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Fact Sheet: Proposed Protective Action Guides for Radiological Dispersion and Improvised Nuclear Devices

Release Date: 01/03/06 00:00:00

WASHINGTON - The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) posted today in the Federal Register the “Application of Protective Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents.”  The public and interested stakeholders will have until March 6, 2006 to submit comments regarding this proposed protective action guidance.

The objective of the proposed guidance is to provide federal, state, local and tribal decision makers with uniform federal guidance to protect the public, emergency responders, and surrounding environments from the effects of radiation following a radiological dispersion device or improvised nuclear device incident, and to ensure that local and federal first responders can address issues or circumstances that may arise.

These Protective Action Guides outline the projected dose of radiation to an individual, from an accidental or deliberate release of radioactive material, at which a specific protective action to reduce or avoid such a dose of radiation is recommended.

Background

A radiological dispersal device (RDD) is a device or mechanism that is intended to spread radioactive material from the detonation of conventional explosives or other means over a finite area such as spraying by a crop duster. An improvised nuclear device (IND) is a device built from components of a stolen weapon or from scratch using nuclear material that could produce nuclear explosions.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 called upon the department to develop and implement countermeasures to prepare and respond to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats. After conducting a “dirty bomb” scenario exercise in Seattle in 2003 (TOPOFF 2), DHS officials determined that additional federal guidance to state and local officials overseeing public health and safety after such an attack was needed.  

Although radiological materials are used regularly in laboratories, medical centers, and industrial settings, it is very difficult to construct an RDD that would deliver radiation doses high enough to cause immediate health effects or fatalities in a large number of people.  However, if these materials are stolen or otherwise acquired, they could be used in an RDD to contaminate facilities or places where people live and work, disrupting lives and livelihood, and to cause anxiety to those who believe they are being or have been exposed. RDDs have been termed “weapons of mass disruption.”

Interagency Coordination  

This proposed protective action guidance is an extension of guidance previously published by the EPA in consultation with other federal agencies and used by local and state officials since the 1970s to respond to incidents caused by the accidental release of radioactive material from a nuclear power plant or other similar nuclear or radiological accident (Manual of Protective Actions Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, revised 1992). This proposed guidance specifically addresses the response to an RDD or IND attack, which would require a unique, flexible and incident-specific approach to immediate response and long-term recovery efforts.

A federal interagency effort with representation from eight federal agencies developed and approved the proposed guidance. The draft guidance was prepared by the Departments of Homeland Security, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Labor, and Health and Human Services, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

This proposed protective action guidance uses similar radiation dose levels for the early and intermediate phases of a response as in the existing guidance, and also provides federal, state and local officials with a decision-making framework (an “optimization process”) for long-term cleanup, allowing for a remediation plan proportional to the size and complexity of the incident.  The guidance uses a scientific unit of measurement, a “rem” (a basic unit of dose which takes into account the different biological effects of different types of radiation).  A millirem is one-one thousandth (1/1000) of a rem.  The protective action guides were based on the following criteria:

  • Prevent acute health effects,
  • Reduce the risk of chronic effects,
  • Balance protection with other important factors that affect the public welfare, and
  • Ensure actions taken result in more benefit than harm

For the cleanup phase of the response, the proposed guidance recommends a decision-making framework referred to as optimization process for reaching a consensus on the desired level of cleanup that is responsive to federal, state and local needs including, most importantly, the protection of the local public health and welfare. Optimization is a flexible approach, detailed in the protective action guides published in the Federal Register, in which a variety of dose and risk benchmarks may be identified from state, federal, or other sources such as national and international advisory organizations, in order to establish appropriate remediation options.  This guidance does not change any existing standards.

In developing the guidance, the federal government recognized that experience from existing programs such as EPA’s Superfund program, NRC’s standards for decontamination and decommissioning to terminate a plant license and other national and international recommendations will be useful in planning the recovery and restoration efforts following an RDD or IND incident.  This guidance allows the consideration and incorporation, as appropriate, of any or all of the existing programs, and does not alter existing programs. It is sufficiently flexible to address the extremely broad range of situations that can occur under various RDD and IND scenarios.  This range is larger than most existing programs or recommendations address. State and local officials, working with federal counterparts, will be able to make informed decisions with sufficient information to decide what is best for their community.  

Public Comment Period

Public comments will be accepted until March 6, 2006. Comments can be submitted, identified by Docket Number DHS-2004-0029 and Z-RIN 1660-ZA02 by one of the following methods:

  • E-mail to: FEMA-RULES@dhs.gov (include Docket Number DHS-2004-0029 and Z-RIN 1660-ZA02 in the subject line of the e-mail message)

  • Fax to: (202) 646-4536

  • Mail or courier to: Rules Docket Clerk, Office of the General Counsel, Federal Emergency Management Agency, room 840, 500 C Street, SW, Washington, DC 20472

  • All comments received will be posted without change and can be publicly viewed online at www.epa.gov/feddocket or physically inspected at 500 C Street, SW, room 840, Washington, DC 20472

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This page was last reviewed/modified on 01/03/06 00:00:00.