Risk Management Series 
Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of  
Terrorist Attacks 
December 2003 
 
 
FEMA 
 
 
FEMA 428 / December 2003 
 
 
RISK MANAGEMENT SERIES 
 
Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks 
PROVIDING PROTECTION TO PEOPLE AND BUILDING 
 
 
www.fema.gov 
 
 
Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this  
publication do not necessarily reflect the views of FEMA. Additionally, neither 
FEMA or any of its employees makes any warrantee, expressed or implied, or 
assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or 
usefulness of any information, product, or process included in this publication. 
Users of information from this publication assume all liability arising from 
such use 
 
 
The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is one of the most  
significant transformations in the Federal Government in decades, establishing a  
department whose first priority is to protect the nation against terrorist 
attack.  

Within the DHS, the Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) is 
focused on ensuring that our nation is prepared for catastrophes, including both 
natural disasters and terrorist assaults. 

This Primer for Protection of Schools Against Terrorist Attacks provides 
guidance to protect students, faculty, staff, and their school buildings from 
terrorist attacks. It also provides guidance to the building science community 
of architects and engineers working for local institutions on school projects.   

This document is intended for use by schools who feel that they are at risk to 
terrorist attacks. It provides necessary guidance to those who desire to 
increase the performance of their school and related infrastructure. Not all 
schools are at risk of terrorist attacks. The decision-makers in each school 
district should use current and available threat information from the proper 
sources to make this determination.  

The use of experts to apply the methodologies contained in this document is 
encouraged. This primer references several sources for additional information, 
including publications completed by other government agencies. The reader is 
encouraged to obtain additional guidance. 

This document was prepared by the Building Sciences and Technology Branch of the 
Mitigation Division, part of EP&R. DHS would like to thank the following 
agencies  
for their contribution and input to this publication: 
_	General Services Administration 
_	Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center 
_	Naval Facilities Command (NAVFAC) Criteria Office 
_	USACE Protective Design Center 
_	Department of Veterans Affairs 
_	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/National Institute for  
Occupational Safety and Health 
_	Department of Justice, Office of Domestic Preparedness (DHS - Border and 
Transportation Security) 
_	United States Air Force - Civil Engineer Support Agenc 
 
 
 
 
FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
The purpose of this primer is to provide the design community and school  
administrators with the basic principles and techniques to make a school that is 
safe from terrorist attacks and at the same time is functional, aesthetically 
pleasing, and meets the needs of the students, staff, administration, and 
general public. Protecting a school building and grounds from physical attack is 
a significant challenge because the ability to design, construct, renovate, 
operate, and maintain the facility is spread across numerous building users, 
infrastructure systems, and many building design codes. There is a strong 
interest in the United States (U.S.) in ensuring the safety of students, 
faculty, and staff in our schools. Schools are integral parts of their 
communities. On any given weekday, nearly 53 million young people aged 5 to 17 
attend more than 117,000 public and private schools where 6 million adults work 
as teachers or staff (counting students, faculty, and staff, this constitutes 
more than one-fifth of the U.S. population). Additionally, schools are resources 
for their communities.   

Many schools are used as shelters, command centers, or meeting places in times 
of crisis. Schools are also used widely for polling and voting functions. In 
some communities, schools are places of health care delivery. 
Schools may or may not be the targets of terrorism, but they are certain to be 
affected by terrorism, whether directly or indirectly. On September 11, 2001, 
four elementary schools and three high schools located within 6 blocks of the 
World Trade Center were just beginning classes when the first plane hit the 
north tower. Thousands of children were exposed to the dust clouds from the 
collapsing buildings. Even those children not in the immediate vicinity 
experienced a great deal of anxiety. Children in at least three states (New 
York, New Jersey, and Connecticut) had parents working in or around the World 
Trade Center that day.  In the Washington, DC, area, schools faced similar 
situations after the Pentagon was attacked.1 

Many Americans feel that schools should be the safest place our children can be, 
perhaps at times even safer than the homes in which they live. Security is not a 
standalone capability; it is a critical design consideration that should be 
constantly reviewed and scrutinized from the design phase through construction 
or rehabilitation and onto building use. 
The focus of this primer will be on the threats posed by potential physical 
attacks on a school by terrorists. Attacking schools and school children could 
be a highly emotional and high profile event. At the time of publication of this 
primer, there have been no direct terrorist threats against a school known to 
the public; however, schools could be indirectly threatened by collateral damage 
from a terrorist attack directed at nearby facilities. Protecting a school 
against terrorist attack is a challenging task. A school may have considerable 
vulnerabilities, because of its well defined periods of use, designated access 
points, storage of sensitive personal information, minimal security forces, and 
numerous avenues of penetration and escape for attackers. 

