

# Administration in Turmoil

## Yellowstone's Management in Question 1907–1916

In 1905, Hiram Chittenden, in a revised version of his earlier history of Yellowstone National Park, declared that the U.S. Army's efforts to manage the park had been very successful; he also foresaw a long, bright future for the military management of the nation's first park. "The system thus inaugurated still continues with every prospect of permanency," he wrote, and "it is not probable that public opinion will ever sanction a return to the old order."<sup>1</sup> While Chittenden's optimism was not unfounded, the combination of two federal departments trying to administer a single government unit was proving problematic. Acting superintendents were beholden to the Interior Department on matters pertaining to the management of the park, and to the War Department when it came to military issues. To add to the confusion, construction in the park was the job of the Army Corps of Engineers. It was, in short, time to begin deciding whether managing the nation's parks was really a military matter.

In 1907, park management turned in a new direction. When former acting superintendent and recently retired army Lieutenant General S. B. M. Young returned to Yellowstone at the request of the Department of the Interior and assumed command from Major John Pitcher on June 1, 1907, he inaugurated a new, transitional era in park management. With Young overseeing the loosening of the military's hold on national park management, acting superintendents Harry Benson and Lloyd Brett watched and, in some important ways, aided in the completion of the process. By the time Brett served his last years as acting superintendent, the transfer back to civilian—albeit professional civilian—management

was an accomplished fact. The last years of military involvement in Yellowstone also saw some major positive developments: the Interior Department became more involved with the parks it oversaw, several landmark structures were built in Yellowstone, a system of park museums was conceptualized, and a civilian ranger force was inaugurated.

### **The Last Military Managers**

In 1907, three years after General Young retired from military service, Secretary of the Interior James R. Garfield asked him to return to Yellowstone, where he had served briefly as acting superintendent, to take over John Pitcher's command and serve as superintendent of the park. Young's main accomplishment during his second term was his proposal to replace the military presence in the park with a corps of what he called "civil guards" working for the Department of the Interior.<sup>2</sup> For a variety of reasons—chief among them the fact that neither the Department of War nor the Department of the Interior was ready for the change—his proposal was not acted upon, and in November 1908, Young was replaced by Harry Coupland Benson.

Born in Ohio before the Civil War, Benson earned a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College before entering the U.S. Military Academy in 1878, and graduating in 1882. He served in several military efforts before assuming the acting superintendency of the park: the campaign against the Apache Indians in 1885–1886, the Spanish–American War, and the military's presence

on the Philippine Islands. He was also provost marshal of San Francisco after the 1906 earthquake and fire. His tenure in the park was only two years, but it was very successful. According to historian Aubrey Haines, Benson was “a true intellectual” and “a good soldier and administrator.”<sup>3</sup>

In October 1910, Lloyd Milton Brett, the last military officer to serve as Yellowstone’s acting superintendent, took over Benson’s post. Born in Maine in 1856, Brett graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1879. His service in wars with the Sioux Indians earned him the Congressional Medal of Honor, after which his military career continued with service in the Apache Indian Campaign in 1885–1886, the Spanish–American War, and the Philippine Insurrection. A respected military officer, Brett took up a “doubly difficult” challenge in the park, overseeing two crucial transitions: “from horsedrawn to motorized transportation and from military to civilian administration.”<sup>4</sup>

## The Rocky Road to Civilian Administration

Historians Aubrey Haines and H. Duane Hampton have both discussed, in great detail, the story of the movement from military to civilian governance of Yellowstone National Park.<sup>5</sup> In short, from 1907 to 1916, erratic and frustratingly slow progress was made toward returning civilian management to the park. During this decade, park managers—military officers—advocated a return to civilian rule, while the War Department, the Department of the Interior, and Congress took turns blocking the road to change.

A major roadblock to civilian control of Yellowstone Park was its firmly entrenched military leadership. By 1907, civilian “park rangers” had assumed duties in all other national parks except Yellowstone. As the nation’s first park, Yellowstone continued to be operated by the army at a time when the newer, California parks—Yosemite, Sequoia, and General Grant (today’s Kings Canyon)—unsuccessfully tried to convince the War Department, already stretched thin by the Spanish–American War and the Philippine Insurrection, to spare soldiers for duty in their parks. Conversely, Yellowstone had only a small contingent of civilian employees. Lack of adequate Congressional appropriations for administration and protection of the park in 1886 and 1894 meant that the park was able to employ only a few civilians as scouts,

buffalokeepers, and their assistants. Without a core of non-uniformed rangers on duty, Yellowstone could not build a force of civilians large enough to assume significant power or influence before transfer of the park from military hands on October 1, 1916.

This delay in developing a civilian corps of park rangers was troublesome, given how clear it was to General Young and other acting superintendents—even as early as Moses Harris in 1887—that having soldiers police Yellowstone furthered the interests of neither the military nor the park. Harris had expressed these sentiments in the 1880s, as he was turning over the park’s administration to his successor, F. A. Boutelle.<sup>6</sup> Twenty years later, Young echoed Harris when he argued, in October 1907, that military management was problematic for both the army and the park. First, it was “injurious to the Army” in that regimental and squadron organizations were disrupted. Young also asserted that the necessity of breaking the men into small, far-flung parties, “separated for indefinite periods of time without the personal supervision of an officer,” was demoralizing to the troops. Nor were the park’s interests met: “The enlisted men of the Army are not selected with special reference to the duties to be performed in police patrolling, guarding, and maintaining the natural curiosities and interesting ‘formations,’ . . . [nor] in protecting against the killing or frightening of the game and against forest fires,” Young noted.<sup>7</sup> In addition, Young clearly believed that “divided responsibility and accountability” was advantageous to neither the army nor the park, and should not continue. “Under existing conditions,” he lamented, “the superintendent is answerable to the Secretary of the Interior, while at the same time the troops acting as park guard are held to accountability and discipline as is contemplated and provided for in the United States Army.”<sup>8</sup>

Young alluded to a problem that Horace Albright, in 1917, as acting director of the National Park Service (NPS), called “a great big three-headed monster that it has been next to impossible to control.”<sup>9</sup> Hampton also found this metaphor useful. “[W]ith the roads under the direction of the Army Engineers, the cavalry under control of the Secretary of War, and the Acting Superintendents serving both the Department of the Army and the Department of the Interior,” Hampton wrote, the management of the park was both unwieldy and costly.<sup>10</sup> To slay the monster, General Young proposed that control of the park be put back into a single set of hands—those of a “civil guard” of specifically suited, selected, and trained men who would serve under

control of the Department of the Interior. The traits of the men who would form the civilian guards were clear to Young.”<sup>11</sup> “It is quite obvious,” he wrote,

that any man assigned to duty in any capacity in the park should . . . be by natural inclination interested in the park and its purposes. In addition, every man should be an experienced woodsman, a speedy traveler on skis, an expert trailer, a good packer who with his horse and pack animal could carry supplies to subsist himself for a month alone in the mountains and forests, and besides he should be of a cool temperament, fearless, and independent character, and handy with his rifle and pistol to enable him to find and overcome the wily trapper and the ugly large game head and teeth hunter. He should be well informed in the history of the park and thoroughly cognizant with all the curiosities and points of interest therein; he should also be qualified to pass a reasonable examination in zoology and ornithology. [Furthermore,] [a] visiting tourist should always be favored by an intelligent and courteous answer on any subject pertaining to the park from any guard interrogated.<sup>12</sup>

“Two years’ experience in governing the park with troops and comparing the results of enforcing due observance of all rules, regulations, and instructions through the troops, and through the few scouts that in reality are civil guards, leaves no doubt in my mind,” Young wrote in his 1907 annual report, “about the superiority of a trained and well-governed civil guard for this particular and difficult duty.”<sup>13</sup> Young also argued that the soldiers actually resented “being required to subserve both the military interest and the interest of the park on their small pay,” and that the existing system of dual command was certainly more costly to the government. He suggested that either the entire responsibility should be given to the War Department or the troops should be withdrawn.<sup>14</sup>

President Theodore Roosevelt instructed Young to devise a plan for “a civil guard to replace the military in the park.” However, according to Hampton, “[b]y the time the plan had been drawn up and presented to the Secretary of the Interior, the President had changed his mind and the Secretary of the Interior was not willing at that time to request an increased appropriation.”<sup>15</sup> Thus, like that of others before him, Young’s advice was

left unheeded, and would not receive a fair hearing for another eight years.

By 1908, during conversations regarding expansion of the post, the issue of the size of the military reservation came to a head. This was really a question of which department had control of the land contained within and immediately around the fort, and General Young and Major H. T. Allen, commander of the troops in the park, took opposing sides. Young favored the Interior Department, while Allen stood squarely on the side of the War Department. In January of that year, the War Department’s Major General J. F. Bell warned Young that “Allen is right in his views, and I hope they are not inconsistent with yours. Tho[ugh] there may never be any probability of trouble between you and Allen, there is fruitful opportunity for trouble in the situation, and serious trouble might ensue were it not for the personality of the present occupants of the two positions held by you and Allen respectively.” “[T]he reservation,” Bell continued, “certainly ought to include all the buildings belonging to the military authorities, and ought to include grounds which can be used as a drill ground.”<sup>16</sup> Young disagreed. “My dear General,” he began, “there may possibly be authority for making a military reservation inside the boundaries of the Yellowstone Park, but I have failed to discover such.” He continued to say that there was “no probability of any friction between Allen and [himself]” and that he even would suggest that Allen become superintendent when he left. He ended his defense of the Interior Department’s exclusive and complete control of the park with this view of the situation: “You need not entertain any apprehension of having another civilian superintendent so long as troops are used in the park,” he wrote. “There is no salary, and my work is simply a labor of love.”<sup>17</sup> In another letter to Secretary Garfield, Young wrote, “It seems to me, under existing law, the Secretary of the Interior cannot relinquish absolute control, nor can the Secretary of War acquire exclusive control over any part or parcel of land within the boundaries of Yellowstone Park.”<sup>18</sup>

By late summer of that year, the issue had reached the White House via President Roosevelt’s friend, Alexander Lambert. While spending 10 days in the park that summer, Lambert noticed the tension between General Young and Major Allen, not to mention the third “head of the monster,” the Army Corps of Engineers’ officer in charge of road construction. Lambert championed Young’s position and noted that he had all of the responsibility, but none of the authority to do his job effectively.



