Records* with articles that he wanted them to read, and making sure that constituent mail hit the desk and went out the door in no time at all. He had a very safe district and he kept it safe. There was extremely little legislation that was done in his office. Most of it was done on the committee staff. John Dean was actually on the committee staff then, but I didn't know him. McCulloch once sent out 11,000 copies of "The American Creed" to kids in his district. Now his name was on the envelope, and his name was on the Creed, but to give backing in the envelope there was a piece of cardboard and you had to stamp his name on both sides of the cardboard, and so we made twenty-two thousand impressions.

The other member was a little bit later during the graduate year before the army, and that was Bob Griffin. Griffin was at that point in his first term in the Senate. I saw very little of him but my responsibility was opening and distributing the mail. I knew generally what people in the office did, and I knew who got what kind of letter, but that was about it. I wound up working with Griffin later on, when I was the minority staff director of the Senate Rules Committee and he was a member of the committee. I am completely confident that he had no recollection that I had ever worked in his office.

RITCHIE: When you were up here, even though it was on a part-time basis, did you spend any time going into the Senate chamber or the committees?

GOLD: I went one day to the Senate gallery and by chance heard Bobby Kennedy make his speech breaking with the Johnson administration on the Vietnam War. It was just a stroke of fortune, that was all. I did go to the gallery from time to time, because that was the only way to see the Senate then. Some of what was going on I could understand, some of what was going on just mystified me, as it would mystify most observers. You couldn't know why people were saying the things they were saying in order to move things through the process. I'd go to a committee from time to time as well, though my interest in politics at that time was more in elections than it was in governance. Governance came later.

RITCHIE: You mentioned that you worked on Mathias' campaign in '64. How is it that you didn't go to work for Mathias?

GOLD: It never crossed my mind. I was simply happy that he won. I was only a freshman then and we had an extremely active Republican Club at American University. I became the president of that club in my sophomore year, for two terms, and we did all sorts of things that were unconventional. We ran a precinct in northern Virginia for Linwood Holton when he was running for governor in 1965. We took volunteers to New York to work for John Lindsay for mayor in 1965. We took a big group of volunteers to New York, fifty three of them, to work a weekend for Nelson Rockefeller in 1966 and we worked for Javits in '68. So these were all things that were very unconventional. And then we worked on behalf of Nixon in his '68 campaign. All of that was before the army, when Nixon was my commander in chief.

RITCHIE: Well, as you said, there wasn't much purpose for Republicans in Washington, D.C. to focus on local politics.

GOLD: All the other clubs did it. I'll tell you the difference. We had a very pragmatic group. Working for Goldwater in the District of Columbia was not pragmatic, it was a waste of time. What are you going to do, elevate him from 15 percent to 16 percent?

When Mathias was running for the House, he already had two terms in. He was running against an American University political science professor, Royce Hanson. It made sense for us to work to save a congressional seat. We had a club president who led in that direction, but it made perfect sense to me. I thought that was a good way to spend our time. As it turned out, it *was* a good way to spend our time.

RITCHIE: Well, you went to work for Mark Hatfield, who was very much like Charles Mathias in many ways. How was it that you wound up in Hatfield's office?

GOLD: A stroke of the greatest good fortune. I was no longer the president of the Young Republican Club by about a month, in March 1968, but we had established an award, and we named it after Robert Taft. We had initiated it in 1966 and our first recipient was Leverett Saltonstall. The next year we gave it to John Sherman Cooper. Then we gave it to Mark Hatfield, and the next year we gave it to Jacob Javits, and the year after that we gave it to Howard Baker. By that time I was gone and so was the award. But be that as it may, Hatfield was the third recipient of the award. He was enormously popular on college campuses then, because he was against the war, and he was against the draft, so that was music to students' ears. I invited him, even though I was out of office by the time he spoke.

We got the university president to give him the award, and I introduced him. He put on a rousing good show. That was good for him, and it was good for the students, and it was good for the club that sponsored him. From my perspective—I had a shyer, more reticent personality than a friend of mine did—that would have been the end of it. But my friend said, "I think we should ask Hatfield to go to lunch." I wouldn't have had the temerity to do that alone, but together we did. And Hatfield agreed.

So two college students, neither of whom was from Oregon, took him to lunch at O'Donnell's seafood down on Thirteenth Street and E. After lunch he said, "You know, I wouldn't have accepted this if I hadn't intended to reciprocate. Why don't you join me at the Senator's Dining Room next time?" So we did. And then we took him to lunch again and he reciprocated again. It probably went back and forth about four or five times in the 1968 and 1969 period, to the point that during the Republican convention in 1968, I had him come to my parents' apartment for breakfast. It was a day when the headline in the *Miami Herald* was that it was going to be a Nixon-Hatfield ticket. And he still came. He wasn't too busy notwithstanding what must have been a lot of convention business. I learned later that that was very typical of Mark Hatfield. He would stop and take the time for things that mattered to him and people that mattered to him. And for whatever reason, I mattered to him. As I say, I wasn't from his state, I wasn't a contributor, my parents weren't contributors. There was no reason for him to go to lunch with me. There was no reason for him to reciprocate. There was no reason for him to follow it up after the first go-around. None of it, except for whatever it is that he took an interest in a young man, that's all.

