

Risk Management Series Reference Manual

to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings

December 2003



RISK MANAGEMENT SERIES

Reference Manual *to* Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings

PROVIDING PROTECTION TO PEOPLE AND BUILDINGS



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Central to this mission is the protection of people and the critical infrastructure of the built environment. This Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings provides guidance to the building science community of architects and engineers, to reduce physical damage to buildings, related infrastructure, and people caused by terrorist assaults.

The comprehensive approach to understanding how to improve security in high occupancy buildings will better protect the nation from potential threats by identifying key actions and design criteria to strengthen our buildings from the forces that might be anticipated in a terrorist assault. It is important to note that many of the methodologies in this publication have been adapted from other government sources and modified to meet the mission of the DHS. This allows for the effective transfer of decades of federal and Department of Defense research and experience to the broader building science community.

This document was prepared by the Building Sciences and Technology Branch of the Mitigation Division, part of EP&R. The DHS would like to thank the following agencies for their contribution and input to this publication:

- O General Services Administration
- O Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center
- O Naval Facilities Command (NAVFAC) Criteria Office
- O USACE Protective Design Center
- O Department of Veterans Affairs
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
- Department of Justice, Office of Domestic Preparedness (DHS Border and Transportation Security)
- O United States Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency

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FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

BACKGROUND

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) developed this *Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings* to provide needed information on how to mitigate the effects of potential terrorist attacks. The intended audience includes the building sciences community of architects and engineers working for private institutions, and state and local government officials working in the building sciences community. The manual supports FEMA's Mission (Lead America to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from disasters) and the Strategic Plan's Goal 3 (Prepare the Nation to address the consequences of terrorism), all of which will be done within the all-hazards framework and the needs of Homeland Security.

The building science community, as a result of FEMA's efforts, has incorporated extensive building science into designing and constructing buildings against natural hazards (earthquake, fire, flood, and wind). To date, the same level of understanding has not been applied to manmade hazards (terrorism/intentional acts) and technological hazards (accidental events). Since September 11, 2001, terrorism has become a dominant domestic concern. Security can no longer be viewed as a standalone capability that can be purchased as an afterthought and then put in place. Life, safety, and security issues must become a design goal from the beginning.

OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE

The objective of this manual is to reduce physical damage to structural and non-structural components of buildings and related infrastructure, and also to reduce resultant casualties during conventional bomb attacks, as well as attacks using chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) agents. Although the process is general in nature and applies to most building uses, this manual is most applicable for six specific types of facilities:

- Commercial office facilities
- O Retail commercial facilities
- O Light industrial and manufacturing facilities

- Health care facilities
- O Local schools (K-12), and
- Higher education (university) facilities

The processes and measures may not generally be economical or applicable to lighter density occupancies, such as single-family homes. More intense occupancies (e.g., industrial facilities) have already been addressed in most cases.

This is one of a series of publications that address security issues in high-population, private sector buildings. This document is the foundation of the *Building Vulnerability Design Against Terrorist Attacks Training Course* (FEMA 438).

The purpose of this manual is to provide guidance to the building sciences community working for private institutions. It presents tools to help decision-makers assess the performance of their buildings against terrorist threats and to rank recommendations. It is up to the decision-makers to decide which types of threats they wish to protect against and to determine their level of risk to each threat. Those decision-makers who consider their buildings to be at high risk can use this guidance as necessary.

The information contained in this document is:

- O not mandatory
- not applicable to all buildings
- not applicable when it interferes with other hazards such as fire

This manual presents incremental approaches that can be implemented over time to decrease the vulnerability of buildings to terrorist threats. Many of the recommendations can be implemented quickly and cost-effectively.

ASSUMPTIONS

The information provided herein builds upon the synergies between the mitigation measures for natural hazards and manmade hazards. For example, seismic standards for non-structural building components are beneficial against the explosive blast of conventional bombs. Hurricane window design, especially against flying debris, applies also to explosive blast. Landscaping for mitigation against wildfires improves detection of placed devices. Ventilation system design against airborne biological, chemical, and radiological agents also works for similar hazardous material releases, whether intentional or accidental. Assessing threat, vulnerability, and risk may be complicated when comparing natural against manmade hazards. A natural hazard refers to a natural event such as a flood, wind, or seismic disaster. Historical data have been used by FEMA and other agencies/organizations to economically quantify the risk for natural hazards. Manmade hazards include technological hazards and terrorism and they are distinct from natural hazards primarily in that they originate from human activity. Technological hazards are assumed to be accidental and that their consequences are unintended. There is limited discussion of technological hazards in this document. For manmade hazards, the threat and likelihood of occurrence are less well defined and the associated vulnerabilities have many considerations that impact making good risk management decisions.