*Mounted cavalry drill on Parade Ground at Fort Yellowstone.*

He also discussed the lack of knowledge, discipline, and experience of most of the soldiers. Finally, he promoted Young's 1907 idea of using civilian guards instead of troops, and told the president that Young would not stay in the park under the current conditions.<sup>19</sup>

In September 1908, Young met with Interior Secretary Garfield about the park situation. In a letter to President Roosevelt, Young stated that at that meeting, he had agreed to stay on as superintendent, and "await action by Congress." However, he added, if Major Allen was not reassigned, Young would resign his own position. In his annual report the next month, Young "beg[ged] to renew the recommendation made in my last annual report to place the government and protection of the park under a selected and well-organized civil guard." Again, his request met with no success.<sup>20</sup> Instead, Young's position as superintendent appeared to be in jeopardy. Roosevelt's friend, Lambert, had written to Secretary Garfield expressing his opinion that "at present the Park is worse cared for than it has been for the last ten years. The game in the Park is not being properly and honestly protected and some campers even suggested that the soldiers were killing the game, particularly the grizzly bears."<sup>21</sup>

Garfield, who also visited Yellowstone during the summer of 1908, was convinced that the "Government should adopt a more advanced policy respecting [the park's] maintenance, improvement, and operation." He supported an extension of roads, trails, and structures that enabled the public to "obtain the benefits" of the

park's scenic beauties, and believed future appropriations should be given to the Department of the Interior, rather than the War Department for disbursement. This procedure would transfer the control and supervision to the Interior Department. On the other hand, he found the system of using regular army troops for patrol to be "highly satisfactory."<sup>22</sup>

In November 1908, Major Harry Benson took over Young's position.<sup>23</sup> Under Benson's tenure as acting superintendent, the issue of a military reservation within the bounds of Yellowstone Park was settled—at least temporarily—in favor of the War Department, but the fate of a civilian administration remained inconclusive.<sup>24</sup> The debate was revived in 1910. In April of that year, new Secretary of the Interior Richard A. Ballinger responded to Missouri Congressman Harry Coudrey's request for a trained civilian force, by stating that the park was "very efficiently patrolled by three troops of cavalry of 100 men each, with the assistance of three civilian scouts." He felt that "it was inadvisable to substitute civilian employees for soldiers for the protection of the reservation."<sup>25</sup> Immediately thereafter, Secretary Ballinger requested that Secretary of War Jacob Dickinson assign one additional troop of cavalry and a full pack train to the park for the 1910 season. Dickinson, however, demurred. Officially, he argued that the fourth available troop was needed at Fort Duchesne, Utah, to "preserve order on the Indian Reservation." Privately, he was reluctant to make Fort Yellowstone a priority because he felt that the soldiers on duty in the park "have little, if any, time for proper

military training, and it is very desirable, for this reason, to keep the force so employed at the minimum number."<sup>26</sup> Further, the War Department was reluctant to assign enough soldiers to police the park adequately because a tour of duty in Yellowstone was poor preparation for "real" military service.

In August 1910, Secretary Ballinger received word that Major-General Leonard Wood, Army Chief of Staff, wanted to transfer Major Benson and the three troops of Fifth Cavalry to the Hawaiian Islands, and to replace Benson with Major Lloyd Milton Brett and his First Cavalry troops. Ballinger was sorry to lose the capable Major Benson, but he did not feel it was his prerogative to dictate personnel assignments to the War Department. Thus, in October 1910, Yellowstone received what was to be its final military superintendent.<sup>27</sup> Shortly before Major Benson left, the chief clerk of the Department of the Interior, Clement Ucker, made an inspection of the park. In the conclusion of his report, he strongly recommended that a civilian superintendent be appointed with continued use of soldiers for patrol. He also called for all employees in all national parks to be brought under civil service rules, and for "the appointment of the superintendents [to] be taken out of the realm of politics."<sup>28</sup>

Throughout the summer of 1911, the question of Yellowstone's administration, as well as the administration of the rest of the national parks, kept the Department of the Interior busy. Department officials explored questions of whether any law existed to "prevent the Secretary of the Interior from appointing a civilian Superintendent," and of how such a civilian superintendent would be paid—that is, if he would be paid from the appropriations by the Sundry Civil Appropriations Act, approved March 4, 1911, for the following fiscal year.<sup>29</sup>

By that time, forces outside the park and its military management were advocating the development of a civilian management plan. For example, J. Horace McFarland, president of the American Civic Association, took a leadership role in convincing both the American Society of Landscape Architects (ASLA) and Secretary Ballinger to support the establishment of "a bureau to administer the national parks." McFarland believed that park policies should be driven by professional decisions, not political ones. His views held sway: the ASLA began to educate the public on the issue, and Ballinger recommended the creation of such a bureau in his annual report for 1910.<sup>30</sup> Haines wrote that Ballinger's report led to a conference organized to deal with problems in the na-

tional parks. The conference was convened by Ballinger's replacement, Walter L. Fisher, who continued Ballinger's investigation into the idea of a national park bureau. Held in Yellowstone in September 1911, the conference was intended to study the national park problem and help promote the creation of a bureau.<sup>31</sup>

The subject of park administration was indeed one of three main issues on the agenda of the first National Parks Conference, the other two being concessions and transportation. "The purpose of the conference," the proceedings stated, "was to consider all the questions that arise in the administration of these reservations in order that the department [of the Interior] might be able to make such changes in the regulations and to foster such development as might be for the best interest of the public."<sup>32</sup> The assembled officials, representing concessions, parks, the Interior Department, and other interested groups, discussed at length the idea of a central bureau to administer all of the parks. Yellowstone's Colonel Brett diplomatically declined to take sides on the issue, instead commending both types of park governance. Brett averred that the military, with its organization and discipline, was "as well suited for this kind of work as it is for any other military work, because," as he put it, protecting the park was "military work," but conceded that a civilian administration would win out in the end simply because it would have more staying power. "The only argument," he stated, "which can be adduced for replacing us by the other form [a civilian administration] is that the other form should have more permanency."<sup>33</sup>

Another conference held in 1911, the annual meeting of the American Civic Association (ACA), had as its primary focus "a federal Bureau of National Parks." This conference, organized by the association's leader, J. Horace McFarland, who had also attended the National Parks Conference, featured an address by President William Howard Taft, who fully endorsed the creation of a bureau of national parks. "If we are going to have national parks," Taft proclaimed, "we ought to make them available to the people, and we ought to build roads . . . in order that those parks may become what they are intended to be when Congress creates them. . . . And we cannot do that, we cannot carry them on effectively, unless we have a bureau which is itself distinctly charged with the responsibility for their management and for their building up."<sup>34</sup>

While President Taft supported a national parks bureau, Congress did not.<sup>35</sup> Shortly after the conferences

concluded, Colonel Brett used his annual report to call on the secretary of the interior to decide upon a fixed policy regarding military versus civilian management in order to proceed, as he put it, with a “stable and progressive administration.”<sup>36</sup> It had been four years since an official directly involved with the administration of Yellowstone Park had rallied for the cause of civilian management. It was time for the War and Interior departments to decide, Brett wrote, “if the park shall continue to be policed by United States troops or if they shall in the near future be replaced by a civilian organization.”<sup>37</sup> Brett repeated this recommendation verbatim in his 1915 annual report.<sup>38</sup> His efforts to persuade others to move on the matter can thus be read as an attempt to convince Congress to do the same.

By 1913, the Interior Department was providing more leadership in the drive to improve the situation in the nation’s parks. That year, President Woodrow Wilson appointed a former city attorney from San Francisco, Franklin K. Lane, who possessed “informed concern for the national parks and an active agenda for their improvement,” to be his secretary of the interior.<sup>39</sup> One concern common to national parks at the time stemmed from their deplorable sanitary conditions.<sup>40</sup> Yellowstone’s problems with sanitation and stream pollution were serious, and Acting Superintendent Brett felt that the problem “must be met by some general plan in the near future.”<sup>41</sup> Lane, for one, appeared ready to listen to park administrators and rectify the situation. According to historian Ethan Carr, Lane, “[f]aced with limited resources for park planning . . . improvised and sought out cooperative agencies” to help him solve such problems as park sanitation.<sup>42</sup>

While officials at the Interior Department were moving in the direction of civilian administration, they were also reluctant to offend the War Department. Thus, when Brett concluded, toward the end of the 1913 season, that the War Department’s attitude toward the park was “a menace to the efficient management of this reservation,” the Interior Department attempted to defuse the conflict. In a letter to Secretary Lane, Brett quoted the War Department Inspector’s report: “it is my belief that this is not a proper duty for the Army. The Army should be withdrawn from this park and from all national parks.” Brett believed that this attitude affected the men on duty. Furthermore, he felt frustrated in his attempts to maintain order in the park, as the Quartermaster Department, for example, would not allow him to make needed improvements at the soldier stations. Brett urged

a definite policy regarding soldiers and their duties. The response from the Department of the Interior was not reassuring: “Your letter received. There seems to be no occasion for the anxiety you express. Have heard nothing here of contemplated change and can doubtless arrange matters satisfactorily should occasion arise.” A few days later, Secretary Lane’s assistant explained to Brett that perhaps Brett was “exaggerating the disposition of the War Department,” and that War Department Secretary Lindley Garrison “seemed disposed to cooperate as far as possible with us in giving the park an effective administration.”<sup>43</sup>

While downplaying the tensions surrounding the park’s administration, the Interior Department seemed ready to act on other issues by providing the necessary leadership for change. In 1913, for example, Lane appointed Adolph C. Miller, an economics professor from the University of California, as assistant secretary in charge of national parks. Horace Albright—the future superintendent of Yellowstone National Park—began his NPS career as assistant to Miller.<sup>44</sup> In 1914, Miller chose Mark Daniels, a San Francisco-based landscape architect who had helped him devise a plan to develop Yosemite Valley in a non-disruptive, view-enhancing, and aesthetically pleasing way, to be general superintendent and landscape engineer for all national parks.<sup>45</sup> These men would play decisive roles in promoting and crafting the new civilian service devoted to administering the nation’s parks.