When I was in the service, we corresponded. When I'd come back to Washington from time to time on leave, I'd go to see him, and he would always see me. I was never told that he didn't have time. So when I got out of the service, I got a job for about six months working on a study that was funded by the then Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, on the legal and social obstacles to the rehabilitation of narcotics addicts. This project was underway and I helped them finish it, and then by that time I thought: well, maybe something will open with Hatfield. He was up for reelection that fall of '72, and he found an opening in his office. So I wound up on Hatfield's staff on the nineteenth of September, 1972. It was, to go back to your question, purely serendipitous, because none of it would have happened but for the temerity of a third person in putting us together and then the interest that Hatfield took in me as an individual, when there was no apparent reason for him to do that. That's how it got started.

RITCHIE: What did you do in this part-time job?

GOLD: Oregon projects. At that time I was a Master's student and worked part-time. We had a little section that did Oregon projects, and I had never been in Oregon in my life. I barely knew Portland from Salem, or Salem from Eugene, but you know, you've got a map. Some city manager wants this, or some council of government wants that, or some constituent was writing about the postoffice that was closing or whatever else it was. It was a pretty interesting way to learn the state. I stayed with that work, eventually became in charge of it, all through law school. Except as I was going through law school and was further and further along, I would begin to take on issues that had legal dimensions to them, so that although nominally I was still in charge of that projects section, I gradually was able to hand some of that off to an assistant and take on things that I thought were even more interesting. But I had very little to do with legislation. Mostly it was grant programs and things of that sort—other than the appropriations process, which was someone else's responsibility—making sure that Oregon got its share of federal grants.

RITCHIE: Was the staff a lot smaller in those days than a senator's staff would be today?

GOLD: Well, Hatfield had probably a larger staff than most people with budgets of his size. He paid a lot of people a little money as opposed to a few people a lot of money. Even later, when I got to be the minority staff director of the Rules Committee, I wrote him a memo and told him about what I was getting paid relative to what people in a similar position were getting paid in other committees. I expected a very modest increase, and he made me get to parity with the other committees in a single day. It was the richest day of my life.

RITCHIE: It was an interesting phenomena in the 1970s: there were a number of cases where the ranking Republican minority member of a committee had more people working for him than the Democratic chairman. It seemed to me in those days that the Republicans, maybe because they had been in the minority for such a long time, tended to pay less and have more people, run people through their offices, a lot of recent college grads would come and go quickly. The Democrats, because they were used to being in charge, had a smaller staff but they were—

GOLD: More senior.

RITCHIE: Veterans who had been around forever. They were almost as old as the senators were in most cases.

GOLD: I think that's fair. Well, the majority staff director on the Rules Committee was Bill Cochrane—you remember Bill? When I came to the committee he was already in his middle sixties and had been at the committee for twenty years. My predecessor as the minority staff director in 1976 would have been twenty-nine years old. He had been with the committee maybe two years. So it's just what you're talking about.

RITCHIE: I remember when Charles Percy was ranking on Foreign Relations. He had a larger staff than the chairman. It didn't make any sense to me at first.

GOLD: Well, it may be just what you say. The psychology of being in a permanent minority, or an apparently permanent minority, as opposed to people who have made a career of being in charge, because you don't have much responsibility in the minority. When we were on the Rules Committee, we used to get the agenda at 5:30 p.m. on the day before the meeting.

It's funny because as close as I came to the legislative process and the legislative procedure since then, for about the first four years that I was here I had nothing to do with it. *Nothing* to do with it. Then Hatfield offered me an opening, because he was a member of the first permanent Intelligence Committee, the one that succeeded the Church committee, that [Daniel] Inouye was chairman of. The system that they had was to have every senator get a designee, because you couldn't operate the way you do with other committees in that there was a need to have security clearance. So they set up a permanent committee staff but they allowed every senator to have a staff designee with security clearance, and he asked me if I was interested in doing that. I said "sure," and that was the step out of his personal office.

RITCHIE: Just before that, the same years that you were here, '72 to '76, Watergate was the big issue.

GOLD: Oh, yes.

RITCHIE: I know you were a full-time law student and a full-time staffer, but did you also follow what was going on and get caught up in all of that?

GOLD: Oh, very much so. I wasn't the person in the office that was handling it. Hatfield himself was very circumspect. He had the perfect response, I thought: "As a potential juror in an impeachment trial, I should not express my opinion ahead of time but wait until I hear the evidence." First of all, I think that was correct. I was actually pretty appalled at some people who were making proclamations about the evidence before they ever heard the evidence, either for Nixon or against him. I thought Hatfield's position was judicious. It had the additional virtue of backing people off of pressuring him on how he was going to vote. Someday, he might have to actually vote, but not for a while, so why get himself out on a limb?

