



# Experiences with non-O157 STEC and implications on Public Health Programs

**FLEMMING SCHEUTZ**


**STATENS SERUM INSTITUT**

**The International *Escherichia* and *Klebsiella*  
Centre (WHO)  
Copenhagen**





# Publications “O157”, “non-O157”, VTEC, STEC & Shiga-Like Toxin in Title/Abstract in PubMed (1982 - 2007)





# Non-O157 STEC studies

K. E. Johnson et al. CID 2006;43

**16 countries, 1988-2006 (1,402/2,892) 48%**

**Range 19%-100%**

USA, Canada, UK, Germany, Spain, Italy, Czech Republic, Belgium, France, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Australia, Chile, Argentina & Japan

**Netherlands, 2006 80%**

**Australia, 2004 64%**

**Belgium, 2006 81%**

**Brazil, 2007 100%**


**Poland, 2004 100%**

**Germany, 1998 88%**






# Non-O157 STEC surveillance 27 countries; 18,302 isolates






# Non-O157 STEC surveillance 27 countries; 6,480 isolates





# STEC incidences in Europe


Selected incidences of STEC  
Data from "The Enter-net database"





# STEC in Denmark 2006

Incidence of  
STEC  
(per 100.000)




- > 4
- 2 - 3,99
- 1,5 - 1,99
- 1 - 1,49
- 0,5 - 0,99
- 0 - 0,49
- No cases

Number of diagnosed STEC infections by county, and annual incidence of all STEC infections in 2006



# Detection ratio of STEC in counties using molecular methods vs "other methods" in Denmark







# Non-O157 STEC outbreaks

**O22:H8**

**O26:H11**

**O103:H2**

**O103:H25**

**O104:H21**

**O111:H- / H2 / H8**

**O113:H21**

**O117:H4**

**O118:H2**

**O119**

**O121:H19 / H21**

**O128:H2**

**O145:H-**

**O?:H19**

***Citrobacter freundii***






# O103:H25 outbreak in Norway

Date of onset of disease

HUS  
"outbreak"  
notified

- HUS cases
- Diarrhea cases





# Source: Sliced, dry fermented lamb's sausage





# Product and environmental samples

O103 positive

Cured meat products	2462	53
Sheep meat	171	9
Environment	296	0
Spices, additives, culture	57	0
Minced meat	1000	0

All isolates were *stx2* negative & *eae* pos.  
BUT clustered with patient isolates by  
MLVA (DNA fingerprint)



**O103:H25  
outbreak in  
Norway  
*stx2* & *eae***

**17 cases; 15 children**

**10 with HUS**

**1 child died**

**HUS notification**

**Massive media attention**

**O26:H11  
outbreak in  
Denmark  
*stx1* & *eae***

**20 cases; all children  
median 2 years**

**Very mild symptoms**


**Discovered by PFGE**

**Little media attention**



# Lessons learned in Norway

- **Outbreak discovered due to notification of cases of HUS**
- **Methods in clinical laboratories were inadequate for detection of non-O157 in 5 out of the six first cases of HUS**
- ***stx2* negative isolates dominated**
- **MLVA was used to identify cases and the source**





# Lessons learned in Denmark

- **Real-time PFGE of Danish non-O157 detected a "mild" outbreak**
- **Only possible because isolates were available for typing**

## Source identified using

- **access to purchase records**
- **cooperation with supermarkets searching their central computers**





# HUS and STEC notifications worldwide

**HUS & STEC**

**7**

**Australia, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Poland**

**Notification dates from 1998 – 2005**

**STEC only**

**13**

**Austria, Canada, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden**

**Notification dates from 1990 – 2005**

**Not mandatory**

**7**

**England & Wales, France †, Italy ‡, Romania, Spain, Scotland\*, South Africa**

**Pediatric- nephrology network since**

**† 1996 < 15 Yrs**

**‡ 1988 < 14 Yrs**

**\*Laboratory based since mid-eight'ies**







## Shiga toxin 2 (*stx2*) subtype and clinical presentation


Subtype	Non-HUS *	HUS*
<i>stx2</i>	60	11
<i>stx2c</i>	49	1
<i>stx2d</i> -activatable	4	
<i>stx2d</i>	39	
<i>stx2e</i>	2	
<i>stx2</i> -variant	3	
<i>stx2</i> + <i>stx2c</i>	23	7
<i>stx2</i> + <i>stx2d</i>	1	
2x <i>stx2</i> -activatable	4	
<i>stx2c</i> + <i>stx2</i> -activatable	1	
Total	186	19

***stx2* OR\* 32.5 > *stx2c* OR\* 4.7 for HUS**

\*) OR: odds ratio; multivariant analysis adjusted for age




# Virulence profile and clinical manifestation in 559 Danish STEC patients 1994-2005






# Stx1 : 4 subtypes a - d 7-8 variants

Pairwise (OG:100%,UG:0%) (FAST:2,10) Gapcost:0%  
VT1 translated sequences






# Stx2 : 7 subtypes a - g 35 variants



SP	A <sub>1</sub>	A <sub>2</sub>	SP	B
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
## Subtyping Method for *Escherichia coli* Shiga Toxin (Verocytotoxin) 2 Variants and Correlations to Clinical Manifestations<sup>∇</sup>