By the spring of 1914, officials in the War Department began seriously to re-assess the army’s presence in Yellowstone. In a letter to his counterpart in the Interior Department, the secretary of war indicated that he would send a modified cavalry detachment of 250 troops to protect the park. Unlike the soldiers who were usually sent to Yellowstone, these “selected cavalymen, preferably those having experience in the . . . Park and having a natural taste and aptitude for the character of duties which they are to perform there,” would be well suited to their duty. With World War I already underway in Europe, the secretary of war was clearly preparing for the eventuality that a civilian force would take over administration of the park. “[S]hould circumstances arise necessitating a substitution of civilian rangers for cavalymen in guarding the park,” he wrote, the Interior Department “could take over such of these experienced men as it might need, they being discharged from the Army for that purpose should their service be needed.”<sup>46</sup>

In July 1914, the Second Squadron of First Cavalry

was withdrawn from Yellowstone and sent to its new station at the Presidio of Monterey, California. The squadron was replaced by 200 cavalymen drawn from nine regiments on duty posts across the country. Secretary of War Lindley Garrison then took additional steps toward a civilian takeover. In a letter to the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, he explained that the cost of administering and supplying Yellowstone was one reason why the War Department “should be relieved of carrying the burden of national parks.” He believed the Interior Department was ready to “take over the burden, provided Congress will appropriate the money necessary to bring this about.” He also offered to turn over to the Department of the Interior “the complete plant which has been established, barracks, quarters, telephone lines and all free of cost, with the idea that the Army may be relieved entirely from all police work in the parks.”<sup>47</sup> In an earlier letter, Garrison had mentioned that Brett would remain on duty until October 31, 1915, at which time “the arrangements contemplated to permit the complete withdrawal of the army from the Park” would be completed.<sup>48</sup>

The secretary of the interior’s office was also preparing for significant changes. In 1915, Secretary Lane hired Stephen Tyng Mather—a Chicago businessman, preservationist, and mountaineer who would later become the first director of the NPS—to be his assistant in charge of national parks.<sup>49</sup> As historian Linda McClelland has written, many saw this as “a hopeful sign that park matters would gain increasing attention and that the much needed improvements would receive congressional funding.”<sup>50</sup>

With the appointment of Mather, and with Albright and Daniels already at work on national park matters, the movement to create a bureau for parks was moving steadily forward. In May 1915, Mather established a system of communication between the parks, the office of the general superintendent, and himself to handle regular monthly reports, requests for funds, and any important questions regarding policy.<sup>51</sup> Before the year was out, he created a park filing system to preserve in order of receipt and to cross-reference either the original or copies of all orders and instructions and other correspondence dating back to January 1, 1907.<sup>52</sup>

Mather and Albright were also working on the issue of withdrawing troops from Yellowstone, and identifying the particular needs of Yellowstone’s future ranger force. Major General Hugh L. Scott, who was then chief of staff of the army and who agreed with Mather on the need

to remove the troops from the park, joined with Acting Superintendent Brett in these discussions.<sup>53</sup> “The plan contemplated the release of a number of sergeants and corporals,” Albright later recalled, “who had had such experience in leadership and had shown real interest in Yellowstone Park, these men to be appointed park rangers. Other rangers [were] to be recruited from stage drivers, scouts who were on duty to help the soldiers . . . etc.”<sup>54</sup>

The stumbling block in creating a civilian administration for Yellowstone at this point was Congress. “Congress had placed Yellowstone Park under protection of the military and intended . . . for it to remain that way,” some representatives argued. In addition, despite all evidence to the contrary, some politicians believed civilian management would cost more.<sup>55</sup>

What finally tipped the balance in favor of civilian administration was the introduction of automobiles into Yellowstone National Park in the summer of 1915. Behind Mather’s decision to allow cars into the park was the notion that the increased revenues would help offset some costs, and thus make the idea of a civilian administration of the park more financially feasible.<sup>56</sup> Also, because the War Department refused to let soldiers work at the entrance stations, the Department of the Interior had to hire “four park rangers” to do that work.<sup>57</sup> As the Judge Advocate General put it, the troops were allowed “only to prevent trespassers from entering the Park, and to remove those who did gain entrance,” meaning that all other tasks—from working on roads to stocking streams and fighting forest fires—had to be performed by “a large civilian force.” Thus, in an era of incipient automobile tourism, the military became a less-suitable entity for managing parks.<sup>58</sup>

In the meantime, Mather and Albright took steps to create the park’s ranger force. Mather’s plan envisioned all rangers being employed by the soon-to-be-created National Park Service instead of by specific parks. With knowledge gained by work experience and training, each ranger could be transferred to other parks during his service. The idea was to create an atmosphere in which a person would want to make the job his career; thus, “each man would have the fullest incentive to give his best service, knowing that advancement would be based solely on character and general efficiency.” Persons who possessed tact and a good temperament would be chosen after they had passed a civil service examination that would test for educational qualifications.<sup>59</sup>

During the spring of 1916, discussions were



*Visitors on open coach.*

underway at the Interior Department on how to proceed with removing troops from Yellowstone. Because the Sundry Civil Appropriations Act of March 3, 1883, had authorized the secretary of the interior to request the use of “temporary” troops from the War Department, no legislation was necessary for the transfer back from the War Department.<sup>60</sup> In July, just one month before the NPS would be formally created on August 25, 1916, Interior Secretary Lane wrote to Secretary of War Newton Baker requesting that the troops be relieved of duty after the end of the 1916 season. According to Lane, both departments agreed that certain “selected cavalrymen” would be available to remain as civilian rangers upon their official discharge from the army. The men, selected by Colonel Brett, would be “appointed first-class park rangers at a salary of \$100 per month.” Also, all property constructed and maintained by the army would be transferred to the Department of the Interior. Secretary Baker responded that he would arrange for the transfer of troops to take effect on October 1, 1916. The men selected for the civilian ranger corps would be officially discharged on September 29, in order to begin serving in the NPS on October 1.<sup>61</sup>

Adjutant General W. M. Wright directed the transfer of all army clothing, camp, and garrison equipment to the Quartermaster’s Depot in St. Louis, Missouri. Based upon an inspection and valuation of the army, the Interior Department was offered any desired stores or supplies remaining at Fort Yellowstone. The disposition of the remaining supplies, stores, and transportation was to be supervised by the commanding general of the Western Department. After an inspection by Superintendent of National Parks Robert B. Marshall (also chief geographer of the U.S. Geological Survey), Wright



*Tourists eating beside automobile atop Mount Washburn, ca. 1920s.*

wrote to Mather suggesting that the Interior Department purchase \$65,000 worth of goods from the army. That amount, however, did not include the post’s hospital equipment, for which the Department of the Interior later had to pay the War Department.<sup>62</sup>

The transfer of the park from military to civilian hands proceeded smoothly, but was not without occasional bumps along the way. For instance, it was not clear whether the Army Corps of Engineers’ buildings were included in the transfer agreement. The disagreement was cleared up when an arrangement was made for the Interior Department to reserve “one double set of stone quarters, two double sets of officers wooden quarters, two sets of noncommissioned officers quarters, and the equivalent of one-half the double stone barracks and blacksmith shop” from the corps.<sup>63</sup>

## **Developments in the Built Environment**

Several developments occurred in the park’s built environment during the last decade of military management. Fort Yellowstone was completed, several soldier stations were built, a museum system was conceptualized, and landscape architects began to influence the planning and improvement of park structures and landscapes.

Fort Yellowstone took on its present characteristic appearance, as important new buildings were added between 1908 and 1913. In 1909, the post was enlarged to house the four-troop detachment long deemed necessary to protect the park. Four troops (a troop consisted of 60–100 men) had lived in the park before, but under unsatisfactory conditions. To house four troops comfortably, additional barracks and officer quarters were





YNP PHOTO ARCHIVES, YELL #23562

*Double cavalry barracks, ca. 1915.*

needed. Seven buildings were added in 1909: a double cavalry barracks, a bachelor officers' quarters, a duplex for two captains, a field officer's quarters, two large cavalry stables, and a building for both a stable guard and a blacksmith shop. These buildings were made of stone, which was readily available, relatively cheap, fire-resistant, and permanent. All seven structures had walls of local sandstone; lintels and sills of dressed stone; painted wooden trim, eaves and soffits; and, hipped roofs of red-clay tile.<sup>64</sup> Also in 1909, Superintendent Norris's blockhouse was removed, being inadequate for further army use.

The barracks—the largest building at Fort Yellowstone—had a capacity of two troops, or 200 men. With “a U-shaped plan . . . the central wing running north south, and transverse east–west wings at either end,” the building was “generally symmetrical about an east–west axis.” It was “originally divided along this axis from basement to attic,” wrote architect David Battle and historian Erwin Thompson, “each company occupying one end of the structure.” It had three floors, each having “a covered porch . . . along the west elevation of the central wing, and along all three walls facing the court on the east.” For decoration, a band of dressed stone “extend[ed] around the entire building just above the first floor windows.”<sup>65</sup> The design of these buildings is noteworthy because for the first time, the Quartermaster Department employed civilian architects who brought with them design ideals inspired by the Beaux Arts movement. Thus, Fort Yellowstone's architecture from this period included such typical Beaux Arts elements as formal site plans, classically inspired designs, and “formal symmetrical building layouts arranged around axes.”<sup>66</sup>

Because Fort Yellowstone was still considered a

permanent post in 1909, military authorities decided to build a bachelor officers' quarters (BOQ). Fort Yellowstone's BOQ was a two-story, T-shaped structure with the major wing running north–south and a smaller wing centered on the east side. “A large roofed porch extend[ed] along the major portion of the west elevation,” wrote Battle and Thompson, and a stone gable with “a semi-circular attic window set in an arched opening” added a gentle touch to the strongly classical and linear features of all buildings in this set.<sup>67</sup> For this building and others of its time period, the quartermaster adapted the Colonial Revival Style.<sup>68</sup> The building's plan was typical for bachelor officers' quarters, with apartments for six single officers and “an officers' mess or club.”<sup>69</sup> Fort Yellowstone's BOQ—as was common with most such structures at similar military installations—faced the parade ground, and was placed near the other officer housing.<sup>70</sup>

Fort Yellowstone's bachelor officers' quarters were probably built because each permanent installation needed a BOQ, not necessarily because more officers' quarters were needed. According to Battle and Thompson, “there were more than enough officers' quarters at Fort Yellowstone for the permanent staff” when the BOQ was built. The building was also intended to house visiting army officials and staff, including the dental surgeon, the inspector general, and courts martial boards.<sup>71</sup>

There was some question as to the appropriate size of the field officer's quarters. During the planning stages, Major Allen, the commanding officer at the time and the person who would reside in the building, wrote to the War Department commander that he needed a bigger residence than plans called for. “I beg to state,” he wrote, “. . . this place, like West Point, Fortress Monroe, Fort Meyer, and probably a few other posts, is annually visited by a large number of people (10,414 last year) and that it is incumbent upon the Commanding Officer to be prepared to house more persons than would be possible with a field officer's set.”<sup>72</sup> He preferred plans for a commanding officer's house, which would have cost more and was “designed for colonels and above at regimental or larger posts.” His request was turned down, but an extra bedroom and bath in the attic were added to the otherwise standard plans for the field officer's quarters.<sup>73</sup>