Hatfield became a very good personal friend of mine. He was a friend of mine, as much as you can be an intergenerational friend like that. He was my friend when he was my boss, and he was my friend after he was my boss. I never have asked him how he would have voted. And if I did, he could tell me what I might advise him to say, which is: "Since there wasn't a trial, I never heard the evidence." That's the correct position, because the senators swear the oath to do impartial justice. That's odd if you've already made a proclamation of your position before you ever heard the evidence. He was, I think, in the right place. Anybody who was interested in politics would be mesmerized by what was going on with Nixon then and I was no exception to that. But I was not working for a person who was an advocate one way or the other.

RITCHIE: There's a new book on Watergate by a Maryland professor, Keith Olson, and his thesis is that it really was the Republican party that was the spearhead in convincing Nixon to step down to avoid a trial in the Senate, that all the key players were Republican senators and representatives who stepped in at the time.

GOLD: [Hugh] Scott, Goldwater, and John Rhodes going to the White House and telling Nixon: "Your time is up. You don't have the votes in the Senate." Because Nixon I'm sure might have thought that with the assistance of people like [James] Eastland, and [John] Stennis, and others—how many Democrats could he count? A half a dozen, eight? I don't know, but something like that, I would think. You add those people to most of the Republicans and you've certainly got a third.

In the House Judiciary Committee, which would have been the first place where you would have seen this either as a partisan or as a bipartisan effort to oust Nixon, you had people like [William] Cohen, [Tom] Railsback, Larry Hogan, who were among seven or eight Republicans on that committee who came down against Nixon. Therefore, it was hard to say: "Well, what [Peter] Rodino has run here is just a partisan witch hunt." What if they had stayed with him, and never let a bit of light between the party up here and Nixon, like the Democrats did on the House Judiciary Committee with [Bill] Clinton? What effect would that have had on the Senate? Would people have felt like they had to rally around also? It might have been that way. So the big difference—well, there are a number of differences both substantively and otherwise, but one of them is the absence of defections from the president's own party, which in my opinion was key to getting Nixon out of office. I believe that completely.

Secondly, of course, there was the absence of somebody, a John Dean type figure or any other characters in the administration, who would say: "Look, this behavior of the president has alienated me and I'm going to turn against him." So in the absence of Republican defections from within the administration and on the Hill, you don't get there.

Moreover, on the Watergate Committee you have Howard Baker asking the central question. If anybody remembers one thing from those Watergate hearings, it's "What did the president know and when did he know it?" Who posed that question? Was that Sam Dash? Was it Sam Ervin?

In any event, on this point, you had to have both defectors and honest brokers, and Baker, who I think began the process as the senior Republican on the committee trying to figure out how he could help Nixon, contributed instead to the appearance of a non-partisan process, mostly because he played it straight as opposed to trying to accuse the other side of a partisan witch hunt.

RITCHIE: One of the big differences between the Nixon and the Clinton situation was the Ervin Committee. For Nixon you had months of hearings that were televised and publicized, and you had senators from Ervin to Baker and others asking questions of a wide range of witnesses. The equivalent really for the Clinton impeachment was the Starr Report, which was thousands of pages dumped on the Internet all at once. It lacked that sustained national focus.

GOLD: It lacked it for sure. The case was not developed before the public. As you point out, it's a terribly important difference, because the peculiarity is that with the Internet you have the wide dispersal of information but the lack of development of the case. Whereas before, you had less dispersal of the information but greater development of the case. It's a different kind of case, for sure, anyway, but the point is the presence of Republican defections, or at least the absence of a unified Republican defense, doomed Nixon. The absence of that kind of unified, vigorous defense was terribly damaging to Nixon, because it meant that partisans who wanted to get him out of office were given some political cover by defecting Republicans. The whole effort to remove him could not be termed purely partisan.

RITCHIE: That whole era, with Watergate, and the Rockefeller Commission, and a whole series of revelations, created a sense of trying to open things up and make Congress more involved in what the executive branch was doing. That led to the formation of the Intelligence Committee. There had been no Intelligence Committee at all until the Church committee started as a special committee. What was the atmosphere on the Intelligence Committee when you got involved with it in '76?

GOLD: Well, it was the successor to the Church committee, so it was not itself an investigative committee. Inouye was trying to find some way of exercising responsibility as an oversight chairman, but without overt hostility to the agency. There were people who spilled over from the Church committee staff to the Inouye committee staff, but it was a very much toned down effort. What you have seen from the Intelligence Committee through time has its origins in the treatment that Inouye and Baker, who was the vice chairman when Inouye was chairman, gave to the subject, which was a fundamentally nonpartisan effort aimed at rebuilding relationships with the intelligence community. Nobody was looking to uncover additional scandals at that point. The question was how to establish a reasonable way to working with the intelligence community. The Inouye committee was the harbinger of many years of a relatively non-confrontational, cooperative relationship. You didn't have leaks out of that committee.