This primer should be used in conjunction with the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks 
Against Buildings, and FEMA 427, Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to 
Mitigate Terrorist Attacks. 

SCOPE 
This primer presents an approach to protecting schools at risk from terrorist 
attacks.  

The information presented is intended primarily for architects and engineers, or 
school administrators with a technical background. This publication is designed 
to meet the needs of all schools, including those with serious security 
concerns. Because security concerns of individual schools vary greatly, some 
users with modest security concerns may feel beleaguered by the amount of 
information and technical approach presented. They should feel free to select 
the methods and measures that best meet their individual situations while 
gaining a general appreciation of security concerns and risk management. 
Several design philosophies and techniques have been incorporated into this 
primer, including the Department of Defense (DoD) Minimum Antiterrorism 
Standards, the Army and Air Force Security Engineering Manual, the General 
Services Administration (GSA) Public Building Standards, the Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA) Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist, and the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)/National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Guidelines for Airborne Contaminants. 

ORGANIZATION AND CONTENT OF THE PRIMER 
This publication contains many how-to aspects based upon current information  
contained in FEMA, Department of Commerce (DOC), DoD (including Army, Navy,  
and Air Force), Department of Justice (DOJ), GSA, VA, CDC/NIOSH, and other  
publications. It is intended to provide an understanding of the current  
methodologies for assessing threat/hazard, vulnerability, and risk, and the 
design considerations needed to improve protection of new and existing buildings 
and the people occupying them. As needed, this primer should be supplemented 
with more extensive technical resources, as well as the use of experts when 
necessary. 

Chapter 1 presents a methodology for architects, engineers, and school  
administrators to analyze the safety of students, teachers, and staff for  
vulnerabilities to various terrorist threats. The methodology presented will 
assist schools in performing risk management by helping them to identify the 
best and most cost-effective terrorism mitigation measures for their unique 
security needs. 

Chapters 2 and 3 discuss site and layout, and building design guidance and  
safety plans, respectively, and mitigation measures or comprehensive 
architectural  
and engineering design considerations to provide an acceptable level of  
protection. Specifically, Chapter 2 discusses comprehensive architectural and  
engineering design considerations for the school site, from the property line to  
the school building. Chapter 3 presents design considerations for the building  
envelope. 

Chapter 4 is a brief discussion of explosive blast theory. Chapter 5 presents  
chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) measures that can be taken to  
mitigate school vulnerabilities and reduce associated risk for these terrorist 
tactics  
or technological hazards. 

Chapter 6 is a standalone description of the concept of safe rooms within  
schools that will resist CBR and blast threats intended to provide school board  
members and decision-makers with the basic components of a protective system. 

Appendices A, B, and C contain acronyms, general definitions, and chemical  
and biological agent characteristics, respectively. Appendix B is an extensive  
glossary with terminology used in the report. 

Appendices D and E present a comprehensive bibliography of publications  
(including information for obtaining the publications), and the associations and  
organizations capturing the building security guidance needed by the building  
sciences community (including web sites), respectively.  

Appendix F contains the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist. 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Principal Authors: 
Michael Chipley, UTD, Inc. 
Wesley Lyon, UTD, Inc. 
Robert Smilowitz, Weidlinger Associates, Inc. 
Pax Williams, Battelle Memorial Institute 
Contributors: 
Milagros Kennett, FEMA, Project Officer, Risk Management Series Publications 
Eric Letvin, Greenhorne & O'Mara, Inc., Consultant Project Manager 
Michael Kaminskas, UTD, Inc. 
Christopher Arnold, Building Systems Development, Inc. 
Shawn Fenn, FEMA 
Randall Hoffman, UTD, Inc. 
Damian Kolbay, UTD, Inc. 
Eve Hinman, ATC/Hinman Consulting Engineers, Inc. 
Robert Burns, UTD, Inc. 
Curt Betts, U.S. Army Engineer District, Omaha 
Connie Deshpande, Department of Education 
Bill Modzeleski, Department of Education 
Randy Haslam, Jordan, Utah, School District 
Deb Daly, Greenhorne & O'Mara, Inc. 
Wanda Rizer, Greenhorne & O'Mara, Inc. 
Julie Liptak, Greenhorne & O'Mara, Inc. 
Bob Pendley, Greenhorne & O'Mara, Inc. 
 
