Facilitating DisarmamentWritten by Dr. Christopher A. Ford, United States Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, delivered at the Conference on "Preparing for 2010: Getting the Process Right" , Annecy, France, March 17, 2007. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) review process was designed from the outset to provide States Party with an opportunity periodically to discuss the operation of the Treaty and how best to preserve its integrity and fulfill its purposes. When NPT Parties have been able to reach consensus upon the way ahead, which has occurred at fewer than half of the Treaty's Review Conferences, they have issued resolutions, decisions, or Final Documents. Such documents, which are statements of political rather than legal agreement upon certain policy positions, have provided an important window into Parties' thinking at the time, and have served as valuable guideposts to policy for as long as they have remained relevant to the challenges facing the Treaty regime. It is up to all States Party to evaluate continuously the situation facing the NPT regime, and to use the Treaty review process to encourage support for measures that promote fulfillment of the Treaty's provisions and achievement of the purposes expressed in its Preamble. As the world changes, many positions expressed in past Review Conference documents will remain of enduring importance, and will need to remain a focus of attention. Over time, however, other positions may be overtaken by events, while new issues will no doubt also arise that require new positions to be taken. During the last NPT review cycle, much controversy arose over the present-day import of certain positions related to nuclear disarmament, the "Thirteen Practical Steps," that were articulated in the Final Document of the NPT Review Conference held in the year 2000. The security environment has changed substantially since 2000, and we cannot assume that all suggestions made then necessarily remain relevant today. The United States believes that the "Thirteen Steps" now constitute an inadequate set of policy priorities for achieving the goals of Article VI and the Preamble of the Treaty. Rather than assuming that political statements from the year 2000 will forever reflect the needs of a changing world, the interests of nuclear disarmament would be better served by careful study of what measures would most contribute to the Treaty's goals today. A companion paper to this document discusses the sort of international security environment that would be necessary in order not merely to achieve nuclear disarmament but also to sustain it indefinitely. As part of its ongoing contributions to creating such an environment, the United States seeks in this paper to reemphasize its commitment to the goals expressed in Article VI and the Preamble to the NPT. It also offers some suggestions about how the Treaty review process can help Parties understand and create the conditions in which it would be possible to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons. U.S. Commitment to Disarmament The United States is steadfastly committed to the goals expressed in Article VI and the Preamble to the NPT. As an expression of this commitment, it believes that States Party should use the current NPT review cycle as an opportunity to reaffirm these objectives and consider ways to achieve them that are relevant to the current international situation. As U.S. diplomats have stressed in recent consultations, the United States is committed to engaging in dialogue with foreign partners on how to create an environment in which it will be realistically possible to achieve and sustain the total elimination of nuclear weapons. As can be seen from the companion papers to this document, the United States has an outstanding record of: ending the superpower nuclear arms race; drastically reducing its nuclear weapons stockpile and inventory of delivery systems; removing large quantities of fissile material from its nuclear weapons program and from military uses; cutting back its nuclear weapons infrastructure; and reducing its reliance upon nuclear weapons for national defense. These accomplishments, moreover, are not just historical but ongoing. The United States' conclusion that the "Thirteen Steps" formulation from 2000 does not fit today's conditions, therefore, does not represent a lack of commitment to the goals expressed in Article VI and the Preamble to the NPT. On the contrary, the U.S. position represents a commitment to ensuring that these goals are pursued realistically and productively. Creating a Disarmament Environment With the objective of creating an environment in which total nuclear disarmament will be practical and realistic, rather than simply a utopian fantasy, the United States urges NPT States Party to reaffirm their support for the goals expressed in Article VI and the Preamble to the NPT, while publicly recognizing the progress made by some nuclear weapon states (NWS) in continuing to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in their stockpiles. Building upon this, the United States believes that the following elements would help create the environment necessary for disarmament:
Conclusion To repeat, the United States is steadfastly committed to the goals expressed in Article VI and the Preamble to the NPT. As an expression of this commitment, it believes that States Party should use the current NPT review cycle as an opportunity to reaffirm these objectives and ensure the relevance of the international community's disarmament-related agenda under present conditions. It is no less important now than during previous review cycles to pursue the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and no country would be more pleased to see fulfillment of the NPT's goals than the United States. It is time for States Party to commit themselves to building upon the progress already made toward these ends in order to create not only an environment in which nuclear weapons can finally be eliminated, but also one in which this abolition could be sustained indefinitely through robust measures to ensure against the reemergence of such weaponry. |