We started there in '76. In '77 Jimmy Carter was coming in as a new president. His choice for a DCI, Director of Central Intelligence, was Ted Sorenson. The Democrats had control, so confirmation should have been smooth. It wasn't smooth, and Sorenson was never confirmed. He was withdrawn. There were issues about how he treated classified information. We worked together as a bipartisan staff up at the Kennedy Library—the Kennedy Library was not built then but they had archives in a warehouse in Massachusetts.

RITCHIE: Waltham, Massachusetts.

GOLD: Yes, I went up there with both Democrat and Republican staffs. We worked together on it so there was no issue like: the Republicans are going to develop a case against Sorenson to embarrass the president. Inouye wasn't for Sorenson. And when Sorenson's lack of support from the chairman and some senior Democrats as well as substantial lack of support on the Republican side became known, Carter withdrew him.

RITCHIE: And then Stansfield Turner came in.

GOLD: That's exactly right. Hatfield didn't serve on that committee that long, so I didn't. About six months.

RITCHIE: When you get on a committee like that, do you get an area of specialization or do you just sort of keep track of everything that's coming down the pike?

GOLD: Well, if you stay long enough you might get an area of specialization! Hatfield was tremendously interested in foreign policy from the Vietnam angle, but the intelligence community was not a matter of special interest to him. In those early months I attended many briefings to get myself up to speed. Then I would get him into briefings. I took him out to the NSA one day. I took him out to the CIA one day. We had breakfast with George Bush, who was the CIA director at that point.

Be that as it may, the work essentially involved two things in the early months. One, getting personally up to speed; and two, getting him up to speed. What happened, that changed my role with the committee and his for that matter, was that the Senate went through the committee reorganization of 1977, under a committee chaired by Adlai Stevenson. His committee recommended reducing the number of senators' committee assignments. Hatfield had too many assignments and he was going to have to give something up. I was invited to stay on committee staff. But Hatfield also offered me a position with the Rules Committee. I thought: better stay with the Rabbi. So I left the Intelligence Committee and went to the Rules Committee. But I was very much interested in the work of that Intelligence Committee.

I was impressed with the way that the staff worked together on a bipartisan basis. There was no partisan fissure on the committee.

RITCHIE: There had been years in which the Congress was really getting very little intelligence information. The CIA director would come and talk to Richard Russell and Leverett Saltonstall and that was about it. Senator [Mike] Mansfield had argued for years that they needed some kind of an intelligence committee. Once they created it, however, I get the sense that there were some members who would have preferred not to have anything to do with it. Once you're on the Intelligence Committee you really can't talk about much of what you're dealing with, and it's a different world than most of the other committees up here. Do you think that it's serving the function that it's supposed to? That is, is it necessary for the Senate to have that kind of regular presence in the intelligence network through scrutiny or oversight through that committee?

GOLD: I think Mansfield was correct about it. I don't think it is suitable to have an important oversight function delegated to one or two people. For instance, from a philosophical standpoint, I don't have any particular problem with using the CIA in covert operations. But the question becomes then: Is that solely an executive branch matter? Or is that something at least that Congress has a coordinate responsibility to look at it? Congress has to appropriate the money for this, so does the whole thing just become a big black box, and only the executive has any real responsibility for it? Or does Congress have a role to play in terms of at least making sure that American national interests are being appropriately addressed.

The committee that deals specifically with the intelligence community is addressing with a very important instrument of American policy. The committee is an appropriate instrument, because for the most part it has been leak-proof over a long period of time, and I think it has been very responsible in how it has treated classified information. We have more than twenty-five years of experience with it now, and I don't think that anybody can look at that record and say that Congress has not been responsible in how it has dealt with these subjects.

RITCHIE: Well, from Intelligence you moved to Rules, which is a very different world all together. Can you explain what the Rules Committee is and what its jurisdiction covers?

GOLD: The Rules Committee deals with the most partisan and least partisan subjects in the Senate. It had been an extremely active committee just before I got there, because it dealt with the confirmation of Gerald Ford to be vice president; it dealt with the confirmation of Nelson Rockefeller to be vice president; it dealt with the revision of the impeachment rules; and the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign laws. So that was quite an era for the committee.

RITCHIE: And they had just finished the [Louis] Wyman-[John] Durkin contested election case.

GOLD: Yes, thank you, also the Wyman-Durkin case. The vice presidential confirmation was given to them as a unique responsibility, and it came up twice in a little bit of time in the middle ’70s. When you’re dealing with election law, it’s the most partisan kind of issue that you can have. Election contests are even a more partisan issue, I suppose, within that same genre. The committee also deals with a lot of things that are non-partisan such as Senate administration and oversight of the Smithsonian.

The committee dealt with partisan matters in a partisan way, and it dealt with nonpartisan matters in a nonpartisan way. It was an interesting place to work. It is now much too big. It has nineteen members, whereas there were nine members during my period of time. It was a workable committee then. They don’t have enough to do to occupy nineteen members.

