No. S-97-18
SHARING REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES:
THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN
A TIME OF CHANGE
Dr. Shirley Ann Jackson, Chairman
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Keynote Address to the
22nd Annual Symposium of the Uranium Institute
September 5, 1997
Good morning ladies and gentlemen. I begin my address today with some degree of
mixed feelings. Certainly it is my pleasure to join you at your annual meeting and
to address this morning's session on regulation, competition, and nuclear power.
Nevertheless, my pleasure in making this visit is overshadowed by the sadness
enveloping your country as you mourn the loss of Princess Diana. Like so many
others around the world, I share that sadness. As I heard said earlier this week,
"Truly a great light has gone out."
As you know, the United Kingdom and the United States have a longstanding history as
partners and friends in the nuclear arena. U.S. industry and regulators also share
strong partnerships with most of you here today. Therefore, I am delighted to be
able to participate in and to continue this time-honored dialogue, as I make my
first visit to the United Kingdom as Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC). In addition to my participation here, I also will have the
opportunity to meet with nuclear officials from both government and industry, and to
visit several nuclear facilities, including the Sellafield complex.
Because the generation and regulation of nuclear energy and reactor byproduct
materials are topics not confined by national boundaries, changes to a particular
aspect of how business is conducted in one country--such as the current trend in
electric power industry competition and restructuring--can have a direct impact on
the world electricity market, and, by implication, the nuclear power industry around
the globe. Therefore, we each must understand our own domestic issues, but, at the
same time, we must work within the larger sphere of international energy demands and
regulatory activities. This requires sharing knowledge to broaden international
perspectives on nuclear issues, and to enhance a global nuclear safety culture.
I will begin by discussing several areas of emerging and/or active NRC focus,
including (1) the storage and disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium; (2)
NRC nuclear regulatory jurisdiction over the U.S. Enrichment Corporation and its two
associated gaseous diffusion plants; (3) the potential for NRC oversight of U.S.
Department of Energy nuclear facilities; and (4) of primary focus, U.S. electric
utility industry deregulation. I will close with a brief discussion of the recently
formed International Nuclear Regulators Association, an organization established to
provide a forum in which senior nuclear regulatory officials can share perspectives
and seek consensus on safety, policy, and economic issues of concern to regulatory
bodies worldwide.
1. Plutonium Storage and Disposition
In January of this year (1997), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) issued its
Record of Decision for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile
Materials. In its Record of Decision, DOE stated that it has decided to implement a
program for the safe and secure storage of weapons-usable fissile material
(plutonium and highly enriched uranium), and announced a strategy for the
disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium. DOE plans to pursue a dual-track
approach for plutonium disposition, which would include (1) immobilizing surplus
plutonium with high-level radioactive waste in a glass or ceramic material, for
direct disposal in a geologic repository; and (2) burning some of the surplus
plutonium as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic commercial reactors before
disposal in a geologic repository.
The NRC has a direct interest in this program, because it impacts at least three
major areas that the NRC regulates--commercial nuclear power reactors, fuel cycle
facilities, and the (as yet unbuilt) high-level radioactive waste geologic
repository. The NRC has been actively evaluating the proposed plutonium disposition
alternatives since the DOE Record of Decision was issued. Shortly after issuing its
Record of Decision, the DOE briefed the full Commission on its plans for plutonium
disposition. In February and March of this year, the NRC sponsored two technical
seminars, both open to the public, in which representatives of the nuclear industry,
including several foreign representatives, made presentations on the fabrication of
MOX fuel and its use in commercial reactors.
Just 2 months ago, the DOE issued a program acquisition strategy for selecting
private sector organizations to assist in implementing the MOX fuel alternative for
disposing of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. The MOX fuel fabrication services
detailed in the proposed strategy include: designing, constructing or modifying,
licensing, and operating a fuel fabrication facility; supplying commercial nuclear
fuel for reactors; and ultimately, decontaminating and decommissioning the
fabrication facility. The proposal would involve a one-time use of MOX fuel to
dispose of existing weapons-grade plutonium, but would not include reprocessing. In
addition, the MOX fuel fabrication facility would cease operation and be
decommissioned after completing its mission of weapons-grade plutonium disposition.