Allen's request ran squarely into the army's concern with rising construction costs, largely the result of “[n]ew systems of heat, water, and sewerage and electric or gas lighting.” “To manage these changes and reduce new



YNP PHOTO ARCHIVES, YELL #23955

*Double officers' quarters. 1918.*

construction costs,” wrote the authors of *Context Study of the United States Quartermaster General Standardized Plans, 1866–1942*, “existing plans were rearranged and wasted space eliminated to create smaller buildings ‘without sacrificing convenience.’”<sup>74</sup> On the first floor, the plan for the field officer’s quarters called for a library, dining room, and parlor for socializing, as well as the necessary kitchen, entrance hall, and pantries. There were four bedrooms and two baths on the second floor, and two bedrooms in the attic, with space for an additional bedroom and bath, which in this instance were added immediately to the plan.<sup>75</sup>

The double set of captains’ quarters, a two-story duplex facing the parade ground to the west, had a covered entrance porch and a back porch on each side of the duplex. The plan for this building was also symmetrical “about a central east–west axis.”<sup>76</sup> The two cavalry stables were symmetrical “about both [their] major and minor axes.” They had a rectangular, two-story plan with “a gabled roof over the clerestory at the loft, and shed roofs over the wings on either side.” Both stables could hold 94 horses in either boxes or stalls.<sup>77</sup> The one-story blacksmith shop, also rectangular and basically symmetrical, was intended to serve the two cavalry stables, and was outfitted with saddle shops, blacksmith shops, and guard rooms for both.<sup>78</sup>

Although money was appropriated in 1909 for a new hospital, Battle and Thompson reported that it was not built until 1911, because the Surgeon General did not approve of the site selected. Instead, a one-story, frame hospital annex, intended as quarters for personnel

assigned to hospital duty, was built in 1909. It had the capacity to hold 12 men.<sup>79</sup>

In 1911, the so-called “new,” one-story, concrete guard house (jail) was built. Designed as a rectangle, the structure was one and one-half stories high, with a covered porch running its full length. Although the structure was designed to be built of stone, concrete was ultimately used instead. Stone probably proved to be too expensive; as authors of the *Context Study* confirmed, concrete was often used at this time to reduce costs.<sup>80</sup> As with most other buildings built in this period, double-hung, wood windows were used throughout. Bars were embedded into the concrete of the prison windows and toilet for added security.<sup>81</sup>

The building with perhaps the most interesting history at Fort Yellowstone is the chapel. Construction began in 1912, but plans for the building dated back several years. In 1897, a concerned citizen wrote to the acting superintendent lamenting “the lack of facilities for public worship at Fort Yellowstone,” and offered to build a chapel. Colonel Young, in his first stint as acting superintendent, refused the offer, explaining that the limited amount of land available for military use precluded the construction of buildings unrelated to “purely military purposes.”

Religious enthusiasts were not so easily deterred. Just after the turn of the century, an Episcopalian missionary named John Pritchard established himself near what is now Emigrant, Montana, and held occasional services in a troop mess hall at Fort Yellowstone. Inspired perhaps by the success of Pritchard’s operation, two

“ardent churchmen”—Acting Superintendent Captain John Pitcher and U.S. Commissioner Judge John W. Meldrum—joined forces to get a chapel built. But after funds were appropriated for fiscal year 1909, park superintendent General Young again caused the project to be delayed. Finally, while many army personnel and civilians thought the post would be better served by the construction of a recreation hall, which could have hosted worship services and also served many other purposes, legislation “For the Construction of a Chapel in or Near the Military Reservation Within Yellowstone National Park” was introduced, passed, and signed into law.<sup>82</sup> While many at the fort saw no need for a chapel, there were plenty in the Department of the Interior and the War Department who approved of the idea of turning soldiers’ minds from the worldly distractions of drink and gambling to an otherworldly arena. On his trip to the park in 1910, Clement Ucker, for example, complained about the number of saloons and “dives” at Gardiner, Montana, a number similar to that found at many other types of federal reservations—military and naval—as well as at some other national parks. He believed that temptation to the soldiers should be removed, and even promoted the idea of having the Montana legislature pass a law preventing the operation of saloons or gambling houses within two miles of a park entrance.<sup>83</sup>

By the early twentieth century, chapels were relatively common on military posts throughout the nation, and chapel designs were even standardized. Most chapels built during this period were in the Gothic Revival Style and, according to the *Context Study*, stood as “major examples of high artistic expression.”<sup>84</sup> According to Haines, the plan for the Yellowstone chapel was “essentially that of a cruciform church, though its arrangement is indicative of an Episcopalian origin—possibly from a standard plan of that denomination.”<sup>85</sup> The church was constructed of native sandstone, quarried from the bluffs overlooking the Gardner River. The stone used for the chapel was handled differently from that used in other park structures. It was “roughly squared and coursed as opposed to the ashlar construction found elsewhere, and the finished stone [was] hand-tooled rather than machine finished.” With its pitched roof “supported by wooden trussed arches and roofed with slate shingles,” the chapel was finished in January 1913, and was the last building constructed at Fort Yellowstone.<sup>86</sup>

The story of several structures not built in Yellowstone is perhaps as telling as that of those that were. For example, in 1911, Acting Superintendent Brett asked the

adjutant general for 15 new buildings, listed in order of importance. First on the list was a riding hall. Over the course of Brett’s and other commanding officers’ tenure at Fort Yellowstone, inspectors general had criticized the fort’s troops on several fronts. In March of that year, the inspector general found “all troops slow in work with sabre and showing need of more practice.”<sup>87</sup> Conceding that Yellowstone’s inclement winter weather prevented outdoor training, Brett requested an indoor riding arena, arguing that his troops were held to “a standard of efficiency that [was] high considering the handicaps of extreme cold weather extending over more than half the year, deep snow, and the absence of a riding hall.”<sup>88</sup> Requests for a riding hall continued to dominate Brett’s wish-list, but the quartermaster general’s office predictably responded, “No funds are at present available for the construction of a riding hall at Fort Yellowstone, Wyo., and no item for such a purpose has been included in the estimates for the fiscal year.”<sup>89</sup>

In September 1912, Inspector General Alonzo Gray made a more forceful plea for a riding hall. “There are many posts in the country provided with a riding hall where it is not needed to the extent that it is needed here,” he argued. “The lack of a riding hall reduces the military efficiency of this command, which is used as park police during the open season.”<sup>90</sup> Perhaps the War Department was unwilling to put more money into the Yellowstone post when political winds were shifting toward civilian management of national parks.

One other building government officials hoped to construct during this period deserves mention. During the last decade of military management, there were plans to build a new administration building. One architect involved with the project was Robert Reamer, the Northern Pacific Railroad’s architect who had designed the Old Faithful Inn and the railway station at Gardiner. When Chief Clerk Ucker visited Yellowstone during the summer of 1910, he got a glimpse of Reamer’s plans for the administration building, which Ucker found to be the “most artistic and appropriate building in every respect that could be erected.” He urged the Department of the Interior to approve the plans and secure funds for the building’s erection. While in the park, Ucker requested Reamer to prepare plans for a substation and residence at the West Entrance.<sup>91</sup> Congress and the Interior Department did not take action in regard to either building at that time, but discussions continued about the construction of a new administration building.

In November 1913, Colonel Brett revived the issue

of a new administration building when he wrote Interior Secretary Lane concerning suggestions to improve park access. Apparently, Mr. Richard T. Greene of New York City had complained to the secretary about travel conditions and accommodations in the park. While Brett dismissed most of Greene's displeasure, claiming, for example, that Greene's request for boardwalks would lead to the "unthinkable" outcome of having the park "resemble Atlantic City," he did agree that the park could do a better job of informing the public about notable park features. "That information of all the natural objects is not well disseminated is correct," he admitted to Lane. "This feature is turned over to guides, bell boys, and porters, by the hotels and camps," he continued, "and such information as they are able to give is not of much value." Conceding that park officials needed to offer the public more in the way of information, Brett lobbied for a new administration building by coupling it with the idea of a museum. Greene's "complaint," he told Lane, "emphasizes the necessity for an administration building, housing all that is interesting in historical data and specimens of natural curiosities, etc." He even advocated that "[s]mall branches of the administration building in the shape of bungalows . . . be erected at Norris, Upper Basin, and the Canyon," to be staffed by persons "able to give intelligent information."<sup>92</sup>

While it would be several decades before Brett's dream of an administration/museum building came to fruition, his proposal is noteworthy. For one, it marked the first time a government official called for museum space in Yellowstone. Second, because Brett's vision entailed branch museums, he, in effect, advocated an organized system of museum and administrative facilities spread throughout the park that could provide useful information to visitors, such as exists today. Finally, his model of putting a museum under the same roof as administration offices was an early version of what was to become a park staple in the 1950s: the visitor center, a building combining protective, administrative, and informative functions. While none of these buildings was built at the time, it is clear from Greene's complaint and Brett's proposal that the need for such facilities was great. It would be only a question of time before they were put back on the drawing board.

If government officials could not come up with funds for museum space, they did find money for bolstering the park's protective infrastructure. Integral to the administration and protection of the park, several soldier stations and so-called "snowshoe cabins" were

built during this period. The importance of such cabins for patrolling the park both in winter and summer was outlined in a 1908 letter from Acting Superintendent Young to Secretary Garfield:

there are scattered throughout the park, in what are intended to be secreted points, cabins called snowshoe cabins. These cabins are at a distance of about 10 miles from the outlying outposts. It is one of the duties of the enlisted men and of the scouts who may be out on outpost, to cross the country on snowshoes, and these cabins are placed at distances which are considered to be a fair day's travel for the men on snowshoes through the mountains. The work of climbing the mountains is so difficult that it is impossible for the soldiers and scouts to carry anything on their backs. For this reason the Interior Department purchases for the funds appropriated for the maintenance and protection of the Yellowstone National Park, a small amount of rations which is stored in these cabins and is used by the scouts and soldiers during the nights spent in the cabins on the occasions when they visit them.<sup>93</sup>

Military acting superintendents after Young agreed with this assessment, and made every effort to improve the cabins and even add to the system throughout the years.

In 1912, a snowshoe cabin was built on the shore of Buffalo Lake, within the state of Idaho, one mile east of the park's west boundary. The one-story, one-room log structure "atop a mortar and cobble foundation" initially had a sod roof, later replaced by an overhanging gabled and wood-shingled one. As was customary at the time, the cabin's logs were saddle-notched.<sup>94</sup> Still standing today, the cabin at Buffalo Lake is, according to most scholars, the park's oldest existing snowshoe cabin.<sup>95</sup> Several soldier stations built at the time, for example, those at Norris and Bechler River, are also still standing.