This primer was prepared under contract to FEMA. It will be revised 
periodically, and comments and feedback to improve future editions are welcome. 
Please send comments and feedback by e-mail to riskmanagementseriespubs@dhs.gov 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENT 
 
 
 
FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

CHAPTER 1 - ASSET VALUE, THREAT/HAZARD, VULNERABILITY, AND RISK1- 
1 
1.1   Asset Value Assessment 1-2 
1.1.1  Identifying School Core Functions1-4 
1.1.2  Identifying School Infrastructure1-4 
1.1.3  Quantifying Asset Value1-5 
1.2   Threat/Hazard Assessment1-7 
1.2.1  Threat Identification1-9 
1.2.2  Threat Definition1-13 
1.2.3  Threat Assessment Products1-15 
1.2.4  Design Basis Threat1-18 
1.3   Vulnerability Assessment1-20 
1.4   Risk Assessment1-23 
1.5   The Risk Management Process1-28 
CHAPTER 2 -  SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 2-1 
2.1   Land Use Considerations 2-2 
2.2   Site Planning 2-4 
2.2.1   Site Design2-4 
2.2.2   Layout and Form2-4 
2.2.3   Vehicular and Pedestrian Circulation2-9 
2.2.4   Landscape and Urban Design2-10 
2.3   Stand-off Distance2-14 
2.4   Controlled Access Zones 2-16 
2.5   Entry Control and Vehicular Access2-20 
2.6   Signage2-21 
2.7   Parking2-22 
2.8   Loading Docks and Service Access2-24 
2.9   Physical Security Lighting2-25 
2.10  Site Utilities2-26 
2.11  Summary of Site Mitigation Measures2-28 
2.12  Crime Prevention Through  Environmental Design (CPTED)2-33 
CHAPTER 3 - BUILDING DESIGN GUIDANCE AND SAFETY PLANS3-1 
3.1  Architectural3-2 
3.2   Building Structural and Non-structural Systems3-5 
3.3  Building Envelope3-10 
3.3.1 Building Exterior3-10 
3.3.2  Exterior Wall Design3-10 
3.3.3  Window Design3-12 
3.3.4  Doors3-17 
3.3.5   Roofs3-18 
3.4   Mechanical Systems3-18 
3.5   Electrical Systems3-24 
3.6   Fire Protection Systems3-25 
3.7   Communications Systems3-26 
3.8   Physical Security Systems3-27 
3.9   Summary of Building Envelope Mitigation  Measures3-29 
3.10  Recommendations Based on the  Homeland Security Advisory System3-32 
3.11  School Safety Emergency Management Plan3-33 
3.12 Emergency Plans and Training3-36 
CHAPTER 4 - EXPLOSIVE BLAST4-1 
4.1   Blast Effects4-1 
4.1.1  Building Damage4-3 
4.1.2  Casualties and Injuries4-5 
4.1.3  Levels of Protection4-5 
4.2   Stand-off Distance and the Effects of Blast4-10 
CHAPTER 5 - CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL MEASURES5-1 
5.1  Evacuation5-2 
5.2   Sheltering in Place5-3 
5.3   Personal Protective Equipment5-6 
5.4   Air Filtration and Pressurization5-8 
5.5   Exhausting and Purging5-8 
5.6   CBR Detection5-9 
5.7  Indications of CBR Contamination5-11 
CHAPTER 6 - SAFE ROOMS WITHIN SCHOOLS6-1 
6.1   Types of CBR Hazards6-2 
6.1.1  Toxic Industrial Chemicals6-2 
6.1.2  Incapacitating and Tear-producing Agents6-3 
6.1.3  Biological Agents6-3 
6.1.4  Radiological Agents6-4 
6.2   Most Likely Delivery Methods for CBR Agents6-4 
6.2.1  Internal Release6-5 
6.2.2  External Proximate Release6-5 
6.2.3  Remote Release6-5 
6.2.4  Remote Release with Forewarning6-6 
6.3   Vulnerability to Remote CBR Release6-6 
6.4   Vulnerability to Remote CBR Release with  Forewarning6-10 
6.5   Vulnerability to Internal CBR Release6-11 
6.6   Vulnerability to External Proximate CBR Release6-11 
6.7   Recommendations for CBR Protection  6-16 
6.8   Safe Rooms in Response to the Domestic Explosive Threat6-16 
6.9   Locating Safe Rooms to Mitigate Threats  6-20 
6.10  Fragment Mitigating Upgrades  6-24 
6.11  Structural Upgrades  6-30 
APPENDIX A - ACRONYMS 
APPENDIX B - GENERAL GLOSSARY 
APPENDIX C - CBR AGENT CHARACTERISTICS 
APPENDIX D - BIBLIOGRAPHY 
APPENDIX E - ASSOCIATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 
APPENDIX F - BUILDING VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST 
 
