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EPA's Environmental Scenarios Project
Background
| Scenario > Eco-Efficiency Revolution > Full Speed Ahead > Soft Landing > A Darker Age |
In 2001, EPA initiated an environmental scenario development project, based on the model established by the Global Business Network, to see beyond typical assumptions and biases about the future and to promote a "longer view." To begin, members of the Agency's Futures Network interviewed EPA senior career managers to elicit their beliefs about the future of the environment and the Agency's role in environmental protection. The interviews revealed executives' assumptions about future environmental issues and identified topics they believed worthy of further analysis. The majority of those interviewed believed that while the state of the U.S. environment would be the same or better 20 years from now, the state of the global environment would be worse. The greatest uncertainties expressed centered around the level of public support and approval which might be accorded to environmental protection in the future. Based on these revelations, EPA managers were interested in using scenarios to explore the scope of EPA's role in the future, both domestically and internationally, as well as issues related to persistent and emerging environmental problems.
In July 2000, a new Scenario Development Team, a subgroup of the Futures Network, considered the issues that senior managers raised and identified several topics for further research: aquifer depletion/water quantity; sprawl; biotechnology and nanotechnology; chemicals in the environment; and climate change. These topics would be explored more fully in the scenarios.
Developing the Scenarios
To frame the scenarios, the Scenario Development Team selected as axes two critical, uncertain driving forces that affect environmental quality and EPA's ability to carry out its mission: economic growth and social cohesion. The Economic Growth axis was defined in terms of growth or decline in the total production and consumption of goods and services, as measured by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in national economies and the Gross World Product (GWP) at the level of the world economy. At one end of the Economic Growth axis is high growth in U.S. GDP and GWP. Toward the other end of the axis, growth rates slow or become negative.
The Social Cohesion axis was defined in terms of the extent of shared values, mutual trust, inclusiveness and participation, and willingness to face common challenges and cooperate in meeting them. For the purposes of EPA's scenarios, alignment around shared environmental values is one of the main aspects of social cohesion. At one end of the Social Cohesion axis, most individuals, communities, and organizations are committed to environmental protection. Different actors within society are willing to cooperate with one another and to support government action in order to meet widely recognized environmental challenges. Toward the other end of the axis, society is increasingly fractionalized. Many people are indifferent or hostile to environmental values or refuse to recognize the seriousness of environmental challenges. Economic inequities, social conflicts, and practices that exclude people from participation create distrust and limit society's ability to cooperate in meeting challenges.
These two "drivers" or axes intersect to create four quadrants representing four possible scenario worlds: Eco-Efficiency Revolution, Full Speed Ahead, Soft Landing, and A Darker Age. While they may at times appear exaggerated or unrealistic, each of the worlds represents the plausible extremes defined by the axes. The scenarios are intended to illustrate differing, potential impacts on human health and the environment presented by these possible worlds. They were constructed for the express purpose of promoting and facilitating strategic discussions among EPA's managers. EPA staff conducted most of the research to prepare the scenarios, with guidance and assistance from the Institute for Alternative Futures. These versions of the scenarios were completed in October, 2000.
Scenarios are not predictions. They are stories of how the future might unfold — plausible stories that reflect information about trends and potential future developments. These four scenarios were designed to span a range of potential future conditions. The actual future is not likely to match any one of these four depictions, but it will probably fall somewhere within the range of possibilities that the scenarios explore.