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Received 27 December 2006/Returned for modification 27 January 2007/Accepted 4 April 2007

Shiga toxin 2 (Stx2) from Shiga toxin-producing *Escherichia coli* (STEC) was subtyped by a method involving partial sequencing of the *stxAB*<sub>2</sub> operon. Of 255 strains from the Danish STEC cohort, all 20 cases of hemolytic-uremic syndrome were associated with subtype Stx2 (11 cases), subtype Stx2c (1 case), or the two combined (8 cases).






# Only 12 Stx2 variants found in Danish patients

New variants

First time in humans





# Attack rate of Stx2 variants associated with HUS

## O157

Stx2a-O157-EDL933 + Stx2c-O157-FLY16	6/23	26%
Stx2a-O157-EDL933	3/17	18%
Stx2c-O157-FLY16	1/18	6%
Stx2a-O157-SF + Stx2c-O157-FLY16	1/1	-

## Non-O157

Stx2a-O48-94C	6/20	30%
Stx1b + Stx2a-O157-EDL933	1/3	-
Stx2a-O157-EDL933 + Stx2c-O157-FLY16	1/2	-
Stx1b + Stx2a-O48-94C	1/5	20%



# Conclusions

## Two Stx2a variants associated with HUS

**Stx2a-O157-EDL933**  
(& Stx2-O157-FLY16)

in NSF O157

**Stx2a-O157-SF** }  
**Stx2a-O48-94C** }

in SF O157

in **Non-O157**

## New Paradigm:

**How may STEC be classified?**

**Are certain virulence "cocktails" associated with severe disease rather than the serotype?**







## New Paradigm

# Classification of STEC in 5 Sero-pathotypes

Based on the reported occurrence of serotypes in human disease, in outbreaks and/or in hemolytic-uremic syndrome (HUS)  
Karmali et al., 2003, J. Clin. Microbiol., 41:4930-40

Sero-pathotype	Relative incidence	Frequency of involvement in outbreaks	Association with severe disease (HUS or HC)	Serotypes
A	High	Common	Yes	O157:H7, O157:NM
B	Moderate	Uncommon	Yes	O26:H11, O103:H2, O111:NM, O121:H19, O145:NM
C	Low	Rare	Yes	O91:H21, O113:H21, O104:H21, others
D	Low	Rare	No	multiple
E	Non human only			multiple



# Problems with this classification


## Association with serotype and not with virulence profile

- More than 120 O:H serotypes have been associated with HUS (Bergey's Manual of Systematic Bacteriology, 2nd ed.)
- Many O:H serotypes display extensive heterogeneity

## Involvement in outbreak may rapidly change

## Relative incidence


- is skewed by lack of efficient detection methods
- will vary depending on the epidemiology of specific types





# Alternative classification

1. HUS inducing STEC and/or an epidemic outbreak potential
  - *eae* and *stx2a*
  - *eae* negative and *stx2d* (activatable)
  - *eae* and *stx1*      Less common but certain O:H serotypes have been associated with HUS
2. Diarrhea inducing in humans!
  - Many different virulence profiles
  - Capacity to produce Stx and association with diarrhea in humans
3. Animal-associated STEC
  - High prevalence in the animal reservoir
  - Seems to be their natural habitat
  - No human cases
  - Candidates for this group are *stx2e* positives





# Questions

**Should management and treatment of patients be adjusted according to virulence cocktail?**





# Danish Practice since 2000

**ALL patients with STEC are excluded or quarantined if they are**

- **Children in institutions and day care**
- **Staff of health care facilities**
- **Hospital staff or hospitalized patients**
- **Food handlers**

**and until they have had two consecutive STEC negative stool samples**

**Prolonged shedding of STEC has resulted in huge social problems especially for parents**



## New Paradigm

# Danish example of consequences

Revision of guidelines for treatment of Danish patients with STEC may include antibiotic treatment of asymptomatic patients with


- *eae* negative STEC
- *eae* & *stx1* - except some serotypes

Asymptomatic patients are likely to be allowed back in institutions and day care after treatment



# Recommendations

- **Adequate detection methods should include the isolation of bacteria**
- **Typing methods should be standardized**
- **Subtyping methods for Stx2a variants associated with HUS should be implemented**
- **Urgent need for standardized nomenclature**





# Questions

1. **How much is detection and surveillance scewed?**
2. **Can case definitions for HUS to be notified within the Public Health system be established?**
3. **Will management and treatment of STEC patients depend on**
  - **a case-to-case based assessment?**
  - **an outbreak-to-outbreak approach?**
  - **local epidemiology?**







## Question

Should non-O157:H7 STECs be considered to be adulterants as *E. coli* O157:H7?

**YES - some**





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