The present, third soldier station at Norris was built in 1908, after the second station burned to the ground that February.<sup>96</sup> The presence of a government structure at Norris dates to Patrick Conger's administration (1882–1883), when he had a cabin built for his assistant superintendents, as one of his "five comfortable cabins" throughout the park.<sup>97</sup> That structure served Conger's and subsequent administrations until Colonel Young, during his first tour of duty in the park, replaced



*Norris Soldier Station, ca. 1916.*

the station with a better structure in 1897.<sup>98</sup> When Captain Chittenden recommended to John Pitcher that the stations be enlarged and improved, the Norris Soldier Station was one of the first to receive attention. Pitcher considered the Norris station to be “the poorest station we have,” and commenced drawing up plans for its improvement in 1901. The Norris station was enlarged at that time, however, by only a separate small structure known to the troops as the “officers’ dog house.”<sup>99</sup>

According to R. Laurie and Thomas H. Simmons, Robert Reamer, architect of the Old Faithful Inn, volunteered to draw up plans for the third Norris soldier station, but because “there are a few discrepancies between Reamer’s design and the building as constructed,” it is not clear if Reamer’s plan was implemented.<sup>100</sup> The building’s T-shaped plan also resembled, with modifications, Pitcher’s 1901 drawing, which had two rooms for officers only accessible from the porch, not from the station’s living quarters.<sup>101</sup> Simmons and Simmons reported that Lieutenant Cox and Mr. Rowlands, from the Quartermaster Department, completed the drawings and specifications for the building.<sup>102</sup>

The building, designed in Rustic Style, was a one-story log structure with “a roof of intersecting gables clad with wood shingles, overhanging eaves and exposed rafter ends.” According to Albert H. Good, editor in 1933 of *Park Structures and Facilities*, rustic design represented a style that “through the use of native materials in proper scale, and through the avoidance of rigid, straight lines, and over-sophistication, gives the feeling of having been executed by pioneer craftsmen with limited hand tools. It thus achieved sympathy with natural surroundings

and with the past.”<sup>103</sup> Another name for this architecture is Adirondack Style, which Linda McClelland has suggested involved “the use of native logs and rock in a rustic unfinished form, naturalistic siting of structures, incorporation of porches and viewing platforms, the climatic adaptation of using native stone for the foundation and lower story and native timber above, stone chimneys with massive fireplaces and mantles, open interiors with ceilings of exposed rafters and trusses, and a multitude of windows.”<sup>104</sup>

Indeed, the Norris station has many of these characteristics: one of the four chimneys is stone (the others are brick); the logs have “square notches with three surfaces cut at the ends, except for those on the porch, which are flush cut”; the log ends “extend beyond the plane of the building in a tapered fashion, creating a battered appearance”; some logs are unpeeled; the doors are vertical boards with “hand wrought metal straps”; there are “two burl tree trunk posts supporting the roof” at the front; and there are numerous windows.<sup>105</sup> The Norris Soldier Station remains standing, and currently houses the Museum of the National Park Ranger—after having been “rebuilt from the ground up, log-by-log” in 1976 as part of a U.S. centennial exhibit.<sup>106</sup>

The Bechler River Soldier Station, built largely in 1910, is also still standing. The station and barn are frame structures with hipped roofs clad with wood shingles. The offset front porch has square columns and a stick balustrade. The ranger station on the site is the officers’ quarters “dog house” built at the Thumb Soldier Station in 1904, and moved to the Bechler River site in 1946. According to Simmons and Simmons, this officers’

quarters structure “may be the only remaining of the officer quarters associated with each of the soldier stations except [for] the one at the North Entrance.”<sup>107</sup>

Several other soldier stations were built or improved during the last decade of military involvement in the park; a number of these structures were either revised extensively or replaced at a later date. In 1907, for example, the old station near Rainy Lake at Tower Fall was demolished and replaced with a new station, a cabin, and stable built nearer the junction of the Grand Loop and Northeast Entrance roads.<sup>108</sup> This is the oldest soldier station still standing, even if it has undergone much revision and improvement.<sup>109</sup> In 1910, contractor J. B. Cain of Bozeman, Montana, built a second station, formally referred to as “the new Gallatin Station,” in the northwest corner of the park.<sup>110</sup> This station, a frame house with a lath-and-plaster interior and painted green on the outside, included a stable large enough to house twelve horses.<sup>111</sup> The station was replaced after a destructive fire in 1918.<sup>112</sup> In 1912, a new soldier station was built near the park boundary on Crevice Mountain, east of Gardiner.<sup>113</sup> In 1914, a new Snake River Station (one-story log building, 16' × 50', with an 16' × 24' addition forming a T-shape) was built in late summer near the South Entrance, to replace the one that burned on August 7, 1914.<sup>114</sup> According to Haines, by the end of the military era, there were 16 soldier outposts (snowshoe cabins or soldier stations). Not counting the cabin at Buffalo Lake, which was not part of the system at that time, there were cabins or stations at Soda Butte (1886; 5 men), Grand Canyon (1886; 14 men), Norris (1886; 15 men), Riverside (1886; 10 men), Lower Geyser Basin (Fountain) (1886; 14 men), Upper Geyser Basin (1886; 15 men), Lake Outlet (1887; 15 men), Snake River (1892; 5 men), Thumb Bay (1897; 11 men), Tower Fall (1901; 7 men), Gardiner (1903; 6 men), Sylvan Pass (1904; 5 men), Cooke City (1904), Gallatin (1908; 4 men), Bechler (1911; 5 men), and Crevice (1901 and 1912; 3 men).<sup>115</sup>

Improvements to the stations and cabins were numerous over the years. In 1910, for example, the army's acting adjutant general consented to the construction of bathing facilities. Previous requests for such facilities had been rejected. For instance, Major Cheatam of the Quartermaster's Department in Washington, D.C., withheld permission because he figured the soldiers, whom he thought only manned the outposts during the summer months, could bathe in the rivers.<sup>116</sup> While some sanitary improvements were made after 1910, conditions



YNP PHOTO ARCHIVES, YELL #48569

*Canyon Soldier Station. 1906.*



YNP PHOTO ARCHIVES, YELL #22439

*Soda Butte Soldier Station. 1905.*

in most cases remained less than adequate.<sup>117</sup> In 1912, the inspector general's report included the following suggestion: “All sub stations need a bath house built on and a hot water tank attached to the kitchen range. At present the men bathe under conditions which will be absolutely impossible in winter. The result will be that, in winter, they will not bathe.”<sup>118</sup> Running water was needed at the stations for another reason—fire. Running water “would not only add to the comfort of the men who are cooped up within these stations for from five to eight months, and who do their patrolling and scouting upon skis,” wrote the inspector general, “but would add an additional protection against fire, which, if it should burn [their] skis, would probably sacrifice [*sic*] the lives of the men at these posts.”<sup>119</sup>

While these reports drew attention to the dismal condition of many soldier stations, the reports of other, more aesthetically minded critics found fault with the appearance of the soldier stations and snowshoe cabins. For example, when Chief Clerk Clement Ucker visited



YNP PHOTO ARCHIVES YELL #129313

*View of Fort Yellowstone from Capitol Hill, ca. 1915.*

the soldier stations as part of his 1910 tour of the park, he found that “no similarity in style of architecture had been followed.” He urged the interior secretary to erect suitable stations for the soldiers’ use, in a style of architecture that would conform to the style chosen for the new administration building (which, as has been noted, was not built).<sup>120</sup>

Other complaints regarding the outposts focused on their appearance as well. In August 1911, Brigadier General Marion Maus, the commanding general of the Department of the Columbia, inspected Fort Yellowstone and its outlying stations and cabins. The outlying posts were “neither creditable nor satisfactory,” he wrote. Arguing for the construction of permanent structures, he recommended relocating and possibly reducing the number of the fifteen stations.<sup>121</sup> Thumb and Fountain should be relief—not permanent—stations, he believed, and Riverside should be relocated to the West Entrance of the park. In regard to the appearance of the stations, he argued that they should fit in with their surroundings and “have a uniform, artistic, and dignified appearance.”<sup>122</sup>

Shortly thereafter, in October 1911, the inspector general reported that “each of the Outlying Stations of the Loop” should have “buildings and shelter, of an appropriate design in keeping with other buildings of the park . . . in place of the improvised and unsightly shacks now used for the purpose.” Each of those stations should be “so enlarged that . . . there should be a kitchen and dining room, properly screened against flies,” and at least 16 men should be comfortably accommodated with the necessary buildings: “a bathroom, horse equipment storeroom, a shelter that will accommodate at least 25 animals, a shed that will accommodate at least

8 months’ supply of firewood, proper toilet facilities, and proper storage for an 8 months’ supply of beef and an 8 months’ supply of rations.”<sup>123</sup> Brett agreed with the inspector general’s recommendations: “I earnestly advocate all that is suggested by the Inspector General on these subjects,” he wrote the adjutant general. “The fifteen outlying soldier stations must be recognized as a part of the barracks and quarters of this command.”<sup>124</sup>

Commanding General Marion P. Maus agreed. In October 1912, he wrote again to the adjutant general about the state of affairs at Fort Yellowstone. His comments addressed the very question the military needed to ask itself: what was its future in the park? “If the sub stations are to be permanent in this park,” he remarked, “it is strongly recommended that a portion of ground for each station be set aside and allotted specially for the use of the military, in order that there may be a permanency as to these locations.” “If it is the policy of the War Department to maintain troops in the Yellowstone National Park,” he chided, “an adequate allotment should be made for a riding hall, stable for pack train, machine gun platoon and barracks for teamsters and packers; also suitable ground at sub-stations should be declared part of the military reservation and allotment made for constructing suitable and creditable habitations for men and animals.”<sup>125</sup> Just how permanent the military presence would be remained at issue, however. Permanence required an allotment and, furthermore, a commitment.

The army’s commitment to the post was also questioned by Colonel J. L. Chamberlain, serving as inspector general in 1913. He complained that soldiers on duty at the soldier stations were not warm enough in the winter,

and recommended that quilts be used instead of army blankets, which the inspector had found to be inadequate in very cold weather, no matter how many were used. Furthermore, men working under such conditions “at points beyond touch with the post should be provided with a double outfit of special clothing except the coat: that is, with two mackintoshes instead of one and two pairs of socks.”<sup>126</sup> It is hard to believe that for 17 years soldiers working at these posts were not given more than one pair of socks.