Successful implementation of this approach also would require the full spectrum of
irradiation services needed to burn MOX fuel at commercial NRC-licensed reactor
facilities. This would include designing and engineering the necessary reactor and
facility modifications; obtaining Federal, State and local environmental permits;
performing core design and fuel design services; irradiating the fuel; and storing
the irradiated fuel until it can be ultimately disposed of in a geologic repository.
The DOE acquisition strategy also states that the U.S. would pursue the use of
Canadian CANDU reactors, if international agreements are reached among the Russian
Federation, Canada, and the United States for implementing disposition of U.S. and
Russian plutonium.
Certain technical, financial, and political questions, related to the MOX fuel
initiative and to plutonium disposition in general, remain unanswered. Some
supporters of the MOX fuel option have argued that plutonium immobilization is not
an adequate method of disposal, because the plutonium later could be re-extracted
from the glass or ceramic immobilization medium. In the U.S., industry
representatives have expressed reservations about the size and duration of the
investment necessary for commercial nuclear power companies to invest in the MOX
fuel program--based on the financial vulnerability that could exist if unforeseen
national or international events later prompted DOE to cancel the MOX program. And certain U.S. public interest groups have asked that DOE set minimum standards of
safety or performance for commercial utilities selected to participate in the MOX
program.
Last week at the Argonne National Laboratory near Chicago, DOE officials met with
nuclear utility representatives and others to focus on these and other issues. In
the upcoming weeks, DOE will brief the Commission on the overall DOE strategy for
plutonium disposition, including its acquisition strategy for MOX fuel fabrication
and irradiation services. The Commission recognizes fully the importance of this
program--both to the U.S. and to nations around the world--as well as the need to
carry out successfully the broader goals and objectives of weapons-usable fissile
material storage and disposition. The Commission will continue to monitor the
evolving DOE strategies for plutonium storage and disposition, to ensure that the
NRC is prepared to perform its emerging regulatory role in a manner that ensures the
protection of public health and safety, and that avoids unnecessary delays or costs.
2. U.S. Enrichment Corporation
Another area of particular interest to this group began with the U.S. Energy Policy
Act of 1992, which established the U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to operate the
DOE gaseous diffusion plants in Piketon, Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky. The Act
required the NRC to establish standards that would govern these uranium enrichment
facilities, and to establish a certification process to ensure that the USEC
complies with those established standards. The Act also requires the NRC to submit
annual reports to Congress, with input from DOE and the Environmental Protection
Agency, on the status of health, safety, and environmental conditions at the gaseous
diffusion plants.
As required by the Energy Policy Act, the NRC issued regulatory standards entitled
"Certification of Gaseous Diffusion Plants" (10 CFR Part 76) in September 1994. The
USEC submitted a complete application for certification in September 1995. A
proposed NRC certification decision was prepared and issued in September 1996, and
the actual certificates were issued to the USEC less than a year ago, in
November 1996. On March 3 of this year, the transition from DOE regulatory
oversight was finalized, and the NRC officially assumed nuclear regulatory
jurisdiction over the USEC operations at the Kentucky and Ohio plants.
The next major milestone for the USEC was set into motion by the passage of the USEC
Privatization Act in April of 1996. This Act provides for the USEC to become a
private corporation, and institutes a five-year certification cycle. President
Clinton recently gave the USEC the approval to move forward with privatization.
Given that USEC supplies about 40% of the worldwide production of enriched uranium
for commercial power plants, privatization of the enterprise offers a tempting
acquisition to large U.S. companies. The U.S. government must decide soon whether
to sell USEC as an entity or to make a public offering to prospective shareholders.
However the transition is made, it will be the largest divestiture of a U.S. Federal
production corporation in history, and, unless unforeseen difficulties are
encountered, it should occur within the next 6-8 months.