ORGANIZATION AND CONTENT OF THE MANUAL

This manual contains many how-to aspects based upon current information contained in FEMA, Department of Commerce, Department of Defense (including Army, Navy, and Air Force), Department of Justice, General Services Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, and other publications. It is intended to provide an understanding of the current methodologies for assessing threat/ hazard, vulnerability, and risk, and the design considerations needed to improve protection of new and existing buildings and the people occupying them. As needed, this manual should be supplemented with more extensive technical resources, as well as the use of experts when necessary.

- Chapter 1 presents selected methodologies to integrate threat/hazard, asset value, and vulnerability assessment information. This information becomes the input for determining relative levels of risk. Higher risk hazards require mitigation measures to reduce risk. The chapter also provides an assessment checklist that compiles many best practices (based upon current technologies and scientific research) to consider during the design of a new building or renovation of an existing building. The checklist can also be used to assess the vulnerability of existing buildings within the context of the defined threats.
- Chapter 2 discusses architectural and engineering design considerations (mitigation measures), starting at the perimeter of the property line, and includes the orientation of the building on the site. Therefore, this chapter covers issues outside the building envelope.
- Chapter 3 provides the same considerations for the building its envelope, systems, and interior layout.
- Chapter 4 provides a discussion of blast theory to understand the dynamics of the blast pressure wave, the response of building components, and a consistent approach to define levels of protection.
- Chapter 5 presents CBR measures that can be taken to mitigate vulnerabilities and reduce associated risks for these terrorist tactics or technological hazards.
- Appendices A, B, and C contain acronyms, general definitions, and CBR definitions, respectively.
- Appendix D describes electronic security systems and design considerations.

 Appendices E and F present a comprehensive bibliography of publications, and the associations and organizations capturing the building security guidance needed by the building sciences community, respectively.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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This manual was prepared under contract to FEMA. It will be revised periodically, and comments and feedback to improve future editions are welcome. Please send comments and feedback by e-mail to riskmanagementseriespubs@dhs.gov

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	i
Background	i
Objective and Scope	i
Assumptions	iii
Organization and Content of the Manual	iii
Acknowledgments	v

CHAPTER 1 – ASSET VALUE, THREAT/HAZARD,

VULNERABILITY, AND RISK		
1.1	Asset V	Value Assessment 1-10
	1.1.1	Identifying Building Core Functions 1-11
	1.1.2	Identifying Building Infrastructure 1-11
	1.1.3	Quantifying Asset Value 1-12
1.2	Threa	t/Hazard Assessment1-14
	1.2.1	Threat/Hazard Identification1-14
	1.2.2	Threat Definition of Physical Attack on a Building1-21
1.3	Vulne	rability Assessment 1-24
1.4	Risk A	ssessment 1-35
1.5	Risk M	lanagement 1-42
1.6	Buildi	ng Vulnerabilty Assessment Checklist 1-45
CHAI	PTER 2 –	SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE
2.1	Land	Use Considerations 2-2
2.2	Site Pl	anning 2-6
	2.2.1	Site Design
	2.2.2	Layout and Form

2.2.3	venicular and Pedestrian Circulation 2-11
2.2.4	Infrastructures and Lifelines
2.2.5	Landscape and Urban Design 2-14
Stand-	off Distance 2-22
Contro	olled Access Zones 2-25
2.4.1	Physical Protective Barriers 2-27
2.4.2	Other Perimeter Barriers 2-30
2.4.3	Anti-ram Vehicle Barriers 2-32
Entry	Control and Vehicular Access 2-36
Signag	ze
Parkin	g 2-42
Loadir	ng Docks and Service Access 2-44
Physic	al Security Lighting 2-45
Site U	tilities
Summ	ary of Site Mitigation Measures 2-51
Crime	Prevention Through Environmental
Design	a (CPTED)
Design TER 3 –	u (CPTED) 2-59 BUILDING DESIGN GUIDANCE
Design TER 3 – Archit	u (CPTED) 2-59 BUILDING DESIGN GUIDANCE
Design TER 3 – Archite 3.1.1	BUILDING DESIGN GUIDANCE
Design TER 3 – Archit 3.1.1 3.1.2	a (CPTED)
Design TER 3 – Archit 3.1.1 3.1.2 3.1.3	a (CPTED)
Design TER 3 – Architt 3.1.1 3.1.2 3.1.3 Buildin	BUILDING DESIGN GUIDANCE
Design TER 3 – Archit 3.1.1 3.1.2 3.1.3 Buildin 3.2.1	a (CPTED) 2-59 BUILDING DESIGN GUIDANCE 3-1 ectural 3-3 Building Configuration 3-3 Space Design 3-6 Other Design Considerations 3-8 ng Structural and Nonstructural Systems 3-10 Building Design to Achieve a Desired 3-10
	2.2.4 2.2.5 Stand-Contro 2.4.1 2.4.2 2.4.3 Entry C Signag Parkin Loadir Physica Site Ut Summ Crime