TABLES 
Chapter 1 
Table 1-1  Asset Value Scale1-6 
Table 1-2   Nominal High School People and  Asset Value Assessment 1-7 
Table 1-3 Homeland Security Threat Conditions1-10 
Table 1-4 Event Profiles for Terrorism and  Technological Hazards1-15 
Table 1-5 Threat Rating Scale 1-16 
Table 1-6 Nominal High School Threat Assessment1-17 
Table 1-7 Vulnerability Rating Scale1-21 
Table 1-8 Nominal High School Vulnerability  Assessment1-22 
Table 1-9 Risk Rating System1-24 
Table 1-10 Risk Color Value System1-25 
Table 1-11 Nominal School Risk Assessment Matrix1-26 
Chapter 2 
Table 2-1 Correlation of Mitigation Measures  to Threats2-30 
Chapter 3 
Table 3-1 Glazing Protection Levels Based  on Fragment Impact Locations3-13 
Table 3-2 Correlation of GSA Glazing Performance  Conditions and DoD Levels of  
Protection  for New Buildings3-14 
Table 3-3 Safety/Security Recommendations3-32 
 
Chapter 4 
Table 4-1 DoD Minimum Antiterrorism (AT)  Standards for New Buildings4-6 
Table 4-2 Correlation of DoD Level of Protection  to Incident Pressure4-6 
Table 4-3 Damage Approximations4-13 
Chapter 5 
Table 5-1 Indicators of a Possible Chemical Incident5-13 
Table 5-2 Indicators of a Possible Biological Incident5-15 
Table 5-3 Indicators of a Possible Radiological Incident5-15 
Chapter 6 
Table 6-1 Pressures Exerted on a School Building  Face by Wind6-13 
FIGURES 
Chapter 1 
Figure 1-1 The assessment process model1-2 
Figure 1-2 Typical building design and construction process1-19 
Figure 1-3 Risk management choices1-19 
Chapter 2 
Figure 2-1  Non-redundant critical functions collocated near loading dock2-6 
Figure 2-2  Clustering to enhance surveillance  opportunities while minimizing 
views  
into  buildings2-7 
Figure 2-3  Blocking of sight lines2-13 
Figure 2-4  Improper building siting and view relationships2-13 
Figure 2-5  Clear zone with unobstructed views2-14 
Figure 2-6  Concept of stand-off distance2-15 
Figure 2-7  Exclusive and non-exclusive zones2-17 
Figure 2-8  Sample bollard applications2-18 
Chapter 3 
Figure 3-1  Re-entrant corners in a floor plan3-3 
Figure 3-2  Glazed areas oriented perpendicularly  away from streets3-4 
Figure 3-3  Offset doors through the foyer3-5 
Figure 3-4  Side view of a test structure illustrating  performance conditions 
of Table  
3-23-13 
Figure 3-5  An unprotected window after a large  explosion3-15 
Figure 3-6  Sacrificial roof3-18 
Figure 3-7  Example of protecting outdoor air intakes3-20 
Figure 3-8  Another example of protecting air intakes3-21 
Figure 3-9  Example of elevated air intake3-21 
Figure 3-10  Example of enclosing an existing  vulnerable air intake3-22 
Figure 3-11  Considerations for the design of a new  security system3-28 
Figure 3-12  Physical security devices3-29 
Chapter 4 
Figure 4-1  Blast pressure effects on a structure4-4 
Figure 4-2  Explosives environments - blast range to effects4-8 
Figure 4-3  Blast analysis of a high school for a  typical car bomb detonated in 
the   
school's parking lot4-9 
Figure 4-4  Blast analysis of a high school for a  typical large truck bomb 
detonated in   
the school's parking lot4-9 
Figure 4-5  Relationship of cost to stand-off distance4-10 
Figure 4-6  Incident overpressure measured in pounds  per square inch, as a 
function  
of stand-off  distance and net explosive weight  (pounds-TNT)4-13 
Chapter 5 
Figure 5-1  Example of chemical dispersion5-3 
Figure 5-2  Universal-fit escape hood5-7 
Figure 5-3  An IMS chemical detector designed for  installation in HVAC 
systems5-10 
Figure 5-4  Placards associated with chemical incidents5-14 
Figure 5-5  Placards associated with biological incidents5-15 
Figure 5-6  Placards associated with radiological incidents5-1