RITCHIE: It’s also the committee that hands out room assignments and parking spaces, and all the things that make this place function on a daily basis.

GOLD: Here, it is done on a relatively mild, seniority basis without a lot of political maneuvering behind the administrative decisions of that nature. But there were plenty of partisan matters before the committee. We had controversy over Federal Election Commission nominations. We had controversy over two Jimmy Carter proposals, one to have public financing of congressional elections and the other to have election-day voter registration, both of which the Republicans vigorously and successfully opposed with filibusters. And the committee was operated in a quite partisan manner. Coming from Hatfield’s personal office, which is to say working for one of the least partisan members, and then coming from the Intelligence Committee, which was essentially a nonpartisan experience, the Rules Committee was a change. We had three members during my time on the Republican side: Baker, who was the Republican leader, Bob Griffin, and Hatfield. The guy who was really our bulldog was Griffin.

RITCHIE: The whip.

GOLD: He wasn't Baker's whip, he was the former whip. Baker had defeated him for leader, and Griffin was in his last two years in the Senate. He had announced that he wasn't going to run for reelection. Then he changed his mind and lost. Griffin was a tremendously detail-oriented person. You go present committee budgets to Griffin and he wanted to go line-by-line with you. He was tremendously detail-oriented, and much more of an instinctive partisan. He was a reasonably good match for the opposite side.

RITCHIE: Was it about this time that you began to get interested in the Senate rules, and legislative process and procedure, while you were on the Rules Committees? How did that develop?

GOLD: It had almost nothing to do with the Rules Committee, other than sort of a mistaken impression that people have that if you work on the Rules Committee you know something about the rules, which is just wrong. The Rules Committee had jurisdiction over the standing rules, but Robert C. Byrd, who was by that time the Democratic leader, was having none of that. They abolished the subcommittee on the standing rules, and the subcommittee on the standing rules was Robert C. Byrd, a committee of one.

The way I got to the rules was sort of by combination of prior experience. It's a presence on the Rules Committee, yes, but it's also because of work on the Intelligence Committee, and it deals with this: the ranking Republican on the Intelligence Committee, called the vice chairman, was Howard Baker. His staff designee was Howard Liebengood, later sergeant at arms. Howard and I became good friends on the Intelligence Committee staff. When I went to the Rules Committee, Liebengood shortly thereafter went to Howard Baker's leadership office, because Baker was elected minority leader. So I left just about the same time he did. Well, we can go through '77 and '78, I'm still on the Rules Committee staff, by '79 Baker is under some pressure from conservatives in the caucus, from [William] Armstrong of Colorado, [James] McClure of Idaho, and others, to have a Republican parliamentarian, somebody on leadership staff who can address what they concede is the great disadvantage Republicans have on the floor. So consequently there needed to be a parliamentary presence in the leader's office, in their view.

Baker finally addressed this, so Liebengood recruited me. I said, "Well, I don't know much about this. I'm certainly not Dr. [Floyd] Riddick. I just don't know much about this." He said, "Do you want the job or don't you?" "Sure." So Baker called Hatfield and said he'd like to take me over to the leadership staff, and Hatfield agreed and would have to replace me. He called a fellow in Oregon and said, "Marty Gold's going to be leaving. Do you want to come work for me?" And the guy who had been in Hatfield's office before said fine. He resigned his job in Oregon to come back here. And then there was a delay of a couple of months. I was in the dark. What's the problem? In the meantime, this other guy is out of a job, waiting to replace me. Well, what had happened is that Bill Hildenbrand, who was secretary to the minority, was uncomfortable with the creation of the position. He felt like it was his role to keep the Republicans straight on matters of procedure, and if that position was being created, essentially it was a statement that he wasn't doing his job. Baker had told Hatfield that he wanted his man. Hatfield had gotten a replacement. I'm ready to go, and nothing's happening. That went on for a couple of months.

Finally, Baker called me to his office. It was the first time I had ever set foot in the place. And I got a lecture. I was surprised, frankly. Hildenbrand was sitting in there, and Baker said, "Now, I'm ready to make this move, but I want to tell you, when you work for me on the floor you are under Bill Hildenbrand's supervision. You will do what he tells you to do." And so on and so forth. Later on I understood what was going on. It allowed Baker to create the position but give the appropriate deference to Bill. That was important in the context of their prior relationship, because Bill had been chief of staff to Hugh Scott, when Hugh Scott repulsed a couple of bids by Baker to become Republican leader, so Hildenbrand had worked against Baker, and now he was working for Baker. Some of the old Baker people were suspicious of him. So as Baker and Hildenbrand were trying to navigate their own relationship, Baker wanted to be very careful not to alienate Bill or to give him reason to think that he was being forced out or that this new position was a slap at him. It took a while to do that. Meanwhile, over time Bill became a good friend of mine and we worked well together.