	3.2.3	Loads and Stresses	3
	3.2.4	Good Engineering Practice Guidelines 3-14	4
	3.2.5	Building Materials	6
	3.2.6	Methods and References 3-10	6
3.3	Buildi	ng Envelope 3-1'	7
	3.3.1	Building Exterior 3-1'	7
	3.3.2	Exterior Wall Design 3-18	8
	3.3.3	Window Design 3-20	0
	3.3.4	Doors	1
	3.3.5	Roof System Design 3-32	2
3.4	Mecha	anical Systems 3-33	3
3.5	Electr	ical Systems 3-44	4
3.6	Fire P	rotection Systems 3-4	5
3.7	Comm	nunications Systems	5
3.8	Electr	onic Security Systems 3-40	6
3.9	Entry-	control Stations 3-46	8
3.10	Physic	al Security Systems 3-50	0
3.11	Summ	nary of Building Envelope Mitigation Measures 3-50	0
CHA	PTER 4 -	EXPLOSIVE BLAST	1
4.1	Blast H	Effects	1
	4.1.1	Building Damage 4-0	6
	4.1.2	Injuries	8
	4.1.3	Levels of Protection	8
4.2	Stand-	off Distance and the Effects of Blast	3
4.3	Predic	ting Blast Effects 4-10	6

4.3.1	Blast Load Predictions	4-16
4.3.2	Blast Effects Predictions	4-18

CHAPTER 5 – CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND

RADIOLOGICAL MEASURES		
5.1	Evacu	ation 5-2
5.2	Shelte	ring in Place 5-2
5.3	Person	nal Protective Equipment 5-5
5.4	Air Filtration and Pressurization	
	5.4.1	Air Filtration and Cleaning Principles 5-8
	5.4.2	Applying External Filtration 5-20
	5.4.3	Applying Internal Filtration (Recirculation Filter Units)5-24
	5.4.4	Radiological Hazards5-25
5.5	Exhau	sting and Purging5-26
5.6	CBR I	Detection 5-26
5.7	Indica	tions of CBR Contamination 5-31

APPENDIX A – Acronyms

APPENDIX B – General Glossary

APPENDIX C – Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Terms Glossary

APPENDIX D – Electronic Security Systems

APPENDIX E – Bibliography

APPENDIX F – Associations and Organizations

TABLES

Chapter 1

Table 1-1	Asset Value Scale 1-13
Table 1-2	Nominal Building Asset Value Assessment 1-14
Table 1-3	Event Profiles for Terrorism and Technological Hazards1-17
Table 1-4	Homeland Security Threat Conditions 1-24
Table 1-5	Site/Building Inherent Vulnerability Assessment Matrix (Partial Risk Assessment) 1-25
Table 1-6	Classification Table Extracts 1-26
Table 1-7	Selected Extracts – Recommended Standards Chart 1-27
Table 1-8	Level of Visibility 1-29
Table 1-9	Criticality of Target Site 1-30
Table 1-10	Target Value to Potential Threat Element 1-30
Table 1-11	Aggressor Access to Target 1-31
Table 1-12	Target Threat of Hazard (WMD Materials) 1-31
Table 1-13	Site Population Capacity 1-32
Table 1-14	Potential for Collateral Damage (Mass Casualties) 1-32
Table 1-15	Building Summary Sheet 1-33
Table 1-16	Building Ranking 1-33
Table 1-17	Simplified Building Ranking Matrix1-34
Table 1-18	Risk Factors Definitions 1-38
Table 1-19	Total Risk Color Code 1-38
Table 1-20	Site Functional Pre-Assessment Screening Matrix

Table 1-21	Site Infrastructure Systems
	Pre-Assessment Screening Matrix 1-39
Table 1-22	Building Vulnerablilty Assessment
_	CHECKIISt 1-40
Chapter 2	
Table 2-1	Correlation of Mitigation Measures
	to Threats 2-54
Chapter 3	
Table 3-1	Glazing Protection Levels Based on
	Fragment Impact Locations 3-21
Table 3-2	Correlation of GSA Glazing Performance
	Conditions and DoD Levels of Protection
	for New Buildings
Chapter 4	
Table 4-1	DoD Minimum Antiterrorism (AT)
	Standards for New Buildings 4-9
Table 4-2	Correlation of DoD Level of Protection
	to Incident Pressure 4-10
Table 4-3	Damage Approximations 4-19
Chamber F	
Chapter 5	Comparison of ASUDAE Stondards
Table 5-1	59 1 and 59 9 5-19
	52.1 and 52.2
Table 5-2	Indicators of a Possible Chemical
	Incident
Table 5-3	Indicators of a Possible Biological
	Incident 5-35
Table 5-4	Indicators of a Possible Radiological
	Incident

