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International SafeguardsAs part of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the NRC participates in U.S. and international activities to account for and control nuclear material assigned to commercial and other peaceful purposes. Although not required to do so under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the U.S. voluntarily agreed “… to permit the Agency to apply safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all facilities within the United States, excluding only those facilities associated with activities with direct national security significance to the United States…” to encourage participation of non-nuclear-weapon States in the Treaty. This attempt resulted in the signing of the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement in 1977. Since then over 200 facilities licensed by the NRC have been placed on the list of U.S. facilities eligible for IAEA safeguards reporting and inspections and four facilities selected by the IAEA are submitting accounting data to the IAEA. Recently, an Additional Protocol to the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement was ratified by Congress and awaits final implementation. When the Additional Protocol enters into force all U.S eligible facilities will be subject to strengthened reporting requirements and expanded IAEA access rights. To learn more about the Additional Protocol, click here. The NRC provides technical assistance to the IAEA and supports U.S. initiatives to extend and enhance international safeguards and verification programs. The NRC participates in U.S. physical protection information exchanges with other countries. Teams of specialists visit facilities and hold discussions to ensure that special nuclear materials transferred between countries will be adequately protected in the recipient country. The NRC staff had a lead role in a September 2004 revision to the International Convention on the Physical Security of Nuclear Material. Documents related to international safeguards may be found here , the Safeguards chapter of the IAEA Annual Report , and the U.S. Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System . U.S-IAEA Safeguards AgreementThe U.S-IAEA Safeguards Agreement is a voluntary agreement between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of international safeguards on nuclear material in the U.S. In September 1976, the U.S.-IAEA agreement was submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors for the Board's approval and was submitted to the U.S. Senate on February 9, 1978. Its advice and consent to ratification was given unanimously, with understandings, on July 2, 1980. It The U.S-IAEA Safeguards Agreement is called the “Voluntary Offer” for short since the United States was under no obligation to accept safeguards on its nuclear material under the NPT. This treaty was signed to demonstrate to non-nuclear weapon States that there was no economic disadvantage for implementing safeguards. Under the voluntary agreement, the United States provides data on declared nuclear material to the IAEA for the verification and to determine whether nuclear material has been diverted for weapons development. Currently, an Additional Protocol to this agreement is being instated to further strengthen this agreement. Please see the page on the Additional Protocol to the U.S-IAEA Safeguards Agreement for further information. Frequently Asked Questions
What is the difference between the Voluntary Offer and the Additional Protocol? How is the NRC involved in the Voluntary Offer? What does it mean to be on the eligible facilities list? What happens when a site is selected for an inspection by the IAEA? Next, the facility operator fills in a design information questionnaire (DIQ) for the IAEA. The DIQ contains a detailed physical description of the facility and its material flow. The DIQ forms the basis for the practical implementation of IAEA safeguards at the facility and is confidential. When all negotiations are concluded the IAEA creates a “Facility Attachment” which describes the safeguards arrangements for that particular facility. Unless specifically approved as part of the safeguards approach, IAEA inspections are announced in advance of the IAEA visit. To the extent possible, the NRC will notify the licensee in writing of the proposed visit as soon as possible after receiving the IAEA’s inspection notification from the U.S. Department of State. Unless the licensee and the NRC agree otherwise, an NRC employee will, to the extent possible, accompany the IAEA inspector(s) during the visit. The licensee, applicant, or certificate holder should inform the NRC immediately if the IAEA inspection cannot be accommodated on the specified date. Typical IAEA inspections activities include, but are not limited to:
It is important to note that the voluntary agreement signed by the United States has a managed access clause which allows any activity, component, process or otherwise proprietary information deemed sensitive by the government to be concealed or excluded during the inspection visit. The licensee must, however, make a reasonable effort to allow for the collection of necessary data through other possible means. Additional Protocol to the U.S-IAEA Safeguards AgreementThe Additional Protocol to the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards agreement is a treaty between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for strengthened safeguards on U.S. nuclear material. This treaty was signed in 1998 by the U.S. Government and will enter into force after all involved regulatory agencies are prepared with the necessary changes to regulations and guidance documents. The U.S Additional Protocol is based on the Model Additional Protocol with the exception of the National Security Exclusion. When this treaty enters into force, additional information from NRC and Agreement State licensees will be required along with providing expanded access rights to the IAEA. The United States Government hopes that by agreeing to strengthened safeguards measures, it will provide an example for other nations to follow. Frequently Asked Questions
Discovery of the Iraqi clandestine nuclear weapons program in 1991, and subsequent discoveries involving other foreign nation’s nuclear programs, led to the recognition that the IAEA’s capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities needed to be strengthened. At that time the focus of IAEA safeguards was to ensure the accuracy of a State’s nuclear material declarations through verification that the declared nuclear material was used only for peaceful nuclear activities. Beginning in December 1991, the IAEA Board of Governors began considering how to strengthen the IAEA safeguards program. New measures that the IAEA had authority to implement under the existing States’ safeguards agreements were adopted in 1995. However, some new measures required the approval of new protocols to States’ safeguards agreements with the IAEA. In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreements between the States and the IAEA, and the IAEA Department of Safeguards immediately began negotiating “Additional Protocols” to the States’ safeguards agreements. When did the U.S sign the Additional Protocol? What is the difference between the Model Additional Protocol and the Additional Protocol signed by the U.S.? Why did the U.S sign the Additional Protocol? What is required by the Additional Protocol?
Who is responsible for facilitating the collection of information required for the Additional Protocol? How is the required information for the Additional Protocol reported? Are there any other countries that have signed an Additional Protocol agreement? Where can I find more information about the Additional Protocol? |
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