RITCHIE: Now, see, I always assumed that you started learning the rules when you were on the Rules Committee, but it was actually after you left the Rules Committee.

GOLD: The first day that I was on the job, Don, I sat there and I said, "What am I supposed to do?" They said, "Watch Byrd." Twenty-three years later I'm still doing it. Watch Byrd. God help me, what if he had done something? I sat there on the sofa. I couldn't leave that floor. I couldn't leave for lunch. I couldn't leave for any purpose, because I just knew that the moment I did it, Byrd would come in and pull a maneuver. So I watched the entire day, and it was a day when there were hours of quorum calls, when you had nothing but the presiding officer, one Democrat, one Republican on the floor, and Sparky Matsunuga's constituents in the gallery. That was all there was to it. And me sitting there by myself on a sofa on the Republican side of the chamber, watching this. Bored but petrified at the same time that something was going to happen.

The only thing that happened that first day was that John Tower asked me a question. I didn't have the faintest idea what the answer was. Hildenbrand saved me. He answered the question, and Tower looked at me and asked, "Is that right?" There were only three possible answers: yes, no, or I don't know. I don't know was not an acceptable answer at that moment, so I said yes because I was sure that Bill must know what he was talking about. The way I learned the rules was on-the-job observation and study, because I didn't have to worry about anything else but that. I had no distractions, so I concentrated on the rules. A lot of it was trial and error, frankly.

RITCHIE: That whole time period from 1977 to 1980 is one of the most interesting periods but probably one of the least paid attention to in terms of what was happening to the parties. The Republican party had taken a series of hits in the '70s when Nixon resigned and Ford lost. In '77 you had a Democratic president and overwhelming Democratic majorities in both the House and the Senate. The Republican party had sort of run out of places to go, but it rebuilt during those four years and came back to win the presidency and the majority of the Senate four years later, which was a remarkable turnaround.

GOLD: After '74 I believe we had thirty-four seats. But we had thirty-eight seats in that first Congress when I was working for Howard Baker. Then in '78 we got up to forty-one. I thought it was fabulous we had broken forty. Republicans broke forty I think in the '70 election and maybe in '72, but then they went back down again. And in the House they never could get past about 180. The worst of it was the Great Society Congress when I think they had 140. So, as a practical matter, they were psychologically confined to the minority. Nobody on our side thought that in the '80 elections we were going to get control. We thought we might build to control and we'd get there in '82. The election of 1980 was a vast surprise.

RITCHIE: But in that period between '77 and '80 you didn't even have enough votes to stop a cloture motion from passing. What kind of strategy could the Republican party have on the floor in terms of figuring out how to make the rules work for your party?

GOLD: Nongermane amendments. I have told classes for a long time that the advent of the Republican Senate in 1980 was partly Ronald Reagan's doing, in the sense that he captured sort of a conservative wave that was at that point in the country, but not his altogether. It was the responsibility in part of Jesse Helms, and Jim McClure, and Bill Armstrong, and some others, [Orrin] Hatch as well, who offered a range of nongermane amendments on terribly controversial subjects like abortion, prayer in the schools, forced busing, the death penalty, things of that nature, and got votes on them during the year.

We would agree to unanimous consent orders—now today you wouldn't get a consent order like this because you'd have to show the amendment ahead of time but we would go along with unanimous consent orders that allowed for two amendments by Mr. Helms and another amendment by Mr. McClure without ever specifying the subject. In other words, if Byrd wanted a time agreement, we'd give him a time agreement, but we'd also make sure that our amendments were in order, because the amendments would otherwise be nongermane. So these people would offer the amendments and they would get tabled. From the point of view of making law, the amendments were a nullity. From the point of view of making a political record, they were everything. They established a voting record. Now, in '80 when Reagan was running, well you had Dan Quayle running also against [Birch] Bayh. You had [Charles] Grassley running against John Culver. You had [Robert] Kasten running against Gaylord Nelson. And [Steven] Symms running against Church, and so on. In every one of those races you could say: "Well, the senator had four opportunities to oppose forced busing but he didn't do it. He could have imposed the death penalty for this heinous crime, but he didn't do it. He voted against it. So therefore your senator is out of step."

Even though you had a conservative tide running in the country, those people had been durable. They had survived Republicans coming in and out of presidency, and these people had been in office for years and years. Frank Church had served for four terms and was going for his fifth term. You want to make a case that they are out of step with their constituents, but how do you do that? The Democrat-controlled committees were not going to report legislation that would let you make that case. The Democratic majority leader was not going to call up legislation that was going to let you make that case. So the way to make the case was through nongermane amendments.

We also had at least some allies on cloture from time to time. For example, during the campaign financing votes, Russell Long or Jim Allen would be able to help us out, because you did not have the ideological uniformity in the parties like you do now. Eastland and Stennis could help. Then the South began to change. The Democrats who got elected from the South began to change. But the old-timers, the Russell Longs, and people like that, were likely to help us. So we had at least a cloture-competitive environment, depending on the issue. And we had the use of nongermane amendments as a tactic to raise issues.