The private sector entity that purchases the assets of the USEC will be responsible
for the operation of the two gaseous diffusion plants, and the development, by the
USEC, of any new uranium enrichment processes. The Act prohibits the issuance of a
certificate of compliance to that entity if the NRC determines that:
(1) The entity is owned, controlled, or dominated by an alien, a foreign
corporation, or a foreign government; or
(2) Issuance of a certificate would be inimical to the common defense and security
of the United States; or
(3) Issuance of a certificate would be inimical to the maintenance of a reliable
and economical domestic source of enrichment services.
On December 19, 1996, the NRC staff submitted for Commission approval a paper
entitled, "Direct and Final Rulemaking: USEC Privatization Act--Conforming Changes
and Revision to the NRC Enforcement Policy (NUREG-1600)." With this paper, the
staff proposed amendments to bring applicable NRC regulations into conformance with
the statutory requirements of the Act. The Commission approved this direct and
final rulemaking.
The initial USEC certification was based upon a finding of compliance with NRC
standards to protect public health and safety and the common defense and security.
Any recertification of the USEC, or certification of a USEC successor, will be based
on NRC review and approval of any needed updates to the initial application. In
addition, the Commission must make the three determinations which relate to foreign
ownership, control or influence, the common defense and security, and a reliable and
economic domestic source of uranium. The Commission also will review the USEC
implementation of Compliance Plans, and accumulated regulatory experience. The
staff has prepared for Commission review a standard review plan including these
elements--as implementation guidance for issuing a certificate of compliance to the
privatized USEC or any subsequent recertifications of the gaseous diffusion plants.
In summary, the NRC and the USEC, as well as other responsible U.S. Federal
agencies, are coordinating activities to ensure that the Privatization Act
requirements are met, and to facilitate a smooth transition from operation as a
government corporation to operation as a private corporation.
3. External Regulation of DOE Nuclear Facilities
By longstanding tradition, a primary mission of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
has been nuclear weapons production, as well as the development of commercial and
naval nuclear reactors, and the conduct of energy-related research. With the end of
the Cold War, certain elements of the DOE mission have shifted. The fundamental
mission elements of the department have remained the same, but approximately half of
the DOE nuclear budget is now devoted to three activities: materials management,
decommissioning and cleanup, and waste management. Through decommissioning, DOE
expects to decrease the number of its existing nuclear facilities from 600 to 200
over the next 10 years.
The self-regulation, by DOE or its predecessors, of all aspects of safety at its
nuclear facilities, with the primary exception of environmental protection, has
existed since the enactment of the original Atomic Energy Act in 1946. In 1994,
legislation was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives that would have
subjected new DOE facilities to immediate external regulation, and would have
created a stakeholder group to study external regulation of existing facilities. As
an alternative to that approach, the Secretary of Energy created, in January 1995,
the Advisory Committee on External Regulation of DOE Nuclear Safety. The Advisory
Committee was charged with providing advice and recommendations on whether (and how)
new and existing DOE facilities and operations might be externally regulated to
ensure nuclear safety.
In its December 1995 report, "Improving Regulation of Safety at DOE Nuclear
Facilities," the Advisory Committee recommended that essentially all aspects of
safety at DOE nuclear facilities should be externally regulated. The Secretary of
Energy accepted and endorsed the Advisory Committee report, and created the DOE
Working Group on External Regulation (Working Group) to provide recommendations on
implementation of the Advisory Committee report. The December 1996 recommendations
of the Working Group were: (1) that the NRC should be the external nuclear safety
regulator, and (2) that the transition to external regulation should proceed in
phases.