The fish hatchery was also improved during this period, as the park was still considered the world’s most important source for black-spotted (today’s Yellowstone cutthroat) trout eggs. In 1913, the Department of Commerce constructed a 34’ × 60’ fish hatchery near the Yellowstone Lake outlet. The shingle-covered, hewn-log building was furnished with modern equipment capable of eyeing 30,000,000 eggs, and a loft for use as quarters and, once other proposed buildings were constructed, as storage. About 400’ upstream, a small dam was constructed across a creek, with a 12” wooden stave pipe installed to draw water. In late summer, a 14’ × 30’ quarters and mess building with a 10’ × 12’ ell in the back was constructed at Clear Creek, a tributary on the east shore of Yellowstone Lake. This building, constructed from local timber and finished with drop siding, was used by the employees “taking fish spawn from Clear and Cub creeks.”<sup>127</sup> Permission was also granted to construct buildings similar to the ones at Clear Creek at a site farther south, near Columbine Creek on the lake’s east bank. The secretary of the interior’s office reminded the secretary of commerce that the buildings must “be of a permanent and sightly character.”<sup>128</sup>

In the early spring of 1913, the U.S. Geological Survey began to collect data about the streams in the park. By September, four gauging stations had been erected—one each on the Madison River near West Yellowstone, Montana; the Gibbon River at Wylie Lunch Station; the Yellowstone River above the Upper Falls; and the South Fork of the Snake River at the south boundary. At all except the Snake River station, a vertical staff gauge was installed; the Snake River station had an overhanging chain gauge. All except the Gibbon River station were located near soldier stations, so that soldiers could make daily recordings. The Gibbon River station, which was located just below the bridge at the Terrace Road crossing, was read by a Wylie company employee; the gauge was relocated at the time of the bridge’s construction in late August 1913. Occasionally, hydrographers were

housed at the soldier stations without cost.<sup>129</sup>

In 1914, the Bureau of Fisheries completed a one-and-one-half-story log residence on Columbine Creek, along with a bungalow and a frame barn to house four horses and sufficient storage for grain and hay near their hatchery in the Lake Hotel area. As officials recognized that the hatchery was becoming an attraction for many travelers, the bureau improved its lawn and tidied up fallen timber and debris. The bureau also devoted considerable time to explaining the plant’s operation to interested tourists. “[T]he workings of the plant have become a matter of interest to so many tourists as to require at times the services of one of the attendants constantly in showing them around,” wrote Brett in his annual report.<sup>130</sup>

Other miscellaneous administrative facilities constructed during this period included an addition to the Lamar Valley Buffalo Ranch, and several checking stations. The buffalo ranch received a new building in 1915, when park employees constructed a log home, with addition, near the mouth of Rose Creek for the buffalo keeper. This one-story house had a dining room, living room, and three bedrooms, with a brick chimney in its center. A one-story addition with another brick chimney was built along the front. The building’s interior was finished with beaver board, and its roof was shingled.<sup>131</sup> Because the park was opened to automobiles on August 1, 1915, the crew of the engineer officer (of the Army Corps of Engineers) constructed three checking stations for automobiles: one at Madison Junction, one at Dunraven Pass, and one at the West Entrance. Until more checking stations could be constructed, the Army Corps of Engineers’ road crew buildings at Beaver Lake and at DeLacy Creek were used for this purpose. Brett used allotments from park revenues to fund the project. At the West Entrance, workers built a 14’ × 14’ log building with “tarred paper and graveled roof” at a cost of approximately \$200. At “the north end of Dunraven Pass about 11 miles from Canyon Junction,” they constructed a similar building, but only costing \$100. Finally, they erected a 14’ × 28’ log building at Madison Junction about fourteen miles from the west boundary at a cost of approximately \$250.<sup>132</sup> The checking stations are no longer standing.

In addition to constructing administrative facilities, park officials considered it their responsibility to improve the park’s trail system as well. For example, during the summer of 1907, soldiers built an outhouse and horse railings on Mount Washburn and replaced



the old wooden signs scattered around the park with approximately 600 new enameled steel signs affixed to iron stakes set in cement. Other improvements for visitor safety and enjoyment included “Platforms for accommodation of tourists getting out of coaches . . . built at Norris, Mud Geyser, Upper Yellowstone Falls, Inspiration Point, and at the Great Falls and Keplers [*sic*] Cascade; Stairways were built in connection with the two latter,” wrote Young in 1907. Many toilets were also built throughout the park. Young noted that all improvements were stained “to harmonize with the surroundings.”<sup>133</sup>

The idea of harmonizing buildings with their surroundings in Yellowstone was first associated with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the 1880s. It became an institutionalized practice in national parks around the turn of the twentieth century, when landscape architects—professionals who made it their business and mission to create or preserve park-like landscapes, and had previously been involved primarily with private estates—became more interested in working in the public arena. As the nation devoted more of its time and resources to its public parks, landscape designers were called upon more frequently to address conflicts between built and natural environments in the public sphere. In fact, landscape architects like Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., were instrumental in the development of the NPS, and after the agency was created, played an essential role in shaping the national park idea—namely, the preservation of national parks for the benefit and enjoyment of the public.

Landscape architect Mark Daniels, appointed general superintendent and landscape engineer for all national parks in 1914, was the first of his profession to be officially associated with the national parks.<sup>134</sup> His career with the still-evolving NPS was not lengthy, but it did have a lasting impact. Central to his vision was the belief that any national park development should be planned in a comprehensive manner, and that such plans should be drawn so that they would “suit . . . not only topographic features, but all the various physical conditions.” Scenery, after all, was a crucial part of national parks, he argued, and it had to be preserved: “the scenery or natural phenomena are of such a character to be largely educational,” he claimed, and it was the educational nature of this scenery that made national parks important. Scenery, Daniels believed, would lead the “mental horizon” of visitors to be “broadened materially.”<sup>135</sup> Daniels advocated orderly development of the

parks, and drafted preliminary plans for such development; he also designed the first uniforms for the new civilian park rangers.<sup>136</sup>

Daniels influenced the design of administrative facilities in national parks as well. Even if his ideas were not put into practice during his tenure with the Department of the Interior, they remained on record to influence later NPS plans. First, Daniels believed that development in the parks should take the form of planned “villages.” As the number of visitors grew in the national parks, Daniels claimed, a “community ceases to be a camp; it becomes a village. . . . It has municipal problems . . . [and] will demand some sort of a civic plan in order to properly take care of the people who visit.”<sup>137</sup> Second, he argued, buildings in the parks should have a common architectural theme. According to Linda McClelland, “Daniels’s efforts . . . established the concept of an architectural scheme whereby a type of architecture is determined [in Daniels’s own words] ‘in light of a careful study of the best arrangement of the buildings and for picturesqueness.’”<sup>138</sup> Daniels did not design any villages for Yellowstone, but his experience in Yosemite and his plans for Glacier, Mount Rainier, and Crater Lake national parks were important contributions to national park landscape architecture.

The 1916 annual meeting of the American Society of Landscape Architects was of signal importance for the national parks. Much of what was said underscored the dual—and potentially contradictory—mandate to protect the parks and to open them up for the enjoyment of the public. The resolutions passed at the conference foreshadowed how important landscape architects would be to the process of developing—also called “improving”—the parks while protecting their scenic values. “The need has long been felt not only for more adequate protection of the surpassing beauty of those primeval landscapes,” one resolution stated, “but also for rendering this landscape beauty more readily enjoyable through construction in these parks of certain necessary roads and buildings for the accommodation of visitors in a way to bring the minimum of injury to these primeval landscapes.” The conference resolutions clearly advocated the use of landscape architects in this process. James Sturgis Pray, who cautioned against the “over-exploitation” of the parks, reminded conference attendees to heed the words of Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., (son of landscape architect Frederick Law Olmsted, who had created Central Park and authored a plan for Yosemite Park in 1865), who was instrumental in

drafting the National Park Service Organic Act:

The National Parks are set apart primarily in order to preserve to the people for all time the opportunity of a peculiar kind of enjoyment and recreation, not measurable in economic terms and to be obtained only from the remarkable scenery which they contain,—scenery of those primeval types which are in most parts of the world rapidly vanishing for all eternity before the increased thoroughness of the economic use of the land. In the National Parks direct economic returns, if any, are properly the by-products; and even rapidity and efficiency in making them accessible to the people, although of great importance, are wholly secondary to the one dominant purpose of preserving essential esthetic qualities of their scenery unimpaired as a heritage to the infinite numbers of the generations to come.<sup>139</sup>

In the years after 1916, landscape architects would become integral to the design and planning of the built environment in national parks, particularly in regard to structures, campgrounds, roads, and roadside kiosks.

## Policies to Protect the Park's Treasures

The policy issues of concern between 1907 and 1916 recalled those of the two previous decades: protecting wildlife (especially game species and those in danger of extinction); managing people around wildlife; responding to fire; planning campground management; and informing visitors about, while at the same time protecting, the park's natural wonders. Unfortunately, the challenges involved with using soldiers to manage and police a national park proved to be an impediment to progress in these areas. In the last decade of military management of Yellowstone, this problem reached its apex.