RITCHIE: It must have been an interesting time to be on the floor. You had people like James Allen who was trying to redefine what filibusters and clotures were all about. Were you there during the big post-cloture filibuster fight?

GOLD: I got there in ’79, just a little bit afterwards. But one of the very first things that we worked with—well, actually I started working on this just prior to coming over for Baker—was Byrd’s proposal in ’79 the rules change to close up the post-cloture filibuster with the one hundred hour limit. It looked similar to today’s rule. Baker did not resist it. He appointed a Republican task force to address it. So who was on the task force? [Ted] Stevens, who was the chairman because he was the whip, so Baker made him the chairman. Then he got two Republicans from the left, Javits and Hatfield, so there I was, and two from the right, Helms and McClure. That was the task force. The object was not to just block any potential rules change but to come up with amendments and alternatives. Today, you might just see resistance.

But the psychology of the minority has changed a lot. One of the things that [Bill] Frist pointed out in this Congress for example was that in all those years when you had the same party controlling the White House and controlling the Senate, the minority never filibustered judges. The minority went along with consent agreements, as long as we had the right to offer our amendments. We got what we wanted, they got what they wanted. They got more control over floor time, we got the chance to offer our amendments. The minority often did not try to block legislation but would try to find ways of proposing alternatives. If they absolutely had to block it they would, but otherwise they would find ways of proposing positions that would at least contrast a solution with the majority solution. In 1979, we had a number of amendments that we proposed to Byrd's rules changes, all of which went down.

RITCHIE: Not one was adopted?

GOLD: Not formally. Well, there were a couple of instances where Byrd made an accommodation, but he modified it himself, we never amended him. He had great pride of authorship in those changes.

RITCHIE: At that point, when you were trying to learn the rules, how did you go about it, other than sitting there on the floor and watching Senator Byrd? Did you talk to other people? Did you do much reading? What was your strategy?

GOLD: I studied *Riddick's Senate Procedures* in the summer months of 1979. I spent a lot of my August recess with that book, going over and over it. Dr. Riddick was around then. I talked to him. I would talk to the parliamentarian's office. Bob Dove and Alan Frumin would talk to me. It was mostly talking to Bob and to Alan, talking to Doc, and to Hildenbrand. It was observation on the floor, studying the procedure book, and talking to those people.

RITCHIE: Who would come to you then for advice? You mentioned Senator Tower in the chamber but would senators just in general come up to you or was it mostly the leadership?

GOLD: Well, Baker always. Eventually I sort of got to the point where I felt that I was really doing him a service as opposed to just being there. But also other people: Lowell Weicker, John Chafee would come on things, or I'd have discussions with McClure, who was a very detail-oriented person, and was very interested in floor procedure. Stevens was another one, as was Hatch. Some of them had staffs that had self-styled procedural experts, who were actually reasonably good at it too. So it wasn't like I was completely off by myself. But basically what Baker did was make me available as a resource to Republican senators. So, in the end, I had my clients, if you will, and sometimes their positions were not the same as Baker's. But Baker would never say, "don't help this senator."

RITCHIE: Would they be trying to plan strategy for a legislative action or just trying to figure out where they were in the process?

GOLD: All of the above. I remember one day when they were trying to put a pay increase through. It was right at the end of the session. They had started a maneuver for a pay increase in the dead of night. They had a Saturday session and I came in the office and I was told that Chafee wanted to see me in the cloakroom. I went in there and he said, "*Marty*, tell me how I can kill this pay raise." I'm thinking to myself: "Get yourself another lawyer. That's my pay raise!" [Laughs] I needed that pay raise. But what are you going to do? You tell him. We had a very good and trusting relationship with these members, and I'll tell you, Don, when I got back up here, one of the really gratifying things to me was that people from those years who were still around, John Warner, [Thad] Cochran, Grassley, [Richard] Lugar, Hatch, Stevens, [Pete] Domenici, were all extremely welcoming because they remembered how we operated.

I tried to reflect Baker. Reflecting Baker to these members, Baker's modus operandi, was a very good thing. If you're working with someone who is a decent guy and has the right perspective on the institution, that is imputed to you. So Hatfield was imputed to me, and Baker was imputed to me. When I came back, all those years later, it was still there.

RITCHIE: Senator Baker had a real tightrope act during those four years when he was minority leader, because his party, as you mentioned, was very divided ideologically. There was a fairly large number of moderate Republican senators at that point, almost half and half in terms of how the party was.

GOLD: Correct.

RITCHIE: How did he operate as leader?