In September 1996, as part of its Strategic Assessment and Rebaselining Initiative,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) published a Direction Setting Issue paper
that addressed options for the NRC position on regulating DOE facilities. In March
1997, after considering public comments and the December 1996 DOE decision, the
Commission endorsed having the NRC assume nuclear safety regulatory oversight of
certain DOE nuclear facilities, contingent on the NRC being given adequate resources
(financial and human) to take on this new responsibility, and a clear delineation of
the authority the NRC will exercise over the facilities. In addition, the
Commission directed the NRC staff to convene a high-level NRC Task Force to
identify, in conjunction with DOE, the policy and regulatory issues needing analysis
and resolution. In a June 1997 meeting, Secretary of Energy Federico Peña and I
agreed on a pilot program as a basis to explore pursuit of NRC regulation of DOE
nuclear facilities.
At present, the NRC and DOE are preparing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to
establish the framework for a pilot program that could, if successful, lead to a
joint recommendation by DOE and NRC to the U.S. Congress that NRC be given statutory
authority to regulate nuclear safety at DOE nuclear facilities. The pilot program
is intended to "simulate NRC regulation" of a selected set of DOE nuclear
facilities, over a 2-year period, in order to help both agencies gain experience
related to NRC regulation of DOE facilities. This also will provide an opportunity
to develop actual data on the costs and benefits of external regulation. "Simulated
regulation," as defined for the purposes of this pilot program, means that the NRC
will test regulatory concepts, performing the facility oversight functions that it
believes would be appropriate to ensure safety, evaluating the facility and its
standards, requirements, procedures, practices, and activities against NRC
standards. After six to ten pilots have been conducted, the NRC and DOE will
determine whether to seek legislation to give the NRC statutory authority to
regulate individual DOE facilities or classes of facilities. Issues to be addressed
include (1) the form of the regulatory process (licensing, certification,
consultation, or other processes), (2) who is to be regulated (DOE or its
contractors), (3) the safety criteria, (4) the role of stakeholders, (5) safeguards
and security, and (6) how best to transition into the external regulation framework,
including the development of any necessary clarifying and/or enabling legislation.
As we proceed, our primary goal is to remain rigorous in ensuring public and
environmental protection on a cost-justified basis, and to ensure that whatever
steps we take toward phased-in DOE oversight do not compromise our ability to ensure
adequate protection of public health and safety within the scope of our current
mission.
4. Electric Utility Restructuring in the United States
Let me turn to my main topic, which has been an area of focus for the electric power
industry, government regulators, and the public in both the U.K. and the U.S., as
well as in other countries. Despite significant differences in the electricity
generation industry and regulatory structure, the deregulation (and, in the U.K.,
the privatization) of the electric power industry has raised certain areas of common
concern. As nuclear energy producers seek to be cost-competitive in an open market,
a number of issues which I will discuss come rapidly into focus. They are
intertwined with the following types of questions. What is the optimum structure
for a cost-competitive utility company? How can the regulator best adapt its
resources to ensure protection of public health and safety in this changing
environment? To what extent should the public be involved? These and other
questions quickly illustrate the value of sharing perspectives across national
boundaries and learning from one another's experience in this area.
The primary mission of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is to ensure
adequate protection of public health and safety, the common defense and security,
and the environment in the use of nuclear materials in the United States. In
particular, as the government agency responsible for regulating nuclear safety at
reactor power facilities, the NRC has an important function during this transition
to a competitive electricity generation market. Therefore, as the U.S. electric
utility industry transitions to a competitive market, the NRC must understand any
effects of the changing business environment--such as ownership changes, mergers, or
cost-reduction strategies--on nuclear safety.
To be as fair as possible to all involved in the U.S. electricity generation
business, it is important, as the NRC changes or contemplates changing our
regulatory requirements or outlook, that we lay out our plans as early and as
clearly as possible. Wherever possible, we have sought to learn from and to apply
the experiences of others, including the experiences in the U.K., associated with
privatization and restructuring of electric utilities. As the trend toward
restructuring continues, even national boundaries are becoming somewhat less
distinct. We have seen American corporations such as General Public Utilities and
Cinergy becoming part-owners of British utilities. We also are seeing corporations
such as British Energy in partnership with U.S. companies such as PECO Energy,
considering ownership of U.S. utilities. Our responsibility is to evaluate this
globalization trend to continue to ensure protection of public health and safety
within these new and varied business arrangements. From our perspective, the NRC
challenges in this area fall under three general headings: (1) the availability of
funds for decommissioning; (2) electrical grid reliability; and (3) the impact of
cost competitiveness on safe nuclear operations.