FIGURES

Chapter 1	
Figure 1-1	Recent acts of terrorism 1-2
Figure 1-2	Total facilities struck by international
	terrorist attacks in 1997-2002 and
	total facilities attacked in 2002 1-3
Figure 1-3	The assessment process model 1-5
Figure 1-4	Satellite imagery/GIS tool 1-7
Figure 1-5	Satellite imagery/GIS tool 1-8
Figure 1-6	Aggressor weapons 1-15
Figure 1-7	Estimated plume from a 1-ton chlorine
	spill in Washington, DC 1-16
Figure 1-8	Facility system interactions 1-23
Figure 1-9	Common system vulnerabilities 1-35
Figure 1-10	Non-redundant critical functions
0	collocated near loading dock 1-41
Figure 1-11	Vulnerability examples 1-42
Figure 1-12	Typical building design and
0	construction process 1-43
Figure 1-13	Risk management choices 1-44
Chapter 2	
Figure 2-1	An example of using GIS to identify
0	adjacent hazards 2-5
Figure 2-2	Clustered versus dispersed site layouts 2-8
Figure 2-3	Clustering to enhance surveillance opportunities
0	while minimizing views into the buildings 2-8
Figure 2-4	Streetscape security elements 2-17

Figure 2-6	Improper building siting and view relationships	2-21
Figure 2-7	Clear zone with unobstructed views	2-21
Figure 2-8	Concept of stand-off distance	2-22
Figure 2-9	Stand-off distance and building separation	2-23
Figure 2-10	Exclusive and non-exclusive zones	2-26
Figure 2-11	Application of perimeter barrier elements	2-28
Figure 2-12	Using street closing to create a controlled access area	2-31
Figure 2-13	Sample bollard applications	2-33
Figure 2-14	Examples of active and passive vehicle barriers	2-35
Figure 2-15	Combined multi-user gate	2-37
Figure 2-16	Summary of site mitigation measures	2-53

Chapter 3

Figure 3-1	Glazed areas perpendicularly oriented away from streets
Figure 3-2	Re-entrant corners in a floor plan 3-6
Figure 3-3	Offset doors through foyer 3-7
Figure 3-4	Side view of a test structure illustrating performance conditions of Table 3-2 3-22
Figure 3-5	An unprotected window subject to a large explosion 3-23
Figure 3-6	Narrow and recessed windows with sloped sills 3-29
Figure 3-7	Sacrificial roof
Figure 3-8	Example of protecting outdoor air intakes
Figure 3-9	Example of elevated air intake 3-36

Figure 3-10	Another example of protecting outdoor air intakes 3-37
Figure 3-11	Example of enclosing an existing vulnerable air intake
Figure 3-12	Physical security devices
Chapter 4	
Figure 4-1	Typical pressure-time history
Figure 4-2	Reflected pressure coefficient vs. angle of incidence 4-3
Figure 4-3	Typical impulse waveform 4-4
Figure 4-4	Blast pressure effects on a structure 4-7
Figure 4-5	Explosives environments - blast range to effects
Figure 4-6	Blast analysis of a building for a typical car bomb detonated in the building's parking lot 4-12
Figure 4-7	Blast analysis of a building for a typical large truck bomb detonated in the building's parking lot
Figure 4-8	Relationship of cost to stand-off distance 4-13
Figure 4-9	Stand-off distance and its relationship to blast impact as modeled on the Khobar Towers site 4-15
Figure 4-10	Incident overpressure measured in pounds per square inch, as a function of stand-off distance and net explosive weight (pounds-TNT) 4-17
Chapter 5	
Figure 5-1	Universal-fit escape hood 5-6
Figure 5-2	Scanning electron microscope image of a polyester-glass fiber filter

Figure 5-3	Four primary filter collection mechanisms 5-9
Figure 5-4	Classic collection efficiency curve 5-10
Figure 5-5	A bag filter and HEPA filter 5-12
Figure 5-6	Comparison of filter collection efficiency based on particle size
Figure 5-7	Typical performance of a HEPA 99.97% 5-14
Figure 5-8	Scanning electron microscope image of activated carbon pores
Figure 5-9	Charcoal filter beds 5-17
Figure 5-10	UVGI array used for air disinfection with reflective surfaces
Figure 5-11	A military FFA 580 air filtration system containing both a HEPA filter and an ASZM-TEDA carbon adsorber as part of an overpressure system
Figure 5-12	A commercial air filtration unit 5-22
Figure 5-13	An IMS chemical detector designed for installation in HVAC systems
Figure 5-14	Placards associated with chemical incidents
Figure 5-15	Placards associated with biological incidents
Figure 5-16	Placards associated with radiological incidents