GOLD: With tremendous adroitness. I can start this story at the end and work backwards. When I left I wrote him a note and in the note I said to him: "To every axiom there is an exception. In this case the axiom is that no one is hero to his own valet," because I learned from watching him. He had tremendous political instincts. The staff would give him a memo—you could do this, you can do that—raising with him all the options that he could exercise. He had a very good sense of when to press forward and when to lean back. When to give someone his head and when to rein him in, because he understood human relations well, and because people understood that he was being square with them. He had a fine relationship with Robert C. Byrd. He told Byrd when he became majority leader that he was going to signal to him everything he was going to do. He would create no surprises. So Byrd would know ahead of time whenever Baker was going to move in one direction or another direction. Whatever Baker sacrificed in terms of the element of surprise was rewarded in terms of the element of trust.

Baker had allies. For example, I remember early in the Reagan administration we got to the point of having to breach the national debt at one trillion dollars. You had some very conservative Republicans who didn't want to vote for that. Now we had a majority, and we couldn't not vote for that. Baker understood that his credentials as Reaganaught were somewhat suspect. After all, he had run against Reagan. He said he was going to be Reagan's spear carrier in the Senate, but that wasn't absolutely settled in yet. So he got [Strom] Thurmond to come talk to them. Thurmond essentially said, "I've never voted for a debt ceiling increase, but I'm voting for this one and so are you." He understood how to reach out and bring in other people as he needed to, was very consultative with his committee chairmen, and not in the least bit a martinet. That also helped. In other words, he never challenged the ego of other members. In that respect, I think he was a great deal more like Mansfield than like [Lyndon] Johnson.

RITCHIE: The best leaders, it seems to me, are the ones who respect the institution as an institution, rather than operating strictly as a partisan. They all have to be partisan leaders because they're leading a party, but somehow they have to deal with this peculiar institution that's been around for a few hundred years and isn't going to change dramatically for them.

GOLD: He had the greatest respect for the Senate, and still does. He operated according to the precepts that he himself believed in. He never really believed much in round-the-clock sessions, so he didn't schedule them. He didn't believe necessarily in Saturday sessions or keeping the senators off balance in terms of their personal life. So he did it as little as possible. He tried to institute this idea that later grew up as a "family-friendly Senate," he tried to institute a little bit of that when he came in by saying, "Look, we'll plan the one late night of the week will be Thursday night. If we get our work done on Thursday night we won't be in on Friday." The simple fact is that senators did want to get out of here on Friday, and Baker's notion was: "All right, look, we're not going to tell you you're going to be late Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday. We're going to try to avoid that until we get to the point in the session where we can't avoid it. But at least in the early months we won't do it unnecessarily. You can plan your evenings, if you have fund-raisers to go to, if you have to be with your family, whatever it is, have at it. But then know that you're going to be here on Thursday late, but not on Friday if we get our work done." He set up a work load that was reasonable to achieve under those conditions. In time that broke down. The press of business necessitated it. But there was a genuine effort to try to make that happen.

RITCHIE: Also looking back to that period in the late 1970s, I don't think Jimmy Carter ever understood how good he had it. His party had overwhelming majorities in both houses, and he had an extremely accommodating minority leader. Howard Baker went out on a limb on a number of occasions for Carter.

GOLD: The Panama Canal.

RITCHIE: Being the most famous, yes, it would never have passed without Baker's support. That was a big risk for Baker as a leader, too.

GOLD: It was probably one of the things that kept him out of the presidency, frankly. There were going to be people that never forgave him for that. I think that was an act of supreme statesmanship on his part. It's not unlike the Watergate Committee we were talking about. What posture could he have taken on the Watergate Committee? He could have been a hard-edged partisan and tried to discredit the work of the Ervin Committee. Instead, he is regarded as being one of the most credible people on the Ervin Committee because he did not approach it that way. He appeared fair-minded in his approach. The same thing was true of the Panama Canal. I think that he came to the Panama Canal issues as a matter of honest intellectual commitment, even though it might harm him politically.

RITCHIE: I think Clinton could not have imagined having the same things that Carter had.

GOLD: No. Absolutely not. This is a different place now.

RITCHIE: Well, we're coming to 1980s, which is a natural break, and I think we can stop here. My schedule is pretty open this week.

GOLD: We're in good shape this week, for me as well. I've got a couple of seminars to do.

RITCHIE: Actually, one of the things I'd like to talk about is the seminars that you've done as well. I'd like to focus on how you've trained other people.

GOLD: The next one will be number eighty this year. That will be a pretty good year for me.

RITCHIE: When you look at the transcript, if you think there are some things we should develop more, we can pick it up at the beginning of the next session. We'll have a transcript for you by then. Transcription is not an exact science, so it's worthwhile taking a look at it. I have much more sympathy for the Reporters of Debate after being involved with transcription!

GOLD: That is the most remarkable thing. How they get all that, I just don't know. I can remember having to correct the record of a Baker-Byrd colloquy the day my son was born. My son was born at six o'clock in the morning and by about nine Baker's driver was out at the hospital with the galleys. My wife did not appreciate that. "Can't they leave you alone?" No, no, the *Record* has to be right. I've never actually, Don, looked in the *Record* of October 1st, 1980, to even remember what it was about! [Laughs]

End of the First Interview