A. Decommissioning Funding Assurance
Under Section 161 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the NRC has
statutory authority to regulate the decommissioning of its licensed nuclear
facilities. Existing decommissioning regulations require power reactor
licensees to set aside funds periodically in external trust fund accounts (or
to provide third-party guarantees for estimated decommissioning costs). As
such, by the time a licensee permanently ceases operation, the total estimated
amount of necessary decommissioning funding should be available.
In its regulations, the NRC shares responsibility for decommissioning funding
regulation with rate regulators--that is, with the State Public Utility
Commissions (or PUCs) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (or FERC). Traditionally, the NRC has relied on the FERC and the PUCs for such decisions
as the sources of decommissioning funds (whether rate-payers or licensee
stockholders), the timing of funds collection, and the investment in trust
funds. This practice is consistent with earlier NRC determinations that
traditional cost-of-service rate regulation has provided reasonable assurance
of funds for operations and decommissioning.
In the emerging environment of electric utility restructuring, the NRC has had
to re-evaluate certain aspects of these provisions, including the NRC
definition of "electric utility," the potential impact of new ownership
arrangements, and the problem of above-market or "stranded" costs. In
February 1996, the NRC issued a comprehensive action plan to provide a
framework for evaluating this overall area. This action plan has resulted in
a range of NRC actions, which I will discuss briefly.
1. Commission Policy Statement
To provide an operating framework, the Commission recently issued a
final policy statement on financial assurance, which indicates that the
NRC:
will continue to conduct its financial qualifications,
decommissioning funding, and antitrust reviews;
will identify all direct and indirect owners of nuclear power
plants;
will establish and maintain working relationships with U.S. State
and Federal government rate regulators ; and
will re-evaluate its regulations for their adequacy in addressing
the changes caused by restructuring and economic deregulation of
the U.S. electric utility industry.
2. Rulemaking Activities
The NRC is also about to issue for public comment a Proposed Rule on
decommissioning funding, based on the results of an April 1996 Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and the continuing analysis of emerging
industry developments. The proposed rule would modify NRC financial
assurance regulations in four areas:
First, it revises the NRC definition of "electric utility," to
ensure that decommissioning funding requirements clearly cover
all responsible licensee entities. The revision clarifies that
"electric utility" applies to that portion of a company's costs
that are recovered through rate regulation, whether that portion
constitutes all or only part of the company's costs. For
entities within the revised definition of electric utility, rates
must be established by a regulatory authority, either directly
through traditional "cost of service" regulation, or indirectly
through another non-bypassable charge mechanism. Electric
utilities are allowed to use an external sinking fund that builds
up over time; licensees that are not electric utilities must
couple their external sinking fund with a surety method or
insurance.
Second, it allows credit on earnings from decommissioning trust
funds.
Third, to keep the NRC informed of decommissioning fund status,
it requires periodic licensee reports on fund status and on any
changes to licensee external trust agreements. This new
requirement would go into effect 9 months after the effective
date of the rule, and would require reports every 2 years
thereafter.
Fourth, the NRC would take additional action, as needed, either
independently or in cooperation with State and Federal rate
regulators, to ensure adequate licensee accumulation of
decommissioning funds, including modifying a licensee schedule
for decommissioning fund accumulation.
The proposed rule also indicates that the Commission will consider
other financial assurance strategies, including accelerated funding,
for inclusion in the final rule.