What had been clear to Major Moses Harris at the beginning of the military era was even clearer to leaders during the army's last decade of park management: namely, that accomplishing the dual tasks of military training and park policing put too much strain on the troops. Inspectors general often noted examples of this problem in their lists of "irregularities and deficiencies." Some comments were relatively easy to respond to and rectify. "In practical test in field at Gardiner, Montana,

March 29<sup>th</sup> [1911]," noted one inspector, "the bread baked in field bakery was not of best quality, showing that bakers need practice in this work."<sup>140</sup> "Many men had dirty breeches," and "Four men[s] collar ornaments were not properly worn," observed another. While such comments might seem insignificant, they revealed concerns that soldiers at the post were not being trained effectively. Some inspectors identified more serious issues. "The deployment into line of skirmishes was poor," commented one inspector. "The failure to [use the clock figures to indicate the position of the enemy] resulted in many men aiming at wrong target." "When the command 'charge' was given, the men broke badly," was another criticism.<sup>141</sup> Inspector J. L. Chamberlain wrote, "In the exercise for fire control and fire discipline the command did not demonstrate careful training and efficiency or a full appreciation of the true meaning of the terms."<sup>142</sup>

Was excelling in military training while protecting the park too much to ask of the men? Was one actually detrimental to the other? Many commentators felt that the two tasks did not complement one another and, in fact, interfered with each other. "The command is regarded as efficient," cautioned one inspector, "but its training is not what it would be if nearly all of its drill season were not necessarily used in patrol work as park policemen."<sup>143</sup> "The garrison has been employed extensively in road work in the park," complained Inspector Chamberlain. "Beside being detrimental to military instruction and training, such employment I believe to be improper and unwarranted."<sup>144</sup>

Another problem was the issue of morale: service at Fort Yellowstone was not for everyone. "There have been a large number of desertions in this park," wrote Commanding General Maus, "and the duty here does not appear to be as popular as it should be." "If men were properly selected, and their accommodations improved, I do not believe there would be desertions," he added.<sup>145</sup> Inspector Chamberlain also noted the reluctance of "a considerable [number] of men" to be posted at the fort. Many were there against their wishes, he reported.<sup>146</sup> Only "a selected class of men," the inspectors noted, who had expressed interest in the park, were able to withstand the hardships posed by the post. Furthermore, Maus noted, the troops stationed in the park really should be "show troops." "Many thousands of prominent citizens, not only of our country, but of foreign countries, annually visit the park, and are escorted on their way by details of men, who also are seen patrolling



Y.N.P. PHOTO ARCHIVES, YELL #12731

*Haying operation near Gardiner. 1912.*



Y.N.P. PHOTO ARCHIVES, YELL #17

*Bison corral at Mammoth. 1903.*

in all directs and at the hotels, and are therefore under prominent observation.” The post needed a better class of men than those who often found themselves serving at the stations—the “recruits who have not had time to be trained or disciplined.”<sup>147</sup> The only way to solve this problem was to separate the duties and create a corps of civilian rangers to handle issues related to park management. Thus, between 1907 and 1916, a few civilians were added to the ranks—but the process, as noted above, was frustratingly slow.

With respect to wildlife issues, the military followed

the precedent of encouraging the perpetuation of some species while discouraging, and often killing, others. Favored species included bison, deer, elk, and pronghorn (called “antelope” by most observers of the day), and the policy of feeding these ungulate populations continued. Wolves, coyotes, mountain lions, and most other predators were deemed unworthy of such protection. During the spring of 1910, a meadow at the North Entrance was plowed, under plans of returning it to an alfalfa field. Because it would have taken about two years of plowing and cultivating to prepare the field, however, the ground was seeded with spring wheat. The field produced 80 tons of wheat hay for use in winter 1911. By that year, the meadow was overrun with foxtail and weeds. A 40-acre meadow near the Lamar Valley Buffalo Ranch was plowed in 1909, and seeded with timothy, which also provided about 80 tons of hay.<sup>148</sup> In 1910, an irrigation system was constructed in the 40-acre meadow and in an adjoining field of several hundred acres.<sup>149</sup> More and more park lands were converted into hay fields as acting superintendents attempted to keep up with increases in the herd of “tame” buffalo and the elk herds that ate the hay intended to sustain the pronghorn population during hard winters. Clearing, grubbing (digging up of roots), breaking, and seeding of meadow land “should be done each succeeding year for four years, in order to secure sufficient winter supply of hay for a constantly increasing herd,” wrote Superintendent Young in 1908.<sup>150</sup>

During 1915, the field near the North Entrance arch was disked (worked with a disk harrow), reseeded, and dragged. Two hay cuttings were obtained from the field, producing about 120 tons; almost 220 tons of hay were cut from the fields near the buffalo ranch. With the increase of the bison herd to 276 animals, it was necessary to add more irrigated, seeded meadows to those existing near the ranch. That land was targeted for seeding and irrigation later in 1915 or in the spring of 1916.<sup>151</sup>

Fencing was used to protect the buffalo ranch area in Lamar Valley, to keep cattle and dogs out of the park, and to keep antelope from leaving the park in winter. An old wire fence that extended westward along the north boundary from the junction of the Yellowstone and Gardner rivers was responsible for preserving the antelope herd, Young believed.<sup>152</sup> In 1914, approximately four miles of fence was replaced at the buffalo ranch and from the North Entrance arch eastward to the Gardner River. In the latter case, 2,000 feet of a five-foot steel picket fence were built under contract.<sup>153</sup>

At the buffalo ranch, the herd continued to thrive

and increase, numbering 276 animals by 1916.<sup>154</sup> Starting in 1908, around 15 older bulls were transported each spring from the Lamar herd to a corral at Mammoth, where they were put on display for tourists as a “show herd.”<sup>155</sup> “This was done for two reasons,” wrote Major Benson: “First, to remove the bulls from the herd in which the calves were present, as the bulls were continually fighting and endangering the lives of the calves; second, in order that the visiting tourists might be able to view them.” “Probably 10,000 tourists drove to the buffalo corral this summer [1909] in order to see these buffalo, it being the main feature of the stop at Mammoth Springs,” he added.<sup>156</sup>

Mountain lions, coyotes, and later, wolves, considered harmful to calves of elk, deer, buffalo, and antelope, were vigorously hunted and killed. In 1907, Young wrote that the “mountain lions have been almost exterminated,” allowing him to sell the pack of dogs used for hunting them in 1908.<sup>157</sup> Several packs of wolves were seen on the elk ranges in 1915, and as they were considered dangerous to elk calves, Brett wrote that “[a]rrangements [were] being made to systematically hunt” them.<sup>158</sup> As many as 270 coyotes were killed one year, and in 1916, U.S. Biological Survey employees killed 180 coyotes, 12 wolves, and 4 lions.<sup>159</sup>



YNP PHOTO ARCHIVES: YELL #9105

*Bear feeding at Lake Hotel. 1910.*

Park officials had more complex sensibilities about bears. Since the 1880s, visitors had been enjoying the spectacle provided by bears feeding at various garbage dumps around the park. But as bears became more accustomed to people, and thus less afraid of them, they also became more destructive of property, and even dangerous. “They frequently become so tame,” wrote Benson in his annual report for 1910, “that they do not hesitate to destroy tents or go through windows into houses to secure food, and sometimes refuse to be driven away.”<sup>160</sup> But because the creatures were not considered harmful to the park’s beloved game animals, most acting superintendents of the time did not consider killing a bear unless it had a serious conflict with humans. In 1910, for example, after a bear bit and scratched a member of a road-sprinkling crew near Excelsior Geyser, and after “many requests” to “kill some of these vicious bear” were received from visiting parties who suffered bear-related property damage, officials considered doing away with overly “friendly” bears. But, as Benson wrote in his annual report, “this was not resorted to.”<sup>161</sup> In 1911, although two grizzlies and three black bears were killed because they were considered “dangerous to life and property,” park officials also completed investigations of one or two cases wherein men who became “too bold” with bears were attacked and severely injured. Because park officials determined that the bears in question had been defending their cubs, the bears were not blamed.<sup>162</sup>

By 1913, however, the number of bears feeding at dump sites was alarmingly high. For example, “[t]hirty-two grizzlies,” wrote Brett, “were noted at one time on the garbage dumps at the canyon on August 20” of that year. As the number of bear–human conflicts rose, so too did the number of “necessary” bear killings; thus, officials killed five bears deemed “dangerous to life and a menace to property” in 1913, and “six black bears and two grizzlies” in 1916.<sup>163</sup> The less-than-hygienic conditions at the dump sites were a source of concern for Mark Daniels, general superintendent and landscape engineer of the national parks. After visiting Yellowstone in 1914, Daniels suggested to the secretary of the interior that perhaps “some method of bringing the bears to the bear dumps could be devised which would accomplish the ends desired without making the dump a most unsanitary and filthy looking hole.”<sup>164</sup> Many years later, Daniels’s recommendation was incorporated into the elaborate infrastructure associated with the bear feeding ground at Otter Creek (see Chapter 6).

Another important wildlife development during

this period was the purposeful introduction of non-native species by park officials. More than 310 million native and non-native fish were introduced to the park's waters from 1881 to 1955, largely to please visitors who wished to fish in areas that were historically fishless.<sup>165</sup> In 1916, for instance, "seventeen thousand eastern brook trout were planted" in the park.<sup>166</sup> Park officials also toyed with the idea of introducing non-native mammals to the park. In 1907, for example, just before he left his command at Yellowstone, Major Pitcher received a letter from Interior Secretary James Garfield approving his plan to procure "white goats" from British Columbia or elsewhere, and to "domesticate" them in the park.<sup>167</sup> Superintendent Young, who pursued Pitcher's "white goat" idea fervently, if unsuccessfully, also had high hopes of introducing this non-native species, and managing the animals in the same fashion as the bison were managed, such that, as Young put it, "the park herds will in due time restore some of the progeny to the former near-by haunts of their kind." Young also sought to "improve" the park's wildlife spectacle. "Only such species of animals and birds as were found in the park when originally laid out and set aside exist here to-day," he mused, incorrectly, in 1907. "With intelligent management and comparatively little expense," he continued, "a greater variety of birds and animals could be successfully added and propagated within the park, and under the protection of a specially trained body of scouts such animals as buffalo, that have been exterminated, and mountain sheep and antelope, that are rapidly being exterminated in the United States outside the park, will undoubtedly increase in the park."<sup>168</sup> Pitcher's and Young's idea of introducing goats into the park survived as late as 1915, as park historians Lee Whittlesey and Paul Schullery have observed.<sup>169</sup> "The general mood of these and other recommendations was that more was better—that nature could be enriched, indeed improved upon, by the judicious actions of humans," they noted.<sup>170</sup>

Along with new wildlife policies came new policies regarding fire control and management. In the 1910s, in addition to the park's basic policy of regulating campers' fires and patrolling camping areas daily—sometimes twice daily during dry and busy summers—two new developments arose: the establishment of a series of trails and roads for fire management, and a cooperative agreement between the departments of Interior, Agriculture, and War, drawn up on August 14, 1912, "for the prevention and suppression of forest fires along the park boundary."<sup>171</sup>

Prior to these innovations, park officials could do little more than hope for both a wet year and responsible campers who followed the park rule to extinguish all campfires. These were years when superintendents felt "indebted" to frequent rains, and at the mercy of dry weather and "frequent violent electric storms."<sup>172</sup> In 1907—a wet year, as luck would have it—Young asked for \$30,000 to pay for removal of slash and dead timber within 150 feet of the park's roads. He also circulated the following policy edict:

Hereafter within the boundaries of this park, whenever a tree—dead or alive—is felled for telegraph or telephone construction, railway, roadway, or any right of way, for fuel, for building, bridging, or for any purpose whatever, the brush and tops must be lopped and piled in a cleared space, and—if conditions are favorable for burning without danger of the fire spreading—will be burned.<sup>173</sup>

