Protecting People and the EnvironmentUNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
ACCESSION #: 9507200264
RGE
ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION o
89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER N.Y. 14649-0001 AREA CODE 716
546-2700
ROBERT C. MECREDY
Vice President
Nuclear Operations
July 14, 1995
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Attn: Allen R. Johnson
PWR Project Directorate 1-1
Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject: 10 CFR Part 21 30 Day Report
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
Docket No. 50-244
In accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and
Noncompliance, Section 21 (c) (3) (ii), which requires "Written
notification to the NRC ... on the identification of a defect or
a
failure to comply", the attached 10 CFR 21 report is hereby
submitted.
Very truly yours,
Robert C. Mecredy
xc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. Allen R. Johnson (Mail Stop 14B2)
PWR Project Directorate I-1
Washington, D.C. 20555
Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406
Ginna USNRC Senior Resident Inspector
PAGE 2
10CFR21 30 DAY WRITTEN REPORT
I. NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL INFORMING THE
COMMISSION:
NAME: Robert C. Mecredy
Vice President Nuclear Operations
ADDRESS: Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation
89 East Avenue
Rochester, New York 14649
II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE FACILITY, THE ACTIVITY, OR THE
BASIC
COMPONENT SUPPLIED FOR SUCH FACILITY WHICH FAILS TO
COMPLY OR
CONTAINS A DEFECT:
The facility is the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.
The basic
component is a 14 inch air-operated butterfly valve,
used as
the Service Water outlet valve AOV-4561 (Fisher Series
7600
valve) for the Containment Recirculation Fan Coolers
(CRFC).
The valve assembly (less actuator) was replaced during
the 1995
refueling outage as preventive maintenance for
AOV-4561.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE FIRM CONSTRUCTING THE FACILITY OR
SUPPLYING THE BASIC COMPONENT WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR
CONTAINS
A DEFECT:
The butterfly valve installed during the 1995 outage
was
procured as a replacement for a specific serial
numbered
original plant valve (AOV-4561). Since the valve is
standard
and commercially available, it was procured as
commercial grade
and dedicated as safety-related by Rochester Gas and
Electric
(RG&E) under Commercial Grade Item Engineering
Evaluation
(CGIEE) 94-051. The valve was supplied by:
Fisher Controls Co.
c/o Northeast Controls, Inc.
60 John Glenn DR
Amherst, NY 14228
PAGE 3
IV. NATURE OF THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY AND THE
SAFETY HAZARD
WHICH IS CREATED OR COULD BE CREATED BY SUCH DEFECT OR
FAILURE
TO COMPLY:
The replacement valve was installed as AOV-4561 in
mid-April,
1995, with the plant in cold shutdown and this portion
of the
Service Water system isolated for maintenance and not
required
to be operable. As part of the installation process
and prior
to turnover for post-maintenance testing (PMT) and
return to
operable status, Instrument and Control (I&C)
technicians were
performing initial alignment of the valve to the valve
actuator
and valve positioner, using a valve-specific
calibration data
sheet. On April 18, 1995, during this initial
alignment, the
I&C technicians found that AOV-4561 actuated opposite
from the
required configuration. The difference in actuation
was caused
by improper keyway placement, resulting in
"air-to-open"
operation. The original engineering requirements
stipulated
"air-to-close" operation.
The safety hazard which could be created by such a
defect is
the loss of Service Water flow through the Containment
Recirculation Fan Coolers (CRFC), when combined with
single
failure considerations. This condition could result in
the
Containment pressure slightly exceeding design
limitations in
the event of the limiting "Steam line break in
Containment"
accident.
V. THE DATE ON WHICH THE INFORMATION OF SUCH DEFECT OR
FAILURE TO
COMPLY WAS OBTAINED:
The information was obtained on April 18, 1995.
VI. IN THE CASE OF A BASIC COMPONENT WHICH CONTAINS A
DEFECT OR
FAILS TO COMPLY, THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ALL SUCH
COMPONENTS
IN USE AT, SUPPLIED FOR, OR BEING SUPPLIED FOR GINNA
STATION:
One valve was procured for AOV-4561, and installed in
mid-
April, 1995, in the Service Water system at Ginna
Station.
PAGE 4
VII. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION WHICH HAS BEEN, IS BEING, OR WILL
BE
TAKEN; THE NAME OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION
RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE ACTION; AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT HAS BEEN OR
WILL BE
TAKEN TO COMPLETE THE ACTION:
Corrective action was taken by the Ginna Station
Maintenance
group. A nonconformance report (NCR) was initiated,
and the
valve was repaired in accordance with the Engineering
disposition for this NCR, by cutting a new keyway in
the valve
actuator lever. The actuator lever was reinstalled,
and the
valve actuator was calibrated per the requirements of
the
calibration data sheet to verify proper valve
operation. These
corrective actions were completed within seven days of
identification of the problem, with the plant in cold
shutdown
and this portion of the Service Water system isolated
land not
required to be operable.
The CGIEE for this valve was revised by Procurement
Engineering, to include verification of appropriate
component
operation, with successful completion of PMT as the
acceptance
criteria. This provides assurance that the valve
interfaces
correctly with the valve actuator and functions
correctly as
part of the Service Water system.
The purchasing description in the Materials Management
computer
system was revised by Procurement Engineering to ensure
that
future purchase orders will stipulate the original
design
requirement that the valve be supplied as
"air-to-close".
The importance of verifying equipment interfaces and
component
interactions during consideration of critical
characteristics
for dedication was reemphasized to procurement
engineers by
Procurement Engineering supervision in June, 1995.
VIII. ANY ADVICE RELATED TO THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY
ABOUT THE
FACILITY, ACTIVITY, OR BASIC COMPONENT THAT HAS BEEN,
IS BEING,
OR WILL BE GIVEN TO PURCHASERS OR LICENSEES:
The critical characteristics selected for commercial
grade
dedication should have required verification that the
valve
would fail as designed on loss of air. Associated
activities
that are normally performed to assure that the valve
interfaces
correctly with the valve actuator (such as I&C
calibration and
PMT) should be included as part of the commercial grade
dedication process. Verification that dedicated
components
interface correctly assures the configuration necessary
for
proper component operation and system function.
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