3. Related Actions
The NRC has taken several other related actions, including (1) issuing
a draft Standard Review Plan on antitrust reviews, and another on
licensee financial qualifications and decommissioning plans; (2)
ensuring that NRC databases on licensee ownership and antitrust
conditions are updated, as well as informing power reactor licensees of
their continuing obligation to inform the NRC of any ownership changes
or transfers of control; and (3) holding numerous meetings with
industry representatives, State and Federal rate regulators, the
financial community, and other stakeholders. The overall effect of
these measures has been to improve NRC, licensee, and public awareness
of issues of concern related to electric utility restructuring.
B. Electrical Grid Reliability
An equally important area of NRC focus has been electrical grid reliability,
or security. In recent years, NRC probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) have
made it clear that a Station Blackout at a nuclear power station is a major
contributor to core damage frequency. As many of you know, the term "Station
Blackout" is used, in the nuclear power industry, to refer to an event in
which a loss of offsite power is coupled with the inability of the onsite
emergency diesel generators to provide vital power to plant safety equipment.
While Station Blackouts have been extremely rare to date, the possibility of a
Station Blackout continues to be an area of NRC focus, particularly in light
of certain recent events.
In 1996, within a 5-week period, two electrical disturbances on the United
States' Western Grid caused 190 power generating plants to trip off-line,
including several nuclear units. In reviewing the electrical disturbances,
the Western Systems Coordinating Council listed as contributing factors: high
Northwest transmission loads; equipment out of service; inadequate maintenance
of right-of-way; operation in a condition in which a single failure would
overload parallel lines, triggering cascading outages; communication failures
to neighboring utilities, prior to the disturbances; and the lack of response
to earlier events.
More recently, in June of this year, one of the U.S. Midwestern regional grids
experienced severe loading conditions that affected power flows into two other
regions. Later analysis showed that the resulting grid disturbance came close
to causing several tie line trips, which, in turn, would have resulted in
overfrequency generation trips and underfrequency load shedding, and could
have resulted in a smaller scale of the blackouts that occurred in the
previous Western grid event.
These events and studies tell us that, while nuclear generating stations are
robust in design and operational standards, they also are vulnerable to grid
disturbances, and especially to losses of offsite power. Such events cause
unnecessary challenges to plant safety systems. Grid reliability governance
structures must take into account and mitigate this vulnerability.
In addition, efforts to enhance grid reliability must sometimes balance other
concerns. As an example: the North American Electric Reliability Council
(NERC), together with the regional councils, oversees grid reliability as a
voluntary function. Recently, the NERC has sought to establish measures to
ensure that transmission operators can monitor their systems to ensure grid
reliability. One such measure has been the interim Transaction Information
System, which makes available to transmission operators all information
related to a given transmission transaction--such as source, path,
connections, middlemen, and destination. Recently, two electric power
industry groups complained to the FERC about this measure--which is known as
"tagging"-- stating that the NERC is usurping FERC authority over transmission
scheduling. According to the complainants, "tagging" makes so much
information public that competitors are able to undercut transactions. Just
last week, NERC announced a change to its "tagging" requirements that will
limit the dissemination of transmission information to control areas and
transmission areas only.
These and other issues can make the assurance of grid reliability a complex
endeavor. In the U.S., Federal oversight currently is handled by the FERC and at the Department of Energy. The 1996 and 1997 grid disturbances I have
described have shown that critical electrical network oversight issues--including standards of performance, operational criteria, and personnel
training--must be properly addressed as deregulation proceeds. To address
concerns in this area, the Department of Energy has created a working advisory
committee on U.S. electric system reliability. This committee is considering
whether current efforts to maintain reliability are sufficient, and whether a
need exists for increased Federal authority over reliability in the future.
The NRC is participating in this activity, as appropriate. What is important
to the NRC is that grid reliability is addressed explicitly as electric power
industry restructuring evolves. The Commission has asked the NRC staff to
give greater focus to ensuring that health and safety issues within NRC
jurisdiction are addressed--particularly in validating grid reliability
assumptions. The staff was asked specifically to inform the Commission of
actions by Federal and State economic regulators in establishing membership
requirements for the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC),
particularly as they relate to the oversight issues I have delineated. The
Commission is especially interested in the effectiveness of such requirements,
and enforcement policies as they relate to grid reliability.