During the dry year of 1910, Acting Superintendent Benson sent troops out twice daily to patrol roads and campsites for any sign of fire.<sup>174</sup> While Chief Clerk Ucker was inspecting the park that summer, several major fires occurred, leading him to recommend that a comprehensive system of trails and roads leading off the main road be developed, and that more money be dedicated for the system's development.<sup>175</sup> That fall, 25 miles "of new trails or fire lanes" were built in the park's southeast corner, and during the summer of 1911, "similar passageways were built from Snake River Station, on the south line, west to near the southwest corner, thence north along the west boundary line and northeast via Summit Lake to Upper Basin." As Colonel Brett noted, the purpose of these trails was to facilitate easier movement of scouts and patrols in the course of protecting game and preventing wildfires. When Brett's patrols found campfires burning, they either extinguished them themselves or, if they could locate the guilty parties, marched them back to put them out.<sup>176</sup>

While the summer season of 1912 was relatively wet, Brett realized that all years would not be so good. He therefore asked for funds for "[f]orty-eight miles of additional firelanes" for fiscal year 1913 (no new fire lanes or trails were constructed in 1912 "[o]wing to lack of funds"). He also gave credit, in his annual report, to the newly created agreement between the departments of Interior, Agriculture, and War that intended to

create “an efficient system of fire patrols in connection with the rangers in charge of the forests adjoining the park.”<sup>177</sup> In 1913, the army built 58 miles of new trails or fire lanes “along the western boundary line and from Gallatin Soldier Station to headquarters via Sportsman Lake.” Such trails made patrols of the newly organized districts assigned to various soldier stations much easier. Soldiers made caches of fire-fighting tools at each station and coordinated their efforts with U.S. Forest Service employees.<sup>178</sup> In 1914, a new fire lane was constructed through timber from the Snake River station east toward the southeast corner of the park. Several other extensive fire lane projects were undertaken that year, which, as it turned out, was a very dry one.<sup>179</sup> Acting Superintendent Brett reported that both road crews and crews assigned to construction of fire lanes were called upon to help fight the numerous serious fires burning in the park. Two of those fires qualified as boundary fires, allowing the new multi-departmental agreement to be activated.<sup>180</sup> The summer of 1915 was unusually wet, allowing fire lane crews to complete the fire lane projects started the year before and repair nearly all the established fire lanes in the park.<sup>181</sup> By the end of 1915, more than 150 miles of fire trails had been built.<sup>182</sup>

As might be expected, many of the fires with which park officials had to deal were ignited by careless campers or, in dry years, by campfires that had been extinguished correctly but continued to smolder underground.<sup>183</sup> Campers, careless or not, were having a big impact on the park. In addition to building campfires, they created garbage, required toilet facilities (called “earth closets” in those days), demanded improvements for their comfort, and necessitated government intervention to protect park land from overuse. Throughout the last decade of military presence in the park, several camps (not yet called campgrounds)—first for travelers by horse and later for those traveling by automobile—were erected, and policies designed to improve sanitation and minimize campers’ impact on the land were developed.

Earlier in Yellowstone’s military management period, concessioners had operated the only permanent camps. Travelers, however, were allowed to set up camp wherever they desired, as long as they abided by the rules and regulations established by the military and Department of the Interior in 1897, during Captain Erwin’s administration. Camp had to be made at least 100 feet from a traveled road, and campsites had to be “thoroughly cleaned before they [were] abandoned.” Pits were provided for all trash; anyone making camp

in an out-of-the-way place without pits, had to hide all refuse “where it [would] not be offensive to the eye.”<sup>184</sup> New camps housing park road crews, called road camps, were established in 1907 at Canyon, Trout Creek, Beaver Lake, Beryl Spring, the Upper Geyser Basin, West Thumb, Excelsior Geyser, and near the Lake Hotel. Tent floors, side walls, and frames to support canvas covers were installed, as well as mangers and feed boxes.<sup>185</sup>

When General Young took over the superintendency from Major Pitcher, he continued Pitcher’s program of campsite cleanups and enforced the rules regarding “camps” that previous acting superintendents had devised. Furthermore, Young noticed the effects of campsites on the sanitary condition of the park. To prevent contamination of the Fort Yellowstone and Mammoth Hotel water supply, he closed Swan Lake Flat, which drained into Glen Creek, to camping and grazing.<sup>186</sup>

Clement Ucker’s visit to the park in the summer of 1910 convinced Young that sanitation remained an unsolved problem. He recognized the need to hire someone to assess the park’s garbage disposal and sewage needs.<sup>187</sup> While this recommendation was not acted upon until 1913, a more thorough inspection of camps was ordered later that summer, and suggestions were made that fall for improving their upkeep. Acting Superintendent Benson asked Major Wallace DeWitt, a surgeon with the Medical Corps, to inspect the “temporary camps”—those not operated by concessioners—and report back with recommendations. DeWitt found that sites at the following locations seemed to have been in use year after year: at Mammoth Hot Springs, near the power plant; near Apollinaris Spring; on the freight road from Fountain Station to Excelsior Geyser; at Lake, one-half mile south of the soldier station in the meadow across the road; at Snake River station; and on Tower Creek above Tower Fall. The upkeep of these camps was poor, he reported. Consequently, he insisted that campers traveling the main road use only designated camping places. He furthermore suggested that the government provide signs marking specific areas of a camp—latrines, dumps, stock-watering spots, lavatories, and drinking water. Finally, he recommended that park officials post rules and regulations governing camping at each camp and hand them to each camping party at park entrances.<sup>188</sup>

Subsequent acting superintendents also contrived solutions to the sanitation problem.<sup>189</sup> In 1912, for example, Colonel Brett came up with two ways to improve sanitation concerns in the park. First, he had medical



YNP PHOTO ARCHIVES, YELL #31927

*Visitors posed in front of tents at Wylie camp. 1912.*

officers stationed at Fort Yellowstone serve as sanitary inspectors for the entire park, including soldier stations and all concession facilities.<sup>190</sup> Second, he devised a system whereby a regularly scheduled cleaning team of two men attended to garbage disposal and upkeep of the earth closets. This represented the beginning of restroom maintenance in Yellowstone. The two men, with their single team and wagon, operated along the tourist route during August and September. Brett was so pleased with their work that he planned for the system to be used “hereafter” during three months of the year—July, August, and September.<sup>191</sup> The system was implemented during summer months for the remaining years of military control of the park.

In 1913, the Wylie Permanent Camping Company established a new camp near the East Entrance, and a second concessioner, the Shaw & Powell Camping Company, which had operated in the park since 1898, was authorized to establish camps in the park, as well. The latter company started that year to build the necessary structures—“kitchen, dining room, storehouse, laundry, wagon sheds, stables, blacksmith shop, granary, bathhouse, etc.”—at “Willow Creek, near Gibbon Falls, on Nez Perce Creek near Fountain Station, Upper Geyser Basin, West Thumb of Lake, Grand Canyon, and near Tower Fall.”<sup>192</sup>

Sanitation in the park continued to concern Colonel Brett that year. “The question of sanitation and stream pollution,” he wrote to the secretary of the

interior, “is a very important one, which must be met by some general plan in the near future, as park travel increases.”<sup>193</sup> Worried as he was about increased pressure from campers on the park’s sanitation systems, Brett could only watch as tourist numbers ballooned. Between 1904 and 1915, the total number of park visitors grew from fewer than 14,000 to more than 50,000 annually.<sup>194</sup> Brett realized that existing conditions were not sustainable. His need for help was confirmed when Interior Secretary Lane sent out the department’s chemist, R. B. Dole, who after making “a very thorough sanitary inspection,” assented that conditions were awful.<sup>195</sup>

In 1914, the Shaw & Powell Camping Company increased the number of sleeping tents and other facilities connected with their camps to meet the needs of more and more tourists.<sup>196</sup> Brett also noted in his annual report that the Department of the Interior was taking measures “to prevent the pollution of the drinking water used by visitors to the park.” “[I]t is important,” he emphasized, “that [measures] be put in[to] operation before the fine health record of the park is broken.” That summer, General Superintendent Daniels made what Brett called “his first annual inspection.”<sup>197</sup>

As mentioned earlier, the summer of 1915 marked the entrance of automobiles and other gasoline-powered vehicles into the park. To meet the needs of these new visitors, Brett called for the establishment of three “special sanitary camps” to be built at Mammoth Hot Springs, Upper Geyser Basin, and the Canyon area.

These “camps,” proposed to be established specifically for those traveling in private automobiles with their own camping equipment, were to be provided with “a few conveniences” and located near the points of interest, but at some distance from existing, concessioner-run permanent camps and hotels. At a time of tight budgets, Brett could easily rationalize such an expense: “[A]s the automobile tickets of passage, for which a charge is made by the department, are a source of considerable revenue, it seems that an expense for this purpose is warranted,” he wrote in his annual report.<sup>198</sup>

In January 1916, Brett sent Interior Secretary Lane a map marked with four proposed sites for the new automobile camps: the three previously suggested locations and one at the Yellowstone Lake outlet. The secretary’s office requested an estimate for a fifth site at Tower Fall, which Brett did not recommend, and asked Brett to contact the mayors of Medford and Ashland, Oregon, regarding their automobile camps, which were thought to be exemplary. In April of that year, Brett was notified that \$1,500 had been approved for constructing camps at his four original locations. The assistant secretary requested that the campgrounds be completed by the beginning of the 1916 season.<sup>199</sup> Each camp served twelve automobiles and their passengers, and consisted of a large pole and frame shed (60’ × 32’, 8’ high at the eaves) that served as a car shelter and was roofed with 28-gauge corrugated painted steel roofing and divided into six double stalls. Ladies’ and men’s toilets, dry wood, and cooking

grates were provided at each camp. Running water and electricity were provided only at the Mammoth camp.<sup>200</sup>

## Conclusion

The last decade of military involvement in Yellowstone was marked by major developments in park infrastructure and protection policies. Also, as the job of protecting the park from poaching was replaced with the task of “guiding and policing tourists,” military leaders sought to escape the yoke of park management. Concurrently, conservationists and the Interior Department lobbied for the return of Yellowstone and all national parks to civilian management. These movements culminated in the creation of the NPS on August 25, 1916. The mandate and philosophy of the new bureau were drafted by Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., as part of the National Park Service Act. “[The NPS’s] fundamental purpose,” wrote Olmsted, “is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”<sup>201</sup> The task for the next generation of Yellowstone administrators, now statutorily enacted, would be to guide the development and improvement of park facilities in a way that helped visitors enjoy the park’s natural beauty and scenic features while at the same time preserving this beauty and these scenic features from exploitation.