C. Cost-Competitiveness and Safe Nuclear Operations
The NRC also continues to focus on the possible impact of cost-competitiveness
pressures on safe nuclear operations. While the overall safety of the U.S.
nuclear power industry continues to improve, NRC safety assessments at several
reactor facilities have identified deficiencies that may stem from the
economic pressure on a licensee to be a low-cost energy producer, which in
turn may limit the resources available for corrective actions and plant
improvements. The NRC is developing measures that would identify plants where
economic stress may be adversely impacting safety, including the use of
leading performance indicators, and reviewing and revising, as appropriate,
all elements of our plant inspection and evaluation processes. We also are
moving more strongly to risk-informed regulation through the appropriate use
of PRA techniques, through the development of PRA guidance in the form of a
Regulatory Guide and Standard Review Plan, as well as through pilot processes
for risk-informed regulation, out of which application-specific regulatory
guides will be developed. These efforts will assist the NRC and nuclear
licensees in focusing their resources on the most safety-significant aspects
of nuclear operations, while maintaining defense-in-depth--which, in turn,
should both enhance safety and increase cost-competitiveness.
As we pursue these initiatives, we continue our efforts to pursue our health
and safety mission within the most efficient and effective regulatory
framework possible--for both the NRC and the nuclear energy industry. We have
been working with the nuclear energy industry to remove unnecessary regulatory
requirements through conversion to improved Standard Technical Specifications,
changes to rules that are marginal to safety, and the implementation of NRC
Regulatory Review Group recommendations.
5. Creation of the International Nuclear Regulators Association (INRA)
The topics I have covered so far this morning provide a few illustrations of safety
improvements and concerns in one nation (the U.S.), which are very likely to be
matters of interest for others. Many questions related to nuclear regulation--for example, the causes of nuclear accidents, the effects of exposure to low-level
radiation, or new approaches to ensuring reactor safety--command attention
throughout the world. To enhance international communication and cooperation, the
heads of eight of the world's nuclear regulatory bodies--from Canada, France,
Germany, Japan, Spain, Sweden, the U.K., and the U.S.--met in Washington, DC in
January of this year, and again in Paris in May, to negotiate and to constitute
formally the International Nuclear Regulators Association (INRA).
The purpose of INRA is to influence and enhance international nuclear safety from a
regulatory perspective. The organization seeks to carry out this goal in several
ways:
by establishing a forum in which senior regulators can exchange views;
by building a global nuclear safety culture;
by encouraging the most efficient use of resources;
by seeking international consensus on nuclear safety issues and facilitating
international cooperation;
by cooperating with other international and national organizations involved in
nuclear safety; and
by identifying nuclear regulatory challenges.
In seeking to accomplish these goals, the INRA also will focus on identifying and
agreeing upon common elements of a nuclear regulatory program, and working with
other governments to influence improvements in nuclear safety.
The INRA will act by consensus to fulfill its objectives, and will make
recommendations to international and national agencies on nuclear safety issues. At
the constituting meeting in Paris, the founding members of INRA elected me to serve
a 2-year term as the Association's first chairman. I am pleased and honored by the
challenges and opportunities that come with this responsibility, and I will continue
to make INRA issues an area of personal focus. I will be making a more detailed
presentation on the INRA at the IAEA General Conference later this month, and at the
Paris meeting of the OECD/NEA in December.
6. Conclusion
In closing, I hope that this discussion has given you a better understanding of
several areas of NRC focus in this era of change, as well as some of the strategies
we are pursuing in addressing these issues. In addition, I hope that I have
reaffirmed for you the value of the continuing dialogues that occur among nuclear
safety regulators worldwide, as well as among all those involved in the nuclear
enterprise, as we share perspectives in an attempt to achieve the robust and safe
use of nuclear materials globally. Thank you for the invitation to speak at this
session, and thank you for your attention. I will be happy to address any of your
questions.
